red dragon number 250 rising - archive · 2018. 2. 2. · red dragon rising to unconﬁ rmed...

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NUMBER 250

RedDragon Rising

to unconfi rmed reports-AP. China launches strike on Taiwan; Ground forces advancing

Great Zulu War

Th e First Crusade

WWI Naval Arms Race

NUMBER 250

BREAKING NEWS CHINESE FORCES INVADE TAIWAN 14:50 EDT

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21 On the Horns of the Buffalo: Isandlwana & Rorke’s Drift A British army comes up against Zulu tactical skill in one of the empire’s small wars. by Kelly Bell

6 Red Dragon Rising: chinese Military Power in the 21st century Potentials for war and peace in East Asia. by Bruce Costello


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39 THE LOng TRADITIOnR1 Red Dragon Rising: The coming War With china Design by Bruce Costello

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40 The First Arms Race: german-British naval Rivalry & the Opening of the great War

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6 #250

Red Dragon Rising: Chinese Military

By Bruce Costello

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Background The history of Sino-American relations can perhaps be best described as convoluted and cyclical. During World War II the United States maintained signifi cant contact with Mao Tse Tung, the leader of the Chinese Communist faction, and coordinated important operations with him against Japan. The US maintained a much stronger relation-ship with Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-chek. The situation changed quickly after the war. American contact with Mao ceased. Washington gave full support to the Nationalist government. When the Communists won the civil war and consolidated their control of the mainland in 1949, there were no diplomatic relations with the US. The new communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) was openly hostile to the West. In 1950 the Soviets supported North Korea when it launched its armed forces against South Korea. That gambit failed when American and United Nations forces defeated the North Korean army and, counterattacking, advanced north and approached the Yalu River. At that point, the leadership of the Peoples Republic of China gave the UN several warnings and then intervened in force. The Korean War continued until 1953, ending in stalemate. For decades afterward, relations with the US remained cool, with the US not recognizing the Communist regime and instead continuing to back the Nationalists on Taiwan. In the early 1970s both Washington and Beijing executed major diplomatic initiatives to open links between the two countries. Growing Soviet power and the Sino-Soviet split were causing the Chinese to look to the US for support in the Asian version of the balance of power game. US President Richard Nixon agreed to withdraw offi cial diplomatic support from the Nationalists, and the Taiwanese position on the UN Security Council was ceded to the PRC. At the same time, the US continued to indicate any Chi-nese military attempt to take Taiwan would be opposed. Sino-US military and economic relations grew for nearly 20 years, until the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. With the end of the Cold War shortly thereafter, the US downgraded its strategic relationship with the PRC, though still maintaining strong economic ties. Meanwhile the Chinese began what is perhaps the most remarkable economic expansion in world history.

Power in the 21st Century


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In 1996 the Taiwanese independence movement grew more politically powerful. Until that time, both the Communists and the Nationalists considered Tai-wan to still be part of China. Nationalists could still hope to one day “return to the mainland” and reunite the country under their own rule, while the Commu-nists refused to cede any traditional Chinese territory. The PRC countered the independence move by mak-ing threats. They also conducted a series of missile tests intended to influence the Taiwanese away from electing a pro-independence president, Lee Teng-Hui. The US responded by dispatching two aircraft carrier battlegroups to the region. One of the carriers, the USS Nimitz, became the first US ship to transit the Formosa Strait in 20 years. The PRC show of force failed, and Teng-Hui was elected. Relations between the two ma-jor powers then seemed to return to normal. As the 21st century opened, it became apparent a new power rivalry was growing between the US and the PRC. A singular incident occurred—an “accident” that downed a Chinese fighter plane, costing the pilot’s life, and causing near fatal damage to a US electronic warfare aircraft. The US plane spent several days in-terned at a Chinese airbase on Hainan Island while negotiations were conducted. Finally the crew was re-leased while the aircraft itself was disassembled and shipped back to the US on a Russian cargo plane. The two governments then publicly attempted to get on with normal relations while a series of low-lev-el cyber-attacks between the two continued for some time before subsiding. Trade increased in ways par-ticularly favored China and that country continued to experience tremendous economic growth. The terror attack of 11 September 2001 radically changed the world situation. The US launched its war on terrorism, but the poorly executed war in Iraq has brought widespread doubt about US ability to main-tain the military and political status quo. China, mean-while, has considerable interest in maintaining the sealanes to the Middle East to ensure a continuing supply of petroleum for its expanding industries.

Economics A critical dimension among historical causes for war has been international competition for resources, particularly petrochemicals during the past century. The trend has been that more and more of the world’s oil production has become centered in Southwest Asia—one of the most politically unstable parts of the globe. Russian fortunes have also significantly re-vived as the vast oil and gas fields of Siberia have been brought into production. At the same time, however, Europe, the US and China must all rely on oil imports to keep their economies booming. In the Pacific, the US and the PRC appear to be moving toward a confrontation. Many things may hap-pen to avert such a catastrophe. One factor is the in-creasing degree of economic interdependence between the two powers. The Chinese historical experience has led them to believe it is imperative to create a zone of dominance around their borders. Americans largely view national defense as beginning in the Western Pacific, where they have several long-standing allies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) who are also concerned about the growth of Chinese power. China’s geopolitical objectives conflict with the arrangement desired by the US for the Asian littoral. China is today close to achieving total dominance over what their strategists call the “First Island Chain,” that is Taiwan and the Spratley Islands. Taiwan may rejoin China through mutually agreed political adjustments, or it could be the scene of the start of a regional war. The “Second Chain of Islands” has been identified by PRC strategists as the ultimate defense line necessary for their longer-term protection. That line runs from the southern tip of the Aleutians through Guam and to the south. The trouble with that line, of course, comes from the fact several of America’s allies in Asia—Ja-pan, South Korea, Singapore and Australia—lie to the west of it. Whatever the US does or doesn’t do in the region, then, those other nations would resist Chinese encroachment on their sovereignty and independence.

US Strategy In a hypothetical war with China, US strategy would be to maintain and secure dominance over the Western Pacific while at the same time protecting its allies against PRC military attack. Such a war would be primarily an aero-naval struggle for both sides, though with some land forces likely also committed in order to occupy and hold base areas. The US Navy (USN) currently deploys 278 war-ships. The main striking power comes from its 11 carrier strike groups (CSG). Fourteen nuclear ballis-tic missile submarines (SSBN) are deployed in two groups, with one of them scheduled to be converted into cruise missile carriers (SSGN). Three existing SSGN and 53 nuclear powered attack submarines are deployed in 10 squadrons. At present in the Pacific,


USN forces are divided into five CSG, one SSBN group, and four SSN squadrons, leaving five CSG, two SSBN groups and six SSN squadrons in the Atlantic. Those force elements are moved around as needed to reinforce 5th Fleet in the Indian Ocean and 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. Typically there are two or three CSG plus support elements kept constantly deployed at sea. There is generally one nuclear powered aircraft carrier (CVN) undergoing refit from among the 10 on active duty. Besides those units, there are 12 expeditionary strike groups (ESG), carrying Marines and their air-craft. The core of each ESG is its LHD or LHA, light aircraft carriers similar to the British Illustrious-class. That force will shrink to ten groups as the new Wasp-

class ships come on line, but their air complement will be increased to 10 F-35 stealth fighter bombers each, with three ships carrying up to 30 of those powerful new airplanes. Those groups typically operate where there isn’t major naval opposition, in support of War on Terror operations and other objectives, but they could be used to secure sea lines of communication (SLOC) and secondary areas in the event of a major war. A key advantage of the USN is its long history of winning naval wars along with its professionalism and training. In contrast, the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has no such warfighting history, and its professional qualities and operative training levels are unknown.

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Other Powers

Russia is growing increasingly hostile to the US, largely because that nation’s government feels agreements were violated when NATO expanded into its “near abroad,” the formerly Soviet-controlled regions such as the Baltic states and the Ukraine. US military bases in central and south Asia, such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, are also worrisome to Moscow. The Russians have therefore been expanding their conventional and nuclear forces and have begun conducting joint exercises with PRC forces in the Pacific and western Asia. That alliance doesn’t yet appear to have solidified, and the extent of Russian involvement in an actual Sino-American war is questionable. The Russians also understand resource-hungry China shares a long border with them in Si-beria. If the global power balance ever changes such that the US has been effectively neutralized in the Western Pacific, it is easily conceivable Peking’s next geo-strategic project would be to sort out old territorial disputes with Russia.

India, sitting astride sea lanes key to the PRC economy, is another power experiencing rapid economic expansion. With a growing middle class and a large number of high-tech workers and engineers, the last several years have been good for the economy. The Indian military has also benefited, in-cluding ongoing upgrades of the fleet to two carrier battle groups, an addition of modern Russian fighter aircraft, and general implementation of high technology. A big problem still exists, though, in that India can’t es-cape being a state with many different nationalities. The dis-pute with Pakistan over Kashmir also persists despite efforts to arrange some kind of settlement. The economic boom has not been uniformly experienced by all classes and regions, and that underscores serious social problems. India, like many other nations, is also vulnerable in that it has to import petrochemicals to maintain its economic vitality. India has generally held to its traditional post-indepen-dence policy of neutrality, with the interesting twist that it’s engaged in joint military exercises with both Russia and the US in recent years. Its government has also recently attempt-ed to settle old border disputes with China. It is difficult to know whether the Indians would cast their lot with either side in the event of a Pacific war; it seems most likely they would—at least at first—maintain a watchful neutrality. At the same time, though, it’s also note-worthy the bulk of its trade and economic fortunes currently lie in its relationship with the US.

Europe, specifically the European Union, is some distance from the Pacific theater. Though the EU is on the whole ex-periencing good economic times, the fortunes of its various member nations are mixed. There are many political prob-lems and not a few internal tensions, plus setbacks in inte-grating all its member countries into a tighter union. In the event of a sudden or short war, it seems probable the EU as a whole would abstain from committing to the conflict, though various NATO members might heed an American request for assistance. Due to the distance involved it would take time before a serious expeditionary force could be sent.

In recent years the USN has worked out a Fleet Re-sponse Plan, whereby it will be possible to put five or six CSG at sea within 30 days, plus two more CSG within 90 days after that. The USN command believes it would be necessary to allocate up to seven CSG to the Pacific in the event of war with China, along with other forces. To enable that, there is presently being made a gradual shifting of CSG to the Pacific. By 2009 there will be five or six CSG home-ported there, and by 2015 that number will have risen to seven. Sup-porting those CSG will be two of the new SSGN—converted ballistic missile submarines that can each fire up to 154 cruise missiles while also transporting 66-man Special Forces units. One of them is already basing out of Bangor, Washington. There is presently also an ongoing debate about moving a CSG from the US west coast to either Ha-waii or Guam, while facilities on Guam have already been upgraded to accommodate B-2 Bombers and other specialized aircraft. Munitions and spare parts have been brought forward over the last several years, in the main to allow for quicker response to trouble on the Korean peninsula, but also to more generally sup-port fleet operations across the Western Pacific. That is in contrast to the situation in the mid-1990s, when it seemed for a time all US power would soon be leaving the region. The US Air Force has four numbered air forces in the Pacific region (5th in Japan, 7th in South Korea, 11th in Alaska and 13th on Guam). Altogether, they incor-porate six combat wings and other elements for a total of over 300 aircraft. The USAF has also dedicated a number of fighter wings, bombers and support aircraft to forward deploy to reinforce Pacific bases in the event of war. While the average age of US aircraft has been increasing, it’s expected the advent of the F-35

continues on page 12


Latin America represents a surprising new challenge to US interests. It’s surprising because it was considered a secure area only a few years ago, before Washington’s benign ne-glect had its effects. While many South American nations benefited from good economic times in the 1990s, much of that has recently fallen flat. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US opted out of military cooperation with several Latin American nations, including Brazil and Ecuador, over con-cern about their enforcement of various international laws the US doesn’t support. In order to keep their militaries viable, some of those southern nations have signed treaties of coop-eration with the PRC, and Chinese officers now train their militaries. Even worse problems in some nations, notably Venezuela and Bolivia, have cropped up due to the negative backwash from globalization that has worked to mobilize leftist movements, thereby making it possible for anti-US leaders, such as Venezuela’s Chavez, to come to power. Venezuela, in particular, is expanding its armed forces with the purchase of modern Russian jet fighters, along with the acquisition of five Kilo-class submarines and other weaponry. Constant internal propaganda within Venezuela seeks to create a paranoia the US is planning to attack, and Chavez is actively seeking alliance with China and Russia. At present the US seems to be trying to renew its historic relations with Brazil, the largest nation in South America and another growing economic power house. Nevertheless, it will take a prolonged effort to restore the former balance across the region and reestablish a secure southern flank. Asia presents an interesting contrast in power relationships. China’s only true ally in the region is North Korea, a weak state ruled by marginally insane persons, but possessing a military strong enough to make things miserable for its neighbors. China is also using its growing economic influ-ence to attempt to befriend some of Americas’ oldest allies, in particular Australia. Also of interest to China are the vari-ous Pacific island nations, places where potentially strategic ports and bases might one day be established. The US appears to have a solid relationship with Japan. In recent years China has sought to pressure Tokyo, much the same as it did to Taiwan. That effort appears to have backfired, though, just as it did with Taiwan, and the US has therefore been able to renew military cooperation agree-ments there. Interestingly, the Chinese have lately tried to reverse the damage and improve relations with Tokyo, in-cluding possibly military exercises. It’s suspected that effort will take some time to bear fruit, if it ever does. Meanwhile, it seems possible the Chinese economy may surpass that of Japan in a generation. South Korea is increasingly an unknown. While having capable air and localized naval forces, it would be relatively easy for the Chinese to check their participation in a Pacific war by simply by mobilizing North Korea.

Singapore and Vietnam have both made strong overtures to the US to create and maintain extensive new relationships. That’s particularly poignant for the Vietnamese who, though they fought for years against the US during the 1960s and 1970s, have a much longer history of conflict with, and dom-ination by, China. The US has responded to the opportunity, though not at full speed, probably due to ongoing desire to maintain decent relations with the PRC. Singapore would be likely to quickly commit its small but capable forces to the US cause in the event of war. It is conceivable they could provide a significant irritant to PRC war plans, particularly as they sit astride the strategic shipping lane to the Middle East. The US maintains good relations with Australia, and has long had port privileges there. To the Australians, however, the big threat is Indonesia, and the US has been reluctant to anger that nation’s government. Nonetheless, Australian troops have fought in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their general commitment to the US alliance seems certain. In contrast, New Zealand hasn’t had close military relations with the US since the 1980s, and though they would likely give Washing-ton political support in the event of a Pacific war, no military support would probably be sent. The US closed its bases in the Philippines in the 1990s. American military cooperation there remains strong, though, with trainers assisting the Filipino army against Abu Sayef Islamist guerrillas. In the event of war, the Philippine armed forces are neither large nor well equipped enough to tangle with the PRC, at least prior to the arrival of substantive US reinforcements. Manila’s willingness to commit to such a dangerous engagement is unknown. Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint for war. The results of recent elections have been close between pro-indepen-dence and pro-PRC factions; however, it seems unlikely China will be so reckless as to launch such a war in the near future. Taiwan is taking steps to upgrade its navy, air force and army, including the purchase of four Kidd-class destroy-ers, but their military is regarded as being slow to modern-ize.

Taking aim: PLA machinegunner.


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will be a tremendous new boost to American domi-nance of the air. US Army and Marine ground forces in the Pacific have been decreasing, and in a few years there will only be one army brigade forward-deployed in Korea. There is another brigade defending Alaska and a light infantry division in Hawaii. Emphasis is instead being placed on forward-deploying stateside elements in the event of war. Due to the current (early 2008) situation in Iraq, there may be trouble carrying out such deploy-ments due to a lack of available units. That situation should begin to be rectified by 2009, though, since US departure from Iraq seems almost a certainty by then, and it will likely be entirely resolved by 2015. Supporting the entire US military structure is the inter-network of communications, data processing, global positioning system (GPS) and other technologi-cal elements. That structure is dependent on satellites, which currently have some serious vulnerabilities to anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). Thus the “high fron-

tier” has become a front of great importance in modern warfare. In the event of war, the PRC is likely to start with the initiative and will probably dictate how and over what it will be fought. The PRC has numerous forces equipped with strong anti-ship capabilities, so it seems improbable the US would go “charging in” with a small force of carriers. It seems more likely any such war would start with a period where US and al-lied forces attempt to cause attrition to key PRC force elements via submarine warfare, cruise missile and air attack and other means. Cybernetic warfare and anti-satellite efforts will be components of the struggle for both sides. At the same time, of course, the political element can’t be discounted, with information warfare (propaganda) and special forces-supported insurgent operations playing their parts. The geographic scope of the war would also be of immense importance. If China attacks with direct Russian or North Korean support, for example, the US


Scenario for War The following is a summary of a possible Sino-Ameri-can War as presented in the Asia Times (Hong Kong) in April 2006, by Victor N. Corpus. The scenario postulates a preventive US war on China to curtail its rise to power. To foment a pretext, Taiwan is encouraged to declare indepen-dence. Expecting a full PRC military response, the US and Britain put 15 carrier groups to sea. Of those, seven US and two British CSG mass in the Western Pacific, while three US CSG in the Persian Gulf, along with two other US CSG and a final British group, deploy to the Indian Ocean as a strate-gic reserve. Accordingly, the PRC coordinates its response with its allies, Russia and Iran. Their strategy of Assassins Mace is then put into effect.1. The PRC conducts a missile barrage against Taiwan. In re-

sponse, the nine Western carrier groups move toward the East China Sea, while three CSG enter the Persian Gulf.

2. China dumps US Treasury Bonds in favor of gold and Euros, precipitating a global monetary crisis.

3. PRC naval forces withdraw close to the Chinese coast. US glee is short-lived.

4. Operation Assassins Mace, a massive attack on US and British space assets begins, using maneuverable micro-satellites, space mines and ground based lasers. Comple-menting the attack is a huge cyber-war effort by a legion of Russian and Chinese hackers. The net effect is to dis-able US sensors and disrupt their information networks, thereby blinding Allied forces and crushing their ability to coordinate operations.

5. At this point a massive wave of supersonic cruise missiles are launched at the Allied ships in the Pacific out to dis-tances up to 1,200 miles from the Chinese coast. At least two dozen cruise missiles are fired at each carrier, in-cluding conventional and EMP warheads. The PRC high command believes the US Navy has no effective defense against their cruise missiles. Also launched are bottom-rising mines, homing torpedoes, rocket torpedoes and thousands of UCAV (converted older aircraft acting as “robot” Kamikaze’s).

6. Following up the cruise missiles is a barrage of land-based ballistic missiles capable of homing in on ships at sea. If all goes as planned, most or all of the nine carriers will be sunk or burning hulks.

7. Ballistic missile strikes using conventional, EMP and FAE warheads are made against all forward Allied bases in Ja-pan, Guam, Kyrgyzstan, Diego Garcia etc.

8. When signaled by Russia and China, Iran launches a bar-rage of the same cruise missile types at the three US CSG nearby her coast. If all goes well, results will be the same as in phase six above.

9. PRC and Russian tank divisions roll into Central Asia, overrunning US bases in that region and securing the oil fields around the Caspian for themselves.

10. The threat of launching the recently strengthened strategic nuclear forces of China and Russia secure the victory.

That’s certainly an interesting scenario, but it has many weaknesses. For example, the US and UK might well decide not to send their carrier groups charging in like cavalry, in-stead making selective conventional strikes against PRC ports and forces while using submarines to enforce a blockade of the Chinese coast. Taiwan might be captured but, if the sea lanes aren’t secured over the longer run, it would be difficult for Peking to maintain any victory that had been won.

The Nuclear Dimension Since 1991 the US has had preeminence in nuclear means over all other nations combined. With the advent of the internet, new satellites and continued upgrades to its nuclear delivery systems (notably the B-2 and Trident II), American nuclear supe-riority is so great some analysts now attribute a perfect first strike capability to the US. That is, it may well be the US now has the ability to attack and destroy other powers’ nuclear weapons systems without receiving any counterstrike in return. Both China and Russia have been working hard to redress that imbalance. The PRC is soon to field a new mobile ICBM, the DF-31, which will be able to accurately target all parts of the US. In addition, five new Jin-class submarines with 5,000 pound JL-2 missiles are being deployed. Their command and control capabilities are also being rapidly upgraded, which would be a vital aspect of any protracted war scenario. In a few years the PRC is therefore likely to achieve a guaranteed second strike capacity. If both sides have such strike capabilities, that factor should tend to limit or prevent a Pacific war; however, under dynamic circumstances and changing national fortunes, there’s always room for miscalculation. For instance, one type of strike that wouldn’t involve direct destruction of civilian populations is an EMP attack. A single multi-megaton warhead detonated 300 miles above the American heartland would wipe out almost all communications and electronics—a potentially decisive blow, but one that would surely be countered by at least an in-kind response. What can be expected for certain, therefore, is a return to Cold War-era nuclear anxieties in the not too distant future.

