INDEPENDENT REPORT

For Submission to

The Honorable Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, United States Department of State

In re:

REVIEW OF THE FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (“FTO”) STATUS

OF

THE PEOPLE’S MOJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN (“PMOI”) /

MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ (“MEK”)

PREFACE BY:

Professor Yonah Alexander, Ph.D.

CONTRIBUTORS:

Heideman Nudelman & Kalik, P.C. Richard D. Heideman, Esq., Senior Counsel

Noel J. Nudelman, Esq. Tracy Reichman Kalik, Esq.

Matthew S. Apfel, Esq.

Dr. Cheryl Benard

Gregg Rickman, Ph. D., Former Special Envoy of the Secretary of State to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism

AFTERWORD BY:

Richard D. Heideman, Esq., Senior Counsel Heideman Nudelman & Kalik, P.C.

November 19, 2010

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface by Professor Yonah Alexander, Ph.D. ………………………………...…......1

I. Overview: Political Context and Introduction to the People’s Mojahedin of Iran………………………………………………………………………………...7

1. Terrorism…………………………………………………………………..9

2. Human Rights Abuses…………………………………………………... 11

3. Iran’s Repression of Freedoms…………………………………………..14

4. Human Rights Abuses against Women…………………………….…….14

5. Nuclear Ambitions ………………………………………………………18

6. Proposed American Response to the Iranian Threat……………………..21

7. History and Background of the People’s Mojahedin of Iran ….………...22

8. Iranian Regime Disinformation …………………………………………24

II. Brief History of People’s Mojahedin of Iran Designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization ……………………………………………………………………..25

III. Current Realities and Changed Circumstances…………………………………..27

1. Foreign Organization…………………………………………………….28

2. Engages in Terrorist Activities…………………………………………..28

3. Capability and Intent……………………………………………………..34

4. Threaten United States Interests or United States Nationals…………….39

IV. Delisting of the People’s Mojahedin of Iran as a Foreign Terrorist Organization FTO will be in the National Security Interests of the United States……………..40

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………...45

Afterword by Richard D. Heideman, Esq. ………………………………………......47

Appendix……………………………………………………………………..............P1

1. Submission Letters and Credentials…..………………………………… P2

iii

2. Attachments ……………………………………………………………P18

A. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 09-1059, 2010 WL 2794301 (C.A.D.C. 2010)…………………………………………………………....P19

B. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A §1189(a)(1), as

amended Dec. 17, 2004…………………………………………………………….P32

C. In the Matter of the Review of the Designation of Mujahedin-e

Khalq Organization (MEK), and All Designated Aliases, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization Upon Petition Filed Pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 1,273-1,274 (Jan. 12, 2009)………………………P39

D. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Office of the Coordinator for

Counterterrorism, US Department of State, Oct. 8, 1997…………………………………………………………….P41

E. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Designations by the Secretary of

State, 1999 Report Index (Complied every 2 years), Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, Oct. 8, 1999…………………………………………………………….P42

F. 2001 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Office of the

Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, Oct. 5, 2001…………………………………………………………….P47

G. Patterns of Global Terrorism, Latin America Overview, Office of

the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, May 21, 2002…...………………………………………………P50

H. Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Daily Press Briefing, September 11,

2001: Attack on America State Department Daily Press Briefing (Oct. 05, 2001)...………………………………………………..P58

I. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Office of the Coordinator for

Counterterrorism, US Department of State, Aug. 6, 2010…………………………………………………………….P70

J. President Barack Obama, Remarks by President Barack Obama

Hradcany Square Prague, Czech Republic (Apr. 5, 2009)………………………………………................................P73

iv

K. President Barack Obama, Remarks by President Barack Obama to the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2010)…………………………………........................................P77

L. Background Note: Iran, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, US

Department of State, Jul. 23, 2010…………………………………………………………….P84

M. Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, State Sponsors of Terrorism,

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, Aug. 5, 2010…..................................................................P99

N. Agreement Between the Individuals of the People’s Mujahedin

Organization of Iran (PMOI) and Multi-National Forces-Iraq 2003...........................................................................................P104

O. News Release, Headquarters United States Central Command,

MEK Consolidating Under Coalition Control (May 10, 2003)…………………………………………………………P105

P. News Release, Headquarters United States Central Command,

Update on the Consolidation of the Mujahedin-E Khalq (MEK) (May 17, 2003)…..……………………………………………P106

Q. Major General Raymond T. Odierno, Transcript of

Videoteleconference from Baghdad (Jun. 18, 2003)…………………………………………………………..P107

R. Proclamation by the Commander, Multi-National Forces Iraq (July

2, 2004)………………………………………………………P117

S. Letter from MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Deputy Commanding General, to the People of Ashraf, Iraq (July 21, 2004)……………………………………………………….....P118

T. Letter from MG William H. Brandenburg, Commanding General,

to the People of Ashraf, Iraq (Oct. 7, 2005)…………………………………………………………..P119

U. Letter from MG John D. Gardner, Deputy Commanding General to

Secretary General Mme. Sedigheh Hosseini (Feb. 16, 2006)…………………………………………………………..P122

V. Lord Alton and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home

Department, Appeal No. PC/02/2006 (POAC, November 20, 2007)(Selections)………….………………………..…………P123

v

W. Maryam Rajavi’s Ten Point Platform for Future

Iran…………………………………………………………….P126

1

PREFACE By

Professor Yonah Alexander, Ph. D.

In light of the July 16, 2010 United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit case which remanded to your esteemed office the review of the Foreign

Terrorist Organization (“FTO”) status of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of

Iran(“PMOI”)1, which is also referred to as the Mujahadin-E Khalq (“MEK”) I would

like to take this opportunity to respectfully express my best professional views on this

matter with the request and hope that you will take the necessary steps to decertify and

revoke the PMOI’s status as a FTO both in light of current realities with regards to

changed circumstances which have materialized over the past nine years and in light of

the national security interests of the United States of America.

As you may know, I have been working as an academic on Iranian issues for more

than forty years, offering courses and seminars, conducting research, and publishing

extensively in the field, including the books “The United States and Iran” (University

Publications of America, 1980) and “The New Iranian Leadership: Ahmadinejad,

Terrorism, Nuclear Ambition and the Middle East” (Praeger, 2008). I have also had the

honor of serving as an academic advisor to the State Department, Department of Defense,

and other government agencies as well as to Congress. Most recently I published the

three-volume set “Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy” (Praeger, 2008).

Ambassador (Ret.) Michael A. Sheehan (who served as coordinator for counterterrorism

as the State Department, 1998 to 2000) pointed out in his “Foreword” to this book that “If

we are to fight terrorism effectively, we must engage in constant rigorous analysis – not

1 People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran is also referred to as the Mujahedin-e Khalq or MEK.

2

only of terrorist groups, but also of our own efforts to fight them.” It is in this spirit that I

bring to your attention the developing consensus in the academic community, open

intelligence sources, and political and legal opinions by some allies, that former

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s re-designation in 2009 of the PMOI as a FTO

should be vacated and reversed for at least two key reasons. First, it was and remains

contrary to the current realities given significant changed circumstances connected to this

matter. And second, it is in my opinion as well as others most knowledgeable in the field

and on the issues contrary to the national security interests of the United States of

America to maintain the PMOI’s FTO designation.

More specifically, under 8 U.S.C. §1189(6) (A) of the Immigration and Nationality

Act, if an organization has been designated as a FTO, the Secretary of State may remove

the organization from the FTO list if circumstances that were the basis for the designation

have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation or the national security of the

United States warrants a revocation. I emphasize the application of the term “or”

contained within the statute, as it would be sufficient for you, Madame Secretary, to

forthwith revoke the FTO designation if only one of the stated conditions existed as either

of said conditions will warrant the revocation of a FTO designation. Most notably, when

analyzing the PMOI, it is clear that both of these conditions exist so as to warrant

revocation.

Indeed, the changed circumstances merit the removal of the PMOI from the FTO list.

These include but are not limited to the following occurrences:

o PMOI repudiated violence, ceased all military operations, and voluntarily

surrendered its weapons and capabilities to conduct terrorist operations.

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These actions have been substantiated by U.S. intelligence and military

bodies.

o PMOI members at Camp Ashraf in Iraq have been designated as

“protected persons” under the Fourth Geneva Convention by Coalition

Forces rather than “prisoners of war” under the Third Geneva

Convention.

o The Court of Appeals of England in its May 27, 2008 ruling asserted that

the PMOI is not “concerned with terrorism” and that it neither has the

intention nor the capacity to resort to violence in the future. Moreover, the

Government of the United Kingdom draft order delisting PMOI as a

“terrorist” organization was approved by both houses of Parliament on

June 23, 2008 and came into effect on the following day.

o The European Community has delisted the PMOI as a terrorist

organization within the European Union framework.

o There is no known credible evidence that the PMOI/MEK has the intent,

capability, desire or plan to take or support any acts of terrorism.

Additionally, it is clear that the national security interests of the United States

warrants the revocation of the PMOI’s FTO status. Applicable factors and considerations

include but are not limited to the following interests:

o A stable and democratic Iran is in the interests of the United States.

o The PMOI is de facto the primary opposition group to the authoritarian

Iranian regime.

