Michal Rozynek, University of Edinburgh, Politics as Pluriverse. The limits of the political and bounded rationality.

Politics As a Pluriverse.

Michal Rozynek

This is a work in progress. Not to be cited without author’s permission.

It might seem strange that in the time when politics seems omnipresent, it is also

perceived by many to be in peril. I fact the sole statement that politics is something that

can be in crisis or in need of defence is a sign of our time. If we were to point out the

causes of this phenomenon, among these we would have to list: the crisis of participation

and political trust, privatisation of public life, and the increasing complexity of political

knowledge. These three factors in particular pose questions about both the nature and

value of contemporary liberal democracy as well as about the state of contemporary

political culture in relation to the processes of globalisation, multiculturalism and social

atomisation. Particularly an interesting line argument comes from a strand of thought

characteristic to the second half of the 20th century. It is represented by a group of

otherwise unrelated thinkers, such as Schmitt, Oakeshott, Arendt or Mouffe, who argue

that the threat to politics now allegedly comes from the way we conceptualise political

life. They warn us about the danger of perceiving politics as universal. According to

them, politics rests on certain distinctions between private and public, moral and political,

which cease to exist as a result of a universalist view.

The aim of this paper is to show that the universality of political action we

experience in contemporary liberal democracies should not be treated as grounds for

interpreting politics as a universal activity. The argument is divided into three sections.

Section one investigates the notion of politics as a limited activity defined through the

concept of ‘the political’. Drawing mainly on Arendt and Schmitt will I show the perils of

extending the notion of politics to the non-political. However, I also will criticise their

models as insufficient in explaining the universality of political action brought by the

idea of nationalism. In section two I also examine the problem of the limits of politics,

although from the perspective of the concept of bounded rationality. I show that in fact

the idea of political community relates us to a specific form of common experience that

conditions it. I use the concepts of phronesis, and sensus communis to explain what I

mean by bounded rationality. This leads me in the final section to investigate how this

form of bounded political rationality finds its place in the modern form of political

community – ‘the nation’. I conclude by arguing that universality of political action is

meaningful only in a bounded model of the political.

Politics and Its ‘Enemies’

The term ‘politics’ in its original sense - just like all other political notions – is

polemical. Aristotle clearly uses it to distinguish the Greek way of life from barbarians.

The latter are in fact defined by him as those who do not know politics and because of

that can exist only as slaves1. By this Aristotle means two things. Firstly, they are not free

because their lives do not belong to them but to the despot. Secondly, they cannot become

free because in Aristotle’s view they are incapable of speech (logoi). Hence violence is

the only way that can guarantee their obedience. Politics, by opposition, is defined as the

realm of free word and deed2. For Aristotle it is a uniquely human way of life3, which he

lists among its highest forms4. This teleological understanding of politics has been

criticised in our times as being overly ambitious at the price of forming a highly

exclusive political model. The exclusiveness of politics in Aristotle’s theory is a product

of a strong distinction between the private and the public. Or in other words, it is a result

of a restriction on what and who can appear publicly.

In the more contemporary context however, the political is no longer that clearly

defined. Politics is not an exclusive activity and because of that, the traditional ways of

defining it through the distinction between private and public are no longer productive. In

fact the problem of what can be considered political and what cannot, became itself one

1 Aristotle, Politics, London, Penguin Books, 1992, Book III

2 Arendt Hannah, The Human Condition, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 19983 Ibidem, p. 134 Ibidem, p. 13

of the key political questions that distinguishes various ideological and theoretical

positions5. In other words, even though we can all agree what politics in it’s broadest

sense is, we find it problematic to determine which areas of human action should be

present in the political domain.

Hannah Arendt describes this process as the invasion of the social onto the

political. Drawing on Aristotle’s understanding of politics as something radically

different from the affairs of the household, the author of The Human Condition shows

how the later becomes politicised. The household (oikos) is described by Aristotle as the

most basic natural human organisation – the family. It is based on need and necessity.

And this is why the relations within the household are hierarchical – based on the natural

notion of paternal power and subordination6. Polis, on the contrary, is the sphere of those

who are free. Member of such a community are called citizens because they are not

related to each other by means of blood or subordination7. They are equal and thus can

enjoy the freedom of speech. The equality of public speaking (insegoria) was what

distinguished the political system of Athens. Arendt argues that it is exactly speech and

the ability to persuade that defines the political relationship between citizens8.

