The metaphorical links between ecology, ethics, and society

Brendon M. H. Larson

Department of Environment and Resource Studies, University of Waterloo, Waterloo,

ON N2L 3G1 Canada

Email: blarson@uwaterloo.ca

Phone: 519-888-4567 ext. 38140

Abstract

It is now widely understood that metaphors are not simply rhetorical embellishment in

science, but serve a critical epistemic role for the creation and exploration of theories.

Three prevalent ecological metaphors—competition, invasion, and resilience—serve as

examples and touchstones of the role of metaphors in ecology, and how their origin and

operation as “feedback metaphors” interweaves ecology with its social context. In each

case, the social origin of these metaphors implies that they are value-laden at the level of

interpretation (i.e., due to their resonance with everyday language) and/or at the level of

worldview (i.e., due to the way they highlight some aspects of a comparison while hiding

others). Thus, metaphoric choices in ecology should be subject to ethical scrutiny. In

effect, this necessitates paying attention to the “evolutionary ecology” of metaphors in

ecology itself—that is, attention to factors such as their context, diversity, history, and

scale. These normative elements in metaphors bear directly on perennial discussions

about objectivity and advocacy in ecology, and how ecologists should use metaphors in

science while being cognizant of and sensitive to their social context.

Keywords: advocacy, science, society, values, worldview

Over the past several decades, the role of metaphors in scientific inquiry has become

much more widely appreciated. A metaphor is a figure of speech by which we

understand one thing in terms of another, and most of us learned about them in the

context of English courses in high school—or perhaps during our undergraduate

education. We learned that “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” in Hamlet’s

famous “to-be-or-not-to-be” soliloquy were not actual slings and arrows, but unpleasant

things in his life (which he considered ending, by suicide). Hamlet could have just

referred to them as the “problems of life.” Instead, Shakespeare employed a poetic

metaphor as rhetorical embellishment to ‘dress up’ his narrative. If this is all metaphors

do—put the bare facts poetically—then it is not surprising that metaphors were widely

disparaged in scientific writing until quite recently (Ortony 1993), despite their continual

use. However, it is now increasingly recognized that metaphors are not simply

embellishments, but cognitive instruments in science that have an “epistemic”1 function

in helping us to understand complex relationships and/or what was formerly unknown

(e.g., Keller 1995; Brown 2003).

Here, I don’t have space to discuss the origin and function of scientific metaphors

in detail. Instead, I focus on how metaphors operate as links between ecology and its

social context, demonstrating that (i) ecological metaphors originate from the everyday

social world; (ii) they are thus value-laden; and (iii) their use in ecology thus requires

1 Epistemic means “of or pertaining to knowledge.” In this sentence, notice several instrumental metaphors (“instrument” and “function”) for metaphors.

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ethical reflection, particularly in the context of advocacy for conservation outcomes. (For

further discussion of these ideas, see Larson 2011a).

Metaphors permeate ecology (Worster 1985; Larson 2011a), so a few concrete

examples—competition, invasion, and resilience—may help to indicate their epistemic

function. Each of these terms was adopted as a central metaphor in ecology at a particular

point in time: competition a little after the time of Charles Darwin, invasion with Charles

Elton in the mid-twentieth century, and resilience with C. S. Holling a few decades ago

(see, respectively, McIntosh 1992; Elton 1958; Holling 1973). They were not simply

embellishment, but central concepts adopted by ecologists to better understand natural

phenomena by reference to everyday phenomena that were already known. In this sense,

then, they were “constitutive” metaphors that directed ensuing empirical inquiry down

particular paths rather than others. As time passed, one might say that they were

increasingly interpreted as part of the foundation of ecology, that is “factual,” because

they were (arguably) subject to empirical test, and more or less empirically supported.

Ecologists chose these metaphors because they helped to understand phenomena;

and they did so because of an apt comparison with something everyday and better known.

Returning to our examples, ecologists inhabited a world where humans themselves

competed and invaded territories, and where the meaning of “resilient” was clear in the

context of everyday experiences with things that recover their shape after stress or

expansion (e.g., an elastic band). By applying this everyday understanding to something

new (that is, by using it metaphorically), ecologists obtained an ability to better

conceptualize and therefore to investigate phenomena in nature.

