religious identity in serbia and croatia

8/13/2019 Religious Identity in Serbia and Croatia

1/29

1

Martina TopiUniversity of ZagrebFaculty of Political scienceE-mail: [email protected]

Dragan Todorovi

University of NiFaculty of PhilosophyE-mail: [email protected]

RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN SERBIA AND CROATIA: FAILURE OR

ADVANTAGE IN BUILDING THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY?

AbstractFounding discussion of this paper is centered on dominant religious identity in Croatia and

Serbia and their interconnectedness with the European identity.Therefore, in Croatia through out history an antemurale christianitatis attitude has been

enforced according to which Croatia is the cradle of Christianity that defended Europe from theOttoman threat. That attitude was the foundation of the Croatian identity in Yugoslavia that then shifted

towards the level of the Federation as a whole. Later on, that same discourse became dominant duringthe 1990s or, after Croatia left the Yugoslav federation. Christian identity was presented as afoundation of Croatian national and European identity and independence as such as a return to Europe.

The Spirit of Nemanja on the other hand presents a permanent follower of the Serbiansociety and shaping of the new collective identity of the Serbs as it was centuries before. As opposite tothe trends of de-traditionalism in societies of the late modernity, in the last two decades a process of re-traditionalism in Serbia has been going on. At the same time, Serbian Orthodox church presents aninstitution of the highest trust among the Serbian citizenship. Faithfulness to Orthodoxy was anunavoidable factor of the Serbia war folklore in tragic dissolution of the previous joint state at the endof millennium, the same as today presents one of the piers of the national homogenization whereasSerbian orthodox inheritance seems to be an inseparable ingredient of the cultural capital with whichSerbia walks towards the European unification.

This paper thus discusses interconnectedness of the religious and European identity in anattempt to answer on the following questions: has (if so, how) the religious identity influenced shaping

of the European identity of Croatia and Serbia or, up to what extent has the Christian tradition of thepeoples of the western Balkans has been underlined and adjusted with the contemporary Europeancultural and spiritual mosaic?

Key words: Croatia, Serbia, Religious Identity, European Identity, Christianity, Catholicism,Orthodoxy, EU

RELIGIJSKI IDENTITET U SRBIJI I HRVATSKOJ: BALAST ILI

PREDNOST U IZGRADNJI EUROPSKOG IDENTITETA?

SaetakOsnovna rasprava ovoga rada jest dominantni religijski identitet u Hrvatskoj i Srbiji i njihova

meupovezanost sa europskim identitetom.Naime, u Hrvatskoj se kroz cijelu povijest potencira antemurale christianitatis stav prema

kojemu je Hrvatska kolijevka kranstva koja je branila Europu od otomanske prijetnje. Taj stav

prvotno je bio osnovicom hrvatskoga identiteta u Jugoslaviji koji se prenosio na razinu Federacije, a

Croatian part of this paper (as well as the theoretical background on the general EU affairs) ispartially based, in its idea, on the research conducted by Martina Topi for research project FP7 IMEfinanced by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Program (FP7). M. Topiparticipates in the project as a researcher in the Croatian IME team.Serbian part of this paper is prepared as a part of the project Sustainability of the identity of Serbs andnational minorities in the border municipalities of Eastern and Southeastern Serbia (170913),conducted at the University of Ni Faculty of Mechanical engineering, and supported by the Ministryof Science and Technological development of the Republic of Serbia.


2/29

2

poslije je isti taj diskurs postao dominantnim za vrijeme devedesetih godina prologa stoljea, tj. nakonizlaska Hrvatske iz jugoslavenske federacije. Kranski identitet predstavljan je kao osnovicahrvatskoga nacionalnog i europskog identiteta, a sama neovisnost kao povratak Europi.

Nemanjiki duhje, pak, trajni pratitelj ubrzane modernizacije srpskoga drutva i oblikovanjanovoga kolektivnog identiteta Srba, kao to je bio i stoljeima unatrag. tovie, nasuprot trendovima'detradicionalizacije' u drutvima kasne modernosti, posljednja dva desetljea u Srbiji prisutan je proces'retradicionalizacije', a Srpska pravoslavna crkva institucija je od najveega povjerenja srpskoga

graanstva. Vjernost pravoslavlju bila je nezaobilazan initelj srpskoga ratnog folklora u traginomraspadu negdanje zajednike drave na koncu milenija, jednako kao to je danas jedan od stupovanacionalne homogenizacije, a srpsko pravoslavno nasljee neodvojiv sastojak kulturnoga kapitala skojim Srbija koraa u europsko ujedinjenje.

Ovaj rad, dakle, raspravlja meupovezanost religijskog i europskog identiteta te pokuava datiodgovore na pitanja: je li i kako religijski identitet utjecao na oblikovanje europskoga identitetaHrvatske i Srbije, odnosno u kojoj mjeri je naglaena kranska tradicija naroda zapadnoga Balkanasuglasna sa suvremenim europskim kulturnim i duhovnim mozaikom?

Kljune rijei: Hrvatska, Srbija, religijski identitet, europski identitet, kranstvo,katolianstvo, pravoslavlje,EU

WHAT IS PRECISELY THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY?

Is European identity a phenomenon in process of establishment or a definitely

built identity? Is it more a desire then an achievement or, empty myth in the globalpolitics (Gvozden 2007)? Is it more accurate to discuss the European spirit insteadof the European identity? Which would be its positive and which its negativeconstants? These are the questions that bother theoreticians of the Europeanunification process.

In positive constants of the European identity, several characteristics havebeen outlined: rationality, equality, human rights and freedom, democracy,enlightening, progress, wealth, civil society, rule of law, political pluralism, ethnicaland religious tolerance, multiculturalism, internationalization and Europeanuniversalism. Negative constants have been outlined as: irrationality, lack of trueequality, authoritarianism and totalitarianism, mysticism, lack of progress anddecadence, poverty, patriarchy, political monotheism, ethnical and religioussegregation, disintegration and xenophobia (Trkulja 1996).

Actual project of the European integration contains political, economical andcultural processes directed towards building the common European home (Suboti2007, 7). However, ever since 1973, when the Declaration on European identity has

been written, this question does not disappear from the European agenda. Declaration,signed by nine countries, underlined the necessity for European unification as a meansof salvage of the European civilization where the unification as such was meant for allEuropean countries that will share the same values as the nine founders (Historymole2010; Yolles 2009). This European idea with years grew to the European Union.

With break-up of the Socialist system in Europe, eastern and southeasternEuropean countries expressed desire to join the EU. This however brought the

question of unification in geographical and/or ideological boarders. Nonetheless,creation of unique European identity does not go in hand with citizen of the EUmember states and further enlargements are further deepening the gap and the lack ofunderstanding among each other1.

1 EU is in majority of cases divided when important decisions are in stake. This is usually when itcomes to the decisions concerning the progress of the Union where certain members (usually the socalled old ones) want to continue with the process of envisaged reforms while other members (mostlythe so called new ones) cannot always follow these changes. In that sense, old members are moreinterested in deepening the integration while the new ones deem towards widening the integration


3/29

3

In 2000 the president of the European parliament, Nicole Fontaine asked if anincrease in the size of the membership of the European Union to 27, 28 or even 30Member States would change its very nature (Yolles 2009, 1). This question clearlyunderlined the problem of enlargement in geographical or ideological terms for it isquestionable whether new members share the same values and the same system ofgoverning as the founders of the European project as well as first nine members.

Therefore, one of the major problems of the EU is the division to so called oldand new member states where enlargement is often seen as a threat to vision of unitedEurope. This also happens because of cultural differences in democratic cultures ofthe new member states and these differences then explain politics and development ofthe concerned states. In that sense, new member states are seen through the so calleddevelopmental culture while the old ones are seen through the so called rhenishculture and this furthermore produces divisions according to which old memberssupport the ideology founded on relations and thus opposite to the ideology of thenew members that are considered to be the ideologies founded on transactions.Moreover, this also means that both old and new members are dedicated to thecollective goal of the European project however, their approach differs (see Yolles,2009).

It therefore seems that a big problem in the Union lies in question of theconflict of ideologies which brings to the further weakening of already fragileEuropean identity. In this sense, further enlargement is sometimes seen as additionallyworsening already existing problems (Gillingham 2004; Yolles 2009; Jacobsen 1997).

Problem behind all problems the EU is faced with is often discussed in thecontext of discussions on sovereignty regarding the fact that many Europeans believethat recent shifts in decision making threaten the sovereignty of member states(Hooghe i Marks 1997, 2).

In that sense, the conflict of European and national imposes itself in anydiscussion and in a certain way citizens feelings of national attachment and their

perceptions of threats to the nation-state and to the nations interests and culturalintegrity have been shown to matter (Kritzinger 2003 u: de Vreese & Boomgaarden2005, 62)2.

