resisting cve: best practices from pilot cities · key lessons from boston 1) problem: frequent...
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Resisting CVE: Best Practices from Pilot Cities
Shannon Al-Wakeel, Muslim Justice LeagueLaboni Hoq, Asian Americans Advancing Justice | LAFaduma Warsame, Young Muslim Collective
MASA Organizing
Resisting CVE: Best Practices from Pilot CitiesLessons from Boston
Shannon Al-Wakeel, Muslim Justice League
CVE EXTENDS STRUCTURAL TARGETING
OF SUSPECT COMMUNITIES.• Pathologizes and criminalizes dissent and difference.
• Incentivizes members of target populations to police and inform on neighbors.
• Solicits information that may expand watch-listing and resultant coercion (e.g.
through Terrorist Screening Database, CARRP program, CBP interrogations, FBI
fishing expeditions, etc.).
• May expose increased numbers of vulnerable individuals to “pre-emptive”
prosecution. See, e.g. Mahin Khan case; Trevor Aaronson (2013). The Terror
Factory: Inside the FBI’s Manufactured War on Terrorism. Brooklyn: Ig Publishing.
Resources on the roots and popularity of “radicalization” discourse:
• Arun Kundnani (2012). Radicalization: The Journey of a Concept. Race & Class, 54(2), 3–
25.
• Amna Akbar (2013). Policing “Radicalization.” UC Irvine Law Review, 3, 809–883.
CVE DEPLOYMENT
IN BOSTON
● 2014 (one-year anniversary of Boston
Marathon bombing): Announcement of
DHS “local envoy” on CVE to be based on
Boston.
● Curation of “CVE Collaborative” by US
Attorney’s Office for Massachusetts
(USAO-MA, i.e., federal prosecutors), and
production of CVE Framework.
● 2015: USAO-MA taps Massachusetts
Executive Office of Health and Human
Services (EOHHS) as a conduit for CVE
grants to community groups and signs
Memorandum of Agreement.
RESISTANCE TACTICS
IN BOSTON
● 2014: Founding of Muslim Justice League.
● Education of Boston-area communities about
CVE, and raising of concerns with USAO of
MA (federal prosecutors). Inclusion of dissent
against CVE in CVE Framework.
● 2015: Press conference raising community
concerns about non-transparent development
of CVE programs.
● Launch of Resisting Surveillance series —
intersectional community fora on racial,
religious and political profiling, from
COINTELPRO to targeting of Movement for
Black Lives, etc. — to contextualize CVE.
● Discussions with EOHHS of concerns about
entangling health and social services with
CVE.
CVE DEPLOYMENT IN
BOSTON, CONT.
● 2016: Opening of Request for Input (RFI) on
CVE by EOHHS.
● Rebranding by USAO-MA and EOHHS of
CVE as “PEACE Project”: “Promoting
Engagement, Acceptance and Community
Empowerment,” and invitation for grant
applications.
● Three Boston-based recipients awarded
“PEACE Project” grant. 70% ($147,000 of
$210,000) awarded to two Somali-
community-serving non-profits.
● 2017: Separately from the PEACE Project
grant, Boston Police Department (BPD),
together with two Massachusetts non-profits,
is awarded DHS funds for a CVE program
targeting Somali youth — the Youth and
Police Initiative Plus”(YPIP) — in partnership
with the Police Foundation and two non-
profits.
RESISTANCE TACTICS
IN BOSTON, CONT.
● 2016: Submission of community concerns
to EOHHS through RFI process. Delivery of
petition by 1000+ Massachusetts residents
against EOHHS collaboration in CVE.
● Launch of Health Justice Team — health
care providers and health policy
professionals concerned about CVE and
surveillance.
● Education of community organizations that
“PEACE Project” is part of CVE campaign.
● 2017: Coalition letter reiterating concerns to
“PEACE Project” grantees, particularly in
light of Trump policies and appointments,
urging end to CVE involvement and
requesting further conversations.
