revista econòmica de catalunya nº 64: knowledge economy and territory

3 Int roduct ion

5 Dossier ‘Knowledge Economy and Territory’

7 ForewordSÒNIA RECASENS

9 22@: 10 years of economic t ransformat ionORIOL MOLAS AND MARTÍ PARELLADA

18 The ‘Barcelona, Cit y of Knowledge’ project and 22@ BarcelonaJOAN TRULLÉN

27 The impact of 22@ on urban development and real est at e: Barcelona’s future cent ral business dist r ict

SARA MUR AND JOAQUIM CLUSA

50 The economic impact of infrast ruct ures in 22@RAMON SAGARRA RIUS

62 Theory and development of clustersALESSANDRA CHEVALLARD AND EMILIÀ DUCH

The 22@ Barcelona model: a city organized into clustersMONTSE CHARLE

66 Science and technology parks as global business plat formsRICARD GARRIGA, RAÚL SÁNCHEZ AND FRANCESC SOLÉ PARELLADA

76 22@ Barcelona and the management of innovat ive and ent repreneur ial t alentFRANCISCO J. GRANADOS

85 A conversat ional capital (KCv) perspect ive of 22@ BarcelonaJOAN MUNDET, MICHELE GIROTTO, JORDI GARCIA BRUSTENGA AND XAVIER GÓNGORA

96 Open innovat ion in the public sector : t he case of urban labsESTEVE ALMIRALL AND HENRY CHESBROUGH

22@Urban Lab, the example of BarcelonaANNA MAJÓ

106 22@ Barcelona: export ing the modelAURORA LÓPEZ, ANDREU ROMANÍ, RAMON SAGARRA AND JOSEP MIQUEL PIQUÉ

117 The t r iple helix at t he science and technology parks of CataloniaM. CARMEN ADÁN AND JOAN BELLAVISTA

126 Creat ive cit ies: a new paradigm for local agendas? MONTSERRAT PAREJA-EASTAWAY

137 How can governments create clusters of innovat ion? The case of 22@BarcelonaITXASO DEL PALACIO AND JEROME ENGEL

146 Smar t t er r it or iesALFONSO VEGARA

154 Do wor ld cit ies need knowledge dist r ict s? Observat ions on 22@Barcelona and it s counterpar t s

GREG CLARK

175 22@ Barcelona: a knowledge cit y beyond science parksHENRY ETZKOWITZ AND JOSEP MIQUEL PIQUÉ

No. 64

Catalan version published in:October 2011

English version published in:July 2014

Catalan version co-funded by ERDF

Eu r op ean Un ion

European Regional Development Fund

Invest ing in your future

3 Revista Econòmica de Catalunya

This issue of Revista Econòmica de Catalunya turns its

attention to analysing the links that form between the

knowledge economy and the territory. If we had to focus

on the best international experiences in this area, we

would all agree that 22@ Barcelona has known how to

combine urban transformation with economic and social

transformation. Therefore, coinciding with the 10th

anniversary of the project, we have invited various authors

to help us understand, from their own point of view, the

complexity of the discourse surrounding this binomial

that is transforming cities around the world.

Coordinated by Josep Miquel Piqué and Mònica

Flores, this dossier analyses the economic foundations of

22@ (Joan Trullén) as well as the economic impact of busi-

ness activity (Oriol Molas and Martí Parellada). We also

wanted to include the economic impact of urban transfor-

mation, at the hands of Mur&Clusa Associats.

The phenomenon of entrepreneurship has been

analysed by Francesc Solé Parellada, and the clusters

model dealt with by Emilià Duch's working group from

the consultancy Competitiveness. We have also analysed

the 22@ model based on the experience of the profes-

sionals working there, in order to understand the key

points in terms of urban planning, infrastructure and

models of social and economic transformation.

We have invited a researcher from the IBEI (Francisco

Granados) to give a social reading from the perspective of

talent management, and we have analysed the relational

and conversational capital garnered in the district with

Dr Joan Mundet's working group from UPC.

We did not want to overlook the international view-

point, in relation to other international projects and clus-

ter models, open innovation models and the triple helix

model. Of particular note is the presence in this issue of

authors such as Henry Chesbrough (UC Berkeley), Greg

Clark (Urban Land Institute), Herny Etzkowitz (Stanford

University), Jerome Engel (UC Berkeley), Itxaso del

Palacio (Imperial College) and Joan Bellavista (XPCAT).

Lastly, an analysis of smart territories by Alfonso

Vegara, of Fundación Metrópolis, as well as creative cities,

by Professor Montserrat Pareja-Eastaway of the University

of Barcelona, complement this series of articles.

Introduction

DossierKnowledgeEconomy and Territory

Revista Econòmica de Catalunya7

ForewordSònia RecasensDeputy Mayor for Economy, Business and EmploymentBarcelona City Council

For its 64th issue, Revista Econòmica de Catalunya chose

a prime theme for the city of Barcelona: the Knowledge

Economy and Territory, aimed at analysing in depth the

22@Barcelona Innovation District.

Given the success of the issue, and the interest

expressed from hundreds of international delegations in

the institutional, business and academic spheres that visit

Barcelona every year, we felt it was the right moment to

print a special issue in English to disseminate and share

our experience.

Throughout its history, Barcelona has been able to

detect the opportunities that have come its way and has

overcome the challenges posed. As a city, Barcelona has

certain assets that place it in optimum conditions for pro-

moting the knowledge economy, an economy which

speaks in terms of innovation and internationalisation.

In this sense, 22@Barcelona is a very good example of

how an area such as Poblenou is transforming 200

hectares of industrial land into a knowledge economy. A

district that has all the elements necessary to promote the

creation of wealth and jobs, based on concentrating uni-

versities and businesses in a territory along with advance

infrastructure that coexists with residential areas and pub-

lic spaces. Thanks to this process, the district is currently

home to more than 7,000 businesses that have provided

over 56,000 new jobs.

Barcelona Growth Centre’s location at the heart of

22@, a symbol of the new Barcelona at the service of com-

panies, focused on economic growth and the creation of

employment, is yet another way the City Council is lend-

ing its support to strengthening the district’s position as

an economic driver of the city.

I would like to thank all of the authors who made this

issue of Revista Econòmica de Catalunya possible, as well as

the Economists’ Association, for promoting this publica-

tion, which helps us analyse our economic situation and

plot new work horizons for our future.


The 22@ Barcelona project

In 2000, Barcelona City Council created a municipal

company, 22@ Barcelona, to promote and manage a proj-

ect whose aim was to transform obsolete industrial zones

of Poblenou into an area with high urban and environ-

mental quality, where new knowledge and innovation-

related activities could be carried out. The project was

based on a model of a compact Mediterranean city with

neighbourhoods in which to live, study and work at the

same time. To achieve this, the former land use designa-

tion of 22a, which established that these city centre areas

should only be used for industry, had to be changed to

the new status of 22@, which permits the coexistence of

all production activities that do not cause a nuisance or

pollution, normalizes the presence of dwellings that have

been affected since 1953, and favours their restoration.

The objectives were, and continue to be: urban, social

and economic transformation that involves combining

dwellings, premises, facilities and green spaces; the pro-

motion of industrial, commercial and service activities;

and the fostering of technical, scientific and cultural

development. The project does not overlook the infra-

structures and public services that ensure opportunities

and quality of life. Thus, the 22@ Barcelona district has

adopted a high-quality, compact, diverse and sustainable

urban model to make the resulting city more balanced,

more hybrid and more ecologically efficient, with a

stronger economy and greater cohesion.

This is a city project that covers urban development,

planning and the management of urban development,

heritage and infrastructures, as well as economic devel-

opment through the promotion of clusters, the organiza-

tion of public-private platforms, and the establishment

and support of companies.

Below we highlight two basic characteristics of the

project, beyond the political commitment to its imple-

mentation. There is an emphasis on the required legal

and financial resources, and a form of project gover-

nance that distinguishes 22@ Barcelona from most

urban operations whose objective is to promote the

location of economic activities.

One factor that has boosted the location of ‘@ activ-

ities’ in the district, particularly in the initial stage, is the

incentives included in the urban development plan. As

a result of these incentives, property developers could

make better use of the zone than of other spaces in the

city and metropolitan area. This has clearly been an

important factor in the location of new activities in the

district.

A second factor to consider is the project gover-

nance. The municipal company 22@ Barcelona is not

only responsible for the district’s urban planning, but

also for implementing its urban and economic renewal

project. To achieve this, the company’s team has pro-

moted around 40 projects to attract new companies in

sectors in which Barcelona could attain a certain degree

of international leadership; to promote the establish-

22@: 10 years of economic transformationOriol MolasGaps

Martí ParelladaUniversity of Barcelona

9

1. In accordance with Article 7 of the MPGM approved in 2000, activitiesthat are characteristic of the 22@ zoning designation are those related tothe sector of information and communication technologies, and those asso-

ciated with research, publishing, design, culture, multimedia activity, data-base management and knowledge management.


ment of the main institutions’ university centres; and to

enable the installation of the required support services.

To assess the introduction of activities defined as

‘@’1, that is, activities that use talent as the main pro-

ductive resource, the 22@ Barcelona district carried out

studies on their evolution in 2007, 2008 and 2009. In

addition, the need to assess the overall impact of public

policies in this district and to evaluate the results

obtained during the first decade of the project led to a

study2 to identify indicators that could be used in a syn-

thetic analysis of the economic growth generated by the

project. The initial results of this study are presented in

this article.

As the object of study is broader than in previous

research, we should be able to perceive the clearly strate-

gic nature of the sectors that have been promoted. For

beyond the intrinsic added value of the @ economy, it is

clear that it has positive secondary effects: from the gen-

eration of indirect activity (restaurants, shops and busi-

ness services, among others) to the renewal and consol-

idation of a brand - a territorial identity that could attract

other independent activities (in the hotel and catering

trade, traditional sectors that are being updated and

freelance professionals, among others). Furthermore,

taking into account the model of a compact city that

inspired the 22@ Barcelona project, this brand could

even attract residential housing, which, in turn, would

generate more economic activity.

Ur ban developm ent and populat ion gr owt h

The first focus of transformation of the 22@ district,

which is the most obvious and the most relevant from the

perspective of public investment, is the territory. The

urban area3 that the project covers forms part of the

transformation project itself and constitutes one of the

greatest challenges that the city of Barcelona has taken

on in recent years.

The 22@ district covers an area of 198.26 ha (which is

equivalent to around 115 blocks of the Eixample neigh-

bourhood), with a potential 4 million m2 of gross floor

area, of which 80% is destined for the establishment of

production activities and 20% for dwellings, facilities

and services. The original number of dwellings in a cen-

sus of the area was 4,614, and the aim is to construct a

further 4,000 new subsidized dwellings. The transforma-

tion is closely tied to a 180-million-euro infrastructure

plan, which has provided the district with new fibre

10

2. TC-field work, ‘22@ Barcelona: 10 anys, 2000-2010’. February 2011.

• Start of the renovation of 65% of the industrial areas of Poblenou• 117 plans approved: 78 (76%) private initiative, 2,830,596 m2 of gross floor area:

- 136,837 m2 of land for facilities- 119,720 m2 for open spaces- ± 3.000 dwellings built as subsidized housing

• Eight public green areas have been designed: 21,898 m2 (6.724 m2 are under construction)• A total of 82,137 m2 of facilities have been built above grade (Ca l’Aranyó/Pompeu Fabra University, Mediacomplex building, etc.)

• Planning of 70% of the subsidized housing envisaged• 1,502 dwellings: 892 dwellings constructed, 521 under construction and 107 with building permits• 2,041 dwellings built, in the permit stage or approved (51% of the 4,000 envisaged in the General Metropolitan Plan)

• Permits for a total of 1,323,000 m2 of gross floor area:- 70% for economic activity uses- 18% for dwellings- 12% for facilities

PLANNING

FACILITIES AND

GREEN AREAS

DWELLINGS

CONSTRUCTION

3. Geographic boundaries of 22@: C. Wellington / Av. Meridiana / Pl. de lesGlòries Catalanes / Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes / Rambla de Prim / Pl. deLlevant / C. del Taulat / Ronda del Litoral / (coastal area).

Source: municipal company 22@ Barcelona.

Table 1

St ate of urban development act ivit y up to 31/12/09


optic, electricity and general infrastructure networks,

and with a detailed mobility plan. It has been accompa-

nied by the promotion of private investment, which has

led to the development of 117 plans for facilities, open

spaces and dwellings, as shown in the table below.

One effect of the investment is that the resident pop-

ulation of 22@ has increased by 16,750 people since 2001

(according to 2009 data). Currently, the 22@ district has

over 90,000 inhabitants, which represents 5.6% of the

population of Barcelona (according to the municipal regis-

ter of 2009). In percentage terms, the population growth

in the 22@ district (23%) has been much higher than in

the city as a whole (8%), in the metropolitan area (14%)

and in Spain (18%) for the same period.

Likewise, the characteristics of the 22@ district have

meant that its population is younger on average than

that of the entire city of Barcelona. This indicates that the

zone is attractive to the younger age groups who opt to

live in this area of the city.

The location of new economic activities in the zone

and the population growth have boosted, and continue

to boost, a considerable amount of indirect activity. This

helps to increase the number of services in the neigh-

bourhood that make it more habitable. In turn, an

upwards spiral is generated that feeds back on itself.

Cadastral data reveal an increase in land use for activi-

ties associated with the increasing vitality of the zone, as

the area occupied by non-residential premises is 10 dec-

imal points higher in the 22@ district than in the rest of

the city (42.4% compared to 32.6% in Barcelona).

This process has been intensive in recent years, as the

city lost almost 5% of premises dedicated to non-resi-

dential uses between 2002 and 2010, whilst in the 22@

district the percentage rose by over 7%4.

The num ber of com panies locat ed in t he dist r ict

has doubled in t he last t en years

It is calculated that there are now 7,064 companies in

22@ Barcelona, which represents 3% of all companies in

the province of Barcelona (according to DIRCE data). It

is also estimated that 4,400 freelancers work in the dis-

trict. The number of companies has more than doubled

in the last ten years, as in 2000 there were just over 3,400

entities. Therefore, there has been a growth of 105%,

which is far higher than that experienced in the entire

province or in Catalonia (around 60%).

Most of the 3,437 companies in the district at the

start of the 22@ project remain there today (just over 7

out of every 10 companies, or around 2,500 firms in

total). However, approximately 1,000 have disappeared

or moved to other zones (27%). Nevertheless, this is just

a snapshot, and is therefore static. During 2000-2010, the

zone was particularly dynamic, and was witness to the

emergence and relocation of a large number of compa-

11

Graph 1

Compar ison of populat ion growth (as a %) for t he 2001-2009 per iod

30%

0%

20%

10%

22.8%

22@ Barcelona Metropolitan area Catalonia

7.8%

13.7%

17.9%

90,214 1,621,537 4,992,193 7,475,420

73,464 1,503,884 4,390,390 6,343,110

Population 2009

Population 2001

Source: Statistics Department of Barcelona City Council and IDESCAT.

4. Currently, the district has around 42,000 premises for dwellings, almost30,000 for parking, just over 6,000 for industrial use, close to 4,300 for

shops, restaurants and hotels, around 1,300 offices and approximately 270for other services (education, health, sport, etc.).

nies. Furthermore, we should not underestimate the

effects of the recession, which have made it impossible

for companies founded in recent years to consolidate

their position. According to information provided by

companies specialized in business surveys and in the use

of commercial registers, each year between 800 and

1,000 companies have been founded in the area, but

between 500 to 700 have folded. This is a very fast pace,

which shows the dynamism of the territory. According to

these sources, the balance of growth was clearly positive

up to 2008. However, in 2009 and 2010 a slightly higher

number of companies folded than were founded.

1

Despite the recession, since 2000 approximately

4,500 companies have been established in the district

(almost 25% in the first three years, 2000-2003, 40% in

the second, 2003-2006 and 35% in the third, 2007-2010).

If we add the 2,500 companies that were already present

in the area, we reach the figure of over 7,000 companies

present in the zone today. On average, 454 new compa-

nies have set up in the area per year, or 1.2 per day. Just

under half of the new companies registered since 2000

are start-ups; the rest are companies that have relocated.

In absolute figures, it is calculated that around 2,150

companies have been newly founded in the district,

whilst the rest (around 2,400) moved from other zones,

mainly the city and its metropolitan area.

Knowledge and technology as a st rategic focus

of growt h

In line with the original vision of the project, 22@

Barcelona is fully committed to clustering in various sec-

tors in which Barcelona could become a notable leader,

such as the audiovisual sector, information and commu-

nication technologies (ICT), media technologies, energy

and design. ‘The aim in these zones is to increase the

innovative capacity of companies by creating production

environments that bring together leading companies,

institutions, public agencies, universities and research,

development and innovation centres in each sector. In

these entities, an enterprising culture shall be promoted.

Added value services, tools and infrastructure shall be

provided for the competitive development and growth

of companies, and contact shall be promoted with the

leading business and research, development and inno-

vation projects worldwide’.

Thus, in addition to the objective of attracting lead-

ing companies, the project has promoted the establish-

ment in the district of various university centres, with

over 25,000 students, and numerous research and tech-

nology transfer centres.

Initially, five clusters were promoted (Media, ICT,

Medical Technologies, Energy and Design), which are

those that have been analysed in studies carried out to

date and on which we have data. However, the eco-

nomic development in recent years has led to the inclu-

sion of new, priority strategic sectors such as Agri-Food,

Higher Education, Aeronautics, Automotive and

Logistics. These are emerging areas that also require

special attention and should continue to be promoted in

the future.

12 Revista Econòmica de Catalunya12

Graph 2

Compar ison of t he increase in business act ivit y (as a %).2000-2010 per iod

150%

0%

100%

50%

105.5%

22@ Barcelona Province Catalonia

57.3% 60.0%

7,064 companies

3,437 companies

Companies 2010

Companies 2000

225,652 companies 299,989 companies

143,411 companies 187,445 companies

Source: TC-fieldwork, ‘22@ Barcelona: 10 anys. 2000-2010’. February 2011 and DIRCE.


There has been a clear change in the types of activi-

ties carried out by companies in the district. Records of

the Barcelona City Council’s business tax (IAE), which

are only available up to 2005, are an indicator that can be

used to measure change in production structure.

Statistics on this information indicate that the number of

service companies in the zone has increased consider-

ably, at the expense of manufacturing . In 1996, 27% of

the companies in Poblenou carried out industrial activi-

ties. In 2005, when the 22@ project was already fully

underway, this figure had dropped to 18%. This change

occurred extremely rapidly if we compare it to the evolu-

tion in manufacturing activity in the city as a whole.

Currently, over 3 of every 4 companies in 22@ work

in the service sector, 15% in manufacturing and 8% in

other sectors. This production structure is very similar to

that of the entire province of Barcelona, although the

proportion of manufacturing is still 4.7 points higher in

the zone. The main industrial activity is related to pub-

lishing, the graphic arts and the production of recorded

media. These represent 4.5% of the total activity in the

district and 30% of the existing manufacturing activity.

Within the service sector there is greater diversification

of companies. However, commercial activities (24%)

and business services (19%) predominate.

If we use as an index the OECD categorization, which

groups economic activities according to their level of

knowledge and/or technology intensity5, we can see that

traditional manufacturing sectors have contracted, whilst

knowledge- and new technology-intensive sectors have

expanded . If we use as a reference data from the IAE

records, the number of companies in these sectors has

increased considerably in 22@. In 1996 - 4 years before

the launch of the 22@ project - knowledge-intensive

13

Graph 3

Companies in 22@ by act ivit y. 2010

Manufacturing14.8%

Other 8.4%

Services76,8%

1,043 companies 596 companies

5,425 companies

Sample group: 7,064 companies

% BCN Province

Manufacturing: 10.1%

Services: 76.0%

Other : 13.9%

Source: TC-fieldwork, ‘22@ Barcelona: 10 anys. 2000-2010’. February 2011, and data from DIRCE 2010.

5. Groups based on CCAE-93 rev.1, in parenthesis. High-tech manufactur-ers:Pharmaceutical products (224), Office machinery and computer equip-ment (30), Manufacture of electronic materials, radios, televisions andcommunication devices (32), Medical and optical precision instruments(33), Aeronautical and space construction (353); Mid- to high-tech man-ufacturers:Chemical industries - except pharmaceutical products - (24-

244),Machinery, equipment and mechanical material (29), Machinery andelectric material (31), Manufacture of vehicles and trailers (34),Manufacture of railroad material and other transport equipment(352/354/355); Knowledge-intensive services:Mail and telecommunica-tions (64), Finances and insurance (65 a 67), Business services, except realestate activities (71 to 74), Education (80), Health (85).


activity in the zone was five percentage points below the

figure for Catalonia. By 2005 it had reached the same

level, and now it is three points above it. In 2010, 27.4%

of the companies located in 22@ carried out knowledge-

intensive activities, compared to 24.4% in Catalonia and

22.8% in Spain.

Some activities that are prioritized in the strategic

plans of the 22@ Barcelona project, such as graphic arts

and cultural and recreational activities, are not includ-

ed in the aforementioned OECD classification. If we

group these activities together, we find that in 2001

they represented 17% of activity in the district (accord-

ing to data from IAE records), whilst in 2005 their pres-

ence had increased to 21%. Currently, 31% of the com-

panies in this territory, or around 2,200 firms overall,

carry out @ activities, whilst in the whole of Catalonia

only 23.6% of companies undertake such activities.

Probably the employment data most clearly reveals

how the district has successfully attracted knowledge-

and/or technology-intensive sectors throughout the

process. It is estimated that approximately 2 out of

every 3 current employees in 22@ work in knowledge-

and/or technology-intensive companies. This high per-

centage is mainly due to the establishment of compa-

nies in recent years.

14

Graph 4

Companies in 22@ who under take act ivit ies @. 2010

@ activit ies31.0%

Remaining activities69.0%

2,190 companies

Sample group: 7,064 companies*

Publishing and graphic arts (22)

IT and o�ce equipment manufacturing (30)

Electronic material and communication device manufacturing (32)

Medical-surgical, precision and optical material manufacturing (33)

Telecommunications and email (64)

Ancillary financial intermediation and insurance activities (65)

IT activities (72)

Research and development (73)

Business activities (74)

Education (80)

Cultural and leisure activities (92)

@ activit ies in Catalonia. 2009 31.0%

Source: IDESCAT (2009). Data from DIRCE.

Sectors Total 22@ Before 2000 After 2000

Table 1

Dist r ibut ion of workers in 22@ by knowledge int ensit yof t he company that employs them. 2010

Population: ± 90,000 workers. Calculation basis: 1,029 companies that have provided information on thisaspect. These results show a trend. However, they do not show the exact distribution of workers in thedistrict (they are calculated using estimations). They are not comparable with the information availablefor the city or for Barcelona as a whole (data from registers).

Source: TC-fieldwork, ‘22@ Barcelona: 10 anys. 2000-2010’. February 2011.

Knowledge-intensive activities 67.5 56.6 73.8

High-tech manufacturers 3.7 5.9 2.3

Mid- to high-tech manufacturers 4.2 8.0 1.7

Knowledge-intensive services 59.6 42.7 69.9

Non-knowledge-intensive activities 32.5 43.4 26.2

Mid- to low-tech manufacturers a 0.8 1.6 0.3

Low-tech manufacturers 6.8 9.5 5.2

Non-knowledge intensive services 21.3 26.3 18.7

Unclassified in OECD 3.6 6.1 2.0


In 2009, it was established that one of the distinctive

elements of workplaces in @ companies is their high

human capital. On average, 72.5% of employees in @

companies with workplaces in the district were univer-

sity graduates. This figure is significantly higher than

the 37% of the employed population of Catalonia with

higher education qualifications, stated in the labour

force survey (EPA) for the fourth quarter of 2009. The

2009 figures also show that @ companies are with-

standing the impact of the recession better than others.

Managers of such companies were aware of the difficult

context, but most stated that their companies were sta-

ble or growing. Therefore, we can conclude that one of

the main objectives of the project is being met: that of

attracting and concentrating economic activity based on

talent, which must act as a catalyst for an economy with

high added value, to better face the current economic

challenges.