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situation would become much more delicate. Such a situation might be enough to dissuade allies from sup-porting the US, an event that could lead to grim choic-es. Another possibility might come from a small Chinese attack on, for example, Taiwan, which then quickly resulted in the political collapse of that coun-try’s government. The US might not likely prosecute a war for long in a situation in which its ally had al-ready been deposed and replaced by another regime. Yet another contingency could come from the strategic situation elsewhere when such a US-China war began. If other areas are also in crisis simultaneously with the Pacific, the US task would be further complicated. In consideration of those possibilities, the US has been strengthening its Pacific alliances and seeking new ones. A further uncertainty for US planners comes from the fact that longer-term Chinese intentions aren’t really known. The internal debates of the PRC gov-ernment are mostly impenetrable. When lacking solid knowledge, it becomes easy to assume the worst.

PRC Strategy The PLAN is comprised of 72 major surface war-ships and 58 submarines, including five SSN. The ships are of varying age and quality, but efforts are going into providing a fully modern navy. The PRC is reported to have acquired Aegis missile technology, and such weapons are currently being mounted on their new destroyer classes. The latest Russian surface to air missiles (SAM) are also available to them, both to their navy and land based forces, and efforts to inte-grate all air defenses are underway. Most of the Chinese submarines are diesel, but

they include a number of the latest Russian Kilo types, which are both quiet and stealthy. Torpedoes are of homing and super-fast varieties, and they’re comple-mented by the latest in sea mines. There are currently five SSN, and more nuclear boats are under construc-tion, giving the PRC a potentially global capability in submarine warfare. Evidence is mounting that the PRC is either de-signing a force of aircraft carriers or about to activate the Kuznetzov-type carrier bought from the Russians years ago. That ship has been moved to a PLAN na-val base painted in PLAN colors, and its decks are swarming with workers. At the same time, the PRC has built and acquired a number of carrier-capable SU-30MK Flanker aircraft. The PLAN is divided into three fleets—the North Sea Fleet, the East Sea Fleet, and the South Sea Fleet. The East Sea Fleet is opposite Taiwan, and has the largest complement of warships and the most diffi-cult mission. The North Sea Fleet has the SSBN, and would attempt to form a barrier line with them in the event of war. The PLAAF (Peoples Liberation Army Air Force) provides support to the navy. While the PLAAF has several thousand planes, it’s estimated only some 700 combat aircraft would be available to support a war in the Western Pacific. The PLAAF has also been busy modernizing, and most of the older MiG-19 and MiG-21 types have been replaced, though many have been rebuilt as unmanned combat aerial vehicles (drones, or UCAV). The PLAAF is now deploying the J-10, a fourth generation fighter, and is busily developing two possible fifth generation fighters, the J-12 and J-13, which will have stealth capabilities.

Taking off: F6 jet.


The Chinese Embassy Bombing On 7 May 1999, during the Kosovo war between NATO and Yu-goslavia, the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was bombed by US aircraft and three Chinese newsmen were killed. The Chinese government and people were outraged. The incident came close to breaking the US re-lationship with China. Within a few days, NATO and the United States issued a formal apology, explaining the bombing had been an accident due to out of date maps. Since that time there have been several rumors—mostly debunked—that the bombing was an attempt to terminate Chinese shared communi-cations with the Yugoslavs, that it was intended to prevent them gathering technical information on US warfighting techniques, or that the objective was to kill Yugoslav President Miloslovic during a visit to the embassy. One story stated SHAPE commander Gen. Clark was later dismissed due to his role in the bombing. The US is partly victim of its self-created reputation for bombing accuracy during Desert Storm. That China was gathering intelligence is assumed. That they might have been sharing it with the Yugoslav’s is not verified but conceivable, possibly in return for knowledge about an F-117 stealth aircraft shot down earlier. The only thing certain is the lasting shadow over Sino-American relations.

Much effort has also gone into munitions, and the PRC has some modern air-to-air and air-to-ground variants, plus fuel air explosives (FAE) and electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) weapons. Both the PLAAF and PLAN have planes capable of firing supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, which have ranges of from 62 to 1,100 miles. In-air refueling capabilities are be-ing increased, and it appears their aircraft elements are generally being made capable of striking warships out to 1,200 miles from shore. The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has been re-duced in size over the last 15 years, from a strength of 120 divisions to around only 50 today. At the same time, though, PLA combat capabilities have increased tremendously. Most units are now mechanized; they have robust new weapons, and the current focus is on achieving integrated command control and communi-cations. Amphibious capabilities are still limited, but are also being rapidly increased to the point the PLA will likely be able to project significant power offshore before the end of this decade. On the whole, though, the PRC will remain inferior to the US and its allies in numbers and types of weap-ons for some time. It’s estimated the Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) will reach 4 trillion dollars by 2020, and that by 2040 the Chinese economy may surpass that of the US. In the meantime, the Chinese are attempting to address the disparity in power by focusing on deploying forces designed specifically to attack US weaknesses. Current Chinese military doctrine holds its best to “win victory through one strike.” Their force structure and dispositions are being set according to that dogma. All realms of warfare are being studied: cyber war, in-formation warfare, and space warfare all are getting at-tention and funding. The Chinese believe the greatest US vulnerabilities are in its dependence on satellites and the internet, and that a hard blow against those complexes at a key time could prove decisive. Nuclear warfare is not being overlooked, and improvements are under way to ensure PRC nuclear forces are capa-ble of surviving and fighting a protracted campaign. The PRC has also been conducting a two-tier dip-lomatic campaign, rewarding and befriending nations with economic ties while at other times blatantly and crudely threatening them. It’s mentioned several times in the US Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress on Chinese Military Power that the latter tendency may lead to serious miscalculation. On the face of things, then, the Chinese are deploy-ing an increasingly capable military that may be well able to achieve PRC objectives in time of war. At the same time, though, there are many unknowns, such as how effective the untested Chinese military really is, and whether information will really be able to move in a timely way up and down their chains of command during a real shooting war.

SourcesUS DOD Annual Report to Congress—Military Power of the People’s Republic

of China, 2007. Carter, Steinbruner, Zraket. Managing Nuclear Operations, The Brookings In-

stitute, 1987.Washington Observer, 1/24/2007, by Teresa Hsu; China Tests Anti-Satellite

Weapon.Reuters, June 14, 2007; China Taking on US in Cyber Arms Race, Lt. Gen. Robert

Elder.FT.Com. May 25 2007, by Demetri Sevastopulo in Washington & Mure Dickie in

Beijing; US Concerns as China Builds Nuclear Subs.AFP, May 16 2007, by Benjamin Yeh; Taiwan Tests Defenses Against China.Global Policy Forum, October 2006 by Jan Fitchner; Symbiotic Competitors

– The Nature of Sino-US. Relations.Washington Times, 18 March 2006, by Bill Gertz; Pentagon ‘Hedge’ Strategy

Targets China.Washington Post, 13 March 2005, by John Pomfret; China Rising—The Awaken-

ing of an Economic Giant.The Jamestown Foundation, 13 May 2004, by Stephen Blank; The Central Asian

Dimension of Chinese Military Strategy.

The National Security Archive; Nixon’s Trip to China: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/press.htm

Summary A war between the US and China is by no means a certainty. Such a war, if it ever occurs, might be a quick, though still potentially bloody, affair. It might be a short war destructive primarily to military as-sets, or it might go longer and become excruciatingly bloody. The current international order of business and finance would certainly be one fatality of such a conflict, and both sides would suffer severe long term economic loss. A Sino-American war could easily leave any winner still feeling cheated of the benefits of victory and saddled with deteriorating economic and social situation.

16 #250

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Red dRagon Rising: The Coming War With China

Red Dragon Rising (RDR), is a strategic-level inves-tigation, with operational undertones, of the possibilities inherent in the first 30-or-so days of a hypothetical war be-tween the Peoples Republic of China and a US-led counter-alliance. The timeframe is the not-too-distant future, roughly between now and the end of 2014. On the Chinese side, the viewpoint of the player is that of Beijing’s top-rung national leadership. On the US side, the player represents the top-rung military commander in the Western Pacific theater. The game is easily adaptable for solitaire play. The system—given we’re dealing with events that haven’t happened and therefore can’t be studied in detail af-ter the fact—has been crafted to present the war as a unitary vision rather than a strictly sequenced process. Three initial assumptions are as follows. First, the Chi-nese are cast—not unreasonably, we think—as the aggres-sor. They’re the “revisionist power” here, the nation wanting to overturn the present-day status quo in the Western Pacific, they’re conducting a strategic offensive. Second, the war inevitably starts over Taiwan, as that island is unavoidably the first strategic block Beijing must neutralize on the way to

becoming East Asia’s hegemon. Third, the war will not begin with a nuclear attack; though the danger of that kind of escala-tion may not be far off. Most ground units in the game represent brigades (“brigade combat teams” or “BCT” for the US). The exceptions are: 1) the Singaporean army is represented by just one unit-counter; and 2) the Taiwanese and Philippine armies are represented by their corps components. Aircraft units are mostly represented by mixed-type com-bat wing formations, though only one aircraft type—the pre-dominant one for each such wing—is shown on each coun-ter. Long range bombers have their own mono-type units that can’t combine operations with the other tactical air wings in the game. Ship units mostly represent mission-oriented groupings of vessels (Surface Action Groups). Aircraft carriers and cruise missile attack submarines each represent just one such ves-sel of those types. Other submarines are represented in groups called “Subrons.” On the area map, each inch equals approxi-mately 100 miles.


Two-hundred-fi fty issues of Strategy & Tactics! I fi rst started subscribing with issue #22, Renaissance of Infantry. Somewhere along the line I became the editor and lead designer. I’ve seen a lot of ups and downs in the magazine, especially when it comes to the philosophy of simulation design. The purpose of this column is to give the readers an idea of what’s going on in the wargame design world. I’ll do that by highlighting the wargame included in the hobby edition of the magazine. There’s a tradition of wargaming going back to the general staffs of the 19th century, through the US Navy developing its various “Rainbow” series war plans during the 1930s, to today’s operations research staffs. Comput-ers have made their presence felt in wargaming, but board wargaming still has many advantages. One advantage is board wargaming puts many complex factors into a playable format. Because of the magazine parameters, we develop systems that can fi t into a limited number of pages of rules, plus map and unit-counters. An-other advantage is all the data are out there for the gamers to see. One of my predecessors, Jim Dunnigan, observed that many people buy wargames for the data they present. And you get a lot of information in an S&T design: an order of battle, a map with terrain analysis, and a set of rules that point up the critical aspects of the subject. That transpar-ency is one of the major advantages of board wargaming over computer wargaming: there are no black boxes. You, the gamer, can change the data without having to crack any programming. You can also easily create your own new units and scenarios. Beyond all that, you also get an analytical article on the same topic as the game. You can then use the wargame to explore the points discussed in the article. S&T emphasizes analysis and hard data and goes beyond the usual mass-market magazine presentations. S&T has published wargames on just about every military topic: the World Wars, Napoleonics, the American Civil War, the ancient and medieval worlds, the colonial era. There was even a game on the clash between police and demonstrators at the 1968 Democratic National Con-vention in Chicago. And, as described in the magazine’s title, games have ranged in scope from the level of grand strategy down to man-to-man tactics. Another trend over the years has been to publish wargames on confl icts in progress, or which could poten-tially break out. S&T designs have included wargames on the Arab-Israeli Wars, Vietnam, and NATO versus the Warsaw Pact. This issue’s wargame, Red Dragon Rising (RDR), therefore isn’t the fi rst foray into hypothetical near-future Far Eastern campaigns. S&T has in the past pub-lished two different versions of a China versus the Soviet Union game, The East is Red. All of which brings us to the question: how do you go about designing such a wargame? There are different philosophies of game design. One is what I term “systems based.” The idea is you create a set of rules to model each of the major components of the event. For example, in the wargame in the hobby edition of this issue, Red Dragon Rising, you have several distinct types of combat forces: naval, air and land, as well as subtypes

within each of those categories—aircraft carriers, surface combatants, submarines, and so forth. In order to turn all that into a playable game, the design and development team used a common quantifi cation formula for all of them. Units are given a numerical rating quantifying their indi-vidual anti-air, anti-surface, anti-ground and anti-submarine combat strengths. Those numbers represent their relative combat power against each of those types of targets, and that quantifi cation can be a tricky thing because it inte-grates many different factors: fi repower, sensors, training, doctrine, etc. There are also what are called “design for effect” factors, which are generally used to model the outcomes of operations. RDR’s turn structure is an example of that approach. Each turn represents a period of activity. There’s no set time frame; rather, if the Chinese haven’t won after a certain number of operations, they’re considered to have burned up their political and logistical resources, and the war ends (with their defeat). Effectively, the game shows the outcome of the level of intensity of operations, with each turn showing one major action in a telescoping time-frame. On a higher level, RDR gives players the opportunities to explore competing strategies in the Far East without hav-ing to get bogged down in technical minutiae. For instance, the US player might try aggressive initial use of his carrier task forces in the Taiwan Strait, as opposed to holding them back and then using them to respond to Chinese moves. The Chinese player might try to go directly for Taiwan, or instead conduct a broader offensive. And then there are all the “what if” situations presented as random events. Players have to deal with constantly arising chaos factors; so winning is never just a matter of crunching numbers or following a pre-set plan. You have to be able to respond to crises and exploit opportunities as they arise. RDR demonstrates that, even after 250 issues, we still have plenty of new concepts to offer in simulation design. We’re looking forward to the next 250 issues. S&T accepts wargame submissions from designers at large, as well as from professionals already in the fi eld. Submissions have to go through the publisher and a survey process, but we’re open to innovative ideas and approaches. Wargame design is your opportunity to ‘make’ history.

O N D E S I G N

18 #25018 #250

megafeedbackreport:resultsfromissue#248

2008 2009 2010 2011WWI 248: First Blood Marne 255: Battle Over Britain 261: Op. Justice 267: Kaiser’s WarGunpowder 249: Forgot Nap Btls 256: Marlborough’s Bat. 262: Fred’s War 268: Vienna 1683Modern 250: Red Dragon Rising 257: Cold War Btls 2 263: Chosin 269: FalklandsDouble Issue 251: Cobra (update) Americana 252: War in Far West 258: San Juan hill 264: Shiloh 270: Amer Rev.WWII 253: Kursk (Bomba) 259: Battle for China 265: Op. Jubilee 271: KharkovAncient 254: 2nd Punic War 260: Grt Med. Btls 2 266: Reconquista 272: Julian

The Mega-Feedback was posted on the DG web-site last time with great response. We ran a special MFB on our new StrategyAndTacticsPress.com site for World at War magazine last summer without a corresponding print survey in a magazine and also got a good response; so it probably comes as no shock there were more respondents via the web for this round than came in by postcard, and the total responses were up again over last year. In addition to the customary game proposals, we asked other questions. One of those was about our new World at War magazine. Those expressing intent to subscribe or otherwise buy the magazine moved up to 92 percent from 86 percent last time; so we’re glad to see we’re winning over the remaining skeptics. We’re even more pleased over 100 individuals have already ordered their subscriptions. The fi rst issue will be shipping in June; so make sure you subscribe soon so you don’t miss the premier issue (Ty Bom-ba’s redesign of the old-SPI classic Barbarossa is the game). We also asked about counter art. This has been a subject of much debate for over 10 years now, and the results of this survey aren’t going to end the sym-bols vs. icons argument, as no choice obtained a clear majority. Here are the results:

32% symbols for 20th century and beyond; icons for pre-20th century

19% symbols only17% icons only16% symbols for battalions and above, icons for

company and below11% symbols for infantry, icons for other types05% other responses

Our take on the results is that we’ll most often go with the preferred choice (symbols for 1900+; icons for 1899 and earlier), but we’ll make exceptions where they make sense. For example, we believe the counters for this issue’s hypothetical modern game were best rendered with icons. (Perhaps we also should have included a choice about symbols for land units, icons for naval and air.) For those who want to see what future game counters are going to look like, we post samples on the StrategyAndTacticsPress.com site as they’re completed. The Special Edition proposals continue to accrue pledges toward eventual publication. The continuing discussion about how best to publish them has come back around to publishing them as regular issues of S&T rather than separately. That would ensure the supporting articles will be done as regular magazine issues with all the great maps and full-color illus-trations. What we’re thinking is we’ll establish a number for the pledges needed to trigger our mov-ing ahead with the project. The Special Edition will then be slated for an issue about two years out, as the choice for the era category it’s from. That is, the Special Edition will be in lieu of a standard-sized game choice (and would count as two subscription units). For example, if the Sun Never Sets II proposal reaches the critical number by the next Mega-Feed-back, we’ll select it fi rst for the Gunpowder category and place it in the schedule in the next issue that’s a Gunpowder issue. We’ll be running more survey questions on this in the next MFB.

18 #250


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Op. Market Garden • Bodenplatte 1945 • Biak

Barbarossa: The Russo-German War

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Now for the game proposals! It’s been great to see the number of proposals from new designers steadily increase. Fresh ideas and perspectives look to be the preference of the voters, though Miranda still submitted the most of any designer and came away with three out of the nine proposals selected (includ-ing Julian, which has been in the MFB for years but could never quite score a selection until now). Javier Romero is back for another design (Reconquista), and John Butterfi eld (a veteran designer of RAF fame) will be in S&T for the fi rst time. Welcome to the rookies with their fi rst S&T designs: Paul Haase, Paul Koenig, Phil Youde, and Phillip Sharp! We’re excited about reaching our 250th issue, and even more excited with the launching of World at War magazine. 2008 is going to be a great year, and we look forward to continuing our dialogue with customers and receiving their input on future games and articles.

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20 #25020 #250


The origins of the Zulu War of 1879 were uncommonly simple. There was no intricate political maneuvering or sinister international plots leading to its

outbreak. The war started because Great Britain’s High Commissioner for South Africa, Sir Henry Bartle Frere, feared the powerful Zulu tribe would sooner or

later invade the colonies for which he was responsible. And he was determined to beat them to the draw.

On the Horns of the Buffalo: Isandlwana & Rorke’s Drift

by Kelly Bell

Collision of Civilizations Frere based his opinion of the Zulus and their King Cetshwayo (or Cetewayo) on hearsay reports of their bloodletting and savagery, mainly from tribes who feared them. He erroneously concluded Cetshwayo and his impis were waiting for the British to become complacent and vulnerable to a sudden, devastating assault. Frere assumed the Zulus’ 40,000-man stand-ing army could only be there for a specific reason—to wipe out Her Majesty’s forces and take over all of southern Africa. He was wrong about Cetshwayo’s in-tentions, and therein hangs the tale in which the Brit-ish would suffer one of their worst defeats of the 19th century. Cetshwayo was well informed on the military re-sources and technology at the disposal of the British Empire. He took the realistic attitude peaceful co-ex-istence with the imperial power was in his own best interest. His army was the core of his kingdom, and risking it in an uncertain war could lead to political as well as military disaster. Zulu society could not ex-ist without a powerful army, even during peacetime. It provided the means through which young men were assimilated into society, as well as maintaining domi-nation over subject tribes. In 1877 the British Empire had annexed the finan-cially ailing Transvaal Republic, a state that had been formed by Boer settlers. The Boers were the descen-dants of various European colonists who had come to southern Africa before the British, sometimes fleeing religious persecution at home, the Boers (peasants) of-ten took a zealous approach to relations with the other Africans. Raiding was endemic on the frontier and the British became heir to a border dispute between the Zulu and Boer. London appointed a commission to re-solve the matter, and that panel ruled in favor of the

Zulu. Frere disagreed with the ruling, and he refused to enforce it. In July 1878 two of Zulu sub-chief Sirayo’s wives abandoned him and ran away to Natal with their lov-ers. In his tribe adultery was a capital offense, and so the chief’s sons tracked down the wayward spouses and dragged them back to Zululand, where they were executed. The Natal government correctly pointed out the young men had committed an illegal border cross-ing and demanded they be handed over to Natal au-thorities along with a fine of 500 cattle. The situation forced Cetshwayo to risk having an insignificant frontier violation balloon into a major crisis. On the one hand, if he didn’t surrender the cul-prits it might mean war. But if he did he would suffer a loss of prestige among his own people. Among other

22 #250

things, cattle were an important symbol of rank and wealth in Zulu society, and the surrender of 500 head would have had consequent political implications. Cetshwayo handled the delicate situation adroitly. He explained to the Natal authorities the young men had acted foolishly and in the heat of anger because of the great insult cast upon their father by his faithless wives, and apologized for their actions. He then paid an indemnity of 50 pounds sterling. To Frere’s discom-fiture the Natal government accepted the apology and fine and let the matter drop. In October the Zulus arrested and temporarily de-tained two British surveyors, accurately pointing out they had been making unauthorized measurements on tribal land. Then some Anglican missionaries left Zululand and complained their work was being inter-fered with by Cetshwayo and his men, who were kill-ing converts and suppressing the Gospel. Interestingly, none of the complaining churchmen had been harmed, and the reports of murdered Christian Zulus were never substantiated. It is possible the missionaries, having noted the rising tensions in the region, decided to get out before their parishes became a war zone, and used the excuse their lives were being threatened by “bloody handed savages.” Frere had heard all he needed. He wrote to London, requesting more troops and arms.