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o The PMOI is an existing organization, with members, followers, leaders,

thinkers, speakers and activists committed to democracy and a better

future for the Iranian people, knowledgeable about the dangers of the

current Iranian regime and committed to working with the United States

in pursuit of democracy and stability in the region.

o De-designation of the PMOI’s FTO status will enable it to overtly work

through peaceful methods towards the establishment of democracy in

Iran.

o The delisting of the PMOI would facilitate cooperation between the

PMOI and other Iranian dissidents and ideological supporters who are

currently prevented from being associated with a “terrorist” organization.

o The PMOI can play an important and significant role in advancing the

interests of the United States in the intellectual battle of ideas in which the

United States is deeply involved and committed in the Middle East and

elsewhere.

o The PMOI, without the “terrorist” stigma can communicate credible pro-

democratic messages and reform messages to Iranian youth who are

rightly concerned with the repressive, bleak and controversial future of

their country under the totalitarian control of President Ahmadinejad and

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

o On a broader level, by delisting the PMOI, the United States will directly

encourage other terrorist organizations on the FTO list to cease and desist

resorting to ideological, theological and political violence for the purpose

5

of achieving tactical and strategic goals in violation of law. Thus, the

cost-benefits calculation of this constructive approach of rehabilitation

will save potential American lives in the future and contribute

significantly to United States security interests globally.

o Conversely, failure to remove the PMOI from the FTO list will weaken

the credibility of a FTO designation by the United States of America and

therefore will adversely affect the foreign policy interests of the United

States.

In sum, in my opinion, what is critical to realize is that Iran’s regime through its

exportation and sponsorship of terrorism and repression of any form of democracy at

home is and continues to be a dangerous “wild card” opposed to the interests of the

United States and the international system. As such, the Iranian regime poses a serious

and undeniable threat not only to the Middle East and the United States but to the entire

human civilization. By delisting the PMOI, the United States will further enable the

strengthening of this pro democracy organization which is currently tainted and restricted

by the FTO designation. Doing so, I believe, will ultimately save American lives and

protect our interests regionally and globally.

It is with these constructive views in mind, that I urge you to consider the

following Independent Report which we believe provides a sober analytical overview of a

matter with significant policy implications to this nation and which indeed merits your

attention and inclusion in your analysis and pending decision in re the issue of

continuing, or delisting, the PMOI/MEK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

6

I urge, Madame Secretary, that you take all necessary steps to decertify the PMOI/MEK

as a FTO as being in the current national interest of the United States of America.

7

I. OVERVIEW: POLITICAL CONTEXT AND INTRODUCTION TO THE PEOPLE’S MOJAHEDIN OF IRAN

Over the past three decades, Iran has been ruled by an oppressive theocratic regime

which continues to have little to no respect for human dignity, individual and collective

rights or the most basic fundamental freedoms we as Americans and all freedom loving

people hold dear and sacrosanct. In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly

in September 2009, the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad decried not only

capitalism but also Liberalism, the intellectual underpinnings of free and open society.2

Iran is, by all accounts, the worst and most prolific sponsor of hate-filled terrorism in the

world. Iran’s support for terrorism knows no bounds. Since 1979 Iran has been listed,

and remains, a State Sponsor of Terrorism, having sponsored, committed and provided

material support for terrorist acts of violence, causing murder, maiming and mayhem

throughout the world and contrary to the national security interests of the United States

and our allies. Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism, and repression of those who cherish

freedom and democracy, has enabled and emboldened those who choose to justify

violence against innocent civilians under the ambiance of seeking some greater good,

higher calling and anticipated greater life or afterlife. Iran’s acts of terrorism, and

support for terrorists and terror organizations is legendary and dangerous. Iran’s

repression of her people denies their human rights and dangerously oppresses those who

cherish democracy or dare to speak up for different ideas. Iran’s selected leadership

supports an inner circle whose ideology permits and encourages attacks rather than

2 See Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Address before the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2009). “Liberalism and capitalism that have alienated human beings from heavenly and moral values will never bring happiness for humanity because they are the main source of all misfortune wars, poverty and deprivation.”

8

peaceful solutions. All reported attempts by the United States to thwart Iran’s horrible

words and horrid deeds have been rebuffed and have, by all accounts, failed to produce

any change in attitude, words or convictions. The President of Iran repeatedly uses

venom, hatred, threats and rhetoric designed to intimidate and put down all external and

internal forces which are contrary to his views for Iran’s future. The pro-democracy

movement in Iran, although growing, is hampered by the lack of an organization

supported by the United States and our allies, capable of advocating ideas and addressing

issues consistent with democracy, freedom and the national security interests of the

United States. Accordingly, Iran’s theocratic authoritarian regime is indeed considered

by most within the academic, private, and governmental sectors at home and abroad as

one of the most serious threats to global peace and security.

In 2008, Professor Yonah Alexander co-authored a book entitled “The New Iranian

Leadership: Ahmadinejad, Terrorism, Nuclear Ambition, and the Middle East.” What

Professor Alexander wrote in the Preface to that volume remains chillingly accurate

today: Iran’s government continues to be a “wild card” in the international system and

poses a serious threat to the entire human civilization. 3 The Iranian regime poses threats

through their sponsorship of international terrorism, their exportation of hate filled

diatribes and incitement against our ally Israel in the Middle East and democracy in

3 See YONAH ALEXANDER, THE NEW IRANIAN LEADERSHIP: AHMADINEJAD, TERRORISM, NUCLEAR AMBITION, AND THE MIDDLE EAST vii-viii (2008). “What is of grave concern to the world community are Iran’s roles in international terrorism and its development of weapons of mass destruction, particularly with the regime’s expanding nuclear program. These challenges have been intensified with the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005…Ahmadinejad’s apparent vision of his country becoming the dominant power in the region, capable of expanding its terrorist-sponsored activies in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories is only one of the latest examples of Iran’s nearly three decades-long record of the “wild card” in the international system. Perhaps the most disturbing dangers posed by contemporary Iran under Ahmadinejad are those relating to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people in the Middle East; the stability of the state system in the region; the movement toward democracy; and perhaps even the survival of civilization itself.”

9

general, their hostage taking of American citizens today as they did back in 1979, and

their aspirations at any cost for a catastrophically lethal and destructive nuclear weapon.

This danger is not a new concept to the American government. The following provides an

overview of Iran’s notorious threats to the United States.

1. Terrorism

Iran has the notorious label of being the most pernicious and most active state sponsor

of terrorism in the world; as earlier reports noted in detail, the most recent United States

Department of State Annual Country Report on Terrorism for 2009 notes, “Iran remained

the most active state sponsor of terrorism. Iran’s financial, material, and logistic support

for terrorist and militant groups throughout the Middle East and Central Asia had a direct

impact on international efforts to promote peace, threatened economic stability in the

Gulf and undermined the growth of democracy.”4 This support for Terrorism by the

Islamic Republic of Iran includes its providing material support for¸ inter alia, HAMAS,

Hezbollah, Palestine Islamic Jihad and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-

General Command.5

Moreover, the State Department has noted in its most recent Country Reports on

Terrorism that:

4 See Country Reports on Terrorism, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, Aug. 05, 2010 [hereinafter 2010 Country Report on Terrorism]. 5 See id. “Iran remained the principal supporter of groups that are implacably opposed to the Middle East Peace Process. The Qods Force, the external operations branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is the regime’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad. Iran provided weapons, training, and funding to HAMAS and other Palestinian terrorist groups, including Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support to Lebanese Hizballah and has trained thousands of Hizballah fighters at camps in Iran. Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has assisted Hizballah in rearming, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.”

10

• Iran’s Qods Force provided training to the Taliban in Afghanistan on

small unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect fire weapons and

Iran has arranged arms shipments to select Taliban members.6

• “Iranian authorities continued to provide lethal support, including

weapons, training, funding, and guidance, to Iraqi Shia militant groups

that targeted U.S. and Iraqi forces within Iraq. The Qods Force continued

to supply Iraqi militants with Iranian-produced advanced rockets, sniper

rifles, automatic weapons, and mortars that have killed Iraqi and Coalition

Forces, as well as civilians. Iran was responsible for the increased lethality

of some attacks on U.S. forces by providing militants with the capability

to assemble explosively formed penetrators that were designed to defeat

armoured vehicles. The Qods Force, in concert with Lebanese Hezbollah,

provided training outside of Iraq and advisors inside Iraq for Shia militants

in the construction and use of sophisticated improvised explosive device

technology and other advanced weaponry.”7

• “Iran remained unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qa’ida (AQ)

members it continued to detain, and refused to publicly identify those

senior members in its custody. Iran has repeatedly resisted numerous calls

to transfer custody of its AQ detainees to their countries of origin or third

countries for trial; it is reportedly holding Usama bin Ladin’s family

members under house arrest.”8

6 See 2010 Country Report on Terrorism, supra note 4. 7 See 2010 Country Report on Terrorism, supra note 4. 8 See 2010 Country Report on Terrorism, supra note 4.