In addition to the establishment of large firms in the

district, small and micro companies have played a key role

in the economic dynamism.

Some company relocations to the neighbourhood

are particularly well-known and attracted media atten-

tion. During 2010 or 2011 alone, companies such as

National Geographic, Aenor, Marcus Evans, Quantum

Solutions, Bassat Ogilvy, CMT and Telefónica moved or

were in the process of moving to the area. Although

these companies have a strategic value beyond their

quantitative value, much of the success of the 22@

Barcelona initiative is due to the attraction of a large

number of small and even micro companies who see an

opportunity for their projects in the area.

It is calculated that there are currently around 90,000

people working in 22@, which is approximately 10.2%

of the number of workers in the city of Barcelona6. Of

these, 62.5% work in ‘new’ companies that have moved

to the district in the last decade.

Approximately 8 out of every 10 companies employ

fewer than 10 workers. Small companies, which employ

between 10 and 49 workers, represent 12% of the total,

whilst medium-sized and large companies that have 50

or more employees represent 5%. If we compare these

15

Graph 5

Dist r ibut ion of workers in companies in the 22@ dist r ict . 2010

% BCNProvince

0.4

1.6

9.0

89.0

1.7More than200 workers

Between 50 and199 workers

Between 10 and49 workers

Up to10 workers

0% 20% 60% 80%40% 100%

3.2

12.4

82.6

41.9% of 22@ workers



]

]

Source: TC-fieldwork, ‘22@ Barcelona: 10 anys. 2000-2010’. February 2011, and DIRCE 2010.

6. The number of workers in the district is not exact, but is the result of an estima-tion calculated on the basis of a sample of 1,029 companies for which data areavailable on the total number of employees in the company and the number of

employees working in 22@. Using the ratio of the number of workers in the dis-trict by ranges of company size, and information on the number of employees inthe rest of the companies that are registered, we made the subsequent estimates.

Sample group: 7,064 companies


figures with those for the production fabric of the

province of Barcelona (DIRCE), we can see that 22@ has

a higher percentage of medium-sized and large compa-

nies (4.9% compared to 2% in the entire province).

However, these data are on entire companies, not

just the staff at workplaces within 22@. The use of

aggregate data shows that micro companies employ

22% of the workers in the district, whilst small compa-

nies employ 36% and the 160 or so medium-sized and

large companies are responsible for 42%.

Some final considerat ions

1. The results of actions carried out in the 22@ dis-

trict in its first ten years of existence are clearly positive,

if we consider the initial objectives that were estab-

lished. This is demonstrated by some of the most rele-

vant indicators:

• The population in the 22@ district increased by

23% in the 2001-2009 period, which is much higher

than the population growth in the city (8%), the metro-

politan area (14%) or the whole of Catalonia (18%).

• Since 2000, approximately 4,500 companies have

set up in the district. When we add this figure to the

2,500 existing companies, the total number of firms in

the zone in 2010 was just over 7,000. Of the 4,500 com-

panies in the district in 2010 that had been installed

during the decade, around 2,150 were start-ups, whilst

the rest had moved from other zones, mainly in the city

of Barcelona itself or its metropolitan area.

• One of the main objectives of the project was to

boost @ activities in the district. These activities include

those related with the ICT sector, research, publishing,

design, culture, multimedia activity, database manage-

ment and knowledge management. The results show

that 17% of companies in the district undertook @

activities in 2001. By 2010, this figure had risen to 31%

of the companies in the district, whilst in Catalonia the

figure for the same year was only 23.6%.

• The specialization due to the increasing presence

of 22@ activities in the district has considerably

increased the human capital that is found there. In total,

72.5% of employees of companies that have workplaces

in the district are university graduates. This is in contrast

to a figure of 37% for the whole of Catalonia.

2. Considerable social consensus has been attained

on actions carried out in the district7. All the political

groups in Barcelona City Council voted in favour of the

change in the General Metropolitan Plan (PGM) to

renew the industrial areas of Poble Nou-District with

22@ activities. The actions that have been progressively

implemented have attained sufficient consensus to be

able to continue with scheduled activities. Disagree -

ments about PERI Llacuna, priority reservation for resi-

dents of some of the subsidized flats built in the neigh-

bourhood, and the safeguarding of items of industrial

heritage in the zone are areas of debate in which con-

sensus has been reached.

3. Although the territorial area of the 22@ disctrict is

limited, it could be an example of the renewed impor-

tance of considering territories as units of economic

development. This contrasts with economic develop-

ment through the expansion of mass production, in

which large companies sought the most efficient terri-

tories on a global scale. In this case, development with-

in a territory was no longer able to guarantee the devel-

opment of the territory. The rediscovery of an urban and

regional policy has led to a re-evaluation of the role of

social and institutional conditions and the mobilization

of endogenous resources as a way to ensure develop-

ment, together with the factors that have traditionally

been taken into account, including training, innovation,

infrastructures and enterprising ability8.

4. Studies carried out to assess policies implemented

in the 22@ district have focused not on determining

whether they have contributed to attracting activities

such as those classified as @, which is clearly shown by

available data, but on evaluating whether the changes

that have occurred in the district are specific to this zone

16

7. See M. Martí, ‘El proyecto 22@Barcelona. Glocal governance, renovaciónurbana y lucha vecinal en Barcelona’. VII Congreso Español de CienciaPolítica y de la Administración.

8. M. Parellada, prologue to the book El distrito industrial de la cerámica,A.M. Fuertes (dir), Fundación Dávalos Fletcher, 2005.


or reflect a trend can also be found in the rest of the city

or the metropolitan area. Comparisons of the situation

in the district with other districts of Barcelona, the met-

ropolitan area as a whole or towns with industrial spe-

cialization close to the central city show that there are

slightly different positive effects in 22@. In addition, the

results show that economies of location, that is,

economies that value the importance of proximity to

other companies in the same sector, have been relevant

to determine the location of companies that carry out @

activities9.

Therefore, although the 22@ project has only been

implemented for a relatively short period of time and

the attraction of the 22@ district is evidently dependent

on the attraction of the Barcelona metropolitan area, the

results obtained to date can only be classed as positive.

5. The importance of location factors in the

Barcelona metropolitan area and the development of

new territorial areas whose characteristics make them

suitable for policies similar to those implemented in the

22@ district (for example, in the city of Barcelona itself,

the impact of the La Sagrera station and the BZ

Barcelona Innovation Zone project in Zona Franca; and

in the metropolitan area, the Barcelona Synchrotron

Park around the Alba synchrotron and the DeltaBCN

Aerospace and Mobility Park) mean that is it reasonable

to consider the promotion of location policies for new

economic activities that include the offer of land

required for these urban development activities in the

city of Barcelona itself and in the metropolitan area. The

desire to promote all of these areas together under the

brand ‘Barcelona Economic Triangle’, the experience

gained in the 22@ district, the potential represented by

the provision of land for the aforementioned projects

and those that could be developed, and the opportuni-

ties for action provided by an entity such as the

Barcelona metropolitan area are all essential factors that

will help to ensure the introduction of economic activi-

ties associated with the knowledge society.

17

9. E. Viladecans-Marsal, J.M. Arauzao Carod, ‘Can a knowledge-based clus-ter be created?. The case of the Barcelona 22@ district’, Papers in RegionalScience, 2011, own publication.


1. Int roduct ion

Since the engineer Ildefons Cerdà’s plan for the

reform and extension of Barcelona in 1859 (Pla de

Reforma i Eixample de Barcelona), the city has undergone

various urban development interventions of great

scope that have made it a benchmark for scholars of

urban phenomena. Some notable examples are the

Jaussely Plan of 1905, Le Corbusier’s Macià Plan of

1934 (which was not implemented, due to the Civil

War), the General Metropolitan Plan of 1976, and the

transformation that took place as a result of the

Olympic Games of 1992. Major international events,

such as the Universal Exhibition of 1888 and that of

1929 (on electrical industries) were also major drivers

of economic and urban development.1 The transforma-

tion of Poblenou that began in 1998, together with the

opening up of Avinguda Diagonal to the sea and the

Universal Forum of Cultures, constitute, in my under-

standing, an important link in this chain of plans and

projects. In particular, what is known internationally as

the 22@ Barcelona project has aroused great interest in

the field of urban development and in that of local eco-

nomic development.

The redevelopment of the industrial areas in the

Poblenou-22@ BCN District of Activities must be con-

sidered within the context of economic and urban devel-

opment operations of greater scope, known as the

‘Barcelona, City of Knowledge’ project, which is promot-

ed by Barcelona City Council.

The aim of this article is to identify the economic

model underlying the urban development proposal of

22@. This model is characterized by the internationaliza-

tion of the economy, the tertiarization of activity, the

increasing flexibility of production, and the emergence of

a new technological paradigm based on information and

communication technologies.

Barcelona, which is one of the few cities in southern

Europe that was in the front line of the commercial rev-

olution in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and

played a leading role in Spain in the industrial revolution

during the second third of the nineteenth century2, faced

at the end of the twentieth century a new technological

and organizational revolution known as the Knowledge

Economy.3

The economy and urban planning must adapt to the

new production context. In particular, zoning, which is

one of the main instruments of urban planning, must be

altered to fit the new reality of production. Zoning, which

emerged as a central tool of functionalist urban develop-

ment, must be adapted to the new reality, and along with

it planning must be modified. We can no longer seek spe-

cialization in zones by defining uses on the basis of a

classification of production sectors (specifically in indus-

The ‘Barcelona, City of Knowledge’ projectand 22@ Barcelona

Joan Tru llénDirector of the Barcelona Institute of Regional and Metropolitan Studies (IERMB)

1. Joan Busquets, Barcelona. La Construcción urbanística de una ciudadcompacta, Ediciones del Serbal, Barcelona 2004.

2. Jordi Nadal has developed these arguments in different studies. OnPoblenou and its evolution since the industrial revolution see: Jordi Nadaland Xavier Tafunell, Sant Martí de Provençals: pulmó industrial deBarcelona, 1847-1992, Ed. Columna, 1992.

3. For information on the knowledge economy and the city, and on measure-ment of the knowledge economy in urban areas and its application toBarcelona see: Joan Trullén, Josep Lladós and Rafael Boix, ‘Economía delconocimiento, ciudad y competitividad’, Investigaciones Regionales, no.1, 2002, p. 139-161.


trials zones) into ‘what’ they produce. To generate

increasing yields, we should not try to achieve vertical

integration in large production plants, sector zoning and

radical separation of uses. Instead, we should generate

economies outside the company that come from different

sectors and converge in the territory. The important fac-

tor is no longer ‘what’ is produced, but ‘how’ it is pro-

duced. As Giacomo Becattini stated, to understand the

keys to contemporary economic development, the unit of

analysis should shift from ‘sector’ to ‘district’4.

Production has moved away from large industrial

production plants that incorporate most of the produc-

tion stages and added value. The focus has shifted from

specialized industrial cities. Instead, the form of produc-

tion in the knowledge economy shall essentially be flex-

ible and have a considerable intangible component. In

this form of production, the city plays an important role:

it provides the urban dimension that generates

economies associated with diversity; and economies of

location are associated with the integration in a territory

of groups of innovative companies dedicated to specific

production activities.

The cities compete more than the companies.5

Therefore, the conditions need to be created so that

dynamic external economies can emerge in the territory

of a metropolis. The dimension of metropolis is relevant,

as is the grouping of innovative companies into clusters

and Marshallian industrial districts. These territorial fac-

tors are crucial to competitiveness.6

Therefore, old spaces with industrial zoning that are

situated in central areas could be used for new produc-

tion activities under certain conditions. This notion goes

far beyond the concept of a digital or information city

proposed at the beginning of the 1990s in some scientific

circles. Here what we are talking about is the city of

knowledge.

2. The ‘Barcelona, Cit y of Knowledge’ project

The Barcelona, City of Knowledge project is the main

focus of Barcelona’s economic and urban development

policy after the Olympic project. The Barcelona project

gave rise to what would later become known as the 22@

Barcelona project. Joan Clos, who was chosen to replace

Pasqual Maragall as Mayor of Barcelona in September

1997, made the concept of ‘city of knowledge’ a guiding

principle of municipal government action:

Barcelona must be faithful to its tradition of moderni-

ty, which has been demonstrated so many times

throughout its history, and must accept that the

knowledge revolution shall be a driving force in this

part of the world. Barcelona is in a favourable situa-

tion to position itself as a leader.7

In response to this idea, an ad hoc structure was cre-

ated in October 1998 to promote the new project, with

the appointment of two commissioners: one for urban

planning and one for the economy.8 After the elections

of May 1999, the post of councillor for the City of

Knowledge was created and headed by Vladimir de

Semir. The Municipal Action Programme 2000-2003

described the objective of making Barcelona a city of

knowledge.

The economic context in which this proposal arose

was strongly influenced by two fundamental factors:

weakening of the major impetus of the Olympics, which

boosted economic activity between 1986 and 1992; and

the recession of 1993-1995, which had a severe effect on

Barcelona until 1996. Barcelona needed to turn towards

new objectives and the focus became the concept of the

city of knowledge. The adoption of a proactive strategy

has characterized municipal economic policy since 1998.

4. Giacomo Becattini, ‘Del ‘sector’ industrial al ‘districte’ industrial. Algunesconsideracions sobre la unitat d’anàlisi de l’economia industrial’, RevistaEconòmica de Catalunya, no. 1, 1986. Michael Porter’s clusters or groupsof innovative companies are concepts that are very similar to Becattini’snotion of ‘Marshallian industrial district’.

5. Roberto Camagni, Economia urbana, Antoni Bosch (editor), 2005.6. Joan Trullén, ‘Factors territorials de competitivitat a la Regió Me tro po li ta -na de Barcelona’ in Revista Econòmica de Catalunya, no. 34, January1998, p. 34-51.

7. Joan Clos. ‘Una ciutat amb idees’, Barcelona, Metròpolis Mediterrània, no.1. Monograph on Barcelona, City of Knowledge, 2001, p. 4. The reference wasto Richard V. Knight (1995): ‘Knowledge-Based Development: Policy andPlanning Implications for Cities’, Urban Studies, 32.

8. José Antonio Acebillo, Director of Barcelona Regional, Commissioner forInfrastructure and Urban Planning, and Joan Trullén, Commissioner forEconomic and Territorial Assessment and Diagnosis for the Barcelona, Cityof Knowledge project were appointed by Resolution of the Mayor’s Office,22 October 1998.


In this line, the economic strategy was based on the

emergence of ‘a new macroeconomic context from the

time of integration into the monetary union, with a

reduction in nominal and real interest rates that would

facilitate the adoption of strategic changes, which would

necessarily involve the mobilization of considerable

financial resources’9. Unlike the pattern found in many

Spanish municipalities, Barcelona would not prioritize

residential construction, but a change in the economic

basis, supported by new concepts of urban development.

Preparatory work on the new strategy began in the

mid-1990s. In fact, the Revista Econòmica de Catalunya

published two monographs in issues 33 and 34 on La

Barcelona metropolitana: economia i planejament

[Metro poli tan Barcelona: economy and planning]. The

issues contained eighteen articles that described the

state-of-the-art in these matters and in other related

areas such as finances, ecology, demography and

mobility in the metropolis10. The aim was to identify

elements that could be used to construct a new story

after the Olympic project, which had put Barcelona on

the world map for the first time. A change in scale of

the Barcelona metropolitan area was detected, as well

as Barcelona’s new role as a central supplier of servic-

es to the network of metropolitan cities, and the con-

siderable competitive capacity of a metropolis in

which SMEs are predominant, due to the existence of

territorial factors of competitiveness. A new story

needed to be created to bring together the city’s strat-

egy. And this story would be defined in a new project

for the city: Barcelona, City of Knowledge.

Next, we will highlight some of the main points of

the urban development strategy.11 First, the city of

Barcelona’s function as a central server for the metropol-

itan area was identified. In other words, the city needed

to adopt functions of a tertiary nature, and consequent-

ly traditional industrial and logistic uses would be

replaced by tertiary ones. Second, the city should expand

not towards the west, as it had in the past, but towards

the east. To achieve this, two actions were required:

Avinguda Diagonal needed to be opened to the sea, and

Poblenou needed to be transformed. The third point was

to associate this new strategy with a major infrastructure

decision: to make La Sagrera the central station for a

new high-speed train, and thus opt to redevelop the

Besòs area and the triangle Sagrera-Besòs-Front

Marítim. A singular building (the Jean Nouvel water

tower) would act as a sign of the new direction of urban

growth of Barcelona towards the east.12

The economic and territorial strategy of the

Barcelona, City of Knowledge project was drawn up

between October 1998 and May 1999. An executive

summary was subsequently published without the sta-

tistical workings in the monographic issue of the journal

Barcelona, Metròpoli Mediterrània, [Barcelona, Medi ter ra -

nean Metropolis] in 2001, which was dedicated to the

City of Knowledge project.13

A description of Barcelona’s economic model and a

specific analysis of the city and the knowledge economy

were published in 2001 by Barcelona City Council in the

book La Metròpoli de Barcelona cap a l’economia del conei-

xement: diagnosi econòmica i territorial de Barcelona 2001

9. The new financial framework that was emerging was comparable to thatfound at the start of the twentieth century with the repatriation of capitalfrom Cuba and the Philippines, which provided the opportunity to fund oneof Barcelona’s biggest urban development operations: the urban reform andconstruction of the Via Laietana road. This point had been debated in one ofthe last urban strategy councils chaired by Pasqual Maragall. The transfor-mation of Poblenou was a project of comparable financial magnitude to theurban reform of Via Laietana eighty years earlier. On the funding of thereform and construction of Via Laietana, see Francesc Roca i Rosell, Políticaeconòmica i territori a Catalunya, 1901-1939, Ed. Ketres, Barcelona 1979.

10. These issues were presented at Barcelona City Council’s Saló de Cent inApril 1998.

11. The urban planning strategy would mainly be defined by José AntonioAcebillo. The subsequent urban transformation project for Poblenou, led byRamón García-Bragado, had to be in line with this strategy. Xavier Casas, the

deputy mayor and the president of the Commission for Urban Planning,Infrastructures and Housing would play a central role in the urban develop-ment of Barcelona between 1998 and 2008, particularly that of Poblenou. SeeRamón Garcia-Bragado, in the preface of the book 22@ Barcelona. 10 anysde renovació urbana, Barcelona, 2011.

12. The group of specialists who drew up the Modification of the GeneralMetropolitan Plan for redeveloping the industrial areas of Poblenou,approved in July 2007, was comprised of the Urban Planning Manager,Ramón García-Bragado (who proposed the 22@ name for the project), thearchitects Ricard Fayos, Àurea Guillén and Pau Batlle, the economistsRafael González Tormo and Joaquim Clusa, who drew up the economic andfinancial study, and the jurists Enric Lambies and Sònia Cobos. See thepreface of the book 22@ Barcelona. 10 anys de renovació urbana,Barcelona, 2011.

13. This monograph includes different contributions that together give an idea ofthe nature of the project. It includes studies on ICT (Tere Serra), R&D (Jordi


[The Metropolis of Barcelona Towards the Knowledge

Economy: An Economic and Territorial Analysis of

Barcelona 2001].14

The economic and territorial strategy is set out in the

study ‘Projecte Barcelona Ciutat del Coneixement.

Informe Final. Elements per a una diagnosi econòmica i

territorial’ [Barcelona, City of Knowledge Project. Final

Report. Elements for an economic and territorial analy-

sis], published by the Department of Applied

Economics, UAB, on 26 May 1999. This study was part of

a programme of research on the urban and metropolitan

economy of Barcelona.15 The main hypotheses and pro-

posals are given below.

a) The importance of know-how and knowledge to

explain the generation of added value in advanced

economies and the continuity of production. Together

with labour and capital, knowledge will gain relevance

as a production factor. Intangibles such as education are

increasingly important. The relevance of capital is dimin-

ishing. Codified knowledge is becoming less important.

b) Skilled labour is becoming more important than

unskilled labour. ‘Tangible’ capital is increasingly

important.

c) The growing importance of increasing returns in

industrial and service sector production, which leads to

further specialization of territories. The technical

change is occurring both in industrial and service sec-

tors. For the first time, economies of scale, scope and

network are affecting the service sector considerably

and increasingly.

d) The importance of territorial factors to explain the

continuity of industrial and service sector production.16

The notion of a knowledge-based economy is further

reaching than the concept of an ‘information society’. It

not only includes knowledge of a scientific nature or

from advanced research, but also knowledge of different

production areas. It distinguishes between information

(codified knowledge) and non-codified or non-codifi-

able knowledge.17

In Barcelona, one opportunity to exploit was the exis-

tence of a strong tradition of industrial know-how, built

on a foundation of arts and trades and a worldwide rep-

utation in design and art, and in fields related to medi-

cine and health, training and knowledge transmission.

Some of these areas will be brought together in clusters

or groups of innovative companies based in Poblenou.

On the basis of works by Masahisa Fujita and

Takatoshi Tabuchi, a process of recentralization of

knowledge-intensive production activities was identified

in large metropolises, in contrast to trends in the 1970s

and 1980s, which showed greater growth of medium-

sized cities. Considerable economies of agglomeration

would emerge that would generally boost the process of

relocation of the most knowledge-intensive activities to

the centres of large metropolises.

Behind the growth in economies of agglomeration

lies: economies of scale in the provision of public servic-

es (international airports, major ports, large hospitals,

large universities and research centres) and economies

of location (through cross-fertilization as in Jacobs, spe-

18. Camí), 22@ BCN (Ramón García-Bragado), indicators for ‘Barcelona, City ofKnowledge’ (M. Antònia Monés), urban ecology (Salvador Rueda), economicactivity and employment in the Barcelona as a city of knowledge (MaravillasRojo), culture (Ferran Mascarell) and education and training in the knowledgesociety (Marina Subirats). The Technical Programming Unit of Barcelona CityCouncil, headed by M. Antònia Monés, drew up a series of indicators for cen-tral themes in the new strategy, including the penetration of ICT and theInternet, the quantification of advanced business services, knowledge centres, andICT production, among others. A map of the city of knowledge was drawn upfor Barcelona, which precisely identified the the presence in the territory of edu-cational centres, libraries, theatres, museums, auditoriums, exhibition rooms, andhighlighted the uneven distribution is the municipality of the offering of theseservices, particularly in the Sant Martí, Nou Barris and Sant Andreu districts.

14. Joan Trullén, La metròpoli de Barcelona cap a l’economia del coneix-ement: diagnosi econòmica i territorial de Barcelona 2001.Ajuntament de Barcelona, Gabinet Tècnic de Programació, Barcelona2001, with foreword by M. Antònia Monés.

15. This programme of research in the UAB’s Department of AppliedEconomics resulted in various publications, such as the Pla Delta I. El

16. model econòmic i territorial de Barcelona (1995) and Noves estratè-gies econòmiques i territorials per a Barcelona (1998). These studieswere promoted by Narcisa Salvador until 1998 and by M. AntòniaMonés from 1999, from Barcelona City Council’s Technical ProgrammingUnit. In addition, Carola Adam collaborated extensively (with NatividadHernández, Hugo Fuentes and Guillermo Gandara, among others) andsubsequently Rafael Boix (with José Antonio Santana and Rafa Porcar).Rafael Boix headed the study ‘Barcelona ciutat del Coneixement.Economia del coneixement, tecnologies de la informació i de la comuni-cació, i noves estratègies urbanes’, Barcelona City Council’s TechnicalProgramming Unit, 2004.