Additional problem is emigration that is also seen as weakening the nationalstate (see e.g. Hooghe and Marks 1997) together with economic problems that

brought the increased number of immigrants from new member states. Fear from

through the process of enlargement of the EU membership. At the same time, divisions occur in regardto the relations with the USA because old members want to challenge the hegemony of the US whereasthe new ones confront this idea. This has shown clearly when the war in Iraq came to the Europeanagenda. Old members rejected the justification of the war enforced by the US whereas the new onessupported the intervention (see Yolles, 2009).2Three questions have been identified in this approach: cultural, instrumental and civic and all three are

dealing with differences between European and national (see Ruz Jimnez et al. 2004). In this sense,when at the end of the 1980s the EU launched a number of policies aimed at creating a Europeanidentity, the member states responded by incorporating into the Maastricht Treaty a clause stating thatthe Union should respect the member states respective national identities (article F, point 1). Thisreaction, along with the introduction of the principle of subsidiary and the rejection of the wordfederal, revealed that, in line with the cultural theorys conception of identities, many memberstates saw the creation of a European identity as a potential threat to their own national identities andtheir citizens national loyalties (Ruz Jimnez et al, 2004, 2). In this sense, political elites justifiedtheir reluctance towards common EU politics and towards future enlargement and many expressed aview according to which the Europeanization is opposite to the maintaining of the national identity andthus difficult to achieve (Ruz Jimnez et al. 2004; Hjelid 2001).


4/29

4

immigration is seen as a main factor for reluctance towards further enlargement of theEU.

In that sense, certain authors claim that the fear of emigration affects voting atthe EU referendums on which the citizens of the EU express views not only on thematter of the enlargement but also to all issues of the European integration such as,for example, European Constitution (Schuck & de Vreese 2008; de Vreese &

Boomgaarden 2005). This means that the citizens of the EU member states thatrejected the first version of the European Constitution did not necessarily know whatthey were voting for (thus, the content of the Constitution) but they also voted againstthe further enlargement of the EU.

European identity is therefore a fragile issue. It relies upon the history of theEU by growing the idea of post-war unique European economy market and the idea ofcommon identification for a new Europe that will be founded on community (Mihi2008).

Europeanism as a construct has not overgrown existing national differencesand specialness but, in a contrary, it has been envisaged that it will build the

perspective on overlapping with them and not on their full replacement. The fear offaceless global (uniformity regarding the unification of market and production,

removal of boarders and free movement of people, capital and goods, ideas andcultural models) can be overgrown by advocating the creation of other types of

belonging and uniting that will not be necessary based on common background,language or the state. Understanding of the religious identity of present members ofthe European family or those that seek to become its members will bear a significantrole in that process. The religion issue will also bear significant issue in furtherEuropean unification process and due to the discussions that are being lead within theEU it is apparent that the religious differences have shown to matter already.

EUROPE AND THE RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

One of the most important cultural-psychological lines belongs tothe question of the religious identity. Will all those that care fortheir religion very much become able to remove its divisions? Will,and if so when, Catholic and Protestants from the West acceptOrthodox from East and South so that all of them together, asChristians, can accept Moslems and then all of them together theJews? (Radakovi 2010, 46)

By not paying attention to warnings of Edgar Moren (1989) that the Europeanculture is consisted from the spiritual matrix based on Jewish-Christian-Greek-Latininheritance, Europe decided to remove any mentioning of the Christian inheritanceand Christian values from the European Constitution3and thus it remained on the rulethat underlines cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe. In the base ofthis attitude is the fear from discriminating all of those who do not posses the feelingof belonging to the Christian tradition and to prevent discrepancy from the formulaUnity in diversity that determines the EU.

3First European Constitution has been signed on 29thOctober 2004 in Rome and it has been signed by thePrime Ministers of the EU member states. Lisbon Treaty (redacted European Constitution rejected atreferendums in France and Holland in 2005) got signed on 13thDecember 2007. It got enforced on 1stDecember 2009 after Check republic ratified it.


5/29

5

However, it should not be forgotten that the European secularism is asecularism of the Christian type. European cultural code is deeply founded in theChristian inheritance ( 2007). At the beginning of the 21stcentury, whenthe European citizenry questioned achievements of the liberal democracy and whenthe intolerance between Europeans and growing number of Moslem immigrantsunwilling to adjust to the formal secularization, has grown there also exists a tendency

of growth of religious beliefs and the influence of the religious institutions.Discussions on the destiny of religion in modernity also began (Mardei, 2003).

It can, actually, be said that the reason for uprising of the religion cannot be found inthe news that it offers but in the ideas that are made as a synonym of the religion(democratic state, rationality, enlightenment, secular society or modern society) andthat were not able to fulfill everything they promised ( 2007, 18).

Creators of the common supranational European identity clearly see that thealternative to new cloaking with the religious cover can be the only the foundation ofthe Universal secularism or, common public space in which all religious attributeswould be eliminated so that everybody could feel as equal citizens. With that Europewould remain what it was always meant to be, and what Kundera defined asmaximum of diversity on the minimum of space.

Apart from internal turbulences, extension of eastern boarders clashedEuropean secularism with declared religious identity of the new members (Bulgariaand Romania) and the countries of the so called Western Balkan4, candidates formembership in the European club. For several decades efficiently controlled by theideology, religious beliefs burst to the surface upon the break up of the Socialistsystem that brought to the violent dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (SFRY)-The America of the East (arko Puhovski).

The processes of disintegration and radical societal changes manifested duringwars in the 1990s. This conditioned questioning and redefining of the nationalidentities of the newly founded geopolitical entities or, more accurately, new

homogenizing of the nations. Rudimental ethno-nationalism, in which the idea of thenational states bears the most significant place on the pedestal of the highest values,does not stop to serve as a basic means of the state politics.

Interconnectedness of the state and the Church becomes actual again: inCroatia that is the political program of gaining independence and belonging to thewestern civilization circle (Bing 2008; Topi i dr. 2009) and identifying nation andreligion in the discourse Croat-Catholic (see e.g. US embassy report 2001, 2002,2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010; FP/ST-1) whereas in Serbia that isthe authoritarian and aggressive idea of unification of all Serbs in one state (Popovi-Obradovi 2004).

Religion-in Croatia envisaged through the Roman-Catholic Church (CatholicChurch in the continuation of the article) and in Serbia through the Serbian Orthodox

Church-again attempts to found itself as the founding element of the cultural identityand legitimizing force of the society and as the founding element of the nationalidentity as well. This continuity of manifestation of religious in Croatian and Serbiansociety, with more or less success, lasts until today.

4Western Balkan term created to change the image of a whole region is a joint name for states thatare not member states of the EU. Geographicaly they are situated on the west of the Balkan peninsulaand match the formula former Yugoslavia Slovenia + Albania = Western Balkan (Pavlovi 2010,92).


6/29

6

A basic question occurs here: how these tendencies correspond with actualglobal trends and European concept of supranational that is making an attempt to tiethe differences with which it promotes the ideal of equality in diversity while at thesame time preserves the individuality in the mass? Is Croatian and Serbian religiousidentity threatening to jeopardize declarative desire of political elites in joining theEuro-Atlantic integration processes?

RELIGIOUS AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN SERBIA

Serbs and Serbian Orthodox Church

Revitalization of religiosity in Serbia for two decades has been marked withreligious traditionalism: return to faith and tradition as well as a return to the Churchas a reliable keeper of those values. Preserved from crowning in Ottoman period

precisely under the caring eye of Orthodoxy, Serbian nation was meant to return to itsconfessional roots that came with invitations from the Church to return to the tripartiterelationship of Church-nation-state.

Consequences of communist dictatorships on Orthodox peoples are nearly catastrophic.National Orthodox identity is nearly completely lost. The only keeper of self-conscience wasthe Church. In the case of our people we know that Church, shut in isolation, did not have theopportunity to do what it did for centuries: to be a matrix or the main vein of the being andwith that of the culture of its people. In empty space, matrixes of other cultures and religionsflew in ( // 2005).

The argument on faith as matrix of the Serbian nation went along with ethno-nationalist statehood ideology of Slobodan Miloevi and the state authorities of thattime up to the level that the Church was blessing war and re-drawing of the boardersin the Balkan. The differences between statehood and religious engagement ofSerbian Orthodoxy got lost as well as the difference between politics and the faith.

After changes from the 5th October, Serbian Orthodox Church kept and

strengthened its societal and political position. Institutionalization of the public role ofthe Church occurred in further shaping of the national identity and Orthodoxy steppedout from the marginalization of the societal life. In June 2001 state educational system(elementary and high schools) introduced religious classes regardless of theConstitutional principle on separateness of the Church and the state, regulation on

privacy of religious beliefs and freedom of conscience.Faculty of Theology returned to the Belgrade University and Orthodox priests

in the professional military. Nationalized possessions are returned or substituted andnew Churches are being built.

