relative influences of affect and cognition on behavior ...psyc604.stasson.org/farley.pdf · fect...

Relative Influences of Affect andCognition on Behavior: Are

Feelings or Beliefs More Related toBlood Donation Intentions?

Sally D. Farley1 and Mark F. Stasson2

1 Virginia Commonwealth University and Albright College, Harrisburg, USAand 2 Metropolitan State University, St. Paul, USA

Abstract. This study tested the relative predictive power of affect and cognition on global attitude and behavioral intentionwithin the tripartite model of attitude structure. Participants (N = 264) completed questionnaires that included an itemregarding blood donation experience, five semantic differential items, four behavioral intention items, and one globalattitude item. Participants were randomly assigned to either an affective or cognitive instruction set for the semantic dif-ferential items. As predicted, semantic differentials were more highly correlated with both global attitude and behavioralintention when completed under the affective instructions than under the cognitive instructions. In addition, donors’ andnon-donors’ attitudes on the semantic differential scales were distinguished from one another only when they were elicitedunder the affective instruction set. Results provide support for the tripartite model of attitude structure. Future researchshould examine the relative importance of affect and cognition in less emotion-laden domains.

Key words: affect vs. cognition, attitude structure, blood donation

Historically, attitude has been defined in terms ofan acquired behavioral disposition (Campbell, 1963),degree of positive or negative evaluation, or “a men-tal and neural state of readiness . . . exerting a . . .dynamic influence upon” behavior (Allport, 1935, p.810). One widespread conceptualization of attitudeis the tripartite model (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Ac-cording to the tripartite model, an attitude is com-prised of three correlated, but distinct, components:affect, cognition, and behavior. Affective measuresof attitude include self-report measures of feelingsabout attitude objects and physiological measuressuch as blood pressure and heart rate. Cognitive mea-sures may include beliefs about attitude objects andjudged evaluative favorability toward attitude ob-jects. Behavioral indices typically involve self-reportmeasures of past behavior, behavioral intentions, orobservations/reports of actual behavior (Fishbein &Ajzen, 1975).

The tripartite model of attitudes has been a popu-lar and enduring conceptualization of attitude,though it has not been endorsed uniformly in the lit-erature. Perhaps the best-known criticisms of theDOI: 10.1027//1618-3169.50.1.55” 2003 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers Experimental Psychology 2003; Vol. 50(1): 55Ð62

model have focused on doubts surrounding the exis-tence of strong links between the affective and cogni-tive components on the one hand and the behavioralcomponent on the other (LaPiere, 1934; Wicker,1969). Wicker’s (1969) paper sparked the consis-tency controversy, challenging the assumption thatpeople possessed stable, underlying attitudes that in-fluence behavior. Wicker maintained that attitudeswere, at best, only weakly related to overt behaviorbased on an average correlation of .15 between atti-tudes and behavior in the 42 studies reviewed. Subse-quent work illustrated that correspondence betweenmeasures is an important moderator of attitude-beha-vior consistency (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974; 1975),with larger correlations between attitudes (affectiveor cognitive) and behavior when both measures referto the same action, target, context, and time (Fish-bein & Ajzen, 1975). More recent models such as theMODE postulated by Fazio (1990) have articulatedconditions under which attitudes are good predictorsof decisions and behaviors. Similar to the ELM(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), the MODE model main-

56 Sally D. Farley & Mark F. Stasson

tains that there are two modes of processing, a moreeffortful processing mode when attitudes are less ac-cessible or motivation is high, and a more automaticdefault when attitudes are highly accessible and mo-tivation is low (Fazio, 1990; Posavac, Sanbon-matsu, & Fazio, 1997; Schuette & Fazio, 1995).