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• “Senior IRGC, IRGC Qods Force, and Iranian government officials were

indicted by the Government of Argentina for their alleged roles in the

1994 terrorist bombing of the Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association

(AMIA); according to the Argentine State Prosecutor’s report, the attack

was initially proposed by the Qods Force. In 2007, INTERPOL issued a

“red notice” for six individuals wanted in connection to the bombing. One

of the individuals, Ahmad Vahidi, was named as Iran’s Defense Minister

in August 2009.”9

Given the above, it is clear that Iran poses a significant ongoing political and real threat

not only to the United States but to American interests in the wider Middle East,

including our commitment to assisting in reconstruction efforts within Iraq and

Afghanistan.

2. Human Rights Abuses

Iran and its authoritarian regime pose one of the greatest threats to human rights

around the world.10 The US State Department described the situation in Iran in its

Country Reports on Human Rights 2009 report on Iran as follows:

• The government severely limited citizens' right to peacefully change their

government through free and fair elections.11

• The government executed numerous persons for criminal convictions as juveniles

and after unfair trials.12

9 See 2010 Country Report on Terrorism, supra note 4. 10 Most recently on September 29, 2010, an Executive Order was signed by President Obama imposing sanctions on Iranian officials responsible for or complicit in human rights violations. 11 See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Iran, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, Mar. 11, 2010 [hereinafter 2010 Human Rights Country Report].

12

• Security forces were implicated in custodial deaths and the killings of election

protesters and committed other acts of politically motivated violence, including

torture, beatings, and rape.13

• The government administered severe officially sanctioned punishments, including

death by stoning, amputation, and flogging.14

• Vigilante groups with ties to the government committed acts of violence.

• Prison conditions remained poor.15

• Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained individuals, often holding them

incommunicado.16

• Authorities held political prisoners and intensified a crackdown against women's

rights reformers, ethnic minority rights activists, student activists, and religious

minorities.17

• There is a lack of judicial independence and of fair public trials.18

• The government severely restricted the right to privacy and civil liberties,

including freedoms of speech and the press, assembly, association, and

movement; it placed severe restrictions on freedom of religion.

Iran’s treatment of women, ethnic and religious minorities, journalists, student

protesters, nearly anyone opposing its totalitarian rule, is simply beyond the pale of

12 See id. 13 See 2010 Human Rights Country Report, supra note 11. 14 See 2010 Human Rights Country Report, supra note 11. 15 See 2010 Human Rights Country Report, supra note 11. 16 See 2010 Human Rights Country Report, supra note 11. 17 See 2010 Human Rights Country Report, supra note 11. 18 See 2010 Human Rights Country Report, supra note 11.

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civilized behavior. Many opposing the regime are accused of “waging war against God,”

a crime in Iran punishable by death. Iran’s abuses are crimes against humanity.

Iran’s abuses extend to the provision of military and economic aid to the terrorist

forces of Hamas, Hezbollah and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Hamas,

Hezbollah and other organizations have waged war against Israel through the use of

suicide bombers, capturing soldiers, attacks on buses, restaurants, religious events and

other murderous terrorist actions. These Iran-sponsored acts of terrorism have

precipitated war upon Israeli, American and other civilians living, studying in or visiting

Israel, through their terror and offensive military actions against Israel, her people and

society. The Iranian regime through its support for terrorist groups has also caused more

harm to the Palestinian people. Iranian acts of terrorism have also targeted Americans

such as the attack on the Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983, which US District

Judge Royce Lamberth has determined to be an act of despicable Iranian terrorism.19

Iran’s denial of Israel’s right to exist, demonstrated by President Ahmadinejad’s incessant

calls for Israel to be “wiped off the map,” are considered by some experts to be

incitement to genocide.20

19 See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F.Supp.2d 46 at 64-65 (D.D.C. 2003) (“No order from this Court will restore any of the 241 lives that were stolen on October 23, 1983. Nor is this Court able to heal the pain that has become a permanent part of the lives of their mothers and fathers, their spouses and siblings, and their sons and daughters. But the Court can take steps that will punish [Iran and those Hezbollah terrorists]who carried out this unspeakable attack, and in so doing, try to achieve some small measure of justice for its survivors, and for the family members of the Americans who never came home.”). 20 Irwin Cotler, State-Sanctioned Incitement to Genocide in Ahmadinejad’s Iran: The Responsibility to Prevent GPN GENOCIDE YEAR IN REVIEW 2009, http://beta.genocidepreventionnow.org/Portals/0/docs/Cotler-GPN-YEAR-REV2009.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2010).

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3. Iran’s Repression of Freedoms

Iran’s repression of the freedom of the Iranian people extends also to Iran’s

hateful acts and diatribe against all forms of opposition, including the PMOI. As will be

further presented infra, Ayatollah Khomeini despised the PMOI and its call for

democratic change in Iran; beginning in 1980, the Khomeini regime branded the PMOI as

the largest threat to Iran’s authoritarian government and instituted a Reign of Terror

against the group.21 During 1980 and 1981 the atrocities against PMOI members and

sympathizers hit new horrific levels when an average of 50 to 100 people a day were

executed by the Iranian regime.22 Since that period, over 120,000 dissidents have been

murdered by Khomeini’s government with the majority being PMOI/MEK.23

4. Human Rights Abuses Against Women

The fate of women in Iran is deplorable. Women are officially discriminated against,

subjected to arbitrary arrest and jailing, denied equal treatment in employment, marriage,

in legal proceedings, and in general life are treated as second-class citizens. This

treatment flies in the face of international agreements and international covenants on

human rights, a number of which Iran is a party to, and some of which Iran has refused to

ratify.

As proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 48/104 of December 20, 1993, the

Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women declares that “States should

21 See The Reign of Terror, Iran: Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/irtoc.html. 22 See id. 23 See Nader Shakiba, Profile of Iran’s Master Terrorist: Mohammed-Reza Iravani (a.k.a. Amir-Hossein Taghavi), IranFocus, May 28, 2005. “No one knows exactly knows how many prisoners were sent to firing squads in the summer and autumn of 1998, but the killings left a deep scar on the national psyche of Iranians…In the words of Professor Maurice Copithorne, the last UN Special Rapporteur for Iran, the massacre constituted ‘one of the darkest chapters in the history of the Islamic Republic’”; see also Ervand Abrahamian, Yale University Press, The Iranian Mojahedin, 257, 1989.

15

condemn violence against women and should not invoke any custom, tradition or

religious consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its elimination. States

should pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating

violence against women…”24

According to Article 3 of the resolution:

Women are entitled to the equal enjoyment and protection of all human rights and

fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any

other field. These rights include, inter alia:

( a ) The right to life;

( b ) The right to equality;

( c ) The right to liberty and security of person;

( d ) The right to equal protection under the law;

( e ) The right to be free from all forms of discrimination;

( f ) The right to the highest standard attainable of physical and mental health;

( g ) The right to just and favorable conditions of work;

( h ) The right not to be subjected to torture, or other cruel, inhuman or

degrading treatment or punishment.25

These principles are also enshrined in numerous other international covenants and

agreements including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted December 10,

1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted December 16,

1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted

24 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess, Supp. No. 49, at 217, UN Doc. A/48/49/(1993). 25 See id. at Art. 3.

16

December 16, 1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

against Women (adopted December 18, 1979 but Iran has not ratified) and the

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment (December 10, 1984 which Iran has not ratified). It is important to note the

failure of Iran to ratify the latter two conventions, signaling further their disregard for

human rights in general and the inalienable rights of women specifically.

Moreover, on April 24, 2008, the European Parliament passed a resolution

condemning Iran for its treatment of women.26 In this and other international agreements

and covenants, Iran has shown itself to be implacably against the female citizens of its

own nation.

In the European resolution, the fate of Iranian women is detailed showing that more

than a hundred women were arrested, interrogated or sentenced in Iran between 2006 and

2008 alone. During that time, the Iranian government has raised over EUR 1 million in

bail for them. Newspapers, magazines and broadcasters promoting women's rights have

been closed down, including the most prominent magazine advocating women's rights,

Zanan, which existed for over 17 years before being closed down on 28 January 2008.27

Moreover, during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's five-year tenure as the regime's

president, 1,860 people have been executed, among them 42 women, with 261 cases

reportedly carried out in public. Additionally, seven have been stoned to death, among

them women.28

26 European Parliament resolution on women's rights in Iran, 24 April 2008, P6_TA(2008)0185, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/483ac2dc2.html. 27 Id. 28 Soona Samsami, Iranian Women Stand Against Misogynist Ahmadinejad, Huffington Post (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/soona-samsami/iranian-women-stand-again_b_735971.html.

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Women in Iran face strict dress codes, are forbidden to be seen in “revealing”

clothing, and in Spring 2010 were threatened by the capital’s police chief with arrest if

found with a suntan. Iranian clerics have even suggested that women in such situations

have been the cause of earthquakes.29

In summer 2010, Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, a 43 year-old mother of two, was

convicted in May 2006 of having an “illicit relationship” with two men and received 99

lashes as part of her sentence on September 2, 2010 after the London Times ran a picture

of an unveiled woman mistakenly identified as her on August 28, 2010, her lawyer said at

the time. Despite already having been punished, she has now been further convicted of

“adultery” and she and sentenced to death by stoning. Her stoning sentence was

suspended in July 2010, but on September 28, 2010 she was convicted of murdering her

husband and was sentenced to death and “According to the court’s ruling, she is

convicted of murder and her death sentence has priority over her punishment (for

committing adultery),” announced National Prosecutor General Gholam-Hossein in a

Tehran press conference.30 It is unclear what legal safeguards she was given in this

aspect of the trial. After appearing on TV in August 2010 where she "confessed" to

involvement in the murder of her husband, Mohammadi Ashtiani's government-appointed

lawyer Houtan Kian told the Guardian newspaper that she had been tortured for two days

before accepting the interview. She has been denied visits by her family and her lawyer

since then and has not been given permission to call anyone.