16. Projecte Barcelona Ciutat del Coneixement, May 1999, p. 17.17. Knowledge includes both categories and codes for interpreting the infor-

mation itself, abilities or specializations with tacit content, and solutionsto problems or research of a heuristic nature that cannot be well definedby algorithms. See Moses Abramovitz and Paul A. David, TechnologicalChange and the Rise of Intangible Investments: The US economy’sGrowth Path in the Twentieth Century, 1997.


cialization in certain activities or Marshall, Arrow and

Romer externalities). In addition, the increasing impor-

tance of network economies has also been detected

(Roberto Camagni, Carlo Salone).18

The ‘Barcelona, City of Knowledge’ study identified a

change in economic base in Barcelona, and detected

some trends, including the following:

a) Loss of relative importance of industry and its

metropolitan decentralization. Two thirds of the metro-

politan industrial base are outside of Barcelona. Con se -

quent ly, Barcelona increasingly acts as a service provider

for the metropolis.

b) Greater cyclical sensitivity in industry than in

services.

c) Sharp increase in the demand for land for knowl-

edge-intensive tertiary activities.

d) Poly-nuclear nature of the metropolis of Bar ce lo -

na, with considerable concentrations of industrial activi-

ties in historic metropolitan towns and cities, and con-

centrations of the tertiary sector in Barcelona itself.

e) The metropolis is not a city of cities, but a poly-

nuclear metropolitan area that is diverse in general, but

specialized in certain production activities in its main

nodes. Barcelona has strong economies of location for

many tertiary activities. This is considered to be highly

relevant in the new strategy of the city of knowledge,

promoted by the municipality of Barcelona 19.

f) Spending on research and development has been

found to be insufficient in comparison with other

European metropolises. Shortfalls have also been found

in the stock of human capital per employee. Con se -

quent ly, these areas need to be strengthened.

The strategic consequence of this evaluation is clear:

‘Barcelona, as the central city of a poly-nuclear metro-

politan region, must strengthen its specialization in

knowledge-intensive activities’20. This has an economic

and territorial consequence:

The traditional urban economic strategy of Barcelona

was based on the fact that the predominant economic

activity was manufacturing, and that zoning of land

uses in the central city of the metropolis was essential

to maintain manufacturing activities. To pass from an

industrial manufacturing model to a model adapted to

the technological revolution, it is essential to open up

the 22a zoning to these new activites, to protect their

production and employment base.21

The sixth section of the document is on ‘Poblenou,

Technological District’. It proposes the establishment in

Poblenou - and within a new scientific, technical and

cultural axis that covers Nou Barris, Sant Andreu and

Sant Martí - of a new technological district to strategi-

cally locate productive, research, learning and develop-

ment activities that are knowledge-intensive. The instru-

ments proposed to meet this objective include those of a

town planning nature and those of a university and

research and development nature. Furthermore, to

implement this proposal to attract new technological

activities of a scientific, technical and cultural nature, a

new industrial land policy needed to be defined to

include these activities in the industrial zoning: ‘The

notion of sector must be replaced by that of activity, to

promote knowledge- and employment-intensive

activites in old zones with 22a designation’.22

One of the main arguments in all of this debate is

that the new knowledge-intensive activities are more

employment-intensive than industrial manufacturing

activities.

Together with a specific approach centred on land

uses, we should focus on the importance of creating an

environment with a high quality of urban development

in the Poblenou zone that includes ‘educational services

to cater for a population from different countries and

cultures with a high degree of mobility’.23

To strengthen new research and development activi-

ties, a new university centre for teaching and research

needs to be created in Poblenou. To achieve this, land

must be provided to meet the space requirements of

these uses, and new forms of managing these services

18. A later systematization can be found in La metròpoli de Barcelona capa l’economia del coneixement: diagnosi econòmica i territorial deBarcelona 2001, Chapter 3.

19. Projecte Barcelona Ciutat del Coneixement, May 1999, p. 22.

20. Ibid., p. 29.21. Ibid., p. 29.22. Ibid., p. 31.23. Ibid., p. 32.


will be needed to facilitate interaction with the environ-

ment, in a context of transition from the Humboldtian

University to the post-Humboldtian.24

3. Zoning based on t he knowledge economy in the

22@ Barcelona st rat egy

The new economic and territorial strategy laid out in

the Barcelona, City of Knowledge project has an impor-

tant consequence for urban development: the need to

increase the land available for knowledge-intensive

activities, particularly in the municipality of Barcelona.

However, much of the land available for locating eco-

nomic activity in Barcelona is designated in the General

Metropolitan Plan as industrial.

Studies on the location of economic activities in the

metropolitan area indicate that the demand for industri-

al land in the municipality of Barcelona has decreased,

whilst the demand for land for the service sector has

increased considerably.25 In addition, service sector activ-

ities have two essential characteristics: high employment

density and high demand for centrality. This opens the

door to reusing old industrial land for new service sector

activities.26

Furthermore, there was a considerable amount of

industrial land available in central zones of the metrop-

olis, particularly in the districts situated in the north and

east of Barcelona. This land is classified as industrial and

is designated as 22a in the General Metropolitan Plan

(PGM). This is consistent with an economic model based

on the specialization of Barcelona in manufacturing pro-

duction.

The aim is now to modify this traditional zoning

instrument to adapt it to the new strategy of Barcelona

as a city of knowledge: ‘To pass from an industrial man-

ufacturing model to a model adapted to the new tech-

nological revolution, it is essential to open up the 22a

zoning to these activites, to protect their production and

employment base’.27

However, the question was how to achieve this. The

aim was not simply to expand the activities in the 22a

zoning to include ICT activities, but to incorporate a

wide range of activities that are ‘knowledge-intensive’.

Teams of engineers who worked on the definition of the

@ activities, led by Miquel Barceló, had a vision that was

focused on ICT in particular, and based on the constitu-

tion of a ‘digital city’, along the lines of cities such as

Bangalore or projects such as that of Silicon Alley in New

York or the Cyber district of Boston.28 However, now the

aim is to adopt a more general vision, based on the prin-

ciples of the knowledge economy, and implemented

according to the new paradigm.

Indeed, the classical zoning is based on the notion of

a production sector defined by the characteristics of

what it produces. The new zoning should be based on

‘how’ it is produced, in accordance with the criteria in

the paradigm of the knowledge economy. If we had

opted for a highly precise definition of @ activities as

those that are strictly related to the production of infor-

mation and communication technologies, then an

extension of the existing list of activities of a manufac-

turing nature by incorporating ICT manufacture and

services would have been sufficient. In contrast, if we

adopt a vision of the knowledge economy, as foreseen

by the OECD, then activities that produce ICT and those

24. Here the main reference was the OECD document Science,Technology, Industry. University Research in Transition, Paris, 1998,p. 7 and 8. A document by Pedro Conseiçao, Manuel V. Heitor and PedroOlivera was also used, entitled: ‘Expectations for the University in theKnowledge-based Economy’, and published in TechnologicalForecasting and Social Science, 58, 1998, p. 203-214.

25. Joan Trullén (1998): Noves estratègies econòmiques i territorials pera Barcelona, p. 20.

26. On changes in employment demand in Barcelona see ‘Tendències de l’ocu-pació a Barcelona a partir de INSS i IAE (1993-1997)’, research agree-ment between Barcelona Activa and the UAB, Joan Trullén with RafaelBoix and Juan Antonio Santana, Department of Applied Economics, 25September 1998, duplicated.

27. ‘Introducció: la nova zona 22@ i la ciutat del coneixement’, Chapter 2 ofthe ‘Modificació del PGM per a la renovació de les àrees industrials delPoblenou-Districte d’Activitats 22@BCN’.

28. Studies that were first promoted by Miquel Barceló from the CatalanInstitute of Technology and then by the 22@ Barcelona development com-pany, on the introduction of ICT in Barcelona and in the metropolitanarea, were essential to define the technological and business strategy ofPoblenou, and, in particular, the initial list of @ activities. In addition,Barceló boosted the location of the Catalan Institute of Technology inPoblenou, and was behind the technological drive focused on informationand communication technologies. A detailed description of the project andits relation with the model of the digital city can be found in Antoni Oliva,El districte d’activitats 22@bcn, Aula Barcelona, Barcelona, 2003.


that intensively use ICT and have highly qualified

human capital should be included. This latter perspec-

tive requires new dynamics, and is supported by the

‘Barcelona, City of Knowledge’ document and other

previous economics studies.

Therefore, on the basis of studies on the location of

economic activity, it was argued that much of the

demand for land in Poblenou would be for non-indus-

trial activities that are mid- to high-tech or high-tech,

and services in particular.29 These activities have one fun-

damental characteristic: they have very high employ-

ment density.30

Therefore, a proposal was made to adopt the

OECD’s notion of knowledge economy, set out in its

document OECD Science, Technology and Industry

Scoreboard 1999: Benchmarking Knowledge-based

Economies. This led to the adoption of general criteria

rather than just lists of the sectors and subsectors

defined in national classifications of economic activi-

ties; and to the use of a method for approving propos-

als that required the formation of an advisory commis-

sion to evaluate whether proposed activities met the

established criteria.

In its first document to propose how to measure

knowledge-based economies, the OECD warned of the

adoption of simplistic criteria:

The importance of technology-based activities has

often been approximated by the share of high-technol-

ogy industries in manufacturing. However, this

approach focuses only on the main producers of

high-technology goods.

It is desirable to include otehr activities that are inten-

sive users of high technology and/or have the rela-

tively highly skilled workforce that is required to ben-

efit fully from technological innovations. Therefore, in

addition to the commonly identified manufacturing

industries, service activities such as finance, insurance

and communications are included here.

This approach went far beyond what was initially

established and what emerged from the model of a dig-

ital city.31

These activities were identified by the acronym CITI

and the categories 72 (communications), 8 (bank insur-

ance, estate agents and business services) and 9 (com-

munity services, social services and personal services).

Consequently, a criterion was adopted that enabled a

wide range of service sectors to be included in the @

designation.

Finally, the approved text included in detail a wide

range of ICT manufacturing and service activities, and

also referred in general to ‘those other tertiary activities

that are based on knowledge and increase competitive-

ness, according to the OECD Science, Technology and

Industry Scoreboard 1991, page 18, particularly in techno-

logical, commercial and financial areas’.32

This important amendment was accompanied by the

adoption of a list of criteria that @ activities had to meet,

which are as follows33:

a) Use production processes characterized by inten-

sive use of new technology resources.

b) Have a high employment density (number of

workers or users/area).

c) Generate high added value.

d) Be directly related to the generation, processing

and transmission of information and knowledge.

e) Not pollute or be a nuisance, and be suitable for

central urban environments.

The decision to include a reference to new knowl-

edge-intensive activities and to potential changes in the

OECD method, and to establish some principles or gen-

24

29. ‘Noves estratègies...’ p. 20 and 21.30. A comprehensive study was carried out on the location of economic

activities in Barcelona, in the district of Sant Martí and the blocks ofPoblenou, based on the business tax and covering the period 1992-1997. The study revealed a trend of deindustrialization and ter-tiarization and examined at two-digit level the area of the blocks inPoblenou. See Joan Trullén and Rafael Boix, ‘Tendències recents del’activitat econòmica al Poblenou de Barcelona a partir de les dades del’impost d’activitats econòmiques’, collaboration agreement between

Barcelona City Council and the UAB, Department of AppliedEconomics, 1999.

31. See Miquel Barceló and Antoni Oliva, La ciudad digital, Pacte Industrialde la Regió Metropolitana de Barcelona, Beta Editorial, L’Hospitalet deLlobregat, 2002, p. 121.

32. Modificació del PGM per a la renovació de les àrees industrials delPoblenou-Districte d’Activitats 22@BCN, p. 249. Annex 1. Relació d’ac-tivitats @.

33. Ibidem Art. 7.2, p. 227.

eral criteria for assessing whether an economic activity

was suitable for inclusion within @ activities, required

the creation of decision-making procedures that were

different to those that had been used up to that point in

Barcelona’s urban planning regulations. Specifically, it

was agreed to create an advisory commission, comprised

of people of recognized technical and professional abili-

ty in the area of ICT, the information society, and the

knowledge economy. This commission would be

appointed by the Mayor of Barcelona, and would have

three objectives: report on the special plans that would

have to develop @ activities, propose updates to the list

of @ activities and assess, in cases of doubt or impreci-

sion, whether or not an activity met the criteria estab-

lished in the @ regulations.

4. Conclusion: Poblenou, 22@ Barcelona Dist r ict

of Act ivit ies

In this article, we focus on the inclusion of the

process of redevelopment of the industrial areas of

Poblenou and 22@ Barcelona in a broader project to

transform Barcelona, which was drawn up between

1999 and 2000 and which is known as Barcelona, City

of Knowledge. This project not only covers strategic

aspects of economy and urban planning, but also a

wide range of fields such as technology, research and

development, culture, education, employment and

information.

Barcelona’s new strategy is based on economic and

urban planning theories brought together in the princi-

ples of a new urban economy (the cities compete,

according to Roberto Camagni) and a new theory of

Marshallian industrial districts (the old criteria of classi-

fying activities by sectors no longer apply, as many of

the advantages are in the ‘district’, says Giacomo

Becattini).

If the key is not the ‘sector’ but the ‘district’, then

urban zoning must change. The old system of zoning

designation identified the sector as the basic economic

category. However, in the redevelopment of Poblenou a

new classification of ‘activities’ is proposed that

includes ICT and service activities that are ‘knowledge-

intensive’, according to the OECD definition.

To pass from an industrial manufacturing model to a

model of knowledge economy, it is essential to open up

the new zoning to these activites, to promote a new

production base with high employment density. This

will lead to the introduction of the new ‘district of

activities’ 22@ Barcelona, within the general project of

‘Barcelona, City of Knowledge’, of which the district

forms part.

References

ABRAMOVITZ, MOSES, & DAVID, PAUL A. (1996), ‘Technological Change

and the Rise of Intangible Investments: The US Economy’s Growth-

path in the Twentieth Century,’ Employment and Growth in the

Knowledge-based Economy, Paris: OECD.

ACEBILLO, JOSÉ ANTONIO (1998), ‘Barcelona: servidor central de la

xarxa metropolitana de ciutats’ in Revista Econòmica de Catalunya, no.

34, pp. 96-106.

BARCELÓ, MIQUEL, AND OLIVA, ANTONI, (2002) La ciudad digital. Pacto

Industrial de la Región Metropolitana de Barcelona, L’Hospitalet de

Llobregat: Beta editorial.

BARCELONA, METRÒPOLI MEDITERRÀNIA Monograph dedicated to

‘Projecte Barcelona Ciutat del Coneixement’, Ajuntament de

Barcelona, 2001.

BECATTINI, GIACOMO, (1986) ‘Del “sector” industrial al “districte”

industrial. Algunes consideracions sobre la unitat d’anàlisi de l’econo-

mia industrial’, Revista Econòmica de Catalunya, no. 1.

BOIX, RAFAEL, (2006) Barcelona ciutat del coneixement. Economia del

coneixement, tecnologies de la informació i de la comunicació, i noves estratè-

gies urbanes, Gabinet Tècnic de Programació, Ajuntament de Barcelona.

BUSQUETS, JOAN, (2004) Barcelona. La construcción urbanística de

una ciudad compacta, Barcelona: Serbal.

CAMAGNI, ROBERTO, (2005) Economia Urbana, Antoni Bosch Editor.

CLOS, JOAN, (2001) ‘Una ciutat amb idees’, Barcelona, metròpolis

mediterrània monographs, no. 1. Barcelona : Ajuntament de Barcelona.

Àrea de Relacions Ciutadanes.

CONSEIÇAO, PEDRO; HEITOR, MANUEL V. AND OLIVERA, PEDRO, (1998)

‘Expectations for the University in the Knowledge-based Economy’,

Technological Forecasting and Social Science, 58, p. 203-214.

GARCÍA-BRAGADO, RAMÓN, (2011) 22@Barcelona. 10 anys de renovació

urbana [prologue], Barcelona, 2011: Ajuntament de Barcelona.

KNIGHT, RICHARD V. (1995). ‘Knowledge-Based Development: Policy

and Planning Implications for cities’, Urban Studies, 32.

Modificació del Pla general metropolità per a la renovació de les àrees

industrials del Poblenou, districte d’activitats 22@BCN. Definitively

approved by Agreement of the Subcomissió d’Urbanisme del Municipi

de Barcelona on 27 July 2000 (DOGC no. 3239 de 5/10/2000).


NADAL, JORDI I TAFUNELL, XAVIER, (1992) Sant Martí de Provençals:

pulmó industrial de Barcelona, 1847-1992, Barcelona: Ed. Columna.

OECD (1998) Science, Technology, Industry. University Research in

Transition, Paris.

OLIVA, ANTONI, (2003) El districte d’activitats 22@bcn, Barcelona: Aula

Barcelona.

ROCA I ROSELL, FRANCESC, (1979) Política econòmica i territori a

Catalunya, 1901-1939, Barcelona: Ed. Ketres.

TRULLÉN, JOAN, (1998) ‘Factors territorials de competitivitat a la

Regió Metropolitana de Barcelona’, Revista Econòmica de Catalunya, no.

34, January 1998, p. 34-51.

TRULLÉN, JOAN (1998): Noves estratègies econòmiques i territorials per a

Barcelona, Barcelona: Ajuntament de Barcelona, Gabinet Tècnic de

Programació.

TRULLÉN, JOAN; BOIX, RAFAEL AND SANTANA, JUAN ANTONIO, (1998)

Tendències de l’ocupació a Barcelona a partir de INSS i IAE (1993-1997),

Research Agreement between Barcelona Activa and UAB,

Departament d’Economia Aplicada, duplicated.

TRULLÉN, JOAN, AND BOIX, RAFAEL, (1999) Tendències recents de l’activi-

tat econòmica al Poblenou de Barcelona a partir de les dades de l’Impost

d’Activitats Econòmiques, Partnership Agreement between Ajuntament

de Barcelona and UAB, Departament d’Economia Aplicada.

TRULLÉN, JOAN, (2001) La metròpoli de Barcelona cap a l’economia del

coneixement: diagnosi econòmica i territorial de Barcelona 2001. Barcelona:

Ajuntament de Barcelona, Gabinet Tècnic de Programació.

TRULLÉN, JOAN; LLADÓS, JOSEP AND BOIX, RAFAEL,(2002) ‘Economía del

conocimiento, ciudad y competitividad’, Investigaciones Regionales,

no. 1, p. 139-161.


Introduct ion: 22@ as a necessary condit ion to

increase worldwide compet it iveness through the size

of the supply and consolidated clusters

At the end of 2000, a major redevelopment operation

started with the definitive approval of the Modification of

the Metropolitan General Plan to redevelop industrial areas

of Poblenou, the 22@ Barcelona district of activities, which

covers an area equivalent to 113 blocks of Cerdà’s Eixample

and has a potential of close to 4 million m2 of gross floor

space (GFS). This operation was to be carried out in a tradi-

tional industrial area that was occupied by around 1.4 mil-

lion m2 of built floor space in varying states of physical and

functional obsolescence and with a manufacturing zoning

designation (22a). In general, the existing constructions

underutilized a very central area that is just 15 minutes from

the centre of Barcelona.

Over 4,600 dwellings were also located in the 198-ha

area. These dwellings, which were not fully legal, were kept

in the new plan. The 22@ development increases the hous-

ing stock by around 4,000 dwellings for affordable housing

and on ceded land, with a GFS equivalent to 10% of the

total development (0.3 FAR - floor space area ratio), which

will be transferred to the City Council from the develop-

ment by law and as its share in the planning gains.

Thus, a potential 3.2 million m2 GFS for economic activ-

ities was put on the market for building high-density offices

(3 FAR in the blocks1), as corresponds to a central business

district. This is a necessary condition for competing in the

global real estate market and attracting new economic activ-

ity to the central city, which, without the critical mass of 22@

and the opportunity to create clusters, would have had to

mainly locate activities in the outskirts of the metropolitan

area in a more dispersed way. This highlights the role of

Barcelona as the central server in a system of metropolitan

towns and cities, and the focus of directional activities.

The block is the basic unit for planning and for manag-

ing private initiatives, if there is agreement among over 50%

of the land owners. This unit facilitates the distribution of

profits and charges resulting from the development plan,

which is in proportion with the land ownership by existing

companies. It also provides sufficient flexibility to adapt the

supply to the needs of the real estate market. The plan that

the City Council began to implement in four predetermined

areas and the move of activities to the district are additional

incentives for the development of private initiative.

From an economic perspective, the plot ratio incentive

(up to 2.7 FAR for @ activities in the new economy and

2.2 FAR for other service sector uses, such as hotels,

excluding manufacturing activity and storage) generates

planning gains to cover compensation for relocations

(around €600 per m2 of existing floor space), demolitions,

compensation for existing buildings (around €200 per m2

of existing floor space), the costs of city and internal infra-

The impact of 22@ on urban developmentand real estate: Barcelona’s future centralbusiness district

Sara Mur and Joaqu im ClusaConsulting economists, www.murclusa.cat


(*) The authors are grateful for the interest of the BSAV. The map was includ-ed thanks to Albert Viladomiu Mangrané, Director of Urban Planning ofthe BSAV, and it was drawn up by: [email protected]

1. The FAR (floor space area ratio) of 3 m2 of gross floor space/m2 of land isequivalent to a building area of around 36,000 m2 of floor space above

grade in a block of the Eixample (12,000 m2 of land). This is almost equiv-alent, for example, to building a Mapfre Tower (approximately 42,000 m2

of gross floor space above grade) or an average-sized Corte Inglés of 7floors above grade of around 45,000 m2 of gross floor space) and explainsthe type of building in the blocks with new constructions.

structure and the proportional contribution to financing

the redevelopment of the entire area, according to the

specifications of the Special Infrastructure Plan (PEI) and

which accounts for less than €80 per m2 of floor space

above grade that the corresponding tax ordinance deter-

mines per unit of land area.

The concept of PEI is also an innovation in the man-

agement and private financing of the redevelopment of

the entire area. It determines a high standard of quality

for the electricity supply, telecommunications and waste

collection. Thus, the planning gains also finance most of

the infrastructure of the city, with only a minimum con-

tribution of general investment from the City Council’s

current revenue. This funding mechanism was subse-

quently applied to the infrastructure of La Marina del Prat

Vermell and is planned for La Verneda. It could be applied

in the implementation of urban development plans in the

entire municipality, to finance the city infrastructure that

cannot be assigned to specific sectors.

Naturally, the blocks that have already been trans-

formed or those that are more likely to be transformed in

the future are those that are less dense and close to the

average plot ratio for the previous use (around 1 FAR), as

less compensation needs to be paid. Therefore, the time it

takes to infill the area will depend on the market condi-

tions at each moment to pay the compensation, so the

densest blocks are likely to take longer to develop.

The development of the blocks could be delayed if dis-

agreements arise between landowners that are not part of

the initial majority initiative. Such disagreements are gen-

erally due to compensation, as the financing of the new

development could be covered by property developers

who buy the land from the current landowners. Although

the compensation committees have legal instruments for

paying compensation to the minority owner, this does

not mean that arguments will not arise that could delay

the development of the whole block or sector.

Development in blocks also helps to surpass the min-

imum standards of general urban planning regulations, as

20% of the block or area is set aside for open spaces and

10% for all kinds of facilities, including newly created

ones that are of a 22@ nature.

Free land transfers are neutral in relation to the sale

price of the real estate product, as the residual unit value

of the plots is the derived demand based on the the sale

price of the final product. The business costs, the profit

from the promotion, and the absolute price of plots only

depends on the plot ratio attributed in the plans and the

unit price.

The dimension of the 22@ district can be compared to

La Défense in Paris2, which is advertised as the biggest

international business district in Europe and is centrally

situated3. In an area of 564 ha4, a total of 3.4 million m2 of

offices, 0.95 M m2 of commercial floor space and 0.95 M

m2 of dwellings have been constructed in this area since

the 1960s. There is a total of 4.4 M m2 GFS for economic

activity, 185,000 jobs and 20,000 residents. Today, the

headquarters of 12 of the 50 biggest multinational com-

panies in the world are located in the Île-de-France area,

with 50 million m2 of offices.

The 3.2 M m2 GFS of 22@ represents 72% of the floor

space for economic activity in La Défense and could

house 133,000 jobs in the future using an equivalent stan-

dard (24 m2 GFS per job). Although the total area will

only be 35% of that of La Défense and the average plot

ratio will be around double, the comparison is appropri-

ate as it highlights the scope and development opportu-

nities of 22@. The dimensions of office space in towns in

the Barcelona metropolitan area, with 12.2 M m2(5) (of

which 7.3 M m2 GFS corresponds to the municipality of

Barcelona), are smaller than the 50 million m2 in Île-de-

France stated in information on La Défense, given the

differences in the level of rent, the degree of tertiarization

of the economy, and the effect of its capital status.