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But the choice of these metaphors was also an interpretive and definitive act. The

choice of these metaphors was not inevitable because ecologists could have adopted other

ways of understanding by choosing other metaphors. Other metaphors, however, may

not have resonated as well with the cultural contexts in which ecologists introduced them.

The chosen metaphors reflected prominent aspects of the prevailing zeitgeist. The role

that symbiosis plays in contemporary evolutionary biology demonstrates that early

ecologists might have chosen some other metaphor than competition (Larson 2011), and

it also demonstrates that scientists are more likely to choose metaphors and follow the

lines of inquiry to which such metaphors point because they resonate with the prevailing

cultural assumptions about the world.

According to Keddy (1989), the competitive and masculine culture in ecology

prioritized study of competitive interactions (and associated empirical exploration) over

cooperative ones (also see Boucher 1986). Further, some scholars question whether

competition is an appropriate metaphor for passive interactions, such as the shade of one

plant preventing the growth of another, that are transformed by the metaphor into

combative ones (e.g., Keller 1988). Davis et al. (2001) claim that the Nazi threat to mid-

twentieth century Britain incited Elton to adopt the metaphor of “invasion” (as opposed

to viewing highly mobile species as simply spreading or expanding demographically).

I’m not familiar with published explanations for the recent rise of the resilience metaphor

in ecological thought, though this would be an interesting topic for an historian of

ecology to pursue.

Moreover, there is synergistic feedback between the metaphors adopted within

ecology (and other sciences) and the cultural context in which they originate (e.g., Stepan

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1986; Bono 1990; Maasen et al. 1995). Elsewhere (Larson 2011a), I have made the case

for calling these “feedback metaphors.”2 The metaphors originate in everyday language;

they are applied within science, where their use shapes scientific inquiry; and, their use in

science in turn feeds back into culture. If this were not the case, the metaphoric referent

would have been too obscure to be useful and to communicate to other scientists as well

as to lay people (including funders and the broader public). If scientific metaphors did

not reflect and resonate with their cultural context, they would not endure—and indeed

many have not. For example, as space exploration has been given a lower and lower

public policy priority, the “spaceship-Earth” metaphor, ubiquitous around the time of the

spectacular Apollo moon missions, has all but dropped out of environmental discourse.

The referents of feedback metaphors occur at various scales. Often the referent is

bodily experience—e.g., so-called cognitive metaphors sensu Lakoff and Johnson (1980),

such as “balance,” which is the referent of mathematical equilibrium according to

Cuddington (2001). In other cases, the referent of a metaphor is cultural. The cultural

context of some metaphors may be somewhat obscure (e.g., a “keystone” species, drawn

from Medieval architecture), or they may sometimes reflect the discourse of the day—

called discourse metaphors by Zinken et al. (2008)—e.g., “meltdown,” drawn from

nuclear-power-plant accidents, which, in turn, is drawn from metallurgy. Sometimes a

metaphor may be much more deeply embedded in the cognitive structure of the society—

called root metaphors by Pepper (1942)—e.g., “mechanistic” explanations.

Given that these core metaphors in ecology reflect the society in which they

occur, they are implicitly (or sometimes explicitly) value-laden. This occurs not least

2 Note that this choice of a metaphor is steeped in a cybernetic view of the world (see Larson 2011).

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because metaphors can have different meanings (“polysemy”), which occurs at various

levels as well. At an interpretive and psychological level, many of these metaphors have

a popular “resonance” that is quite strongly value-laden, for example “invasive” species

are, by that token, bad things. The value resonance of some metaphors (and their

alternatives) is extremely context-dependent. Partisans of free-market economics might

view competition as a good thing, while partisans of Keynesian economics might view

cooperation more favorably. Sometimes even invasion can be a good thing (e.g., when

we want to introduce a species to control another that’s deemed a “pest”). At their worst,

ecological metaphors can have racist, sexist, or misogynistic overtones (e.g., Haraway

1989; Zuk 1993; Herbers 2007).

At the level of worldview, scientific metaphors are also implicitly and subtly

value-laden. This largely originates from the manner in which all metaphors both

highlight and hide. As I said, a metaphor is chosen because it is apt. If new species did

not colonize (also a metaphor) in a manner that we could compare with “invasion,” then

we would not utilize the metaphor at all—we might say “colonize” rather than “invade.”

