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Religious Leaders’ Fight Against Corruption in Afghanistan Impact Evaluation Report

www.iwaweb.org

Religious Leaders’Fight Against Corruption in Afghanistan

Impact Evaluation Report

Integrity Watch Afghanistan

2015

Cover Image: President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani addressing National Anti-Corruption Conference of Religious Leaders by Integrity Watch.

Copyright © 2015 by Integrity Watch Afghanistan. All rights reserved.

Published by Integrity Watch Afghanistan

Kolola Poshta, Kabul, Afghanistan

Email: [email protected]

Website: www.iwaweb.org

Religious Leaders’ Fight Against Corruption in Afghanistan

INTEGRITY WATCH AFGHANISTAN

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TABLE OF CONTENT

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 1

SECTION I: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....................................................6

SECTION II: PRE-AND-POST EVALUATIONS ..................................................9

SECTION III: IMPACT EVALUAITON ANALYSIS AND RESULTS ....................14I. General Perception of Corruption.............................................................................................. 15II. Examining the Impacts of the Training...................................................................................... 20III. Explaining the absence of observed impacts ........................................................................... 28Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 32References .................................................................................................................................... 33Appendix I: List of Masajed .......................................................................................................... 35Appendix II: List of Surveyed Masajed .......................................................................................... 51Appendix III: English Instrument for Face-to-Face Interviews ...................................................... 54Appendix IV: Dari Instrument for Pre-and-Post Evaluation ........................................................... 59Appendix V: Qualitative Interviews with Clerics ........................................................................... 62

FIGURES

Figure 1: Average Performance of Workshop Participants ........................................................................ 9Figure 2: voting preferences based on Version A .................................................................................... 17Figure 3: voting preferences based on Version B .................................................................................... 18Figure 4: voting preferences based on Version C .................................................................................... 19



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TABLES

Table 1: Average Performance of Workshop Participants ....................................................................... 10Table 2: Average Score for Pre-and-Post Evaluations .............................................................................. 10Table 3: Average Score for Pre-and-Post Evaluations .............................................................................. 11Table 4: Average Score for Pre-and-Post Evaluations .............................................................................. 11Table 5: Average Score for Pre-and-Post Evaluations .............................................................................. 11Table 6: Average Score for Pre-and-Post Evaluations .............................................................................. 12Table 7: Attending Workshops on Corruption ......................................................................................... 12Table 8: Participants’ Views about Workshop ......................................................................................... 12Table 9: Views about Workshop Materials ............................................................................................. 12Table 10: General Perception of Corrupt Practices (2016 total responses) ............................................. 15Table 11: Attitude toward Komissionkar and Praying in Masjed ............................................................. 16Table 12: Attitude toward using komissionkar (treatment vs. control masajed) ..................................... 20Table 13: Attitude toward using intermediaries (treatment vs. control masajed) ................................... 21Table 14: Attitude toward preferential service delivery (treatment vs. control masajed) ....................... 21Table 15: Tendency to report instances of bribery (treatment vs. control masajed)............................... 22Table 16: reporting frequency of bribery (treatment vs. control masajed) ............................................. 23Table 17: reporting frequency of bribery (treatment vs. control masajed) ............................................. 23Table 18: reporting the amount of bribes (treatment vs. control masajed) ............................................ 24Table 19: reporting the amount of bribes (treatment vs. control masajed) ............................................ 25Table 20: voting preferences based on Version A (treatment vs. control masajed) ................................ 26Table 21: voting preferences based on Version B (treatment vs. control masajed) ................................ 26Table 22: voting preferences based on Version C (treatment vs. control masajed) ................................ 27Table 23: Views about Workshop Length ................................................................................................ 28Table 24: Views about Workshop Length ................................................................................................ 29Table 25: Clerics’ views about their role in fighting corruption ............................................................... 30



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ExECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Harakat integrity initiative was aimed at encouraging the involvement of the clergy and religious institutions to increase public awareness about corruption and individual’s Islamic duties in terms of fighting corruption. This program was evaluated through two mechanisms: pre-and-post evaluation of participants’ understanding of corruption and an impact evaluation initiative that aimed at evaluating the impacts of religious institutions on public awareness about corruption and the tendency of citizens to disclose corruption and report instances of bribery. The impact evaluation utilized a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) of participating masajed and Imams’ sermons delivered in these masajed to test the impact of awareness campaigns delivered by clerics on the public involvement in fighting corruption.

The pre-and-post evaluations of the workshop participants, based on a survey that studied the participants’ awareness of corruption from Islamic perspective and their views about the workshop, showed that the workshop increased the level of clerics’ awareness. The clergymen who participated in the nine workshops organized across the country demonstrated a better understanding of administrative corruption from the perspective of Afghanistan laws and Islamic teachings on the nature of corruption and how to fight it. In addition, 66% of imams from treatment masajed expressed that the workshop made them aware of how they could, as clerics, take part more actively in the fight against corruption in Afghanistan.

The impact evaluation specifically examined 3 indicators: (a) awareness of masjed participants about corruption and common corrupt practices; (b) participants’ likelihood to report instances of bribery; and (c) participants’ attitude toward corruption in service delivery. The evaluation measured the three indicators in treatment and control masajed but no statistically significant differences were observed in the two groups of masajed.

Overall, the overwhelming majority of masjed participants disapproved corruption and corrupt practices. 82% disapproved using intermediaries and 86% deplored using friends for speeding up an application for public services. 90% denounced a minister who provides preferential treatment to the people of his ethnicity or province. More than 80% expressed preference for a candidate who is clean over a candidate who is from their own ethnic group and provides public services to the people.

Comparing treatment and control masajed, however, the awareness of masjed participants about corruption, their likelihood of reporting bribery and attitude toward corruption in service delivery were slightly different in treatment and control masajed, but the magnitude of the differences was small and not statistically significant.

Although it is impossible to offer a definitive explanation for the absence of statistically significant impacts, it may be attributed to the short span of the trainings and the participants’ lack of confidence in the government to tackle corruption seriously. Although the materials that had been prepared for the training were well designed, the training was too short (two days only) to allow imams to absorb the training materials that they were supposed to discuss in their sermons. 75% of imams from the treatment masajed believed that the workshop was too short and recommended the workshop to be extended in order to allow thorough discussion of the workshop materials. Qualitative interviews with imams of treatment masajed also showed that only 20% of them had read the workshop materials. In addition, majority of imams of treatment masajed saw the government’s lack of determination to fight corruption as a barrier to the success in fighting corruption in Afghanistan. They saw the government’s support in the fight against corruption as the first necessary step for further involvement of clerics in an anti-corruption campaign.



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Recommendations ▪ The government should take the fight against corruption seriously and prosecute corrupt officials in

order to restore the confidence of the civil society organizations and the public in the government’s determination to tackle corruption.

▪ The state and organizations that are involved in promoting transparency and fighting corruption need to conduct a rigorous assessment of how clerics and religious institutions can contribute to anti-corruption campaign, given the importance and mobilization capacity of religious institutions in the Afghan society.

▪ Develop more grand initiatives to engage clerics and Islamic institutions in fighting corruption through promoting religion-based dialogues against corruption through seminars, TV and radio programs and local discussion groups.

▪ The Ministry of Hajj and Religious Endowments needs to engage more proactively and on continued basis with the clergy and religious institutions even in rural areas to monitor Friday prayer sermons and utilize them for mobilizing support for fighting corruption and promoting transparency.

▪ Instead of concentrating on delivering trainings, capacity building programs for clerics need to be multi-faceted and also focus on improving their oratory skills, mobilization capacity and how to effectively deliver anti-corruption messages.

▪ With paying attention to the quality of program rather than the number of participants, capacity building programs for clerics need to be held for longer periods of time and in multiple stages to maximize the instructive capacity of programs and enhance participants’ skills.

▪ Capacity building programs need to incorporate incentives for encouraging participants and rewarding high-achievers in order to ensure maximizing the effectiveness of programs.

▪ Rigorous monitoring and evaluation must be set to evaluate the mid-term and long-term impacts of such capacity building programs so that more effective programs are prioritized for receiving funding in the long run.

▪ The Ministry of Haj and Religious Endowment in collaboration with the Ministry of Higher Education should consider revising and incorporating the training materials of this workshop into the curricula of madrasas and faculties of Sharia.



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Background and Theoretical FrameThe capacity of clerics, as a religious institution, in mobilizing populaces in Muslim countries has often superseded those of other competing institutions such as tribes, political parties, and civil society organizations. Clerics have often demonstrated to be more effective in mobilizing people to participate in social and political activities and to make sacrifices, whether financial or even life sacrifices in form of call for martyrdom. In Iran, the capacity of clerics in political mobilization was demonstrated in a revolt that led to the defeat of an 1890 tobacco concession that had granted a monopoly on the purchase and sale of tobacco to a British company. The Iranian Shiite cleric, Mirza Hassan Shirazi, who was living in Iraq at the time, called on ordinary Iranians to boycott the purchase of tobacco in a nationwide protest that finally rendered the concession void.1 Fifty years later during the Islamic revolution, the Shiite clergy, led by Ayatullah Khomeini, successfully surpassed the well-organized leftist parties and other secular associations in rallying the masses in the struggle for toppling the monarchy and steered the revolution toward establishing an Islamic theocracy in that country.2

In more recent case, the mobilization capacity of clerics, both Shiite and Sunni, is well demonstrated in the current insurgencies in Syria and Iraq. The Syrian insurgency is rooted in 2011 revolution, which was staged by the deprived rural working classes, predominantly Sunni, who suffered from the economic policies of Bashar Al-Asad. The revolution initially was led by disenfranchised tribes and demanded democracy and economic reforms. However, as anti-government demonstrations started to take place after Friday prayers and with the call by Sunni imams, the revolution gradually took a sectarian tone and turn into an armed uprising while Sunni clerics, successful in mass mobilization of impoverished Sunnites, assumed the leadership of the revolt. The unrivaled capacity of clerics to mobilize Sunni working classes made even secular groups and defected Baathist military officers who joined the revolution to adopt the religious-based discourse promoted by Sunni clerics.3 A similar trend was observed in Iraq as early as 2004.

After the fall of Saddam’s regime, the disenfranchised Sunni tribes provided support for an insurgent movement initiated by former Baathist officers who fought the US-backed regime in Baghdad. Although secular Sunni politicians, tribal leaders and Baathist officers initially led the insurgency, the Sunni clerics gradually were able to build a broader support base from amongst disenchanted Sunni youth and assumed the leadership of the insurgency.4 In response to the spread of Sunni insurgency, which ended the control of the central government over western Iraq, the Baghdad government failed to mobilize strong popular support for fighting the insurgency. It was, however, a fatwa (religious decree) issued by the Shiite cleric, Ayatullah Sistani, which mobilized thousands of Shiites to join the Iraqi army or militia forces in order to fight insurgent groups.5

In Afghanistan, religious institutions have played a significant role throughout the history of country as Islam permeates all aspects of social life in this predominantly Muslim country. Islam plays a significant role in both the social and the political life in Afghanistan, where more than 99 percent of citizens identify Islam as their religion.6 Barfield offers the clearest statement regarding the role of religion in Afghanistan as he writes, ‘Afghanistan is an example of an older form of Islamic society in which religion is not an ideology but remains an all-encompassing way of life [ . . . ] When Islam is a way of life, it permeates all aspects of everyday social relations, and nothing is separate from it. This is the state of Islam in Afghanistan. Its influence is ever present in people’s everyday conversations, business transactions, dispute resolutions, and moral judgments.’7

Surveys of the Afghan population affirm Barfield’s statement. For example, only 27 percent of respondents to a 2011 Asia Foundation Survey expressed support for keeping religion and politics separate. That survey also

1 Poulson, Stephen C. Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Iran: Culture, Ideology, and Mobilizing Frameworks (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), pp. 85–102.

2 Ibid.3 Lund, Aron. ‘Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: The Rise of The Syrian Islamic Fron’, UI Occassional Papers No. 17, March 2013, The

Swedish Institute of International Affairs. 4 Hashim, Ahmed. ‘Terrorism and Complex Warfare in Iraq’, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 2, Issue 12, June 2004.5 Chivers, C. J. ‘Answering A Cleric’s Call, Iraqi Shiites Take Up Arms’, New York Times, 22 June, 2014. http://www.nytimes.

com/2014/06/22/world/middleeast/iraq-militia.html?_r=0, Accessed on 04/20/2015; Bazzi, Mohamad. ‘The Sistani Factor: How A Struggle Within Shiism Will Shape The Future of Iraq’, Boston Review, August 12, 2014. http://bostonreview.net/world/mohamad-bazzi-sistani-factor-isis-shiism-iraq. Accessed on 04/20/2015.