The presence of priests in public manifestations and of the political elites inreligious gatherings is unavoidable along with strong media coverage. The speech ofintolerance towards religious otherness (especially on Protestants who are placedamong sects but also on atheists), points towards open quits with non-alike minded.All of this is happening in secular Serbia, multi-ethnical and multi-confessionalcountry declaratively strongly dedicated towards building a citizen democracy.

The variety of questions on which in public appearances its representatives are considered tobe invited to answer and comment, constitutes nearly all aspects of life of the contemporarysociety: from the position of women, birth rate and judgmental attitudes on the birth controltowards judging of the so called pagan education and atheism in general, demands to defendthe Serbian language, Cyrillic and authentic national values as well as opposing to the


7/29

7

acceptance of damaging western influences seen through the products of the mass culture(Santa Claus, Coca Cola, movies on Harry Potter) up to the critical views on NGO, Europeanintegration as well as building of the cultural model that would come out from Orthodoxreligion and general peoples experience ( 2006, 106).

Moral and ideological arbiter of the Serbian Orthodox Church is trustworthy formajority of the citizens. The evidence on this is found in numerous public polls

conducted during the last couple of years in Serbia.5Similar results are found in academic researches with particular accent on

attitudes of the youth (Kuzmanovi and Petrovi 2008; Trifunovi 2007; Kuburi andKuburi 2010). This position is not jeopardized by negative actions of the clergy

because these are seen as individual behavior whilst the Church remains one of thefounding elements of the Serbian ethos.

How can one then understand a note that people (narod) is insufficientlyecclesiastical in the time of mass return to faith and the Church, re-traditionalism andde-secularization of the society and in light of the fact that the Serbian OrthodoxChurch is the institution of the highest trust among the public? Are Serbs really

believers, as the Serbian Orthodox Church expects them to be? If they are, what is thequality of their faith?

Serbs and religiosity

Eastern Christianity is by all means ecclesiasticalChristianity and not the individual one. In Orthodoxy therecan be no person that consider itself as Christian without itsconstant inclusiveness and unity with the Church () Fromthe perspective of Orthodoxy, individualistic Christianity isoxymoron ( 2010, 339).

The most common mistake made in considerations on religious situation inSerbia and in the Balkans, supported from the side of the priesthood and religiouscommunities, is identifying of the confessional belonging with religiosity.Acknowledging and expressing confessional identification with official censuses isusually used for description of the religious background. For instance, the informationfrom the last census in 2002 on 85 % of Orthodoxs, Orthodox clergy in public

performances present as percentage of the Church believers.Confessional identification is a wider term then religiosity and means

acknowledging and accepting of the concrete faith regardless of the personalreligiousness.

Confessional belonging, as a wider term of the general religiosity, can mean: (1) actualconnectedness to the concrete faith and with that actual personal religiosity; (2) traditionalconnectedness with certain faith because of equalization of the religion and ethnos but withoutpersonal religiosity however with clear conscience on confessional background and (3)

acknowledgement of the religious background, religion of the birth (religion of grandfathersand fathers) regardless of the lack of conscience on that and personal religiosity (orevi2007b, 652).

5 The highest trust in Church http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/123571/Najvece-poverenje-u-crkvu;Trust in the Church and the president http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/article/718805.html;Majority of trust goes to the coat and the uniform http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Najvishe-se-veruje-mantiji-i-uniformi.lt.html.


8/29

8

Questions on personal religious identifications are not present in the stateregulations but there is no lack of empirical researches of sociologists of religion fromthe 80s6:

Table 1RELIGIOSITY OF THE CITIZENS OF SERBIA

What is your relation towards the religion? Are you personally? (In %):

MODALITY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

ReligiousIndifferent

Not religiousAtheists

23,822,545,48,25

25,125,546,62,8

71,314,311,60,3

59,321,317,61,4

74,4

55,526,315,82,4

5728,311,72,9

80,5

Legend:

1. Religiosity of the citizenry of Ni region in 1982 (orevi 1984);2. Societal structure and the quality of life in Serbia (without Kosovo) in 1990 (Miladinovi 2001);3. Religiosity in Branievski county in1993 ( 1995);4. Serbia at the end of Millennium (Beograd, Novi Sad and Ni) in 1999 (Radisavljevi-iparizovi2006);

5. World values survey, the worlds most comprehensive investigation of political and socio-culturalchange (www.worldvaluessurvey.org. Online Data Analysis), 2001;6. The quality of inter-ethnical relations, conscience on regional identity and the possibility ofcollaboration and integration in the Balkan (territory of southern Serbia) in2003 (orevi 2009);7. Cultural orientation, ethnical distance and the culture of peace in Serbia and the Balkan (territory ofthe city of Ni) in2007 (orevi 2009).8.European values study(www.europeanvalues.nl/), 2008 (Blagojevi 2009).7

However, personal religious declaration belongs to the so called indicators ofreligiosity and does not tell us anything on classical, Church, conventional religiosity,founded on unique believing in religious doctrine and surrounding religious behaviorinside the community. Classical religiosity rejects subjective religiosity withoutecclesiastical belonging to the Church.

Classical religiosity supports practicing of the religiosity in certain religiousinstitutions as well as development of the feeling of belonging to faith andorganization; it assumes personal recognition and ecclesiastical feelings in religiousterms, public affection in religiously and from the Church prescribed way as well asadhering to the basic beliefs in dogmatic doctrines of that religion or confession.Typological representative of the classical religiosity is so called ecclesiasticalbeliever ()-dedicated believer-that should belong with its all being to the religionand Church that it inherited from its national and family three (orevi 2007a,492).

There is no religiosity in terms of traditional and actual connectedness forreligious community without co-existence of the religious awareness and religious

behavior and associating.

6 It should be noted that the comparison of demonstrated results is rather difficult because allinformation has not been collected on equal samples which only confirms the lack of continuity inquestioning religiosity of the public opinion in equal time intervals.7Serbia has been included in the European research on human values this year for the first time. Theresearch has been conducted in 46 countries in Europe and the responsible institution for the research isInstitute for philosophy and societal theory from Belgrade. The research has been conducted onstratified sample of 1512 examinees.


9/29

9

Table 2RELIGIOSITY OF THE CITIZENS OF SERBIA

Elements of the religious conscience (In %)

Indicators 1 2 3 4 5

Believing inGod

17,6 23,5 46,3 82,4 79,5

Believing inlife after

death

5,4 10,4 28,4 27,1 25,5

Believing inParadise

- - 25,7 17,4 27,8

Believing inHell

- - 25,7 18,1 24

Legend:

1. Religiosity of the citizens of the Ni region in 1982 (orevi 1984);2. Societal structure and the quality of life in Serbia (without Kosovo) in 1990 (Miladinovi 2001);3. Religiosity in Branievo county in1993 ( 1995);4. World values survey, the worlds most comprehensive investigation of political and sociocultural

change (www.worldvaluessurvey.org. Online Data Analysis), 2001;5.European values study(www.europeanvalues.nl/), 2008 (Blagojevi 2009).

If we remove believing in Lord, otherwise soft indicator of religious sanctity,we can talk about dissolution of religious conscience: the persuasion of declared

believers in basic religious beliefs is weak, i.e. there is a weak belief in dogmas of theChristianity. Therefore, we are discussing religiosity of shallow, imaginary and formaltype.

Table 3CONNECTEDNESS TO RELIGION AND CHURCH IN SERBIA

Elements of religious behavior and associating (In %)

Indicators 1982.%

1993.%

1999.%

WorldValuesSurveySerbia(2001)

EuropeanValuesStudySerbia(2008)

Liturgy nearly every

time

0,16 0,3 2,1 - -

Going to Churchonce a week

0,32 1,5 - 9,6 5,8

Everydayprayer

5,56 38,8 15,9 18,1 12,3

Regular fast 2,86 24,4 16,8 - -

Legend:

1. Religiosity of the Ni region in 1982 (orevi 1984);2. Religiosity in Branievo county in 1993 ( 1995);3. Serbia at the end of Millennium (Beograd, Novi Sad and Ni) in 1999 (Radisavljevi-iparizovi2006);4. World values survey, the worlds most comprehensive investigation of political and socio-culturalchange (www.worldvaluessurvey.org. Online Data Analysis), 2001;5.European values study(www.europeanvalues.nl/), 2008 (Blagojevi 2009).


10/29

10

Actual connectedness with religion and the Church is very weak and religiousbehavior shows discontinuity. The process of revitalization is expressed in willingnessof the citizens to express themselves in religious terms but this however does notfollow consequential religious practice. The salvage is something counted on althoughreligious duties are not being fulfilled and although a whole set of the Church ritualactions have not been fulfilled.

Table 5TRADITIONAL CONNECTEDNESS OF RELIGION AND CHURCH IN SERBIA

Indicators 1 2 3 4

Childrensbaptizing

59 84 84 78

Observing thereligiousholidays

58 93 87 -

Burialsadministered

by the Church

- 92 86 87

Legend:

1. Religiosity of population of the Ni region in 1982. godine (orevi 1984);2. Religiosity in Branievo County in1993 ( 1995);3. Serbia at the end of Millennium (Beograd, Novi Sad and Ni) in 1999 (Radisavljevi-iparizovi2006);4.European values study(www.europeanvalues.nl/), 2008 (Blagojevi 2009).