● Testimony to Boston City Council re BPD’s
CVE collaboration targeting Somali youth.
KEY LESSONS FROM BOSTON
1) Problem: Frequent rebranding of CVE (“Building Community
Resilience,” “public health” themes, “PEACE Project,” etc.).
Recommendation: Be consistent in message and principles.
• Avoid being drawn into discussions that presuppose CVE is a
response to the “problem of radicalization.” (What is your alternative to
CVE?) Instead, contextualize CVE within ongoing structural targeting,
and raise community awareness of the roots of “radicalization”
discourse.
• Be clear that opposition to CVE not based on its name but instead on
its debunked premises that criminalize communities and the ways CVE
erodes privacy and chills freedoms.
• Be clear that the harms of CVE would be no less severe if it focused
on “all types of extremism” (as opposed to “Islamic extremism”).
KEY LESSONS FROM BOSTON
2) Problem: Uniform community rejection of CVE may be unrealistic at
this stage, particularly given financial incentives.
Recommendation: Prioritize informed communities and accountability.
• CVE, particularly as it operates through grants, exacerbates “Good
Muslim”/“Bad Muslim” dynamics — just as it has done in the UK.
• Some organizations will accept CVE funds regardless of how informed
of dangers. But education about CVE has assisted many others who
might have applied if not informed of those dangers.
• Once grants are sought and issued, communities must be empowered
to make informed choices about where to seek services.
• CVE cannot survive without acquiescence of some proportion of
targeted communities themselves. Communities hold the power to end
this criminalization campaign.
Shannon Al-Wakeel, Executive Director, MJL:
www.muslimjusticeleague.org
www.facebook.com/muslimjusticeleague
Twitter: @MuslimJustice
For more Information
Resisting CVE: Best Practices from Pilot CitiesLessons from Los Angeles
Laboni Hoq, Asian Americans Advancing Justice | LA
DEPLOYMENT OF CVE IN LA & COMMUNITY RESPONSE
● 2008: “Initial collaborative CVE efforts in greater Los Angeles began”
● September 2014: Announcement of CVE Pilot Programs in 3 cities: Boston, LA, MN
● November 2014: DHS Sec. Jeh Johnson Press Event launching CE at Mosque in LA
❖ Community Response: Civil Rights and Muslim Community Groups issue statement
oppposing CVE as “ill-conceived, ineffective and stigmatizing,” as reported in L.A,
Times
❖ Core community criticisms of CVE:
❑ CVE is based on debunked theories that there are reliable “behavioral
indicators” that can predict radicalization
❑ CVE’s focus on Muslim communities, and false premise that Muslims are more
prone to radicalization than other religious or ethnic groups
✓ White supremacists commit far more acts of extremism than do Muslims
❑ CVE chills free speech/association, stigmatizes Muslim communities, makes
community members less likely to engage with authorities to prevent crime
DEPLOYMENT OF CVE IN LA & COMMUNITY RESPONSEFebruary 2015: Three Day WH CVE Summit: LA Contingent Presents “LA Framework for CVE”
● Created in collaboration/consultation with DHS; FBI, USAO; various City of LA Departments: LAPD; L.A. County Sheriff, Mental Health and Social Services; and hand-picked Muslim community groups; civil rights groups never consulted
● “The Los Angeles Framework consists of three pillars: prevention, intervention, and interdiction. Each of the three components aims to meet community needs while mitigating a variety of risk factors…Both prevention and intervention are early mechanisms of risk mitigation, whereas interdiction is a mechanism for disrupting criminal threats.”