Crossing the Border Britain at the time was bogged down in the Second Afghan War, and relations with the Russian Empire were also strained to the point of near-war. Whitehall, therefore, replied with a message informing Frere to avoid war with the Zulus. Those instructions, how-ever, arrived after the high commissioner had begun hostilities. Frere learned he would be receiving no reinforce-ment after he had already deluged Cetshwayo with a host of insulting demands: that the Zulus disband their entire army, that the Zulus not occupy the lands the commission had awarded them, that the British take over the king’s capital, that Cetshwayo surrender Sir-ayo’s sons and hand over the “outstanding” penalty of 500 cattle. Cetshwayo (rather to Frere’s surprise) agreed to pay the 500-cow fine. But the Zulu king re-jected the other demands, as the high commissioner had anticipated. Both sides mobilized their forces, and on 6 January 1879 British troops crossed into Zulu-land. Lt. Gen. Lord Chelmsford commanded the invad-ing army. He led a force of 6,000 regulars and 9,000 colonial and native auxiliaries. He intended to make a three-pronged stab into Zulu territory from Natal and the Transvaal. All three of his columns would advance on the tribal capital of Ulundi, where he believed the Zulu army would concentrate. The natives would then


be fatally decimated by modern British firepower. The plan might have worked against less organized foes, but coordinating three columns across hostile terrain and in the face of one of the best led and best trained armies in black Africa would prove to be Chelmsford’s undoing. The northern column was commanded by Col. Ev-elyn Wood. His mission was to protect Chelmsford’s left as well as distracting the Zulus. The eastern col-umn was on the right, under Col. Charles Pearson. He was to approach Ulundi from the south. The brunt of the fighting would fall on the middle column, commanded by Col. Richard Glyn. Cross-ing the Buffalo River into tribal land at Rorke’s Drift, Glyn’s column toted six 7-pounder guns and included cavalry, engineers and two native battalions, with a slow-moving ox-drawn supply train. This force con-sisted of more than 4,700 men, with 1,852 being Eu-ropeans. Col. Anthony Durnford commanded a small reserve. Unfortunately for Glyn, his unit was the one Chelmsford decided to accompany, and His Lordship took it upon himself to be field commander. It was 20 January 1879 before the engineers had the road improved to the point it could convey the col-umn, which advanced 10 miles and established a camp on the high kopje (flat-topped hill) of Isandlwana. Chelmsford was pleased with himself for finding a bivouac with such splendid visibility and a sweeping field of fire over the surrounding savannah. He ignored the advice of Paul Kruger (a Boer), who recommended he laager (circle) his supply wagons. Further, when another veteran of combat with the Zulus, J.J. Uys,

counseled him to “Place your spies far out. The Zu-lus are more dangerous than you think,” he dismissed him. There were to be no advanced pickets. On the morning of the 21st Chelmsford sent out a 150-man patrol under Maj. John Dartnell to probe the position of a Chief Matyana, 12 miles away. Shortly after the patrol had departed, Chelmsford sent two battalions of his Natal Native Contingent (NNC) un-der Commandant Rupert Lonsdale to reinforce them, boosting them to 1,600 troops. That afternoon Dart-nell sent a courier back to inform Chelmsford he was in contact with the enemy and would not be returning that day. Dartnell also requested reinforcement, but Chelmsford, ever disdainful of the enemy, sent only food and blankets. At 1:30 the next morning a messenger woke Chelmsford with another dispatch from Dartnell. The Zulu force facing him had been reinforced, and now numbered approximately 2,000 warriors. Chelmsford ordered the formation of a relief force consisting of the 2nd Battalion/24th Regiment and four 6-pounder field pieces from “N” Battery. Though Glyn was part of the column, Chelmsford accompanied the force and com-manded in person. The detachment set out eastward across the still-dark plain at 4:30 a.m. Lt. Col. Henry Pulleine was left in charge of the camp at Isandlwana. After he had joined forces with Dartnell, Chelms-ford decided to march his command to the banks of the nearby Mangeni River, a tributary of the Buffalo. He should have realized positioning his troops along the Mangeni was dangerous because from there the en-emy could advance on them unseen from behind the

24 #250

adjacent Nqutu Plateau. And Zulu Chiefs Tshingwayo and Mavumengwana did just that. Having sent out a large number of scouts, the Zulu chiefs were well informed of their enemy’s move-ments and positions. They not only knew Chelmsford had placed himself in a precarious position, but also that he had divided his forces. The encampment at Isandlwana was low on manpower owing to the de-tachments. By this time Chelmsford had learned from a pris-oner there were 12 Zulu regiments on the plateau, and they were forming up for their assault. But where was the attack going to hit? Sometime between noon and 1:00 p.m. a naval officer, Commandant G. Hamilton-Browne, whom Chelmsford had sent back with some native auxiliaries to assist the base camp in moving to the riverside position, sent the general a frantic note reading: “For God’s sake come back with all your men. The camp is surrounded and must be taken un-

less helped.” Shortly after 2:00 p.m. hours a still-com-placent Chelmsford set out for Isandlwana to see for himself what was agitating Hamilton-Browne. At 3:00 p.m. Chelmsford was still five miles from Isandlwana when he was stunned to see an exhaust-ed, traumatized Lonsdale meet him on the trail with the incredible news the force at Isandlwana had been overrun and slaughtered. Chelmsford muttered in re-sponse: “I can’t understand it. I left over a thousand men there.” When the column trekked on into what had been the Isandlwana camp, they found an incredible sight.

Last Stand At 10:00 a.m., 22 January 1979, Col. Durnford arrived at Isandlwana, bringing with him five troops of Natal Mounted Natives (NMN), three Natal Na-tive Contingent (NNC) companies, a rocket battery and almost a half-million rounds of rifle ammuni-tion. He reported to Lt. Col. Pulleine, who sent out a reconnaissance patrol to explore the whole plateau. The patrol returned and reported there were no Zulus atop the height, but that a large body of tribesmen was moving toward Rorke’s Drift, where the British had established a field hospital at a small mission station. Pulleine thought there was no immediate danger to his position, and for the British that would prove a tragic error. He let Durnford leave camp in order for him to link up with Chelmsford’s contingent.

British Order of Battle, Isandlwana, 22 January 1879 Commanding: Lt. Col. Henry Pulleine• Two guns and 70 men of N Battery, 5th Brigade, Royal Artillery

(equipped with two 7-pounder guns)• Five companies of 1st Battalion, 24th Foot• One company of 2nd Battalion, 24th Foot• Mounted volunteers and Natal Police• Two companies of the Natal Native Infantry


At the time, Chelmsford was between Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift, and the recon patrol had mistaken his Basuto native soldiers for Zulus. At about 11:30 a.m. a group of Pulleine’s Basuto cavalrymen, chas-ing a small group of Zulus who were driving a herd of cattle across the top of the plateau, rode to the preci-pice of a rocky valley beneath the high ground’s north-ern edge, looked down, and saw 20,000 Zulu warriors. That army was commanded by Tshingwayo. Realizing their hiding place was discovered, the Zulus immedi-ately charged up the slope. The Battle of Isandlwana was underway. When a mounted Basuto galloped into camp with news of the oncoming attack, Pulleine suspected the man was overreacting. Nevertheless, he ordered his soldiers to deploy. But his position was not well placed—the firing line was too long and too far from the reserve ammunition wagons. The companies along the eastern sector were spread particularly thinly, with gaps of 200-300 yards between them. The Basuto troops, joined by Capt. R. Younghus-band’s “C” Company of the 1st/24th, were already fir-ing into the oncoming mass of shrieking warriors. Not appreciating the gravity of the situation, and perhaps gaining false confidence from the many Zulus he was watching fall, Pulleine did not use the time he had to contract his perimeter to a manageable length. Tshing-wayo, however, was expecting to take heavy casual-ties, and he and his officers had planned their battle strategy well. Pulleine’s firing line was engaging the “chest” of the Zulu “buffalo.” But Tshingwayo was attacking in the classic buffalo’s head formation. He sent his right horn around the Isandlwana kopje and cut the road connecting it with Rorke’s Drift. His left horn swung around the other side and the two columns linked up, surrounded the British. Thousands of Zulus then charged across the open plain atop the elevation. For a moment the fight seemed to hang in the bal-ance as Durnford’s still-nearby riders collided with the left horn and opened a heavy fire with their rifles. Elsewhere on the field, the Zulus were having huge gaps blown in their ranks by the defenders’ disciplined riflery and 7-pound case-shot. At distances ranging from 150 to 300 yards from the British line, stunned warriors dropped flat in hopes of ducking the fearsome firepower but bullets and shrapnel continued to tear them to pieces. Pulleine might have used that pause to contract his thinly manned perimeter, but thinking the attack already halted he missed his last opportunity, and never gave the order. At that moment a senior Zulu officer ran among his warriors and bellowed: “The king didn’t send us here to run away!” Thousands of Zulus rose to their feet and charged in. Meanwhile, the British soldiers manning the firing line were running low on bullets. Runners were sent back to bring up more ammunition, but the wagons

A Nation of Warriors From the time Zulu boys were old enough to walk they were groomed for warfare. Constantly drilled with primitive but effective weapons, and forced to run long distances, they grew up lean, athletic and with limitless stamina. Not allowed to marry until they had proven themselves in combat, they yearned for war. Moving against their foes at a savannah-eating canter, they crossed broken ground on foot faster than a zebra, springing upon their enemies like lions. Zulu commanders were adroit at hiding large bodies of warriors in high grass or other natural cover. The warriors were armed with animal hide shields, short stabbing spears and longer throwing spears (all spears were called assegai) and hard wooden clubs they called the knobkerrie. By 1879 some had acquired firearms through trade or capture. The Zulus were not marksmen, however, and most used traditional weapons out of simple preference. The favored battle tactic was based on the imagery of the Cape Buffalo’s meathook-like horns. Forming themselves into a double-U formation, Zulu ibutho (regiments) would charge their opponents, us-ing the outer wings (“horns”) to envelop and overwhelm the enemy’s flanks and rear. The Zulu center (the “head”) would then smash into the opposing main body, which would quickly find itself surrounded by howling warriors. A reserve of older Zulu soldiers (the “loins”) would follow in the wake of the main force, but that reserve was seldom needed because anyone even slightly suspected of cowardice, inepti-tude or indolence would be executed immediately after the battle. Motivated by discipline, tradition and the need to prove their manhood, Zulu tribesmen fought with abandon. The Zulus had for generations rolled over all adversaries, and were regarded with awe and abject fear by other tribes. One of their few reverses prior to 1879 was in battles against mounted Boer marksmen, who also warred with uncompromising resolution.

Battle dress 1879: Zulu warrior in full kit.


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were too far away for immediate replenishment. Fur-ther, ridiculously regulation-bound quartermasters re-fused to issue cartridges and shells to any troops other than those with ammunition specifically earmarked for their units. Forced to obtain ammo from their own sup-ply wagons instead of those closest to them, the runners had to run hundreds of extra yards. And then they ran into an even greater problem than the obtuse quarter-masters. Designed to withstand rough handling, the sturdy wooden boxes were not only virtually impossible to break open, but screwed shut. Very few of the defend-ers had screwdrivers. Some soldiers frantically began hacking away at the boxes with bayonets. But the am-munition resupply became a case of “too little, too late.” The Zulus could see the defensive fire dwindling and closed in ever faster. As they came within 60 yards of the “thin red line,” and no more shattering volleys met them, the Zulus knew they had won the day. At 1:00 p.m. a solar eclipse cast an eerie dark shadow across the battlefield, but most of the men at Isandlwana were too busy fighting for their lives to notice. Yelling “si gi di” (“kill”) Zulu warriors poured through gaps in the perimeter, forcing the British and their native auxiliaries into small groups that were quickly isolated and annihilated. Warriors worked as teams, two or more of them concentrating on one man until he was killed. Even so, the defenders’ fighting spirit impressed their enemies. “Ah, those red soldiers at Isandlwana,” recalled a tribesman years later. “How few they were, and how they fought! They fell like stones—each man in his place.” With the Zulu right horn blocking the road, the sur-viving British and Basutoes could not retreat toward ei-ther Chelmsford’s position or Rorke’s Drift. Realizing all was lost, Pulleine gave the last order of his life when he told Lt. Teignmouth Melville to save the Queen’s Color of the 1st/24th. Melville took the flag, but was killed trying to cross the Buffalo River. The pennant floated downstream and sank. (It was later recovered and today hangs in England’s Brecon Cathedral.)

Screened by Durnford’s remaining mounted troops, about 350 men of Pulleine’s command escaped across what became known as Fugitive’s Drift. The defenders lost 1,329 men, 52 of them officers—including both Pulleine and Durnford. The Zulus killed all enemy wounded in a ritual cleansing, the “washing of the spears.”The Other Side of the Assegai Considering Tshingwayo had more than 20,000 Zulu warriors in the vicinity, Chelmsford should have had a far better appreciation of the situation. Yet he was largely in the dark about enemy movements, and had divided his forces, to boot, in the face of a superior enemy. Of course, the British did have the advantage of superior firepower, but even so the destruction of Pulleine’s command altered the balance in the cam-paign. Though he had lost between 2,000 and 3,000 men in the assault, Tshingwayo had obliterated the British encampment, killing most of its 1,400 soldiers. He also instilled a grudging respect—and sobriety—in the arrogant Chelmsford. Effectively, the main British strike force in the Zulu War was put out of action. The British commander spent the remaining day-light hours assembling his men and assimilating about 350 of those who had escaped Isandlwana. One of the reasons Chelmsford had time to gather his scattered troops was that a never-identified British infantryman ducked into a rocky fissure and spent several hours picking off Zulus until they finally found his sniper’s nest and silenced him. The warriors were so intent on dispatching the lone rifleman they did not notice the surviving soldiers who were reassembling and escap-ing. After the Zulu army moved on, the British returned to Isandlwana and spent a sleepless night on its pe-rimeter. Then, before dawn of the 23rd they began to withdraw to Rorke’s Drift. And there they found the survivors of another epic fight.

Rorke’s Drift Rorke’s Drift was a Swedish mission consisting of a couple of stone buildings with thatched roofs. One structure was the residence of a long-fled mission-ary and was being used as a hospital. The other was a storeroom containing biscuits, mealie bags and dried meat. Two British officers, Lt., Gonville Bromhead and John Chard, commanded the outpost, which was manned by B Company 2nd Battalion of Her Majesty’s 24th Regiment and an NNC company. Incredibly, in the preceding hours those men had held off an entire Zulu army. They had succeeded where Pulleine’s much larger command had failed. What had happened? At 3:15 p.m. hours on 22 January, two couriers had arrived at Rorke’s Drift with news of Isandhlwana’s fall and that one horn of the Zulu army was en route. Realizing the sick and injured men in the hospital could not be moved fast enough for the garrison to escape,


King Cetshwayo Born in 1832, future Zulu King Cetshwayo (or Cete-wayo) kaMpande literally fought for his throne. In 1856 his father, King Mpande kaSenzengakhona, sat back and observed while his sons Cetshwayo and Mbuyazi led impis against each other in a bloody fraternal war over the succes-sion. Cetshwayo defeated his brother, and in 1861 the king recognized him as his heir. Taking power on his father’s death in 1872, Cetshwayo ruled fairly and prudently within Zulu tradition, but was unable to avoid war with Britain’s ambitious colonial authorities. After his army suffered griev-ous losses in the battles of Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift, he realized the basis for his authority was disintegrating. After the Zulu War, he lived in relative obscurity until his death at age 52 in 1884.

Lord Chelmsford Of German ancestry, Frederic Augustus Thesiger was born 31 May 1827, and on the death of his father on 5 October 1878 he became the second Baron Chelmsford. Educated at Eton University, he entered the British Army in 1844, served in the Crimean War in 1855, and then in the 1868 Abyssinian campaign. His distinguished performance in those operations earned him the post of Adjutant General of India, where he served from 1869-1874. Placed in command of Her Majesty’s South African Forces in 1878, he failed in the following year’s Zulu War to perform up to his earlier standards. After the Zulu War he resigned his command and re-turned to England where he died in 1893.

After the war: Zulu King Cetshwayo meets with Garnet Wolseley, the new British commander.


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Bromhead and Chard ordered their men to barricade the perimeter with 200-pound mealie sacks. When pickets spotted approximately 4,500 Zulu warriors ap-proaching, the 300-man NNC company panicked and bolted, led by their European sergeant. Incensed, sev-eral British troops snatched up their rifles and riddled him with bullets. Neither Bromhead or Chard had any words of rebuke for the gunsels. The mass desertion reduced the post’s complement from more than 500 to just 139 men, of whom 35 were in the hospital. At 4:20 p.m. Chard began concentrat-ing the defenders into a smaller, easier-to-defend area around the storeroom. Ten minutes later the Zulus at-tacked. Led by Cetshwayo ’s younger brother, Dabulaman-zi, this force was especially hungry for battle because Isandlwana had been overrun before they had arrived. None of the warriors, from Dabulamanzi on down, wished to try and explain to Cetshwayo why they were returning from the campaign without a single bloody spear among them. Rorke’s Drift had not even been one of Tshingwayo’s objectives, but for Dabulamanzi and his men it was a target of much-needed opportu-nity. Hurling themselves against the redcoat enclave, the Zulus were shot down in masses by rifle-armed marks-men. Climbing over piles of their own dead, the war-riors finally made it to the barricades, but the chest-high ring of mealie sacks was a formidable obstacle.

More Zulus were skewered on long British bayonets. Trying to catch the British off-balance, Dabula-manzi had his men attack different sectors of the de-fenses at irregular intervals, but Bromhead and Chard, themselves fighting in the ranks, maintained a small reserve force they personally directed to threatened sectors. Chaplain George Smith also made himself useful, distributing ammunition and offering words of encouragement to the men. When the Zulus set fire to the hospital roof the British were able to evacuate all but six patients, who were killed. Of the others, those able to find a gun be-gan firing on the enemy. At 6:00 p.m. Chard had the wounded dragged into a hastily constructed smaller circle of mealie sacks where, if need be, the remaining defenders would make their last stand. The Zulus launched six major attacks on the mis-sion station perimeter, and each was repulsed by the firepower and bayonets of defenders fighting for their lives. At 2:00 a.m., 23 January 1879, the Zulus began drifting away from the battlefield. By 4:00 a.m. all were gone. At 7:00 a.m. the exhausted defenders saw the enemy army silhouetted atop a high adjacent pla-teau—it was trudging away from them. Dabulamanzi and his dispirited men met up with Chelmsford and his column advancing from Isandlwana. Neither army was in the mood for further bloodshed. They merely exchanged hostile glares as they passed silently within spear-throwing distance of each other.

Victoria Cross land: the Fight at Rorke’s Drift.