29Women with Suntans Will Be Arrested, Iran Police Chief Warns, FOX NEWS, Apr. 28, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/04/28/women-suntans-arrested-iran-police-chief-warns/. 30 Sakineh Ashtiani is Sentenced to Death: Prosecutor, TEHRAN TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010, http://www.tehrantimes.com/Index_view.asp?code=227505.

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Iran’s regime is oppressive against all democracy advocates, including women’s

organizations and all women leaders who are activists in pursuit of a better future for the

people of Iran. The PMOI, headed by a woman, is triply repressed: as a pro-democracy

movement, as an organization headed openly by a woman leader and as an organization

labeled a terrorist organization by the United States.

5. Nuclear Ambitions

It would be improper to chronicle in such a short space the path of broken promises

concerning Iran’s nuclear program that Iran under the leadership of Ahmadinejad has

taken. Nonetheless, it is apparently clear that Iran has been on a secretive quest for

nuclear weapons despite its claims that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.

• August 2002- the National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI)31—of which

the PMOI is the principal member—revealed that unbeknownst to the IAEA,

Iran clandestinely constructed two nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak.

• Fall 2002- IAEA investigated Iran’s nuclear activities at Nantanz and Arak

and investigators visited the two sites the following February.

• September 2003- IAEA board adopts its first resolution concerning Iran’s

nuclear activities which called on Tehran to increase its cooperation with the

agency and suspend uranium enrichment activities.

• October 2003- Iran signs additional protocol to its 1974 IAEA safeguards

agreement to comply fully with the IAEA’s investigation.

31 The NCRI includes five organizations which as a group aims at promoting democratic regime change in Iran and the creation of an interim government in the country. See Introduction to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, NCRI, at http://ncr-iran.org/content/view/6046/. More specifically, the NCRI, “pledges to uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all international covenants on human rights” and “believes in the separation of Church and State.” See Introduction to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, NCRI, at http://ncr-iran.org/content/view/6046/.

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• Late 2003- IAEA concludes that based on its investigation and information

received from Iran after the October 2003 agreement that Iran had violated

Iran’s safeguard agreement by engaging in certain clandestine nuclear-related

activities. These activities included plutonium separation experiments,

uranium enrichment and conversion experiments, and importing various

uranium compounds.

• August 2005- Iran resumes uranium conversion despite its signing of a

suspension agreement in 2004.

• January 2006- Iran announces its resumption of its development on its

centrifuges at Natanz. The IAEA board adopts a resolution in response to

Iran’s activities referring the matter to the UN Security Council. Iran

subsequently announces it would stop implementing its additional protocol.

• August 2009- After three years of diplomatic overtures and Security Council

measures, ElBaradei of the IAEA reports to the Security Council and the

IAEA board that Tehran continues to defy its international obligations by

continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor

program. Iran subsequently refuses to suspend its enrichment program.

• As of June 2010, Iran has continued its enrichment activities, now at nearly

20%, according to the IAEA, and had not agreed to a nuclear fuel swap deal.

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• The PMOI have continued to uncover additional nuclear facilities within Iran

which have been clandestinely constructed by the Iranian regime; the PMOI in

September 2010 disclosed a facility northwest of Tehran.32

• The accuracy of the PMOI information about the Iranian regime nuclear

program has been confirmed by an independent expert. Frank Pabian, a senior

adviser on nuclear nonproliferation at Los Alamos National Laboratory in

New Mexico who has said “they’re right 90 percent of the time,” adding “that

doesn’t mean they’re perfect, but 90 percent is a pretty good record.”33

As is apparent, despite United Nations sanctions and diplomatic outreaches to Iran, the

Ahmadinejad regime continues on a rogue path towards nuclear armament.

As such, President Obama has made clear that “Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile

activity poses a real threat, not just to the United States, but to Iran's neighbors and our

allies.”34Moreover, in recent remarks, President Obama recently highlighted this fact in

front of the United Nations’ General Assembly when he stated, “Iran is the only party to

the NPT that cannot demonstrate the peaceful intentions of its nuclear program, and those

actions have consequences.”35 It is obvious that Iran as a nuclear power would destabilize

not only the Middle East but would completely destroy President Obama’s efforts

towards a policy of international nuclear disarmament. Moreover, Iran threatens and

32 Greg Miller, Dissident Group says Iran has Secret Nuclear Facility, Washington Post, Sept. 9, 2010, at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/checkpoint-washington/2010/09/dissident_group_says_iran_has.html. “A spokeswoman for the Iranian group, Soona Samsami, said the new compound was 85 percent complete and could prove to be “far more important than the Qom site,” a facility that Iran worked on in secret for years before it was exposed by the Obama administration in 2009.” 33 William J. Broad, Iran Shielding Its Nuclear Efforts in Maze of Tunnels, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 05, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/06/world/middleeast/06sanctions.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all 34 President Barack Obama, Remarks by President Barack Obama Hradcany Square Prague, Czech Republic (Apr. 5, 2009). 35 President Barack Obama, Remarks by President Barack Obama to the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2010).

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represses those, such as the PMOI and its members, who seek to disclose the truth of

Iran’s nuclear ambitions and inherent threat to world and regional safety, security,

stability and peace.

6. Proposed American Response to the Iranian Threat

Western governments for many years have pursued a policy of reconciliation and

even appeasement, hoping the Iranian regime would change its behaviour. As recent

history has sadly shown, the Iranian regime under the Ayatollahs, lower clerics and

Ahmadinajad will not change as a result of reconciliation or appeasement. The evidence

of this is clear; when given an outreached hand, Iran will merely slap it away. Prior and

subsequent to harsher economic sanctions, reconciliation has done and did little to stop

Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program, supporting terrorist groups in the region

including Hezbollah in Lebanon and HAMAS in Gaza in a bid to prevent a lasting peace.

Iran also continues to meddle in Iraq and sees instability in Afghanistan as beneficial to

its hegemonic interests in the region.

Given the above, as previously indicated, the American government must further

implement a new comprehensive approach towards Iran. An integral part of such a

comprehensive approach should further address not only economic sanctions of the

Iranian regime, but also on encouraging indigenous political change with a focus on

supporting, enabling, legitimizing and encouraging pro-democracy movement in Iran,

including the PMOI as the main legitimate Iranian opposition.36

36 See House Majority Announces Call for Firm Washington Policy on Tehran, Removal of Mojahedin Resistance from State Department Terrorist List; 220 Members Sign “Statement on Iran’s Deeds,” Press Release, Congress of the United States, Sept. 16, 1998. See also H.R. Res. 1431, 111th Cong. (2010) (House of Representatives Resolution cosponsored by over 100 members of Congress calling for delisting of the PMOI).

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7. History and Background of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran

As previously indicated, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (“PMOI”) is an

Iranian political organization and member of the National Council of Resistance of Iran.

Founded in 1965 by three anti-fundamentalist university graduates who opposed the

Shah’s cruel and repressive regime, the PMOI offered a modern, democratic

interpretation of Islam37 which embraced democracy and the rights of all Iranians. A

figure of great importance within the PMOI’s history is Massoud Rajavi who was one of

the original members of the PMOI and one of the PMOI members who reinvigorated the

party after the Iranian Shah persecuted the movement. A telling passage from Le Monde

which reported on the veto of Rajavi’s candidacy for Presidency in January 1980 by

Ayatollah Khomeini notes:

“According to diverse estimates, had Imam Khomeini not vetoed his candidacy in the presidential election last January, Mr Rajavi would have gotten several million votes. He was, moreover, assured of the support of the religious and ethnic minorities – whose rights to equality and autonomy he defended – and a good part of the female vote, who seek emancipation, and the young, who totally reject the reactionary clergy…”

This ideology of inclusiveness and tolerance alienated the PMOI movement not only

from the Shah but from Islamic fundamentalist theocracy which was established in 1979;

Since the founding of the Islamic Republic of Iran, tens of thousands of PMOI members

and supporters have been brutally and in violation of international law executed by the

Iranian regime, including 30,000 political prisoners who were executed in a few months

between the summer and autumn of 1988, following a fatwa issued against the PMOI by

Ayatollah Khomeini. The fatwa read in part: 37 See Islamic Republican Party, Iran: Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/irtoc.html

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“As the treacherous Monafeqin [PMOI] do not believe in Islam and what they say is out of deception and hypocrisy,… it is decreed that those who are in prisons throughout the country and remain steadfast in their support for the Monafeqin, are waging war on God and are condemned to execution… It is naive to show mercy to those who wage war on God. The decisive way in which Islam treats the enemies of God is among the unquestionable tenets of the Islamic state. I hope that with your revolutionary rage and vengeance toward the enemies of Islam, you would achieve the satisfaction of Almighty God. Those who are making the decisions must not hesitate, nor show any doubt or be concerned with details. They must try to be 'most ferocious against infidels’.”38