Apparently, there seems to be a significant extension of traditional rituals fromthe domain of religious practical behavior. Thus, we can talk about typical believerof four rituals:

Therefore, by contesting the attitudes of individual Serbian sociologists of religion on havingthe enormous increase in the religiosity of Serbs, once again I am outlining my thesis onrevitalization of their traditional religiosity-Serbian Orthodoxy is actually traditionalist-overwhelmed with traditional believers. The word goes towards traditional, ritual type that isbaptized (and baptizes its siblings), married in Church, observes the fests (and perhapsChristmas and Easter, in the village litias are mandatory as well) and buries itself underneaththe Cross (orevi 2009, 62).

The puzzling element in this is whether believers do this out of pure spiritualmotifs or from religious conformism regarding the fact mentioned rituals lost theirexclusive religious character long time ago and became instead societal desired

behavior and custom normative.In a word,

religious changes in the last twenty years in Serbia on a level of measurable indicators areclearly visible. In all dimensions of the religiosity of the citizens of Serbia, statisticallyimportant changes are traced however, these changes are present in different dimensions ofreligiosity and ecclesiastical sentiments are of different volume, intensity and domain: thelongest domain is present among religious-confessional conscience of examinees and theshortest in ecclesiastical attachment to the Church as a regular and strict adherence to the socalled religious duties ( 2010, 33132).

***


11/29

11

Can we talk about true connectedness of religion and Church among thecitizenry of Serbia? In a half century, from declared atheists there seems to be achange to declared believers and someone could use that to conclude that Serbia isgoing through a religious renaissance. However, it is rather difficult to conclude thatthere seems to be a sudden religious turnout: just like that times mass rejection of the

blessed nature of humans was based on political instrumentalism of Marxism and

formal adjustment to the new way of thinking and behaving8

, in the same way, presentde-secularization is not a product of general spiritual search and the need for personalcalming but rather a consequence of social-political events, societal crisis produced bythe break up of Socialist ideological values and uprising nationalism. By comparingexperiences from the former Yugoslavia, it seems that in Serbia there is a return ofreligions (in sense of a return to religious institutions in the public sphere) and notthe return to the religion (in a sense of citizens returning to the religious experience)(Cvitkovi 2009).

Intensity and the quality of faith in many aspects do not correspond if we bearin mind indexes of dogmatic, actual and traditional relationship with the religion andChurch in Serbia. There seems to be a very thin level of believers that founded firmspiritual connections with belonging to the religious community and that literally

respect religiously prescribed rules and thus, these are those that are so called goodand religious believers.

It is unquestionable that there seems to be a progress in the conventionalreligiosity among the Serbian people that should not be explained as a dedication tothe faith but rather as approaching to the religion and the Church. There is indeed anotable revitalization of religious customs but this is present as an expression ofnostalgic return to values whose continuity was violently interrupted with theinstallation of academic atheism in these places (Blagojevi 2000).

It is very common to see pure rituality followed by celebration and kitschiconography. Declared religiosity among majority of the Serbian population in Serbiais not a stadium but a beginning of a long-term process of spiritual perfectionism andattachment to the Church that lasts. Thanks to the two decades of waves that wereaffirming the collective religiosity in the context of strengthening of the nationalidentification, Serbs at the beginning of 21st century are religious in a way oftraditional believing without belonging (orevi 2009, 62).

RELIGIOUS AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN CROATIA

European identity in Croatia has not been researched deeper then discussionson the national identity and this is the case because Croatia has always dealt withsearch for its own Croatian identity and with the unification of territories that itconsidered as its own in one united Croatian state and later with its position inYugoslavia.

In that sense, the European identity has always been attached with the nationaland most often it was used as an instrument to achieve nationally oriented goals.However, the national process was made through the process of Europeanization andthe European cultural circle and thus, Croatian national identity was tied to theEuropean values.

8 In the world there are still many new atheists, free thinkers, representatives of the intelligentdesign and generally non-religious people that, despite all attempts to diminish their influence, stillexist. See: 2008.


12/29

12

However, this did not function well in practice through out all Croatianhistory. Therefore, when Croatian elites failed in achieving their goals and to gain theEuropean support, the discourse of the European betrayal would take special place inthe public which then furthermore created the animosity towards Europe and theEuropean.

In that sense, an attitude of the all time betrayal from Europe has been

imposed and this discourse exists up to today when it results with a high Euro-skepticism which is nonetheless the highest Euro-skepticism that any state prior tojoining the EU had (see e.g. Eurobarometar 70, 64, 62; Topi et al. 2009; ani 2003).

In movements for national/European emancipation modernization has playedan important role and modernization processes in Croatia are often seen as chaotic andunsuccessful and as a so called industrialization backwards (Poljanec-Bori 2006,360; Rogi 2000; Topi et al. 2009) however, modernization is at the same time

blamed for fragmentation of the collective identities and this process begun before thebreak up of the Yugoslav regime which failed in creating one unique Yugoslavidentity and it continued during the 1990s when the new Croatian state failed increating one unique Croatian identity that will not be fragmented (see e.g. Katunari2007; Rimac 2004; Topi et al. 2009; Topi 2010 a).

Europeanization in all these processes bears a significant role since everymodernization was shown as Europeanization and in the end, when the modernizationfailed in its goals the Europeanization failed as well. This count for all cases exceptfor Istria where both processes have been successful and this indeed can have aconnection with the fact that the Istrian region has always been aware of its specialtyand the historical consequences because of which it found itself inside Croatia as wellwith a low impact in the war destruction during the 1990s (see e.g. Banovac et al.2004; Banovac 1997; Boneta 2004; Rimac 2004).

The reason for failure of the modernization and the Europeanization can betraced in the fact that the modernization has always been seen through the issues oflanguage, Latin letter, belonging to the western civilization, belonging to Christianity,importance of the thousand years old statehood and non-existent yet always desiredstate with roots in medieval kingdoms (Kalanj, 2005).

In this way, the modernization has been presented through traditional terms ofnation and nationalism however at the same time it has been tied with the Europeanvalues and belonging to Europe that then did not accept this and thus a discourse of

betrayal would occur. This cycle has constantly been repeating throughout allCroatian history (Topi et al, 2009).

In terms of the Europeanization and the European identity, four approachescan clearly be identified:

) antemurale christianitatis according to which Europe betrayed Croatiaregarding the fact Croatia served Europe as the outer wall that defended Europe fromso called eastern enemy and on which Europe never thanked Croatia but even more,

betrayed it. Croatia is also seen as a cradle of Christianity which Europe does notacknowledge although it considers itself as mostly Christian;b) Central European identity that Croatia always considered to belong to (with

that ignoring the Mediterranean identity of Dalmatia and Istria) and this approach wasdominant until WW I;

c) Changes after World War II when all Central European states faced fascismand later Socialism and societies then changed towards the direction of totalitarianismencouraging the discourse of conflict of east and west (see e.g. Topi i dr. 2009; LeRider 1998; Gross 2000; Krlea 1957; Radi 1994; Roksandi 1989; Boban 2005) and


13/29

13

d) After the fall of Socialism during the 1990s when Croatia changed thedirection towards democratization of the society and European discourse againoccurred first in the light of Euro-optimism and then again in light of the anti-European discourse on betrayal (see e.g. Eurobarometer 70, 71, Topi et al 2009).

However, after the war from the 1990s, the EU took over the position of socalled betrayer from general term of Europe and the modernization again started to

occur in the discourse of the Europeanization. But, modernization in this sense servedas a mask for a radical traditionalism and ethnically oriented nationalism that soughtto ethnically cleanse nation and the biggest victim to this was given by minorities(that became other) and women (that were placed on a level of those meant to give

birth to new Croats) (Bijeli 2006; Kesi 1994; Topi 2009; Topi et al 2009; Topi2010a). At the same time modernization served for a robbery of the state ownedcompanies and creating inequality through the politics of 200 rich families that willcarry the economic growth and that erased the middle class9(Petrii 2000).

This politics did not help the factual modernization let alone Europeanizationfor the EU did not look with sympathies on the violation of rights of the minoritiesand women and the society radicalizing in traditionalism projected as modernizationand Europeanization (see Topi 2009; Topi 2010a; Topi 2010b). Croatian citizens

on the other hand, blinded with war suffrage and eventual victory did not reallyrealized what is happening in the country and thus expected Europeanization that has

been promised to them and when it did not happen, the first Euro-skepticism occurredand the period from the 1990s is generally seen as the beginning of strengthening ofthe national in favor of the European (see e.g. Novosel 1991; Lasi 1992; Finkielkraut1992; Golua 2001; Sekuli & porer 2008).