In addition to the issues surrounding whether af-fect and cognition are related to behavior, the tripar-tite model has also been questioned in terms ofwhether affect, cognition, and behavior are really dis-tinct concepts. McGuire (1985), for example, ques-tioned whether affect and cognition should be con-sidered distinct constructs due to the strong correla-tions often observed between measures of these com-ponents. Few studies have sought to verify thevalidity of the model. The studies that have investi-gated the validity of the model (Breckler, 1984; Ko-thandapani, 1971; Mann, 1959; Ostrom, 1969;Woodmansee & Cook, 1967) typically involved ob-taining measures of all three attitude components andthen assessing discriminant and convergent validity.While empirical support for the tripartite model hasnot been consistent, a study by Breckler (1984) pro-vided strong evidence in support of the model. In astudy concerning attitudes toward snakes, Breckler(1984) found that the three-component model pro-vided a significantly improved fit over the one-factormodel, and that the components were only moder-ately correlated. Other research has also argued thataffect and cognition are distinct components of atti-tude, implying that affect and cognition may havedifferent influences on behavior (Abelson, Kinder,Peters, & Fiske, 1982; Breckler & Wiggins, 1991;Edwards, 1990; Lavine, Thomsen, Zanna, & Bor-ginda, 1998; Millar & Millar, 1990; Zajonc, 1980).

Even assuming that the distinction between cog-nition and affect is a clear one, it still remains to beseen how these components differ in their influenceon behavior. In a provocative article, Zajonc (1980)argued that feeling and thinking are two independentsystems. Contrary to many researchers who havemaintained that affective processing occurs only aftercognitive processing takes place (Berlyne, 1967; Ep-stein, 1983; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; and Lazarus,1984), Zajonc (1980) contended that affect precedescognition. As an example of this viewpoint, oneoften “feels” a certain way about an attitude objectbefore one knows anything about it. Zajonc main-tained that the affective system is fast, basic, and soinescapable that it might be characterized as the de-fault source of attitudes. The cognitive system, incontrast, is slower and more controlled. Therefore,feelings about an attitude domain may be processedmore quickly than our thoughts, thereby dominatingour actions and decisions. Subsequent research hasdemonstrated that affect has a relatively stronger in-fluence on behavior than cognition (Breckler & Wig-gins, 1991; Edwards, 1990; Lavine et al., 1998).

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In one study, Abelson et al. (1982) assessed af-fect, cognition, and a global rating of attitude towardpresidential candidates. For example, people wereasked to decide if George Bush had ever made themfeel angry (affect) and later asked to decide how wella given trait described George Bush (cognitive). Theglobal attitude measure was used as an indicator ofbehavior/ behavioral intention due to the fact that ithad correlated highly with voting behavior in pastresearch. Abelson et al. (1982) found that the affec-tive measure was a significantly better predictor ofglobal attitude than was the cognitive measure. Al-though this study provided further support for boththe tripartite distinction and the idea that affect mightbe more closely related to behavior than cognition, itis possible that this outcome could have been dueto differential quality of the affective and cognitionmeasures (e.g., perhaps the given trait judgment wasnot a good measure of the cognitive component).

More recent research has focused on the role thataffect and cognition play in attitude change. Millarand Millar (1990) maintained that attitudes are eitheraffectively or cognitively -based, depending uponwhich component may be more salient to particularindividuals. For example, one person may possesspositive attitudes toward blood donation due to be-liefs in social responsibility, while another personmight attribute his negative feelings about blood do-nation due to anxiety. The results of Millar and Mil-lar’s study suggested that emotion-laden attitudeswere more vulnerable to cognitive attempts at persua-sion, while cognitive-dominant attitudes were morevulnerable to emotional persuasion attempts.

Edwards (1990) also posited that one componentof attitude (affect or cognition) was dominant, butattributed the difference to how the attitudes wereformed. In a study in which she created new affectiveor cognitive attitudes, Edwards (1990) found apattern of results different from Millar and Millar’s.She found that attitudes formed on the basis of affectwere influenced more by affective persuasionattempts, but that attitudes formed via cognitionswere equally influenced by affect-based and cogni-tive-based persuasion. In a related study, Brecklerand Wiggins (1991) found that participants’ cogni-tive responses were related to only affect before apersuasion attempt, but related significantly to onlythoughts after the persuasion attempt. Although theresults of these studies do not fit a consistent pattern,this research clearly indicates that relations amongthe three components of attitude are complex andthat affect and cognition have different influences onbehavior.

The differential predictive power of affect andcognition in six behavioral domains was investigatedin two studies conducted to gather further supportfor the tripartite model (Breckler & Wiggins, 1989).