All the main urban agglomerations in the world aim

to expand their central business districts in locations as

close to the centre as possible. This is also the case of

Madrid, which in 2009 initially approved a zoning plan


2. http://www.ladefense-seine-arche.fr/les-lieux-du-projet/la-defense.html.Document ‘Enjoy La Défense Seine Arche’. May 2011.

3. They advertise that the district is 10 minutes from the centre of Paris and30 minutes from the airports in public transport.

4. With 31 ha of open area and 11 ha of green spaces.5. Information from the Land Registry Office, Technical Programming Unit,July 2009.

for the extension of La Castellana under the slogan ‘The

economic heart of Madrid’6. The 312-ha area has a poten-

tial 3.05 million m2 GFS, 45% of which would be for hous-

ing and 55% for economic activity (2.4 M m2 GFS). The

Madrid model differs from that of Paris and Barcelona

basically in the proportions of housing and economic

activity, which are almost equivalent. However, this is an

issue that could be considered in future plans for

Barcelona or in the modification of current plans.

Consequently, 22@ is a plan with a vision for the

future. It was drawn up to make more floor space avail-

able for the offices the market required, and to encour-

age the location of the advanced technology activities

that the new economy needed and continues to need. It

has dimensions, location, quality of city infrastructure

and innovative systems of financing and management

that are comparable to the best initiatives carried out

worldwide.

The recession that began in the second half of 2007

has substantially changed the rate of applications for 22@

building permits. The rate of annual approval of permits

for the 2008-2010 period (133,105 m2 GFS per year) was

23-27% lower than that in 2002-2007 (122,933 m2 GFS

per year if 7 years are considered and 143,422 m2 GFS

from 2002 to 2003). The duration of the low demand will

naturally affect the absorption rate, both in 22@ and in

the other operations in Barcelona that are currently sup-

plied or in the planning and development stages.

Given that construction in 22@ has taken place in four

and a half years of expansion and three and a half years of

contraction, we could consider that the medium-term

demand is in the order of 100,000 m2 GFS per year in

approved building permits and around 4,200 new jobs per

year, using the average standard of La Défense in Paris.

In this article, we deal successively with the following

topics: the forecasts in the initial economic and financial

study in relation to the current results (Section 1); the

supply in 22@ in the context of competing operations in

Barcelona ‘river to river’ (Section 2); the situation of com-

petitive prices and the parameters and opinions in reports

by real estate agents, with reference to some internation-

al prices (Section 3); reference to the economic feasibility

of the development, according to the influence of the dif-

ferent components of the prices and particularly to the

compensation and costs of the city infrastructure (Section

4); the potential building area in 22@ up to 2020 (Section

5); the impact of 22@ on the rest of the construction

dynamics in Barcelona, as reflected by the approved

building permits above and below grade (Section 6).

The concluding chapter (Section 7) refers to the

dimension that will be attained by 22@ and the opera-

tions around the La Sagrera station when completed, in

the context of floor space for tertiary activities in the var-

ious districts of Barcelona and according to the land reg-

istry records. This section supports the hypothesis that the

floor space for economic activity, and certainly the occu-

pation, will surpass that of the districts of Ciutat Vella and

the Eixample, which form the old business centre of

Barcelona.

Forecasts and economic hypotheses in the

Modified Met ropolit an General Plan (MPGM):

20 years, absorpt ion of 135,000 m 2 GFS per year

and economic feasibilit y of compensat ion

‘The main aim of this Economic and Financial Study is

to ensure that the forecasts in the development plan are

met, and to demonstrate that the distribution of charges

and profits is feasible, meets the provisions established in

planning regulations, and is in line with the situation in

the real estate market. In particular, the aim is to highlight

that the development of the “zones”, at the current and

foreseeable value of the real estate market, and public

investment and that from other sources can adequately

finance the “systems” (infrastructure, compensations, city

infrastructure and facilities for the community) required

for the urban development.

This document refers particularly to the following

points:

1. Dimension of the new supply of floor space for eco-

nomic activities resulting from the development plan.


6. http://www.madrid.es/portales/munimadrid/es

2. Demand for floor space for economic activities in

Barcelona and Poblenou.

3. Feasibility of the new urban development

charges, to be financed with the increase in plot ratio.

4. Assessment of the feasibility in real estate terms

of the transformation operations (special plans).’ (From

the amended text for definitive approval of the

Modification of the Metropolitan General Plan,

September 2000, pages 1 and 3).

With respect to the first aspect, the study’s summa-

ry table gives the following figures for potential: ‘If we

add the 509,976 m2 GFS of existing housing and local

and @ facilities, the total potential is just over 3,500,000

m2 GFS. The fulfilment of the potential is foreseen in 20

years in 2019, at an average rate of 133,000 m2 of floor

space for economic activities per year and the construc-

tion of around 4,000 affordable dwellings.’

The following statement was made on the job

potential: ‘The new urban planning also provides the

opportunity to increase the number of jobs located in

Poblenou, which is currently at around 31,000 people,

according to the register for 1996. With an optimistic

forecast of a density of 25 m2 of floor space per job,

the new production district will house over 91,000

jobs.’7

The following should be highlighted: ‘...given that

the annual growth in GDP in these years has been

2.5% on average; a rate that we can reasonably expect

to maintain in the next ten years and at least enables

us to forecast various economic growth scenarios.’

On the assessment of the supply for economic activ-

ity in Barcelona in 1999, the study stated: ‘For these rea-

sons, Poblenou’s share in the dynamics of the munici-

pality is between a minimum of 40% and a maximum of

60%. If we apply these percentages to the trend of

387,854 m2 GFS per year for all types of tertiary activities,

the potential demand in Poblenou is between 155,034 m2

and 232,550 m2 of new floor space per year, with an aver-

age forecast of 194,000 m2 of new floor space per year.

[...] Barcelona currently has a stock of 4 million m2 of

offices, which is 56% of the stock of Madrid and 16%

that of London. [...] The City Council must ensure the

transformation of Poblenou regardless of the economic

and real estate cycle. [...] The vision must be for 15-20

years. [...] Currently, 35-45% of the stock of offices is

considered obsolete and does not meet the users’

requirements. [...] The estimation of the total absorption

of offices of an “international level” in Barcelona and the

metropolitan area is estimated [...]to be 197,000 m2 per

year. The share of Poblenou in the most optimistic fore-

cast would be situated, according to this study, at 69% of

the total absorption in the metropolitan area, that is,

135,930 m2 per year. [...] The operation in Poblenou is

presented as a unique opportunity to re-centralize a

Metropolitan process that is excessively decentralised.’

On the economic feasibility of private operations,

the document stated that: ‘An operation shall be prof-

itable when the difference between the value of the

resulting plots that have to be developed and the total

costs of developing them is positive and this difference


7. More recently, the figure of 150,000 potential jobs has been estimated by22@ (2009), ‘22@Barcelona project. A social, urban and economic urbanrenewal’, Mimeo, p. 24.

Plan of st ages

Development of a new potent ial floor space for product ion act ivit ies

Potential GFS 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015-2019

Predetermined operations 1,150,833 345,251 460,331 345,251

Optional operations 1,509,021

Encumbrances = <38,000 pts/ potential m2 of gross floor space 901,626 180,324 360,651 180,325 180,326

Encumbrances = > 38,000 pts/potential m2 of gross floor space 607,395 91,109 121,479 212,588 182,219

TOTAL 2,659,654 616,884 942,464 738,164 362,545

100% 23% 35% 28% 14%

reaches a percentage of the total investment that is

equal to or higher than the ordinary returns in the real

estate sector.’

The justification of the economic feasibility of private

operations was supported by detailed accounts that were

submitted for three types of blocks of different densities

and with the final conclusion that ‘...we obtained resid-

ual values of land at the start of the operation [...] that in

all cases were above the €601/m2 of land (€100,000/m2 of

land) that correspond to a plot ratio of 1 FAR before the

expectations of reclassification’.

The considerable innovation in the redevelopment

of the sector and its financing was described as follows:

‘Barcelona City Council shall draw up a special infra-

structure plan to define and specify the standard of the

aforementioned urban development services and the

characteristics of other required infrastructures and

services, both those planned for the public domain and

those planned for private land’. In accordance with the

suppositions of city infrastructure drawn from the

progress in the PEI, the economic feasibility study

(EEF) of the MPGM estimated that the unit cost of the

investment required in the area of the MPGM is

€180/m2 of road (30,000 pta/m2) and the total invest-

ment is €119 M (19.780 billion pta). The planned

financing is 70% from the owners of the land under

transformation (1,269,409 m2 of land counted) and 30%

from the public services providers. The resulting cost to

landowners is €24/m2 GFS in areas with a plot ratio of

2.2 FAR and €30/m2 GFS in those of 2.7 FAR’.

After 10 years of urban development and economic

management that is in line with the forecasts both in

terms of the rate of transformation, demand, city infra-

structure and public-private financing in a cycle of

expansion, the development of the innovative 22@ dis-

trict since 2000 should be adapted to the recession,

which increases the length of time needed to attain the

proposed objectives.

Concurrent and compet it ive operat ions:

12.4 M m 2 GFS, a surplus of 207,500 jobs and a short-

fall of 198,600 dwellings

Barcelona started this century with a limited supply of

offices. However, this changed with the approval of the

22@ project in 2000, with a total floor space of

approximately 4 million m2, of which around 3.2 M m2

GFS are for economic activity. The project represented a

major quantitative and qualitative change in supply that

put Barcelona in a competitive position in the global

market.

This supply for economic activity competes today with

the operations in the Plaça d’Europa in Hospitalet

(0.2 M m2 GFS), the Forum (0.6 M m2 GFS) and Fira de

Barcelona (0.2 M m2 GFS), with a potential of around

26,000 jobs8.

In the future, the supply in 22@ will have to compete

with that of La Marina del Prat Vermell (0.3 M m2 GFS), La

Verneda (0.3 M m2 GFS), Biopol (0.3 M m2 GFS), BZ

Barcelona Innovation Zone (1 M m2 GFS)9, with a potential

for approximately 52,700 jobs, and particularly the supply

around the future central station of La Sagrera-Prim

(0.5 M m2 GFS), with an estimated potential for 18,400 jobs,

according to the information in the attached tables10.

The potential floor space above grade in 22@ has

been updated with documents and information provid-

ed by 22@ Barcelona S.A.U. The below grade figures

have been kept as in the MPGM.

Given its significance, we should also refer to the poten-

tial supply of the operation in the Centre Direccional de

Cerdanyola - Parc de l’Alba, whose plans were approved in

2005. This supply could be considered in a complementary

market to the operations in the city centre. It will meet a dif-

ferent demand for economic activity in terms of the charac-

teristics, location and price. It covers an area of 340 ha and

has a potential floor space of 1.9 million m2, of which

1.5 M m2 GFS are for economic activity.


8. The number of potential jobs is calculated by considering the same plans withapproximate standards of 20 m2 of gross floor space per job in offices, 40 m2

of gross floor space/job in retail, 60 m2 of gross floor space/job in facilities,60-100 m2 of gross floor space/job in logistic activities and industries and2,500 m2 of gross floor space/job in car parks.

9. The incorporation of the major suppply from the plans for El Prat de Llobregat

(La Seda, Enkalene, etc.), Gavà, Viladecans (DeltaBCN Aerospace and MobilityPark, etc.), Sant Boi de Llobregat, Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramanetthat should be taken into account are beyond the scope of this article.

10. The city infrastructure operations in La Marina and La Verneda areplanned in three phases. In the BZ Barcelona Innovation Zone, a firstphase of city infrastructure of 30 ha is already planned.


Major operat ions in Barcelona

Totalareaha

Area forhousing

(m2 GFS)

Area foreconomicactivity

(m2 GFS)

Facilities (m2 GFS)

Total areaabove grade

(m2 GFS)

Floor space belowgrade/ car parks

(m2 GFS)

Total potential floorspace (without facili-

ties) (m2 GFS)

Definitiveapproval(m2 GFS)

Operation

22@ (2000) 198.3 367,382 3,136,095 3,503,478 389,275 3,892,753 940,000 2000

Forum 256.6 260,693 645,374 906,067 228,555 1,134,622 128,452 1999

Prim 21.2 264,726 29,414 294.140 34,431 328,571 90,080 2010

La Sagrera station and surroundings 81.4 752,831 435,972 1,188,803 220,594 1,409,397 395,533 Compiled

BZ Barcelona Innovation Zone (Zona Franca) 50.0 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 2011

La Verneda 58.2 676,094 289,755 965,849 68,750 1,034,599 286.422 P.P.A.

La Marina 75.0 869,238 315,420 1,184,658 38,336 1,222,994 383,088 2005

Vallbona 24.4 169,600 18,844 188,444 18,700 207,144 57,711 P.D.A.

Plaça d’Europa L’Hospitalet 42.0 168,533 195,962 364,495 3,677 368,172 98,056 2001

Biopol L’Hospitalet 30.0 — 300,000 300,000 —- 300,000 75,000 Compiled

Ciutat de la Justícia L’Hospitalet 5.3 — 84,379 84,379 147,989 232,368 45,500 2003

Fira de Barcelona (2000) L’Hospitalet 24.0 — 240,000 240,000 — 240,000 125,000 2001

Gran Via L’Hospitalet — — 367,618 367,618 — 367,618 72,497 Compiled

Housing Programme Operations 2011 65.2 748,000 62,064 810,064 76,403 886,467

Total 931.6 4,277,097 7,120,897 11,397,995 1,226,710 12,624,705 2,697,339

(22@/ Total) 21% 9% 44% 31% 32% 31% 35%

(22@ + La Sagrera and surroundings)/ Total 32% 32% 51% 44% 53% 45% 53%

(22@ + La Sagrera and surroundings)/ Total BCN 36% 34% 61% 50% 60% 51% 62%

Source: drawn up by authors using the information available in planning documents and reports.Note: (P.D.A.: pending definitive approval; P.P.A.: pending provisional approval)

Major urban operat ions 2000-2030: 1,182 ha - 11.4 M m 2 GFS (excluding facilit ies)

Source: base plan provided by Barcelona Sagrera Alta Velocitat. Data compiled by authors.

To date, urban infrastructure has been carried out, as

well as the construction of a synchrotron. As a result, the

Barcelona metropolitan area has a quality supply for dif-

ferent types of high-tech industrial activities in an area of

approximately 600 km2, which is equivalent to the area of

the municipality of Madrid.

In the case of 22@, the average standard in the eco-

nomic feasibility study for the MPGM was 25 m2 GFS per

job in the district, with an estimated total of 91,000 jobs.

However, the number of potential jobs has been updated to

an estimated potential figure of 150,000 (22@, op. cit. p. 24).

The major operations considered, together with other

operations in the 2011 housing programme11, have a total

potential of 11.4 M m2 GFS, 7.1 M m2 GFS for economic

activity, and include a considerable potential supply of new

dwellings (56,000 units), with a high percentage reserved

for affordable housing. Some of these operations are high-

ly self-sufficient in the ratio of the active population/poten-

tial jobs, as is the case of La Marina del Prat Vermell and La

Verneda12.

Together, all of the operations up to their completion

generate a potential of 59,000 active members of the pop-

ulation13, with a surplus of 207,500 jobs and at the same

time a shortfall of 198,600 dwellings (161,300 in the

municipality of Barcelona).

This conclusion is similar to that drawn from a study

carried out in 200514 on the entire Barcelona metropolitan

area and plans for over 200,000 m2 GFS. It estimated that

there was a surplus of 522,000 jobs in 2011 in comparison

to the expected dynamics (op. cit. p. 15).

The total potential figures were estimated at

775,000 jobs and 427,000 new dwellings, and an absorption

period of 31 years for floor space for economic activity and

17 years for that of dwellings (op. cit. p. 54), with the expect-

ed dynamics at that time. In terms of the argument followed

in this article, the metropolitan area plans for 2001-2002


Major operat ions in Barcelona

No. dwellings No. residents No. active population Balance (active population -jobs)No. jobsOperation

22@ (2000) 4,000 8,800 4,180 150,000 125,820

Forum 6,273 14,766 7,014 14,211 7,197

Prim 3,509 7,720 3,667 884 —2,783

La Sagrera station and surroundings 9,410 20,703 9,834 17,515 7,682

BZ Barcelona Innovation Zone (Zona Franca) — — — 20,000 20,000

La Verneda 8,781 19,088 9,067 9,090 23

La Marina 10,865 23,904 11,354 10,405 -949

Vallbona 2,120 4,876 2,316 818 -1,498

Plaça d’Europa L’Hospitalet 1,684 3,705 1,760 8,477 6,718

Biopol L’Hospitalet - — — — 13,213 13,213

Ciutat de la Justícia L’Hospitalet - - — — — 3,000 3,000

Fira de Barcelona (2000) L’Hospitalet — — — 3,429 3,429

Other Gran Via L’Hospitalet — — — 12,636 12,636

Housing Programme Operations 2011 9,350 20,570 9,771 2,825 -6,946

Total 55,992 124,132 58,963 266,503 207,540

(22@/ Total) 7% 7% 7% 56% 61%

(22@ + La Sagrera and surroundings)/ Total 30% 30% 30% 63% 63%

(22@ + La Sagrera and surroundings)/ Total BCN 31% 31% 31% 75% 78%

Source: drawn up by authors using the information available in planning documents and reports.

11. ‘Municipal commitment to boost the generation of land and promote20,000 dwellings in the next eight years’, by the governing team ofBarcelona City Council, April 2011 (excluding La Marina, Prim andVallbona which are included in the major operations).

12. Pending provisional approval.

13. Estimates using the standards of 2.2 people per dwelling and 47.5% of theresidents actively employed.

14. Roca, J., Clusa, J., Marmolejo, C. (2005), El potencial urbanístic de laRegió Metropolitana de Barcelona. Barcelona City Council, TechnicalProgramming Unit. Collection: Conèixer Barcelona. The study onlytookinto account plans for over 200,000 m2 of gross floor space above grade.

would have a surplus of 329,000 jobs or, alternatively, a

potential shortfall of 315,000 dwellings.

Therefore, the supply of new floor space for economic

activity in 22@ (3.2 M m2 GFS), together with the supply in

La Sagrera-Prim (0.5 M m2), comprises 51% of the supply

of land for economic activities ‘from river to river’ and

would ensure a wide supply for over 20 years according to

the past dynamics, which have been temporarily disrupted

by the recession. We cannot guarantee the same situation

with respect to housing needs, whose forecasts will defi-

nitely have to be reconsidered in the current economic sit-

uation and the periods required for coverage and comple-

tion will have to be lengthened.

Today, the operations of the Forum, Ciutat de la Justícia,

Fira de Barcelona and Plaça d’Europa are practically com-

pleted, whilst other operations that have been approved

more recently, such as La Marina (2005), have not been

sufficiently developed.

The potential available in 22@ and La Sagrera-Prim will

constitute in coming years the main supply for economic

activity (around 2.1 M m2 GFS and around 96,600 jobs), but

it will have to compete with the supply in the rest of the cen-

tral city, as it will account for approximately 47% of the total

for the major operations considered.

22@ in the market of offices and hotels according

to real estate reports: new business distr ict

with economical prices

Offices are the most common type of building in 22@.

They represent 51% of the floor space above grade in build-

ing permits approved from 2000 to 2010 (487,637 m2 GFS

out of a total of 959,846 m2 GFS). The next biggest use is

that of affordable housing, which amounts to 18% of the

approved floor space above grade. This is followed by

hotels, with 13% of the approved floor space above grade.

The area for car parks (441,753 m2 GFS) increases floor

space above grade associated with uses above grade by

46%. Therefore, the three main real estate markets for 22@

are offices, affordable housing and hotels.

The Forcadell report indicates that the average office

rent in what are known as the ‘new business centres’

(22@, Plaça d’Europa in Hospitalet, Plaça Cerdà-Passeig

de la Zona Franca) stood at €13.90 /m2 GFS at the end of

2010 and maximum rents of €18.95 /m2 GFS, although the

closing prices (or ‘expert opinion’ prices, in the words of the

report) are estimated at €7 and €13 /m2 GFS. The ‘new

business centres’ have prices lower than those in the prime

zones, the business district and the central zone, but above

the price of offices in the outskirts of the city.

Rents in 22@ are 22% below those in the prime zone at

€17.56/m2/month on average and a closing price of

between €15 and €19/m2/month. It is notable that the clos-

ing prices are more similar to the asking prices than in

other zones.

According to the same report, the sale prices in 22@

are €3,325/m2 floor space (with closing prices of €2,200-

2,700/m2 GFS) and are 37% lower than in the prime zone

(€5,250/m2 GFS).

The rates of return (yields) that reflect the risk of invest-

ing in each location of the city for new business centres and

for the outskirts stand at between 7 and 8% per year, com-

pared to 5.5-6.5% in the prime zones. In addition, the avail-

ability rates are higher the further from the centre, compared

to the average of 13% for all of Barcelona, which is far from

the 7% found in 2007.

The report states that the drop in prices compared to

previous years is greater the further from the centre,

although ‘...in 2010 most of the operations were carried out

in decentralized zones, unlike in 2009, which was dominat-

ed by the prime zone and the business district’.

According to the Forcadell report, office rental in

Barcelona amounted to 3.4 million m2 from 2000 to 2010,

with an average of 305,500 m2 GFS per year. The year with

the lowest office rental was 2001 (212,000 m2, as shown in

the first graph), whilst with the recession already underway,

a total of 225,300 m2 were rented in 2009 and 239,100 m2 in

2010. The average for the 8 years of expansion is 320,000 m2

and that of the 3 years of recession is 268,000 m2, with an

average for the 11-year period of 306,000 m2.

The Savills report of 2010 states that the net absorp-

tion of offices in 2010 was 274,000 m2 GFS, which coin-

cides almost exactly with the rental figures in the

Forcadell report. Although the rental volume cannot be

directly related with the number of building permits


approved, the share for 22@ can be estimated by relat-

ing the area for which permits were granted with the

area rented in the period of expansion (122,933 m2 GFS,

compared to the aforementioned 320,000 m2 GFS). This

gives a share of 39% of the market of offices built exclu-

sively in Barcelona and L’Hospitalet.

In this context, the 22@ district is in an intermediate

position in terms of its attractiveness in Barcelona’s real

estate market , despite the competitive prices that it

offers. The reports by estate agents for offices show that

there is a good rate of office rental in Plaça d’Euro pa and

that this can be attributed to the good public transport


�000

500,000

400,000

300,000

�00,000

�001 �00� �003 �004 �005 �006 �007 �009�008

100,000

0

�010

Rental (m 2) of offices in Barcelona 2000-2010

Source: Forcadell (2011).

1984

60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0

1986 1988 1990 199� �010 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1994 1996 1998 �000 �00�1995 1997 1999 �001 �003 �004 �006 �008�005 �007 �009

�0.0

10.0

0

Prime rentals at Dec. �010 prices €/m2 GFS per month

Prime rentals BCN nominal rents €/m2 GFS per month

‘Pr ime rentals’ in Barcelona offices in 3/m 2 of gross floor space/month 1985-2010. Nominal rent s every year and constant rent s at December 2010 pr ices

Source: Savills 2011 (nominal prices) and compiled by authors for the conversion to constant prices.

connections with the rest of the city, and particularly with

the airport.

The evolution of office prices in relation to economic

cycles can be clearly illustrated using statistics and graphs

from the Savills report15 for the second half of 2011, from a

26-year perspective beginning in 1984, which was the start

of what was known as the bubble of 1986-1991, as shown

in the enclosed graph.

The recession of 1991 began with very high rents that

were recovered, in nominal values, in 2008. However, the

real values have still not surpassed the 1991 levels. Only

57% of the constant rentals of 1991 have been obtained,

which illustrates the dimension of the 1986-1991 bubble,

particularly in the market of offices16, and the sensitivity of

this market to economic cycles that do not always coin-

cide with the cycle of housing prices.