More serious discussion on the EU and the European identity begun only afterthe elections of the 2000 (after the first democratic change of government after 10years of rule of the Croatian Democratic Union of the late president Franjo Tuman)and this is partially because Croatia at that time made a significant step towards themembership in the EU. However, with the return of Croatian Democratic Union(reformed though) to power in 2004 the process of joining the EU run into obstaclesas it was projected prior to the elections (see e.g. Nacional 2003; Index 2003; Vjesnik2003) and then the final decrease towards joining the EU occurred reaching its peak inthe last couple of years (since Croatian Democratic Union re-gain elections and sinceSlovenia blocked Croatian negotiations without real arguments and Europe failed in

protecting Croatia) (see Eurobarometar 62, 64, 70, 71, 72).As for the religious identity, religion played an important role in creating the

national identity and then European identity through out all Croatian history. CatholicChurch was included in all aspects of the societys life in nearly all periods of thehistory and most often it was presented in the public sphere as well. The exceptionfrom this was during the Yugoslavia when religion has been radically pushed in the

private sphere and officially banned however, Catholic Church was not banned from

holding the Sunday services and thus influencing the believers. Yugoslav secularismwas an attempt to overcome the religious differences inside the federation since theCommunist party apparently realized, long before Europe that now faces the problemof religious differences did, that religion more often divides then connects.

The return to religiosity was however aggressively imposed during the 1990s

9This topic became the issue on a public agenda only in 2010 and that says a lot about the strength ofthe nationalistic rhetoric and the politics of the so called enemies of Croatia if someone dares tocriticize Croatian Democratic Union that aggressively equalizes itself with Croatia (see e.g. Bing2005).


14/29

14

but that is, according to some researches, more of declarative then practical level.More Croatian citizens during the 1990s declared themselves as believers then in

periods prior to the 1990s and the independence however, on concrete question inregard to the extent up to their faith goes, they have given different answers withwhich they have shown they are not so called true believers or, they expressthemselves as religiously active however, they overthrow the Churchs doctrine in

regard to the everyday life. This is seen in already mentioned Istria in whichmodernization and Europeanization were the most successful (Boneta, 2000).Therefore, Croatian citizens seem to be religious in a way of traditional

belonging for the purpose of national identification whereas believing factor becomessignificant in all regions except for Istria where people define themselves as religiousand religiously active but then reject doctrines of the Church in regard to the everydaylife (Boneta 2000).

With this we are coming to the term Croat-Catholic often heard in the publicdiscourse and always present in majority of official discourses with which faith andnation are equalized as synonyms and which should not be a characteristic of acountry that with its geographical position and supposing ideology wants to belong toEurope but actually leads a version of Middle Eastern politics of equalizing religion

and ethnicity (see Vuk, 1992).As for the interrelationship of religion and nationalism, the research of Sekuli

and porer (2006) has shown that in 20 observed years the societal changes that canbe interconnected with the interrelation of religion and nationalism occurred. Thosesocietal changes, pictured in changes of societal values, are lower in socialist periodand extremely high in 1996 while in 2004 they started to decrease.

In the case of Croatia, war had an impact that made the religion take importantplace after religion, during all time of the existence of Yugoslavia was placed on themargins of the society, and religion as such served as a de-legitimatization of old andlegitimatization of the new system and the collective identity (Boneta 2000; Sekuli iporer 1997).

Newly accepted religious identity that was generally Christian but specificallyCatholic again became the foundation for separating other ethnical groups as it wasduring the history when the religion was used to identify non-Croats and discriminatethem (see Boneta 2000; imi 1984; US embassy report 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,2005, 2006, 2007, 2008. 2009, 2010). However, the process of religious self-identification was not balanced in a whole Croatia concerning the religiousdifferences10but also various levels of war inclusion (Rimac 2004; Boneta 2000; Bing2005; Sekuli and porer 2006). For example, in Istria the process of secularizationduring the second Yugoslavia was extremely strong and some authors place it todirect connection with modernization (Boneta, 2000) however, during the 1990s theCatholic Church gained the strength and included itself in the societal-political

process criticizing especially the modernization (see Boneta 2000) and thus calling

upon the so called return to the tradition.Croats and the Catholic Church11

10 On regional differences numerous researches has been conducted, e.g. Vrcan 2006; Vrcan 2001;Marinovi Jerolimov and Zrinak 2006; Boneta 2004.11Regarding the fact there are no papers on this precise theme, the argumentation is supported with themedia articles as well.


15/29

15

As in the case of Serbia and Serbian Orthodox Church, Croatia in the last twodecades also faced revitalization of religiosity. As it was already mentioned, duringthe 1990s there was a return to the tradition which was shown as modernization andEuropeanization however, what was in stake was imposing of the tradition andradicalization of ethnical nationalism and one of the leading roles in that was taken bythe Catholic Church that imposed itself as a carrier of those values. In that it gained

the significant support of the political elites. At that time, the society was divided toloyal citizens and internal enemies (Bijeli 2006; Topi 2009) and Catholic Churchlegitimized the regime that discriminated women and national minorities that foundthemselves in the position of otherness. From that rhetoric it does not give up eventoday although this is not the official attitude of the majority of publicly exposedclericals anymore however, often discriminatory and dangerous dropouts of theclericals nobody sanctions (both the state or the Church itself) but everything ratherends up in the domain of the public discussion and the media scandals and in the lastinstance in the domain of the Internet discussions with conflicts of citizens divided

between those who praise the Ustashas and those who praise the Partisans. Thisdiscourse does not seem to be able to vanish from the public agenda since thatdiscourse is constantly presented in the public and after certain time of cease there it

comes another one although it has been almost 20 years since the process ofYugoslavias dissolution started and although it has been 15 years since the war withSerbia officially ended12.

The Church also actively participated in imposing the tripartite relationshipbetween the Church, nation and state and it strongly encouraged the nationalisticparties (e.g. ruling Croatian Democratic Union that later reformed itself) whilst itdemonized the opposition led by the Social Democrats, calling them as the destructorsof Croatia although the opposition did not play an active role in nearly any nationalscandal nor did it economically devastated Croatia as the Croatian Democratic Uniondid in all of its terms in the Government (see Petrii 2000) (nowadays the corruptionand robbery affairs are making nearly the daily consumption in the media).

The Church also imposed itself as the keeper of the nation and up to themeasure that it openly participates in election campaigns in favor of the CroatianDemocratic Union that, out of 20 years of independence, rules Croatia for 16 years.

However, until 2010 this was normally going on up to the level of populistrhetoric that demonized the opposition and in constant discussions expressing worryfor the dignity of the war from the 1990s which brings the question on the valuessome Church officials are prolonging.

The Church always stood with the Croatian Democratic Union and in 2010due to the economic crisis and the instability of the Government threatened to becalled off after the Prime Minister Ivo Sanader resigned from his position Croatiancitizens witnessed an early start of the election campaign this time directed towards

preserving the rule by the Croatian Democratic Union. Some clericals from the

12For example, during the summer of 2010 there was a outrageous flirting with the Ustasha regimecommitted by the priest at the commemoration (more on that later) while during November 2010 therewas a gathering in the city of Karlovac in which the protagonists asked for rejection of the anti-fasciststruggle and the support for fascism. The gathering was organized by the marginal party and not theChurch however, the attitude of this paper is that the behavior of some clericals is encouragement togroups that want to encourage intolerance and that is clearly visible on Internet forums under nearlyevery article and then again in concrete actions such as this one or assaults to the non-Catholic religiousobjects, assaults to the religious leaders, symbols, anti-Semitic assaults and threatening letters andstatements, etc. These are not mass however they are constant up to today (see e.g. T-Portal 2010a; USembassy reports 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007;: 2008; 2009; 2010).


16/29

16

Church, apart from generally present populism, went that far to openly call upon theUstasha regime from WW II. Therefore, the priest at one commemoration openlyglorified the Ustasha fhrer Ante Paveli and justified his regime:

In the year 1941 Croatia was made by Croats and our leader13 and the Ustashas. Theetniks14wanted to kill us so that we disappear. Tito and the Partisans helped them in that.That is why the etniks did kill our people on todays day 68 years ago.