6 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 40.7 Barfield, Afghanistan, 40–41.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/world/middleeast/iraq-militia.html?_r=0


http://bostonreview.net/world/mohamad-bazzi-sistani-factor-isis-shiism-iraq




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pointed to the importance of the religious elite in Afghanistan: 70 percent of respondents said that religious leaders should be consulted when local problems are addressed. Moreover, the survey showed that the proportion of respondents favoring consultation with religious leaders had increased by 10 percent since 2006.

Why are religious leaders so successful in mobilizing populaces and garnering public support? Many studies have examined this question and provided insights on the different mechanisms through which religious leaders influence the public. Olson argues that clerics belong to a profession that is socially visible and necessitates its members to be charismatic and enjoy persuasive skills to be successful in this profession. With this requirement, individuals with some degree of charisma and persuasion usually select into this profession and are capable of influencing behavior and attitude of the public.8

Brady and Sniderman identify group cue as the mechanism through which clerics influence behavior. They refer to the tendency of individuals to express opinions similar to the group that they like and dislike views that are associated with the group that they dislike. Therefore, members of religious groups or congregations form opinions and views that are consistent with the views of the congregation that they belong to while the views of the congregation is highly influenced by its leader, i.e. the cleric.9

Many studies have demonstrated that the influence of religious leaders can be explained by their role in priming the concept of God as the supernatural omnipresent and omniscient. Through experimental studies, Shariff and Norenzayan demonstrate that using religious primes activates, among the participants, the feeling of presence of a supernatural watcher, which in turn makes the subject less likely to act selfishly and more likely to make personal sacrifices and demonstrate altruistic behavior.10 Their findings are consistent with the results of psychological experiments conducted by Burnham and Hare, and Bateson and others, who show that the perception of being watched induces more cooperative behavior and increase in public good contribution.11

In a different experiment, Carpenter and Marshal conclude that using religious primes makes individuals to compare their behavior and attitude with their moral standards and more likely to act based on their moral standards, at personal costs to themselves, and decrease level of moral hypocrisy.12

In sum, different mechanisms seem to enable religious leaders to influence individuals’ behavior and attitude. These different mechanisms do not necessarily contradict and may interact together to reinforce the influence of religious leaders. Charisma and persuasive skills of clerics could compound their ability to reinforce the feeling of presence of supernatural watcher or make them compare their behavior with their moral standards and, therefore, act more altruistically and demonstrate prosocial behavior at costs to themselves.

Building upon the theories that explain the influence of religious leaders, this study presumes that clerics can have an effective role in anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan. Given the influence of clerics through these different mechanisms, the religious institutions and the clergy can be expected to play a significant role in mobilizing populaces to take part in fighting corruption, which also demands sacrifices from individuals. Calling upon the concept of God, as the supernatural omniscient and omnipresent, and using religious primes to make individuals compare their behavior with their moral standards, clerics can ask the public to avoid corrupt practices and to carry out their moral and religious duties in fighting corruption. The clergy, therefore, is expected to play two functions. First, they can increase public awareness about moral standards from Islamic perspective on what constitutes corruption or what practices are considered to be corrupt. Second, clerics can use religious primes to invite the public to avoid corrupt practices and take part in fighting corruption.

8 Olson, Laura R. 2009. “Clergy and American Politics.” In The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics, eds. Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt and James L. Guth. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 371-93.

9 Brady, Henry E. and Paul M. Sniderman. 1985. “Attitude Attribution: A Group Basis for Political Reasoning.” American Political Science Review 79: 1061-1078.

10 Shariff, Azim F., and Ara Norenzayan. 2007. “God Is Watching You: Priming God Concepts Increases Prosocial Behavior in an Anonymous Economic Game.” Psychological Science 18: 803-09.

11 Burnham, Terence C. and Brain Hare. 2007. “Engineering Human Cooperation: Does Involuntary Neural Activation Increase Public Goods Contributions?” Human Nature 18: 88-108; Bateson, Melissa, Daniel Nettle and Gilbert Roberts. 2006. “Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-World Setting,” Biology Letters Vol. 2, Issue 3.

12 Carpenter, Thomas P. and Margaret A. Marshal. 2009. “An Examination of Religious Priming and Intrinsic Religious Motivation in the Moral Hypocrisy Paradigm”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 48(2): 386-393.



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The intervention that this impact evaluation assessed, therefore, had two components: (1) developing a manual about corruption and the role of the public in fighting corruption based on the teachings of the Prophet and from Islamic point of view; and (2) organizing workshops for inviting the clergy to take an active role in public campaign, from Islamic perspective, against corruption. The workshops were held in Kabul and 8 major provinces, inviting over 2000 clergymen from throughout the country. After attending the training, the clerics were expected to deliver sermons in their local masajed, encouraging people to report cases of bribery through anonymously sending SMS texts to a hotline. The collected data through the hotline was intended to be utilized for public awareness and mapping the corrupt public institutions and the level of corruption within these institutions.

Here (or right after the research questions) I expect to see a conceptual framework which serves as a model within which your experiment is firmly located. I also expect to see some discussion of the assumptions you are making in order to connect the data you get to the conclusions you wish to draw. You do provide a good chunk of that, but it is not elaborated to the point that it becomes convincing.



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SECTION I: RESEARCH METHODOLOGYIn spite of the crucial role of religious institutions in Afghanistan and other Muslim societies, there have been few studies on the impact of religious institutions on civic activities. This impact evaluation intends to provide one of the first rigorous studies of such type.

Since one of the main objectives of the program is to encourage citizens’ involvement in fighting corruption, the impact evaluation aims at measuring one of the two indicators of outcome: public attitude toward corruption (understanding what practices are considered to be corrupt) and their willingness to report instances of bribery as one of anti-corruption efforts. The impact evaluation, therefore, will focus on answering the following questions:

1. What is the impact of public sermons delivered by the clergymen about corruption on masjed participants’ attitude toward different types of corruption?

2. What is the impact of public sermons delivered by the clergymen about corruption on masjed participants’ attitude toward corruption in service delivery in public sector?

3. What is the impact of public sermons delivered by the clergymen about corruption on masjed participants’ willingness to report cases of corruption in face-to-face interviews and through a designated hotline?

To answer the first and second question, which measure attitude, we utilized a short survey questionnaire that was administered after prayers in treatment and control masajed. For the second question, which aims at measuring behavior, we added a question to the survey questionnaire and asked the masjed participants during the face-to-face interview whether they had to pay bribes. In addition, we designated two different hotline numbers to which masjed participants could send SMS texts for reporting cases of bribery that they experienced. To distinguish and compare the SMS texts sent from treatment and control masajed, we used two separate hotline numbers, which were printed on two different types of posters that were distributed among masjed participants as they left the masajed. The two arrangements for reporting instances of bribery were used to assess the short-term and long-term impacts of the program on behavior, with face-to-face reporting indicating short-term impact and sending SMS texts (particularly those long after the distribution of posters) indicating the long-term impacts of the program.

Internal ValidityOne of the concerns in measuring the aspired outcomes of an intervention is internal validity, that is, whether the observed outcome is really caused by intervention or factors other than the intervention. One of the biases that undermine the internal validity of a study is the bias associated with retrospective evaluation. It is common to evaluations that study the impacts of a program after it has been implemented. Such evaluations often find more favorable effects for the program while they do not take into consideration other variables that may have compounded the effects of the program.13 Another bias that undermines internal validity is the selection bias, which refers to the tendency of individuals or communities with particular characteristics (such as wealth, education, religiosity, and other socioeconomic characteristics) to sign up for a particular program than other individuals or groups. In such a case, the detected effect associated with the program could be in fact related to those particular characteristics rather than the program itself.14 This type of bias is particularly of high concerns for programs like this initiative that invites clergymen to attend a workshop since clergymen

13 Glewwe, P., M. Kremer, S. Moulin, and E. Zitzewitz (2004), “Retrospective Vs. Prospective Analyses of School Inputs: The Case of Flip Charts in Kenya,” Journal of De-velopment Economics, 74, 251 268.

14 Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Michael Kremer (2006), “Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit”, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.


SECTION I: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

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with particular tendencies (such as being more politically active, favoring government policies or those of grand masajed) may be more likely to participate in such initiatives if participation is based on self-selection.

In order to avoid these two biases and be able to rigorously estimate the impact of the program, the impact evaluation utilized an RCT, assigning masajed randomly into either a treatment or control group. Following a phase-in approach to RCT15, the randomly selected treatment masajed participated in the program in the first stage while control masajed participated in the program at the second stage after the completion of the impact evaluation.

To ensure randomized assignment of masajed into treatment and control, a list of all masajed in Kabul city, totaling to 550 in 17 districts, were obtained from the Directorate of Masajed within the Ministry of Haj. The masajed were ordered alphabetically based on the masjed names. For the purpose of selecting 75 treatment masajed from all districts, every 7th masjed on the list was selected, and their imams were officially invited to attend the two-day workshop. Another 75 masajed were also selected, following the same procedure, as control masajed and were to be invited for the second workshop, organized after the conclusion of the impact evaluation. Appendix I lists all the masajed and highlights those that were selected for treatment and control.

In addition, after the training of imams, the face-to-face interviews were conducted during daily prayers (noon, evening, night or late night) instead of Friday noon prayers in order to minimize selection bias. Since most Afghans are free on Friday, they have the luxury of choosing which masjed to attend for Friday noon prayers, which may draw worshipers with particular characteristics, for instance being less or more critical of the government, toward particular imams. In such a case, the observed difference in treatment and control masajed cannot be definitely attributed to the impact of the program and could rather be explained by the characteristics of the worshipers. In addition, the number of worshipers for Friday noon prayers is very high in most masajed, which allows neither random sampling interview because all worshipers leave at the same time nor allows interviewing all participants due to the large gathering in Friday prayers. Daily prayers, however, mitigated both of these problems. First, worshipers usually go to the near-by masjed for daily prayers and do not select remote masajed because of working during weekdays. Second, the number of worshipers during daily prayers is small in most masajed and interviewing all participants is feasible and the attrition rate is relatively low. Therefore, all treatment and control masajed were surveyed during weekdays and daily prayers. Appendix II provides the details of surveys in the sample masajed.

Another bias undermining the internal validity of an impact evaluation is spillover effects or externalities. Spillover happens when the control subjects directly or indirectly benefit, or are affected by, the treatment, which is supposed to impact the members of treatment group alone.16 In order to mitigate spillover effects, we dropped the masajed that were located in the proximity of each other whether they were in treatment or control group. This reduced the likelihood that a participant that was surveyed in a control masjed had also attended the sermon delivered in treatment masjed in a prior time. In addition, surveying masajed during daily prayers also mitigated the spillover effects as participants are likely to go to the same masajed on regular basis instead of going to different masajed on Friday, when they have free time.

15 Ibid.16 Ibid.



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External ValidityExternal validity focuses on whether or not the findings of an impact evaluation or experiment can be generalized to outside the context in which the experiment or the impact evaluation was carried out.17 To ensure external validity of this impact evaluation, we left it up to the clerics to choose the content of the sermons they delivered. Of course, using a laboratory setting or asking the clerics to deliver a particular verse of Quran or statement could help in strengthening the treatment effects through choosing strong primes. This, however, would have undermined the external validity of the study since the findings would not be generalizable to other context and would not inform us about the impacts of similar programs or interventions carried out in collaboration with clerics since clerics usually have freedom of choosing the contents of their sermons, if not the topic.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that not all factors that undermine the external validity of this study were successfully mitigated. Since this study was conducted in masajed, where participants are usually reminded of moral values, the participants’ responses outside the masjed context may be different than what was reported inside masajed. In addition, what people report in a masjed about their observing moral standards may not necessarily reflect what they actually do outside the masjed. Nonetheless, this study does serve its envisioned purpose, which is assessing the impact of clerics’ sermons on masjed participants, instead of identifying and assessing actual corrupt practices in the society.

Impact Evaluation Scope For face-to-face interviews, a subset of treatment and control masajed were randomly selected since conducing face-to-face interviews in all control and treatment masajed were not feasible due to budget constraints. Using a random generator program, 30 of the treatment masajed and 30 of the control masajed were selected for face-to-face interviews. The average number of surveys conducted in treatment masajed was lower than control masajed (37 compared to 57) because of the higher attrition rate in treatment masajed as some of the worshipers used to leave the masajed before or during imams’ sermons and were not surveyed. On the other hand, those in control masajed were surveyed right after the end of the prayers and more worshipers were surveyed. Overall, worshipers in 27 treatment masajed and 18 control masajed were interviewed with surveying more treatment masajed in order to have a balanced number of interviews in each category (1033 interviews in treatment and 1039 interviews in control masajed). Appendix II provides the details of the masajed that were surveyed from the treatment and control group with the number of surveys conducted in each masjed.