British UnitsCavalry The King’s 1st Dragoon Guards Regiment The Duke of Cambridge’s Own 17th Lancers RegimentArtillery

N Battery, 5th Brigade (SA)#8 Battery, 7th Brigade#10 Battery, 7th Brigade#11 Battery, 7th Brigade (SA)Naval Brigade (SA)

Infantry Regiments2/3rd East Kent (SA)2/4th King’s Own Royal1/13th 1st Somersetshire Prince Albert’s Light Infantry (SA)2/21st Royal Scots Fusiliers1/24th 2nd Warwickshire (SA)2/24th 2nd Warwickshire (SA)57th West Middlesex58th Rutlandshire3/60th King’s Royal Rifle Corps80th Staffordshire Volunteers88th Connaught Rangers 90th Perthshire Volunteers Light Infantry (SA)91st Princess Louise’s Argyllshire Highlanders

94th Regiment99th Duke of Edinburgh’s Regiment (SA)

Mounted Infantry 1st Squadron 2nd SquadronNotes: (SA) = unit beginning the campaign in South Africa in January 1879. Other units appeared as reinforcements.

Colonial & “Native” UnitsHorse

Frontier Horse (Transvaal Rangers, Baker’s Horse, Kaffrarian Van-guards, Border Horse Transvaal Burghers)Irregular horse (Natal Carabineers, Buffalo Border Guard, New-castle Rifles)Natal Mounted PoliceMounted Natal NativesNatal HussarsSikali Native HorseVarious volunteers

Infantry Natal Native Contingent Natal Native Pioneers As the diagram indicates, the columns Chelmsford organized for the invasion of Zululand were the equivalent of combined-arms brigades. Each had infantry, artillery and mounted troops, as well as auxiliaries. British infantry still employed traditional linear tactics, though all the troops could also fight as skirmishers. The infantry’s employment of the Martini-Henry breech-loading rifle did much to increase their firepower, though that could not make up for bad tactical dispositions. Artillery in-cluded cannon, rockets and Gatling guns.

Mounted infantry in the British Army were ad hoc units raised from infantry battalions and used for re-connaissance and screening. The other mounted troops were raised from British colonists, Boers, and friendly “natives.” These often had considerable experience in mobile “bush” warfare. Later in the course of the cam-paign, the British brought in two regular cavalry regi-ments. The 17th Lancers made a parade ground charge as the last act of the British victory at Ulundi.


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For their triumph against 20:1 odds, the Rorke’s Drift defenders offset the debacle of Isandlwana and won themselves 11 Victoria Crosses. Bromhead and Chard were promoted to majors and later granted an audience with Queen Victoria. For the Zulus, however, the aftermath was another story.

A Spear Thrust into the Nation Cetshwayo had lost one-tenth of his entire army killed between Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift, and many other warriors were so crippled they would nev-er again be able to fight. If so few British could kill so many Zulus, what chance did the nation have in future battles after yet more of the fearsomely armed soldiers arrived? Cetshwayo made his famous statement that Isandlwana had thrust a spear into the belly of the Zulu nation. Rorke’s Drift had twisted that spear. Ironically enough, the Zulus had pulled out some-

Zulu RegimentsuMbonambi UveuMcijo uDlokouNdi uMxhaphouThulwana iNdlondlouVe iNdluyengweUmbakanli iNgobamakhosiUmcityu uNokhenkeUndiUlundiTulwana

The Zulu army had three general echelons of units: regiments (ibutho), corps (consisting of several regiments), and armies. Regiments were usually formed from men of a common age group. Attrition and combat could cause them to muster anywhere from a few hundred to a couple thousand men. Zulu “corps” were named after a prominent military kraal (village). Commanding officers of each echelon were known as induna. The induna were responsible for discipline, appointing lower-ranking officers and frequently, but not always, commanded the unit in the field. The term impi is frequently used for a Zulu regiment, though it actu-ally meant any body of armed warriors—it’s much closer to the modern sense of “task force.”

Arriving at 8:00 a.m. Chelmsford was astonished to find the garrison at Rorke’s Drift had survived. He and his men had seen the smoke and heard the gunfire the previous afternoon while they were still too far away to help, and after what had happened to their position at Isandlwana they assumed the worst had transpired at the Drift. His Lordship took a full report from Chard—the defenders had 15 men killed in the fighting and 12 wounded, two of whom died later. No exact count was made of Zulu dead, but more than 400 corpses were piled around the barricades, with still more in the sur-rounding brush. Dabulamanzi’s men doubtless carried away an unknown number.

Marching to Ulundi: British naval brigade in Zululand.


The Martini-Henry Rifle The British infantry in the Zulu War was armed with the “Rifle, Martini-Henry Mk 1.” It was a breech-loading, single-shot piece with a caliber of 0.45 inches (11.4mm). It used a Martini breech mechanism and me-tallic cartridges. The barrel was designed by Alexander Henry, hence the name. There was also a carbine ver-sion. The Henry-Martini could deliver what was, for the time, a devastating amount of accurate firepower.

thing of an “operational victory” (as it would be called today) during the opening stages of the campaign. Ef-fectively, Cetshwayo had taken advantage of his cen-tral position to defeat in detail each of Chelmsford’s columns. Col. Wood’s northern column suffered something of a rout at Hlobane on 28 March, though repulsing the Zulus at Kambula the following day. Regardless, it was then pretty much out of action. Col. Pearson’s eastern column had crossed the Tulega River into Zulu territory on 12 January, beating off a Zulu attack at the Inyezane. But with the northern and central columns effectively neutralized, Pearson’s command could go no farther. He dug in at Eshowe. A relief force led by Chelmsford himself finally marched in, defeating the Zulus at Gingindlovu on 2 April. Chelmsford’s cam-paign plan was in tatters. He fell back to reorganize at Natal. The disaster at Isandhlwana had convinced London to send reinforcements. And Chelmsford felt it neces-sary to win as quickly as possible before someone in the Home Office made the decision to have him re-lieved for incompetence. With a new army in hand, he re-entered Zululand in May, this time keeping his forces concentrated. His objective: the Zulu capital of Ulundi, for which the Zulus had to fight. Cetshwayo also saw Ulundi as his objective, con-centrating his regiments for a stand in defense of the Zulu order. On 4 July 1879 the two armies met. Chelmsford’s plan was to form a huge square and let British firepower shoot to pieces the incoming impis. The Zulus obliged by attacking and were shot to piec-es. The proud Zulu army was broken. Cetshwayo was captured, then sent to London where he proved a popular celebrity guest. If the Zu-lus had ever, as Frere so confidently affirmed, been a threat to the Crown, that menace had been removed. Zululand was incorporated into the British Empire.

SourcesBallard, C. John Dunn: The White Chief of Zululand, Donker, Craighall, 1985.Ballard, C. Duminy, A. The Anglo-Zulu War: New Perspectives, University of

Natal Press, 1981.Bancroft, J.W. Rorke’s Drift, Spellmount & Ashanti Publishing, 1991.Farewell, B. Queen Victoria’s Little Wars, Norton Publishing, 1972.Laband, John. (editor) Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign, 1878-1879, Alan

Sutton Publishing, 1994.Perrett, Bryan. Last Stand!: Famous Battles Against the Odds, Castle Books,

2003.

Ready for action.

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S&Tupcomingfeatures

#251 Cobra. Double-sized wargame on the Normandy campaign, 1944; plus plenty of variant counters.#252 The New Mexico Campaign. The Wild West gets wilder as Confederate & Union armies clash in the New

Mexico territory.#253 Kursk: The German Summer Offensive, July 1943. Germany’s last chance in the east, and one of the big-

gest tank battles in history.#254 Hannibal’s War. Multi-player game of the Second Punic War, using a derivative of the 1066 system.#255 First Battle of Britain. German air forces in English skies, 1917-18.

Visitwww.strategyandtacticspress.comforpreviewsoftheseissues.

Work In Progress

ThenewmexicoCampaign,1862

The Civil War in the Far West: The New Mexico Cam-paign, 1862 (NMC for short), is a two-player, low-to-intermediate complexity, simulation of the Confederate invasion of the US southwest. It’s primarily a strategic-level design, but it also contains operational undertones. The Confederate player is generally on the offensive, but the situation also calls for the Union player to make coun-terattacks. Each hexagon on the map represents approximately nine miles (14.6 kilometers) from side to opposite side. The units of maneuver for both sides are represented us-ing a “strength point” system in which each point equals approximately 100 men. Each artillery unit represents about six guns. Each game turn represents half a month. The Confederate combat units are illustrated with cav-alry icons; those of the Union are shown as infantry. That was a broad compromise adopted due to the historic fact both “armies” engaged here—which, in reality, amounted to roughly a reinforced brigade on each side—are prob-ably best described as combined-arms dragoon-and-foot forces. Their unit compositions varied, as did their com-bat tactics, with the day-to-day availability of remounts and other supplies. Since the main sub-component of the Confederate force was known as Sibley’s Cavalry Brigade, while the Union roster was primarily made up of infantry compa-nies, we went with the icon presentation you see on the counters. There is no distinction between “infantry units” or “cavalry units.” The only unit-type distinction among non-artillery formations that matters systemically is the one between Union “regular” and “militia” units.


Attention S&T readers: We’re al-ways looking for authors for FYI for Strategy & Tactics and the new World at War magazine. If you’d like to try your hand at writing short (under 2,000 words), pithy articles for this column, on virtually any aspect of military his-tory, contact Ty Bomba, FYI editor, at: [email protected].

FO R YO U R I N F O R M A T I O N

DidyouKnow?Despite what the • CSI television series would seem to indicate, the largest assemblage of foren-sic investigative personnel on the planet belongs to the US Army’s Central Identifi cation Laboratory Hawaii (CILH). That unit has 250 military and civilian per-sonnel and is headquartered at Hickam Air Force Base. Its mis-sion is to locate and identify the remains of the roughly 90,000 US military personnel still unac-counted for from World War II, Korea, Vietnam and the Cold War. Since starting its work in 1973, the lab has identifi ed 1,050 sets of remains. Update bulletins on their latest efforts can be found at www.jpac.pacom.milThe remains of some 78,000 • US military personnel killed in World War II still remain unlocated and unidentifi ed. The corresponding fi gure for the Korean War is 8,100, while for the Vietnam War it’s 1,900, and for all other Cold War actions it’s 50.Today, within a three-mile radius • of downtown Ypres, Belgium, there lie the remains of over 100,000 unrecovered bodies of World War I soldiers. They’re the “missing in action” from the savage battles fought in and around that locale from 1914 to 1918.

The overall death rate for US • military personnel serving in Iraq is four per 1,000 per year. The rate during the Vietnam War was 22 per 1,000 per year.In Iraq, the Marine Corps death • rate is twice that of the Army, nine times higher than that of the Navy, and 23 times more than that of the Air Force.Considering all US service • members serving in Iraq by rank, the most deadly is that of USMC lance corporal.Among US Army units in Iraq, • active-duty members are three times more likely to be killed than their comrades in the Army Reserve. Among the Marines, however, there is no difference in the death rates between ac-tive-duty and reservists.Throughout the Iraq war so far, • women serving there in the US military have had an overall death rate one-sixth that of their male counterparts.In terms of race and ethnicity, • Hispanics serving in Iraq face a proportionately higher death rate than non-Hispanics, while blacks suffer a lower death rate than whites.From the start of Operation Iraqi • Freedom through the end of 2006, one out of every 31 US military personnel serving in that country was wounded.

aTaleofTwoIslands China and its relationship with Taiwan continue to be a geopolitical fl ash point, one of the last remaining from the Cold War, though perhaps not as dangerous as the situation on the Korean peninsula. Since Tai-wan looks so small on the map, the question arises why did the mainland communist regime not take it over? The simple answer in this case is that oceanography was destiny. The differing fates of Taiwan compared to the other major Chinese island of Hainan illustrate the point. Both islands are of similar size. Hainan is about 13,500 square miles in size, a bit smaller than Taiwan. Hainan is opposite the southernmost coast of China, only 10 miles from the main-land, while Taiwan is 100 miles from the coast. The People’s Republic of China celebrates 1 October 1949 as its founding day, commemorating the victory of the Communist forces in China’s long civil war. On that day Mao Zedong appeared at a vast cer-emony in Beijing to announce “China has stood up!” That was a reference to the century of weakness China had just gone through, having been carved up by colonial powers, followed by strife among warlords, then the civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists, then the Japanese inva-sion, then more civil war. Even so, there was some tidying up called for. Several outlying regions were not yet under the party’s control. Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek still had a few embattled forces left on the mainland, in the south and west of the country, plus on the two large off-shore islands of Hainan and Taiwan, along with a few smaller ones. At that

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“He who does something at the head of one regiment

will eclipse him who does nothing at the head of 100

regiments.”—Abraham Lincoln, 31 December 1861


“

time the Nationalists still clung to their offi cial capital at Chengdu in the far west, and even farther west was Tibet which was not under Chinese control. Those interior positions were cut off from the outside world and were therefore doomed to fall, especially once Gen. Lu Han, Nationalist gov-ernor of Yunan province in the south, switched to the Communist side. Thousands of Nationalist soldiers then surrendered or fl ed to French Indochina. That left Chiang with just the islands. On 8 December 1949 the Taiwanese city of Taipei became the new Nationalist capital. As for Hainan, the Communists were eager to take it, not only to further the unifi cation of the country, but also for the island’s rich iron ore deposits as well as its coal and oil. As the Nationalist position collapsed across the mainland, thousands more of Chiang’s troops fl ed to Hainan and Taiwan. Taiwan stayed out of Mao’s clutches. Hainan’s fate was different. There was nothing subtle about Mao’s

strategy for taking Hainan, no clever outmaneuvering the enemy. Basically, it involved pouring in endless waves of soldiers, regardless of the cost in casualties, until the other side fi nally broke. October and November 1949 saw some 100,000 Nationalist troops escape to Hainan, though the exact number has never been determined. As the Washington Post reported on 31 October of that year, the narrow strait “was swarming with junks and makeshift craft ferrying the National-ists to safety.” Further, there was al-ready present on Hainan a garrison of some 80,000 other Nationalist troops. Last, there was also a Communist guerilla force of 20,000 to 50,000, holding the interior third of the island. In preparation for the impending Communist attack, the Nationalists on 3 December declared the seas around Hainan a war zone. Civilian ships were to come no closer than 12 miles. Chiang also announced he would fi ght to keep Hainan as well as Taiwan. Nor did his forces confi ne themselves to defense. On 28 December, for example, Nationalist forces attacked Communist troops, docks and military stores on Liuchow peninsula, the part of the mainland closest to Hainan. There followed three and a half months of combat. The Commu-nists would launch an attack and the Nationalists would drive them back. Both sides would then make infl ated claims of victory. The fi rst conventional assault by the Communists was on 29 Decem-ber. It was a small operation intended merely to probe the island’s defenses. Though that attack was defeated, a few Communist troops managed to land and move inland to join the guerillas. As the New Year began, the Communists tried a second time and were again driven off. On 7 January 1950, Chiang’s forces claimed they sank 500 junks out of an invasion armada of 1,000 vessels. On 18 Janu-ary the defenders claimed to have wrecked another junk fl eet of over 2,500 vessels, thereby making further invasion attempts impossible, at least for a while. The Nationalist air force

also attacked the mainland cities of Shanghai, Nanking and Canton. All the same, Communist forces kept building, and by 29 January there were over 5,000 junks and other small craft ready to attack again. Those forces, and the inland guerillas, were then preemptively attacked by the Nationalists. Even so, the 10 Feb-ruary edition of the Post would still report the “almost overnight appear-ance of nearly 3,000 junks and other boats along the coast and on Liuchow peninsula.” The mainland’s manpower seemed limitless. On 7 March some 1,000 Communist troops managed to land on the northwest corner of Hainan, apparently as a probe. On 1 April, Chiang’s forces repelled yet another attack, this time of only 50 boats. And then, fi nally, came the main effort. An invasion force gathered by Gen. Lin Piao dwarfed the earlier operations. Eight full armies were gathered together. Each army had 10,000 to 20,000 soldiers, for a total of 100,000. On 17 April, 3,000 to 9,000 of those men established a beachhead on the island’s north shore, about 21 miles west of the local capital of Hoihow. The Communists then poured reinforcements into that beachhead. On 21 April the Nationalists claimed those invaders had also been defeated, but just three days after that the Communists marched unopposed into Hoihow. On Taiwan, Chiang refused to send reinforcements, writ-ing Hainan off as a lost cause. By 23 April, four ships had been gathered at Hainan’s south coast port of Yulin to evacuate as many Nationalists as possible. On 3 May the Nationalists of-fi cially admitted the loss of Hainan while claiming to have also evacuated 60,000 of their soldiers and a great amount of supplies. The remaining defenders stranded on the island were left to fend for themselves. They either surrendered or defected to the Communists. The fi nal battle for Taiwan itself was rumored to be set for the summer, but it never came off. By 22 May the



Communist regime had turned its attention to Tibet. So Taiwan was spared the Great Leap Forward, the Red Guards, the Gang of Four, and the rest of it. Geography or, rather, oceanography, was that island’s salvation. To cross the 100 miles of ocean to reach Taiwan from the mainland would have required a regular naval fl eet, not a swarm of fi shing boats. That fl eet would have also needed air cover. For Hainan, however, junks had been enough to cover such a short distance. The Communists could always fi nd more such boats or quickly build new ones to replace any lost in battle. However many times the defenders drove off the invaders, but in the end the Communists could always replace their losses, try again, and reduce the Nationalists to the breaking point. The mainland Chinese military leaders would use the same hu-man-wave tactics against UN forces in Korea during the war there just a few months later. The Chinese nearly succeeded there, too, driving back the UN army that had been drawing near the Korean-Chinese border. Of course, that situation was fi nally stabilized near the demarcation line between South and North Korea and, after nearly two more years of fi ghting, a ceasefi re was signed. Thus the world has been left with two potential fl ashpoints from the 1950s. The same North Korean regime is still in power, armed to the teeth despite the deaths of millions from hunger, and is still rattling its saber. Meanwhile, mainland China is in the midst of a vast military buildup. The Beijing regime is also building a “blue water” navy. However the Taiwan issue is ultimately resolved, one thing is certain: it won’t involve a fl eet of junks.

~John Lockwood

forcesinIraqThe Peshmerga The Kurds’ peshmerga militia is undoubtedly America’s greatest ally in Iraq. Nicknamed the “Peshrambo” by US soldiers, peshmerga literally means, “those who face death.” The peshmerga numbers over 75,000 well-trained and battle-hardened fi ghters. Their reputation was pur-chased with blood throughout the 20th century. The peshmerga traces its roots back to militia cavalry formed at the behest of the Ottoman emperor in the 1890s. They were a presence on World War I battlefi elds in the Middle East. After World War II, they fought the Iranians, trying to establish their own republic. During the 1960s and 1970s, they fought two guerilla wars in Iraq. They also fought Saddam Hussein’s forces during the Kurd-

1 October 1949: Mao Tse Tung declares the People’s Republic of China.

ish revolt that followed the end of the 1991 Gulf War. After Kurdistan became semi-independent and was brought under the protection of the US, the peshmerga’s two factions, the Kurdish Democratic Party (led by Masoud Barazani, president of the Kurdish region within Iraq) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (led by Jalal Talabani, currently president of Iraq), engaged in open civil war. In the lead-up to 2003’s Opera-tion Iraqi Freedom, peshmerga troops enjoyed a close relationship with US Special Forces, helping them gather intelligence on Iraqi forces as well as the Kurdish terrorist group Ansar al-Islam. When the war began, the peshmerga placed itself under the command of the US 10th Special Forces Group, conducted several

operations against Ansar al-Islam, and joined American troops in the attack on Iraqi units on the northern border (the Green Line). As Saddam’s army disintegrated, peshmerga forces surrounded and occupied Kirkuk and Mosul in advance of the US mili-tary. Over 26,000 peshmerga were involved in the fi ghting, a signifi cant addition to the Coalition order of battle. Since the fall of Saddam, pesh-merga battalions have been active in the battle against the insurgency. Peshmerga forces have initiated a border patrol and stand watch over Iraq’s oil pipeline. They also accom-pany American troops in the fi eld, act-ing as guides and translators. When insurgents overran police stations in Mosul in November 2004, a pair of

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Kurdish battalions were sent to retake them. While the peshmerga is in reality an independent force, nine of its bat-talions have been at least nominally integrated into regular Iraqi Army brigades. Kurdish leaders have also worked to ensure Iraqi Army units stationed in the north are heavily in-fused with Kurds. Reportedly, 90 per-cent of Iraq’s 2nd Division, stationed in and around Mosul, is Kurdish. In nearby Kirkuk, the 4th Division is also heavily Kurdish. As of mid-2007, Iraqi Kurdis-tan has been persuaded to remain an autonomous region within Iraq. Should the American mission in Iraq fail, Iraqi Kurdistan will most likely declare independence. Were that to happen, the new nation would already have a formidable army, as well as millions of brethren living in the neighboring states of Turkey and Iran. Iraqi 1st Special Forces Brigade The Iraqi 1st Special Forces Brigade is currently the best unit in the Iraqi Army. The brigade numbers about 1,800 men and is divided into four battalions: the 1st Iraqi Coun-ter Terrorism Task Force, the 2nd Commando Battalion, the 3rd Special Operations Support Battalion, and the 4th Special Operations Training Battalion. The brigade is commanded by Col. Fadhil Jameel al-Barwari, a Kurd with years of experience in the peshmerga. The brigade was formed in 2004 and was fi rst trained in Jordan by Jor-danian and US Special Forces. It later

relocated to Baghdad. Recruits go through rigorous training similar to what their American counterparts are subjected to, including physical hard-ship and sleep deprivation. Brigade troops are better armed and equipped than regular Iraqi soldiers, using M-4 carbines, night vision equipment, and up-armored Humvees. Over half the men had combat experience before joining the brigade. In November 2004, 1st Battalion went into Fallujah with the US Marines during Operation Al Fajir (The Dawn). In March 2006, 1st Bat-talion fl awlessly rescued a retired government minister held hostage in Baghdad. Later that month, the 1st and 2nd Battalions raided an insurgent safe house in northeastern Baghdad, killing 16 insurgents and arresting 15 more. That mission was planned and executed entirely by the ISF Brigade, and therefore represented a major step forward for the Iraqi Army.Anbar Salvation Council The Anbar Salvation Council is a loose knit organization of 25 Sunni tribes that have come together to fi ght al-Qaeda in Iraq. While not overly sympathetic to the US or even to the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the tribes have grown weary of the war and al-Qaeda’s indiscriminate attacks on Shia and Sunni civilians. “My father was killed,” said Ahmad Abureeshah, head the Council’s security force. ”They [al-Qaeda] killed my three brothers. Fourteen Sheiks from our fellow tribes were killed. They killed many of our people. So my brother and I called the other sheiks to join us.” The council was formed in Sep-tember 2006 with government support and says it can fi eld 30,000-armed militia. Those forces are becoming increasingly aggressive. According to an article in the 25 January 2007 edition of USA Today, Anbar Salva-tion Council militia have assassinated “six high ranking Sunni insurgents,” battled an al-Qaeda cell in Ramadi, and have been helping American troops locate insurgent hideouts on the Syrian border.