57Relative Influences of Affect and Cognition on Behavior

Within each behavioral domain, Breckler and Wig-gins (1989) asked participants to evaluate both theirbeliefs and their feelings on semantic differentialitems, and also to indicate their opinions on a singleglobal attitude measure. When assessing cognition(evaluation), the instructions asked participants tothink about blood donation and to indicate their be-liefs about it. In contrast, the affective instructionsasked participants to “indicate how blood donationmakes you feel,” (p. 257). Identical anchors (Bad/Good, Wise/Foolish, Important/Unimportant, Selfish/Unselfish, and Safe/Unsafe) and 7-point scales wereused for both affect and cognition items, with partici-pants completing the stems “Blood donation is . . .”(cognition) and “Blood donation makes me feel . . .”(affect). The global attitude was measured by askingparticipants to rate their attitude toward blood dona-tion using a scale that ranged from Ð3 (dislike verymuch) to 3 (like very much), with 0 correspondingto “neutral.”

Results from Breckler and Wiggins’ (1989) firststudy supported the tripartite model in that both af-fect and evaluation had strong correlations with theglobal measure of attitude, but were not highly corre-lated with each other. Furthermore, a second studythat focused on blood donation attitudes showed thataffect was more strongly associated with a scalemeasuring behavioral tendencies than were beliefs.Breckler and Wiggins’ studies provided a strong testof the tripartite model Ð Study One showed that af-fect and cognition were distinct constructs whichwere both related to global attitudes and Study Twoshowed affect to be a better predictor of behavioraltendencies than cognition.

However, it is worth noting that Study Two em-ployed a within-subjects design. Because participantsrated both their feelings and their beliefs about eachattitude domain on the same semantic differentialscales, the possibility of a demand characteristic ex-ists. Whitley (1996) discussed various participantroles that participants enact, including the good, thenegative, and apathetic participant (p. 222). It is pos-sible that “good participants” in Breckler and Wig-gins’ studies deduced the hypothesis under investiga-tion, compared their relative affect and evaluation inthe domains investigated, and reported differencesdue to a contrast effect. Participants might have re-sponded differently simply because they were askedto consider both feelings and thoughts. One featureof the present study is that it serves as a conceptualreplication of the study of Breckler and Wiggins(1989) by using a between-subject design as opposedto a within-subject design. Use of a between-subjectsdesign will likely minimize sensitization effects(Whitley, 1996), and since many behavior change in-terventions rely on attitude change techniques, itwould be useful to know if the success of such inter-

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ventions might depend on whether the affective orcognitive component is targeted. If the affective com-ponent is more closely related to behavioral inten-tions, interventions might very well be more effec-tive if they focus on making people feel more posi-tively about blood donation as opposed to providingpositive beliefs about donating blood.

The present study was intended to clarify the rela-tive predictive power of feelings and beliefs on be-havioral indicators of blood donation. For thepurposes of this study, the terms “affect” and “feel-ing” are used synonymously, and the terms “belief ”and “cognition” are used interchangeably. In keepingwith Breckler and Wiggins (1989), feelings and be-liefs were assessed on identical bipolar scales, and aglobal measure of attitude toward blood donationwas included. In contrast to the research of Brecklerand Wiggins’ (1989), however, participants re-sponded to either the feeling scale or the belief scale,not both. Our behavioral indicators included reportsof past blood donation behavior and behavioral inten-tion measures of the type used in behavioral predic-tion research (see Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Re-sponses were obtained from college students shortlybefore a campus blood drive, about which the partici-pants were notified and asked to attend. One inten-tion item directly assessed if participants expected todonate blood in the upcoming on-campus blooddrive. Behavioral intentions are very important in ap-plied contexts, serving as predictors of or precursorsto behavior. If one type of attitude measure is moredirectly related to intention, it might very well be thecase that the same measure would be more highlyrelated to behavior. Thus, professionals interested inpredicting blood donation or attempting to changeblood donation attitudes or behaviors might want totarget the particular attitudinal component mostclosely associated with intentions.

As a result of the previous literature, we pre-dicted that the affective measure would correlatemore highly with the global index of attitude and thebehavioral indicators than would the cognitive mea-sure. Also, based on research showing that previousexperience can impact on attitude-behavior relations,it was expected that attitude-behavior consistencywould improve as participants had greater experiencedonating blood (Fazio, 1989; Lee, Piliavin, & Call,1999). Finally, we predicted that method of evalua-tion (affective vs. cognitive instructions) would in-teract with donation experience (nondonors vs. blooddonation veterans) in determining attitudes. Specifi-cally, we predicted that donors would have signifi-cantly more positive attitudes than nondonors in theaffective instruction set, whereas evaluations ob-tained under the cognitive instructions would not dis-tinguish donors from non-donors as well as attitudeselicited via the affective instructions.