The impact evaluation faced challenges and limitations but was robust enough to assess the impacts of the program. Respondents were believed to feel more comfortable disclosing information about their experience of corruption and bribery in face-to-face interviews. National Corruption Survey conducted by IWA every two years and Survey of People of Afghanistan, conducted by the Asia Foundation on annual bases, evince that Afghans feel safe and comfortable discussing the instances that they had to pay bribes to government agencies. Therefore, face-to-face interviews were considered with survey questions that were carefully worded so that the respondents felt comfortable answering them. Since the costs of conducting face-to-face interviews are high and cannot be done in a large number of masajed, given the limited budget of the impact evaluation, the face-to-face interviews were conducted in a selected number of treatment and control masajed in Kabul.

17 Shariff, Azim F., and Ara Norenzayan. 2007. “God Is Watching You: Priming God Concepts Increases Prosocial Behavior in an Anonymous Economic Game.” Psychological Science 18: 803-09; Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Michael Kremer (2006), “Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit”, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.


SECTION II: PRE-AND-POST EVALUATIONS

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SECTION II: PRE-AND-POST EVALUATIONSThis evaluation utilized a short questionnaire that tested participants’ knowledge and understanding of administrative corruption based Islamic teachings and Afghanistan legal system (See Appendix IV). The questionnaire for pre-and-post evaluations was administered in all nine provinces where the workshops were held. In addition, we carried out 32 in-depth qualitative interviews with imams from treatment masajed in Kabul to obtain their views and recommendations about the workshop. Overall, this evaluation showed a great improvement in participants’ knowledge and understanding of the workshop subject matter although instrument effects cannot be rejected completely. Some of the improvements in the participants’ responses to the evaluation may be attributed to the fact that they were administered the same instrument as post evaluation. Therefore, we cannot conclude that they learned the rest of the course material as well as the answers to these questions. As Figure 1 and Table 1 show, the workshop participants’ average scores for each province on pre and post evaluations increased across all provinces by more than 10 points, which shows that the workshop was perhaps effective in raising the participants’ awareness.

Figure 1: Average Performance of Workshop Participants



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Table 1: Average Performance of Workshop Participants

Province Pre-evaluation Post-evaluation

Bamyan 45 65.6

Ghazni, Logar and Wardak 44.6 77.3

Herat 50 77.7

Jalalabad 56 72.7

Kabul 43.7 75.2

Kandahar 43 56

Kunduz 46.7 66.7

Panjshir, Parwan and Kapisa 49.2 73.4

Paktia 56 72.7

The following tables summarize the average score obtained by workshop participants in each province for the selected questions (for list of all questions see Appendix IV). Table 2 and Table 3 summarize the scores for questions on definition of corruption from Islamic perspective and Islam’s view on receiving gifts by civil servants. Although there were improvements in answers to both questions, the workshop improved the answers to the fourth question even to a greater extent. Table 4 summarizes the scores for question about bribery from Quranic verses while Tables 5 and 6 look at acting as intermediary (wasita) and misusing public office from Afghanistan legal system. Although the pre-evaluation scores for these three questions are low, the post-evaluation scores demonstrate great improvement.

In sum, the pre-and-post evaluations show that the workshop seem to have improved the participants’ understanding and knowledge of corruption from the perspectives of Islam and Afghanistan legal system.

Table 2: Average Score for Pre-and-Post Evaluations

Question 2: Please define Corruption based on Islamic teachings


Bamyan 4.96 5.7

Ghazni, Logar and Wardak 3.985 6

Herat 4.435 5

Jalalabad 4.314 5

Kabul 4.531 5

Kandahar 3.76 4

Kunduz 4.215 5

Panjshir, Parwan and Kapisa 4.652 5

Paktia 4.314 5



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Question 4: Does Islam sanctions receiving gifts by civil servants?


Bamyan 4.72 5


Herat 3.443 5

Jalalabad 3.569 5

Kabul 3.204 5

Kandahar 2.88 4

Kunduz 3.6 4


Paktia 3.569 5


Question 6: Which Quranic verse refers to bribery as a forbidden (haram) act?


Bamyan 1.027 4


Herat 2.524 4

Jalalabad 2.725 4

Kabul 2.129 4

Kandahar 2.213 3

Kunduz 2.531 3


Paktia 2.725 4


Question 9: What are the criteria based on which acting as an Intermediary (wasita) is viewed as a crime in Afghanistan legal system?


Bamyan 2.28 3


Herat 2.731 5

Jalalabad 3.34 4

Kabul 1.973 4

Kandahar 2.32 3

Kunduz 2.485 4


Paktia 3.34 4



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Question 13: What are the examples of misusing public office based on Afghanistan laws?


Bamyan 2.587 3.2

Ghazni, Logar and Wardak 2.916 5.4

Herat 3.033 5.4

Jalalabad 3.673 5.2

Kabul 2.313 5

Kandahar 3.093 3.4

Kunduz 2.462 4.3

Panjshir, Parwan and Kapisa 2.812 4.8

Paktia 3.673 5.2

The qualitative interviews with imams from the treatment masajed in Kabul also showed positive results and favorable feedback. First, the workshop was the first of its type for many participants. 84% of participants from treatment masajed said that this workshop was the first workshop on corruption that they attended (Table 7). They also viewed the workshop pretty informative (Table 8).

Table 7: Attending Workshops on Corruption

Have you attended any other workshop on corruption aside from IWA workshop? (N=32)

Yes 16%

No 84%

Table 8: Participants’ Views about Workshop

On a scale of 1 to 5, how informative did you find the workshop to be, with 1 being least informative and 5 being most informative? (N=32)

1 3%

2 16%

3 31%

4 28%

5 13%

Table 9: Views about Workshop Materials

On a scale of 1 to 5, how useful did you find the workshop materials (book and guideline), if 1 means least useful and 5 means very useful?

(N=32)

3 10%

4 38%

5 52%



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When asked whether the workshop changed their views about the role of clerics in fighting corruption in Afghanistan, 66% of imams from treatment masajed stated that the workshop increased their awareness about their responsibility, as clerics, to fight corruption and how take a more active role in the anti-corruption campaign. As one of the clerics put:

The workshop was a good opportunity. We had the chance to meet other clerics and learn about their views. This is the responsibility of every Muslim to fight against corruption. The workshop drew our attention to our duties as clerics to fight corruption. We focused more intensively on how we, the clergy, can fight corruption in Afghanistan as religious leaders of this country.

Furthermore, the vast majority of imams from treatment masajed found the workshop materials (the book and guideline developed for the workshop) to be useful (Table 9). The respondents also had strong opinions about how to improve the training materials of the workshop, which is discussed in the next section.



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SECTION III: IMPACT EVALUAITON ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Although the pre-and-post evaluations show that the workshop improved the participants’ knowledge and understanding of corruption, the question that the Impact Evaluation survey tried to measure whether the sermons delivered by the trained clergymen impacted the masjed participants’ view of corruption as well. In other words, the Impact Evaluation survey examined the final outputs of the workshop through assessing the affects of the workshop on the masjed participants.

This section presents the findings of the impact evaluation survey that was carried out in treatment and control masajed. The first part reviews the respondents’ general perception and attitude toward corruption while the second part examines the impacts of sermons delivered by imams on the respondents’ perception and attitude toward corruption through comparing the results from treatment and control masajed. The second part is organized in three subsections: (a) awareness of masjed participants about corruption and common corrupt practices; (b) participants’ likelihood to reporting instances of bribery; and (c) participants’ attitude toward corruption in service delivery.



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I. GENERAL PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION

Corruption has become a bitter reality of life and work environment in Afghanistan and was viewed as the second biggest problem in the country, after security, in the national surveys carried out by the Asia Foundation and Integrity Watch Afghanistan.18 Around 41% of the respondents stated that they had sought government services within the past 12 months and almost half of them had indicated that they had personally experienced corruption.19 According to an estimate, Afghans paid almost 2 billion dollars in bribes over a period of 12 months in 2014.20 In spite of the pervasiveness of corruption and corrupt practices in obtaining public goods and services, fortunately, such corrupt practices are still viewed unacceptable by Afghans. Table 1 summarizes the responses by the participants in the survey carried out in masajed regarding three common corrupt practices: relying on komissionkars (paid intermediaries) and nepotism in obtaining government services and senior officials’ preferential treatment of the people form their own provinces. Komissionkar refers individuals who know civil servants and act as a intermediaries between civil servants and clients in providing public goods or services through corrupt practices (collecting bribes by a komissionkar and sharing it with civil servants). Such practices have become common in Afghanistan due to complexity of bureaucratic procedures, on the one hand, and the pervasiveness of red tapes created by civil servants to force clients to pay bribes, on the other hand.21

Table 10: General Perception of Corrupt Practices (2016 total responses)

Question No. Statement and Question: Yes No

2.01

Suppose that a person wants to apply for driver license. However, he does not have the time to follow the application process. Do you think it is acceptable to use komissionkar for following up the application?

18% 82%

2.02Now suppose that applying for national ID is a lengthy process and takes many days. Do you think it is acceptable to rely on friends or intermediaries in order to speed up the process?

14% 86%

2.03Suppose that a minister uses his authority to serve the people of his province more than other provinces. Do you think what he does is acceptable?

10% 90%

As Table 10 shows, 82% of the respondents viewed relying on komissionkars unacceptable even when a person does not have the time to follow up an application process. Only 18% viewed such a practice to be acceptable. Another common practice is using friends or relatives as intermediaries to obtain public goods or services. In such a case, the intermediary (a friend or relative) does not receive money for his role and instead does a favor to the client. Even this type of practice is perceived as unacceptable by 86% of the respondents while 14% only confirmed such a practice as acceptable. The third question examined the respondents’ views on a minister’s preferential treatment of the province of his/her origin. In the National Corruption Survey 2014, only 33% of the respondents believed that government ministers worked for the interests of all people while the other 67% held that ministers worked for their own interests or the interest of a small group.22 Our survey shows that 90% of the respondents viewed such practices by ministers to be unacceptable while only 10% approved such practices. It must, however, be acknowledged that an individual’s belief about acceptability or unacceptability of a corrupt practice may not necessarily indicate whether or not the individual would engage

18 ‘Afghanistan in 2013: A Survey of the Afghan People’, The Asia Foundation, Kabul, Afghanistan: 2013. http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2013-poll.php; ‘National Corruption Survey 2014’, Integrity Watch Afghanistan, Kabul Afghanistan: 2014, http://www.iwaweb.org/ncs/_2014/docs/national_corruption_survey_2014_english.pdf.

19 ‘National Corruption Survey 2014’, p. 27-28.20 Ibid, p. 3.21 Gardizi, Manija, Karen Hussman and Yama Torabi, ‘Corrupting the State or State-Crafted Corruption? Exploring the Nexus

Between Corruption and Subnational Governance’, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, Afghanistan: 2010.22 ‘National Corruption Survey 2014’, p. 47.

http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2013-poll.php




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in that practice. For instance, although a respondent believes that relying on komissionakar is unacceptable, he/she may still use komissionkar for processing an application if he/she does not have the time for following up the application process.

Table 11: Attitude toward Komissionkar and Praying in Masjed

Table 11 examines the relationship between the resondents’ attitude toward using komissionkar and the number of times they usually perform prayers in masajed. Although a higher percentage of those who perform three of their daily prayers in masjed (20%) have said that using comissionkar is acceptable, the difference is not statistically significant. In fact, the small Chi2 value and the high probability (0.322) of finding such a Chi2 value show that the difference observed across the five groups is not statistically significant.

In this survey, we also investigated the respondents’ whether ethnicity and provision of service by parliament members can influence the respondents’ attitude toward corruption. Four different versions of a statement were prepared and one of them was randomly read for each respondent in treatment and control masajed and their preferences were recorded. In version A of the statement, the respondents were read the following statement, which wants to study whether the respondents prefer corrupt candidates that provide more services or honest candidate that provide less services to the people:



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Version A“Suppose that there are two incumbents running for their seats in the Wolesi Jirga. Candidate 1 is from your qawm. People think that he is involved in corruption. He serves the people to a great extent. Candidate 2 is also from your qawm. People think that he is not involved in corruption. He serves the people less than the first candidate.”

After the statement was read, the respondents were asked which candidates they would vote for if they had the chance to vote for either candidate.

Figure 2: voting preferences based on Version A

Figure 2 shows the respondents’ voting preferences when Version A of the statement is read for them. It is clear that more than majority of the respondents (82%) would prefer voting for a candidate who is believed not to be corrupt although he serve people to a lesser extent over a candidate who is corrupt and serves the people to a greater extent. Only 5% of the respondents preferred the corrupt candidate while 12% stated that they would vote for neither one.