Having been denied its most fundamental rights and having come under extensive attack,

the PMOI apparently concluded that it had no choice but to act, as a last resort and on the

basis of the inalienable right of its members and supporters, recognized in the Preamble

to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which declares: “[w]hereas it is essential,

if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against

tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.”39

These actions did not target innocent civilians and throughout the PMOI’s history of

resistance operations when they did exist, were according to all publicly accessible

credible sources, limited exclusively to Iranian governmental and related targets as an

outgrowth of actions in self-defense.40 Moreover, the PMOI/MEK steadfastly asserts that

they have never targeted or killed Americans.41

38 Ayatollah Khomeini’s Decree Ordering the Execution of Prisoners 1988, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY LIBRARY, http://www.iranrights.org/english/document-106.php (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 39 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 40 At no time were civilians targeted by the PMOI/MEK during armed resistance. See Eric Avebury, Fatal Writ: An Account of Murders and Cover-Ups, British Committee of Iran Freedom, 2000. 41 See Iran: Foreign Policy Challenges and Choices (Any Americans who were killed by alleged acts of the MEK were actually killed by a separate splinter group espousing a Marxist belief system which had no affiliation to the PMOI/MEK); see also Letter to Chairman Lee Hamilton, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, from Janet Mullins, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, US Department of State, April 2, 1992. (The US State Department has even recognized this fact noting: “[i]t is true that some of the assassinations were carried out by avowedly Marxist members of the organization, who…split from the ‘Muslim’ wing…”).

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Today, the PMOI’s ideology continues to be based on a democratic and tolerant

interpretation of Islam, according to which elections and public suffrage are the sole

indicators of political legitimacy. The PMOI believes that the human right of freedom is

the hallmark and guarantor of genuine social progress.42 In short, the PMOI believes and

works to achieve a pluralistic system which would represent the Iranian society as a

whole. The PMOI advocates free election, gender equality, abolition of all discrimination

against national and religious minorities.43 These positions are all directly contrary to

Iranian government policies and practices.

Given this history and political context, a brief introduction to the PMOI as a

designated terrorist organization in the United States is set forth below so as to more

effectively outline the inconsistencies behind and inherent errors in Secretary Rice’s

decision to redesignate the PMOI as a FTO.

8. Iranian Regime Disinformation

Another important factor in the political and factual context of reviewing the case of

the PMOI is the sources of the information about the organisation. There is little doubt

that in most if not all cases the Iranian regime is the original source of information about

allegations against the PMOI accusing it of terrorist activities.

The Iranian regime efforts in this regard is known to most experts. It is accordingly

natural to be skeptical about any current allegations against the PMOI which is a main

opposition to the Iranian regime. The Iranian regime is well known for spreading lies,

42 See MARYAM RAJAVI’S TEN POINT PLATFORM FOR FUTURE IRAN (included in Appendix), (Maryam Rajavi, former Secretary General of the PMOI and current President-elect of the NCRI states within her “Ten Point Platform for Future Iran” that “[the PMOI] want a pluralist system, freedom of parties and assembly. In Iran of tomorrow, we will respect all individual freedoms. Expression of opinion, speech and the media are completely free and any censorship or inquisition is banned.”) 43 See id.

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denying history, evoking conspiracy theories and sponsoring terrorism against those who

stand against their views. A most recent example of spreading continuous lies is the

speech by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at the UN General Assembly in September this year

where he claimed that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were a conspiracy by the US

government.44 The PMOI has been the target of such propaganda for many years.

The Iranian government is reportedly sending large amounts of money to circulate

false information on PMOI in a bid to maintain the organization on the FTO list. It was

recently revealed that in a failed attempt to get one expert to accuse the PMOI of

terrorism, money was offered. The Canadian daily Toronto Star revealed “ John

Thompson, who heads up the Mackenzie Institute, a security minded think-tank, says

China isn't alone in trying to gain influence. Thompson, who is often called on by media

outlets to offer up analysis, says he was offered $80,000 by a man tied to Iran’s mission

in Canada. “They wanted me to publish a piece on the Mujahedin-e khalq," he said. "Iran

is trying to get other countries to label it as a terrorist cult.” Thompson says he turned

down the offer.”45

II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE'S MOJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN DESIGNATION AS A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

The PMOI was designated as a FTO in 1997 and was subsequently redesignated in

1999, 2001 and 2003. The original PMOI designation has been acknowledged to have

44 See Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Address Before the 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2010). 45 Brian Lilley, Activists Say Spy Chief is Right, TORONTO SUN, July 5, 2010, http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2010/07/05/14616126.html.

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been a political move designed at the time to send a “goodwill gesture”46 to Tehran.

Martin Indyk, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs at the time of the

PMOI designation, in an interview by Newsweek disclosed that “…[There] was White

House interest in opening up a dialogue with the Iranian government. At the time,

President Khatami had recently been elected and was seen as a moderate. Top

administration officials saw cracking down on the [PMOI], which the Iranians had made

clear they saw as menace, as one way to do so.” 47

In July 2008, the PMOI filed a petition with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for

revocation of its 2003 Redesignation. Despite a record replete with evidence, information

and materials outlining factors which weighed heavily towards the delisting of the PMOI,

after reviewing the record, Secretary Rice denied the PMOI’s petition and published its

denial in the Federal Register on January 12, 2009.48

The PMOI filed a petition for review on February 11, 2009 with the United States

Court of Appeals of the DC Circuit. On July 16, 2010, the Court held that Secretary Rice

had violated the PMOI’s due process rights as she failed to provide required notice and

unclassified material to the PMOI in advance of her decision and as such did not provide

the PMOI with the opportunity to review and rebut such portions of the record.49

Additionally, given the changed circumstances of the PMOI, current realities and the

vital security interests of the United States as elucidated below, it is clear that upon

46 Norman Kempster, U.S. Designates 30 Groups as Terrorists, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997, http://articles.latimes.com/1997/oct/09/news/mn-40874. 47 Michael Isikoff, Ashcroft's Baghdad Connection - Why the attorney general and others in Washington have backed a terror group with ties to Iraq, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26, 2002. 48 In the Matter of the Review of the Designation of Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK), and All Designated Aliases, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization Upon Petition Filed Pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 1,273-1,274 (Jan. 12, 2009). 49 See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 09-1059, 2010 WL 2794301 (C.A.D.C. 2010).

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Reconsideration, the PMOI should be delisted from the FTO list as their designation

cannot be based on any sound logical or legal principles inherent in due process and

pursuant to the proper application of the rule of law.

III. CURRENT REALITIES AND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

As previously indicated, if an organization has been designated as a FTO, the

Secretary of State may remove the organization from the FTO list if circumstances are

sufficiently different from those that existed at the time of the designation. When viewing

the PMOI in an accurate light today, it is clear that numerous developments have arisen

since 2003 which merit, and in fact mandate, the removal of the PMOI from the FTO list

based on changed circumstances alone. These changes in circumstances demonstrate that

the PMOI does not meet the legal requisites for designation under the statutory

guidelines, and accordingly removal from the FTO list is appropriate and the requested

relief should be forthwith granted by the Secretary upon review of the applicable

standards, facts, circumstances, current realities and national security interests of the

Untied States.

Under 8 U.S.C. §1189(a) (1) the statutory guidelines require that to be designated as

a FTO three criteria must be met:

• the organization in question must be foreign;

• the organization in question must either

o engage in terrorist activities or

o retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or

terrorism; and

• the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization in question either

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o threatens the security of United States nationals or

o the national security of the United States.50

Particularly when analyzing the PMOI today, the facts are clear that while the

PMOI is a foreign organization it does not engage in terrorist activity. Nor does it have

the capability or the intent to act as a terrorist group. Finally it does not threaten the

national security of the United States nor does it threaten nationals of the United States of

America. Therefore, based on the current realities and changed circumstances presented

infra, the PMOI’s FTO designation is unwarranted, improper and should be decertified

without undue delay.

1. Foreign Organization

The PMOI was founded in Iran and moved to Paris, France and subsequently, having

been forced out of France51, to Camp Ashraf in Iraq where they have the status of

“protected persons” under the Fourth Geneva Convention.52 There is no question that the

PMOI is a foreign organization. Moreover, the PMOI does not meet the other two

statutory factors of 8 U.S.C. §1189(a) (1) (B) and (C) warranting a FTO designation.

2. Engages in Terrorist Activities

At an Extraordinary Congress held in June 2001, the PMOI took the unilateral

decision to end the organization’s military activities inside Iran. The decision was

ratified by two Ordinary Congresses in early September 2001 and 2003. Accordingly, in

2001, the PMOI ceased its military operations and committed itself to a policy of

50 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A §1189(a)(1), as amended Dec. 17, 2004. 51 See Concept of Neither East Nor West, Iran: Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/irtoc.html. 52 See Proclamation by the Commander, Multi-National Forces- Iraq, on the signing of the “Agreement for the individuals of the People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran (MEK)” at Ashraf, Iraq, (Jul. 2, 2004); Letter from Geoffrey D. Miller, Major General, US Army, to People of Ashraf, Jul. 21, 2003.