Josipovi15says that the Partisans hat is beautiful but I am bespeaking him that the Ustashashat is more beautiful. They are knitting me that hat today. There have been fewer crimescommitted under the Ustashas then under the Partisans hat (Tportal 2010; see more at e.g.CroVijesti 2010; dalje.com 2010).16

13The priest used the term 'poglavnik' which is the official term used during the Ustasha regime forUstasha fhrer Ante Paveli. Ustasha's are the leaders of the Croatian Nazi regime from the WW II.14Serbian equivalent to the Ustasha's.15 Croatian president appointed in 2010. He declares himself as the agnostic and thus the Churchstrongly opposed to his election openly supporting the populist candidate being investigated fornumerous robberies and corruption affairs which again brings the question of values some clericals are

supporting. The populist candidate managed to make it to the second election round which is when themedia called upon the civilization issue making the election of Ivo Josipovi a civilization issue whilethe other candidate was seen as a non-civilization choice. Although there are no researches thatempirically tested this, it is very obvious that the influence of the Church nearly prevailed in electingthe president however when the media went in with the civilization issue (always sensitive to Croatsproud of their civilization, culture and tradition) came out, apparently passive voters and the youthcame out to the election and rejected the populist. It is thus quite obvious that Church bears thesignificant influence in the society and that it needs a media campaign and insults to the population tomake passive voters come out and make the right choices and to prevent the Church from interfering inthe political affairs.16The incidents on praising the Ustasha regime are not happening on a daily basis however, they dopresent a constant. Most often they appear in the form of uncompromised support towards MarkoPerkovi Thompson, nationalist singer banned from singing in some countries in the world. OnThompsons concerts, Ustasha signs always occur as well as praising of the Ustasha regime however he

himself never gave up from Fascism but insists on patriotism which is clearly not the case. In some ofhis songs, he is praising the Ustasha regime indirectly (by singing about the Bleiburg massacre ofUstashas escaping the justice after committing a Holocaust) by singing about those who just defendedwhat is theirs which is clearly not the case with the Ustasha Nazi regime. However, Thompson has asupport of the Catholic Church that even gave him a divorce although the reason his marriage set apartwas the third person which is clearly against the practice and doctrine of the Catholic Church. But, thestate does not react to that and despite the incidents the Church still protects Thompson that also oftensings on Church gatherings and the priests are lately, since the crisis this is to say, even quoting hislyrics glorifying the Ustasha regime (24 sata 2008). Incidents with praising the Ustasha regime, as theone described above do happen rare then the incidents with so called patriotism (i.e. clericals praisinggenerals convicted for war crimes against the non-Croat civilians) however, those of us who arefamiliar with the theory of nationalism and the worlds history of violence and massacres as well aswith the role of religion in fueling conflicts in general and in Croatia in particular (both WW II and the1990s) do see these statements as disturbing elements that prevent the reconciliation and full peace in

the country. These incidents and a false patriotism that justifies war crimes against civilians togetherwith historical revisionism that also clearly exists (FP/ST-1), do contribute to the fact that there arestill so much unreasonable hate and incidents between religious and ethnic groups in Croatia thatobviously do not happen on a daily basis but that do happen up to today and according to the belieffrom non-Catholic religious communities, their members still feel insecure and threaten to identifythemselves openly. Apart from violence, threatening messages, commentsand other that happens up tothis year, is also because the attacks towards non-Croats and non-Catholics are religiously directed andthrough out history, religious differences have been used to identify non-Croats and to target them fordiscrimination due to the fact religion and ethnicity are closely linked in the society (US embassyreport 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010; FP/ST-1). This is also damagingcountrys prospects for full integration to the EU as well as countrys image because the worlds media


17/29

17

With this politics, it becomes apparent that there is a connection between theethnicity and the religion in the society and that the religion was used throughouthistory to differentiate the non-Croats and to discriminate them and sporadic violenceand threats towards religious groups, institutions and their symbols occur up to todayand can indeed be connected with the indoctrination, revisionism and equalizing of

the religion and nation and for the purpose of identifying others (see e.g. USembassy report 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010;FP/ST-1 2010; FP/STD-2; FP/STJ-3).

Although the Croatian Constitution does not declare the official state religion,the Church still has a special place in the society, but also within the state in whoseofficial bodies even participates. For example, priests participate in committees thatapprove the official history textbooks (FP/ST-1, 2010) and on nearly every questionof the public interest they express their opinion and often influence certain decisionssuch as insisting on introducing the catechism in kindergartens (see e.g. US embassyreport, 2002).

There, and just like in the Serbian case, does not seem to be a boarder betweenfaith and politics and the Church is institutionalized in the matter of their role in

shaping of the national identity.Apart from that, Catholic catechism is the only one fully available in schools

(since 1999) and that caused problems to pupils of other confessions found in asituation to have a free hour in the middle of the school day they have no place tospend and at the same time they are in the foci of attention and under a societal

pressure. According to the Law, pupils of other confessions can take courses in theirreligious catechism only if there is at least seven pupils which is difficult however,even when that occurs there are problems because certain schools are still hostile inoffering religious catechism of other confessions. This is mainly the problem of theSerbian minority that is also the largest one however, others also face this problem(see US embassy report 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009,2010).

Catholic Church regained majority of its property nationalized by theCommunists and when this was not possible it got repaid or substituted with other

properties whereas the Serbian Orthodox Church still has difficulties in regaining lostproperty as well as Jewish Community of Zagreb17(US embassy report 2001; 2002;2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010) whereas Churches are builteverywhere which is apparently specifically post-Yugoslav problem (apart fromSerbia, there is something similar in Macedonia as well).

Croatia also has a whole set of unfavorable concordats with Vatican althoughofficial religion does not exist. According to these contracts, large amounts are paid toVatican and also towards pension contributions and the health insurance and Croatian

public TV (HTV) monthly broadcasts 10 hours of Catholic program with only 10

minutes of program dedicated to other confessions. At the beginning, specialconcordats have been available to the Catholic Church only however, with Coalitionsimplementation of the Law on religious communities in 2002, the contracts have beensigned with other religious communities that are now being financed by the state aswell (US embassy report 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010)however, the situation at the public TV remained the same.

report on incidents like these ones and this does not serve the countrys goals nor the reputation (UAD,2009; UAD 2009 a).17Not Bet Israel Jewish Community


18/29

18

Catholic marriages were also the first to be recognized before the state. Thisremained unchanged until the 2003 when the Coalition government gave the sameright to Islamic and Orthodox marriages and in 2008, reformed Croatian DemocraticUnion gave that right to the Bet Israel Jewish Community upon separating fromJewish Community of Zagreb and signing an agreement with the state according towhich Bet Israel gained the status of the religious community in Croatia (US embassy

report 2008, 2009, 2010).

Croats and religiosity

According to the classification of Halman and Draulanus (2006) Croatiansociety belongs to the quarter most religious societies in Europe if criteria of declaredreligiosity and participation in Church rituals are taken into consideration (Boneta andBanovac 2007). However, as it has been outlined earlier in this paper, it is also thematter of ethnical identification (Croat-Catholic).

Skledar and Marinovi Jerolimov (1997) gave comparative results for the cityof Zagreb from 1968 until 1990 showing how citizens religiously declared themselvesuntil independence from the 1990s. There seems to be a decrease in Catholic

orientation before the period when it was already visible Yugoslavia is setting apartwhile after independence catholic identification increased.

Therefore, in 1968 in Zagrebs population, there were 86% of Catholics, in1982 75%, 1987 63% only to see the catholic identification increasing already in 1989and thus, on the eve of the Yugoslavias dissolution when it was 74%.

However, these findings clearly show that the level of religiosity grew from1989 onwards and especially in favor of the Catholicism while the number ofOrthodox believers decreased regarding the fact citizens of Serbian ethnicity fled thecountry or did not declare themselves. The latter is sometimes still the case due to theunpleasant experiences some are facing (see e.g. US embassy reports 2009, 2010).

Additionally, as shown in the Table 6, on the national level catholicidentification increased further during the period since the independence. Thus, from70% of Catholics in 1989 the catholic identification in 1996 increased to 90% whereasthe Orthodox identification decreased from 10% in the 1989 to 2% in 1996. Theothers however remained on the same level whereas the number of those withoutconfession decreased as well, i. e. from 18% in 1989 to 5% in 1996.

Table 6CONFESSIONAL BELONGING IN CROATIA (in %)

1989. 1996.

Catholics 70 90Orthodox 10 2Moslems 2 2

Others 1 1Without confession 18 5Source:Skledar and Marinovi Jerolimov 1997.

On the other hand, and as Table 7 shows, there is also an increase in theintensity of religiosity. Therefore, the number of those who identify themselves asdedicated believers more then doubled while the number of those who feelindifference towards religion decreased as well as the number of those who are notreligious and those who oppose religion as such both to double terms. Additionally, a


19/29

19

number of insecure also grew which might be the consequence of sudden entrance ofthe religion to the public sphere and aggressive imposing of the religion as ademarcation of the ethnical identity that confused previously secularized citizenry.

Table 7PERSONAL RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION IN CROATIA (in %)

1989. 1996.

Dedicated believer 15 36Religious 27 37Insecure 11 8Indifferent 11 6Not religious 34 11Opposing to the religion 2 1Source: Skledar and Marinovi Jerolimov 1997.

On the third side, and as shown in the Table 8, intensity of religious beliefsalso increased if compared to the period from 1989 which means that imposition of

the religion in the public discourse gained success since we are talking about the year1996 or, about the year after the war officially ended.Therefore, in all segments there seems to be an increased intensity of believing

and religiosity while at the same time the number of insecure, indifferent and notreligious as well as those who oppose the religion, decreased.