In another quarter of the interviews (518 out of 2016 total interviews), the respondents were read the second version of the statement, which wants to study the respondents’ preferences between two corrupt candidates one of whom is less corrupt but serves the people less than the other candidate who is from the same qawm as the respondent but is corrupt and serves the people more, as narrated below:



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Version BSuppose that there are two incumbents rerunning for their seat in the Wolesi Jirga. Candidate 1 is from your qawm. People think that he is involved in corruption. He serves the people to a great extent. Candidate 2 is not from your qawm. People think that he is not involved in corruption. He serves the people less than the first candidate.

Figure 3: voting preferences based on Version B

As Figure 3 demonstrates, 84% of the respondents preferred the second candidate even though he is not from the same qawm as the respondent and serves the people less than the first candidate who is corrupt. This question shows that even ethnicity and providing services to the people does not render corruption acceptable to the people, at least when they are asked to express their preferences. Of course, if it comes to actual voting, some of the respondents may prefer a corrupt candidate who is from their own qawm or who provides services to the people. Nevertheless, what is important is that corruption is still viewed as a moral vice and carries a social stigma in spite of being pervasive in Afghanistan.

The third version explores the respondents’ preferences between two candidates who equally serve the people, one of whom is the respondents’ qawm but is believed to be corrupt.



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Version CSuppose that there are two incumbents rerunning for their seat in the Wolesi Jirga. Candidate 1 is from your qawm. People think that he is involved in corruption. He serves the people to a great extent. Candidate 2 is not from your qawm. People think that he is not involved in corruption. He serves the people to a great extent.

Figure 4: voting preferences based on Version C

Only a small percentage of the respondents (4%) preferred the first candidate while a very large proportion of them (84%) preferred the second candidate in spite of belonging to another qawm (Figure 4). The negative perception of corruption, as demonstrated in these questions, is a good sign that even provision of services and ethnic identity of politicians do not reduce the social stigma associated with corruption. The state and organizations involved in fighting corruption can capitalize on the negative perception of corruption in order to mobilize people in the fight against corruption.



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II. ExAMINING THE IMPACTS OF THE TRAINING

While the previous section explored the respondents’ general perception of corruption (in both treatment and control masajed), this section examines the impacts of this program through comparing the respondents’ attitudes in treatment and control masajed. The three main indicators of the program, which are examined in this section, are (a) awareness of masjed participants about corruption and common corrupt practices; (b) participants’ likelihood to report instances of bribery; and (c) participants’ attitude toward corruption in service delivery.

In order to explore the first indicator, we look at whether there is any significant difference between the respondents in treatment and control masajed in the responses to the questions about using komissionkar, using intermediaries and ministers who serve their own province more than other provinces. Table 12 compares the attitude toward relying on kommissionkar. There is a minor difference in treatment and control groups, but the difference is very small and not statistically significant. With the low Pearson Chi-squared test statistic (1.7668), the null hypothesis that the two groups are similar cannot be rejected. In other words, although the proportions of those who saw using komissionkar to be acceptable are low in treatment and control masajed, the sermons delivered by imams in treatment masajed does not seem to have lowered that proportion significantly.

Table 12: Attitude toward using komissionkar (treatment vs. control masajed)

Question 2.01: Suppose that a person wants to apply for driver license. However, he does not have the time to follow the application process. Do you think it is acceptable to use komissionkar for following up the application?



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Table 13: Attitude toward using intermediaries (treatment vs. control masajed)

Question 2.02: Now suppose that applying for national ID is a lengthy process and takes many days. Do you think it is acceptable to rely on friends or intermediaries in order to speed up the process?

Table 14: Attitude toward preferential service delivery (treatment vs. control masajed)

Question 2.03: Suppose that a minister uses his authority to serve the people of his province more than other provinces. Do you think what he does is acceptable?



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Tables 13 and 14 examine the responses to the questions about relying on friends or intermediaries for obtaining government services and attitude toward preferential service delivery by ministers. Since the data contained cells with low frequencies, Fisher’s exact statistic was used for the Chi-squared test. The two tables show that there are no significant differences between treatment and control masajed in terms of replies to these two questions. Once again, it seems that the sermons delivered by imams did not have a significant impact on the participants’ replies to these two questions.

The second indicator of interest was the respondents’ reporting of bribery, disclosing the instances that they had to pay bribes over the past one year. The respondents in both treatment and control masajed were asked how many times they had to pay bribes, to which organizations and how much. Since bribery is a sensitive topic and respondents may not feel comfortable disclosing the instances that they had to pay bribes, the comparison of replies in treatment and control masajed intends to test whether the sermons delivered in treatment masajed can persuade more respondents to reveal instances of bribery.

Table 15: Tendency to report instances of bribery (treatment vs. control masajed)

Question 2.04: We know that people are sometimes forced to pay a bribe – were you forced to pay a bribe over the past one year?



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Table 16: reporting frequency of bribery (treatment vs. control masajed)

Question 2.05: How many times did you have to give bribe over the past one year?

Table 17: reporting frequency of bribery (treatment vs. control masajed)

Question 2.05: How many times did you have to give bribe over the past one year?



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Tables 15-17 test examine the tendency of respondents to report instances of bribery in treatment and control masajed. Table 15 shows that the percentage of respondents who reported to have paid bribes is almost similar in both groups of masajed, without a significant difference. Table 16 shows the number of times that the respondents paid bribes. Since the variance in the two groups seem to be different, as shown by Bartlett’s test in the bottom of Table 7 (p=0.001), two-sample t-test with unequal variance was used to test whether the number of times that respondents paid bribe is statistically different (summarized in Table 17). The t-test statistic is very small (-1.5456), which means that there is no statistically difference between the two groups in disclosing the number of times that they had to pay bribes.

Table 18 and 19 summarize the test for the amounts of bribes reported by participants in treatment and control masajed. Just looking at the average (mean) bribes reported in the two types of masajed (19162 vs. 40680 Afs), one may be tempted to conclude that the respondents in the control masajed on average paid larger bribes than those in treatment masajed. Two of the masajed in control group were located in the main market and many worshipers were businessmen or retailers who sold merchandizes on streets. They reported to be often harassed by the police or customs officials and were frequently forced to pay bribes. Since the variance in the treatment and control groups is not similar, as shown by Bartlett’s test in Table 9 (p=0.000), two-sample t-test with unequal variance was used to test whether the mean bribes paid by the respondents in treatment and control masajed were different. The observed difference, however, was not statistically significant (Table 19).

Table 18: reporting the amount of bribes (treatment vs. control masajed)

Question 2.08: How much was the amount of the most recent bribe you had to pay?



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Table 19: reporting the amount of bribes (treatment vs. control masajed)

Question 2.08: How much was the amount of the most recent bribe you had to pay?

In addition, we used a second measure of tendency to report instances of bribe, that is, inviting masjed participants to report instances of bribery through SMS text messages sent to two separate numbers (one number for control and one for treatment masajed). Around 3000 posters, inviting the participants to report bribery, were distributed equally in treatment and control masajed as masjed participants exited the masajed. We receive only one SMS message at the number assigned for treatment masajed and no MSM messages at the number assigned for control masajed. The lack of willingness of masjed participants to report experience of bribery through SMS messages, contrary to reporting in face-to-face interviews, could be due to the public perception that reporting corruption through a hotline is useless and troublesome. The 119-hotline set up by the Afghan police as a platform to report crimes or corruption became ineffective as such calls were rarely taken seriously by the Ministry of Interior. In addition, the individuals who reported were some times even harassed by the police.23 What is important for this study is that sermons delivered by imams did not impact the participants’ reluctance to report cases of bribery through SMS text messages, which is consistent with the findings from face-to-face interviews. The sermons did not seem to impact the willingness of participants to report bribery when the responses in treatment and control masajed are compared.

Finally, the third indicator of interest was participants’ attitude toward corruption in service delivery. The questions focused on the respondents’ attitude toward corruption of MPs in service delivery and whether the sermons delivered by imams had impacts, if any, on the respondents’ attitudes. As demonstrated in Tables 20-22, the responses in treatment and control masajed were similar and without any significant difference in all three versions. The number of the respondents who selected candidate 1, 2 or neither one is very close across treatment and control masajed regardless of the version of the statement. The observed small differences are not significant in any of the versions. The Chi-squared statistics in all three versions are small and the p-values are too large to reject the null hypothesis that the proportions of responses to each question are the same (Tables 20-22). Similar to other indicators, it seems that the sermons delivered by the imams in treatment masajed has had no significant impacts on the respondents’ replies to these questions.

23 Jeffry Coonjohn ‘Assessment Corruption Complaint Process, Afghan Ministry of Interior, UNDP Final Interim Report, UNDP, 2014.



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Table 20: voting preferences based on Version A (treatment vs. control masajed)

STATEMENT: Suppose that there are two incumbents rerunning for their seat in the Wolesi Jirga. Candidate 1 is from your qawm. People think that he is involved in corruption. He serves the people to a great extent. Candidate 2 is also from your qawm. People think that he is not involved in corruption. He serves the people less than the first candidate.

Question 2.10: Suppose that you can vote for either candidates. Which one of the two candidates I just described would you vote for (pick one)? Candidate 1 or candidate 2?

Table 21: voting preferences based on Version B (treatment vs. control masajed)

STATEMENT: Suppose that there are two incumbents rerunning for their seat in the Wolesi Jirga. Candidate 1 is from your qawm. People think that he is involved in corruption. He serves the people to a great extent. Candidate 2 is not from your qawm. People think that he is not involved in corruption. He serves the people less than the first candidate.

Question 2.10: Suppose that you can vote for either candiates. Which one of the two candidates I just described would you vote for (pick one)? Candidate 1 or candidate 2?



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Table 22: voting preferences based on Version C (treatment vs. control masajed)

STATEMENT: Suppose that there are two incumbents rerunning for their seat in the Wolesi Jirga. Candidate 1 is from your qawm. People think that he is involved in corruption. He serves the people to a great extent. Candidate 2 is not from your qawm. People think that he is not involved in corruption. He serves the people to a great extent.

Question 2.10: Suppose that you can vote for either candiates. Which one of the two candidates I just described would you vote for (pick one)? Candidate 1 or candidate 2?



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III. ExPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF OBSERVED IMPACTS

The statistical tests reported in the previous section shows that no statistically significant impacts were observed through this impact evaluation, but they do not demonstrate why the intervention did not have an impact. In other words, we are pretty confident that the intervention (training of imams on anti-corruption issues and asking them to deliver sermons in the treatment masajed) did not impact the attitude of respondents in treatment masajed. That is why the responses in treatment and control masajed were very similar and without any major differences. In addition, all the interviews for this survey were conducted within one month after the training of imams in treatment masajed. Thus, the impact evaluation does not rule out the possibility that the program may have long-term impacts, supposing that imams will later study the materials provided in the training and can deliver more effective sermons in the future. The likelihood of such a long-term impact being realized, nevertheless, seems slim as it depends on the good will of these imams to put the efforts on studying the training materials without any incentives.

The qualitative interviews suggest two explanations for the absence of impacts: the short period of workshop and the clerics’ limited interest in the topic due to the lack of political will to fight corruption in Afghanistan. The statistical tests that were used for this impact evaluation do not explain why the intervention did not have any impacts. The plausible explanations presented in this section are, therefore, based on the qualitative interviews with the thirty two clerics who attended the workshop and whose masajed were surveyed as treatment masajed for the impact evaluation.24

The first explanation is related to the workshop duration and workshop materials. The IWA, in collaboration with the Ministry of Haj and Religious Endowments, developed a very good textbook and a handbook for the training of imams. These two sources gathered numerous Quranic verses and narratives from the prophet about corruption, its nature and manifestations, and offered very insightful discussions of religious duties of Muslims in fighting different types of corruption. They provided the imams with very useful tools for delivering sermons that could raise the awareness of masjed participants about different types of corruption and how to take part in fighting corruption. The training of imams, however, was too short and took place in two days only. Not only the training did not cover the materials discussed in the two sources, there was not even sufficient time to discuss the key themes of the book.

The absence of impacts may also be rooted in the minimal treatment effects due the short period of the training for imams. Although the pre-and-post evaluations showed an improvement in the participants’ answers to the evaluation questions, the workshop was too short to cover the workshop materials. This was reflected in qualitative interviews with clerics of treatment masajed most of whom (75%) believed that the workshop was not long enough (Table 23). Those clerics who believed that the workshop was not long enough recommended such a workshop to be held from 3 days up to 15 days, with most of them suggesting the workshop to be more than 5 days long (Table 24).

Table 23: Views about Workshop Length

Do you think the workshop was long enough or should have been held for more days? (N=32)

Workshop was long enough 25%

Workshop should have been longer 75%

24 The questionnaire can be found at Appendix V.



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Table 24: Views about Workshop Length

If the workshop was not long enough, how many days do you think the workshop should have been for?