~William Stroock

Britain’sroyalnavyToday&Tomorrow On 23 March 2007, a total of 15 British sailors and Royal Marines on patrol off the HMS Cornwall were seized by Iranian patrol boats and taken prisoner. Possessing a fl eet that amounts to little more than a collec-tion of aging frigates and destroy-ers supplemented by a trio of small aircraft carriers, Britain lacked the means to rescue that personnel. There ensued a two-week standoff in which Iran paraded the captives before television cameras, infl icting on Brit-ish arms in general, and the Royal Navy in particular, one of the greatest humiliations in their modern history. While the Royal Navy will likely never again “rule the waves,” as it did during the 18th and 19th centuries, its days of that degree of impotence are coming to an end. A construction pro-gram is under way that will give the once proud service more reach than at any time since the Falklands War. The centerpiece of the reviving fl eet will be the two Future Aircraft Carriers (CVF), the Queen Elizabeth and the Prince of Wales. Those vessels will dwarf the current Invincible-class carriers, each displacing over 65,000 tons and carrying crews of 1,450. The CVF are capable of 25 knots and, interestingly, they’ve been de-signed with two “islands” above deck. The forward one contains the bridge, while the aft houses fl ight control for the air wing of 40 planes (36 F-36B Joint Strike Fighters and four airborne early warning craft). Produced by Lockheed Martin, the F-36B “Lightning” is a stealthy short takeoff and vertical landing aircraft that fulfi lls the Royal Navy’s requirements for both air superiority and ground attack fi ghter. A package including Sidewinder and AMRAAM missiles is envisioned for aerial combat, while each of them will also be armed with a pair of JDAM bombs for ground attack. Each package is housed inside a pair of weapons bays located on the aircraft’s fl anks. The Lightning can attain a maximum speed of Mach 1.8, which far exceeds that of the old Sea Harrier.



New Type 45 air defense de-stroyers will be defending the CVF closer to sea level. They will mount state-of-the-art Sampson multi-func-tion radars, which can track dozens of incoming targets at the same time. There’s also the S1850M long-range radar for tracking more distant aircraft and ships. Those targets will be en-gaged by a Principle Anti-Air System (PAS), featuring a vertical launcher that can carry up to 48 long-range missiles. The Type 45s are also to be outfi tted with a main gun for ship and shore bombardment, a torpedo tube, and a Lynx anti-submarine helicopter. In addition to their own crews of 225, each Type 45 will carry a section of Royal Marine commandos for board-ing operations. Eight such ships are planned, and they’re expected to have a top speed of 27 knots. The Royal Navy’s submarine force is also being upgraded. That branch’s mission is especially im-portant, as Parliament has decided to vest it with Great Britain’s entire nuclear deterrent. Toward that end, the Royal Navy presently deploys four Vanguard-class missile subma-rines. Those boats feature 16 tubes, each carrying a Trident D5 ballistic missile, each of which in turn has maximum payloads of 12 warheads. The bulk of the submarine service’s attack boats will continue to be Trafalgar-class SSN. They’re undergoing an upgrade that includes enhanced command, communication and propulsion systems. Like the surface fl eet, however, the submarine service is also getting new state-of-the-art vessels in the form of Astute-class nuclear powered attack boats. The Astute-class has six weapons tubes, capable of fi ring torpedoes or Tomahawk cruise missiles. They can stay at sea for 90 days, and will never need to be refueled over their course of their entire service lives. The Royal Navy’s surface units are organized into two fl otillas, one based out of Portsmouth, which includes all three of the current Invin-cible-class carriers, eight destroyers and six frigates. The other fl otilla is based out of Devensport, home of the fl eet’s assault ships as well as its

Trafalgar-class attack submarines, four Type 22 and seven Type 23 frigates. There’s a facility at Clyde, housing the Vanguard and the soon to be retired Swiftsure-class subs. There’s also a trio of naval air stations (Yeovilton, Caldruse and Caledonia), which operate numerous helicopter and air surveillance squadrons. During the summer of 2007, the Royal Navy operated fi ve patrols worldwide: Atlantic Patrol, encom-passing the bulk of the fl eet; Middle East Patrol, with HMS Richmond and parts of 814, 845 and 846 Squad-rons; South Atlantic Patrol, with HMS Southampton and HMS Clyde; Mediterranean Patrol, with HMS Northumberland and HMS Middle-ton; and Far East Patrol, with HMS Monmouth. During the hostage crisis, some suggested the British retaliate by seizing Khark Island, site of an oil refi nery and pipeline through which pass 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports. There’s a pumping station off the island’s eastern shore with a pipeline and causeway bringing in oil from the fi elds at Gachsaran and Ahvaz. There is also a small port opposite the pumping station, along with ports on the southeastern and northeastern shores of the island as well. There is a small oil terminal on the southeast-ern shore, and a larger facility off the western shore capable of loading three tankers at once. The southwest-ern side of the island has dozens of oil storage tanks of various sizes. There’s an airstrip on the island’s north end and a town as well. The northeastern quadrant is militarized, featuring an army base with a large barracks, earthen revetments and belowground concrete bunkers. Khark Island is valuable and vulnerable to a naval assault. By the middle of the next decade, Great Britain will again be capable of rapidly mounting an assault on a target the size of Khark Island. To do so the Royal Navy could form two task forces, one organized around HMS Queen Elizabeth, the other centered on HMS Prince of Wales, each supported by a pair of Type 45 destroyers, a trio of Type 23 Frigates

and a Sandown-class mine hunter. Ideally, on such an operation, one task force would control the Straits of Hormuz while the other dominated the waters immediately around Khark Island. Once air superiority had been established, a third task force, based on the assault ship HMS Albion, could land, via helicopters, a Royal Marine commando group of 900 men. At the same time, shipborne boarding parties could seize each oil terminal and port facility. The operation could be sup-ported by an RAF contingent based from a nearby friendly nation, such as Bahrain, of two Typhoon F-2 fi ghter squadrons and two updated Tornado GR4 fi ghter-bomber squadrons. The Royal Navy can point to many great victories in its history: Trafalgar, Jutland, and the Falklands. With the imminent arrival of the new aircraft carriers and their state-of-the-art fi ghters, the Royal Navy will again be capable of adding other names to that list. The Royal Navy TodayAircraft Carriers: Invincible, Illustri-

ous, Ark RoyalAmphibious Assault Ships: Ocean,

Albion, BulwarkType 42 Destroyers: Exeter, South-

ampton, Nottingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Gloucester, York, Edinburgh

Type 23 Frigates: Argyll, Lancaster, Iron Duke, Monmouth, Montrose, Westminster, Northumberland, Richmond, Somerset, Sutherland, Kent, Portland, St. Albans

Type 22 Frigates: Cornwall, Cumber-land, Cambeltown, Chatham

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Vanguard-class Submarines: Vanguard, Victorious, Vigilant, Vengeance

Swiftsure-class Submarines: Trafal-gar, Turbulent, Tirless, Torbay, Trenchant, Talent, Triumph

Sandown-class Mine Hunters (Mine Counter Measures Squadron I): Bangor, Blyth, Grimsby, Pem-broke, Penzance, Ramsey, Shore-ham, Walney

Hunt-class Mine Hunters (Mine Counter Measures Squadron II): Ledbury, Cattistock, Brocklesby, Middleton, Chiddingfold, Hur-worth, Atherstone, Quorn

~William Stroock

militarymoderniza-tion:ThePersonnelDimension

When analyzing any country’s military modernization, most defense commentators focus on its acquisition of newer more advanced weapons, sensors and communication systems. They usually ignore the personnel dimension, yet military equipment is of little use if armed forces’ personnel can’t operate it effectively or lack the skills to maintain and repair the new systems. Countries that concentrate solely on acquiring new equip-ment often fi nd themselves saddled with large inventories of inoperable systems and a military that can’t employ its weapons effectively on the battlefi eld. Those that balance their resources between personnel and equipment enjoy a higher readiness and operational success rate, but must then choose between modern-izing slowly and expending massive outlays of funding. Despite its rapidly growing economy providing more fi nancial resources, China has chosen the patient path to military moderniza-tion. Supported by an unprecedented pace of economic growth, China has been modernizing its military forces, doctrinally as well in inventory, over the last 20 years. Beijing’s purchases of Russian conventionally powered submarines, surface-to-air missiles

and fourth generation fi ghters have totaled almost $3 billion a year. Less well known but equally impressive has been the acquisition of Western command, control, communication and computer systems (C4), as well as radars, other sensors and propul-sion systems from France, Germany and Israel. Other than their large-scale reduc-tions in personnel strength, however, China’s equally signifi cant military personnel reforms have largely have gone unreported outside that nation’s own media. The assimilation of in-creasingly complex high-technology equipment has placed a premium on developing the maintenance and tacti-cal skills required to operate the new systems entering the Chinese inven-tory. Many military departments and commands have therefore established relationships with universities and technical schools to provide training and specialized recruits. More importantly, they’ve raised the education and training require-ments for offi cer commissioning and promotion. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) now emphasizes techni-cal and professional training over political indoctrination and has estab-lished a goal of requiring all offi cers to have a bachelor’s degree by 2012, and all fi eld grade offi cers (major and above) a master’s degree by 2015. Other personnel reforms call for increasing the training and education

of the professional non-commissioned offi cers corps. In addition to the lead-ership and tactical training provided by the PLA’s academies and schools, all technical NCOs must now com-plete professional certifi cation in their fi eld by making use of the educational resources in their community. The goal is to strengthen the cohesion of military units, enhance their technical capabilities, and enable them to respond more fl exibly to battlefi eld conditions by making the NCOs the backbone of the PLA in a fashion similar to that of Western armies. All of which has given rise to the proliferation of online courses, fl y-in computer technology training teams, and the establishment of fl eet and army-level technology training schools. Training has also intensifi ed, though rising fuel and other operat-ing costs have placed a premium on time in the fi eld. Political and military leaders therefore increasingly extol the virtues of computer simulations in both individual and collective train-ing. Several years ago, Chinese naval and technical journals dedicated much space to the applications, challenges and advantages of computer-based training. Though not an effective substitute for live operations under realistic fi eld, at-sea, or in-the-air exercises, simulations are useful in teaching trouble shooting, both tacti-cal and technical, and the underlying


50issuesago,S&T200: french foreign Legion. The 200th is-

sue of S&T with three Joseph Miranda designs on French 19th century colonial campaigns. Tim Kutta pens the lead, while S&T veteran Charles Kamps ana-lyzes the air war over North Vietnam. Plenty of special features as the S&Teditor provides his analysis of the future of modern warfare: Jim Dunnigan pro-vides some arcane wisdom on simulating reality, and Col. Wilbur Gray provides a short history of wargaming. There’s also an index of the fi rst 199 issues of S&T.

100Issuesago,S&T150:Salerno. Another entry in John Schettler’s

series on the Italian campaign. Then back to the classical world as Richard Berthold marches along with Alexander the Great and the Macedonian army. Finally, Ste-ven Fratt follows up the previous issue with weapons and tactics of the Franco-Prussian War.

150Issuesago,S&T100:Superpowers at War. The 100th issue

of S&T with the theme of possible near-future war in Europe by David Cook and Doug Niles. Prolifi c author L. Sprague de Camp looks at ancient war machines, super-weapons of the classical world. Richard Berg reviews games while Al Nofi provides a complete order of battle for the US armed forces. SPI veterans Greg Costikyan and Dave Isby give their retrospectives on S&T and SPI.

200Issuesago,S&T50:Battle for Germany. Wargame by the

duo of Jim Dunnigan and Red Simonsen simulating the last stand of the Third Reich using a unique system in which players take command of the Western Allies and the Red Army racing to Ber-lin. Lead article by Stephen B. Patrick. Then David Isby spans the era of the Dreadnought battleship.

� e Long Tradition:

next IssueCobra. Double sized wargame on the Normandy campaign, 1944, including the D-Day landings plus variant coun-ters for Twilight of the Ottomans, Winged Horse and SEALORDS.Future articles. A new look at tercio and regiment in 30 Years War armies, a short history of the Israeli Air Force, and China from the Warring Kingdoms to Mao.

principles and procedures involved in weapons employ-ment over a range of operational circumstances. Another unreported aspect of those initiatives has been the military’s need to compete with China’s burgeoning civilian economy in recruiting and retain-ing qualifi ed personnel. Patriotism and national pride bring candidates to the ranks, but pay, quality of life, and career opportunities have surfaced as factors affecting retention. Those issues also affect military demograph-ics, bringing in fewer recruits from the peasantry and more from the emerging middle class. As a result, modernization and economic growth have generated a need to allocate an increasing propor-tion of China’s defense money to housing, pay and fam-ily issues. At the moment, it’s estimated China spends less than 20 percent of its defense money on personnel costs, but those costs are the fastest growing component of the defense budget. By 2020, China may well be spending as much on personnel as its Western coun-terparts (who spend up to 60 percent of their budgets on personnel). The Chinese military may also have to become as sensitive to casualties as its Western counter-parts. All that, however, is the price to be paid for a technologically adept and operationally fl exible military force in the 21st century. To paraphrase an old US Navy recruiting slogan: “People aren’t the only thing. People are everything.”

~Carl Otis Schuster

150Issuesago,S&T100:150Issuesago,S&T100:

Battle for Germany.

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Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries the mainstay of the British Empire’s power was the Royal Navy. The navy protected the far-fl ung colonial and com-mercial interests of the empire and projected its power globally. The British subscribed to the “Two Navy Standard.” That meant if the Royal Navy were more powerful than the fl eets of the next two powers com-bined, the British Empire would be secure. As the 19th

century closed, Britain’s two main rivals were France and Russia. Both of those powers were land-based, and their fl eets were secondary in the overall scheme of their armed forces’ importance. But on the conti-nent a new power was emerging to challenge British naval dominance. In 1871 the various German kingdoms and prin-cipalities unifi ed into a single state. At that time Ger-many was Europe’s predominant land military power, having bested Denmark, Austria-Hungary and France in a series of wars. But the German Navy was large-ly a coastal defense force. When Wilhelm II became Kaiser in 1890, he advocated the creation of a pow-erful ocean-going fl eet. The diffi culty was in fi nding someone to head a program to build the new navy. The kaiser found a man with the vision to challenge the

British Empire on the high seas, Alfred Tirpitz, who was appointed Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Offi ce in 1897.

Rise of the German Navy In 1853 Prussia was an independent state. Prussia’s King Frederick William IV saw the need for a small navy to supplement his powerful army. He created the fi rst Prussian admiralty under Adm. Adalbert. The king persuaded the Duke of Oldenburg to sell a 50 square mile plot of land on Jade Bay to his government, which would become the naval base of Wilhelmshaven. After defeating Denmark in a short war (1864), the Prus-sians annexed the Kiel Fjord and began construction of the Kiel naval base on the Baltic Sea. Adm. Adalbert proposed building a small fl eet of 20 armored warships. The fi rst ironclad, Arminius, was launched in 1864. It was followed in 1867 by the iron-clad Frederick Karl, purchased from France. Adalbert used sailors trained in the merchant marine to man his little fl eet. The Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) was a triumph of German arms over France. In addition to defeating Napoleon III’s France, the war resulted in the German

Th e First Arms Race: German–British Naval Rivalry & the Opening of the Great WarBy Lew Ritter


states unifying under the leadership of Prussia. How-ever, for the new German navy it was a less than glori-ous debut. The ironclads stayed bottled up at anchor rather than risking a battle with the superior French fleet. One problem facing the German navy was it had been placed under control of an army general. He had little idea about what to do with the fledgling fleet. The consensus was for it to consist of ironclads and tor-pedo boats for coastal defense, but the new kaiser had other ideas. Among other things, he was a student of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan was the premier theorist on naval strategy of the late 19th century. His book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, stressed a strong ocean-going fleet as a projector of a state’s power. Wilhelm believed if Germany were to become a power to rival Britain or France, it would have to have an overseas empire with colonies and global trade. He saw the navy as an instrument of that new empire. He envisioned a large ocean-going fleet, built on the British model. That fleet would protect far-flung German colonies and gain Germany her “place in the sun.” Wilhelm created his own naval secretariat, inde-pendent of army control. The Admiralty was divided into two parts: the High Command (Oberkomando), responsible for planning strategy and battle tactics; and the Imperial Naval office (Reichsmarine), which would design and build warships. But the kaiser still faced two problems. First, most of the German states were without a naval tradition. The public at large failed to see the need for a fleet. During the first 10 years of Wilhelm’s reign, his desire for a modern navy had been constantly thwarted by the reluctance of the Reichstag (the German Parliament) to spend money on what they saw to be little more than a vanity project. It preferred to lavish money on the war-winning army. The kaiser countered that, in any future major war, enemy fleets could blockade German ports and thus cripple the economy by depriving industry of raw ma-terials. Just as critically, Germany was becoming in-creasingly dependent on foreign imports of food, and a naval blockade might mean starvation for the civilian populace.

