“Reconceptualizing the Cyprus Problem:

Looking beyond deadlock into a cooperative future”

“Reconceptualizing the Cyprus Problem:

Looking beyond deadlock into a cooperative future”

Ted GrantTed Grant

Cyprus: 1974 - 2007Cyprus: 1974 - 2007

Turkey invaded the island in 1974 Resulted in North-South divide between

Turkish and Greek populations Development of two states in the 1980s:

Republic of Cyprus (Greek) - South Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

(TRNC) (Turkish) - North

Turkey invaded the island in 1974 Resulted in North-South divide between

Turkish and Greek populations Development of two states in the 1980s:

Republic of Cyprus (Greek) - South Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

(TRNC) (Turkish) - North

Cyprus: 1974 - 2007Cyprus: 1974 - 2007

Through the 1990s, each state viewed the other as a long-term threat to its national security

In 1997 the EU opened accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus

On April 16, 2003, the Republic signed the EU Treaty of Accession

Through the 1990s, each state viewed the other as a long-term threat to its national security

In 1997 the EU opened accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus

On April 16, 2003, the Republic signed the EU Treaty of Accession

Cyprus: 1974 - 2007Cyprus: 1974 - 2007

Between 2002 and April, 2004, Kofi Annan repeatedly tried and failed to negotiate a compromise settlement between the two states

One last effort was made in April, 2004 The Annan plan was submitted to the Cypriot

populations via referendum Favored by majority of Turkish Cypriots in the

North, but rejected by Greek Cypriots in the South

Between 2002 and April, 2004, Kofi Annan repeatedly tried and failed to negotiate a compromise settlement between the two states

One last effort was made in April, 2004 The Annan plan was submitted to the Cypriot

populations via referendum Favored by majority of Turkish Cypriots in the

North, but rejected by Greek Cypriots in the South

Cyprus: 1974 - 2007 (cont.)

Cyprus: 1974 - 2007 (cont.)

Result: Republic of Cyprus entered the EU without the consent of the TRNC

Cyprus remains divided today

Result: Republic of Cyprus entered the EU without the consent of the TRNC

Cyprus remains divided today

Yesilada and Sozen (2002)Yesilada and Sozen (2002)

Argue that T>P>R>S payoff ordering defines the preferences of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots

Predicted outcome: Deadlock Obviously, will hold over repeated games

Argue that T>P>R>S payoff ordering defines the preferences of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots

Predicted outcome: Deadlock Obviously, will hold over repeated games

Yesilada and Sozen (2002) Outdated

Yesilada and Sozen (2002) Outdated

Three developments make this game theoretical analysis no longer correct: The EU’s announcement that it would

commence accession negotiations with Turkey in 2004 (late 2002)

The EU’s announcement that resolution of the Cyprus problem is a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession (2003)

Accession of Greek Cyprus to EU (2004)

Three developments make this game theoretical analysis no longer correct: The EU’s announcement that it would

commence accession negotiations with Turkey in 2004 (late 2002)

The EU’s announcement that resolution of the Cyprus problem is a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession (2003)

Accession of Greek Cyprus to EU (2004)

New ModelNew Model

I propose to model the current situation with a new 2 x 2 social dilemma game: Same set of strategies: C or D New ordering of payoffs:

Republic of Cyprus - T>R>P=S TRNC - R>T>S>P

I propose to model the current situation with a new 2 x 2 social dilemma game: Same set of strategies: C or D New ordering of payoffs:

Republic of Cyprus - T>R>P=S TRNC - R>T>S>P

New VariablesNew Variables

V/2 is the value to both sides of cooperating split equally between them

T is the intangible cost to the Greek side of Turkey’s accession to the EU

t is the intangible benefit to the Turkish side of Turkey’s accession to the EU

P is the political and emotional benefit gained by playing D against a cooperative enemy

V/2 is the value to both sides of cooperating split equally between them

T is the intangible cost to the Greek side of Turkey’s accession to the EU

t is the intangible benefit to the Turkish side of Turkey’s accession to the EU

P is the political and emotional benefit gained by playing D against a cooperative enemy

New ModelNew Model

NEW GAME: BEFORE PRECONDITION IS LIFTED

TURKISH CYPRIOTS

COMPROMISE STAND FIRM

COMPROMISE

V/2 - T, V/2 + t

0, P

GREEK CYPRIOTS

STAND FIRM

P, 0

0, 0

New ModelNew Model

Note: I assume resolution of the Cyprus problem is a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession.

The outcome of this game is DC, which differs from the DD outcome predicted by Yesilada and Sozen (2002).

Note: I assume resolution of the Cyprus problem is a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession.

The outcome of this game is DC, which differs from the DD outcome predicted by Yesilada and Sozen (2002).

Hypothetical CaseHypothetical Case

What if CC were no longer a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession to the EU? My claim: This would create opportunity for

cooperation in the near future, perhaps even before Turkey enters the EU.

What if CC were no longer a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession to the EU? My claim: This would create opportunity for

cooperation in the near future, perhaps even before Turkey enters the EU.

Important (Debatable) Assumptions

Important (Debatable) Assumptions

The EU actually wants Turkey to join its supranational federation

Should the Cyprus condition be lifted, Turkey would eventually be granted EU membership

Should Turkey be granted EU membership, Cypriots, Turks and Europeans would make the assumption that the Cyprus problem will be resolved either before or after accession

The EU actually wants Turkey to join its supranational federation

Should the Cyprus condition be lifted, Turkey would eventually be granted EU membership

Should Turkey be granted EU membership, Cypriots, Turks and Europeans would make the assumption that the Cyprus problem will be resolved either before or after accession

New VariablesNew Variables

L is the additional negotiating leverage held by Turkish Cypriots post-accession because of their parent country’s membership in the EU - is therefore also included as a cost to the Greek side

is defined as a bureaucratic cost to completing the accession process in the second period, once Turkey is part of the EU

Note: In the CC outcome, Turkish Cypriots receive L b/c this is the maximum the Greeks are willing to concede before the accession to avoid a non-CC outcome

L is the additional negotiating leverage held by Turkish Cypriots post-accession because of their parent country’s membership in the EU - is therefore also included as a cost to the Greek side

is defined as a bureaucratic cost to completing the accession process in the second period, once Turkey is part of the EU

Note: In the CC outcome, Turkish Cypriots receive L b/c this is the maximum the Greeks are willing to concede before the accession to avoid a non-CC outcome

Hypothetical ModelHypothetical Model

HYPOTHETICAL GAME: AFTER PRECONDITION IS LIFTED

TURKISH CYPRIOTS

COMPROMISE STAND FIRM

COMPROMISE

V/2 – T – L, V/2 + t + L

V/2 – T – L - , V/2 + t + L -

GREEK CYPRIOTS

STAND FIRM

V/2 – T – L - , V/2 + t + L -

V/2 – T – L - , V/2 + t + L -

PredictionPrediction

I argue that a CC outcome is marginally preferred given this set of payoffs: Both sides would prefer to compromise

before Turkey’s accession

I argue that a CC outcome is marginally preferred given this set of payoffs: Both sides would prefer to compromise

before Turkey’s accession