Recommended Days Number of Responses

3 days 4

4 days 4

5 days 2

6 days 1

7 days 8

10 days 4

15 days 1

In spite of its short length, the workshop did raise awareness among clerics about their role in fighting corruption in Afghanistan. 84% of imams from treatment masajed said that this workshop was the first workshop on corruption that they attended, and 66% of them stated that the workshop raised their awareness about how the clergy could contribute to the fight against corruption.

Nevertheless, clerics’ use of the workshop materials was limited and only 20% of them had read the workshop materials. Of 32 imams leading the treatment masajed, only 7 had studied, after the workshop, the book distributed in the workshop and had used some of book contents (Quranic verses, narratives, discussions or anecdotes from the book) in their sermons. One of the common concerns expressed by imams related to the length of the book and lack of opportunity to discuss the book contents in the workshop. The following quote from one of the respondents reflects what many respondents (Interviews 5, 8, 9, 14, 16, 18, 29, 30) suggested:

The book was very good. I particularly liked the section on administrative corruption. But the book is very long. We did not have time to discuss the main themes of the book in the workshop. For future workshops, you should make the workshop longer so that there is enough time to discuss the book contents.

Another group of imams (Interviews 3, 4, 8, 12, 21, 22, 28) believed that the book was complicated and recommended the book to become shorter and easier to understand. The book is around 300 pages long. Perhaps, a shorter version of the book would have made it easier to read and use it as a reference in the sermons.

The book should be brief and easy to understand. The writers should avoid complicated concepts so that readers are encouraged to read the book and are not intimidated by the length of the book. The writers should consult the clergy widely to improve the book (Interview 3).

The second plausible explanation for the absence of impacts is related to the limited interest of clerics in fighting corruption due to the perceived lack of political will on the side of government to fight corruption in Afghanistan. The interviewed clerics complained about the lack of willingness on the side of government to take their advices and the fight against corruption seriously, which in turn would effects clerics’ views about the workshop and their role to fight corruption.

The qualitative interviews asked imams’ views about the role and success of the clergy in fighting corruption in Afghanistan (Table 25). In terms of their success in fighting corruption, the interviewed imams viewed the advantage of clergy in using Quranic verses and narratives from the Prophet to dissuade people from corrupt practices in the highly religious society of Afghanistan.



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Table 25: Clerics’ views about their role in fighting corruption

How successful do you think the clergy has been in fighting corruption in Afghanistan, if 1 means least successful and 5 means most successful? (N=32)

Degree (1-5) Number or responses

1 1

2 3

3 16

4 8

5 4

The lack of government support in fighting corruption was mentioned as the main barrier to clerics’ success in fighting corruption. The most commonly cited reason for the limited success of clerics in fighting corruption was the absence of political support in the government to fight corruption (18 out 32 responses). The following quotes reflect a common view held by the interviewed imams,

The power of clerics is in their words and knowledge of Sharia. We tell people what Islam says about corruption. However, this is all we can do. We are not government. It is the duty of the government to prosecute and punish the corrupt officials. But the government is not serious about fighting corruption (Interview 30).

We [clerics] do not control the executive branch to arrest and punish the corrupt people based on Islam. And there are people in the executive branch who are corrupt themselves and do not want to eliminate corruption from this country (Interview 32).

The role of clerics is very limited. They can just educate the people about corruption and cannot do more. If the government is serious about fighting corruption, it should follow the recommendations of the clergy about fighting corruption (Interview 25).

The government should give more authority to the clergy to fight corruption. It should establish a commission composed of clerics to fight corruption (Interview 16).

Clerics have not been successful at all because the government does not support them. We talk about corruption but no one listens to us. No one takes any action in fighting corruption (Interview 14).

Clerics should be given a role in the executive branch to prosecute the corrupt people and fight corruption when they face it. It is only then that the clergy will have an effective role in the fight against corruption (Interview 14).

A smaller group of clerics expressed insecurity as major challenge facing clerics who speak out against corruption (Interviews 18, 24, 26, 29). According to these clerics, imams who criticize the government for corruption or speak out against corrupt officials are accused to be sympathizing with insurgents or are threatened by corrupt government officials. As one of the clerics put, “There is no security. The government cannot ensure security of clerics. That is why we cannot talk freely.”

When asked what should be done to get the clergy more actively involved in the fight against corruption, 47% of the interviewed clerics saw support of the government for fighting corruption necessary for the clergy’s involvement in an anti-corruption campaign. They doubted the government’s willingness to fight corruption and complained about lack of government support for anti-corruption initiatives (Interviews 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 23, 24, 28, 29).

Another 38% of the clerics recommended closer collaboration between the government and the clergy. They recommended the government to seek clerics’ consultation in fighting corruption and follow their recommendations (Interviews 3, 4, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 30, 31, 32).



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Given the clerics’ pessimism about the effectiveness of their anti-corruption messages and their doubt in government’s determination to fight corruption, it seems plausible to question how motivated the clerics who attended the workshop were to take the workshop and their role in fighting corruption seriously. It seems that the common perception that the government lacks the political will to fight corruption has had discouraging effects on clerics. This may also explain why a small percentage of the imams who attended the workshop (20%) had actually read the workshop book. This is also consistent with the observations made during the impact evaluation survey. When they were asked to deliver a sermon, based on the training materials, about corruption from Islamic perspective, the imams of treatment masajed usually talked about corruption in general. Their sermons rarely reflected the materials covered in the textbook that had been prepared for the training.

The two factors (short period of the training and clerics’ lack of confidence in anti-corruption initiatives) actually may have contributed together to the observed absence of impacts. On the one hand, the clerics seem to lack confidence in the power of anti-corruption messages as long as the government does not demonstrate the political will to fight corruption seriously. On the other hand, the short period of the training did not allow a thorough discussion of the prepared materials and how the clergy could contribute to the fight against corruption, given the existing obstacles and challenges that tackling corruption in Afghanistan faces.



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CONCLUSION

Engagement of clerics in mobilizing people in the fight against corruption seems to be promising, given the role of clergy and their mobilization capacity in Muslim societies. In Afghanistan, the clergy can have an important role in fighting corruption given the role of Islam in defining the moral values of the society and the role of clerics in interpreting Islamic values. However, the effectiveness of the clergy and other civil society organizations in fighting corruption seem to be influenced by their confidence, or lack of it, in the government’s determination to tackle corruption. Although efforts by civil society organizations and civic associations are productive, such initiatives would be more effective if the government also demonstrate the political will to fight corruption.

In addition, the short-term and crash workshops do not seem to be an effective entry point for inviting clerics to take part in mobilizing the public in fight against corruption. Although this workshop improved the clergymen’s understanding and knowledge of administrative corruption from Islamic perspective and based on Afghanistan laws, it was too short to prepare them for delivering sermons that could impact masjed participant’s views and attitudes. One potential alternative for improving similar programs in the future would be to extend the period of such trainings in order to allow productive discussions of the existing challenges and obstacles to fighting corruption in Afghanistan and how the clerics can take part in the fight against corruption, given the existing challenges. It seems that a realistic discussion of the challenges and prospects of fighting corruption and the role of the clergy in this area seems essential for their active participation..

The training materials for this course are the first of its kind, well designed and grand, compiling very relevant Quranic verses, prophet narratives and historical anecdotes on corruption. The training materials cannot optimistically be covered in a short-term workshop but could be utilized as the basis for long-term trainings and even preferably could be incorporated into the curricula of madrasas and Sharia faculties of universities. The long duration of madrasa and university courses render them suitable for teaching such materials and promoting Islamic anti-corruption discourse.

The findings of this impact evaluation can be relevant to other similar crash workshops that have been organized in Afghanistan, from women rights seminars to workshops organized for civil servants and teachers. Enormous resources have been spent on short-term (two or three day) workshops for improving the skills of civil servants or enhancing the capacity of social activists. No rigorous study of such workshops (particularly in form of RCT) has been carried out in Afghanistan. This impact evaluation cast doubts on the effectiveness of such crash courses or short-term workshops. It appears that promoting civic activities and mobilizing civil society groups demands grand programs and multi-faceted initiatives in order to be effective and contribute to good governance and transparency in Afghanistan.



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APPENDIX

35

APPENDIx I: LIST OF MASAjED

NO Masjed Related district Grand(jami)/ Non _grand(ghair jami)