Thus, same changes occurred in the segment of believing if comparing beliefsin 1989 and 1996. Therefore, the number of those who believe in God more thendoubled while at the same time the number of those who doubt or do not believe,significantly decreased. Similar situation happened with life after death in which in1996 believed more then double of the total examinees while the number of those whodo not believe decreased in double terms. Only the number of those who doubtincreased a little bit which can be a result of aggressive imposition of religion that

again confused the citizenry exposed to secularization thus far.Similar situation is also present with beliefs that God created man and in beliefthat there is the destiny. Thus, double more examinees believe that God created manless suspects that and nearly three times less examinees does not believe at all.

Destiny is the object of believing of a little bit more examinees then beforewhile those who doubt or do not believe decreased.

Table 8BELIEFS (in %)

1989. 1996.God exists

I believe 39 75I doubt 28 15I dont believe 33 10There is a life after thedeathI believe 20 49I doubt 25 28I dont believe 55 23God created men


20/29

20

I believe 30 62I doubt 26 22I dont believe 44 16

Destiny existsI believe 62 74I doubt 20 15I dont believe 18 11

Source: Skledar and Marinovi Jerolimov 1997.

But, as the research from 2010 that compared results from 1999 and 2008,showed, level of believing in the existence of God increased in 2008 in comparison to1999 (42 vs 40 %) but at the same time, the number of those who believe in the lifeforce increased (42 vs 40 %) while at the same time there is an increase in the numberof skeptics (13 vs 8 %) but also of those who believe that neither God neither lifeforce exists (4 vs 3 %) (rpi and Zrinak, 2010).

However, and as shown in the Table 9, Church attendance also increased ifcompared to the period before Yugoslavias dissolution however, not in the sameterms as in other categories. Therefore, the percentage of those that attend Church on

a daily basis remained the same while the number of those who attend Church serviceon a weekly and monthly basis increased and those who never go to the Church againsignificantly decreased.

Table 9CHURCH ATTENDANCE (in %)

1989. 1996.

Daily 1 1Weekly 11 30Monthly 29 43Never 59 26

Source: Skledar and Marinovi Jerolimov 1997

If looking into information from years 1999 and 2008, comparative researchfrom the 2010 has shown that in regard to the 1999, in 2008 there seems to be adecrease of those who attend the Church on a weekly and monthly basis (31 vs 26 %or, 16 vs 21 %). At the same time, there seems to be an increase of those who attendChurch occasionally (40 vs 37 %) and never (17 vs 11 %) (rpi and Zrinak, 2010).

From presented information, it is apparent that there is an increase inreligiosity after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and in years to come (thus, after 1996)religiosity and belonging to the faith remained high with which Croatia places itselfamong the most religious countries in Europe (rpi and Zrinak 2010). Therefore,and as comparative research has shown (rpi and Zrinak 2010) the level of

religiosity started to decrease however, it is still very high and attachment to thereligion remains strong.Therefore, this big European research conducted in 2008 has shown stability

among religious beliefs and in some segments an increase in comparison to the 1999when first such research have been conducted.

Therefore, and as shown in the Table 10, in 2008 84, 3 % declared themselvesas believers with which the catholic identification decreased for six per cent since the

population declared other faith or not being religious at all (rpi and rinak 2010).This is again in line with earlier assumption according to which the national


21/29

21

minorities did not declare themselves as dedicated believers at the beginning of theindependence from the 1990s and some still refrain from doing so.

Table 10BELONGING TO THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY (in %)

Catholics Others Not religious1999. 86, 8 1, 9 11, 32008. 80, 6 3, 7 15, 7Source:Graph in rpi and Zrinak (2010), personal table creation

The same research has also shown stability among religious beliefs in Croatiaand with that also an increase of religiosity amongst youth in comparison to the 1999and also stability in attitudes towards the importance of God and faith in the lives ofthe citizens of Croatia (Table 11).

Table 11IMPORTANCE OF GOD (in %)

1999 2008Completely unimportant 4,5 5,52 2,6 3,63 5.5 4,54 2,3 3,35 11,6 9.46 6,5 6,07 11,2 10,28 10,5 11,69 10,6 10,210 32,9 34,0

Source:Table from rpi and Zrinak (2010), personal creation for this paper

At the same time, it became visible that citizens feel consoled and encouragedby the fate (more then 70 %) while active attendance of religious rituals decreased forsome 10 % in all segments (weekly, monthly) and the number of those who never goto the Church increased as well (Table 12).

Table 12FAITH AS CONSOLATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT (in %)

Yes No I dont know1999 74 16 10

2008 73 20 7Source: Graph in rpi and Zrinak (2010), personal table creation

However, and as shown in the Table 12, in 2008 there seems to be a decreasein trust in the Church as an institution as well as in a Church as an institution that canoffer answers and with which the influence of the Church to societal changes seems to

be decreasing as well (rpi and Zrinak 2010) if the results remain at this level.This is the situation probably because of numerous scandals across the globe that didnot miss Croatia although Croatia mostly remained outside of the global trend


22/29

22

regarding the fact there are no reactions from the state authorities and due to thepresent level or religiosity within the society where the level of religiosity isdecreasing but not as efficiently as it suddenly increased after the independence fromthe 1990s.

Table 13

TRUST IN CHURCH (IN %)

Very high Big Not so high Not at all1999 19 44 30 52008 19 34 34 11Source: Graph in rpi and Zrinak (2010), personal table creation

When looking into these results, and as noted by rpi and Zrinak (2010),dimension of religiosity basically remained unchanged. With that they particularlyoutline dimensions of believing in God, consolation, religious self-identification,

picture of God and importance of God in life.In line with our previous discussion, it is apparent that the process of

clericalization from the 1990s and sudden entrance of the Church in public spheretook an effect in relations to the religious self-identification and also in relation to thereligious attitudes. There is only a decrease in trust in the Church and probably thereason for that are numerous scandals with severe violation of human rights andinternationally protected rights of children. However, and in regard to the generalfindings (the level of religiosity, Church attendance, self-identification), it is apparentthat in Croatia, unlikely for some other European countries, religion still bears asignificant influence and there does not seem to be the individualization of thereligious.

On the other hand there are, earlier mentioned, findings that show that peopledo not entirely agree with doctrines of the Church in regard to the everyday lifehowever, this mostly regards to Istria, a region that has gone through a process of

modernization and Europeanization as well as clericalization that brought to thesituation where people seem to be declaring themselves as believers and activelyparticipate in religious rituals but then again on concrete questions give answersopposite to the doctrine from their declared faith (see Boneta 2000).

Regarding the fact that majority of population declares itself as Catholics,Catholic Church apparently has an influence and/or approach to the believers.Because of the possibility of approaching the people, the role of the Church is veryimportant since especially the Church has the possibility of direct influence on thecreation of the European identity in its positive connotation and in a removal from thenegative aspects of history that the state officially rejected in its highest state-legalact: The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. In that sense, speeches in whichcriminal regimes and dark phase of history are revived verbally should be fully

abandoned and if not the state, in line with its Constitution and a complete legalsystem, should call for consequences in order to ensure a living atmosphere in whichnobody would feel jeopardized or afraid to declare as different then the majority. As ithas already been noted, it does not take much to fuel conflict and these incidents donot help Croatias progress whatsoever. If this should be done, after that, the violenceshould also slowly vanish and Croatia could indeed direct towards trueEuropeanization in its positive connotation.

RELIGIOUS IDENTITY


23/29

23

ADVANTAGE OR FAILURE IN BUILDING THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY?(Instead of Conclusion)

Are Orthodoxy and Catholicism incompatible with democracy or can they helprecent democratic states of the Balkans and its citizens in joining European highwaysafter being lost?

In Serbia and Croatia, as we have explained, there is apparent revitalization ofthe public role of religion and the Church, influenced by the specific societal-politicalevents that occurred in the Balkan. Serbian Orthodox and Catholic Church becamerelevant factors in functioning of the societal organism of the Serbian and Croatiansociety administering a whole set of functions: from homogenizing and ethno-mobilizing at the beginning of the 1990s up to the social-psychological andideological in the present.

Carried with a desire to replace multiple decades of being left out from thecreation of the state politics and the public opinion, both neglected their first twomillennium calls: attachment to the religion of both Serbian and Croatian peoples,

pointing towards the search for inner and blessed and spiritualism of interrelations inan everyday life.

That, as well as presented empirical evidence, gives us the right to achievedlevel of religiosity of both Serbs and Croats-opposite to the picturesque term of GraceDavie (2005) on western European believing without belonging-describe astraditional belonging without believing.

When the WW II ended, churches in Yugoslavia got convicted to half centurymarginalization in societal processes (Serbian Orthodox Church in higher terms thenRoman Catholic Church in Croatia). Severe dissolution of the joint state and the

process of constituting the independent states at the beginning of the 1990s easily gotsupported by the clericals that supported the uprising of the nationalist policies underthe cover of fake promises on quick membership in the European family andmodernization.