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peacefully pushing for regime change in Iran. Since this time, The PMOI's operational

units in Iran were dissolved voluntarily although the organization’s structure and loyalties

to its principles, ideals and commitment to a free and democratic Iran remain intact as an

opposition force to the repressive government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As previously indicated supra, the PMOI is currently headquartered at Camp Ashraf

in Iraq. As part of the Agreement between the Individuals of the People’s Mujahedin

Organization of Iran (PMOI) and U.S. led Multi-National Forces-Iraq concluded at Camp

Ashraf (“Agreement”), in 2003, the PMOI surrendered all arms in its possession within

Camp Ashraf and 2) formally renounced violence and terrorism. This Agreement is

significant because not only do 3,400 members of the PMOI reside at Camp Ashraf, but

more importantly, the entirety of the PMOI’s leadership including its Secretary General

and Leadership Council is based there. The above mentioned Agreement that each

member of the PMOI and its leadership signed specifically reads:

a) I reject participation in, or support for terrorism; b) I have delivered all military equipment and weapons under my control or responsibility; c) I reject violence and I will not unlawfully take up arms or engage in any hostile act. I will obey the laws of Iraq and relevant United Nations mandates while residing in this country. (emphasis added) 53

The Agreement which was signed by each member of the PMOI at Camp Ashraf and by

the entirety of the PMOI’s leadership states clearly that, “[i]f I violate any terms of this

Agreement, I may be subject to prosecution or internment, and administrative sanctions. I

promise to scrupulously comply with this Agreement.”54

53 Agreement between the Individuals of the People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) and Multi-National Forces-Iraq 2003. (emphasis added). 54 Id.

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This disarmament of the PMOI was substantiated by U.S. intelligence and military

officials. Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno—the officer who negotiated the

agreement with the PMOI— noted during a videoteleconference from Baghdad that,

“[w]e continue to conduct stability and support operations to provide for the long-term

stability of Iraq. A critical step in this process was orchestrating the peaceful

disarmament of then People’s Mujahideen of Iran, MEK, which resulted in the

consolidation of the PMOI’s equipment and personnel, consisting of approximately 5,000

personnel and over 2,000 pieces of military equipment.”55 When General Odierno was

asked about the PMOI’s disarmament, Odierno replied, “[The PMOI] have been

completely disarmed. We have taken all small arms and all heavy equipment. They had

about 10,000 small arms, and they had about 2,200 pieces of equipment, to include about

300 tanks, about 250 armored personnel carriers and about 250 artillery pieces. And we

disarmed all of that equipment from them about 30 days ago.”56

General Ordierno subsequently clarified that the 2003 disarmament of the PMOI

and the PMOI’s renunciation of violent means to further their goals was “not a surrender;

it [was] an agreement to disarm and consolidate.”57 Notably, Ordierno remarked in 2004

that the PMOI’s actions in renouncing violence and disarming “should lead to a review of

whether they [sic] are still a terrorist organization or not.”58

Secondly, in 2004 PMOI members at Camp Ashraf in Iraq were designated as

“protected persons” under the Fourth Geneva Convention by Coalition Forces rather than

55 Major General Raymond T. Odierno, Transcript of Videoteleconference from Baghdad (Jun. 18, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2757). 56 Id. 57 James Morrison, Iranian Complaints, Washington Times, May 4, 2004. 58 Id.

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“prisoners of war” under the Third Geneva Convention. This distinction is crucial to

understand when analyzing the capability and intent of the PMOI as a FTO. The Fourth

Geneva Convention protects only innocents and specifically precludes from its coverage

hostile individuals or those suspected of hostile activities.59 Specifically, the Fourth

Geneva Convention declares in Article 5:

Where in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied that an individual protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the present Convention as would, if exercised in the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such State.60

In contrast, the Third Geneva Convention applies to prisoners of war and not innocent

civilians. As set forth above, the US military authorities within the Coalition did not

consider the PMOI armed militants or terrorists which would preclude the applicability of

the Fourth Geneva Convention. Although the Summary of the April 24, 2009

Administrative Record pertaining to the PMOI notes that “[p]rotected persons status

applies only to individuals, not groups…”61, it is important to note that the entire

leadership of the PMOI and every single PMOI member at Camp Ashraf was designated

as a Protected Person and as such, if the vast majority of the PMOI including its

leadership was so designated, than it is only logical to conclude from such designation

that the organization, and the individual members thereof, must not be deemed as

59 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War, Aug. 12, 1948, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75. N.T.S. 287, art V. 60 See id. 61 See Summary of the April 24, 2009 Administrative Record for Review of the Designation of the MEK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (redacted version), US Department of State.

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terrorists by the United States as they would not be entitled to protection as protected

persons..

Prior to determining that the PMOI members at Camp Ashraf would be

considered noncombatants and thus protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention, FBI

and CIA agents conducted an investigation into the individuals within Camp Ashraf.62

This investigation into all of those 3,700 PMOI members located at Camp Ashraf lasted

approximately sixteen months.63 Every single resident was interviewed.64 As was

apparently concluded, no PMOI member at Camp Ashraf was a militant or had the

capability or intent to carry out militant or terrorist activity. It is therefore illogical that

the PMOI is considered to be a FTO when the CIA and FBI have investigated its

members and have formulated and adopted a completely contrary conclusion.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit after

reviewing the Administrative Record on which the Secretary of State had based her

decision, the Court suggested that various sources that the Secretary had relied upon were

dubious:

“[s]ome of the reports included in the Secretary’s analysis on their face express reservations about the accuracy of the information contained therein. See, e.g. Suppl. Admin. R., MEK-11 (describing “possible plans to attack [the] international zone in Baghdad” but conceding that “the ultimate sources of the information was [sic] unknown and as such, their access, veracity, and motivations were unknown.” Similarly, while including reports about the Karbala suicide attack plot described above, the Secretary did not indicate whether she accepted or discredited the reports and we do not know whether the PMOI can rebut the reports.”65

62 See Douglas Jehl, People’s Mujahedin: US Sees No Basis to Prosecute Iranian Opposition “Terror” Group Being Held in Iraq, New York Times, Jul. 27, 2004. 63 See id. 64 See Jehl, supra note 62. 65 See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 09-1059, 2010 WL 2794301 at 8 (C.A.D.C. 2010).

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These questionable contentions within the administrative record and lack of concrete

evidence for such assertions are further evidence that there is no sound basis that the

PMOI has engaged in any military or violent activity let alone terrorist activity since

2001.

Moreover, within the Summary of the 2003 Administrative Record, it is noted that

that French authorities raided several sites and arrested approximately 160 members of

the PMOI on June 17, 2003 in Paris. The Administrative Record notes specifically that,

“French authorities believed that the MEK was using the sites as organizational,

logistical, and operational bases for financing and conducting terrorist activities.”66 It

should be noted that this “belief” was unfounded and those who were arrested were

quickly released and none of those arrested who were under investigation have been

prosecuted by French authorities for any violation of law. It is even more probative to

note that a French appeals court eased restrictions on the PMOI allowing members to

meet, communicate and travel outside of France.67 It should also be noted that apparently

this 2003 incident in France, which turned out to be baseless, did not preclude the EU

from delisting the PMOI in 2009 as a terrorist organization. Indeed, the Court of First

Instance of the European Communities (currently the name has changed to General Court

of the European Union) in its judgment of 4 December 2004 rejected the French

investigation as a serious and credible basis for including the PMOI on terrorism list. The

annulled decision of the European Union was based on that investigation. But the Court

concluded that “[i]t must also be noted that nothing in the file makes it possible to

66Summary of the 2003 Administrative Record for Redesignation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (redacted version), US Department of State at 5. 67 French Court Eases Restrictions on Iranian Nationals, REUTERS, Jun 17, 2006.

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establish that the judicial inquiry opened in France in April 2001, even assuming that it is

attributable to a ‘judicial authority’, which is denied by the applicant, is based, in the

assessment of that authority, on serious and credible evidence or ‘clues’, as prescribed by

Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931.” 68

Given, inter alia, the PMOI’s renunciation of violence and its disarmament, the

PMOI clearly does not engage in terrorist activity nor does it have the capability or the

intent to do so. These factors are also highly probative of determining intent and

capability, and demonstrate the PMOI’s lack of intent and capability to engage in terrorist

activity or terrorism.

3. Capability and Intent

Not only does the PMOI not engage in terrorist activity, but when analyzing the

PMOI today, it is clear that the organization lacks the intent and capability to engage in

terrorist activity or terrorism. In arriving at this conclusion, the factors of capability and

intent will be first examined and analyzed. These factors will then be applied to and

analyzed vis-à-vis the PMOI.

Part of the statutory analysis of whether an organization qualifies as an FTO—in

other words whether an organization poses a ‘threat’ as a terrorist entity— incorporates

what many policy, academic and security professionals term a “threat analysis.”69

According to a GAO report on combating terrorism, it is noted that, “[a] threat analysis,

the first step in determining risk, identifies and evaluates each threat on the basis of

68 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008A0284:EN:HTML 69 See generally Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A §1189(a)(1)(B), as amended Dec. 17, 2004.