Treatment/ Control

031 Abda Maiwand 1 Non_grand

198 Akhand Mohammad Amin 6 grand

238 Aqa Ali Shams 7 Non_grand

486 Ibrahim Adham 15 grand Control

189 Abrahim Khalilullah 5 Non_grand


255 Abrahim Khalilullah 7 Non_grand Treatment


395 Abrahim Khalilullah 10 grand

463 Abrahim Khalilullah 12 grand

473 Abrahim Khalilullah 15 grand Control

517 Aboo Ayob Ansari 16 grand

134 Abohanifa 4 grand Treatment

312 Abohanifa 8 Non_grand

449 Abohanifa 11 grand

467 Abohanifa 12 Non_grand

540 Abohanifa 17 grand

288 Abo Zar Ghafari 8 grand Control

241 Abo Salih Padsha 7 Non_grand

521 Abo Obaida 16 grand Treatment

293 Abo Huraira 8 Non_grand

432 Abo Huraira 11 grand

506 Abo Huraira 15 Non_grand

053 Abo Bakar Sidiq 2 grand

118 Abo Bakar Sidiq 4 grand Control

177 Abo Bakar Sidiq 5 Non_grand

210 Abo Bakar Sidiq 6 Non_grand Treatment


245 Abo Bakar Sidiq 7 Non_grand





36


Treatment/ Control

354 Abo Bakar Sidiq polcharkhi 9 grand Control

339 Aboo Bakar Sidiq Makroyan 3 9 grand

344 Aboo Bakar Sidiq Yaka Toot 9 grand Treatment

554 Aboo Hanifa 17 Non_grand

380 Aboo Hanifa Makroyan 4 9 Non_grand

445 Abo Zar Ghafari 11 grand

522 Abo Zar Ghafari 16 grand

547 Abo Zar Ghafari 17 Non_grand Control

230 Abo Zar Ghafari Chehlaston 7 grand

290 Abo Talha Ansari 8 Non_grand Treatment

113 Abo Talha Ansar 4 grand

436 Abo Muslim Khurasani 11 grand

346 Abo Huraira Shash Darak 9 grand

515 Etifaq Balaye 16 grand

552 Etifaq sar_e_Kotal 17 Non_grand Control

266 Etifaq Shaa Shahid 8 grand

188 Etifaq Niaz Big 5 Non_grand Treatment

370 Etifaq Yka Toot 9 Non_grand

107 Ahmad Jam 3 Non_grand

294 Ahmad Kabir 8 Non_grand

391 Ahmad Mujtaba 10 grand

220 Ahmad Mukhtar 6 Non_grand Control

450 Ahmad Mukhtar 11 grand

323 Ahmad Mustafa 8 Non_grand

292 Ahmad Mustafa 8 Non_grand Treatment

233 Ahmadi Zair Kotal 7 grand

274 Ahmadi Kart_e_Naw 8 grand

011 Akhir Jada 1 grand

511 Adam Safiullah 15 Non_grand Control

015 Uzbik hai Ali Muradan 1 Non_grand

006 Uzbek Hai Shor Bazar 1 grand Treatment

127 Ismail Zabiulla 4 grand

184 Ismail Zabiulla 5 Non_grand

479 Ismail Zabiulla 15 grand

020 Ashab Karam 1 Non_grand


APPENDIX

37


Treatment/ Control

335 Ashab Kahf 8 Non_grand Control

369 Aqsa 2 saraka Maidan 9 Non_grand

138 Altawhid 4 grand Treatment

106 Imam Azam 3 Non_grand




377 Imam Azam 9 Non_grand Control

477 Imam Azam 15 grand

548 Imam Azam 17 Non_grand Treatment

152 Imam Bukhari 4 Non_grand

418 Imam Husain 10 Non_grand

510 Imam Zufar 15 Non_grand

492 Imam Ghazali 15 grand

275 Imam Qutaiba 8 grand Control

497 mam Qutaiba 15 Non_grand

167 Amir Hamza 5 grand Treatment

393 Amir Hamza 10 grand

174 Amir Hamza Shahid 5 grand

200 Anchi Baghaban 6 grand

435 Anas Ebn Maalik 11 grand

083 Ahal lhaq 2 Non_grand Control

071 Awsat Andarabi 2 Non_grand

026 Awsat Dewan Bige 1 Non_grand Treatment

434 Ayob Ansari 11 grand

465 Baba Adam Safiullah 12 Non_grand

431 Baba Adam Safiullah 11 grand Control

505 Baba Husain Abdal Wali 15 Non_grand Treatment

065 Baba Kidani 2 Non_grand

392 Baba Wali 10 grand

181 Baba Adam Safiullah 5 Non_grand

010 Baba Khode 1 grand

224 Baba Zangi 7 grand Control

201 Baba Wali 6 grand

061 Baghban Bashi 2 grand Treatment



38


Treatment/ Control

023 Baghban Kocha 1 Non_grand

319 Baghcha Said 8 Non_grand

005 Bala Qala Ashqan Arfan 1 grand

045 Bala Koh Ashqan 1 Non_grand

016 Barancha ha 1 Non_grand Control

102 Baghal koh Dah Mazang 3 Non_grand

420 Blok Hai Hawaye 10 Non_grand Treatment

406 Baloch HA 10 grand

120 Bihtarin Alam 4 grand

276 Bibi Benazir 8 grand

508 Bibi Dasti 15 Non_grand

204 Bibi Aysha Sidiqa 6 grand Control

425 Bibi Aysha Sidiqa 10 Non_grand

196 Bibi Fatima Zahra 6 grand Treatment

234 Bibi Mahum 7 grand

297 Bain Dah Hasar Bini 8 Non_grand

074 Park Zarngar 2 Non_grand

166 Pol Takhnic 5 grand

157 Panj Piran 4 Non_grand Control

052 Panj Pairan Panjshir 2 grand

530 Panj Pairan Panjshir 16 Non_grand Treatment

081 Panj Pairan Panjshir 2 Non_grand

401 Panjshire ha 10 grand

475 Panjsad Family 15 grand

175 Payambar Azam 5 Non_grand

024 Pair Akram Khan 1 Non_grand Control

085 Tapa Salam 3 grand

324 Tamim Ansar 8 Non_grand Treatment

261 Tani Kot 7 Non_grand

546 Tahia Maskan 17 grand

161 Jaaji Zarif 4 Non_grand

457 Jami Hasnin 11 grand

165 Jami Shaa Awlia 5 grand Control

440 Jami Shahid 11 grand

469 Jami Noor 12 Non_grand Treatment


APPENDIX

39


Treatment/ Control

160 Jarab Baafha 4 Non_grand

208 Jalaludin Balkhi 6 Non_grand

121 Jamiatl Ulama 4 grand

195 Jamhuriat Kart_e_3 6 grand

251 Jangalak 7 Non_grand Control

086 Jawan mard Qasab 3 grand

041 Chaa Madar 1 Non_grand Treatment

243 Chahar Yaar Kabab 7 Non_grand


439 Chahar Yaar Kabab 11 grand


003 Chob Froshi 1 grand Control

453 Haji Amir Mohammad 11 grand

448 Haji Chaman 11 grand Treatment

352 Haji Hakimullah 9 grand

090 Haji Abdulrahim Dah Bore 3 grand

496 Haji Ghais 15 Non_grand

144 Haji Farooq 4 Non_grand

394 Haji Qasam 10 grand Control

131 Haji Qalamudin 4 grand

125 Haji Mohmmad Dad 4 grand Treatment

084 Haji Mir Ahmad 2 grand

410 Haji Nik Mohammad 10 Non_grand

388 Haji Yaqob 10 grand

104 Hasan Basri 3 Non_grand

390 Hasi 2 Shair Por 10 grand Control

147 Hasi 2 Karte Parwan 4 Non_grand

244 Hasi 2 Guzargah 7 grand Treatment

126 Hazrat Idress 4 grand

428 Hazrat Adam 11 Non_grand

105 Hazrat Ismail 3 Non_grand

130 Hazrat Ayob 4 grand

111 Hazrat Bilal 3 Non_grand Control

239 Hazrat Bilal 7 Non_grand

269 Hazrat Bilal 8 grand Treatment



40


Treatment/ Control

459 Hazrat Bilal 11 grand

460 Hazrat Bilal 12 grand

464 Hazrat Bilal 12 Non_grand

325 Hazrat Ji Baba 8 Non_grand

068 Hazrat Khalid 2 Non_grand Control

456 Hazrat Khalid 11 grand

278 Hazrat Khalid Baba 8 grand Treatment

332 Hazrat Khazar 8 Non_grand

222 Hazrat Dawod 7 grand

326 Hazrat Dawod 8 Non_grand

433 Hazrat Dawod 11 grand

282 Hazrat Zakria 8 grand Control

430 Hazrat Zubair 11 grand

350 Hazrat Suliaman 9 grand Treatment

504 Hazrat Suliaman 15 Non_grand

549 Hazrat Suliaman 17 Non_grand

483 Hazrat Shaa Masod 15 grand

136 Hazrat Osman 4 grand

169 Hazrat Osman 5 grand Control

242 Hazrat Osman 7 Non_grand

304 Hazrat Osman 8 Non_grand Treatment

537 Hazrat Osman 16 Non_grand

542 Hazrat Osman 17 grand

301 Hazrat Ali 8 Non_grand

461 Hazrat Ali 12 grand

427 Hazrat Ali 11 grand Control

252 Hazrat Omar Farooq 7 Non_grand

055 Hazrat Omar Farooq 2 grand Treatment

124 Hazrat Omar Farooq 4 grand

413 Hazrat Omar Farooq 10 Non_grand

408 Hazrat Isaa 10 grand

117 Hazrat Mohammad PBU 4 grand

503 Hazrat Noh 15 Non_grand Control

033 Hazrat hai Shor Bazar 1 Non_grand

303 Hazrat Yasir 8 Non_grand Treatment


APPENDIX

41


Treatment/ Control

398 Hazrat Yaqoob 10 grand

484 Hazrat Yaqoob 15 grand

178 Hazrat Yousif 5 Non_grand

203 Hazrat Yousif 6 grand

296 Hazrat Yousif 8 Non_grand Control

411 Hazrat Yousif 10 Non_grand

426 Hazrat Yousif 10 Non_grand Treatment

487 Hazrat Yousif 15 grand

186 Hazrat Younis 5 Non_grand

321 Hazrat Younis 8 Non_grand

478 Hazrat Younis 15 grand

544 Hazrat Younis 17 grand Control

302 Hakim Sanaye 8 Non_grand

556 Hakim Sanaye 17 Non_grand Treatment

092 Humaira Saljoqi 3 grand

155 Hanzala 4 Non_grand

240 Hanafi 7 Non_grand

414 Hanafi 10 Non_grand

458 Hanafi 11 grand Control

317 Khatuml Anbia 8 Non_grand

514 Khatuml Anbia 16 grand Treatment

300 Khatumal Nabien 8 Non_grand

212 Khalid Ebn Walid 6 Non_grand



348 Khalid Ebn Walid 9 grand Control


404 Khalid Ebn Walid 10 grand Treatment

443 Khalid Ebn Walid 11 grand

501 Khazar Safid 15 Non_grand

472 Khulafay Rashidin 15 grand

022 Khwab Gah 1 Non_grand

062 Khawaja Ibrahiam Wali 2 grand Control

557 Khwaja Ahmad Maska 16 Non_grand

069 Khwaja Ishaq Wali 2 Non_grand Treatment



42


Treatment/ Control

248 Khwaja Wali 7 Non_grand

180 Khawja Jam 5 Non_grand

270 Khawaja Wardak 8 grand

351 Khawaja Rawash 9 grand

171 Khawja Sabz Posh 5 grand Control

531 Khawja Sabz Posh 16 Non_grand

018 Khawaja Safa 1 Non_grand Treatment

489 Khawaja Safa 15 grand

129 Khawja Abdullah Ansari 4 grand

357 Khawja Abdullah Ansari 9 Non_grand

493 Khawja Abdullah Ansari 15 grand

295 Khawja Fazayal 8 Non_grand Control

028 Khwaja Faqir 1 Non_grand

545 Khwaja Wali Folad 17 grand Treatment

543 Khwaja Niamtullah 17 grand

318 Khwja Yaaran 8 Non_grand

490 Khairl Bashar 15 grand

412 Dakhal Shafa khana 10 Non_grand

423 Dakhal Wazarat 10 Non_grand Control

066 Dakhal Waliat Kabul 2 Non_grand

013 Darakht Shang 1 grand Treatment

187 Dah Orian Qargha 5 Non_grand

225 Dah Qalandar 7 grand

541 Dah Kipak 17 grand

008 Dewan Bige 1 grand

133 Zakria 4 grand Control

259 Zolbajaldin 7 Non_grand

170 Zaid Ebn Sabt 5 grand Treatment

481 Zaid Ebn Sabt 15 grand

122 Rahmania 4 grand

265 Rahman Mina 8 grand

158 Rangrez ha 4 Non_grand

056 Ranga Dah Afghanan 2 grand Control

311 Ranga Qalacha 8 Non_grand

331 Ziart Shaa Shahid 8 Non_grand Treatment


APPENDIX

43


Treatment/ Control

009 Ziart Ashqan Arfan 1 grand

539 Zair Bland Dah Khudaidad 16 Non_grand

322 Zair Chanar 8 Non_grand

088 Zair Maghzan 3 grand

289 Zair Muqbra 8 Non_grand Control

306 Zair Muqbra 2 8 Non_grand

067 Sar Asiab Dah Afghanan 2 Non_grand Treatment

285 Sar Tapa Balkh 8 grand

305 Sartapa Karta Rahman Mina 8 Non_grand

039 Sar Hawaz Rika Khana 1 Non_grand

030 Sar Karez Ashqan Arfan 1 Non_grand

550 Sarai Shamali 17 Non_grand Control

021 Sarai Shahzada 1 Non_grand

485 Sardar Alam 15 grand Treatment

513 Sardar Alam 16 grand

502 Sardar Madina 15 Non_grand

309 Sarak 3 Shaa Shahid 8 Non_grand

474 Sarwar Kainat 15 grand

533 Saadat 16 Non_grand Control

491 Sad ebn Abi Waqas 15 grand

446 Sad ebn Abi Waqas 11 grand Treatment

149 Sad Ebn Muaz 4 Non_grand

424 Sad Ebn Muaz 10 Non_grand

168 Sad Ebn Muaz 5 grand

078 Sad Ebn Waqas 2 Non_grand

527 Safid Dah Khudaidad 16 Non_grand Control

512 Sultan Yazid Bastami 15 Non_grand

375 Sultan Hod Khial 9 Non_grand Treatment

507 Sulman Fars 15 Non_grand

525 Sulman Fars 16 grand

534 Samnt Khana 16 Non_grand

249 Samandar 7 Non_grand

109 Sang Kash ha 3 Non_grand