Household, as a natural relationship is the domain of subordination and violence.

This allows Arendt to show how with the birth of the concept of society, this

classical distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘political’ is destroyed. We can see this most

explicitly in the classical social contract theory. Both for Hobbes and Locke, the contract

is a product of a strive for survival in the need of protection or co-operation9. Arendt

argues that with the coming of ‘society’ as a key political concept, private interests

gained public significance. This analysis shows how the growing scope of the private

sphere in early modernity, has changed the way we perceive politics. The purpose of

government became to secure and provide for the basic needs of the individual.

According to Arendt the consequences of this phenomenon are dangerous both for the

5 perhaps mention a few of them?6 Arendt Hannah, The Human Condition, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 207 Ibidem, p. 218 Ibidem, p. 259 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan; John Locke, Two Treaties of Government

individual as well as for ‘politics’. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly the growing

scope of the state and society means that it is no longer possible for the individual to

maintain a holistic perspective in his decisions and actions10. The knowledge that is

required to solve most political or social problems is so complex, we cannot expect the

individual to be able absorb it. And it is in this world or dissociation and specialisation,

that becomes characterised by anomie11. Secondly, according to Arendt, the modern

concept of politics as management of the affairs of society leaves the political sphere

empty and neutral. The decisions become impersonal and bureaucratic12. And in this

sense they become similar to the laws of nature. For Arendt, the invasion of the social

onto the political ultimately threatens to destroy the latter through privatisation of the

public and the reduction of politics to economy and social management.

We can find a somewhat similar argument about the danger of losing the

distinction between public and private in Carl Schmitt’s political thought. Schmitt

criticises liberalism for constructing a language that confuses state and society. He claims

that as a result the political enemy becomes confused with a economic competitor, private

adversary or a partner in a discussion13. In this process, Schmitt argues, everything

becomes political and consequently nothing is no longer specifically political14.For

Schmitt, the political existence of a community rests on its ability to distinguish itself

from others. The only distinction strong enough to legitimise political power is one

between friend and enemy. It is only in these categories that we can conceptualise the

state’s constant readiness to engage in conflict15. The distinction between friend and

enemy is for Schmitt existential – it cannot be solved or erased by means of persuasion.

The difference in terms of which this distinction is drawn is not necessarily a substantive

difference of interests or values. Schmitt argues that political enemies need not be hated

personally16 or be defined in terms of conflict of interests. In the most crude sense,

10 Arendt Hannah, The Human Condition, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1998, Book II11 Ibidem12 Ibidem13 Schmitt Carl, The Concept of the Political, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 7114 Ibidem, p. 2015 Ibidem, p. 2716 ibidem, p. 29

political enemies are just those who do not belong to ‘us’. The concept of the political in

the form which Schmitt proposes is closely linked with the concept of the modern state.

Firstly this is because the existence of a state presupposes the existence of other states17.

Hence in Schmitt’s view the existence of the state presupposes the ability of a political

people to define their enemies – which is translated into the right of the state to wage war.

This is what distinguishes the state from all other types of organisations, which exist in

society, such as tennis clubs, political parties or churches.

According to Schmitt, it is the lack of this crucial distinction that makes modern

liberalism unable to incorporate radical conflict in its political language. As a

consequence in liberal democracy, as Schmitt writes, the “adversary is not an enemy but

a disturber of peace”18. But this results in a redefinition of the way we understand and

tackle conflict in general. The language of peace is dangerous because it does not leave

scope for war. So if a radical conflict emerges, the political people do not have the tools

to see it or to react to it. In other words, for Schmitt liberalism fails to see that political

language is in fact antagonistic and polemical19. All political notions have the ability to

turn the world into the dichotomy of friend and enemy20.

“Every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into

a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively

according to friend and enemy.”21

Schmitt’s theory is problematic perhaps most visibly because of the one-

dimensional explanation he offers of the way the political people are constructed. One

does not have to engage with nationalism studies literature to be suspicious of the

limitations of Schmitt’s theory. However, his criticism of the liberal concept of politics is

persuasive. Like Arendt, Schmitt believes that the eradication of the distinction between 17 Ibidem, p. 2518 Ibidem, p. 7919 Ibidem, p. 3020 Ibidem, p. 3221 Ibidem, p. 37

the private and the public –and consequently between a personal and political enemy – is

destructive to the concept of politics itself.