Method

Participants

We randomly assigned 264 student volunteers toeither the affective or cognitive condition (132 ineach). The participants completed the measures inreturn for credit in a variety of undergraduateclasses. Of those participants, one person was omit-ted because she did not complete the measures, butparticipants were retained if they provided partialdata. Two people failed to complete the semantic dif-ferential items, two people failed to complete the be-havioral intention items, and six people failed to an-swer the global attitude question. Participants’ meanage was 22.6, and the sample consisted of 179women and 83 men (demographic data was missingfor one person). In addition, the sample was fairlydiverse in terms of ethnic background (60.5% Cauca-sian, 25.1% African-American, 8% Asian, 1.5% Lat-ino, and 4.6% mixed race).

Questionnaire

The questionnaire included demographic questions,one item concerning past blood donation behavior,five semantic differential items, four behavioral in-tention items, and one global attitude measure. Thequestionnaires were identical with the exception ofthe instructions and question stem for the semanticdifferential items. For these items, participants wereasked to focus on either their thoughts or their feel-ings about blood donation, depending on instructionset condition. The instructions for the task, the se-mantic differential items, and the global attitudemeasure pertaining to blood donation were obtaineddirectly from Breckler and Wiggins (1989).

The behavioral intention measures asked partici-pants to indicate how likely they were to engage incertain behaviors related to blood donation and weremeasured on 7-point scales ranging from (1) ex-tremely unlikely to (7) extremely likely. The inten-tion items were: I would donate blood in the nearfuture; I would donate blood the next time I have anopportunity; I wish to donate blood as soon as pos-sible; and I will give blood at the Student Commonsduring the blood drive next week.

Design and Procedure

The experimental was a one-way (instructional set:cognitive versus emotional) between-subjects design.In addition, past blood donation experience was alsoused to classify participants for some analyses. Parti-


cipants completed the questionnaires five to ten daysbefore a large blood drive took place in the centralstudent activity area (the Student Commons). Afterparticipants completed the questionnaires, they weregiven a debriefing form that included the date, time,and location of the blood drive. Furthermore, the ex-perimenter verbally asked participants to donateblood in the blood drive.

ResultsAfter coding the semantic differential items such thathigher numbers indicated positive attitude towardblood donation, the items were subjected to a reli-ability analysis. The reliability for these items wasquite good (α = .85). Because the reliability for thosein the affect condition (α = .83) was very similar tothe reliability for those in the belief condition (α =.79), the semantic differential items were combinedinto one measure. The internal consistency of the be-havioral intention items was also high (α = .85), butthe reliability for the scale varied depending uponcondition (.95 for affect and .76 for beliefs). Thescale was much improved for the belief conditionwhen the third item (I wish to donate blood as soonas possible) was removed. Consequently, we com-bined three items to create the behavioral intentionindex, yielding an overall reliability of .92, an affectcondition reliability of .93 and a cognition conditionreliability of .90.

For the item measuring previous donation experi-ence, two categories were created, donors (n = 110)and non-donors (n = 150). We collapsed the distinc-tion between novice and veteran donors becausethere were too few participants who had donatedblood four or more times (veteran donors).

The correlations among the semantic differentialindex, the global item, the behavioral intention index,and the donation experience item, both within eachcondition and overall, are found in Table 1. Partici-pants who attended to their affect reported attitudescores that were significantly more related to theglobal measure of attitude (r = .56) than did thosewho attended to their cognitions (r = .34), z = 2.18,p = .015 (Weinberg & Goldberg, 1979). In addition,behavioral intention was more highly correlated withthe semantic differential attitude measure in the af-fective condition (r = .48) than in the cognitive con-dition (r = .29), z = 1.78, p = .038. Furthermore,donation experience was more highly related to thesemantic differential measure in the affective instruc-tion condition (r = .36) than in the cognitive instruc-tion condition (r = .04), z = 2.67, p = .004.