In terms of hotels as a second real estate open market

in 22@, the 2009 report on hotel real estate by CB Richard

Ellis is notable. In reference to 2008, the report states:

...there is a considerable increase in new projects in the

Sant Martí district, specifically in the 22@ zone and its

area of influence. In practice, this relocation highlights

the sector’s definitive commitment to this zone of busi-

ness development. Gradually, the major chains have

begun to set up this area, which is starting to become one

of the city’s important business enclaves. Forty per cent

of new projects are located in this zone, which also ben-

efits from greater land availability and from the fact

that the prices are noticeably lower that in more consol-

idated and central zones...

This preference for locating hotels in 22@, even though

they cannot benefit from the maximum plot ratio for @

activities of 2.7 FAR, can be explained, regardless of the

capacity to purchase plots, by the fact that the sector is

growing and the @ part of the building area (0.5 FAR) can

be transferred to the rest of the development.

As a reference, office rents in Paris, according to informa-

tion provided by the promotion of La Défense, are as follows:

- Prime rents = €750 per m2 GFS and year

(€63 /m2 GFS/month)

- La Défense = €515 per m2 GFS and year


- Seine Arche = €330 per m2 GFS and year


Rents in La Défense are 32% lower than the prime

rents in the centre of Paris, whilst the figure of €14 per m2

of gross floor space and month in 22@ is 28% lower than

rents for the best locations in the centre of Barcelona. This

indicates comparable positions within the city with

respect to the central business district (CBD), as would be

expected with similar public transport distances.

If we compare the prime rents in Barcelona for the sec-

ond half of 2011 (€19.50/m2 GFS/month), we find that

Paris prices are 3.2 times higher than those of Barcelona.

Rents in La Défense are 3.1 times those of 22@, whilst

those of the Seine Arche, which is in a less central posi-

tion, are only two times higher. However, in central posi-

tions of 22@ the prime rents of Barcelona can be achieved,

which indicates the value and real estate interest in this

zone, and the different rents within the district.

Although low prices can be considered a positive factor

in terms of competitiveness and attraction, the stable

prices of real estate products reflect companies’ interest in

being located in a specific city or place within a city, and at

the same time reflects the payment capacity of the compa-

nies that move there. Therefore, comparatively high real

estate prices that are maintained by stable demand are

good news for a city’s economy.

Majority private financing for quality re-urbanisat ion:

economic feasibility of the development of blocks

with affordable contribut ions

The construction and renovation of a city requires pub-

lic and private investment in city infrastructure and con-

struction, financed by the planning gains for building

determined in the urban development plan in use by the

territory’s governing authorities. The recovery of planning

gains finances the infrastructure. The trend is for each


15. The average rents in the ‘prime’ zone in the Forcadell report (€17.56 ) onlydiffer by approximately 10% from those in the Savills report.

16. The Mapfre Tower was not fully occupied until 2002, although its con-struction was completed in 1992.

development to cover all of the direct and indirect costs

incurred by the city, and to provide reserves for affordable

housing. Here we present the two aspects of financing,

analysed from the perspective of the public sector (through

the Special Infrastructure Plan (PEI)) and private promo-

tion (through the example of an economic feasibility study

(EEF) in the urban planning stage).

The Special Infrastructure Plan (PEI) for Poblenou-

22@, which is designed as an urban development instru-

ment that covers the entire area of the MPGM, also

includes the connecting infrastructure required for the

area to operate and assesses other actions that ‘...are still

not located within the area of the Plan and are not works

carried out to connect it, but are considered important for

the development of the zone’ (EEF of the PEI, 2000).

The total investment that was initially expected was 329

million euros,17 of which €210 M (64%) corresponds to

investments in the area of 22@, €10 M (3%) to connection

areas and €109 M (33%) to areas outside of the Plan. By type

of activity, the main investment is the €154 M in mobility

(47% of the entire investment), which is located mainly out-

side of the area of the Plan (approximately 70%) and

involves two important actions: the Avinguda Diagonal

tram and the Front Marítim tram. The two next largest sys-

tems in terms of investment are: energy (24% of the total)

and public space (15% of the total), followed by telecom-

munications (7%), cleaning and waste treatment (4%) and

the water cycle (3%).

The financing of investment in 22@ and connecting

infrastructure, which in total is estimated to amount to


Dist r ibut ion of investment in the PEI by areas (€M)

Total 22@area; 210.3

Connectinginfrastructure; 10.3

Outside of Plan�s scope; 108.7

Investment in the PEI by t ype of act ions (€M)

Total energy 77.9

Total telecommu-nications21.7

Total water cycle 10.1

Cleaning and waste treatment 14.7

Public space 50.8

Total mobility 154.0

Investment in PEI by t ype of act ions (%)

Total energy 24%

Total telecomu-nicacions 7%

Total water cycle 3%

Cleaning and waste treatment 4%

Public space 15%

Total mobility 47%

Financing of the investment in 22@ and connect ions

Development 8%

City Council8%

Other 14%

Operators 32%

Urban planning encumbrances 38%

17. The updated amount is €376.8 M. The use of information from the docu-ment approved in 2000 is justified as it includes details of financing bythe public sector, companies and property developers.

18. In 2006, the transfer of 10% of the development to the City Council wasnot free of encumbrances; this was a precept of State Land Law 8/2007.

€221 M, is expected to be met as follows: 38% from city

infrastructure, 32% from service operators, 8% directly

from municipal budgets, 8% from property developers (in

addition to the charges for city infrastructure) and the

remaining 14% from the other financiers who are involved.

The cost forecasts in the PEI that are included as pri-

vate charges in the corresponding land compensation

projects are likely to be lower than current requirements

in state and Catalan planning regulations referring to

connecting infrastructures and participation to compen-

sate for the shortfall in public transport. The EEF of the

MPGM estimated a unit cost of €24 or €30 /m2 GFS, for

plot ratios of 2.2 and 2.7 FAR, respectively.

Private financing of the urban transformation also

includes the costs of compensation for relocation of exist-

ing activities and rehousing of those in existing dwellings,

demolitions and the infrastructure of the interior of

blocks, as well as the construction costs and all spending

on the management of city infrastructure and construc-

tion processes. The compensation costs may vary consid-

erably depending on the degree of consolidation of the

different sectors within the area of the MPGM. However,

it is the real estate prices that must make the transforma-

tion possible in each case.

A report from 2006 on the financial viability of a private

development proposal in the planning stage for two blocks

in 22@ clearly illustrates the order of magnitude of private

financing and the parameters of the development’s finan-

cial viability. The operation involved considerable compen-

sation costs for construction, relocation of activities and

rehousing as the area was highly consolidated, with a real

plot ratio before the transformation of 1.5 FAR, which is far

above the average of 1 FAR in the entire MPGM.

The operation was based on an expectation of average

real estate prices of €3,000 /m2 GFS for economic activity

classified as @. It required the relocation of existing activity

with considerable compensation costs of around €13 M,

which translates to costs for the potential floor space of

€189/m2 GFS. The entire process was expected to take

6 years, from the purchase of the land to the sale of the built

floor space.

The basic data and results were as follows:

Plot ratio: 2.7 FAR and 0.3 FAR transferred to the City

Council for affordable housing

Sale price for @ activities = €3,000/m2 GFS

Sale price for affordable housing = €1,456/m2 GFS

Average sale price = €2,850/m2 GFS

Average construction cost: €986/m2 GFS

Schedule: 6 years

In relation to the real estate price:

- Average land value: €986/m2 GFS (35%)

- Construction and management (includes marketing):

€1,228/m2 GFS (43%)

- Profit: €635/m2 GFS (22%)

- Annual yield rate: 15%

In relation to plot value (€986/m2 GFS):

- Plot prior to urban development: €600/m2 GFS (61%)

- Compensation: €189/m2 GFS (19%)

- City infrastructure (PEI): €32/m2 GFS (3%)

- Management (includes 4% of PEI and marketing):

€28/m2 GFS (3%)

- Profit: €137/m2 GFS (14%)

- Annual yield rate: 15%

The price of the built real estate product covers all of the

costs and spending in the stages of city infrastructure and

construction, with an annual yield rate of 15% in each stage,

and total city infrastructure charges of €250/m2 of land and

payment for the land prior to urban development at

€1,620/m2 of land. These values are average for plots devel-

oped in Barcelona, according to statistics in the Forcadell

report for the third quarter of 2006 (€1,315-1,800/m2 GFS).

This value is equivalent to a cost of €600/m2 GFS, which is

61% of the average land cost of €986/m2 GFS.

The graph below shows a diagram of the components of

the real estate value of the property, the transfer to the City

Council of 10% of the development18, and the complete

operation.

The following conclusions can be made about the

financial viability of private development:

- The transactions are adapted to the mechanism of

derived demand in each case. The market price of the

final products ‘withstands’ high compensation and high


residual values, with expectations, that are required of

the property.

- The costs of city infrastructure related to the PEI are

only 3% of the value of the plot and do not include the

costs of connection or compensation for the shortfall in

transport that the state and Catalan law currently

require.

- These costs are lower than those of other urban

developments in Barcelona. In the MPGM for La Marina

in the Zona Franca in 2006, for example, the costs of city

infrastructure in the infrastructure plan include a metro

station. This translates to €92/m2 GFS in 2005, which is

equivalent to around €75/m2 GFS (over double that of

22@) if the figures are updated to 2000, with an annual

average rate of 5%.

- In areas with a highly consolidated building area,

compensation may be a relevant condition for the trans-

formation. Existing companies expect to cover the costs of

the relocation and to have new installations outside of

Barcelona with approximately 50% more land and the

renewal of some machinery.

- The transfer of 10% of land for green zones and

10% for facilities is neutral in terms of the financial fea-

sibility of the development, as the basic parameters of

viability are the plot ratio, total income per sale and all

the costs and spending on managing the urban transfor-

mation and the construction.

- The transfer of 10% of the development to the City

Council provides plots that are equivalent to 0.3 FAR for

affordable housing. Without subsidies, this provides the

equivalent to the impact of a subsidized plot. The 10%

transfer is not a charge for the property owner, but a way

of recovering the planning gains or profits conferred on

the land by the planning, given that private initiative

obtains a profit equivalent to 27% of the sale value of the

real estate, which is equivalent to returns of 15% per year

cash of flow during the six years of management.

Impact of building permits for 22@ on all of

Barcelona since 2003: 61% of offices and 38% of hotels

Barcelona City Council granted 158 building permits for

new construction or major renovation in the 22@ district

between 1998 and 2010, for an area of 959,846 m2 GFS

above grade (planning potential) and 441,753 m2 GFS

below grade (an additional 46%), according to the database

of the Technical Unit of 22@.


�00.0

180.0

160.0

140.0

1�0.0

0

100.0

80.0

60.0

40.0

�0.0

€M

Land

1

38.1

14.6

59.�

8.�1.71.8

11.4

36.0

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4.�6.61.64.90.� 1.3

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4�.4

16.�

65.8

13.1

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1.9�.1

CompensationsInfrastructurecosts

Urbanisation management

Profit from urban development Construction costs

Construction management

Construction profits

Components of t he final real estate pr ice


Most permits were approved between 2003 and 2007

(72% of the total area). The evolution of the figures over

time reflects the need in the early years (1998-2002) to

carry out the land planning and management (18% of

the total) and, from 2007 onwards, the general slow-

down in the real estate market (10% of the total). In

comparison to the whole of Barcelona, we can consider

that the activity in 22@ took off in 2003, when previous

permits were accumulated. There were two peaks in

2005 and 2007, with 39% of the total floor space.

From 2001 to 2007, the average built area per year was

172,106 m2 GFS, whilst in the following three years it was

only 33,105 m2 GFS. Between 2003 (accumulated) and

2010, on average 120,000 m2 of floor space above grade

were approved per year. This trend could be taken as an

optimistic forecast of growth in the next few years, as the

period includes four and a half years of expansion and

three and a half years of recession. However, a pessimistic

trend could be situated at 100,000 m2 GFS per year.

The main building type is offices, which represent

51% of the floor space above grade in the approved per-

mits (488,000 m2 GFS out of a total of 960,000 m2 GFS).

This is followed by affordable housing (173,000 m2 GFS

and around 2,200 dwellings) at 18%, and then by hotels

(150,000 m2 GFS and around 2,300 rooms) at 13%.

The average area in permits for offices, dwellings,

hotels and facilities is between 5000 and 7000 m2 GFS

above grade, with the exceptions of manufacturing

(2,100 m2 GFS) and two permits for independent car

parks (18,000 m2 and around 720 parking spaces). A

total of 46% of permits are for under 3,600 m2 GFS,

which is equivalent to approximately a tenth of the

potential of a block. Only 20 permits (13%) are for over

a quarter of the potential of a block. The average permit

is for 6,050 m2 GFS above grade.

The estimate of jobs that the approved permits could

represent was calculated on the basis of the standards that

result from combining Barcelona’s land registry informa-

tion with information on jobs from the magazine Barcelona

Economia, which presents information on employment in

32 subsectors, as well as the authors’ own hypotheses19.

The average standards are as follows:

- Storage: 74 m2 per job

- Retail trade: 86 m2 per job

- Personal services (excluding health) and education:

45 m2 per job

1999

�00,000

180,000

160,000

140,000

�001 �003 �005 �007 �010�000 �00� �004 �006 �008

1�0,000

100,000

0

Total permits ��@ m2 GFS above grade

Total o" ces ��@ m2 GFS above grade

80,000

60,000

40,000

�0,000

�009

22@ building permit s. In m 2 GFS above grade, 2001-2010

19. This is part of a wider study underway on the urban and real estateimpact of 22@.


Car parks

Housing

Equipment and services

Hotels

Manufacturing

O�ces

0 100,000 300,000 500,000 700,000200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000

m �GFS�above�grade

m �GFS�below�grade

36,391

172,758 69,335

132,655 70,902

150,455 60,381

32,054 6,915

484,218 197,828

22@ building permit s. GFS above and below grade by use. In m 2 GFS, 2001-2010

Housing


Hotels

Manufacturing

O�ces

0 50,000 150,000 250,000 400,000100,000 200,000 300,000 500,000

�1998-2010172,758

132,655

150,455

471,924

32,054

350,000 450,000

22@ building permit s. By uses, in m 2 GFS above grade, 2001-2010

Car parks

Housing


Hotels

Manufacturing

O�ces

0 10 30 50 7020 40 60

No.�of�construction�permits2

36

22

17

16

65

22@ building permit s. Number of perm it s per use, 2001-2010


>36,000 (>1 block)

18,001-36,000(50% to 100% block)

14,001-18,000(4/ 10 to 50% block)

10,801-14,400 (3/ 10-4/ 10)

7,201-10,800 (2/ 10-3/ 10)

3,600-7,200 (1/ 10-2/ 10)

<3,600 m� of FAR(1/ 10 potential block)

0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,00075,000 125,000 175,000 225,000

m! of gross floor spaceabove grade

162,242

215,836

112,404

208,684

169,448

91,232

25,000

22@ building permit s by size. In m 2 GFS above grade, 2001-2010

18,196

4,799

5,936

7,598

2,132

7,588

Car parks(not connected)

Housing


Hotels

Manufacturing

O! ces

0 2,500 7,500 12,500 20,0005,000 10,000 15,000

m! of gross floor space/construction permits

17,500

22@ building permit s. Average size by use in m 2 GFS/permit

0 20 40 60 8030 50 70 90

No. construction permits7

13

9

24

32

73

10

>36,000 (>1 block)

18,001-36,000(50% to 100% block)

14,001-18,000(4/ 10 to 50% block)

10,801-14,400 (3/ 10-4/ 10)

7,201-10,800 (2/ 10-3/ 10)

3,600-7,200 (1/ 10-2/ 10)

<3,600 m� of FAR (1/ 10 potential block)

22@ building permit s by size. Number by intervals of m 2 GFS above grade, 2001-2010


Public administrat ion

Non-profit institut ions

Real estate investment

Hotels

Companies

0 50,000 150,000 250,000 400,000100,000 200,000 300,000 500,000

Market initiative m! GFSabove grade

121,572

123,934

481,667

86,703

145,969

350,000 450,000

50,980 69,694

Public administrat ion

Non-profit institut ions

Real estate investment

Hotels

Companies

0 150,000 250,000 350,000 500,000200,000 300,000 400,000 600,000

58,288

21,282

450,000 550,000100,00050,000

O" ces Manufacturing Hotels Equipment and services Housing

47,664 47,664

405,338

21,712 16,020

34,112

4,485

124,687

12,395

16,020

22@ building permit s classified by real estate init iat ive. In m 2 GFS above grade

22@ building permit s classified by real estate init iat ive and uses in m 2 GFS above grade

- Leisure, hotel and catering20: 39 m2 per job

- Manufacturing: 90 m2 per job

- Health: 26 m2 per job

- Offices: 18 m2 per job

Therefore, 32,149 jobs will have been created when

all of the approved permits have been built, if we

apply the average standards for the municipality up to

2010.

20. It is not clear whether this should be applied exclusively to hotels. Doublethe standard of 79 m2 of floor space per job will be considered.

21. This has been classified according to the name of the permit holder. In addi-tion, the 22@ technical services were questioned to ascertain the distinctionbetween ‘real estate investment for rent’ or ‘specific company’, which werethe concepts that were most difficult to assign. The distinction between‘non-profit institutions’ corresponds mainly to trade union estate agents inthe case of housing and institutions in the case of facilities. ‘Lofts’ areassigned to ‘real estate investment’ in dwellings.

In the real estate market21, most applications for per-

mits have been for investment and rental (50.2% of the

approved area), mainly for the development of offices.

Specific hotel initiatives, which are also considered a pri-

vate real estate investment, represent 15% of the approved

floor space. Government buildings, together with the


16,020

Car parks

Housing


Hotels

Manufacturing

O! ces

0 150,000 250,000 350,000 500,000200,000 300,000 400,000 600,000

58,288

12,395

450,000 550,000100,00050,000

Companies Hotels Real estate investment Non-profit institutions Public administration

34,112 69,697

124,687

4,485

3,339

21,712

68,649

47,66450,898

21,282 405,338

4,959

22@ building permit s. Uses and real estate init iat ive. In m 2 GFS above grade

1988

2,500,000

1990 1992 2000 2002 20101989 1991 1993 2001 2003

2,000,000

1,500,000

0

Total new build (m! of FAR)

Extension and renovation (m! of FAR)

1,000,000

500,000

20041994 1996 19981995 1997 1999 2005 20072006 2008 2009

New GFS and GFS of extensions and renovat ions (m 2) in Barcelona 1988-2010

(Source: Barcelona Econom ia)

investment of non-profit institutions in affordable housing

in particular, comprise 26% of the total, and are in similar

proportions. Direct investment by specific companies

accounts for only 9% of the approved floor space.

To determine the impact of the approved building per-

mits in 22@, we examined Barcelona’s real estate output,

using the same source of information, Barcelona Economia22.

The year with the greatest real estate output in the munici-

pality of Barcelona in the last 23 years was 1991, just before

the Olympic Games of 1992, when 2.0 M m2 GFS in new

constructions was built. This figure was not even surpassed

during the peak years of the recent cycle of expansion, in

which 1.62 million m2 GFS was constructed in 2006.

The average annual output in the last ten years

(1.13 M m2 GFS) almost coincides with the average out-

put in the last 23 years (1.13 M m2 GFS) since 1988, as do

the areas for renovation or extensions (0.39 M m2 GFS

compared to 0.33 M m2 GFS). The results highlight the

compensation between the levels of output in cycles of

expansion (1988-1991 and 1997-2007) and cycles of con-

traction (1992-1996 and 2007 and 2010), in a consolidat-

ed territory that is mainly completed, as is the case of the

municipality of Barcelona.

After 1991, there was a clear drop that lasted two years,

followed by a slight recovery up to 1996, which was the

worst year in the previous recession, although the figures

were close to the low output of 1992 and 1994. From 2007

and 2008, the current cycle of contraction began with the

lowest point in 2008 and sharp drops in 2009 and 2010, in

which the lowest outputs in the last 23 years were reached.

A comparison of the total area approved in 22@ and the

total for Barcelona made using the available statistics should

take into account the additional assumption that the City

Council’s statistics include 15% of permits that have been

modified or re-issued that may be counted in different

years, and that the output in the first few years of 22@ is

accumulated in 2003.

As a result of the compilation of data, the estimated

impact of 22@ for different uses between 2003 and 2010 is

as follows:

- Offices .....................................................................................61%

- Hotels.......................................................................................32%

- Facilities .................................................................................13%

- Car parks .............................................................................17%

- Housing....................................................................................6%

- Manufacturing .................................................................5%

- All uses (excluding commercial):......17%

The results indicate that 22@ is the most important sin-

gular operation in Barcelona in terms of offices (61% of the

total since 2003) and that, at the same time, it has played an

essential role in the location of new hotels (38%), to address

the growing demand resulting from the constant increase in

visitors to the city.

The results also highlight that 22@ combines and com-

petes with other areas of the city that have considerable

dynamism in the years of expansion, one of which is the

important area of the Forum, which is adjacent to the dis-

trict of Sant Martí. In addition, the synergic effects of clusters

should be considered as a single operation, to which La

Sagrera central station and the surrounding area shall soon

be added.

Building potentials for 22@ and the expected time

it will take to infill the area: up to 2014, with

100,000 m2 GFS absorbed annually and potential for

85,000 jobs.

The figures are based on data available for 22@, today,

which are (in m2 GFS above grade) as follows:

- Listed buildings for which no permit

has been requested.............................................................108,163

- Other buildings that remain .................................198,193

- Consolidated façades for housing .................137,085


22. In relation to the comparison with information on 22@ building permits byuses, the problem in the new-build statistics in Barcelona Economia is thathotels are classified with facilities. The comparison could also be biased byyears, because there is a time lag between the date of the City Council’sapproval and the favourable information provided by the 22@ technical serv-ices. Therefore, we can assume that the proportion of the two uses is the sameas that in the statistics on total major building works.

- Consolidated industrial buildings pending

transformation ..........................................................................438,955

- Permits granted........................................................................959,847

Total 1 (Consolidated)................................................1,842,243

Areas with planning and management

that have not been built....................................................480,137

Àreas pending planning and/or

management .............................................................................1,570,373

Total 2 (Potential pending

development).........................................................................2,050,510

Total 1+2 (Total potential).....................................3,892,753

Total 1+Total 2 (Total potential,

rounded up).............................................................................4,000,000

In terms of the total 198.3 ha of land, this represents a

total plot ratio of 1.96 FAR. In terms of the 116.0 ha of land

to be transformed (42% of land in roads, green zones and

other systems), this represents a net plot ratio of 3.3 FAR.

A total of 1,842,243 (47% of the total floor space) can

be considered consolidated floor space, and only

959,847 m2 GFS (57% of the consolidated floor space) in

granted permits is still pending construction. A plausible

hypothesis is that building has not yet begun on only

approximately 95,000 m2 GFS in building permits granted

between 2008 and 2009.

The considerable planning and management effort in

22@ is clearly revealed by the building potential with com-

pleted planning and management, which stands at 60% of

the total potential (2.3 million m2 GFS compared to the

total of 3.9 M m2 GFS).

We could consider that the areas that are pending

planning and management (480,137 m2 GFS) will be

developed in the short- to medium-term when the market

conditions are suitable, and that this will be the first poten-

tial area for which construction permits shall be sought.

The main issue is to determine which part of the

1,570,373 m2 GFS with no planning or management, equiv-

alent to 40% of the total potential, will be put on the market

due to demand, after excluding the industrial plots that have

a high ratio of m2 of gross floor space/m2 of land and thus

involve high transformation costs. These plots cannot be

considered as potential supply to be transformed in the

medium term.

Due to a lack of further information, we have used the

proportion indicated in the economic and financial study

of 2000 for blocks with built areas of less than 38,000 m2

GFS in the ‘optional development’ category (59.7%). The

development potential will probably be 1,417,650 m2 GFS

(937.513 m2 GFS added to the 480,137 m2 GFS with plan-

ning and management).

Consequently, the infill of the area will be completed in

12 years (2022), with an optimistic forecast of permits

being granted for 120,000 m2 GFS per year, or in 14 years

(2024), with the pessimistic forecast of permits for

100.000 m2 GFS per year, according to past trends.