046 3 Dokan Ashqan Arfan 1 grand

342 Suhail Ebn Omar 9 grand Treatment



44


Treatment/ Control

419 Saidulmursalin 10 Non_grand

049 Said Jafar Andarabi 2 grand

070 Said Jalal Awal 2 Non_grand

091 Said Jamaludin 3 grand

284 Said Jamaludin Afghan 8 grand Control

299 Said Kamran 8 Non_grand

098 Said Maqsod Shaa 3 grand Treatment

499 Said Maqsod Shaa 15 Non_grand

012 Said Mahdi 1 grand

362 Said Mir Jan 9 Non_grand

247 Said Najat 7 Non_grand

267 Said Noor M.Shaa Mina 8 grand Control

454 Saidul Shuhada 11 grand

137 Saidulmursalin 4 grand Treatment

097 Saidulnabia 3 grand

555 Shaa Awlia 17 Non_grand

079 Shaa Big Khan Pamire 2 Non_grand

264 Shaa Padshaa 8 grand

209 Shaa Jahan 6 Non_grand Control

048 Shaa 2 Shamshira 2 grand

073 Shaa Gulam Pachaa 2 Non_grand Treatment

451 Shaa Madina 11 grand

128 Shaa Mardan 4 grand

075 Shaa Muzafa Wali 2 Non_grand

044 Shaa Naqshband 1 Non_grand

364 Shaa Naqshband 9 Non_grand Control

494 Shaa Naqshband 15 grand

141 Shaa Niaz Barki 4 Non_grand Treatment

345 Shash Darak 9 grand

014 Shamrez ha 1 Non_grand

211 Shams Tabrez 6 Non_grand

139 Shahrara Awal 4 Non_grand

148 Shahrara shaa Ghasi 4 Non_grand Control

553 Shahrak Police 17 Non_grand

260 Shahid Abdulqayom Qudrat 7 Non_grand Treatment


APPENDIX

45


Treatment/ Control

310 Shaikh Abdulqadar Jilani 8 Non_grand

191 Shaikh Mohammadi ha 5 Non_grand

272 Shaikh Mohammadi ha 8 grand

279 Shaikh Najmudin 8 grand

089 Shair Shaa Mina 3 grand Control

468 Sufi Rohani 12 Non_grand

462 Ashqan o Arfan 12 grand Treatment

080 Abdulraman Ebn Awf 2 Non_grand

254 Abdulrahim 7 Non_grand

192 Abdulraim Shakari 6 grand

182 Abdulrazaq 5 Non_grand

315 Abdulrashid Qais 8 Non_grand Control

110 Abdulshakor 3 Non_grand

253 Abdulqayom Qudrat 7 Non_grand Treatment

476 Abdullah Ebn Abas 15 grand

197 Abdullah ebn Masood 6 grand

154 Abdullah Ezam 4 Non_grand

227 Abdullah Ebn Zubair 7 grand

172 Abdullah Ebn Omar 5 grand Control

455 Abdullah Ebn Omar 11 grand

060 Abdullah Ebn Masood 2 grand Treatment

229 Abdullah Ebn Masood 7 grand

373 Abdullah Ebn Masood 9 Non_grand

447 Abdullah Ebn Masood 11 grand

207 Abdullah Ebn Maksom 6 Non_grand

145 Abdullah Shahid 4 Non_grand Control

333 Abdulwakil 8 Non_grand

441 Osman Ghani 11 grand Treatment

250 Azim Khan Imaq 7 Non_grand

099 Behind of agriculture ministry 3 grand

042 Ali Reza khan 1 Non_grand

389 Ali mowafaq Herawi 10 grand

058 Olia ratba Andarabi 2 grand Control

043 Olia Shor bazar 1 Non_grand

119 Omar Ebn Khitab 4 grand Treatment



46


Treatment/ Control

094 Omar Jan Sahib zada 3 grand

524 Omar Adal 16 grand

108 Omar Farooq 3 Non_grand


190 Omar Farooq 5 Non_grand Control


273 Omar Farooq 8 grand Treatment

442 Omar Farooq 11 grand

004 Eid Gah 1 grand

100 Ghazi M.Jan Khan 3 Non_grand

001 Ghazian 1 Non_grand

151 Ghulam Dastagir 4 Non_grand Control

314 Ghaws Azam 8 Non_grand

452 Ghaws Suqlian 11 grand Treatment

526 Ghaws Azam 16 grand

287 Ghaws Azam Dastgir 8 grand

438 Ghaws Azam Dastgir 11 grand

231 Ghaws Tapaa 7 grand

343 Ghaib Hodkhail 9 grand Control

330 Ghaibi Baba 8 Non_grand

176 Fazal Big 5 Non_grand Treatment

017 Formuli HA 1 Non_grand

226 Faiz M.Qudrat 7 grand

308 Qari Abdulrasool 8 Non_grand

146 Quba Kolala Pushta 4 Non_grand

480 Quba 15 grand Control

281 Qarib Chaman 8 grand

407 Qasaba Khna Sazi 10 grand Treatment

328 Qutaiba 8 Non_grand

558 Qala Ahmad Khan 16 Non_grand

213 Qala Bahadur Khan 6 Non_grand

341 Qala Turab Yakatoot 9 grand

163 Qala Jawad 5 grand Control

417 Qala Chaman 10 Non_grand

360 Qala Haji Afzal 9 Non_grand Treatment


APPENDIX

47


Treatment/ Control

385 Qala Hasan Khan 9 Non_grand

271 Qala Hashmat Khan Pashto zuban 8 grand

268 Qala Hashmat Khan Dari Zuban 8 grand

396 Qala Khatar 10 grand

422 Qala Khawaja 10 Non_grand Control

228 Qala Khwja Guzar Gah 7 grand

359 Qala khwaja Yakatoot 9 Non_grand Treatment

150 Qala khawas 4 Non_grand

237 Qala Shaikh khan 7 Non_grand

298 Qala Samad 8 Non_grand

193 Qala Ali Mardan 6 grand

386 Qala Ali Mardan 9 Non_grand Control

221 Qala Ghaibi 7 grand

397 Qala Fatullah 10 grand Treatment

214 Qala Mother Wazir 6 Non_grand

336 Qala M.wakil 8 Non_grand

353 Qala M.Omar Makroyan 4 9 grand

358 Qala M.Omar Makroyan 4 ق 9 Non_grand

520 Qala Mulayam 16 grand Control

372 Qala Mir Abas 9 Non_grand

382 Qala Mir Yahia 9 Non_grand Treatment

215 Qala Nazar M.Ali 6 Non_grand

307 Qala wazir Bani Hisar 8 Non_grand

366 Qala M.Khan 9 Non_grand

374 Qamarudin Hodkhial 9 Non_grand

142 Qandahari ha 4 Non_grand Control

523 Qaway Markaz 16 grand

077 Qol Abb Chakan 2 Non_grand Treatment

096 Qol Qasaban 3 grand

059 Kart-e-Aryana 2 grand

162 Kart_e_Mamorin 5 grand

338 Kart_e_Wali 9 grand

019 Kah Froshi 1 Non_grand Control

025 Katagar ha 1 Non_grand

093 Kalali Dah Mazang 3 grand Treatment



48


Treatment/ Control

036 Kalali Sadoha 1 Non_grand

156 Kolala Pushta 4 Non_grand

444 Koyti Park 11 grand

101 Koyati Pohanton 3 Non_grand

164 Koyti Khoshal Khan Mina 5 grand Control

034 Guzar Faizullah 1 grand

223 Guzargah 7 grand Treatment

103 Gardana Sakhi 3 Non_grand

153 Gardana Kolala Pushta 4 Non_grand

500 Lab Jar Hazrat khazar 15 Non_grand

143 Lab_e_joy Shahrara 4 Non_grand

051 Loqman Hakim 2 grand Control

356 Mahbob Rabani 9 Non_grand

498 Mohammad Hanifa Ghazi 15 Non_grand

488 Mohammad Hanifa Ghazi 15 grand Treatment

082 Mohammad Sarwar 2 Non_grand

087 Mohammad Mustafa 3 grand

205 Mohammad Mustafa 6 grand

291 Mohammad Mustafa 8 Non_grand Control

402 Mohammadi Yadgare 10 grand

429 Mohmmadia 11 grand Treatment

378 Mohmmadia Paktia kot 9 Non_grand

509 Mohmmadia Khwja Bughra 15 Non_grand

183 Mohmmadia Dah Mubarak 5 Non_grand

538 Mohmmadia Qala Zaman khan 16 Non_grand

383 Mohmmadia Mir Abas 9 Non_grand Control

115 Mohmmadia Karte Parwan 4 grand

194 Mohmmadia Karte 3 6 grand Treatment

263 Mohmmadia Karte Naw 8 grand

403 Mahmodi 10 grand

381 Marhom Abdulrahman Hodkhail 9 Non_grand

536 Mardan Ghaib 16 Non_grand

280 Marza Sahib 8 grand Control

035 Marza Qamaruldin 1 Non_grand


APPENDIX

49


Treatment/ Control

002 Pul khishti masjed 1 grand Treatment

355 Mastafoy Qabal boy 9 Non_grand

007 Maaz Ebn Jabal 1 grand

063 Maaz Ebn Jabal 2 grand

329 Maaz Ebn Jabal 8 Non_grand

551 Maaz Ebn Jabal 17 Non_grand Control

518 Makroyan 16 grand

202 Mula Akram khan 6 grand Treatment

038 Mula Mahmmod 1 Non_grand

206 Mula Mushak Alam 6 Non_grand

037 Mula Moman 1 Non_grand

363 Malak Khosh Dil 9 Non_grand

159 Malak Ataa 4 Non_grand Control

114 Munar Taimani 4 grand

032 Munara Ali Bagh Mardan 1 Non_grand Treatment

361 Mansor Elaj 9 Non_grand

116 Mangali hai Shahrara 4 grand

365 Mihtarlam Baba 9 Non_grand

246 Musa char Dahi 7 Non_grand

135 Musa Kalimullah 4 grand Control

495 Mulana Jalaldin 15 grand

334 Mulana M.Yaqob 8 Non_grand Treatment

040 Moy Mubarak 1 Non_grand




027 Mianji 1 Non_grand Control

399 Maidani Bibi Mahro 10 grand

262 Mir Shakar 7 Non_grand Treatment

405 Mir Sahib 10 grand

057 Milad Nabi 2 grand

400 Nazar Rasol dad 10 grand

050 Nayab Salar Abdulwakil 2 grand

256 Nabawai 7 Non_grand Control

199 Nabawai 6 grand



50


Treatment/ Control

064 Nabawai 2 grand Treatment

470 Nabawai 12 Non_grand

482 Nabawai 15 grand

368 Najar Bashi SUltan 9 Non_grand

072 Nakhas Sabiqa 2 Non_grand

379 Nasrullah Khaksar 9 Non_grand Control

421 Nazarkhail 10 Non_grand

132 Noman Ebn Sabat 4 grand Treatment

337 Noman Ebn Sabat 9 grand

409 Noman Ebn Wazir Abad 10 Non_grand

416 Noman Musa Qala 10 Non_grand

528 Nomani 16 Non_grand

327 Naqlia Urdo 8 Non_grand Control

076 Naw Abad Dah Afghanan 2 Non_grand

532 Naw Abd Dah khudaidad 16 Non_grand

516 Naw Abad Sidiqi 16 grand

371 Naw Abad Qala Barakat 9 Non_grand

095 Naw Abad Dah Mazang 3 grand

367 Naw Abad Yakatoot 9 Non_grand Treatment

349 Naw Abad Yakatoot 9 grand

415 Naw Abad Qala Musa 10 Non_grand Control

519 Noor L Huda 16 grand Treatment

283 Hajda Matra 8 grand

535 Hazar Bik 16 Non_grand

387 Wazir Akbar khan 10 grand

123 Wais Qarn 4 grand

173 Wais Qarn 5 grand Control

286 Wais Qarn 8 grand

347 Wais Qarn 9 grand Treatment

235 Yakhdan 7 grand


APPENDIX

51

APPENDIx II: LIST OF SURVEYED MASAjED

M_ID Masjed Name Survey Date Prayer Time District Grand/ Non-grand

Treatment/ Control

Number of Surveys

026 Awsat Dewan Bigi 17/12/2014 Noon 1 Non-grand Treatment 12

041 Chaa Madar 17/12/2014 Late Night 1 Non-grand Treatment 11

027 Mianji 17/12/2014 Night 1 Non-grand Control 9

013 Darakht Shang 18/12/2014 Noon 1 Grand Treatment 14

032 Munara bagh Ali Mardan 18/12/2014 Night 1 Non-grand Treatment 33

083 Ahlul Haq 18/12/2014 Late Night 2 Non-grand Control 6

055 Hazrat Omar Farooq 20/12/2014 Night 2 Grand Treatment 42

056 Ranga Dah Afghanan 20/12/2014 Noon 2 Grand Control 150

134 Abo Hanifa 20/12/2014 Late Night 4 Grand Treatment 34

171 Khwja Sabz Posh 21/12/2014 Evening 5 Grand Control 25

196 Bibi Fatimal Zahra 21/12/2014 Noon 6 Grand Treatment 33

176 Hazrat Osman Fazal Bik 21/12/2014 Night 5 Non-grand Treatment 55

089 Shair shaa Mina 23/12/2014 Noon 3 Grand Control 57

255 Ibrahaim Khalilullah 23/12/2014 Night 7 Non-grand Treatment 24

093 Hazrat Ayob 23/12/2014 Late Night 3 Grand Treatment 39

331 Ziarat Shaa shahid 24/12/2014 Noon 8 Grand Treatment 38

304 Hazrat Osman 24/12/2014 Night 8 Non-grand Treatment 42

521 Abo Obaida 24/12/2014 Late Night 16 Grand Treatment 39

354 Abo Bakar Sidiq pulcharkhi 25/12/2014 Noon 9 Grand Control 26

420 Blok hai hawaye Omar Farooq 25/12/2014 Evening 10 Non-grand Treatment 35

359 Qala khwja Ykatoot 25/12/2014 Late Night 9 Non-grand Treatment 40

064 Nabawai 27/12/2014 Noon 2 Grand Treatment 49

058 Olia ratba Andarabi 27/12/2014 Evening 2 Grand Control 40

061 Baghban Bashi 27/12/2014 Night 2 Grand Treatment 36

125 Haji M.dad 28/12/2014 Noon 4 Grand Treatment 37

135 Musa Kalimullah 28/12/2014 Night 4 Grand Control 63

141 Shaa Niaz Barki 28/12/2014 Late Night 4 Non-grand Treatment 16



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223 Guzargah 29/12/2014 Noon 7 Grand Treatment 24