● Community Response: (February 2015 – December 2015)
● Certain Muslim community groups including CAIR-LA, Islamic Shura Council, MSA West officially reject CVE as harmful to Muslim communities
● These and other civil rights groups (Advancing Justice – LA, ACLU-SC) participate in community education against CVE; get support from national groups including Brennan Center
● Other Muslim community groups including MPAC at first seek to defend CVE, and then try to distinguish their efforts (e.g. Safe Spaces) from CVE after community backlash
DEPLOYMENT OF CVE IN LA & COMMUNITY RESPONSE
● December 2015: DHS Appropriations Act passed allocating $10 million to CVE efforts
❖ Community Response: Local CVE efforts continue w/o transparency; opposing groups unable to
respond
❑ “DHE-funded pilot evaluation in LA” ongoing, including creation of CVE “behavioral assessment
tool”
❑ LA Mayor sub-grant to MPAC to implement “Safe Spaces” in LA
● July 2016: DHS announces Fiscal Year 2016 CVE Grant program
❖ Community Response: LA Mayor convenes certain Muslim community groups to attend LA Mayor’s
Office meetings, CAIR-LA voices concerns with basic premise of CVE as stigmatizing Muslim
communities
● September 2016: LAPD’s Recognizing Extremist Network Early Warnings (“RENEW”) program
announced ; attempt to re-band CVE
❖ Community Response: None as unclear whether program has been implemented
DEPLOYMENT OF CVE IN LA & COMMUNITY RESPONSE
January 13, 2017: CVE Grants awards announced - LA groups:
● LA Mayor’s Office ($825,000): “Training and Engagement” and “Managing
Interventions”
● MPAC ($393,800): “Managing Interventions”
● Bayan Claremont - Islamic Graduate School ($800,000) (“Building Capacity”)
February 2017: Trump Administration reportedly changing CVE to “Countering Islamic
Extremism”
● Community Response: Community groups put private and public pressure to decline
funds
❑ Bayan Claremont: Publicly declined CVE grant
❑ MPAC: Holding onto CVE grant for now, but no money disbursed yet
❑ LA Mayor’s Office: Refused to decline funds
February 7, 2017: Community and Civil Rights Groups (AAAJ-LA, CAIR-LA, Vigilant Love
Coalition, NLG-LA, ACLU-SC) file Public Records Act Request to learn more about Mayor’s
CVE program, LAPD RENEW program, and City’s overall involvement in CVE efforts
❑ In response to the PRA, Mayor’s Office produced copies of its CVE grant
applications; but has yet to produce further documents
LA MAYOR’S OFFICE: PROPOSED CVE PROGRAM
Mayor’s CVE Grant Application: Builds on “LA Framework for
CVE” as “a critical case management and community outreach
component of an overall effective, coordinated, and
comprehensive citywide and regional CVE strategy.”
❖ Program heavily reliant on Community Organizations
who will be “critical in … increasing public referrals.”
❖ Sub-grants: “Organizations funded will include
MPAC, ILM Foundation, Not in Our Town, and Tiyya
Foundation”
● Program incorporates fundamental flaws of CVE:
❖ Mayor relies on “collaboration with … DHS-funded
Los Angeles research project on the development of
the behavioral assessment tool to support full
development and implementation of the [CVE
intervention referral] process.”
❖ Mayor endorses CVE as a law enforcement tool,
which makes it less likely that people will engage with
the program:
❖ Mayor claims to incorporate “protocols to protect
confidentiality and civil rights,” but provides no
specifics about what those are or how they will be
implemented.
NEXT STEPS IN LOS ANGELES: ANTI-CVE ORDINANCE
● Proposed LA City Council Ordinance Rejecting City’s Involvement in CVE Programs
❖ Impetus was City Council’s intention to Propose an “Anti-Muslim Registry”
ordinance
❖ Incorporates broader protections for Muslim communities, to address actual
as opposed to just theoretical targeting, profiling and stereotyping of the
community
❖ Using as an organizing tool to build a strong multi-racial and multi-faith
coalition in opposition to government policies that unfairly target and stigmatize
Muslim communities
● Ordinance prohibits City from “using its resources to create, implement, provide
information for, enforce or otherwise assist or support in any manner any government
program that targets the Muslim community, directly or indirectly, for heightened
scrutiny, including any program that:
(1) requires the registration, or creation of a database, of individuals on the basis of
religion, national origin or ethnicity;
(2) relies on the federal CVE program …
(3) involves participation in joint task forces or other joint operations in ways that
violate California law or City policies, or
(4) that entails surveillance and intelligence collection without adequate transparency
and oversight to guard against discrimination against Muslims and other targeted
communities.”