Enter Tirpitz One evening Alfred Tirpitz was invited to a dinner with the kaiser along with several senior naval officers. For most of the meal Tirpitz remained silent, listening to the endless debate between the kaiser and the admi-rals over such issues as the utility of commerce raiders. Pressed to express his opinion, Tirpitz gave a strong, forceful argument for development of a large fleet of first-class battleships. The young officer impressed the kaiser. Later, Tirpitz gave the kaiser a tersely worded document arguing for a strong ocean-going fleet ca-pable of standing up to the Royal Navy. Tirpitz argued

Alfred von Tirpitz – Naval Mastermind Alfred von Tirpitz was born in 1849 into a professional middle class Prus-sian family. His naval career included commanding the cruisers Prussen and Wurtemburg, and later the Ger-man Asian Squadron. Tirpitz was an emotional man given to manic moods of exhilaration and deep depression. He had a tendency to over analyze matters and devote his energies to the achievement of some particular end. His only sol-ace was in trips to his remote hunt-ing lodge in the Black Forest. Tirpitz could be ruthless and dom-ineering. He had little use for officers appointed simply for their aristocratic background. When subordinates would com-plain about having to deal with Tirpitz’s moods, the kaiser would simply lament: “You’ll have to get along with him, that’s what I have to do.” Still, Tirpitz was considered the most effective minister in imperial Germany and would become one of the closest advisers to the kaiser for almost 17 years. Despite his formidable demeanor, Tirpitz would coninvce the opponents of his naval program in the Reichstag. He would spend hours answering questions and leading escorted tours of the naval bases to win over reluctant parliamentarians. Within 10 months of his appointment as Secretary of State for the Imperial Naval office in 1897, Tirpitz had gotten the Reichstag to pass the first Supple-mentary Navy Law. It involved the building of seven new battle-ships and seven light cruisers. During World War I, Tirpitz became a proponent of unrestricted submarine warfare. Among other things, that led to his falling out with the kaiser. He resigned his position as naval secretary and later became involved in parliamentary politics.

a fleet of commerce raiding cruisers would be ineffec-tive. Germany didn’t have the bases around the world to support such wide-ranging warships. The cruisers would be picked off one by one by superior enemy fleet units. To make its power felt around the world, Germany must build a strong battlefleet. Tirpitz believed the most dangerous naval enemy was Britain. In 1896 the Royal Navy possessed 33 battleships compared to Germany’s six. Tirpitz fore-saw Germany could never out-build the British when it came to capital ships. In response, he created the concept of “Risk Theory” and the creation of a High Seas Fleet. Germany could have naval security with-out outbuilding the Royal Navy. If the planned Ger-man High Seas Fleet was powerful enough to inflict serious harm to the Royal Navy, the British would be reluctant to engage for fear of losing too many war-ships. Thus Germany could create a situation of naval balance without having more ships. Tirpitz stated the case for a High Seas Fleet forc-ibly: “We must diminish the military distance between

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the English and ourselves… not increase it. If we don’t succeed, then our naval policy is lost.” Without a fleet, Germany could not compete with the other European powers. In point of fact, the term “High Seas” was something of a misnomer, intended more for public consumption than being a statement of actual capabilities. The fleet Tirpitz would build would indeed include many capital ships, but its ability to control global seaways was limited. For one thing, Germany lacked the overseas bases to support naval operations outside the North Sea. The fleet was de-signed to operate in the North Sea and English Chan-nel, where the Royal Navy could be challenged and any blockade of German ports be broken. In March 1898, the First Supplementary Naval Bill passed in the Reichstag. Critics of the bill pointed out the primary target of such a fleet would be Great Brit-ain. They feared that would cause a rift in British-Ger-man relations. Despite the misgivings, Tirpitz, whose advocacy of the bill was instrumental in its passing, was promoted to the kaiser’s inner circle of advisors and granted the honorific of von Tirpitz.

Meanwhile the German public was getting behind the new navy. In April 1898, the German Naval League was formed by leading industrialists, including the Krupp family. The league played a major role in build-ing public opinion for a strong fleet and for turning Germany into a world power with colonies that could compete with those of the other European powers. London, meanwhile, looked at the new naval ri-val with suspicion. Lord Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty, stated: “The closer the composition of the new German fleet is examined, the clearer is that it becomes that it is designed for a possible conflict with the British fleet.” That was a signal for Britain to end its “splendid isolation” and form alliances with other powers in Eu-rope. The naval arms race was about to begin.

The Novelles The Reichstag passed three Supplementary Navy Laws (or Novelles) in 1906, 1908 and 1912. The No-velles increased the tempo of ship building. Tirpitz’s 1912 plan called for building three battleships every two years. The growing German fleet meant Britain


Jacky Fisher–Sealord John A. Fisher (universally know as “Jacky”) was Sealord 1904-1910 and 1914-15. He rejuvenated the Royal Navy during that period, largely by promoting the Dreadnought-style battleship. He was not a “fighting admiral,” but a great visionary and builder. Among other things, Fisher was known for his impromptu inspec-tions. During one such inspection, a captain failed to have sufficient knowledge of his ship and was im-mediately relieved of his duties. The officer protested Fisher was ruining his career. Fisher retorted: “If this had been war, you would have been shot.” Fisher, of course, modernized the Royal Navy by building a battle-line consisting of newer battleship classes, armed with big guns and ca-pable of engaging any enemy at long range. He ordered the scrapping of over 150 older warships. Most of those ships were obsolete, too weak to fight and too slow to run away. That caused considerable debate in naval circles, since the prevailing doctrine was in the event of a general war, numbers counted. But Fisher pointed out that those ships were draining men and resources from more modern vessels. Also scrapped were many smaller gunboats and second or third class cruisers, which existed to show the flag in distant tropical ports. Fisher used the surplus manpower to build a reserve fleet of trained crews. Its ships would be manned at two-fifths strength in peacetime and in war would be complemented with sailors mobilized from the reserves. Fisher foresaw the main enemy in a future European major war would be Germany. So he moved several battleships from the Medi-terranean back to Britain to guard the North Sea. He also ordered the construction of new naval bases at Scapa Flow and Rosyth in order to quicken any response to German naval sorties. As First Sea Lord, Fisher broke down class barriers and long stand-ing traditions. His highest priority was ensuring British naval suprema-cy. His motto was for the fleet: Hit hard, hit fast and keep on hitting.

would have to find allies on the continent. Exploratory diplomacy between London and Paris began and re-solved several long standing issues between the two countries. That was echoed by the growing system of alliances that was turning Europe into two mighty power blocs, one centered on Britain and France, the other on Germany.

Naval Scare of 1909 In 1907 the Germans laid down the hulls for four Dreadnought style battleships. That caused some-thing of a panic in the British Admirality. First Sea Lord McKenna estimated Germany could, in the near future, lay down hulls for five to seven battleships a year. If the trend continued, the Germans would have 13 battleships to Britain’s 16 by the end of 1912. To make things worse, during the winter of 1908-09, the British Admirality realized it had underes-timated German capital ship-building capabilities. The Krupp shipyards had doubled their work force, increased dock capacity, and accelerated naval gun and turret production. McKenna requested additional money for an accelerated building program so as to build six Dreadnoughts per year. Others in the govern-ment felt the naval budget could only support a maxi-mum of four new battleships per year. The naval scare of 1909 turned out to be ground-less. German battleship construction had been delayed by the redesign of some of the ships upgrading from 12-inch to 13.5-inch guns. At the end of 1912, the Brit-ish fleet of 22 dreadnoughts faced a German fleet of only 13 battleships. Still, the war scare gave rise to British fears of for-eign invasion. Popular novels predicted an invasion of England and subsequent reduction of the Empire. Among other things, that led to the creation of an ef-fective British Expeditionary Force, designed for rapid intervention on the continent in the event of a general war.

Naval Talks One reason the British were reluctant to build a larger fleet was the Liberal Party was in power and increasing the budget for social programs. Diverting funds to a naval arms race was not in the cards. The Liberals feared they might have to raise taxes signifi-cantly to cover the cost of new warships. In July 1908, Sir Edward Grey invited David Lloyd George (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1908-15, Prime Minister 1916-22), to meet with Germany’s Count Metternich to discuss limiting naval construction and reducing tensions between the powers. But the kaiser rejected any attempt to limit German military expan-sion. It was the fleet that allowed Germany to stake its claim to great power status. Bethmann-Hollweg, German Chancellor 1908-17, proposed a compromise, with both sides slowing down ship construction. The problem was Britain could not allow Germany any We will fight them on the lawns: Winston Churchill inspects

naval personnel.

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kind of naval expansion without risking its own posi-tion. So the talks foundered.

The Haldane Mission Tirpitz’s objective was to have a 2:3 ratio of Ger-man capital ships to British. A third battle squadron of eight battleships was, therefore, to be added to the High Seas Fleet. A ship would be added every other year to bring the total up to 15 battleships by 1918. Viscount Richard Burdon Haldane, Britain’s min-ister of war, met with Bethmann-Hollweg who wanted assurances of British neutrality in the event of any fu-ture war on the continent. Haldane, like Lord Grey, balked at such terms which he knew would alienate the French and give the Germans dominance in Eu-rope. Haldane suggested slowing the tempo of ship building. He met with the kaiser and Tirpitz and both men seemed amenable to the idea if some declaration

of neutrality could be obtained. Haldane returned to Britain with a copy of the new Supplementary Navy Law. He hadn’t read it because it was a thick technical document. The British Admiralty poured over it. They found it called for building large numbers of destroyers and submarines and increasing the readiness of naval personnel. When enacted, it would enable the High Seas Fleet to be fully manned. Britain would face a force of 25 battleships, eight battlecruisers, and many destroyers and submarines. The British concluded Tirpitz had filled the law with unacceptable new provisions that would undermine Brit-ish naval security. So the Haldane mission was viewed as a failure and Metternich was removed from his post. Lloyd George and Parliament were alarmed that the cost of building dreadnoughts rose every year. The origi-nal Battleship Dreadnought had cost 1.8 million pounds.


The Dreadnought Battleship The origins for the Dreadnought battleship were credited to Vittorio Cuniberti, the chief designer of the Italian Navy. He envisioned a large naval gun platform that would make all other battleships obsolete. He wrote about his conclu-sions in an article for the prestigious Jane’s Fighting Ships, calling for the design of ships of 17,000 tons and carrying 12 inch guns. Cuniberti’s radical ideas caught the imagination of naval officers from all the over the world. The Royal Navy’s John Fisher adopted and implemented many of Cuniberti’s ideas. Fisher wanted a ship that pos-sessed both big guns and high speed. The ship he built would have ten 12-inch guns, each firing an 850 pound projectile. That new ship was christened the HMS Dreadnought. Prior to the Dreadnought, most battleships had a main battery of four 12-inch guns and a mixture of other smaller caliber weapons. The smaller weapons were for destroying enemy torpedo boats and other such craft if they closed in. Fisher envisioned naval engagements of the future being fought at 6,000 to 10,000 yards, so deck and turret space should maximize the employment of bigger caliber weapons. Further, the use of different caliber weapons made adjusting the accuracy of fire difficult. Gunnery crews could not deter-mine which weapons were impacting at what ranges owing to the variety of “splashes.” In the new battleships, all big guns would be of the same caliber, which meant more projectiles would be fired at the enemy at the same time in salvos. HMS Dreadnought could fire six 12-inch guns forward or eight broadside. Effectively, it would have firepower equal to three of the older battle-ships. It also had 27 quick-firing 12-pounder (76.2mm) guns and five torpedo tubes. Armor was up to 11 inches. The new battleship could make up to 21 knots, a considerable speed for the time. The building of the Dreadnought took a year and one day to complete. That was a record for that size ship. It took 10 months from Dreadnought’s launching to full commission. The prior record to build a British battleship had been 33 months. Dreadnought was also built in complete secrecy to prevent the news from leaking to Berlin. Dreadnought was the wave of the future. Other nations, including the United States and Japan, moved in the same direction by building even more powerful and faster battle-ships.

Innovations in Battleship Design1860 British launch HMS Warrior;

first iron-hulled frigate.1862 Revolving gun turret.1866 Trial of first torpedo.1868 First submerged torpedo tube.1874 Electrical power.1885 Armor piercing shells.1890 Directed firing and stereoscopic

range finders.


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The Queen Elizabeth Class of dreadnoughts would cost 4 million pounds each. In six years, the navy had spent 229 million pounds on capital ships. Lloyd George was concerned that spending would cause a giant deficit or force the government to raise taxes. The crisis came to a head in January 1914. Winston Churchill, first lord of the Admirality, supported the construction of even more warships. Churchill threatened to resign if forced to reduce the number of ships built in a year. At another point, Churchill proposed both sides take a “Naval Holiday” and abstain from building warships for a year. He hoped that this would provide an incentive to reduce naval construction costs. The idea was derided in the press as both unworkable and utopian. So Churchill returned to Parliament and passed the Naval Estimate for 1914. In it, he proposed building four 27,000-ton battleships, four light cruisers and 12 destroyers. Iron-ically, the hulls had not even been laid down for those ships when the Great War erupted five months later.

Conclusions World War I broke out in August 1914. As expect-ed, the Royal Navy blockaded Germany’s ports by closing the approaches to the North and Baltic Seas at the entrance to the English Channel and north of Scot-land. That put the Royal Navy out of effective range of the High Seas Fleet. The only major confrontation between the Royal Navy and the High Seas Fleet was at the Battle of Jut-land. 31 May—1 June 1916. The German plan was to sortie and catch the British fleet piecemeal, but the High Seas Fleet ran into the combined British fleet while it was engaged on a “sweep” of the North Sea. The British lost several battlecruisers, but the out-gunned Germans broke off and headed back to base. Jutland was a tactical victory for the Germans as they sank a higher tonnage of British ships than they lost, though it convinced the Germans they could not risk the fleet in another battle. In the end, the British gained the strategic victory. Jutland showed that simply building a large fleet was not enough—what was needed was a superior fleet. The Germans lacked the other elements of naval power the British possessed. The British could afford to concentrate on ship-building prior to World War I as they did not have to also build a large army. To the Germans the navy always had to take second place to the army. Beyond the numbers of capital ships, the Royal Navy could also rely on a global network of bases, while the High Seas Fleet would be bottled up in German ports. So the British had superior position throughout the war. After Jutland, Germany’s High Seas Fleet sat out the rest of the war in protected anchorages. It met an ignominious end in the closing days of the Great War when its crews mutinied.

Long Distance Gunnery At the end of the 19th century the Royal Navy was still under the spell of Adm. Nelson. His philosophy had been victorious during the Napole-onic Wars: close with the enemy, fire guns at pointblank range, and board to finish him off. Naval battles were decided by the fighting abilities of individual ship’s captains and crews. But Fisher realized modern naval warfare was too complex to be left to individual captains and seamen. It would have to be controlled by the admirals who could coordinate battle squadrons consisting of a mix of capital ships, cruisers and destroyers. Fisher was the leading proponent of improved long-range gunnery. The idea was modern weaponry could accurately engage the enemy at a distance. Consequently, the fleet that could get in the first blow would have the advantage. That meant a new training regime that was often anathema to tradition-minded officers. Fisher promoted Cap. Percy Scott to the position of Inspector of Tar-get Practice and Gunnery. Scott pioneered telescopic sights and a “dry loader” that enabled gunnery practice at any time. He also installed the director firing method. The director sat perched high atop the ship in a platform above the smoke and noise, where he would constantly provide updates to the gun crews on the bearing and speed of enemy ships. The director noted the location where each salvo hit by the splashes in the water. That often accurately allowed the gunners to adjust their fire. By 1908, British warships were hitting targets at 6,000-7,000 yards.

Naval Strategy in World War I The British realized they could not effectively blockade Germany by anchoring their expensive battleships and cruisers in the seas off German ports. The ships would be vulnerable to sorties of torpedo boats or submarines. The British countered with the distant blockade. Light ships would cruise the North Sea, patrolling for signs of a sortie by the German High Seas Fleet. The British Home and Channel fleets would be sitting at anchor at new bases at Rosyth and Scapa Flow. On receiving word of a German fleet sortie, the British main fleet could rendezvous with the various divisions and attempt to cut off the Ger-mans from their bases at Kiel. The Germans realized they lacked the naval strength to fight a uni-fied British fleet. They hoped to lure a portion of the Royal Navy out to sea and destroy it piecemeal. That was how the Battle of Jutland unfolded in 1916. The Germans sortied into the North Sea, and when they ran into British capital ships, thought they were dealing with British battlecruisers. When word arrived the whole British fleet was steaming to intercept, the High Seas Fleet steamed back to the safety of port. The Germans thus barely avoided the major capital ship battle that both sides had anticipated for two decades.

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The WarshipsThe Battleship The term “battleship” was coined around 1794 to denote ships of the line. It is a shortened form of the “Line of Battle Ship,” that is, a powerful warship capable of taking its place in the battleline of fleet in combat. In the 19th century, battle-ships were becoming increasingly iron (or steel) clad vessels armed with gun turrets. There were many different configu-rations. But in 1905 the Royal Navy, under the direction of Adm. Jacky Fisher, unveiled the HMS Dreadnought. The Dreadnought boasted ten 12-inch guns and featured so many innovations it made its predecessor, dubbed the pre-Dread-nought-class of battleship, obsolete overnight. HMS Dread-nought thus gave its name to the class of modern battleships. The design of the dreadnought battleship became standard among the world’s navies, with several big-gun turrets, cen-tralized fire control, heavy armor and fast speed. Battleships represented the backbone and main firepower of most of the world’s navies up until the 1940s. They were a symbol of national strength and naval domination. For de-cades the numbers of battleships in a navy became a factor in the diplomatic and military strategy interplay of the major powers. Battlecruisers Battlecruisers evolved from the armored cruiser class of warships. The idea was they could outfight anything smaller and outrun anything bigger. Battlecruisers were designed to hunt down and outgun smaller warships and merchant ships while protecting friendly merchant shipping. Since com-merce raiding was expected to be part of any future war, fast powerful ships could destroy enemy cruisers, and lighter vessels would do much to protect the sealanes. For major fleet engagements, battlecruisers were to act as scouting and screening vessels, and then add their guns to the line of battle. Many of the British battlecruisers sacrificed armor in return for more powerful engines and greater speed. At Jut-land, that put the British battlecruisers at a severe disadvan-tage, with three being sunk by German guns. The Germans realized reduced armor would make the battlecruisers too vulnerable, and so they reduced gun caliber to maintain ar-mor. Their battlecruiser (Lutzow, Von Der Tann) acquitted themselves well at Jutland. The difference was in part due to mission. The British needed to maintain a global naval pres-ence, and so having fast heavily armed ships that could react to crises anywhere in the world was a necessity. The German battlecruisers needed only operate in the North Sea in direct support of the High Seas Fleet. While the term “battlecruiser” frequently captured the public imagination, they were phased out in the decades following World War I. Naval engineering reached a stage where battleships could be made fast enough to operate in the old battlecruiser role.Cruisers These were built for scouting missions and supporting the main battle fleet. They would also provide naval pres-ence around the world and guard the sea lanes for merchant shipping. Armored cruisers had a belt of armor along both their sides and decks; light cruisers were similar but had less (or no) armor. The protected cruiser had a special armored deck protecting vital machinery but no side armor. Cruisers could not stand up to the guns of capital ships but proved

useful in other missions. There were numerous types of each cruiser class, following World War I they became consoli-dated into heavy and light cruisers.Torpedo Boat Destroyers Most fleets deployed torpedo boats whose mission was to close on the enemy battleline and fire torpedoes. Even if the torpedo attacks did not sink enemy ships, they would disrupt the capital ships’ formations as they took evasive ac-tion. Consequently, a defense was needed. Ships equipped with searchlights, quick firing, and smaller guns could sink torpedo boats before they could close the range. A new class of ships arose called “torpedo boat destroyers,” since their mission was to stop torpedo boats. The name was later short-ened to “destroyer,” and the mission expanded to screening against enemy submarines. Destroyers were fast, maneuverable warships intended to escort larger vehicles in a fleet or battle group. Offensively, they could launch torpedo attacks and disrupt the formations of the opposing fleet. That would allow the rest of the fleet to engage the scattered enemy capital ships on favorable terms.

High Seas or Bust! German dreadnought battleship.

HMS TELEMACHUS “R” Class WWI destroyer converted to a minelayer.


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Tactics Naval tactics were simple during the age of the great Dreadnought. Wireless was in its infancy, and most warships still relied on signal flags to transmit messages. Fleets sailed in several columns of five to eight ships each. The columns were spaced about 2,000 yards apart. Smaller ships like cruisers and destroyers would be running parallel to screen the larger ships from torpedo attacks and to scout. When a signal was re-ceived enemy ships were in sight, the columns would turn and combine to form a line ahead battle column. That offered each ship the opportunity to fire broadside at the enemy. It also reduced command problems by having each ship follow the lead of those in front. The optimum tactical situation was the classic “Crossing the T” formation. Crossing the T placed the fleet perpendicular to the enemy battle line, where it could fire full broadsides. The enemy, meanwhile, could only respond with its forward guns. That gave the former ships a considerable advantage against the latter. As a result, the German Navy developed such tactics as the “battle turn-away,” which allowed all ships in a column to conduct a simultaneous 180 degree turn to get out of the kill zone. A major concern was enemy torpedo boat attacks. The Russo-Japanese War of 1905-06 had shown such attacks could be devastating. The overloading of pre-dreadnought warships with smaller caliber guns was in part to provide defenses against such boats. On the high seas, however, torpedo boats were of little use since they lacked both range and seaworthiness. Dreadnoughts, therefore, dispensed with most of the smaller guns. Defense against torpedo boats was to be provided by a new class of ships, “torpedo boat destroyers.” The name of that class was later shorted to destroyers, and they are still with us today.