Why Politics Cannot Be Universal

Let us now move to the problem of universality of politics itself. This issue seems to be at

the heart of both Arendt’s and Schmitt’s arguments. For Schmitt politics presupposes the

real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence of at least two political entities22.

Politics cannot be universal. It is a pluriverse23. For Arendt this is even clearer because

for her politics can only be understood as a bounded activity. It is conceived as a limited

sphere of human action, where we choose to appear publicly among others. But the

creation of this public space is always conditioned by the forms in which we are able to

appear to each other.

The question of universality of politics has become particularly significant in the

context of the contemporary globalised world. Globalisation does not only mean a change

in the way we perceive our place among other nations. It also transforms our

understanding of political action. This is due to two phenomenon. Firstly, our lives are

increasingly affected by global factors such as global warming or rising oil prices. These

are phenomenon that are universal because they affect us all. As a consequence the

national perspective becomes insufficient to tackle many of the most significant issues on

the political agenda of Western countries. Secondly with globalisation comes awareness

of certain issues that even though do not affect us all in the same way, they evoke a sense

of compassion or solidarity in us. Issues such as poverty, human rights abuses, genocide

and other types of mass suffering are increasingly perceived on the grounds of common

humanity that transcends national or racial boundaries. The universalist view can be

summed up by saying that with this notion of humanity, politics should enter a new era

which makes traditional state boundaries obsolete.

22 Ibidem, p. 5323 Ibidem, p. 53

The claim to universality of politics is not new. It has originally been at the heart

of the Enlightenment project along with the idea of universal knowledge. The two ideas

are connected because it is only through knowledge that the differences between people

may disappear from the political space. According to the universalist view the limitation

of political community to a specific ethnical or cultural entity has to be based on

prejudice. It rests on an irrational attachment to what is ours and what David Miller calls

ignorance of the outside world24. The position I am advocating comes then just like in

David Miller’s case from an assumption that there is no universal language and that our

rationality is based on sentiments and practices which originate from our living together

as political people25. In philosophy this is a Humean position. In fact this does not

necessarily lead to a strictly conservative or a nationalist political philosophy. The point

about nationalism will be examined in the next section. But what I wish to highlight here

is that the claim about limited rationality can be compatible with a concept of citizenship

based on a formal and not substantial relationship.

Perhaps the most powerful argument against universality of politics is that the

term ‘universal’ belongs to the moral and not political order. This is especially clearly

argued by Chantal Mouffe26. Drawing on Schmitt in her reconstruction of the concept of

the political, Mouffe shows that politics requires an underlying antagonism without

which pluralism becomes an empty slogan. She argues that if we are to take democracy

seriously, we need to encourage a higher level of meaningful difference.

“A healthy democratic process calls for vibrant clash of political positions and

an open conflict of interests. If such is missing, it can too easily be replaced by

a confrontation between non-negotiable moral values and essentialist

identities”27

24 Miller David, Citizenship and National Identity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, p. 25 25 Miller David, Citizenship and National Identity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, p. 2526 Mouffee Chantal, The Return of the Political, London and New York, ,Verso, 1993, p. 127 Ibidem, p. 6

To say that pluralism depends on antagonism is to say that politics is not only a way of

transforming conflict, but a that radical conflict is a condition of politics in general. This

is why Mouffe has to be critical about liberal democracy. As I have mentioned before,

according to Schmitt liberalism is unable to internalise radical conflict.

Mouffe’s argument rests on the concept of bounded rationality. She argues that

politics is the domain of practical reason and not universal moral values28. Drawing on

Arendt and Aristotle she restores the distinction between episteme and doxa. To place

politics within episteme would be the same as to accept Plato’s political utopia. But

politics is not the domain of truth or being. It is constituted by the world of appearances.

Hence to have an opinion means to choose to appear in a certain way in the public sphere.

The problem of practical reason and bounded rationality in general is in the European

tradition of thought particularly connected with the notion of phronesis or in early

modern sense – sensus communis. The latter concept became central to hermeneutics, but

it’s roots can be easily tracked to antiquity. Sensus communis is a descendant of the

Greek word ‘logoi’, which means language as well as reason. By this ancient Greeks

understood the existence of an rationally ordered world [kosmos] that is accessible to us

through language. It is our ability to participate in this common world, which makes

politics possible.