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various factors, such as its capability and intent to attack an asset…”70 As such

capability and intent are two indicators which, when viewed in concert together, provide

indicators as to the actual threat an organization poses to a specific target.71 Stated in a

slightly different way, “[t]hreat is composed of two distinct elements: intent and

capability. These elements must exist within a terrorist organization or movement for

them to pose a legitimate risk.”72

Intent has been defined as the “purpose [or] will to perform an act”.73 In order to

address whether the PMOI or any designated entity has the requisite intent to engage in

terrorism, the definition of terrorism must first be elucidated. The statute concerning the

listing of FTOs, 8 U.S.C. §1189(a)(1)(B) incorporates the definition of ‘terrorism’ as

codified in 22 U.S.C. §2656f(d)(2). 22 U.S.C. §2656f(d)(2) defines ‘terrorism’ as

“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by

subnational groups or clandestine agents.”74 A key term is ‘violence’; without violence

there can be no terrorism under the statutory definition. Therefore, when addressing

intent to commit terrorism, one must look to whether an organization has the intent to

commit violence.

Capability on the other hand can be defined as “activities that sustain and allow

terrorists to conduct a series of successful attacks.”75 Key to the capability factor is

70 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-98-74, COMBATING TERRORISM THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENTS CAN HELP PRIORITIZE AND TARGET PROGRAM INVESTMENTS (1998). 71 Shawn Cupp and Michael G. Spight, A Homeland Security Model for Assessing US Domestic Threats, http://kucampus.kaplan.edu/documentstore/docs09/pdf/picj/vol2/issue1/A_Homeland_Security_Model_for_Assessing_US_Domestic_Threats.pdf [hereinafter Assessing Domestic Threats]. 72 Id. 73 Assessing Domestic Threats, supra note 71. 74 Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, 22 U.S.C. §2656f(d)(2) (emphasis added). 75 Assessing Domestic Threats, supra note 71.

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activity. Specifically, activity which facilitates successful attacks.76 When assessing

capability, one must consider specific instances or the lack thereof where an organization

is enabled to conduct violent activity motivated by political objectives.

Taking the above into account, it is clear that the PMOI has neither the intent nor

the capability to conduct terrorist operations because first, the PMOI has eschewed

violence since at least 2003—thus negating intent—and second, has disarmed and

voluntarily dissolved its operational units within Iran– thus negating capability.

Moreover, the reasons in support of the British delisting of the PMOI specifically

addressed the factors of the PMOI’s intent and capability as a terrorist organization and

although not binding on the Secretary’s analysis, is nevertheless relevant and highly

persuasive with regards to these factors.

The Court of Appeals of England and Wales in its May 7, 2008 ruling asserted

that the PMOI is not “concerned with terrorism” and that it neither has the intention nor

the capacity to resort to violence in the future.77 Moreover, the Government of the United

Kingdom draft order delisting PMOI as a “terrorist” organization was approved by both

houses of Parliament on June 23, 2008 and came into effect on the following day.78 In the

same regard the European community has delisted the PMOI as a terrorist organization

within the European Union framework. These two “delistings” by the United Kingdom

and the European Union are probative of whether the PMOI retains the capability and the

intent to engage in terrorist activity.

76 Assessing Domestic Threats, supra note 71. 77 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Lord Alton of Liverpool and Others (Application for Permission to Appeal from the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission and In the Matter of the People’s Mojahadeen Organisation of Iran), EWCA Civ. 443, Case No: 2007/9516 (Court of Appeal, May 7, 2008). 78 See UK Announcement of PMOI Deproscription (June 23, 2008).

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In the process of delisting the PMOI in the UK—the Proscribed Organisations

Appeal Commission one of the primary adjudicatory bodies in the delisting process–

noted that:

We have to examine all the material that was or could reasonably have been available to the Secretary of State in order to consider whether the PMOI was or could honestly have been believed by him to be concerned in terrorism79. We have subjected all the material to the intense scrutiny which we have indicated we believe to be the appropriate standard for our appraisal….In our view, intense scrutiny of the material requires the conclusions that: With the possible exception of a single questioned incident in May 2002, the PMOI has not engaged in terrorist acts in Iran or elsewhere since August 2001. Even if the PMOI had a military command structure at some point within Iran, the material demonstrates that such structure had ceased to exist by (at the latest) the end of 2002…In May 2003, the PMOI was disarmed. There is no material which indicates that the PMOI has obtained or sought to obtain arms or otherwise reconstruct any military capability despite their capacity to do so after May 2003. Further there is no material to suggest that the PMOI has sought to recruit or train members for military or terrorist action.80 (Emphasis added)

The Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission further noted that:

In short, there is no evidence that the PMOI has at any time since 2003 sought to re-create any form of structure that was capable of carrying out or supporting terrorist acts. There is no evidence of any attempt to “prepare” for terrorism. There is no evidence of any encouragement to others to commit acts of terrorism. Nor is there any material that affords any grounds for a belief that the PMOI was “otherwise concerned in terrorism” at the time of the decision in September 2006. In relation to the period after May 2003, this properly cannot be described as “mere inactivity” as suggested by the Secretary of State in his Decision Letter. The material showed that the entire military apparatus no longer existed whether in Iraq, Iran or elsewhere and there had been no attempt by the PMOI to re-establish it.81 (Emphasis added).

Coupled with the PMOI’s renunciation of violence and its disarmament, these portions of

the Commission’s record are clear that the PMOI does not have the intent nor the

capability today to engage in terrorism. There is no justifiable basis for the United States

79 The term “concerned in terrorism” is most similar to intent and capability factors analyzed by the Secretary of State in determining/analyzing applicability of FTO status. 80 Lord Alton and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Appeal No. PC/02/2006 (POAC, November 20, 2007) at ¶¶ 347-348.6 81 Id. at ¶348.6.

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to maintain the PMOI as a listed FTO, particularly in light of the clear, convincing and

relevant findings of both the UK Parliament and the EU. Moreover, given the fact that

the PMOI does not engage in terrorist activity in the United States or elsewhere as

defined under applicable US law, nor does it maintain either the capability or the intent to

engage in terrorist activity, it should be forthwith delisted by the Secretary.82

Notably, the delisting of the PMOI/MEK would be fully consistent with previous

determinations by the Secretary of State to delist other FTOs in 1999 and 2001:

• In 1999, the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents (FRMR/D) and the

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) were delisted

according to the State Department “primarily because of the absence of

terrorist activity, as defined by relevant law, by those groups during the past

two years.”83 The Khmer Rouge was dropped because it “no longer existed

as a viable terrorist organization”84

• In 2001, the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary

Movement (MRTA) were also delisted by the Secretary of State. According

to the State Department the Japanese Red Army was delisted because of “the

lack of continuing terrorist activity by the Japanese Red Army…[The State

Department] didn't have information that fits that criteria of acts over the last

82Dr. Cheryl Benard, a leading policy analyst and former Senior Analyst with RAND who has worked on issues related to Iranian political groups since the 1980s, notes regarding the PMOI/MEK that, “[i]t was then, and is now, my view – which is shared by a significant portion of the analytic community - that while they are an eccentric…organization, it is no longer accurate to classify them as a terrorist group. They officially forswore violence in 2001 and there is no concrete evidence that this was a false claim. Conversely, there may be reasons to regard them as potential contributors to bringing about a less radical, less regionally dangerous regime in Iran. See Letter from Dr. Cheryl Benard to Hon. Hillary Clinton (Sept. 30, 2010). 83 Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Designations by the Secretary of State, 1999 Report Index (Complied every 2 years), Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, Oct. 8, 1999. 84 Id.

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two years [ending in 2001].” Surprisingly, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary

Movement was delisted in 2001 apparently because of the fact that the group

did not commit terrorist attacks during the two year period of review ending

in 2001 despite the fact that the State Department confirmed in a 2002 report

that, “The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, although active

politically, was not known to have committed any terrorist acts in 2001.”85

Although there is no longer a two-year requirement for a review, the fact that the PMOI,

like the groups listed supra, have not carried out terrorist attacks is a relevant and

probative standard, consistent with due process and fundamental fairness, and therefore it

should be delisted. Moreover, even if the PMOI is considered to be politically active, this

should not be a barrier to delistment given the history of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary

Movement’s FTO delisting in 2001 and subsequent State Department remarks as

presented above.

4. Threaten United States Interests or United States Nationals

Based on these changed circumstances outlines supra, the PMOI threatens neither the

security of United States nationals nor the national security of the United States itself. By

having renounced violence and having disarmed, the PMOI has made clear that it has

neither the capability nor the intent to, and does not threaten the security of United States

nationals or the US itself. This oath of renouncing violence has been an iron clad promise

and subsequent to 2003, no acts of violence have been attributed to the PMOI.

Even if the PMOI had retained the capability or the intent to carry out attacks against

Iran, there is no credible evidence that the PMOI has ever targeted civilians or United 85 Patterns of Global Terrorism, Latin America Overview, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, May 21, 2002. (emphasis added).

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States nationals. It is important to note that in the past three decades not a single

American has been killed as a result of any terrorist activity attributed to or as a result of

a PMOI operation. Simply put, the PMOI threatens neither the United States, the national

security interests of the United States nor United States nationals- key tests for listing

(and delisting) FTOs.

With regards to being contrary to United States interests, the PMOI appears to be one

of the important building blocks for a better and more democratic and free future for Iran,

as well as overall US policy concerning Iran, and therefore it is in the interests of the

United States to delist the PMOI as a FTO, as more fully set forth herein.