If we make combined forecasts for occupation, taking

into account that part of the new developments will be

allocated to dwellings and also assuming the average stan-

dard of 30 m2 GFS per new job, the pending potential

development is likely to house 52,446 jobs, in addition to

those estimated from the permits that have already been

granted (32,14923). This gives an approximate total of

85,000 jobs24 derived from new development in 22@,

which can be added to the existing jobs for activities that

will not be transformed.

The 22@ district , the cent ral stat ion of La Sagrera

and the Forum: Barcelona’s central business district

in 2025-2030

The central business district (CBD) of a metropolitan

urban area is the part of the territory, generally in a very

central position, where there is the highest concentra-

tion of directional activities providing services to com-

panies, with maximum added value per job. For simplic-

ity, the boundaries of the CBD in Barcelona are

considered to be the Eixample and Ciutat Vella districts,

although a more precise delimitation would be more

linear along Passeig de Gràcia and Avinguda Diagonal,


23. However, in another study based on a census of companies, the number ofnew workers in 22@ economic area (extended) was estimated at 44,600in December 2009.

24. Using the standards of La Défense (24 m2 per job in offices and retail) thiswould be 99,062 jobs.

as shown on the maps in reports by the main real estate

agents.

The urban development proposed in the transforma-

tion of industrial Poblenou into the 22@ district has a

potential of around 3.2 million m2 GFS above grade (and

approximately 1.3 M m2 GFS below grade, based on pro-

portions derived from approved permits) and will alter the

concentration of current tertiary activities and the metro-

politan centres.

The municipality of Barcelona had 118.99 million m2 of

registered floor space in February 2005, both above grade

and below grade in car parks, according to the City

Council’s Institute for Fiscal Studies. In December 2009, it

had 121.29 M m2, according to information from the Land

Registry Office of Catalonia. Therefore, there was an incre-

ment of 1.93%, and the breakdown of uses did not coin-

cide exactly with the initial information.

The Sant Martí district represented 12% of the total

registered floor space of Barcelona (14.6 M m2 GFS) in

2005. However, it housed 20% of manufacturing (2.7 M m2

GFS) and 6% of offices (0.4 M m2 GFS) and government

buildings. In contrast, the Eixample district represented

27% of the total registered floor space (23.9 M m2 GFS)

and housed 45% of the offices and public administration

buildings (2.5 M m2 GFS) and 14% of the manufacturing

of Barcelona (1.7 M m2 GFS). Although the increase in the

number of offices would have been very different in other

districts, we do not have enough land registry information

to document it accurately25.

The combined districts of Eixample and Ciutat Vella

that are considered the current CBD account for 45% of

the floor space of offices and government buildings in

Barcelona, with 3.5 million m2 GFS in 2005.

To the dimensions of 22@ (3.2 M m2 GFS above grade

for activity and an allocation below grade -assuming that

industrial activities can coexist that are progressively trans-

formed within the same sector of activity into activities that

are more compatible with other uses - and around 1.2 M m2

GFS below grade), we should add the potential economic

activity in the operation of the Forum (0.6 M m2 GFS above

grade and around 0.1 M m2 GFS below grade) and in the

area surrounding the central station of La Sagrera (0.4 M m2

GFS above grade and 0.1 M m2 GFS below grade). The total

activity in the three operations together would be 4.2 M m2

GFS of activity above grade and 1.4 M m2 GFS below grade,

compared to 3.5 M m2 GFS in the districts of Ciutat Vella

and the Eixample, in 2005.

We can conclude, therefore, that the completion of the

major economic activity operations in the districts of Sant

Martí and Sant Andreu (4.2 M m2 GFS above grade), which


25. This is a serious statistical problem that affects the assessment of thephysical and economic dimensions of cities, that is probably caused by thecentralized management of the land register.

Land Register BCN (above and below grade) 2005.

In m illions of m 2 GFS

Ciutat Vella 8.13%

Eixample 23.99%

Sants-Monjuïc 15.22%

Les Corts 8.32%Sarrià-Sant Gervasi 14.90%

Gràcia 8.36%

Horta-Guinardó 9.25%

Nous Barris 7.45%

Sant Andreu 8.81%

Sant Martí 14.56%

Land Register BCN, Offices-Public Administ rat ion, 2005.

In m illions of m 2 GFS

Ciutat Vella 1.3

Eixample 2.49

Sants-Monjuïc 1.21

Les Corts 0.78

Sarrià-Sant Gervasi 0.82

Gràcia 0.51

Horta-Guinardó 0.11

Nous Barris 0.10

Sant Andreu 0.29

Sant Martí 14.56%

Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies, Barcelona City Council, Ciutat Vella Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies, Barcelona City Council, Ciutat Vella

are close together and will therefore facilitate clustering

and synergies when economic conditions allow, will sur-

pass or at least equal in size and in knowledge-based and

new technology activities the dimensions of the districts of

Eixample and Ciutat Vella (3.5 M m2 GFS, in 2005), and will

modify in any case the central areas in the city.

However, there is still the question of whether more

dwellings are needed than those envisaged in the plans for

these major operations in the east of Barcelona, to create the

balance of a compact and complex city and meet the addi-

tional needs of accessibility and public transport that mod-

ern CBD require. In any case, the main commercial centre of

the city will continue to be the traditional, historic CBD.

Summary and conclusions

1. The 22@ district, which has a potential of almost

4 million m2 of buildable area (GFS), boosts the knowledge

economy by providing companies with externalities to

compete better. It also offers an additional plot ratio of 0.5

FAR, which acts as an implicit subsidy in comparison with

other zones with lower plot ratios. The location in the 22@

district of universities and technology centres and a com-

mitment to clustering means that those who move to the

district do so not only for the prices, but also for the posi-

tion in innovation, the ‘current critical mass’ and because

it is the largest central supply. One of the advantages in

terms of real estate is that construction can begin immedi-

ately, unlike in other competing operations that are still in

the planning stage.

2. The 22@ district competes with operations around the

world of a similar scale that are in central locations, such as

La Défense in Paris or the extension of La Castellana in

Madrid. Its advantage is that it is a knowledge economy

cluster, and its disadvantage is that it has a lower critical

mass and regional and international rail networks are not

highly accessible from the district today. Furthermore, the

prices and rents are higher than those of Barcelona, which

reflects the greater attractiveness of world cities. The district

benefits from the iconic Agbar Tower, the Biomedical

Research Park and the new Telefónica tower on Avinguda

Diagonal, which is outside its urban area.

3. The MPGM predicts that it will take 20 years to com-

plete the development. The annual absorption rate will be

135,000 m2 GFS. The compensation for relocation of indus-

trial activities is economically feasible and 70% of the infra-

structure plan will be covered. The development was well in

line with expectations up to the change in economic and

real estate cycle that began in 2007, and permits have been

granted for only 33,000 m2 GFS on average per year.

4. Concurrent and competing current and future oper-

ations have a total building area of 11.4 mm2 GFS for activ-

ities and housing, generate a surplus of 207,500 jobs and a

shortfall of 198,600 dwellings in the city ‘from river to

river’, and their development shall increase metropolitan

mobility.

5. The potential area available in 22@ combined with

the future potential of La Sagrera-Prim shall continue to

be the main supply for economic activities in the coming

years. However, it will only represent 47% approximately

of the potential. The supply that shall be in most compe-

tition with 22@ will be the Innovation Zone in Zona

Franca in the former SEAT factory, which will provide

around 1 million m2 GFS with a plot ratio similar to that

of 22@, and with very competitive rental prices. The city

infrastructure of this area has just begun. To differentiate

the supply, it is essential to ensure specialization by sec-

tors in each territory.

6. The second main metropolitan supply for economic

activity, in terms of size and quality of the city infrastruc-

ture, is that of the Centre Direccional de Cerdanyola-Parc

de l’Alba, which is currently available. We can consider

that this supply complements that of 22@, as it meets a

different demand for activity, in terms of characteristics,

location and price. The two areas strengthen each other to

attract international demand. They cover an area of 340 ha

and have a potential floor space of 1.9 million m2 GFS, of

which 1.5 M m2 GFS are for economic activity.

7. The 22@ district has been a successful operation

because 61% of the total new office buildings in Barcelona

have been located there since 2003, and 38% GFS of new

hotels, for which there is increasing demand due to the

constant rise in the number of visitors to the city. Without

the 22@ district, these activities would have had to be

located in the wider metropolitan area, which would have


presented fewer opportunities to create urban economic

clusters.

8. The permits approved up to the end of 2010 would

lead to the creation of 32,000 jobs, using the city’s aver-

age standards of density by use. However, in the wider

economic area of 22@, around 44,000 new jobs shall have

been created in 2010.

9. The development of 22@ has been driven by the

location of public facilities, universities and non-profit

institutions, given the supply of land for affordable

housing that represents 26% of the total floor space in

the approved permits. The real estate interest is clear:

50.25% of the approved areas are for buildings for

investment and rent, mainly for offices. Specific hotel

initiatives, which should also be considered private real

estate investment, represent 15% of the approved floor

space. Direct investment by start-ups or existing compa-

nies only accounts for 9% of the approved floor space to

date; consequently this area should be promoted in the

future.

10. From 2001 to 2007, the average area constructed

per year was 172,106 m2 GFS, whilst in the three last

years it has been only 33,105 m2 GFS. Between 2003

(accumulated) and 2010, an average of 120,000 m2 GFS

above grade was approved per year. This trend could be

taken as an optimistic forecast for the coming years, as it

includes four and a half years of expansion and three and

a half years of recession. A pessimistic forecast would be

100,000 m2 GFS absorbed per year.

11. The forecast costs of the Special Infrastructure

Plan that are to be financed by the developments are too

low in comparison to what is currently required in the

Spanish and Catalan planning regulations on connecting

infrastructure and on participation to redress the shortfall

in public transport. The economic accounts for the oper-

ations could include higher city infrastructure costs.

12. The 22@ district is an operation that enables plan-

ning gains to be recovered through the financing of city

infrastructures and through the transfer of land for

affordable housing, which is compatible with private

returns on the operations, due to the plot ratio. Private

real estate initiative has provided profits of approximate-

ly 27% of the real estate sale value and returns of 15%

per year in cash flow for an average management period

of six years from planning to sale.

13. The potential area that is pending development in

22@ (1.4 million m2 GFS) shall be completed in 12 years

(2022) in the optimistic forecast of permits being granted

for 120,000 m2 GFS or in 16 years (2026) in the pessimistic

forecast of 100,000 m2 GFS per year, according to past

trends.

14. The total potential number of jobs is estimated at

85,000 (99,000 using the standards of La Défense, Paris),

with current standards of density. These jobs will be

added to those of activities that will not be transformed.

15. The completion of major economic activity opera-

tions in the districts of Sant Martí and Sant Andreu

(4.2 M m2 GFS above grade) will facilitate the formation of

clusters and synergies when economic conditions are

right, due to their proximity. Combined, these operations

will surpass in size and in knowledge- and technology-

based activity the dimensions of offices for directional

activities in the current CBDs of the Eixample and Ciutat

Vella (3.5 M m2 GFS, in 2005), and shall become the new

CBD of Barcelona by 2025-2030.

16. From the perspective of urban development and

real estate, we can consider whether more dwellings are

needed than those envisaged in the plans for for these

major operations in the east of Barcelona. This would help

to create the balance of a complex and compact city, and to

meet the additional needs for internal accessibility through

public transport of the most contemporary CBD, which

could be funded by the new development. Nevertheless,

the main commercial centre continues to be the tradition-

al, historic CBD.



The economic impact of infrastructures in 22@

Ramon Sagarra RiusDirector of Infrastructure in the 22@ Barcelona, SA municipalcompany. Associate lecturer in the Technology Department, UPF

Int roduct ion

This article describes the general concept of infra-

structure in terms of its relationship with the economy. It

then looks at this relationship in greater depth and goes

on to explain the urban service infrastructure found in

22@. The article discusses in detail the most strategic,

newest infrastructure: the district heating and cooling

system and the municipally owned fibre optics network.

It concludes by stressing the opportunity presented by

the concept of the smart city, which improves the effica-

cy and efficiency of infrastructure use.

Infrast ructure. W hat is it ?

In general terms, infrastructure is considered the

material foundation on which societies are built. This

incredibly open concept can be narrowed down and the

meaning, still in the broad sense with which we usually

interpret it, can be given as the human undertakings that

serve to support other activities and that form part of the

structural organization of cities and companies. In even

more specialized fields, infrastructure is frequently asso-

ciated with networks of services and further character-

ized by differentiating between infrastructure for facili-

ties, technical services, systems and government heritage

items, among others.

The impact of infrastructure is generally positive in

the economic area, the social area or both. Infrastructure

is considered to improve the conditions of agents who

carry out activities in the heart of society, by increasing

the productivity of production factors. Good infrastruc-

ture and networks are linked to more well-being, lower

costs, more safety, better territorial connection, greater

economic growth, and more revenue, among other fac-

tors. Nevertheless, this view, which could be classed as

the classical perspective, is under increasing scrutiny and

there is a need for a deeper, more rigorous analysis of

infrastructure, in terms of its environmental impact and

externalities, as described later in this article.

To understand the economy of infrastructure, we can

divide it into two main types, which in the language of

urban development are known as systems: general and

local.

General infrastructure is defined as that concerned

with generation, transport and links. It is usually

planned by the public sector and financed by the same

sector or by public-private mechanisms promoted by the

government itself. This group includes roads, ports and

airports, power stations, high voltage power lines and

gas pipelines. In relation to 22@, this kind of infrastruc-

ture is required to reach the networks in the area, but is

not sufficient alone. Its development shows the govern-

ment’s and operators’ confidence in the initiative and it

is often described in the media. Investment in general

infrastructure can be used to clearly analyse and quanti-

fy its impact. However, such analyses only cover the

impact in the same network or system.

Local infrastructure, which is otherwise known as

urban infrastructure or urban services, has a capillary

nature and is comprised of the ‘last section’ of each net-

work to reach each building and each user. Considerable

investment must be made to develop this infrastructure.


Concept Infrastructure costs General (estimated) Local

Electricity MT - Public works 61,865,072.14 26,000,000.00 35,865,072.14

Pneumatic waste collection 70,504,663.31 9,000,000.00 61,504,663.31

Development of roads 106,100,094.71 0.00 106,100,094.71

Gas network - Public works 1,221,897.60 0.00 1,221,897.60

Heating and cooling system (approx.) 48,000,000.00 15,000,000.00 33,000,000.00

Telecommunications - Public works 36,878,857.33 0.00 36,878,857.33

Drinking water network 2,249,161.25 0.00 2,249,161.25

Sewer system 36,371,364.85 0.00 36,371,364.85

Mobility - Public works 13,604,762.68 0.00 13,604,762.68

Overall total 376,795,873.87 50,000,000.00 326,795,873.87

Note: The amounts do not include spending on drawing up projects, works management, quality control, health and safety, etc. To obtain the total budget without VAT, consider an increment of 30%.

Currently, the basic level of provision corresponds to

services that in the past were what made a piece of land

into a plot: road, water supply, sewers, electricity supply

and signposting. To this basic level of provision we can

add other services that must be defined in urban plan-

ning, such as fibre optics or pneumatic waste collection.

Local infrastructure is financed by property develop-

ers involved in the transformation/urban development

of the territory, which are often organized into coopera-

tives or compensation boards. However, in some cases,

the service companies themselves must make the invest-

ment. The development of local infrastructure is inextri-

cably linked to the urban development process. An eval-

uation of the economic impact cannot be disassociated

from the impact of the urban development process. On

this point, see the article in this issue by Joaquim Clusa,

which specifically focuses on this topic.

The 22@ district covers an area of around 2 million

metres squared, of which around 600,000 correspond to

roads requiring transformation to include all of the serv-

ice networks, and to organize the area.

The figures for the 22@ district are as follows:

Total area: 2,000,000 m2

Public road area (streets) 600,000 m2

Number of blocks 120 units

Number of stretches of street 277 units

Linear metres of streets 36 kilometres

The following table shows all the costs correspon-

ding to the operation of transforming 22@. It distin-

guishes between the part that corresponds to general

systems (power stations, transport networks, etc.) and

the part corresponding to local systems. The structure of

the table is based on the Special Infrastructure Plan for

Poblenou and the data have been updated and adjusted

to real costs. The figures correspond to works and initia-

tives managed by the company 22@ Barcelona. This

company’s area of activity does not include Avinguda

Diagonal, therefore the costs of developing the tram line

are not included.

The table gives an idea of the economic scale of an

operation such as 22@, although part of the investment

is made by the property developer - in this case, 22@

Barcelona - and another part corresponds to the various

service operators. Consequently, the table is not highly

representative.

The typical costs for an urban development agent are

between 200 and 500 euros/m2, depending on the level

of provision and the characteristics of the land. For

example, the complete redevelopment of a stretch of

street in the Eixample district of Barcelona with a level of

services similar to those that can currently be found costs

between €0.5 and 1 M.

The percentage distribution of the cost per system/

network for urban development in the city of Barcelona,

with a medium-high level of provision such as that

found in the Eixample, is as follows (taking 100 as the

standard level): 50% of the cost is allocated to the urban

development of the ‘skin’, which involves the restruc-

turing of roads, but a minimum amount of other infra-

structure and affected services. If we increase the degree

of urban development and the provision of services, we

have to add 6% for the cost of excavating the road sur-

face for conduits, 21% for the sewer network and 23%

for urban service networks. This estimated cost distribu-

tion for an urban development in Barcelona increases if

we include the latest-generation networks: by 116% if

we introduce a pneumatic waste collection system, and

by 161% if we also include a district heating and cooling

system.

In both general and local infrastructure, the fact that

most networks have a natural monopoly means that the

government must intervene as a promoter or regulator.

However, there are no monopolies in the telecommuni-

cations and energy production networks. In telecommu-

nications networks, which are (theoretically) completely

liberalized, the amount of competition in each territory is

what affects the government’s capacity and form of

intervention. This process may lead to insufficient or

outdated infrastructure.

Infrastructure for energy production and sale, but not

energy distribution networks, are also theoretically liber-

alized. However, aspects that are to a greater or lesser

extent disassociated with production itself, such as the

need to ensure supply, the promotion of renewable

energies, social debate on nuclear energy and the

method for assessing CO2 emissions considerably distort

what should act as a competitive market. A detailed

analysis of these aspects is outside the scope of this arti-

cle. However, in any case, energy - as a broad concept

that includes waste, efficiency and emissions - and

telecommunications are the most critical and strategical-

ly most important services for the development of a ter-

ritory, like the 22@ district, apart from services linked to

mobility that are of a very different nature.

In general, once the infrastructure is in place, there is

a tendency to assume that it will always work, when in

reality it requires attention and maintenance.

Investments in maintenance are not highly ‘visible’; as

inhabitants we are only really aware of the importance

of spending in this area when a lack of investment leads

to a fault in the infrastructure. In this case, the major

impact of shortfalls in investment and maintenance

become clear.

To conclude this introduction, we introduce a new

meaning to the concept of infrastructure. In the past,

infrastructure reflected development and progress. Now,

in the developed world, it increasingly constitutes an

important - if not the most important - aspect of sus-

tainability, in the broadest sense of environmental, eco-

nomic and social factors, regardless of the impact on

landscape and that of the works themselves.

The four phases of developing infrast ruct ure.

Impact s and economic assessment . Planning,

investm ent decision, works and use.

There are four periods in which the development of

infrastructure has considerable economic effects: plan-

ning, the decision to build, the construction itself and the

use phase. Each phase has certain characteristics and

assessment criteria, which are described below.

The p lann ing phase.This is the period between the

moment that a need is identified and an initiative pro-

posed, and the point when the initiative has been fully

defined in technical terms, economically evaluated and

verified by society. Studies on investment decisions,

which must be undertaken by the public or private

developers, must assess the impact of the new infra-

structure. The plans are often presented publicly, which

is essential to obtain equity and efficiency in the distri-

bution of resources. The current recession has shown

that the impact of infrastructure has not always been

evaluated appropriately and is not always positive for

everyone - as stated in the Pareto criteria. Each stage in

the development of networks has economic and social

effects and externalities that must be considered and

presented in the planning phase to ensure the sustain-

ability of the model. The following also need to be eval-

uated in this phase: direct investments (budgets for the

works), structural impacts, externalities and the ‘busi-

ness plan’ for the entire life of the infrastructure. The eco-

nomic impact of this phase is not considerable in quan-

titative terms, but it is very important as it is what must

lead to justification of the technical, economic and social

viability of the infrastructure.

The decision phase.This is comprised of the period

between the justification of the project’s viability and the


political opportunity, when applicable, and the start of

construction. Investment and speculative processes

begin, in which the various agents and those affected

take their positions. In the assessments of land and

activities, the benefits and losses resulting from the

future construction are weighed up. Consequently, this

is the most turbulent stage, as speculation takes place on

the future benefits of the investment.

For general infrastructures, the first effects to be

perceived are generally in the form of expropriations.

Potential positive impacts are not usually included in

the studies and assessments, due to the enabling

nature of the provision of services in the territory.

However, the development of general infrastructure

through urban planning mechanisms has led to some

scandals in the past.

Urban services are selected in the urban planning

period and defined in the urban development project.

The planning must attain a balance between taxes and

charges for developers. It must specify the urban devel-

opment charges, which will be used to finance the con-

struction of streets and networks. The development of

this local infrastructure converts a piece of land into a

plot, and the corresponding buildings can then be con-

structed.

In this phase, those who have opted to carry out the

construction work for the urban development begin the

commercial processes. They make their position on tech-

nical and financial aspects of the building work clear to

the government or the boards.

A quantitative economic assessment of the impact is

particularly hard to achieve, as it involves different inter-

ests in which politics often play a major role. We all

know of some infrastructure projects that have been

announced in the media but have never been built or

have been left half-completed.

The construction phase.This is the period when the

building work takes place and is the phase that has the

clearest, most direct and immediate economic effects. It

is marked by the investment phase. The economic

impact is very well quantified in the project’s budget,

which describes in detail each unit of work to be built

and the associated costs, as well as the items of the pro-

ject’s general costs. This phase has a direct impact on the

government budget, jobs, suppliers and related sectors.

Its dimensions and impact are more widely published

than those of other phases.

The effects of the investment are assessed by an

‘input-output’ technical analysis that provides good

results, as it is based on a statistical analysis that is well

adapted to the relationships between the different eco-

nomic sectors.

The use phase.Once the infrastructure is up and run-

ning, it is essential to ensure that sufficient resources are

available for correct operation, maintenance, and often for

reinvestment precisely in the most technological aspects,

as described at the end of this article in the section on

smart cities. This long phase must produce structural ben-

efits derived from infrastructure use by the population in

general and by the production sectors in particular, lead-

ing to a reduction in costs and a corresponding increase in

the productivity of the different factors.

Although it is the aspect that technically should con-

tribute most to the investment decision, the method for

assessing the structural impact is the most difficult and

the least accurate. This leads to a high degree of arbi-

trariness in these decisions, which frequently become

highly political. Normally, when an investment decision

has a high economic component, it is based on an esti-

mation of the elasticity of production in relation to dif-

ferent factors. The consequences of increases in produc-

tivity are then assessed from an economic perspective.

Increasingly, these analyses are complemented with an

even less precise evaluation of benefits to the well-being

of the part of society that is not directly productive. In

this evaluation, an economic value is given to the time

and the costs saved by people who are not directly

involved in production processes.

As there are frequently considerable technical and

economic differences from the planned scenario, before

an infrastructure investment project begins, the man-

agers may use private sector practices to draw up a busi-

ness plan that includes all the relevant provisional

accounting data. At this point, all the operating, mainte-

nance and reinvestment expenses must be taken into

account. These aspects are frequently underestimated in


investment decisions, as they go far beyond the length of

political terms of office at different levels of government.

Business plans can be used to quantify how much of the

infrastructure should be financed with public resources

and how much by private capital. Furthermore, the

parameters that govern concessions can be defined, as

well as their economic and financial balances, and all

kinds of financial ratios can be obtained from the cash

flows at any time, including the IRR (internal rate of

return) for the infrastructure and the investment project,

and the NPV (net present value).