224 Baba Zangi 29/12/2014 Night 7 Grand Control 32

204 Bibi Ayesha sidiqi 29/12/2014 Late Night 6 Grand Control 22

397 Qala Fatullah 30/12/2014 Noon 10 Grand Treatment 33

550 Hasan Abdal Wali 30/12/2014 Evening 17 Non-grand Control 19

220 Ahmad Mukhtar 30/12/2014 Night 6 Non-grand Control 38

426 Hazrat Yousif 31/12/2014 Noon 10 Non-grand Treatment 40

407 Qasaba Sazi Khana 31/12/2014 Evening 10 Grand Treatment 59

503 Hazrat Noh 31/12/2014 Night 15 Non-grand Control 44

505 Baba Husain Abdal Wali 4/1/2015 Evening 15 Non-grand Treatment 41

488 M.Hanifa Ghazi 4/1/2015 Night 15 Grand Treatment 52

547 Abo Zar Ghafari 4/1/2015 Noon 17 Non-grand Control 77

519 Noorl Huda 5/1/2015 Noon 16 Grand Treatment 49

441 Osman Ghani 5/1/2015 Night 11 Grand Treatment 55

422 Qala Khwaja 5/1/2015 Evening 10 Non-grand Control 19

452 Ghwas Saqlin 13/01/2015 Noon 11 Grand Treatment 42

381Marhom Abdulrahman Hod Khail

13/01/2015 Evening 9 Grand Control 30

343 Ghaibi Khail Hodkhail 13/01/2015 Night 9 Grand Control 64

173 Wais Qarn 14/01/2015 Noon 5 Grand Control 33

527 Safid dah Khudaidad 14/01/2015 Evening 16 Grand Control 38

167 Amir Hamza 14/01/2015 Late Night 5 Grand Treatment 32

461 Hazrat Ali 15/01/2015 Evening 12 Grand Control 17

467 Abohanifa 15/01/2015 Night 12 Grand Control 66

282 Hazrat Zakria 15/01/2015 Late Night 8 Grand Control 29

560 Hazrat Imam Azam Abohanifa 17/01/2015 Evening 12 Grand Control 52

468 Sofia Rahmani 17/01/2015 Night 12 Grand Control 44

466 Chahar Yar Kababhah 17/01/2015 Late Night 12 Grand Control 48

Total Masajed Surveyed 2104


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All Surveys Final Count

Number of treatment masajed Surveyed 27

Number of surveys in treatment masajed 1033

Number of control masajed Surveyed 18

Number of surveys in control masajed 1039

Total masjed surveyed 45

Total surveys conducted 2072



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APPENDIx III: ENGLISH INSTRUMENT FOR FACE-TO-FACE INTERVIEwS

Section 0: Codes

0.01 Masjed ID |___|___|___|

0.02 Respondent ID |___|___|___|

0.03 Masjed Name

0.04 Type of Masjed 1 Grand 2 Non-grand

0.05 Name & Code of Enumerator |_____________________________________|___|___|___|

0.06 Interview Date Day |___|___| Month |___|___| Year |___|___|___|___|

0.07 Type of Masjed1 Sunni

Other 2 Shiite

0.08 Prayer Time 1 Morning 3 Evening 5 Late Night

2 Noon 4 Night


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Enumerator: please fill all questions of section 0 before your interviewection 1:Genral information

Section 1: General information

1.01 How old are you? |___|___|98 Don’t Know

99 Refuse to Answer

1.02 What is your job?

1 Jobless 14 Carpentry 27 Lending Money

2 Farmer 15 Steelwork (Blacksmith) 28 Doctor

3 Butcher 16 Brick Maker 29 Health Worker / Nurse / Midwife

4 Livestock 17 Masonry# Principal / Teacher Manager /

Teacher5 Shepherding 18 Construction Labor

6 Taxi / Transportation 19 Casual Labor 31 Job with Government

7 Trading / Middleman 20 Welding# Job with Non-Government

Organization8 Sale of Firewood or Charcoal 21 Tinsmith

9 Collector and Seller of Bushes 22 Barber# Job with Company or Private

Sector10 Cross Border Trade 23 Baker

11 Shopkeeper 24 Tailor 34 Military Service / Police / Army

12 Milling 25 Needlecraft# Remittances from Family

Members Away from Home13 Mining 26 Carpet Weaving

# Write Verbatim

1.03 How many of your daily prayers do you usually perform in masajed? |___| # Refuse to

Answer



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Questions about sermon

2.01Suppose that a person wants to apply for driver license. However, he does not have the time to follow the application process. Do you think it is acceptable to use komissionkar for following up the application?

1 Yes 3 Cant Say

2 No

2.02 Now suppose that applying for national ID is a lengthy process and takes many days. Do you think it is acceptable to rely on friends or intermidiaries in order to speed up the process?

1 Yes 3 Cant Say

2 No

2.03 Suppose that a minister uses his authority to serve the people of his province more than other provinces. Do you think what he does is acceptable?

1 Yes 3 Cant Say

2 No

Reporting Corruption

2.04 We know that people are sometimes forced to pay a bribe – were you forced to pay a bribe over the past one year?

1 Yes 98 Don’t Know

2 No [>>2.09] 99 Refuse to Answer

2.05 How many times did you give bribe over the past one year?

|___|___| Times

99 Refuse to Answer


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2.06 How long ago were you forced to pay the most recent bribe?

|___|___| Months

2.07 To which organization were you forced to pay a bribe?

1 Police

2 Courts

3 Customs

4 Ministry of Finance or tax authorities

5 Ministry of Education or schools

6 Ministry of Higher Education or universities

7 Hospitals or health institutions

8 Municipality

9 Population Registration Office

10 Attorney General’s Office

11 Power Supply Authorities

12 ID cards & passport offices

13 Arbab of village or wakil-e-guzar of town

14 Employment and social affairs authorities

15 Martyrs and disabled services

16 Haj Authorities

17 Driver license and car registration authorities

# Other (Specify):

2.08 How much was the amount of the most recent bribe you had to pay?

|___|___|___|___|___|___|___| Afs

98 Don’t Know 99 Refuse to Answer



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Corruption and voting

Version A

Suppose that there are two incumbents rerunning for their seat in the Wolesi Jirga. Candidate 1 is from your qawm. People think that he is involved in corruption. He serves the people to a great extent. Candidate 2 is also from your qawm. People think that he is not involved in corruption. He serves the people less than the first candidate.

2.09 Which candidate would you trust? Candidate 1 or candidate 2?

1 Candidate 1 3 Neither

2 Candidate 2

2.10 Suppose that you can vote for either candiates. Which one of the two candidates I just described would you vote for (pick one)? Candidate 1 or candidate 2?

1 Candidate 1 3 Neither

2 Candidate 2

2.11 Which ethnic group do you belong to?

1 Pashtun 6 Nuristani 11 Parachai

2 Tajik 7 Baloch 12 Bayat

3 Uzbek 8 Arab 13 Kuchi

4 Hazara 9 Pashai

5 Turkmen 10 Sadat

# Other (Specify):


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APPENDIx IV: DARI INSTRUMENT FOR PRE-AND-POST EVALUATION

Appendix: Participants assessment questionnaire fight against corruption workshop

Period: before workshop after workshop (note select one of them)

Question 1: the word corruption is searched (note: you can select multiple answers)

1. Destroy 2. Counter Reformation 3.Null 4.None

Q.2. In the Islamic sharia corruption is: Public officials who deviate from the right direction (this ) in accordance with the provisions of Islamic law and its purposes, within the framework of the provision of public.

Is this definition is correct?

1. Yes 2.No 3.Dont know

Q.3. In which year the law against bribery and corruption in Afghanistan was adopted?

1.1380 2.1385 3. 1383 4.dont know

Q.4.In the Islam is the gift or sweets for employees of the government is permissible or not?

1. Yes its permissible 2.No its not permissible 3. 4. Don’t know

Q.5. In which year the United Nations issued the Declaration on the fight against corruption?

1.1970 2.1975 3.1985 4.Dont know

Q.6 what are the implications of the verses forbidding bribes?

Don’t know.3

Q.7 what is the legal punishment for bribery crimes committed?

1. Imprisonment from two to five years

2. Imprisonment of 1 to 10 years

3. Imprisonment from 2 to

4. Financial penalties of financial bribes

Q.8 in Hanafi jurisprudence is whether the judge who issued the bribe is accepted or not?

1. The judge who issued by bribery enforcement cannot be exported, either to the right or without right.

2. The judge verdict in the bribery case is just not enforced, but decisions are enforceable in the case didn’t bribery.

3. If the judgment verdict is issued as a result of bribes, according to the right, the decision does not invalidate.



60

Q.9 Criteria under which the intermediary (mediator) is considered a crime in Afghanistan law which is?

1. Who is mediator be civil servant

2. This action is it concubine, beg and beg to be

3. This practice deliberately do

Q.10 what is the difference between theft and embezzlement?

1. No different

2. Embezzlement, kidnapping of property of the person is openly and theft is secretly.

3. According to the law the embezzle is only in property and governmental authorities

4. Don’t know

Q.11. what are the types of embezzlement?

1. Stealing government property

2. Gain personal benefit from the government property and authorities

3. Abuse of employee for personal gain

Q.12 what is the penalty of grafter in Hanafi view?

1. Implementation of the theft

2. The penalty is imprisonment

3. Both of them

4. Don’t know

Q.13 Instances of abuse of duty what are the views of Afghanistan law?

1. Abuse against of persons

2. Abuse against of persons property and assets

3. Obstruct of law enforcement

Q.14 If hypocrisy is from ordinary people, it will follow in ordinary courts and If is from government official it will follow in Anticorruption courts

Do you agree with the statements or not?

1. Yes 2.NO 3.Dont know


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Q.15 Hazrat Omar Farooq from which way fought against corruption?

1. Beating

2. Registered assets of civil servant

3. Calculated with employee

4. Unlawfully Confiscation of property that was added in capital of their employees

Q.16 what was the appearance of corruption psychological factors?

1. Weak in faith

2. Lack of virtue

3. Greed

4. Other

Q.17 what would be the negative impact of corruption on the economy?

1. Avoid and the refusal of national and international business investment in Afghanistan

2. Loss of government revenues and its debts

3. Weakened of the administrative system.



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APPENDIx V: QUALITATIVE INTERVIEwS wITH CLERICS

Interview Date:

Respondent’s Name:

Respondent’s Phone Number:

Masjed Name:

Masjed District:

Control/Treatment Masjed:

1. Did you attend the two-day workshop organized by IWA in Kabul on the involvement of imams in anti-corruption campaign?

2. Have you attended any other workshop on corruption aside from IWA workshop?

3. Which organization organized this workshop? When? For how many days?

4. How useful do you think the IWA workshop was?

5. a) very useful b) useful c) little useful d) not useful

6. On a scale of 1 to 5, how informative did you find the workshop to be, with 1 being least useful and 5 being most useful?

7. Did the workshop change your views on how uluma can take part in the fight against corruption? If yes, how?

8. Did you receive a copy of the book and manual distributed during the workshop?

9. Since the workshop have you had time to read the book and manual? If yes, approximately how many pages have your read so far?

10. On a scale of 1 to 5, how useful did you find the book if 1 means least useful and 5 means very useful?

11. Which chapter(s) of the book or manual did you find useful and informative?

12. What do you think could be done to improve the book and manual used for the workshop?

13. Can you tell us what specific action(s) you took after attending the workshop in order to invite the people to fight against corruption?

14. Were you able to use any recommendations or parts of the book in your sermons or your engagement in anti-corruption efforts? If yes, what specific recommendations or parts of the book did you rely on?

15. Do you think the workshop was long enough or should have been held for more days?

16. If more days, how long should have been the workshop for?

17. What did you find to be most useful about the workshop?

18. Can you tell us in which ways the workshop could be improved? What suggestions do you have for improving the workshop?

19. What do you think should have been done to improve the training materials for the workshop?

20. On a scale of 1 to 5, how successful do you think uluma have been in the fight against corruption over the past years if 1 means least successful and 5 means very successful?

21. What has been the advantage of uluma in inviting the people to fight corruption?


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22. What has been the limitation of uluma in mobilizing the people to fight corruption?

23. What do you think should be done to further involve uluma in the fight against corruption?

24. More than 99% of Afghans are Muslims and Islam is against any form of corruption. In spite of that, Afghanistan has become one of the most corrupt countries in the world. What do you think has been the cause of widespread corruption in Afghanistan?

25. What do you think the government should have done to further engage uluma in the fight against corruption?

26. What do you think about relying on kommisionkar for obtaining public services? Do you think it is acceptable at all time, acceptable only if needed or unacceptable under any conditions?

27. What specific verse from Quran or narrative from the Prophet do you usually use in your sermons to encourage the people to avoid paying bribes for obtaining public services?

What specific verse from Quran or narrative from the Prophet do you usually state in your sermons to dissuade the people not to vote for corrupt politicians?

Kolola Poshta, Kabul, [email protected]

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