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War on Terror Fight the war on terror with America’s cutting edge weapon systems! You have been

charged with hunting down terrorists aiding regions around the world and toppling their corrupt governments. To accomplish this, you have been given command of the latest weapons and best personnel America has to offer. You get to command ele-ments of the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines, Special Forces and Propaganda War-fare. War on Terror is an ultra-low complexity card game for all ages. The focus is on fast card play, strategy, and fun interactive game play for 2-4 players.

D-DayJune 6, 1944, the day that decided the fate of World War II in Europe.

Now you command the Allied and Axis armies as each struggles to control the five key beaches along the Normandy coastline. If the Allied troops seize the beaches, Germany is doomed. But if the assault fails, Germany will have the time it needs to build its ultimate weapons. You get to make vital command decisions that send troops into battle, assault enemy posi-tions, and create heroic sacrifices so others can advance to victory!

MiDWay From June 4th to June 6th of 1942, a massive battle raged around the tiny Pacific island of Midway that changed the course of World War II. The victorious Imperial Japanese Navy was poised to capture the airfield

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northafricaCovering the great battles of Erwin Rommel from 1941 to 1943, as he fought his way back and

forth across the deserts of North Africa. LNA uses cards to represent the military units, supply convoys and objectives of the historic campaign. To win, you must consider your units’ combat power and maneuver options as well as their supply situation. The game features: the Afrika Korps, Tobruk, the Desert Rats, Malta, anti-tank guns, resupply from Europe, minefields and more. LNA is based around a new combat system that makes maneuver and planning as important as brute force. That approach is faithful to the historic events, in which smaller forces were often able to defeat and rout larger ones by using better tactics and planning. In LNA, battles can be won not only by overwhelming the enemy with firepower, but also by out-thinking and bluffing him. The dynamic game system puts you in charge of one of the most famous theaters of WWII.

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Lightning War on Terror $19.99

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The Western Art of War in the First Crusade

by William Stroock

The Holy Land In the years 1097-1099 a mostly Frankish army swept into the Middle East and conquered what the Christians called the Holy Land. This was the famous First (and probably ir experiences from past wars, the Crusaders engaged in sharp skirmishes, won pitched battles, and took cities in prolonged sieges. Along the way, they retraced the steps of armies that had marched over those lands in prior centuries, and also showed themselves to be exceptionally talented and innovative fighters. The Holy Land is roughly today that part of the Middle East which includes Israel, Lebanon and southern Syria, stretching to the banks of the Jordan River. It contains, of course, the city of Jerusalem as well as the various locations where Christ lived his life and conducted his teachings as described in the New Testament. That region was one of the most fought

over pieces of real estate in the world, being at various times part of the Kingdoms of Judah and Israel, as well as the Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, Mace-donian and Seleucid Empires. By the 1st century AD, it had been absorbed into the Roman Empire as the prov-inces of Syria and Judaea (the latter was sometimes called Palestina, from the Latin for Philistine, the an-cient people who lived there). When the Roman Em-pire collapsed in the west during the 5th century AD, Palestine remained part of the Byzantine realm, only to be again overrun in the 7th century as the Muslims exploded out of Arabia. The Byzantines were pushed back to Asia Minor and Palestine was ruled as part of the Caliphate, the pan-Islamic state that streched from Persia to Spain during the European Dark Ages. The Holy Land Pilgrimage was the goal of many pilgrims who wanted to walk the same paths as the

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personages of the Bible. But by the 11th century, pil-grimage became difficult, if not impossible. The Ca-liphate had long since been divided into contending, warring factions. Topping things off, various nomadic Turkish peoples were moving into the Middle East from Central Asia. Still, the Byzantines could guaran-tee safety as far as Antioch in Syria. But in 1071 the Seljuks defeated a mighty Byzantine army at the Battle of Manzikert, and then proceeded to overrun Asia Mi-nor. An ensuing civil war among the Byzantine nobil-ity added to the devastation of the region. Once secure pilgrimage routes became scenes of robbery, murder and desecrations. In 1081, Alexius Comnenus seized the Byzantine capital city of Constantinople and declared himself emperor. Alexius was a good ruler, but he had a prob-lem—he needed troops because his best recruiting ar-eas in Asia Minor were occupied by the Turks. So he appealed to the West for mercenaries and allies. Little did he realize he was initiating the beginning of one of the greatest military movements in history.

Crusaders Assemble In 1095 Pope Urban II convened the Synod of Cl-ermont at Rome. The Pope challenged the military caste of the West to take action to free Jerusalem from Muslim occupation. Since the knights of the West did not hesitate to fight each other, Urban demanded they instead unite to liberate the Holy Land. The Pope’s call for a crusade was greeted with cries of Deus le vult, “It

is the will of God!” Religious fervor attracted thousands to what was later called the First Crusade. The first wave was led by Peter the Hermit and included many poorer knights, hence it became known as the Peasants’ Crusade. Their initial objective was Constantinople, now practically the frontline of the Christian position in the east. From there they planned to march to Jerusalem. In late 1096, the Peasants’ Crusade reached the Byzantine capital. Crossing the Bosporus, they landed in Asia, but at Nicomedia they were met by a Seljuk army and in the battle that ensued, were largely massacred. The next wave of the First Crusade was more orga-nized. These Crusaders hailed from France and were Norman by birth or marriage. In fact, to this day, Arabs refer to the Crusaders as the Franj or Franks. At the start of the First Crusade, their army numbered some-where between 50,000 to 60,000; 6,000 to 7,000 of which were knights, that is, heavy cavalry from the nobility and its retainers. About half the rest were infantry, while the rest were noncombatants: priests, families and assorted camp followers.

In 1097 the first organized army of Crusaders ar-rived at Constantinople. This group was led by Hugh, Count of Vermandois. He was the brother of the king of France and about 40 years old. Convinced of his own celebrity, he demanded Alexius, emperor of the Byzantines, greet him with great honors. Instead, Alexius mostly ignored Hugh, and the Byzantine

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army watched the newcomers closely. The Byzantines feared their new allies would resort to pillaging, or even set themselves up as new overlords in territories Constantinople claimed. Alexius’s policy was to have the Crusaders move into Palestine where they could do the maximum damage to their mutual enemies in the Islamic world. A second army marched to Constantinople com-manded by Raymond IV, Count of Toulouse, more of-ten known as St. Gilles. He came from Provence, one of the richest areas in France and, through marriage, had strong connections with the Spanish throne. He had already taken part in several campaigns against the Muslim Moors of Spain. St. Gilles was a respected knight and favorite of Alexius who, according to Anna Comnena, Alexius’s daughter and a noted historian, respected his “superior intellect, his untarnished repu-tation, the purity of his life.” Godfrey of Bouillon led the third group of Cru-saders. Born in 1060, Godfrey was Duke of Lorraine. Through his mother he was a descendant of Char-lemagne, and he tried to live up to the great Frankish emperor’s legacy of chivalry and faith. He brought to the Crusade his brothers, Eustace III and Baldwin. Of Eustace little is known, but Baldwin comes down to us as a licentious lover of high living. Robert, Duke of Normandy, eldest son of William the Bastard (later known as William the Conqueror and King of England), led a fourth army of Crusaders.

At the age of 40, he had not yet lived up to his father’s reputation and instead warred against his brother, Wil-liam Rufus. His cousin, Stephen of Blois, came with him as did Robert II, count of Flanders. The former was an unenthusiastic Crusader with a domineering wife; Robert had made the pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1086 and had served as a mercenary under Alexius. Of all the Crusaders who marched to the Middle East, none captured the medieval imagination more than Bohemond. The son of Robert Guiscard, the mighty Norman conqueror of southern Italy, Bohe-mond possessed his father’s fiery drive and unquench-able ambition. Those traits led him into the middle of most of the First Crusade’s battles. Bohemond brought with him his cousin, Tancred. Tancred was young and impetuous, so much so that he started a brawl at the Byzantine court that Alexius himself had to stop. Despite their common enemies, the Crusaders and the Byzantines had reasons to distrust each other. The Byzantines were Greek Orthodox; the Crusaders were Roman Catholic. Moreover, Byzantine and Norman armies had clashed in years prior in southern Italy. And the Crusaders brought with them the usual depre-dations of a medieval army. All that did not bode well for the coming war.

Battles in the East Despite the divergent armies, the Crusaders drew on a wealth of military experience. The Normans had spent most of the 11th century wresting southern Italy from Byzantine control, and in 1066 had invaded Eng-land, defeated King Harold at the Battle of Hastings, and then set themselves as overlords of a new and thriving kingdom in Britain. The Normans were veter-ans of large battles such as Civitate in 1053 (against a Papal army), Hastings in 1066 (against the Anglo-Sax-ons), and Dyrrachium in 1081 (versus the Byzantines, who were considered to be the most advanced prac-titioners of the science of war of the era). They also carried through major siege operations in Arab-ruled Sicily in 1066 and 1071 against the Muslim towns of Messina and Palermo. The Crusaders fought three pitched battles against the Muslims in 1097-1099. The first occurred on 1 July 1097 on the plain of Dorylaeum in Asia Minor. After taking the Seljuk stronghold of Nicaea, the Cru-saders marched southwest in two groups, the main body under St. Gilles preceded by a vanguard under the indomitable Bohemond. Their combined force numbered about 50,000. Determined to deal a deci-sive blow against the invaders, the Seljuk sultan, Alp Arslan, gathered an army numbering several tens of thousands, mostly light cavalry. On the evening of 30 June, Bohemond’s scouts encountered large bodies of Seljuk cavalry. As night fell, he made camp and set out a strong guard. The next morning, Bohemond advanced in battle order, On to Jerusalem: A medieval army marches.


with infantry on each side of his column and groups of mounted knights in the center ready to launch counter-attacks. When scouts returned with news of approach-ing Seljuks, Bohemond pitched camp and made ready for prolonged battle. Except for a marsh on his western flank, his army was exposed on a plain bound by dis-tant mountains, terrain favored the Turkish light horse. The infantry formed up close in a shield wall with ar-chers in support. As expected, the Turkish cavalry rode around Bo-hemond’s army and surrounded the Crusaders, cutting down stragglers between the vanguard and main body. For six hours Frank and Turk fought. The battle was a clash of different tactical styles. The Turks rode in close to Bohemond’s position and showered the shield wall with arrows. In response, parties of mounted knights sallied out and scattered the interlopers. At least one Crusader group was badly mauled when they rode out too far and were cut off. Under constant pressure, the Franks’ shield wall slowly contracted. The battle reached a crisis when the Seljuks attacked through the marsh and broke into Bohemond’s camp. Noncombatants, wounded, and stragglers fought off that foray until Bohemond could pull men from the line and counterattack. At about the same time the main body of the Cru-sader army arrived, deployed and charged. Another group under the Bishop of Le Puy marched through the mountains and came out on the plain behind the Turkish army. Seeing the mass of armored knights con-verging on them, the Turks fled the field. Losses were probably 3,000 to 4,000 on each side. But the critical thing was the Crusaders demonstrated that they had the tactical acumen to counter eastern cavalry tactics that had confounded many an army. The second major battle took place on 28 June 1098 before the walls of Antioch. The Crusaders had taken the city three weeks earlier, but were themselves besieged by Kerboga; the atabeg (prince) of Mosul. Crusader offers to negotiate had been rebuffed by Ker-boga, and so they decided to march out of the city and force a battle rather than suffer the privations of siege. The Holy Lance was found (most providentially!), confessions were heard, and communion taken. Then the Crusaders formed into six squadrons and attacked. Five squadrons faced the main enemy army, while Bo-hemond and his men were the rear guard and reserve. St. Gilles and another contingent were left behind to guard the city. The Crusader force numbered about 30,000 in all, no more than a few thousand of them being mounted knights. Kerboga’s army was perhaps 75,000 strong. Being malnourished and outnumbered, the Crusad-ers appeared to be at a disadvantage; however, Ker-boga’s army was divided between emirs over issues of strategy, some favored an aggressive policy, others were willing to play the waiting game. Even worse

for the Turks, the terrain favored the Crusaders. Antioch lay be-tween Mt. Silpus in the south and the Orontes River in the north. Kerboga was encamped northeast of the city. With his flanks bracketed by the mountains and the Orontes, the Crusaders did not need to worry about being enveloped by Kerboga’s cavalry. As the lead Crusader squadrons marched out of the gate, a strong force of enemy cavalry tried to stop them. The Crusad-ers fought their way through them and then cleared the field for the rest of the army to deploy. Each Crusader squadron formed two lines, infantry up front and cavalry in the rear. Then that formidable array advanced on Kerboga’s army. Turkish horse archers assailed them to little effect. Kerboga offered to negoti-

Middle East mayhem: Saracens clash with Crusaders.

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The Crusader Knight The knights of the First Crusade were cut from a wide swath of medieval society. Many were lords and rich land holders. Others were second and third sons of lords with little prospect of advancement in Europe. Because of the constant warfare of the 11th century, the knightly caste was also open to the lower echelons of society, to replace losses. Some of the knights were not well off and were bound to feudal lords like common servants. Others fought for pay. William the Bastard used mercenaries in his conquest of England, and mercenaries were also popular in Italy. Knights were trained in warcraft from youth, at least in theory. Instruction was usually the responsibility of an ex-perienced knight, often a close relative or acquaintance of the youth’s family. An aspiring knight was taught to use a lance and sword, how to ride, and what was expected of him in battle. Knights often got their first combat experience in small wars between rival families. Another proving ground was the tournament. Tournaments were not just games but dangerous, bloody exhibitions of skill. They were a chance to demonstrate one’s skills before gatherings of fellow knights and therefore increase one’s prestige in an otherwise rigid society. Incidentally, much of the pageantry and cus-tom associated with “chivalry” did not become widespread until much later in the Middle Ages. The word “knight” itself comes from knecht (old German) and cniht (old English), meaning a servant—in this case, one who serves a lord. The usual equipment of a knight was a sword, a long lance, a chainmail hauberk, a shield, and a conical helmet with a nose guard. The hauberk was a long shirt made of interlocked links of iron. It fit over the head like a hood and came down below the knees. It was either worn loose or tied off at the legs like trousers. The lance was couched and leveled at an opponent, though the Bayeux Tapestry, depicting the Battle of Hast-ings in 1066, clearly shows some Norman knights wield-ing lances over their heads like throwing spears. A knight’s shield was kite shaped and made of wood with metal edging. Swords varied in length, usually from 30 to 33 centimeters. While knights usually fought on horseback, they could dis-mount and battle as infantry. Western cavalry was feared for the power and shock of its charge.

Organization Knights, their retainers, camp followers, and accompa-nying infantry marched under the banner of individual lords. The Crusaders did not fight as a single massive “horde,” but under articulated formations capable of independent maneu-vers. Groups under a single commander could detach them-selves from the main body and be used as vanguards, rear guards and flanking forces. Those units were commanded by experienced leaders capable of acting independently. There was no single commander of the First Crusade, but a council of war composed of the most prominent knights.

Infantry The vast majority of Crusader armies were infantrymen. They usually wielded swords, spears and axes and carried a kite-shaped shield. Some were protected by metal armor, others with leather hauberks. Infantry fought in a compact shield wall formation, usually led by a prominent man-at-arms or dismounted knight. There was experience with combined-arms tactics, especially among the Normans. At Hastings in 1066, for example, the Normans used a com-bination of infantry archers and cavalry shock to break the Anglo-Saxon line. Though the chroniclers of the First Cru-sade wrote little of them, infantry played a crucial battlefield role.

Ready for action: medieval troops aboard a sailing ship.

Medieval map of the known world. Europe is to the lower left, Asia at the top, Africa on

the right. Jerusalem is in the center.


Holy Wars & Massacres Christianity wa a powerful force in the lives of the Cru-saders. A pious knight did not go into battle without confes-sion and communion. And, even though the Church disap-proved of the constant warfare of the knightly caste, they granted dispensations to those who fought in defense of Christianity. Christianity could inspire men to great deeds. For instance, when the Crusaders were besieged and starv-ing within the walls of Antioch, their morale and spirits were buoyed by the discovery of a spear purported to be the Holy Lance used to pierce Christ’s side (the “Spear of Longinus”). The discovery, which was revealed in a priestly vision to be in the Church of St. Andrew, spurred the army to battle and helped inspire it to eventual victory. (Apparently, many of the Crusader leaders doubted the authenticity of this relic, but went along with the story as a morale booster.) Knights also lived in a world of violence, bravery and honor. That world is portrayed in the great medieval poem The Song of Roland. Through the exploits of a 9th century Frankish knight in the service of Charlemagne, we see Ro-land’s strength, toughness, honor, piety, and devotion to his emperor. In contrast, Roland’s enemies are cowardly and deceitful. The anonymous author of The Song of Roland regales the reader with dozens of examples of bloody com-bat, smashed helmets, ripped hauberks, and blood drenched swords. Roland’s is not just a battle between rival armies, but of pious Christians against “heathen” Muslims. Piety and traditions of honor did not prevent the Crusad-ers from committing terrible atrocities. When Jerusalem fell, thousands were slain. One chronicler tells us without shame, “When the pagans had been overcome, our men seized great numbers, both men and women, either killing them or keep-ing them captive, as they wished.” Others gloried in tales of rivers of blood running through the streets. When a body of knights found a group of Jews atop the Temple of Solomon, they massacred them, “behead-ing them with naked swords.” All that was within an almost universal practice of the pre-modern world: a city surrendered would be spared from destruction, but a city that resisted and had to be stormed was open to pillage. And often the pillaging was the result of commanders losing control of troops once they had gained entrance to a city. Discipline would break down due to the combination of hardships of a siege, casualties suffered storming walls, and the opportunity for looting. Crusader atrocities were not isolated to Jerusalem. On the march through Germany, Rhineland Jews were butch-ered by the princes of the Crusade because as one survivor related, “Anyone who kills a single Jew will, have all his sins absolved.” When the Crusaders took a Muslim city by storm, an orgy of looting and massacre was inevitable. One Muslim qadi (judge) admonished his fellow Muslims for standing idle after the fall of Damascus: “Beautiful young girls have been shamed and must now hide their sweet faces in their hands!”

ate, to which the Crusaders responded: “You were un-willing when we wanted to do this; now that we have advanced to fight, let each fight for his right.” Driven with dissention and confronted by the advancing assemblage of chainmail-clad soldiers, Kerboga’s army began to disintegrate. But one of the Crusader squadrons was heavily engaged. As the main body advanced, Muslim light cavalry swarmed down from the mountains and attacked Bohemond’s force. His veteran Normans formed into a circle and with-stood the onslaught until reinforcements arrived and drove off the enemy. The Crusaders took Kerboga’s camp and pursued until nightfall. The Crusaders suf-fered light casualties, while the Turks lost thousands. The third major battle took place after the fall of Je-rusalem. This time, the Crusaders were confronted by a Fatamid army out of Egypt that sought to retake the holy city. Commanded by General El Afdal, the Fata-mid force was composed of Sudanese infantry (armed with spears and maces), and Moorish and Bedouin light cavalry (armed with spears instead of bows). El Afdal’s army numbered about 20,000. To meet the threat, several Crusader lords, including Godfrey, St.

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Gilles, Robert of Normandy, and Robert of Flanders, combined forces and marched south. The Crusader army numbered 1,200 knights and 9,000 infantry. The two armies met on 12 August 1099 near the Mediterranean before the walls of Ascalon. Again, the terrain favored the Crusaders. On their right was the sea and on their left high ground through which the Fatamids could not ride. The Crusaders deployed into squadrons, nine in all, with infantry to the front and cavalry in support. The battle began with Suda-nese archers showering the Crusader line with arrows. Seeing his archery had little effect, El Afdal tried to turn the Crusader’s right flank with his Bedouin cav-alry, but Godfrey’s men held and turned them back. With their flanks secure, the rest of the Crusader army advanced and routed the Fatamids. By nightfall, the Fatamid camp and the city of Ascalon were theirs. The Muslims suffered thousands of casualties while Cru-sader losses were light. The Crusaders could use their advantages of heavy armor and shock tactics to better effect against the Fatamids than the Turks, since the Fatamid infantry were not as mobile as the cavalry, and their spear-armed cavalry could not use the same horse archer hit-and-run tactics.