Up to this point, we have referred to the evaluation of

investments (budget), the structural impacts and the

business plan. Below we will discuss aspects related to

externalities. To be economically rigorous, we should

analyse positive and negative externalities together.

However, there is a tendency to include positive exter-

nalities in the assessment of structural impacts, probably

to ‘improve the sale’ of the project. We have already

mentioned some evaluation criteria that are typically

used in these cases, based on the observation of individ-

uals in society/the market to obtain the costs (or time)

avoided or the replacement of non-economic agents.

However, the scope of the analysis is much more com-

plex and imprecise and we could state that it has to be

focused on collective rationality.

When the media discuss externalities, they almost

always refer to environmental ones. However, we

should bear in mind that there are many different

kinds of externalities, including those associated with

risk for people or those that alter the ‘economic estab-

lishment’.

The economic evaluation of externalities is highly

complex and there is no base information or contrasting

markets. Often, the character of externalities is not high-

ly economic. However, there are currently no technical

methods to assess the suitability of investments other

than a comparison of their economic impacts. This forces

us to continue to use monetary units in the comparison

of externalities. Incidentally, we should mention that a

new method has begun to be used, although it is not yet

fully tested. In this method, society is seen as a living

organism, and magnitudes are linked to metabolism to

assess the suitability of different alternatives. Thus, this

approach uses concepts such ecological footprint, diges-

tion times and total energy expenditure.

Examples in 22@. The dist r ict heat ing and cooling

syst em and fibre opt ics

As illustrated in this article and in the other articles

in this volume, all kinds of analyses have been carried

out on the 22@ district as a whole and on most of the

associated plans. The main reference document on the

impact of infrastructure in particular is the Special

Infrastructure Plan (PEI) for Poblenou. In this docu-

ment, the following urban systems are analysed and

characterized: mobility, water, energy, waste and

telecommunications. The systems that existed before

the transformation, the alternatives studied and those

proposed enable the assessment and comparison of dif-

ferent proposals.

The analysis includes networks that are not usually

found in urban development projects, such as a pneu-

matic collection network for waste management sys-

tems; district heating and cooling for the energy system;

and the municipal fibre optic network for the telecom-

munications system. The 22@ operation justified the

development of these systems, taking advantage of the

size and the opportunities for transformation. They have

been assessed as good and very good by users and oper-

ators.

Pneumatic waste collection networks were intro-

duced for the Olympic Games of 1992 in the Vila

Olímpica development and they are quite well known.

This is not the case of the district heating and cooling

and fibre optic systems, which are clearly the first of their

kind in Spain. Consequently, we will examine them in

more detail below.

The district heating and cooling (DH&C) system is

fruit of the European Commission’s Green Paper and a

desire to contribute to meeting the Kyoto Protocol. The

selected mechanism was a public works concession to

develop this service of general interest and the subse-

quent creation of a public-private company, called


Districlima. The system is comprised of a main plant

located in the Forum zone, which makes use of residual

heat from the waste recovery plant and the cooling

capacity of the sea, and a second supporting plant situ-

ated in Carrer Tànger, which is currently under construc-

tion. This infrastructure leads to 40% energy savings

compared to the systems that are traditionally used in

Barcelona and substantially reduces CO2 emissions into

the atmosphere. The current length of the network is

13 km. A total of 59 buildings are connected and over

390,000 m2 floor area of offices. The system can generate

heat and cold at 63.3 MW and 44.5 MW, respectively. It

is slightly more economical than conventional systems

for both property developers and users. The total invest-

ment up to September 2011 was €50 M, which will be

recovered in 14 years, according to the 25-year business

plan. The system is expected to be extended into the part

of 22@ that has not yet been transformed and into the

area of the new high-speed train station in Sagrera.

Work on the cable telecommunications system has

consisted in improving the infrastructure of the existing

Telefónica network and creating a new, neutral fibre

optics network owned by the municipality.

This network is made available to operators - the City

Council acts as the wholesaler - and provides services for

the business and residential sector. In the business sec-

tor, it enables companies within the district to access an

enhanced bandwidth, through the 11 telecommunica-

tions operators who currently use this network. For the

residential sector (fibre to the home, FTTH) fibre optics

cables currently reach 3,000 homes, with a penetration

index (no. of users/maximum number of customers pos-

sible) of 19%. From 2006 to date, a total of €3.5 M has

been invested, and the forecasted annual revenue for

2011 was above €0.5 M . It is expected that all of the ini-

tial investment will have been recovered by 2016.

As well as serving these two sectors, the fibre optics

network is also used (along with the municipal Wi-Fi

network) for self-provisioning of municipal services

(traffic lights, traffic cameras, lighting, etc.).

The article provides the opportunity to present argu-

ments that justify investment in the fibre optic network,

and which are illustrative of the evaluation criteria men-

tioned here. (This example is not intended to be taken as

a general position on government intervention in public

service networks, an aspect that is not covered here). The

arguments have been drawn up with the PhD-holder

Dimitri Zenghelis from the London School of Economics

and illustrate the diversity and difficulty of monetizing

the justifications.

The magnitudes of the direct economic impact of

the telecommunications network have been considered

already. In the sector, it is usually considered that every

euro invested in telecommunications is converted in

the long term into four, an amount that gives an idea of

the structural impact of the investments. The argu-

ments that are given below form part of those that,

whether or not they apply to externalities, should be

considered extremely carefully in evaluations of an

investment’s suitability.

- Social return.A private operator is not likely to

include in the business plan the potential social return

on the investment. This is even less likely if there are sev-

eral operators. Operators generally only consider the

private business that they can do. The social return is

obtained for all the services that can be offered, in addi-

tion to the telecommunication services that a city coun-

cil contracts, including those associated with the concept

of smart city described below.

- Lower cost-oriented prices.The ultimate aim of

the investment is to provide the district with the greatest

number of services possible, and to ensure that the infra-

structure does not constitute a barrier to accessing serv-

ices. In this case, the prices, which are based on

auditable urban development works, and the

desire/opportunity of the government to apply lower

discount rates for writing off the investment leads to

lower prices for users.

- Economic promotion.It is extraordinarily difficult

for private companies to monetize the economic promo-

tion opportunities in a district such as 22@. The infra-

structure is a factor that attracts companies in innovative

clusters, technology service companies and universities.

- Risks taken on.The fact that it is a government

company that takes on the risks associated with policies

and regulations, and bases its service provision on this


network contributes greatly to ensuring the continuity of

the business and the returns for users and society, mak-

ing the project more credible for the private sector

(clients).

Towards the smart cit y

We finish with a note on new associations between

infrastructure and the new technologies: the model of

smart city that is being developed in Barcelona.

Infrastructure and networks tend to have independ-

ent operators. Each is in the hands of different entities or

departments within the government. The information

flows corresponding to the interrelations between them

only occur at a very high level.

However, new technologies provide the opportunity

to make information on all of the networks available to

the managers of other infrastructures, and to the popu-

lation (open data projects). In addition, the compilation

of this information is promoted for other services that

are not associated with urban development networks,

such as health, education and safety. Together, these ini-

tiatives constitute the Barcelona Smart City project.

Initiatives such as this enable more and better per-

formance to be obtained from existing infrastructure.

Thus, fewer resources are consumed and the logistics

are improved, by facilitating the constitution of grids

and operating in collaboration with building manage-

ment systems. At time of recession such as the current

one in which there is no money for more works, such

initiatives must be promoted as they have social and

economic impacts that have not been fully discovered

or evaluated to date.


Theory and development of clustersAlessandra Chevallard and Emilià DuchCompetitiveness


Clusters and local specializat ion

On specialization .The same industries and sec-tors are not found everywhere. Rather, the oppositetends to be true: natural resources, the development ofa specific skill or other historical factors lead to regionsspecializing and developing specific abilities of theirown. In the food industry, every town or region has itscharacteristic products. A similar situation occurs inthe economy: regions have their own specific charac-teristics. For example, Hollywood (United States) isassociated with the film industry, Tolosa deLlenguadoc and Bordeaux (France) with the aeronau-tical industry, and Catalonia with the food or textileindustry. For different reasons in each case, a specificsector has developed more in one region than in oth-ers. This phenomenon of local specialization is knownas cluster ing.

Clusters and com petitive advantage: What is a

cluster?In general terms, clusters are concentrationsof companies and other institutions that are dedicatedto the same business, that is, companies and entitiesthat share the same market and consequently are com-plementary and have similarities. Companies and enti-ties in clusters form relationships between them innumerous ways, including official relationships (suchas those between suppliers and clients, for example)and intangible relationships due to proximity (circula-tion of information, etc.).

Concentrations of businesses or clusters generallyoccur naturally: the existence of a raw material, a spe-cific skill, or proximity to a specific market provides theopportunity for companies to emerge with specific,differential knowledge.

A cluster is a geographically proximate group of com-panies and associated institutions in a particularfield, linked by commonalities and complementarities.Michael F. Porter. On Competition

Advan tages of belonging to a cluster. Althoughit may seem paradoxical, local elements that provide acompetitive advantage may help to increase globalcompetitiveness. Given that clusters involve a con-centration of businesses and knowledge, belonging toa cluster can provide access to specialized suppliers,services and human resources. In addition, specificinformation tends to circulate in a cluster that benefitsthe companies, and enables them to react, adapt rap-idly to market changes, and adopt innovation. Ofcourse, in addition to these ‘natural’ factors, supportpolicies to meet the needs of the existing businesscluster also come into play.

Does this mean that companies that are in a clus-ter will be more competitive than those that are not?In general, companies that belong to clusters tend tobe in a better position to compete at global scale (dueprecisely to the access to specialized information andresources, to the flexibility and to the rapid adaptationto innovation). However, belonging to a cluster doesnot guarantee business success. Companies areformed and fold continuously both within and outsideof clusters. Likewise, entire clusters are in decline thathave not known how to interpret market demands orhave responded less efficiently than other companiesor clusters.


St rategy as the basis of compet it iveness

Differen tiation . The key to business competive-ness is strategy, that is, the capacity of companies tounderstand how the market develops, how their owncompetitive position evolves compared to other com-panies and how demand changes (the consumer’spurchasing criteria). In fact, both the market anddemand develop constantly. Therefore, companiesalso have to evolve and understand which businessesare of most interest. At the same time, they must becapable of differentiating themselves, that is, ofresponding better than their competitors. This knowl-edge capacity and ability to respond to the market isessential, whether a company belongs to a cluster ornot: companies that are not capable of evolving withdemand, or that have done this worse than their com-petitors will probably not survive in the market.

Competitive strategy is about being different. It meansdeliberately choosing a different setof activities to deliver a unique mix of value. Michael F.Porter. ‘What is Strategy?’, Harvard Business Review,Nov-Dec, 1996.

One example of the importance of constant evolu-tion can be found in the Swedish textile industry. Fromthe seventeenth century to the beginning of the twen-tieth century, the region of Sjuhärad, in the south ofSweden, was economically stable due to the develop-ment of iron and wool. The wool market was very tra-ditional for many years: the traders sold wool tohouseholds, and the members of the household madetheir own clothing. It was not until the end of thenineteenth century that a new trend began to changethe value chain: some businessmen began to produceclothing on a large scale. They bought textile machin-ery and used knitting machines. In just a few years, thenumber of people employed in these first companieshad reached 1,500, and Sjuhärad was established as atextile region for several decades.

However, in the 1970s textile trade restrictionschanged, and some that had benefitted the region dis-appeared altogether: suddenly, products could be

imported from countries with much lower productioncosts. The influx of cheap textiles had a profound impacton the local industry, and businesspeople had to devisecreative strategies that would enable them to develop aunique differentiating factor that would ensure their sur-vival in the face of the competition. As a result, buildingon their knowledge of the textile industry, they began todevelop textile machinery. Over time, the technicaldevelopment of this machinery led to a high technicallevel in the manufacture of water filters. Due to the con-tinuing need to specialize to mark their difference, thisknowledge of filters began to be applied to other sectors,such as air filters. Consequently, today around the city ofBoras, there is a cluster of companies that producedevices for ventilation and air quality, whose technicalbasis lies in filters.

This example shows how factors of global compet-itiveness vary constantly. Companies must react to themarket changes and maintain their differentiation tosurvive and grow.

The cluster as a un it of analysis: the concep t of

‘business’.One factor is essential to ensure the effec-tiveness of a strategic analysis of clusters: the clustersmust have been created around ‘businesses’. In otherwords, it is important to ensure that the clusterincludes companies that are dedicated to the samebusiness, and therefore share the same competitiveenvironment. If a cluster includes companies in differ-ent businesses, it will not be possible to meet theirneeds with a single strategy.

A business is not the same as an industry. A businessis a strategic segment formed of a complete value chain,from the raw material to the buyer who approaches aspecific, unique market. We can illustrate this with anexample: the paper industry. In Catalonia, there are aconsiderable number of companies classified within thepaper industry. However, are all of these companies thesame? If we analyse the markets by those who work inthem, we can see that they are dedicated to very differ-ent products: some make paper for tissues, others makepaper for printing, and others make cardboard. In addi-tion, we can find companies who make food paper, suchas kraft paper for cartons (Map 1).

If we continue with the analysis, we find that theseproducts in turn are destined for very different markets:kraft paper is used for cartons in the wine sector, card-

board is used for packaging in the pharmaceutical indus-try, and printing paper for the publishing industry (Map

2). In other words, instead of a classification of the rawmaterial, we have a classification by business. This sec-


Pap er

Printing

Kraft

Cardboard

Tissues

Printing

Kraft

Cardboard

Tissues

Publishing

Wine

Pharmacy

Tissues

Map 1

From the paper sector to the final product

Map 2

From the paper-based product to business focused on this product


ond classification covers all of the companies that arerequired to reach the final consumer of each product.

Each of these markets has its own operating dynam-ics: different clients, different market forces, and differ-ent competing companies. If we wish to understand thestrategic implications for the companies and what theideal environment should be like, we need to study thesefour markets individually. If we focus only on the level ofraw material and analyse all the companies that madepaper in Catalonia, we lose the strategic information thatis specific to each one of these markets.

This illustrates the importance of defining clustersaround businesses. If the perimeter of a cluster is toosmall or too big, we will not be able to reach conclusionsabout individual strategy or the most suitable environ-ment. Consequently, we will probably be limited toimplementing cross-cutting measures. Although theseare important, they will not be sufficient as they will notaddress essential, strategic themes that are required toboost the competitiveness of a territory, as discussedabove.

The following example is from the biotechnologyindustry. This industry covers different markets: biotech-nology for energy production, biotechnology for healthproduction, and biotechnology for food production. Ifwe wish to devise a strategic approach, we cannotaddress these three enormous markets simultaneously,as each of them has very different prerogatives. Instead,we should focus on each market individually. If we studythem separately we can understand their evolution, thefactors that determine competitiveness, and what com-panies must do to be competitive. If we try to respond toall the markets at the same time, we will probably onlybe able to make general recommendations that do notdeal with the specific feature of each market.

Clusters as a tool for analysis and economic policy

We shou ld focus on strategic change, not on clus-

ters. Clusters are not good or bad forever. As mentionedabove, no company is guaranteed to succeed justbecause it belongs to a cluster. Therefore, the emphasisshould not be on the clusters themselves, but on the useof clusters as a tool for analysis when we are definingcompany strategies.

Clusters as an ideal measurement in an econom-

ic analysis.To boost the economy of a region and itsdevelopment, the ideal solution would be to work on theindividual area of each company: to understand whateach company should do in the global situation andwhat kind of environment it needs to carry out its mis-sion. However, it is not feasible to work individually oneach company in the region. Only the large companiestend to carry out individual analyses. Small and medi-um-sized companies find it hard to update their strate-gies, and only very rarely seek exterior help to redefinethem. However, if we work in the area of a cluster, wecan effectively provide strategic recommendations onspending, as the cluster will contain similar SMEs thathave the same competitive goals. Thus, clusters can helpin the design of a strategy and its effective applicationboth individually and collectively.

This is why governments focus on clusters: they aresmaller and more precise measures of analysis thanindustries, and enable the development of a suitableeconomic policy for groups of companies that share sim-ilar characteristics.

Strategic work in the area of a cluster.To in -crease competitiveness, a company needs to work ontwo levels:

• First at a strategiclevel, to draw up an individualstrategy that enables a company to position itself inattractive businesses, use its strengths, and developunique characteristics that differentiate it in the market.

• Secondly, all companies need a suitable environ-

ment that meets their needs (with support organiza-tions, training entities, R&D centres, suitable regula-tions, complementary industries, etc.).

These two inseparable factors, strategy and environ-ment, are essential to determine competitiveness.Therefore, each area needs to be considered:

Ind ividual strategy.In general, each company candevelop its own individual strategy (and must do this). Itmust define how it wants to compete in the market,according to its strengths and weaknesses, and the inter-est of each business. Not all companies dedicate enoughtime to defining their strategy, or to adapting it suitablyto changes in the market. For example, companies oftendo not see the major changes that are coming. This wasthe case with the emergence of VoIP or internet tele-phone: initially, it was not the telecommunications


giants who entered this new market, but new compa-nies, such as Skype, who rapidly became leaders. It is notalways easy to understand what strategic orientationshould be adopted or to apply a new business modelthat is different to the one used previously. However, inany case, the development of a strategy to follow is theresponsibility of the company directors.

Environment. With respect to the environment, nocompany is capable individually of defining and struc-turing the environment in which it develops. There aretoo many exogenous factors that are outside a compa-ny’s control, despite the considerable influence thatthese factors may have on companies. For example, acompany cannot decide unilaterally which universitycourses or techniques are taught at existing educationalcentres, or the regulations that will be applied in theirsector, or the amount that will be invested in researchand development centres. Perhaps some large compa-nies can influence these factors, but in any case they arenot decisions that can be taken by a company individu-ally. These decisions depend on the governing bodies (atregional or supraregional level) and development organ-izations, among others.

The role of regional governm ents and of eco-

nom ic developm en t organ izations.Even if govern-ments follow a non-interventionist policy, theyinevitably have an impact on the economy with theirpowers in the areas of subsidies, legislation, creation ofinfrastructures (such as technology parks) and publicpurchases. Government influence is not only unques-tionable, but also necessary to create a suitable envi-ronment for business development.

Nevertheless, as discussed above, it is not viable for agovernment to work on each company individually.However, if we group companies by businesses we canwork more effectively, with clusters of companies thatshare the same challenges and opportunities. This helpsus to understand how we can promote the developmentof these companies.

The study of clusters helps governments to under-stand two factors: first, which businesses are the mostattractive and will grow the most in the long term; andsecond, what environment is required for these compa-nies to be able to develop. Using this information, a gov-ernment can transmit strategic information to compa-nies so that they can apply it individually; and make

economic policy decisions that help to create an envi-ronment that is favourable to the business cluster.

Tools that governments use to support business clus-ters in their regions include, among others: investing intechnologies that benefit the companies in the cluster,reducing shortfalls in training and specialized staff incompanies, supporting the creation of service centresand associations, providing strategic information on themarket, and acting as an advanced purchasing centrethat prepares companies for future market requirements.


The 22@ Barcelonamodel: a city organizedinto clusters

Montse Charle

Barcelona City Council

The model of 22@ Barcelona urban development In December 2010, we celebrated the tenth anniver-

sary of 22@ Barcelona, which is perhaps the most impor-tant and ambitious project carried out in the city ofBarcelona since the Olympic Games of 1992.

This project, which was approved by Barcelona CityCouncil in 2000, was for the recovery of a territory thatwas historically a driver of the city’s economy: Poblenou.The recovery involves transforming 220 hectares (over3,200,000 m2) of former industrial land situated in thecentre of the city into an innovative and productive dis-trict that acts as a scientific, technological and culturalplatform, with excellent, modern infrastructure for thedevelopment of knowledge-intensive economic activity.

In these 10 years, 22@ Barcelona has become aninternational benchmark in urban, economic and socialtransformation. In this decade in the life of the project,the number of companies, shops, restaurants, hotels,and so on, in the area has doubled. The figures haverisen from 3,400 firms to over 7,000 today. Half of thesecompanies moved to the area from 2000 onwards, and27% of the total are knowledge-intensive companies. Itis estimated that the district has gained over 56,000workers, and the number of residents in the zoneincreased by 16,750 to reach 90,214 inhabitants at theend of 2010.

Economic promotion th rough the cluster modelLocal and regional governments can play a major

role in the economic development of their territory,by boosting local industries, detecting the emergenceof new sectors of activity and promoting their estab-lishment.

One of the main actions in the development of eco-nomic activity in the 22@ Barcelona district has beento boost and promote various economic sectors thatare strategic for the city, on the basis of a cluster

model. This has the following advantages in terms ofeconomic promotion:

• It enables the creation of fields of knowledge inwhich Barcelona can aspire to become a world leader.These fields of knowledge are created through the con-centration in the same geographic location of compa-nies, public organizations and leading science and tech-nology centres. When these fields of knowledge areformed, they should be based on sectors that are consid-ered to be strategic and in which Barcelona can excelabove other regions and countries. If the city does nothave a competitive advantage in which to differentiateinvestment, it shall not be sustainable .

• It facilitates the creation of a real ecosystem ofinnovation that can attract talent and generate new eco-nomic activity. Fields of knowledge and the presence ofcompanies and research centres act as magnets for talentfrom around the world, attracting companies and quali-fied staff, as well as boosting innovation at a technolog-ical and market level.

• It facilitates the design of a strategy to strengthenthe competitiveness of the sector. A concentration ofagents forms a critical mass that is large enough to iden-tify companies’ opportunities, as well as what they needfrom the environment. These factors can be identifiedwith sufficient accuracy to be able to analyse strategicproblems (and thus promote competiveness), instead offocusing on challenges that affect the entire sector.

In addition, the cluster model enables the formationof local and international connections with other clus-ters. This may lead to the establishment of new formaland informal networks that can help to promote jointprojects, attract innovative international projects, andincrease social and corporate cohesion.

The clusters in 22@ Barcelona: the role of govern-

ment entities

The economic activity of 22@ has been organizedinto 5 macroclusters, all in knowledge-intensive areas inwhich Barcelona has exceptional companies and knowl-edge that can help the city to excel internationally:

• Information and communication technologies • Medical technologies • Energy • Design• Media

1. Data from April 2011. 2. Data from 2011.


There are two ways in which a government body canboost development in these areas:

• Firstly, it can identify the most useful businessstrategies, in order to prioritize through support mecha-nisms (subsidies or others) the companies that are mov-ing towards these strategies , and thus make the most oflimited public resources.

• Secondly, all public and support entities (researchcentres, training centres, creation of regulations, etc.)need to be aligned so that they can evolve and respondto the companies’ needs, which change over time.Whenever a new business emerges, such as for exampleelectric vehicles, the established regulations need to beadapted, as well as the actions proposed for sector sup-port bodies.

In addition, government bodies can disseminate theresults of their strategic studies to the local business sec-tor. These studies provide basic information on thedevelopment of businesses and trends in consumerdemand. This may be particularly useful for small andmedium-sized companies who may not be able tofinance this kind of research in all cases, or may have tocarry it out at individual level.

Illust rat ion: t he media clust er in 22@ Barcelona

The cluster ’s perimeter of action

The media sector, also know as the content, commu-nication, creative and cultural industries and copyright-based industry sector, groups together all companiesdedicated to the production, creation, publication, distri-bution, use and management of information and experi-ences whose common aim is communication.

This sector includes a wide range of industries, sometraditional and other emerging, that face similar chal-lenges despite their diverse origins. All companies thatare considered part of a cluster must face similar chal-lenges: if this were not the case, there would be no wayto define shared support mechanisms, and public inter-vention would not be able to focus on strategic problems;instead it would have to deal with cross-cutting issues. Ifwe focus just on strategic challenges, we can increase thecompetitiveness of companies and territories.

The med ia: a strategic sector for Barcelona and

Catalonia

The media sector is a very important sector for theCatalan economy, because of its current size and its pro-jection for the future.