So by using that metaphor, we highlight the ways in which widely spreading species are

like invaders conquering a country. But there is also an “is not” with every metaphor;

that is, there are ways in which the phenomenon is not like the metaphorical referent and

the metaphor hides this “is not” from view. Further, in contrast to a stated simile—X is

like Y—the very act of comparison is itself obscured. The “invasion” metaphor, for

example, implicitly vilifies a species that shows up in a new place. But species do not

have agency or intent to harm (even if they often do cause harm) and they are not

crossing borders bounding countries that are geopolitically demarcated (Larson 2005,

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2011b). The value-laden element of this metaphor leads to a strong bias towards

interpreting the phenomenon of spreading species in terms of what is highlighted by the

metaphor, while ignoring what is hidden. This can lead to epistemic limitations and to

inappropriate social responses—for example, a response to these species as if they are

“bad” and “vicious” rather than just species doing what species do.

From a philosophical point of view, these feedback metaphors implicitly blur the

bright line scientists typically would like to draw between fact and value. Such melding

of fact and value occurs in science all the time. Many ecologists and conservation

biologists, for example, naturally interpret “invasive species” as something against which

we should, without question, defend the homeland (Larson 2008). While this

interpretation may be appropriate if “invasive species” are defined in terms of their

harmfulness, the metaphor is misleading in ecology, where they are defined simply in

terms of their tendency to spread (Lodge et al. 2006). To shift metaphors, as it were,

most laypersons would wish to cultivate ecological “stability” and to restrict ecological

“disturbance,” even though contemporary ecology now recognizes the importance of

disturbance for ecological renewal and the maintenance of biological diversity (Worster

1990; Lodge and Hamlin 2006).

Not only in science itself do metaphors meld fact and value (as “invasion” so

obviously demonstrates), but also when a metaphor from science, interpreted as an “is,”

is used to justify how things “ought” to be in the cultural context from which it is drawn

(see Fleming 2006; Elliott 2009; Larson 2011). The classic example is the “survival-of-

the-fittest” metaphor drawn from Darwinian evolutionary biology and then used as a

justification for competitiveness within society, as in Social Darwinism, and even as

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justification for eugenics and for genocide (Keller 1992; Taylor 1998; and see Larson

2011a for further nuance).

Accordingly, the choice of which metaphor to use is an ethical and value-laden

one, not just epistemological, even though scientists have often restricted discussion to a

metaphor’s epistemic dimensions—as if science were indeed “objective ” and occurring

in a social vacuum. Although the attempt to be objective is a laudable ideal, it is

ultimately not possible to actually achieve (Putnam 2002; Kincaid et al. 2007; Douglas

2009), despite the determination by the early 20th-century Logical Positivists to draw a

sharp distinction between objective facts and subjective values. This is not to suggest

that the selection of a metaphor can be deliberately managed because no scientist can

operate as a perfect “social engineer.” Metaphoric choices are often quite unconscious,

even though one goal of this chapter is to make their choice more conscious or at least

more transparent. On the other hand, there are now some very good examples of

biologists who have consciously used metaphors, such as “invasional meltdown” and

“DNA barcoding” (Larson 2009, 2011), to promote a particular worldview and its

associated values.

Not only is the choice of metaphor an ethical choice, it is also performative,

which enlarges its significance even more. By performative, I mean that the metaphors

we choose are not merely cognitive: they lead to actions in the world that have

consequences. The naturalistic fallacy—inferring an “ought” from an “is”—provides one

example of such consequences (see Wilson et al. 2003; Fleming 2006). That is, while a

metaphor may seem like a scientifically validated “is,” it in fact implies “oughts” that

contribute to social decisions, actions, and outcomes that may sometimes be undesirable.

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Even if we do not consciously transpose a metaphor from one domain to another (e.g.,

“competition occurs in nature, so it ought to occur in human society”), in the case of

some metaphors the “is” is strongly tied to an “ought” and associated actions (e.g., “those

species are invading a forest”, so we are led inexorably to think, “therefore, we ought to

stop them”).

Over time, metaphors have their greatest power in the performativity of an entire

worldview, as evidenced by some subfields and schools of thought in ecology. In the

history of ecology, as already pointed out, there has been a decided emphasis on studies

of competition as opposed to cooperation. The “invasive species” has been so powerfully

performative as to give rise to an entire field of “invasion biology.” Resilience is a fairly

new metaphor in ecological science, but one that has become an increasingly common

metric of the state of an ecosystem and its ability to tolerate anthropogenic change.