It turned out however that even after two decades of wondering, there is stillno clear and contemporary profile of the European identity of both Serbs and Croats,still largely looking in the past then in the future and overall worried for crowning ofthe national symbols inside Europe. Therefore, it is necessary to reformulate the senseand the mission of religion and the Church in the Balkan so that they would supportregional Euro-Atlantic integrations.

By finally leaving behind fruitless adventure with party oligarchies for thepurpose of increasing the competences and privileges and founding of the newtheological democracy in the countries of formerly self-governed socialism,traditional religious communities in both Serbia and Croatia should face true return toserving to the faith or, strengthening of the individual religious sensibility of the

believers. This should be done by following the example of European and other

worlds experiences (Casanova 1994; Herbert 2003).Church can therefore witness in two ways-with spiritual activity as well associal engagement (Zrinak 2005; orevi 2007c). Or, more precisely, byrefraining from the daily political demagogy, search for new ways of public religiousarticulation, stabilizing the personal independent status and the affirmation of thecritical attitude towards anomalies of the pluralist, consumer society and dominantsocietal processes.

Sociologists of religion in the world estimate that the more the society movestowards Europe, the more it will be under the influence of the European secularity


24/29

24

or, religious community in a clash with dynamic competence of the pluralist situationhas three options: to resist, to withdraw or to get itself involved in a relation with

pluralism ( 2010, 35455). First two could be characterized as neo-traditionalism whereas the third one is the one counted on in line with the expectationthat the Church is not opposed to the society and societal changes. Or, it should not beor furthermore, it should stop being so, as it is clearly the case in both Serbia and

Croatia.Serbian Orthodox Church is a member of the Church worlds advisory board(Roman Catholic has an observing position), collaborates up to the certain level inecumenical and inter-religious dialogue. However, true support towards the Europeanintegration will face them with two self-absorbing facts of the modernity: pluralismand individualism, secular as well as religious.

On institutionalized level, religious pluralism points towards the conclusion that any religiousmonopoly becomes buried and eventually significantly modified or cancelled in total.Religious institutions no longer can unquestionably count that certain population willpassively adhere to their authority. Instead, people will have to be convinced to accept thatkind of authority. In other words, something like religious market occurs and in that placeindividuals now have a choice (). This simply means that the religion moves from the level

of subjectivity of the obvious truth towards the level of decision. Said differently, now it ismore difficult to achieve the religious proximity. Religious decision can be an issue ofpassionate attachmentorit can be consumerist option of emotionally low intensively( 2010, 34950).

Serbian Orthodox Church and Catholic Church in Croatia can no longer counton the position of dominant religious pattern from history but they should be facedwith competition in open European cultural and religious surrounding.

So far declarative support towards the processes that western Europeancivilization promotes in its enlargement towards the East should be extended withcareful listening to the messages of other actors on the religious scene and with theneeds of ordinary people with or without religious experience.

By supporting the individuals to a peaceful coexistence with others and forothers in local area but also by redefining the public role and shape of the presentpastoral activity in Serbian and Croatian society, Serbian Orthodox church andCroatian Catholic church can to their present and future believers, tired of transitionand endless pointing towards European future that does not occur, serve as anorienteer in adjusting to the desired western model in its positive connotation.

What would these changes contain?In the sphere of public activity:-giving up from radical nationalistic rhetoric based on chauvinism (fanatical

behavior and the lack of tolerance towards minorities and other ethnic groups)-support to believers in participating in the political life rather then

encouraging them to be passive receivers;

-promotion of the Serbian and Croatian cultural inheritance as a contribution toenriching the European cultural tradition but also introducing the local believers withthe achievements of others;

-collaboration with the civil sector (defense of the dignity of the mankind andbasic human rights: freedom of conscience and religious freedom, social justice andpeace and disapproval of any discrimination, xenophobia and violence);

-questioning the basic values and ethos of the presence (promotion of thesocial justice, rejection of different shapes of the unequal distribution of societal

power, questioning the possibilities of the market based on competition);


25/29

25

-supporting the social-ethical discussion on the justice of the economy(greediness for earning profit, unequal distribution of the societal goods) and a firmcritique of the anomalies of the consumer society (alcoholism, use of narcotics,delinquency, human trafficking);

-raising the conscience on importance of the protection of the life area;-philanthropy and humanitarian work;

-affirmation of the religious values in economic activity (honesty, hardworkinghabits as a means for achieving success, solidarity, relations towards the workingenvironment)

In the sphere of pastoral care:-participating in the theological and ecclesiastical dialogue on the international

level in bodies of the ecumenical movement;-decreasing the anti-cult rhetoric against small religious communities and

decreasing the irrational fear among the citizenry from the assumed negative actionsof sects and cults;

-collaboration and joint performance with other Churches and denominationsin public appearances;

-support to youth in achieving institutional higher education;

-affirmation of the equality of genders in family relations;-awakening of the business spirit among believers and support to the

elementary help in supporting the self-employment;-developing and expressing sensibility for issues of vulnerable minority groups

(ethnical, gender, disabled, etc.).

LITERATURE

Banovac, Boris, Robert Blaevi i eljko Boneta. 2004. Modernizacija (i/ili europeizacija) hrvatskeperiferije primjeri Istre, Like i Gorskog Kotara.Revija za sociologijuXXXV(34):11341.

Banovac, Boris. 1997. Modernizacijski procesi i oblici teritorijalne pripadnosti. Drutvena istraivanja6(1):2348.

, . 2010. . , . , 34758. : .

Bijeli, Biljana. 2006. ene na rubu rodne jednakopravnosti. In Demokratska tranzicija u Hrvatskoj:tranformacija vrijednosti, obrazovanje, priredili S. Ramet i D. Mati: 241-261.

Bing, Albert. 2008. Pomirbena ideologija i konstrukcija identiteta u suvremenoj hrvatskoj politici. UDijalog povjesniara istoriara, knjiga 10, priredio Igor Graovac, 32740. Zagreb: ZakladaFriedrich Naumann i Udruga za promicanje znanstvenog dijaloga (Dijalog).

Bing, Albert. 2005. Amerikanizam i (re) konstrukcija hrvatskoga nacionalnog identiteta u vremenimaradikalnih drutvenih promjena stvaranja i raspada socijalistike Jugoslavije. U Dijalogpovjesniara istoriara, knjiga 9, priredili H. Fleck i Igor Graovac, 25978. Zagreb:Friedrich Naumann Stiftung.

, . 1995. .: .. 2000. Religioznost stanovnitva u Jugoslaviji (Prezentacija deliminog pregleda iskustvenih

istraivanja). U Crkva, drava i civilno drutvo, priredili Milan Vukomanovi i Nemanja

Krajinovi, 2335. Beograd: Centar za demokratiju.. 2006. Savremene religijske promene u Srbji i proces integracije u Evropu. Filozofija i drutvo

XVII(1):95111.. 2009. Empirical (re)evaluation of revitalization of Orthodox christianity. In Revitalization of

religion Theoretical and comparative approaches, edited by Danijela Gavrilovi, 6570.Ni: Yugoslav society for the scientific study of religion.

. 2010. : . , . , 31134. : .


26/29

26

Boban, Branka (2005). Stjepan Radi i Europa. In H. G Fleck, I. Graovac (eds.):Dijalogpovjesniara/istoriara 9, Zagreb: Zaklada Friedrich Naumann

Boneta, eljko i Boris Banovac. 2007. Religioznost i nacionalizam na hrvatskoj periferiji velikiscenariji za male zajednice.Migracijske i etnike teme23(3):16384.

Boneta, eljko. 2004. Politiki identiteti periferija,Revija za sociologijuXXXV(34):14358.. 2000. Stabilizacija vjernike strukture i/ili njihanje klatna Religioznost u Istri (Prilog socio-

religijskoj karti Hrvatske).Revija za sociologiju31(34):13352.

Casanova, Jos. 1994. Public religions in the modern world. Chicago and London: University ofChicago press.CroVijesti. 2010. upnik vjernicima na misi: Ljepa mi je ustaka kapa. Retrieved on 24thSeptember

2010 from: http://www.crovijesti.com/vijesti/636098-zupnik-vjernicima-na-misi-ljepsa-mi-je-ustaska-kapa.html

Cvitkovi, Ivan. 2009. Has the return of relligions occurred or return to the religion? InRevitalizationof religion Theoretical and comparative approaches, edited by Danijela Gavrilovi, 1523.Ni: Yugoslav society for the scientific study of religion.

imi, Esad. 1984. Religija i crkva kao faktor etnike diferencijacije. U Religija i nacija, 2633.Zagreb: CITR GK SKH.

rpi, Gordan i Sinia Zrinak. 2010. Dinaminost u stabilnosti: religioznost u Hrvatskoj 1999. i2008. godine.Drutvena istraivanja19(12):327.

religious identity in serbia and croatia

Documents