IV. DELISTING OF THE PEOPLE'S MOJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN AS A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATOIN WILL BE IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

As presented supra, the Secretary of State has the discretion to remove an

organization from the FTO list if the national security of the United States warrants a

revocation. It is clear that the national security interests of the United States warrants the

revocation of the PMOI’s FTO status.

As a primary matter, a stable and democratic Iran is in the interests of the United

States. As presented supra, the Iranian regime under its present government controlled by

the Ayatollahs and President Ahmadinejad remains the paramount state sponsor of

terrorism in the world today. It is the regime itself that is one of the major reasons why

the Middle East sits on a powder keg. As the primary opposition group to the

authoritarian Iranian regime, de-designation of the PMOI will enable it to work through

peaceful methods towards the establishment of democracy in Iran.

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In this regard, the delisting of the PMOI would facilitate cooperation between the

PMOI and other Iranian dissidents who are currently prevented from being associated

with a “terrorist” organization. The legal implications of a FTO designation are severe.

Among the restrictions are:

• “It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the

jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide “material support

or resources” to a designated FTO.”86

• “Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens,

are inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances, removable from the

United States.”87

• “Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession

of or control over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an

interest must retain possession of or control over the funds and report the

funds to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of

the Treasury.”88

Consequently, the above mentioned restrictions/legal prohibitions severely curtail the

PMOI from seeking new members to join in their fight for a democratic Iran and further

severely limit its funding options and range of operations.

Should this FTO stigma be removed and the PMOI is invited as worthy participant —

in the eyes of the United States’ government— in the discourse of ideas concerning the

Iranian opposition movement, such a new role for the PMOI will be particularly

86 Foreign Terrorist Designations: Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, Sept. 1, 2010 [hereinafter FTO Fact Sheet]. 87 Id. 88 FTO Fact Sheet, supra note 86.

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important in the intellectual battle of ideas in which the United States is deeply involved

with in the Middle East and elsewhere. The PMOI, without the “terrorist” stigma can

communicate credible pro-democratic messages and reform messages to Iranian youth

who are mostly concerned with the future of their country under the totalitarian control of

Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Secondly, at a broader level, by delisting the PMOI, the United States will directly

encourage other terrorist organizations on the FTO list to cease and desist in resorting to

ideological, theological and political violence for the purpose of achieving tactical and

strategic goals in violation of law. Thus, the cost-benefits calculation of this constructive

approach of rehabilitation will save potential American lives in the future and contribute

significantly to United States security interests globally.

Stated in a slightly different way, the delisting the PMOI from the FTO list would

further the most significant aims behind the maintenance of a FTO list in the first place;

the symbolism of “calling attention to terrorist groups as objects worthy of opprobrium,

putting the United States formally on record as opposing their terrorist activities [and]

making it clear that the United States is closely monitoring and assessing those

activities…”89 Accordingly, if the PMOI is not delisted, the symbolism of the proverbial

‘stick’ underlying the FTO list is greatly diminished as is the proverbial ‘carrot’ of

actually being delisted. The FTO list should not be diluted or diminished through inaction

or inappropriate continuation of an ill advised and inaccurate FTO designation.

Moreover, as Paul Pillar, a noted terrorism scholar and author of Terrorism and U.S.

Foreign Policy writes, “[part] of the problem is that the designation of FTOs is a large,

89 PAUL R. PILLAR, TERRORISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 154 (2001).

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cumbersome process that is slow to respond to the changes in the gallery of international

terrorist groups…The slowness stems in large part from a further basic difficulty of

designating [or redesignating] FTOs: that it turns into a legal issue what should be more a

matter of politics, diplomacy, and intelligence.”90 By failing to delist the PMOI this

actually proves the sentiment enunciated above which is a dangerous path to take. We

should rather be taking the opposite position that the logic and clarity that the law brings

is important to designating, redesignating and/or delisting FTOs and by delisting the

PMOI this position will be furthered, advanced and strengthened

Thirdly, the PMOI has been instrumental in the intelligence gathering within Iran and

in providing information to the US government and as such acts to counter Iran’s nuclear

ambitions. In the past, the PMOI has exposed Iran's uranium enrichment facility at

Natanz and a heavy water facility at Arak. Moreover, the NCRI based on information

gathered by the PMOI exposed two suspected nuclear facilities in Lavizan.

Lastly, failure to remove the PMOI from the FTO list will weaken the credibility of a

FTO designation by the United States of America and therefore, will adversely affect the

foreign policy interests of the United States. The legislative history behind the ADEPA

which established the FTO list and the designation system behind the FTO list are replete

with concern that the FTO list would be politicized and organizations would be

designated based on the prevailing ideology of the times. Congressman Bobby Scott of

Virginia is quoted in the Congressional Record as saying:

[W]e find ourselves on the anniversary of the Oklahoma bombing with a bill with the title `antiterrorism.' Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the conference report because it will do little, if anything, to reduce terrorism, while at the same time it will, in fact, terrorize our Constitution.

90 Id. at 154.

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Mr. Speaker, we have a situation where the Secretary of State and Attorney General can designate terrorist organizations. In effect, politicians can designate which organizations are popular and which are not popular. The ANC in South Africa could be designated as a terrorist organization, and support of that organization would be in violation of the law. Politicians can choose which side in El Salvador we ought to be supporting or not supporting by designating one or the other as terrorist.91

This view is also shared by Paul R. Pillar who writes that “political and diplomatic

considerations [can be injected] into decisions on designating FTOs…” 92 Pillar uses as

an illustration of this practice the decision not to designate the Irish Republican Army

noting that “[t]he IRA certainly qualified for designation under the terms of the statute,

and it presented a more significant threat to U.S. interests as defined in the law than did

many of the groups that were designated…” Pillar rightfully warns that “[e]ach such

political exception…diminishes the credibility and value of the FTO list itself.”

Accordingly, we should send a clear message to the world that we take the FTO list

seriously as an objective list based on current realities and not as a subjective list dictated

by political trends and accordingly the US Department of State should forthwith remove

the PMOI from the FTO list given the changed circumstances as elucidated above.

91 104 CONG. REC. H3610-H3611 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1996) (statement by Rep. Scott). 92 PILLAR, supra note 89 at 153.

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CONCLUSION

Given the analyses presented within this independent report, it is our strong belief

that the PMOI’s FTO status should be revoked given the changed circumstances

involving the PMOI and in light of the national security interests of the United States of

America.

It is readily apparent that the PMOI repudiated violence, ceased all military

operations, and voluntarily surrendered its weapons rendering itself physically unable to

act as a terrorist entity. Moreover, PMOI members at Camp Ashraf in Iraq have been

designated as “protected persons” under the Fourth Geneva Convention by Coalition

Forces rather than “prisoners of war” under the Third Geneva Convention. These two

factors coupled with the fact that the UK and the EU have delisted the PMOI as a

terrorist organization present more than a sufficient basis for their removal from the FTO

list based on a change of circumstances analysis.

Moreover, it is clear that the national security interests of the United States

warrants the revocation of the PMOI’s FTO status. These interests include the support of

the primary opposition to the tyrannical Iranian regime in Tehran with the aim of a

change of regime to a democratic centered government, the encouragement of other

terrorist organizations on the FTO list to cease and desist in resorting to ideological,

theological and political violence for the purpose of achieving tactical and strategic goals

in violation of law and security interests. Moreover, the integrity of the FTO list itself is

at stake should the PMOI remain on the FTO list.

Accordingly, upon re-examination of the continued designation of the People’s

Mojahedin Organization of Iran as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, it is respectfully

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recommended, consistent with this Independent Report, that the Honorable Hilary

Clinton, Secretary of State, United States Department of State, revoke said designation.

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AFTERWORD By

Richard D. Heideman, Esq.

I believe it is essential for the United States of America to set the standard for the

world based upon respect for individual freedom, human rights, democracy, and the right

of people to assemble and exercise their inalienable rights to free speech. Inherent within

those concepts is the long standing commitment of the United States to support

“dissidents” in places where democracy is trampled upon—voices that speak out loudly,

clearly and strongly against the ills of their society and in a favor of a better day.

The people who are members of the PMOI/MEK and the culture of the

organization itself, appears built on a platform of seeking a better day, speaking out

against the ills of their society and standing up for equality, democracy and freedom. The

members of the PMOI/MEK and the organization itself have been oppressed, murdered

and victimized by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet in spite of those dastardly attacks,

they have survived as an organization committed to some of the very goals for which

America itself stands.

I believe it is in the interests of the United States of America to stand up loudly,

clearly and forcefully against the words and deeds of President Ahmadinejad of Iran who

takes pride in his denial of history and his boisterous pronouncement that he will lead his

country to greater goals at the cost of freedom, democracy, and human rights.

I believe it would be wrong for the United States to refuse to delist the

PMOI/MEK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization as today, they clearly do not meet the

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criteria for being listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. In reality, they are an ally of

the United States of America and our pursuit of a better day for the people of Iran.

Accordingly, in the spirit of the very freedoms, liberties and commitment to

democracy which you so strongly represent as America’s voice abroad, I implore you to

immediately determine that the PMOI/MEK shall be forthwith decertified and delisted as

a Foreign Terrorist Organization so that they may enjoy the opportunity to truly make a

difference for their people and their country.