However, this ability to engage in the common world is not at all obvious or

natural. On the contrary, our natural dispositions cannot take us above the particular

without the help of reason. This is implicit in the classical differentiation between doxa

and episteme29. For classical philosophy doxa is identical with opinion. It does not

provide us with true knowledge, but allows us to make practical judgements about the

world. Episteme, on the other hand, undermines the validity of doxa and consequently

can be a threat to ordinary practical life. In the metaphor of the cave, Plato illustrates this

by the figure of the philosopher who cannot stand the light of the sun30. There is nothing

in pure thought that can relate us to the world. On the contrary, pure conceptual validity

can be achieved only if we retreat both from the world and from ourselves to a domain of 28 Ibidem, p. 1429 Giovanni Reale, Storia della filosofia antica Vol. 2, Platone e Aristotele, Milano, Vita e pensiero, 1979.30 Plato, The Republic, book 6

abstract thought31.

As a result, it what is common in thinking becomes problematic. If doksa is

limited and there is no link with the common world, than episteme must be just another

isolated world. In other words - is there a type of thinking or a feature of human mind

that affirms our being in the world? Maybe, as Klaus Held suggests, we can reconstruct

the openness of our natural disposition by referring to the notion of practical reason

(Greek phronesis)32. This is part of a wider tradition that refers to what Kant has called in

the Critique of Judgment “a broader type of thinking”33 – a type of reflection that allows

us to move between epistemic horizons. The ability to take the position of someone else

can allow us to make judgments and make them intelligible to others34. Political Theory

since Aristotle has resisted claims to found politics on universal knowledge. Although

truth remains an important issue, especially in normative political theory, true knowledge

is anti- political as it negates the plurality of opinions and horizons.

Where does this ability to move between epistemic horizons come from? The

humanist tradition, represented especially by Vico, Shaftesbury, and Hume will look for

it in what they refer to as sensus communis or common sense. Its origins are twofold. On

one hand there is the notion of phronesis which means an ability to apply general notions

to particular situations and in other words is responsible for practical reasoning. On the

other hand we have the Aristotelian common or sixth sense which represents a combined

action of all the other five: sight, smell, touch, taste and hearing. Altogether they

constitute our ability to perceive the world as given – as ours. And it is only under the

combination of these two powers that we can understand what sensus communis means.

Contrary to popular opinion, sensus communis is not necessarily a group of shared

beliefs. It is common, because unlike sensual data it perceives things as examples of

general types (a brick a stone, a stick) but unlike pure reason it does not undermine the

sensual world. In short, sensus communis is an ability to recognize particular standpoints

as equal in their relation to truth.

31 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, New York, Harvest, 1978.32 Klaus Held, Fenomenologia swiata politycznego, Warsaw, IFiS PAN, 2003, p. 23.33 Immanuel Kant, The critique of judgement, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1952, para. 4.34 Klaus Held, Fenomenologia swiata politycznego, Warsaw, IFiS PAN, 2003, p. 27.

The analysis of sensus communis, shows that the concept of bounded rationality

reaches far deeper than the conservative liberal (Oakeshottian) concept of a practice or

tradition. It is in fact rooted in the conditions of possibility of the political community

itself. Based on my previous discussion of Mouffe’s argument, we can now see why the

universalist position cannot be accepted. In the next section I will discuss the problem of

bounded rationality in the context of the modern nation.

Nationhood and bounded rationality

Even if we agree that politics is a bounded activity, this still does not eliminate the

normative question about what is the appropriate way of setting limits to political

community. For instance we can evaluate the model of the Ancient Greek Polis from the

perspective of justice. And there is no doubt that we will see it as an exclusive

community. As a result, even with our admiration of this model, we would not choose to

live in it. In the contemporary context, a similar analysis has to be made concerning the

nation-state. It can be argued that setting the limits of political association according to

ethnical or historical boundaries is problematic. Particularly it might seem strange why

the benefits of universality of political action that has recently been achieved in most

liberal democracies, should not be extended to all.

One answer to these problems is offered by David Miller. His argument can be

briefly summarised as follows: Nationality relates us to a particularist perspective, where

‘my place’ becomes more valuable than the outside world. This view is based on an idea

of bounded rationality which gives preference to subjective knowledge based on

sentiment and practice rather than reason. As a result the nationalist view produces the

distinction between us and them understood in the framework of what is known and

tamed, and the wilderness of the outside world35. However, this distinction is in fact key

to producing the kind of community of responsibility that modern state requires36. In this

sense the statement ‘mine is better’ should not be considered in relation to truth. It is in

fact a solely normative statement about the nature of our obligations.