Ambush & Skirmish Aside from the big battles, the Crusaders fought in-numerable skirmishes. One of the largest was known as the Foraging Battle, fought during the siege of An-tioch. In late December 1097, having nearly exhausted their supplies, Bohemond and the Count of Flanders

were dispatched to ransack the countryside for food. While the Crusaders were raiding in the vicinity of Aleppo, scouts brought word a large Muslim force was advancing to intercept them. Without consulting Bohemond, the Count of Flanders gathered his knights and attacked the Turks, who scattered and fell back. The Count pursued, but became dangerously separat-ed from Bohemond. At that moment, the main body of the Muslim army descended on him. Meanwhile, Bohemond moved in support and prevented the Turks from surrounding the Count’s contingent, which was again attacking. As he drove forward, the Count’s men ran into several ambushes they handily dispersed. Bo-hemond followed up and dispersed even more of the ambushers. With the enemy chased off, the Crusaders regrouped and fell back toward Antioch, where anoth-er large skirmish was fought. As the siege of Antioch dragged on, the Crusad-ers learned a Muslim army of 12,000 was marching west from Aleppo, faced with the options of battle or withdrawal, the Crusaders embarked on a third course—ambush. On 8 February 1098, Bohemond led 700 knights to a plain seven miles east of Antioch. Seeking to protect his flanks, he took up a position bracketed by the Orontes River and a lake. Bohemond arrayed his force into six small squadrons. When the Turkish army entered the plain, Bohemond sent five squadrons forward and left one in reserve. The Turkish vanguard attempted their usual enveloping tactics, but lacked the space to properly execute them. Bohemond


led forward his knights and drove the enemy vanguard back onto the main body. In the ensuing confusion, Turkish cohesion collapsed and the is army scattered. What those actions demonstrated was that Crusader armies, if they took advantage of their own strengths (especially shock effect), and if they countered enemy strengths (especially tactical mobility), could defeat much larger Muslim forces. Of course, not all battles were going to take place on favorable ground. Sooner or later cities would have to be taken and held.

Sieges & Cities Crusader siege operations brought about the cap-ture of three major cities—Nicea, Antioch, and Jerusa-lem—and several smaller ones. Through those sieges, Crusader tactics were generally the same: surround the city, probe for weaknesses, then launch an assault us-ing siege towers and other heavy equipment. Even so, each city fell for a different reason. Fear of Crusader pillaging in the event of resistance brought about the capitulation of Nicea. The defenders of Antioch held out until they were betrayed from within. Brute force won at Jerusalem. There was little glory in siege work. It was mainly back-breaking labor, digging or filling in trenches, digging mines beneath the walls, building siege en-gines, and then moving those engines into place, all under a hail of enemy fire. Once walls were breached or climbed, determination and fighting skills won the day. The more substantial armor the Crusaders wore was a tremendous advantage in assaulting a city and the subsequent house-to-house fighting. And Turkish cavalry tactics counted for little in sieges. The first Muslim stronghold on the road to Jeru-salem was the city of Nicea in Asia Minor, which lay but a few days march from Constantinople. On 6 May 1097, the Crusaders surrounded the city (save for a side protected by a lake) and set up siege lines. Bohe-mond was responsible for the north sector, the Bishop of Puy, Godfrey and Robert of Flanders the center, and St. Gilles the south. The Turks threw back sev-eral assaults and countered attempts to mine the city walls. When a supply shortage among the Crusaders threatened to end the siege, Bohemond arranged for re-provision by sea. When it was learned the Turks were funneling supplies across the lake, the Crusad-ers obtained boats from Alexius and stopped them. On 19 June, Nicaea finally surrendered to Alexius, who arranged for his army to occupy the city before the Crusaders. Byzantine guides led the Crusaders through Asia Minor and toward Palestine. While Alexius had hoped to reoccupy the once fertile region, he instead found a wasteland, ravaged by years of warfare. The Turks had moved into Asia Minor, displacing the Greek populace who had settlements dating back over 1,500 years. Still, the Crusaders were closing in on the Holy

Land. And its first great defense was the mighty city of Antioch. The siege of Antioch, kicking off on 20 October 1097, took much longer and was a far greater strain on Crusader resources and morale. The Crusaders maintained a tight siege with trench lines and small stone castles built to prevent sorties from inside. Even so, the Turks refused to surrender. After three months, supplies again ran low and the Crusaders were forced to forage throughout the countryside for food. The Muslims besieged within the city took advantage of the situation and sallied, filling in ditches, destroy-ing siege equipment and undoing weeks of work. The Count of Blois was so demoralized he withdrew his contingent, but, by and large, the army held. With the help of a traitor within the walls, an “accursed maker of armor,” according to Muslim sources, Bohemond secretly led a storming party of 60 knights up the walls. They cleared several towers and threw open a nearby gate. The army flooded into the city. The date was 3 June 1098. After Antioch was taken and Kerboga’s army de-feated, the way to Jerusalem was open. The Crusad-ers marched south, taking smaller towns as they swept along. During the second week of June 1099 they arrived at Jerusalem and opened their siege. As was now standard procedure, authority for specific areas was delegated to individual leaders. St. Gilles watched the Jaffa gate, Tancred the New Gate, Robert of Nor-mandy and Robert of Flanders the Damascus gate. Supplies once again ran short, forcing the Crusaders to range for food and water. The arrival of a Geno-ese fleet promised relief, but a Muslim fleet arrived afterward and closed off seaborne avenues of supply. After an initial Crusader assault was repulsed, timber was collected from across the countryside to construct siege engines. Beginning on 13 July, a series of sus-tained assaults were mounted all across the walls. The Fatamid garrison held throughout the first day and the second. But finally on the 15th, the Crusaders gained the north wall and forced opened the gates, at which point resistance disintegrated. The Crusaders took the city and began the massacre for which they became infamous.

Warriors in the Holy Land Taken together, the five battles above (Dorylaeum, Antioch, Ascalon, The Foraging Battle, Bohemond’s Ambush) debunk several myths about the Crusaders. The Crusaders did not advance without scouts or a van-guard, or fight on the ground of the enemy’s choosing. Nor did they panic when attacked or blindly charge into the enemy. The Crusaders fought in well-led and organized formations capable of acting together or in-dependently. At Dorylaeum the Crusaders fought a complex battle of maneuver. Their main body moved to the re-

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Once more: Crusaders engaging Muslims.

The Muslims The First Crusade was waged against three Muslim pow-ers. The Seljuk Turks ruled Anatolia and Syria. They were fierce warriors originally from the steppe country of central Asia. In 1071 they won a decisive victory against the Byz-antines at the Battle of Manzikert and began their move into Asia Minor. By the time of the First Crusade, the Seljuks had descended into their own civil war and those divisions undermined their ability to resist. From Baghdad the Abbasid caliphs ruled, usually as Seljuks clients. Militarily weak and financially unstable, the Abbasids were heavily influenced by Persia. Fatamid caliphs also ruled Egypt, were fierce rivals of the Abbasids and enjoyed friendly relations with the Byzan-tines. Each caliphate was wary of their Muslim cousins and looked for ways to benefit at the other’s expense. Those divi-sions were a major factor in the First Crusade’s final victory, as each caliphate could be fought and defeated individually. The Seljuk army had two main components: the askars, professional troops under the direct command of the Sultan, and provincial forces supplied by local emirs. Payment for service could be in cash or via the iqta’at system, in which land was granted in return for service, though that system was not as rigid as European feudalism. The Fatamid military system was based on the mamluks, or slave-soldiers. They were both cavalry and infantry and were freed upon service. The mamluk system was supposed to supply a steady yield of loyal troops. Incidentally, they did not become an elite (if somewhat rebellious) force until much later. There were also assorted auxiliary forces and mi-litia levies. Muslim armies were based on light cavalry, though there were some heavies. Infantry usually got short shrift. Ibn Ishak, a 14th century Muslim historian, said a Muslim cav-alryman carried two quivers of arrows, a lance, a javelin, a sword, a knife, and a mace, and wore light armor. They pre-ferred skirmishing, envelopments and feigned flight to draw out and disorganize the enemy. The Tactica, a 10th century manual written by the Byzan-tine soldier-emperor Leo the Wise, makes several recommen-dations for dealing with Muslim armies. Leo recommended commanders take to the field with a large body of infantry, deploy ample scouts, fight on open and level ground, protect the flanks with natural obstructions, keep reserves, fortify camp, and avoid reckless pursuit. Incidentally, the term Saracen, which has been used to indiscriminately refer to the Crusaders’ various Muslim op-ponents, had its origins in the Greek sarakoni, which the Byzantines used to describe tribal Arabs.


References John France, Victory in the East: A Military History of the First

Crusade (Cambridge University Press, 1996). Heath, Ian, Armies and Enemies of the Crusades (Wargames Re-

search Group, 1978). Maalouf, Amin, The Crusades Through Arab Eyes (Schocken

Books, 1984).Edward Peter, ed. The First Crusade: The Chronicle of Fulcher of

Chartres and other Source Materials (University of Pennsylva-nia Press, 1998).

Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades Vol I. (Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 1951).

lief of Bohemond’s vanguard and even sent a contingent around the enemy’s flank. At Antioch the Crusaders di-vided themselves into separate but co-ordinated forces, the main body under St. Gilles, and Bohemond’s rear guard. During the first stage of Ascalon, Godfrey’s force defended the flank while the rest of the army attacked the enemy’s main body. At the Foraging Battle, the Count of Flanders acted quickly and decisively, while Bohe-mond brought his force from behind in support. Bohemond organized his ambush force into several squadrons, leaving one in reserve. The Crusaders preferred to de-ploy with a line of infantry to the front, with cavalry in the rear. From there the cavalry could move to reinforce a crisis area or strike at some decisive point. Combined-arms was one of the keys to tactical success. Crusader cavalry used infantry as a base of maneuver. Heavy infantry and archers worked together. Crusader heavy cavalry was especially effective, being able to shatter virtu-ally any enemy line once it was able to make contact. Siegecraft may have been the greatest Crusader skill. Nicaea was convinced to capitulate after a short siege; Antioch took eight months, and Jerusalem fell in less than two months. Given the complexity of siege opera-tions, considered a virtual science in later generations, the Crusaders per-formed brilliantly. If the Crusaders did

have a deficiency, it was in their logistics. Without a regu-lar commissariat, they had to frequently rely on foraging for supply. They also had the dilemma of having to protect and provide for their accompanying non-combatants. The Crusader victories were not the work of one great military leader, but a combination of commanders such as Bohemond, St. Gilles and Tancred. Just as importantly, the Crusades demonstrated the Western military system was well enough developed to carve out a new kingdom in the midst of a hostile Middle East, and then hold it for the bet-ter part of two centuries.

60 #250

SPI Classic Games

EmPIrES of thE mIddlE AGES Between the glories of Rome and the rise of national states came an age in which each land was defined by the virtue and failings of its monarch. Empires of the Middle Ages is a multi-player game of diplomacy in which up to six may act as dynasts and attempt to build their historic kingdoms into vast realms. The period covered in the game spans from AD 771, the time of Charlemagne’s reign, to 1465, the time of the final collapse of the Byzantine Empire. The game is played on a map of medieval Europe on which the players record the power of their kingdoms. Playing cards

resolve the basic actions of the game, while random event cards add period flavor, such as plagues, crusades and heresy. Six scenarios are included, from a solitaire game to a grand sce-nario covering the entire Middle Ages. Components: 1,120 counters, (2) 22" x 34" mapsheets, 220 full color playing cards, 40-page rule book, and player aid cards.

$100.00* *ships as 3 units on ship chart.

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Drive on Stalingrad Drive on Stalingrad is a two-player strategic-level simulation of Fall Blau (Operation Blue), the German attempt to conquer Stalingrad and the Caucasus area of the southwest Soviet Union in 1942. The German player is on the offensive, attempting to win by seizing key areas on the map. The Soviet player is primarily on the defensive in the first scenario, but he is also given the chance to run a full-blown counter-offensive in the second, “Operation Uranus,” scenario. Game play of the main scenario encompasses the period that began with the Germans’ launch-ing of “Operation Blue,” their offensive toward Stalingrad and the Caucasus on 28 June 1942. That scenario ends on 15 September, after 11 weekly game turns. The second scenario starts on 19 November 1942, with the launching of the Soviet “Operation Uranus” counter-offensive, and continues for six weekly turns to the end of December, when historically the German attempt to free their encircled 6th Army at Stalingrad ground to a halt. Each hexagon on the map represents approximately 16 miles (26 kilometers) from side to opposite side. The units of maneuver for both sides are primarily divisions, along with what were actually similarly sized Soviet tank and mechanized “corps.” Air power is represented abstractly. Components: 2 34 x 22 inch mapsheet, rules booklet,

420 die cut counters, storage bags and 1 die.

$48.00QTY Title Price Total

Empires of Middle Ages $100

Drive on Stalingrad $48

USN Deluxe $70

War Between the States $110



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War Between the States, 1861-1865 War Between the States, 1861-1865, simulates the American Civil War from the opening shot at Fort Sumter to Lee’s surrender at Appomattox, using three maps to cover the major theaters of operation from Galveston, Texas, to St. Joseph, Missouri, and from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Jacksonville, Florida.

Game turns represent the passage of a week, with intervening “cycles” dur-ing which players carry out such routines as production, blockade, construction and

politics. Each game turn is divided into two player turns, during which one player or the other may move his ground and naval units on the map and attack his opponent.

The game can be played as a campaign using all three maps and simulating the entire war from beginning to end. Alternatively, six scenarios are also offered, cover-ing the eastern campaigns of 1862, 1863 and 1864, along with three others covering the western campaigns of those same years. The scenarios vary in length from eight to 24 game turns. The scenarios are played on just one or two maps. Expanded and optional

from decision Games

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rules have been added to this new edition of the game, which work to enhance the role of headquarters, allow for variable leader entry into play, give more detail to naval and riverine com-bat, as well as more fully integrating the era’s politics into play. more accurate representation of the actual terrain fought over and the addition of more counters including set of counters for the variant leaders.Contents: 3 22x34 inch maps, 1400 die-cut counters, rule book

and player aid cards. $110.00*

*ships as 3 units on ship chart.

USN DelUxe Refight the greatest naval-air-land war of history. USN Deluxe is an update of the classic SPI game on the War in the Pacific, 1941-45. While maintaining the original game’s basic systems, the new design includes rules for a comprehensive simulation that includes the entire war, extending the game from Hawaii to the Asian Mainland. Scenarios include the first year of the Japanese offensive, as well as 1941-43, 1943-45 and 1941-45. There are also mini-games for Midway, the Solomons, Burma, China, the Philippines, Manchuria and others. Included is a War Plan Orange scenario for a “what-if” naval war with the US and Japan squaring off in the 1930s. Naval forces are at the squadron level, except aircraft carriers, which are each represented by individual counters. Air units are in groupings based on squadrons. Land units are regiments, brigades, divisions, corps and armies. The game system uses an interactive sequence of play in which both sides can launch strikes, exploit errors and win great victories. New rules include kamikazes, armored divisions, task force markers, Soviet intervention, MAGIC, special operations forces, the China front, strategic bombing, and yes, the atom bomb.

Contents: 2 22x34 inch maps, 840 die-cut counters, rules book and assorted Player Aid cards. $70.00

62 #250

Decision Games…publisher of military history magazines & games

Decision Games

nine navies War Nine Navies War is an alternative history wargame that begins at the start of 1915, after a victorious Germany has overrun France the year before. Italy, joins the Central Powers, as do Spain and Greece. All of which makes for a dreadnought showdown in the Mediterranean, Atlantic Ocean and North Seas, as Kaiser Wilhelm seeks to fi nally defeat the Royal Navy and thus make Germany into a true global power.It will be the battleships of Britain, Russia and Free France versus those of Germany, Italy, Turkey, Austria-Hungary and the captured portion of the divided French fl eet. There is also the possibility of later US entry. Victory is determined on points awarded for controlling the sea zones around Europe. Geography creates a two front war, one in the Mediterra-nean and one in the Atlantic. The Central Powers player is also able to win a sudden death victory by controlling the waters immediately surrounding the British Isles for one three turns. All the battleships and battle cruisers afl oat during that era, along with three British aircraft carriers, are represented in the orders of battle, as well as ships that were scheduled to be completed during 1919 if the war had gone on that long. Random events account for the larger developments taking place in the ground war still going on in Russia, the Middle East and colonial Africa, as well as accounting for capital ship losses due to mines, unexplained internal explosions, and submarine, coastal artillery and land based aircraft attack. Top-down, full-color, historical ship icons identify every ship. The game uses a derivation of the classic Avalon Hill War at Sea, and is a simple two-player game with a short three-turn scenario that can be fi nished in one sitting, as well as a 12-turn campaign game that requires about eight hours. Contents: 1 22x34" map, 492 die-cut counters, rules book. $50.00

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Land Without End $50

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Storm of Steel $140



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Storm of Steel Storm of Steel (SoS) is a simula-tion of all of World War I. Its three 34x22” maps cover Europe from the Pyrenees to the Urals plus the Mid-East. The maps can be com-bined for one grand game or they may be used separately for cam-paigns of the Eastern, Western or Mid-East Fronts. Turns represent three months. There are scenarios for each year and each front of the war, as well as a what-if 1919 sce-nario. Ground units are corps. Corps include infantry, shock, moun-tain infantry and cavalry. There are also specialized armored car and tank brigades, as well as tank corps for 1919, plus a planned-for US airborne division. Land combat uses three different com-bat results tables to model different tactics. Naval units are at the squadron level for capital ships and fl otillas for cruisers and destroyers. There’s also a complete sub-marine warfare module. Air warfare is represented by strategic and tactical wings. Players can improve their aerial warfare capabilities by increas-ing their air doctrine level. As air doctrine improves, players can employ interception, aerial supply and aircraft carrier opera-tions. On the political side, players can utilize agents to conduct propaganda and sabotage operations. An industrial production module gives players the capability to produce different types of forces. Production is tied to morale, and winning battles will enhance your side’s output, while de-feats may lead to strikes on the home front. SoS uses cards to recreate major historic operations by grant-ing additional move-fi ght impulses, combat bonuses and extra reinforcements.Contents: three 34x22” maps, world display, 1,400 die-cut counters, 14 assorted displays and charts, 32 page rulebook, 22 scenarios. Ships as four units. $140.00


Land Without End Land Without End: The Barbarossa Campaign, 1941 is a two-player, low-to-intermediate complexity, strategic-level simulation of the German attempt to conquer the Soviet Union in 1941. The German player is on the offensive, attempting to win the game by rapidly seizing key cities. The Soviet player is primarily on the defensive, but the situation also requires he prosecute counterattacks throughout much of the game. Game play encompasses the period that began with the Germans launching their attack on 22 June 1941, and ends on 7 December of the same year. By that time it had become clear the invaders had shot their bolt without achieving their objectives. The game may end sooner than the historic termination time if the German player is able to advance so quickly he causes the overall political, socio-economic and military collapse of the Soviet Union. Each hexagon on the map represents approximately 20 miles (32 km) from side to opposite side. The units of maneuver for both sides are primarily divisions, along with Axis-satellite and Soviet corps (and one army) of various types. The effects of the general air superiority enjoyed by the Germans throughout the campaign are built into the movement and combat rules. Each game turn represents one week. Players familiar with other strategic-level east front designs will note the unique aspects of LWE lie in its rules governing the treatment of supply, the capture of Moscow, and the Stalin line.Contents: 1 22x34" map, 700 die-cut counters, rules book. $50.00

Luftwaffe Luftwaffe is an update of the classic Avalon Hill game covering the US strategic bombing campaign over Europe in World War II. As US com-mander, your mission is to eliminate German industrial complexes. You select the targets, direct the bombers, and plan a strategy intended to defeat the Luftwaffe. As the German commander, the entire arsenal of Nazi aircraft is at your disposal. Turns represent three months each, with German rein-forcements keyed to that player’s production choices. Units are wings and squadrons, and they’re rated by type, sub-type, fi repower, maneuverability and endurance. There are rules for radar, electronic warfare, variable pro-duction strategies, aces, target complexes, critical industries and diversion of forces to support the ground war. The orders of battle are much the same as in the original game, though the German player now has to plan ahead if he wants to get jets. There are also other new targets on the map, such as the German electric power grid. In the original game the US player had to bomb all the targets on the map to win. Given the way the victory point system now works, the Americans need bomb about four out of the fi ve major target systems to win, thereby duplicating the historic result.

Contents: 1 22x34" map, 280 die-cut counters, rules and PACs. $50.00

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64 #250

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