While the previous donation experience variablecan serve as a behavioral indicant, it might also im-pact the relations between attitudes and future beha-


Table 1. Correlations Among Indices of Attitude Under Affective and Cognitive Instruction Sets

Measure 1 2 3 4

Affective Instructions (n = 131)1. Semantic Differential - .56** .48** .36**2. Global - .56** .063. Behavioral Intention - .25**4. Donation Experience -

Cognitive Instructions (n = 132)1. Semantic Differential - .34** .29** .042. Global - .50** .26**3. Behavioral Intention - .46**4. Donation Experience -

Both Instruction Conditions (N = 264)1. Semantic Differential - .45** .31** .15*2. Global - .52** .15*3. Behavioral Intention - .37**4. Donation Experience -Note. The semantic differential index was the only measure for which participants were directed to attend to either theirbeliefs or their feelings about blood donation. *p � .05, **p � .01.

vior (Fazio, 1989). To test whether attitude-behaviorconsistency improved as participants had greater ex-perience donating blood, correlations were computedfor each donation group. The semantic differentialindex and the global item were used as attitude mea-sures, while behavioral intention was used as the be-havioral measure. Although blood donors’ behavioralintentions were more highly correlated with the se-mantic differential index (r = .37) than were non-donors’ intentions (r = .20), the correlations were notsignificantly different from one another, z = 1.46, p =.072. Similarly, using the global index, blood donors’attitudes were more predictive of behavioral inten-tion (r = .54) than were non-donors’ attitudes (r =.45), but again, the correlations were not signifi-cantly different from one another, z = .89, p = .187.

Finally, a 2 ¥ 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA)was conducted to determine if method of evaluation(affective vs. cognitive instructions) interacted withdonation experience (non-donors vs. donors) in de-termining responses to the semantic differentialitems. The predicted interaction was significant, F(1,254) = 9.15, p = .003. Specifically, blood donors hadsignificantly more positive attitudes when thinkingabout their feelings about blood donation (M = 5.6)than did non-donors (M = 4.8), F(1, 125) = 18.27,p � .001, but the donors and non-donors were notsignificantly different from one another in the cogni-tive instruction condition (M = 6.2 and M = 6.1,respectively), F = .177, p = .674. Apparently, the atti-tudes of donors and non-donors were distinguishedonly in the affective instruction condition. Resultsalso showed that participants’ attitudes as measured


by the semantic differential were significantly morepositive in the cognitive instruction condition (M =6.1) than in the affective instruction condition (M =5.2), F(1, 254) = 55.6, p � .001. While a main effectfor donation experience was also found, in that do-nors were significantly more positive about blooddonation (M = 5.9) than non-donors (M = 5.5), F(1,254) = 12.7, p � .001, this effect was significantonly in the affective condition as outlined above.

DiscussionWith respect to blood donation, results indicated thatevaluations obtained on the semantic differentialmeasure (feelings and beliefs), global attitude andbehavioral intention were all significantly related toone another. This evidence suggests strong con-vergent validity of the measures of the different com-ponents of attitude. However, the correlations werenot strong enough to suggest that these concepts areredundant and the semantic differential measure pro-vided different results depending on the cognitive/affective instruction manipulation, findings that pro-vide discriminant validity.

Results provided support for the first hypothesis.Participants responding in terms of their feelingsabout blood donation had evaluations that were morehighly correlated with the global attitude measure,their intention to donate blood, and donation experi-ence than did those responding in terms of their be-liefs about blood donation. Because both global atti-tude measures and behavioral intention scales have


been highly predictive of actual behavior, these cor-relations suggest that affect appears to have astronger link to behavior than do beliefs, at least inthe domain of blood donation. Furthermore, the ten-dency for past donation experience to be morestrongly related to affect than cognition offers retro-spective support for the greater influence of affectthan cognition on blood donation behavior. The factthat this hypothesis was supported using a between-subject manipulation of affective/cognitive instruc-tion set strengthens the existing literature.

Contrary to the prediction that direct experienceincreases attitude-behavior consistency (Fazio &Zanna, 1981), the present study did not support thishypothesis. Consistencies between attitude and be-havioral intention did not improve significantly aspeople had greater experience donating blood, al-though the correlations were in the predicted direc-tion. Fazio (1989) has argued that those with directexperience (blood donors in this case) have strongerattitude-behavior correlations than those lacking di-rect experience (non-donors) because their attitudesare more accessible. One putative explanation for thelack of a previous experience effect in this study isthat non-donors might be just as clear about whythey do not donate blood as donors are about whythey do. Many non-donors mentioned fear of needlesas a reason for why they chose not to donate blood.This “avoidance of pain” motivation of non-donorsmay be just as accessible an influence on behavioras the advantages that motivate past donors (Fazio,1989; Oswalt, 1977).