35 Miller David, Citizenship and National Identity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, p. 2436 Ibidem, p. 29

Miller distinguishes what he calls the three dimensions of nationality. The first

one is that nationality is always part of personal identity37. This is the most evident level

of nationality, as it relates to the way we understand ourselves as member of a concrete

historical community. The second dimension is ethnical, which means that as far as the

nation embodies the historical continuity38, it is based on a set of shared values or beliefs

that broadly constitute an ethnical group. But the third dimension is specifically political

and is key to understanding the previous two39. This is an assertion that a nation is

constituted and maintained by belief and not a substantively understood set of shared

features or values40. The historical continuity of a political people is mythical and its

perception changes constantly throughout history. What constitutes nation as a political

community is then not common identity but a shared attachment to a mythically defined

homeland which is linked to a geographical place41. And this is exactly this notion of a

homeland that is the source of the nation’s claim to self-determination.

Miller’s argument is however still an incomplete expression of the political

dimension of nationhood. By claiming that a shared national identity is necessary for

mobilizing people to provide collective goods, he seems to be placing the nation still

within a contractual theory of society. Miller argues that a contractual understanding of

citizenship as an exchange of public goods is impossible if we were to base it on the idea

of a shared humanity. However, it seems that the two other dimensions that he has listed:

personal identity and ethnicity require a further exploration.

One way of doing this can be found in Benedict Anderson’s reconstruction of the

concept of the nation. For Anderson, to understand nationalism in terms of what he calls

an ‘imagined community’ is to imagine it as both inherently limited and sovereign42.

Nation is an imagined community because none of the citizens will ever be able to know

all of its members43. The relationship with others is thus ‘imagined’. In this sense nation

is not the only type of an imagined community. All types of political peoples could be

37 Ibidem, p. 2738 Ibidem, p. 2739 Ibidem, p. 2740 Ibidem, p. 2841 Ibidem, p. 2942 Anderson Benedict, Imagined Communities, London and New York, Verso, 2006, p. 643 Ibidem, p. 6

understood in that way. In fact, it was only in the case of the ancient Greek polis that the

political space was limited to a hill where all citizens could meet. Since then, as Robert

Dahl describes, political space changed dramatically. It becomes mediated through the

idea of representation44.

What for Anderson distinguishes nations from other types of imagined community

is the idea of time characteristic to national consciousness. Nations are understood as

historical entities moving through time45. Anderson’s analysis is set to spell out the

conditions under which such an act of imagining became possible. He argues that with

the collapse of the religious paradigm, history lost its eschatological character. It is no

longer understood as part of the divine plan46. And now we have to find the meaning of

our worldly existence in the homogenous and empty time. Anderson argues that

nationalism responds to our need for the divine and transcendent because even though we

are individually mortal - nations are not.

This brings us back to the point that David Miller also made: That the origins of

national identity are always mythical. Nations from the beginning are not supposed to

have births or deaths47. Anderson attempts to show that only through this ‘immortality in

history’ could rulers demand their citizens to sacrifice their lives in the name of the

nation. Nationhood postulates is than an imagined community between the past, present

and future. This relation is symbolic and can be found in institutions and monuments

such as the tomb of the unknown soldier48. However, it is also narrative in the sense that

in the empty homogenous historical time in which nations exist and develop the meaning

of our actions is determined by their order in time. In this sense, history is the same form

of organising meaning as a 19th century novel49. The kind of continuity that this notion of

history presupposes allows us to think of ourselves as part of a collective historical entity

moving through time.

44 Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, Yale University Press, 199145 Anderson Benedict, Imagined Communities, London and New York, Verso, 2006, p. 846 Ibidem, p. 1047 Ibidem, p. 2548 Ibidem, p. 1549 Ibidem, p. 26

Conclusion

To summarise my argument, I have discussed the main reasons against a universalist

view of politics. In the first part I have reconstructed the narrow concept of politics as

public activity. Drawing on Schmitt and Arendt I showed the key problems that this

concept encounters in contemporary world. In the second section I examined the reasons

why politics in this narrow sense cannot be a universal activity. Finally, in the third

section I argued that the nation can be seen as an adequate embodiment of the political

principle of bounded rationality. This is not a decisive solution to the problem of

nationhood. The opposite standpoint still has to be examined. However I believe that I

have successfully shown that politics cannot be understood as an universal activity. The

political community can exist only in the tension between the universal and the particular.

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