Interestingly, though, one might say that the increasing prevalence of this metaphor in

ecological discourse actually reflects a narrowing of options, thus in effect reducing our

cognitive resilience for understanding ecological change in diverse ways. As ecologists,

we should always be sensitive to whether our metaphoric lenses have become too narrow

or whether a greater plurality of metaphors would be helpful for maintaining diverse

options for responding to change.

As a consequence of the way they operate, ecological metaphors create a

significant tension between neutrality and advocacy. Some would argue that we can

dispense with the problem of metaphors by simply abandoning them, but that is hopeless

because of their cognitive function—and even the attempt to be neutral is value-laden

(Weber and Word 2001). More to the point, many ecologists, philosophers, and social

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scientists argue that ecology would be more effective in terms of conservation outcomes

if it became more explicitly and consciously value-laden (e.g., Westoby 1997; Norton

1998; Bradshaw and Bekoff 2001; Robertson and Hull 2003; Foote et al. 2009).

Conservation is, after all, motivated by values. That the contemporary zeitgeist is

broadly inconsistent with sustainability values poses a significant problem for

conservation because the metaphoric referents available for use by conservationists may

not be consistent with desired sustainability outcomes (see Larson 2011a). There is an

ongoing challenge here to find metaphors that speak positively to people about

conservation and sustainability and that do not simply reinforce the largely incompatible,

contemporary worldview (which puts a premium on consumption and economic growth).

Concluding thoughts and recommendations

Bringing to light the operation of metaphors in ecology exposes several tensions that lie

at the heart of claims of scientific objectivity and the role of science in conservation and

sustainability initiatives. Conservation problems are not simple ones, where facts lead to

clear decisions (Sarewitz 2004), but instead they are complex, uncertain, and contested

(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). As a result, diverse values come into play that drive the

direction society will take. Therefore ethical decisions are inescapable because the

choice among diverse values is by definition an ethical choice. Science must thus

respond in moving in a more democratic direction (Kitcher 2001), despite fears that this

will devalue science to the lowest common denominator of public opinion, subject to

extra-scientific manipulation, such as we see with the success of climate-change denial

(which is a particular sort of manipulation that must be acknowledged and prevented

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where possible). Gone is the previous, implicit model of the relationship between science

and society/citizens (top-down, science-first), to be replaced by a more bottom-up model

where society is more involved in decisions formerly thought to be determined by science

alone (Dietz and Stern 1998; Pielke 2007). This is uncomfortable for some ecologists,

but many increasingly recognize that advocacy and public engagement as a necessary

path for ecology (Lubchenco 1998; Balmford and Bond 2005; Palmer et al. 2005; Foote

et al. 2009; Nelson and Vucetich 2009).

Finally, it is important to reflect on one of the overarching metaphors in this book,

that of “worldview.” A worldview emphasizes the sense of vision, the view of

something. In that sense, it is coincident with the attempt by science to be objective, to

take a “disembodied” gaze at the world. As Heidegger (1977, p. 133-134) put it, “As

soon as the world becomes picture, the position of man is conceived as a world view …

The fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture.” The

problem here is that vision is one of the more “distancing” senses insofar as it separates

the viewer and the observed (Ingold 2000). This may be inconsistent with the more

embodied linking of ecology, ethics and praxis that we here seek. But sometimes it

seems that the harder we try, the more enmired we become in language, the very

metaphor of a “link” further suggesting two reified entities that must be reconciled.

Awareness of feedback metaphors in ecology demonstrates the extent to which facts and

values, science and society, are less linked (or in need of linking) than intertwined (a

weaving metaphor, I suppose). We can no longer pretend that science exists in splendid

isolation because attention to ecological metaphors demonstrates that ecology and ethics

are already inextricably integrated.

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To facilitate a better understanding of the metaphorical integration of ecology,

ethics, and society, and to operate in this context with greater awareness:

1. Ecologists (as well as scientists and citizens more generally) should reflect on

the prevalent metaphors that shape their lives. Awareness is the first step to

understanding their influence.

2. When utilizing a metaphor, ecologists should reflect on the broader connections

of the metaphor and whether it is consistent with their values and intentions.

3. When creating a new metaphor, ecologists should seek input from experienced

science communicators and diverse stakeholders to better understand its broader

ethical and social implications.

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