LESSONS LEARNED FROM LOS ANGELES
1. CVE Frameworks are couched in jargon that appear unobjectionable on their face, but
need to be unpacked and placed in context:
❖ Mayor’s program couched as a “public health,” but explicitly supports “combin[ing]
mental health professionals with law enforcement [] to address criminal threats”
❖ Need to educate community groups supportive of CVE to “look behind the curtain”
2. Continued engagement with community groups supportive of CVE can be worthwhile,
and can take many forms
❖ Assess whether critical, private dialogue may be more effective than public shaming
❖ Community groups may have complicated reasons for engaging in CVE
❖ Utilize changed external circumstances to change minds, e.g. Trump and “CVE to
CVI”
3. Engagement with state/local agencies to reject CVE should incorporate many different
pressure points:
❖ Issue Public Records Act Request/Demand Transparency
❖ Build diverse coalition in Opposition
❖ Draft ordinance/legislation with provisions that will resonate with other specific issues
affecting the community
❖ Link CVE with broader issues affecting community (e.g. registry and discriminatory
profiling), as well as issues affecting other communities, to help organize
communities around broader local social justice goals (e.g. sanctuary city or police
accountability)
Contact Laboni Hoq, Litigation Director,
Asian Americans Advancing Justice – Los
Angeles
Follow: www.advancinhjustice-la.org
www.facebook.com/AdvancingJusticeLA
Twitter: @AAAJ_LA17
QUESTIONS ABOUT RESISTANCE
TO CVE IN LA?
Resisting CVE: Best Practices from Pilot CitiesLessons from Minneapolis
Faduma Warsame, Young Muslim Collective
➢ In September 2014, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced CVE pilot programs in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis.
➢ In 2015 group of Somali-American were invited to the White House Summit on CVE.
➢ Creation of the Somali American Task Force by Andy Lugar
➢ Formation of the Young Muslim Collective and the #CMeNotCVE social media campaign
➢ The Minneapolis Framework lists five “community-identified root causes of radicalization:
1. disaffected youth2. a deepening disconnect
between youth and religious leaders
3. internal identity crises4. community isolation5. lack of opportunity
“There will be intervention teams in Minneapolis and St. Paul public schools. The schools are very willing. Professionals will be available who can help with difficult conversations to address kids who are exhibiting behaviors of concern.” (Luger, public meeting announcing attendance at White House CVE Summit, February, 2015)
Increased surveillance and marginalization of Muslims.
- In schools
- Places of worship
- Social services and agencies (Non-profits, etc)
- No fly list/ NSEERS
- Previous surveillance efforts in MPS/ST. Paul (SPD recreation club)
- Media representation (Star Tribune op-eds, "objective reporting", etc)
○ Battling recruitment in the land of 10,000 terrorists
- HBO show (portrayal of Somalis as terrorists)
○ The Recruitment -> Mogadishu, MN
Effect of CVE in Minneapolis
Key lessons and ways to resist from Minneapolis
1. Education
a. Brennan Center for Justice/CAIR tool-kit
2. Accountability
3. Advocacy
4. Community Forum/Town Hall
“In Minnesota, almost 50 Muslim organizations signed on to a statement urging law enforcement to "consider our grave concerns about the government's proposed [CVE] pilot program in Minnesota and discontinue this stigmatizing, divisive, and ineffective initiative.”
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Twitter: @YMC_MN
Facebook: www.facebook.com/YoungMuslimCollective
E-mail: [email protected]