Another possible explanation for this finding per-tains to the young age of the sample. The mean ageof the participants was 22.6, and the most frequentage reported was 19. Because the organization coor-dinating blood donations at the University requiredthat donors be at least 18 years of age, many of theparticipants just recently became eligible for partici-pation in blood drives. Consequently, participants’experience levels were relatively low, perhaps weak-ening the test of the past experience hypothesis.

One limitation that deserves mention is the possi-bility that the cognitive instruction set (to whichparticipants responded “Blood donation is. . . .”)caused participants to focus more on the factualproperties of blood donation, rather than on their be-liefs about it. While this is a possibility, we maintainthat the additional instructions (“Please indicate yourbeliefs about blood donation”) were sufficient toprompt participants as to their beliefs.

The final hypothesis, that method of evaluationwould interact with donation experience, was sup-ported. While the beliefs of donors and non-donorswere not significantly different from one another, do-nors’ feelings were significantly more positive thanthe non-donors’ feelings. Clearly, the affect/cognition


distinction was supported with respect to this predic-tion. These results seem consistent with Breckler andWiggins’ (1989) findings implicating previous dona-tion experience as a variable that moderates the atti-tude-behavior relationship.

The results from this study provide further sup-port for the affect/cognition distinction. Although theresults were not entirely uniform, the evidence pre-sented here suggests that feelings tend to be morerelated to people’s overall attitude than their beliefsare, at least with respect to the area of blood dona-tion. Due to this finding, researchers should take careto direct participants to attend to their thoughts ortheir feelings when administering semantic dif-ferential items to participants. It is this conclusionthat probably has the most important implications forapplications to the blood donation area. For example,researchers attempting to determine why people door do not give blood might want to emphasize thatrespondents provide their feelings about donating,not just their thoughts about donating. Similarly,attempts to encourage blood donation through persua-sion or education might be aided by a focus on affec-tive factors (or feelings) as opposed to cognitivefactors because of the stronger link between affectand behavioral intention. Based on our sample, theseconclusions are most readily applicable to youngpeople who have not donated blood extensively inthe past (never or once). It is possible that these sameconclusions might not extend to other groups, suchas regular blood donors who are motivated by dif-ferent factors than those who have not donated bloodfrequently (Chang, Piliavin, & Callero, 1988; Pilia-vin, Callero, & Evans, 1982).

Future research should examine the relative impor-tance of affect and cognition in other attitude domains.While we studied only one behavior, blood donation, abehavior that probably engenders a great deal of affect(fear of needles or disease, good feelings about help-ing others, etc.), it is likely that behaviors vary in termsof whether they are driven more by affect as opposedto cognition. For example, purchasing a computermight very well be related more strongly to beliefsabout usefulness and reliability than more affectiveconcerns. Health behaviors, such as a seeking a cancerscreening test, are likely to involve a variety of beliefsand feelings and as a result might be predicted betterby affect or cognition (or predicted equally well byboth) depending on the level of threat, knowledgeabout the disease, and individual difference factors(e.g., age, risk factors, etc.).

Research should also attempt to ascertain how af-fect and beliefs pertain to overt indexes of behavior.While the behavioral intention measures used hereare usually strongly correlated with behavior (Aj-zen & Fishbein, 1980), it would be useful to haveempirical evidence supporting the relations between


overt behavior and both affective and cognitive atti-tude components. In any event, the findings of thisstudy, along with those of Breckler and Wiggins(1989), support the tripartite model of attitudes andhave cast doubt on McGuire’s (1968) assertion thatthe components of attitude are so thoroughly interre-lated that they are virtually indistinguishable fromone another.

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Received February 27, 2002Revision received July 2, 2002Accepted July 5, 2002

Sally Farley

Albright CollegeDepartment of Psychology2404 Park DriveHarrisburg, PA 17110Ð9303USATel.: +1 717 671 3000Fax: +1 717 671 5300E-mail: [email protected]

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