According to the latest official data available from theStatistical Institute of Catalonia (IDESCAT)1, the grossvalue added (GVA) of the communication sector inCatalonia increased by 31.1% between 2002 and 2007,from a total of €4,977 M to €6,525 M during this period.This figure represents 4% of the GDP of Catalonia andapproximately 5% of employment (145,000 workers).These data clearly situate the media sector above theSpanish average and at the head of the sectors associat-ed with the knowledge economy in Catalonia.

Much of this economic activity is located inBarcelona, the capital of Catalonia. According to datafrom the Business and Labour Observatory of theGovernment of Catalonia2, 88% of all workers in themedia sector in Catalonia are located in Barcelona (62%)and its metropolitan area (26%).

The potential for growth is very high, and at the sametime the media sector promotes the development of ICT(as it uses this technology intensively) and the promo-tion of local culture worldwide.

The importance of the sector at the scale of the localeconomy, as well as its high concentration in Barcelonawith respect to other territories, makes the media a per-fect sector to be analysed using the cluster tool, as this isbased precisely on the concentration of businesses andthe competitive advantage of one territory over others.

The wealth of the Catalan media cluster

As defined by Michael Porter, clusters are businessrealities, and as such they are considered to include all ofthe sector’s economic fabric in a territory. The mediacluster in Catalonia has a wide range of companies thatcover all of the value chain in audiovisual productionand that enable the entire cluster to be efficient andcompetitive. In addition, the cluster includes good pro-fessional and university training centres with excellentmedia-related research in universities and R&D centres.When the wealth of businesses and institutions isanalysed in detail it is clear that the media cluster of


Barcelona stands out nationally and internationally withrespect to other territories:

• Large, small and medium-sized companies: morethan three hundred media companies are concentratedin 22@ Barcelona. Some of the most representative areRadio Nacional d’España and Barcelona Televisió, in thepublic sector; and Mediapro, Lavinia, InternationalSound Studio, ADN, Cromosoma, Canonigo Films,Cuatro, Garage Films, Sonoblok, Vistaprint, the editorialgroup RBA, Enciclopèdia Catalana, Bassat Ogilvy,Miraveo, Apeer, BMAT, and InOutTV, among others, inthe private sector.

• Leading institutions: the Catalan AudiovisualCouncil (CAC) , which is a pioneering regulatory body,and the Barcelona Media Foundation are the most rep-resentative examples of leading institutions that belongto the media cluster. The Barcelona Media Foundation isalso the manager of this cluster. It must ensure the con-nection and interrelation between the different parts ofwhich it is comprised, and promote initiatives thatincrease the competitiveness of companies in the sectorand improve the position of Barcelona as a leader in thisarea.

• Universities and other media-related training cen-tres: the UPF’s Communication Campus (24,000 m2). Thecampus houses the Learning and Research ResourceCentre (CRAI), the Audiovisual University Institute (IUA),the Science Communication Observatory (OCC) and theUniversity Institute for Applied Linguistics (IULA). Inaddition, 22@ houses the SAE Institute, an international-ly renowned media-related higher education centre, andthe UPC School of Professional & Executive Development(3,286 m2 floor area; 3,000 students). Finally, the TechTalent Center houses the new headquarters of the UPCSchool of Professional & Executive Development, whichis a space for knowledge exchange among professionalsin the technological field. It generates creativity and inno-vation for the production sectors.

• Technology centres, R&D and technology transfer:these are key elements that are essential to ensure con-tinuous, joint innovation in a highly technological sec-tor that evolves at a fast pace. In many cases, they bring university research to the market. TheBarcelona Media Innovation Centre (CIBM), theTechnology Centre of the Barcelona Digital Foundation,the Internet Interdisciplinary Institute (IN3) and the

eLearn Center of the UOC are clear examples. The loca-tion of the first European research laboratory of Yahoo!Research Barcelona in Barcelona Media Park is a clearexample of how ecosytems of innovation such as 22@are essential to attracting talent. This is an example ofintegration into the innovation system.

• Other knowledge infrastructure: the multi-sectorincubator Barcelona Activa has a high percentage ofprojects associated with the media and audiovisualfields, and there is a new incubator specifically for themedia on the corner of Roc Boronat and Almogàvers(3,716 m2). Pompeu Fabra University’s Tànger building isaimed at research groups or start-ups associated withthe media, as is the UPF’s Music Technology Group (atwhich the well-known musical instrument ‘Reactable’was created) and the Computational Imaging andSimulation Technologies in Biomedicine Research Group(CISTIB), which is also attached to the UPF. The Imaginabuilding has almost 12,000 m2 of floor area for compa-nies and institutions associated with the media sectorand is a major centre of audiovisual production as it hasa set of 2,000 m2 and other smaller sets, technical roomsfor production and post-production, as well as a teleportfor satellite transmission and reception (La Sexta, GolTV,BesTV, La Fàbrica, etc.). The Media-TIC building has14,000 m2 of space for companies, research and training.The Factoria de Talent Creatiu, attached to the DigitalentFoundation (and promoted by Cromosoma and Abacus,among others) has a set of 100,000 m2 and other techni-cal areas.

Other elements in Barcelona and the metropolitanarea that are connected to the cluster and complementa-ry to it are the following:

i2CAT. A foundation dedicated to promotingresearch and innovation in the second generation of theInternet. Its audiovisual cluster is focused on the devel-opment of video technologies for the Internet.

Barcelona/Catalunya Film Commission .The cityitself has become the biggest and best set that we have.Around 1,000 productions are filmed here every year. The importance of a local market

However, the existence of a network, even such a richone that covers the production chain so well, is not suffi-cient guarantee of a cluster’s success. One of the key fac-tors for developing any business sector is the growth of themarket and the existence of local anchor companies.


In the media cluster, there is a range of markets thatare growing strongly, and these markets are strong inCatalonia. They have a considerable number of anchorcompanies that operate worldwide. The proximity ofanchor companies means that the business networkreceives information on consumer trends so that it canrespond appropriately to market demand, and helpscompanies to establish lasting relations with theirclients. Below, we describe the main media markets andtheir strength in Catalonia:

• In radio, Barcelona has been a leader in Spain(Ràdio Barcelona broadcast its first 30-minute news pro-gramme in 1924) and continues to be a leader in pro-duction and the launch of new creative talents.

• In television, Catalan production companies areamong the most successful in Spain and have beenresponsible for some of the most successful, influen-tial programmes in the last decade. They have beenfurther strengthened with the emergence of local tel-evision, thematic channels, etc. Companies such asGestmusic-Endemol, Mediapro, El Terrat and Lavinia,at their time, were responsible for much of the inno-vation in Spanish television and, in some cases,worldwide.

• In the world of cinema, Catalan producers are lead-ing a considerable resurgence supported by significantnational and international business projects. In additionto the large producers, there are around 200 small pro-ducers of television and cinema in Catalonia who gener-ate some of the most ground-breaking, singular audiovi-sual proposals in Spain. Beyond the success of fictionalfeature films, the production of documentaries, televi-sion series and TV movies have been recognised interna-tionally by a considerable group of entrepreneurs in thefield of creative arts.

• In the field of advertising, Catalonia, and specifical-ly Barcelona, has become a leader in advertising produc-tion at European scale. The presence of creators, talentand a top international production and support industryhas made the city an inspiration and the source andscene of many global advertising campaigns.

• In animation, Catalonia leads the Spanish sector,and has helped some of the strongest companies toattain leading positions in Europe, such as Cromosoma,which is successful worldwide with its crafted, high-quality product.

• In terms of digital creation, there are some majorcompanies in the fields of video game production, tele-vision design and special effects, that have a strong pres-ence in local, European and US markets. Examplesinclude Digital Legends and Novarama.

• In the publishing sector there is also a well-estab-lished tradition led by companies such as Planeta,Random House Mondadori, RBA, Salvat, Zeta,Enciclopèdia Catalana and Grup 62, among others.

Challenges for the fu ture of the cluster

Due to public and private collaboration on variousprojects, such as the Barcelona Media Park, and the newinvestment of companies in the sector, Barcelona is acompetitive and modern territory within this field. Forexample, the Barcelona Media Park is one of the mostemblematic projects carried out in 22@ Barcelona andthe city of Barcelona for the media sector. It has115,000 m2 of floor area for companies and 60,000 m2 forservices related to the communication sector and it iscomprised of Pompeu Fabra University, the 22@Barcelona municipal companies, the Grup MediaPro andBarcelona Media Innovation Centre (the manager of thecluster).

With the impetus of the media cluster in the newtechnological district of 22@ Barcelona, Barcelona hasestablished the foundations for becoming one of themain media centres at European and international scale.It is a focus of innovation and an unbeatable location forthe media industry. Barcelona has all the assets andpotential needed to achieve this goal.


1. The authors would like to thank Jerome Engel, director of theEntrepreneurship Program at the Haas School of Business, University ofCalifornia (Berkeley), for the help and information provided. We wouldalso like to thank the founders of Adecq-BesTv, Digital LegendsEntertainment, Genaker, Groupalia, Polymita, VozTelecom, Wututu and

Zyncro for their collaboration with this study. Finally, we are grateful toRaúl Sánchez for his excellent work on the field study.

Science and technology parks as globalbusiness platforms1

Ricard Garriga and Raúl SánchezBarcelona City Council

Francesc Solé ParelladaUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya-BarcelonaTech (UPC)

As a set of clusters, technology companies located in

science parks benefit from networks between compa-

nies, connections with universities, and with govern-

ment institutions. We based our project on the triple

helix, and developed a model that represents the evolu-

tion of the support provided by agents involved in an

innovation system in each one of the stages of business

growth. We took into account companies created in a

technology park in Barcelona, which were founded with

a global vision, and we focused the analysis on five main

variables that determine the development of a business

(technology, talent, finance, location and evolution) to

internally validate the proposed model. We found that

the support provided by these three agents of the inno-

vation system varies according to the company’s stage of

development. The in-depth results contribute to increas-

ing the efficiency of programmes to support technologi-

cal initiatives.

Environments based on innovation systems have

been found to be particularly favourable for the creation

and development of technology companies. Science and

technology parks are a a clear example of this, as they

support entrepreneurs, and promote the creation and

exchange of knowledge, as well as the exploitation of

new opportunities (Etzkowitz et al., 2005).

A science park is comprised of companies associated

with universities and other research institutions, in

which the creation and growth of knowledge-based

companies is promoted (Monck et al., 1988). At the same

time, a science park is a localized node for knowledge-

intensive companies that provides opportunities to form

connections with research centres, clients and special-

ized suppliers. Companies within science parks benefit

from the excellent facilities, and the proximity of other

knowledge-intensive companies promotes the exchange

of experiences (for examples, see Saxennian, 1994;

Sorenson, 2003; Nonaka et al., 2000; Zucker et al., 1998),

and therefore the creation of new opportunities

(Schumpeter, 1942). In addition, the availability of inter-

mediary ‘inputs’ increases, which enables companies to

deepen knowledge of their specialization (see, for exam-

ple, Sorenson, 2003; Stuart et al., 2003; Porter, 1998;

Marshall, 1920).

Due to the current global economy, many of these

new companies are focused on international markets

from the time of their inception. They see the world as

their main market from the outset and they view the

internal market as a support for their international busi-

nesses (McKinsey & Co., 1993). These companies seek a

competitive advantage through the use of resources

from different countries and the sale of their products to

a range of countries (McDougall et al., 1994; Oviatt et al.,

1994; Oviatt et al., 1995; Oviatt et al., 1997). Global busi-

nesspeople use global intellectual property as a compet-

itive advantage, and access world markets using the

resources that other people have studied and created.

Although many studies have been undertaken on

the role of science parks as promoters of entrepre-

neurship, there is still no clear evidence of what they

really contribute and how they support the develop-

ment of new companies (Fergusson et al., 2004). The

aim of this research is to detect the main factors that

support technology entrepreneurship in a science

park. The analysis is based on the triple helix model

as a system of innovation (Etzkowitz et al., 2000):

university, government and business relationships

among the private sector. We carry out a step-by-

step analysis, and identify the importance of these

three agents as facilitators and points of support

depending on a company’s stage of development. In

fact, this study’s original approach lies in the individ-

ual analysis of each one of the stages of company

growth.

We based the analysis on our previous research

and on field studies in the San Francisco Bay area and

Barcelona (see, for example, Etzkowitz et al., 2006;

Piqué et al., 2005; Piqué et al., 2004), as well as on a

literature review to select five critical variables that

define the process of the development and growth of

international companies. Subsequently, we defined a

model using both the stages of business development

and the triple helix approach. Finally, we selected

start-ups that operate in an international market and

are associated with a technology park in Barcelona,

and we interviewed the founders to validate the pro-

posed model.

The interviews revealed that universities, industry

and the government play different roles in each stage of

a company’s growth. Support from universities and

from the government is particularly important in the

first stage of creating and launching a company, whilst

the main support during the subsequent stages of

growth and maturity comes from all aspects of net-

works and links between companies.

The results of the analysis help to identify the main

factors that promote technological evolution in all of

these stages, and illustrate the importance of each of

the agents who act as facilitators. As a result of the

analysis, governments and other organizations should

be capable of helping to improve policies to support

entrepreneurial technology-based companies.

The analysis is organized as follows: the first part

defines a science park as a group of clusters that sup-

port the creation of new companies that operate in a

global market. In the second part, we describe the

research method and define the variables and stages in

a company’s growth, which are examined in depth dur-

ing the analysis. In the third part, we base the analysis

on the triple helix to develop a model that illustrates

the evolution of support and its importance in each one

of the stages in a company’s growth. In the fourth sec-

tion, we present the main results of the interviews, and

in the fifth section we examine in depth the interviews

with companies in 22@ Barcelona, which are further

analysed and discussed in the sixth and final part of

this article.

Science and t echnology parks and technology

ent repreneurship

In the last few decades, many science and technol-

ogy parks and business incubators have formed associ-

ations with the main universities. The growing atten-

tion given to these places is due to the widespread

belief that science and technology parks promote

national and regional development (Malecki, 1991;

Shefer et al., 1993), stimulate R&D and innovation in

SMEs (Westhead, 1997), promote wealth creation and

business performance (Geroski et al., 1993; Harris et

al., 1995) and generate new jobs (Westhead et al., 1995;

Westhead, 1998).

Monck et al. (1988) define a science park as a large

base of companies that, due to their connections with

universities or other research institutions, benefit from

management tools to boost technology transfer and

business knowledge, so that the park can become an

ideal place to create knowledge-intensive companies

and help them to grow. As an association of clusters, a

science park is a type of business network that is situat-

ed in a specific geographic location, in which the prox-

imity between companies and supporting institutions


ensures that there are strong links between them, and

increases the frequency and impact of interactions

(Porter, 1998).

The advantages of being situated in an innovative

environment generate a virtuous circle (Kenney, 2000)

that attracts talented businesspeople and professionals,

specialized suppliers and investors from around the

world. This local structure of social networks promotes

the flow of knowledge among all of the actors. Different

combinations of knowledge lead to new opportunities

(Schumpeter, 1942). Therefore, working in a cluster helps

to detect more easily gaps in products and services and

consequently to create new businesses (Sorenson, 2003;

Porter, 1998). Furthermore, the increasing demand for

goods, skills and staff attracts specialized suppliers who

make it easy for new companies to access new resources

(Porter, 1998).

Many academics have studied which factors support

the creation of technology companies within science and

technology parks (for example, Link et al., 2005;

Linderlöf et al., 2003; Etzkowitz, 2002). Others have

studied factors that favour the growth of technology

companies (for example, Siegel et al., 2003; Colombo et

al., 2002; Monck et al., 1988). Although some of these

studies are of great scientific value, there is still no clear

evidence of what science and technology parks offer and

how they support the development of new companies

(Fergusson et al., 2004).

In this study, we examine the environmental factors

that determine the stages of creation and growth of

technology-based companies in science and technolo-

gy parks. Like other innovation systems and in accor-

dance with the triple helix model (Etzkowitz et al.,

2000), companies in science and technology parks ben-

efit from the relationship between academic institu-

tions, the government and the private sector. The links

between companies and universities and the govern-

ment create an ecosystem that is favourable for the cre-

ation of new technology-based companies. The impor-

tance of factors that support business activities differ

from one stage to another. Therefore, the importance of

the supporting agents is also expected to differ in each

stage of growth.

Research method

A case study is the best strategy of all when

research aims to answer the questions ‘how?’ and

‘why?’; the researchers have little control over the

events; and the focus is on a modern phenomenon

within a real-life context (Yin, 1984). In his book on

case-study research, Robert Yin (1984) confirms that

evidence from many cases is often considered more

attractive, and a general study is believed to be more

robust. Consequently, the ability to carry out 6-10

case studies, organized effectively within a multiple-

case study design, is analogous to the capacity to

carry out from 6 to 10 experiments on related sub-

jects.

In our research, we selected new companies that

operate in the global market and are located in a

technology park in Barcelona.

We based the analysis on two widely accepted

models. The first is the general model of business

development that divides the process into four

stages: inception, launch, growth and maturity. The

second is the triple helix model (Etzkowitz et al.,

2000) that was defined in the previous section.

On the basis of these two models, we aimed to

analyse how the agents in a triple helix converge

within an innovative environment such as a sci-

ence and technology park. We propose a model

that shows the importance of the support provided

by the three agents of innovation in each of the

stages (Figure 1). With a view to a more in-depth

analysis of the behaviour of new companies oper-

ating in a global market and to obtain comparable

results, we focused on five key variables in the

process of business development. These five vari-

ables are (Figure 2):

• Technologyor intellectual property, and the char-

acteristics of R&D.

• Talent, which includes the academic training of

professionals in the entrepreneurial team, the overall

diversity and its organization and functions within the

company.

• Fundingsources and conditions.



• Location and connections with technology plat-

forms, as well as with the area of influence.

• Evolution of the value chain, sales, and other mar-

ket characteristics.

The research began with a review of the existing lit-

erature and the proposal of a model that linked technol-

ogy entrepreneurship in science and technology parks

and the triple helix model. Subsequently, for exploratory

purposes, we studied the behaviour of new companies

operating in a global market. The aim of an exploratory

study is to construct a theory that solves the problem set

out in the question. The theory is then validated (Yin,

1984). External validation requires confirmatory addi-

tional research.

The aim of the interviews was to find evidence on the

five variables in each stage of company growth: incep-

tion, launch, growth and maturity. The companies were

selected carefully to obtain a representative sample of

technology-based start-ups. All of them were, or had

been in some way, associated with universities and gov-

ernment entities in one of the four stages. They had

always had a global outlook and a high proportion of

their sales and revenue were from international markets.

From an analysis of the interviews we identified, in

entrepreneurial processes at the technology park in

Barcelona, which, how and when the factors are most

effective at providing support. Subsequently, we studied

the behaviour of new companies founded with a global

outlook to detect which environmental factors help in

the creation of technology companies within ecosystems

of innovation like science and technology parks. The

environment is a unit of analysis that was characterized

by studying the behaviour of a subunit of analysis: the

company founded with a global outlook. To extract con-

clusions on the environmental factors that determine the

process of development, we analysed the five variables

in each of the four stages of company growth. Finally, we

related the conclusions with the three agents involved in

the triple helix innovation model: universities, the gov-

ernment and the companies (Figure 3).

4 stages(inception, launch,growth, maturity)

5 variables(technology, talent, finance,

location, evolution)

6 casesTechnology Park

(BCN)

Environmental factorsAgents of the triple

helix

Figure 3

Research design

Tech

Talent

Finance

Location

Evolution

CashFlow

Inception Launching Maturity

Time

I II III IV

Growth

Figure 1

Stages of growth and analysis of the five main variables

Figure 2

Main var iables

Research and development

Intellectual property rights

Product and production

Resources

Academic and professional experience

Global diversity, mentality and contacts

Organization of human capital

Alignment of roles and functions

Sources of funding (FFF, BA, VC, CV, M&A, IPO)

Conditions (investment returns)

National and international

Local/global

Technology platforms

Value proposition, business model, business plan...

Local and international sales

Local and global clients

Value chain

TECHNOLOGY

TALENT

FINANCE

LOCATION

EVOLUTION


Agents Resources

Figure 4

Agents in a science park and resources managed

Research university

Government (national, regional

and local)

Companies (large and SMEs)

- People with abilities and contacts

- Science and technology

- Knowledge (how)

- Experience (what we know) and vision

- Business connections

- Space

- Technology infrastructure

- Professional services

- Market (domestic market)

- Money

- Meeting points - Clients (as a key

element)

Agents Resources

Figure 5

Role of agents in a science park

- People with abilities and business connections- Science (research centres)- Technology (technology centres and licences)- Knowledge on entrepreneurship (how)- Experience (what we know) and vision- Business connections- Space- Technology infrastructure- Meeting rooms- Clients (as a key element)- Schools of business angels (private investors)- Promote an enterprising spirit

Business plan competitions

- Role of legal regulator- Could act as a source of demand, providing a sophisticat-

ed market for high-tech products and solutions- Funding of science and technology through public pro-

grammes- Investment in university education

- Large companies: investment in new companies tomanage their strategic innovation. Business mergers

- Small and medium-sized companies: business relations andclusters

- New companies, to incorporate science and technologyas a value proposition

University

Government

Industry

Development of the model based on the t r iple helix

Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) defined a model of

innovation based on a triple helix of interaction between

university-industry-government. The triple helix model

was based on models of national and regional systems of

innovation developed by Lundvall (1988), Nelson (1993)

and Freeman (1998), among others, and the major contri-

bution of Gibbons (1994) and his ‘Mode 2’ model, which

explains the production of knowledge from a multidisci-

plinary, broad focus.

The triple helix theory proposes that university-indus-

try-government interaction is key to improving the condi-

tions of innovation in a knowledge-based society.

Industry’s position in the triple helix is as the production

node, the government is a source of contractual relation-

ships that ensure stable interactions and exchange, and the

university is the source of new knowledge and technolo-

gies and the main generator of knowledge-based

economies. Industry and government have always been

the principle institutions in leading societies. In a knowl-

edge society, the triple helix model has helped universities

to gain a level equivalent to that of industry and govern-

ment. This was not the case in previous institutional con-

figurations in which it played a secondary role.

Due to its simple, robust structure, the triple helix

model has been used as the basis for many studies.

It fits our study perfectly, and explains the case of most

technology parks in Barcelona.

On the basis of the triple helix, we analysed the role and

interrelations between the agents involved in the innovation

system. Each agent uses different resources to support the

creation of new technology-based companies that have a

global outlook (Figure 4). The role and importance of the

support provided by the three agents varies according to the

characteristics of each one and to the stage in the develop-

ment of the companies.

Figure 5 sums up the main functions of each agent. The

increasing importance of knowledge and the role of the uni-

versity in the incubation of technology-based companies

have increased the prominence of the institutional field.

Enterprising universities are proactive and make academic

and business knowledge available to beneficiaries.


Tech

Talent

Finance

Location

Evolution

CashFlow

Inception Launching Maturity

Time

I II III IV

University Industry Government

Growth

Figure 6

The importance of agents who support the development of technology companies in science and technology parks

As companies increase their level of technology, they

move closer to an academic model, in which they acquire

higher levels of training and share their knowledge. The

government acts as a public entrepreneur and investor, and

also fulfils its traditional role of regulator in the establish-

ment of the rules of the game. Beyond the development of

products, innovation becomes an endogenous process of

‘taking the role of the other’, and fostering interrelation

between institutional spheres.

These functions vary in each stage of company develop-

ment, and therefore the importance of the support provided

by the agents fluctuates in the different stages. Figure 6 illus-

trates the importance of the three agents’ support in each

stage. Due to their research infrastructure, capacity to create

knowledge and highly qualified workforce, universities play

a key role in promoting the creation of technology-based

companies. In most environments, governments invest in

research and, in some cases, finance small technology-

based companies . Once new companies have been created,

the importance of the relation between them increases con-

stantly. In the last stage of growth, the business relations

formed during the entire period enable companies to share

identities and a large amount of information on new tech-

nological developments.

Result s of the analysis

Structured questionnaires were changed at some

point for interviews to understand better how the three

agents in the innovation system had provided support

and the way they benefited companies. Company

founders were asked about the five variables (technolo-

gy, talent, finance, location and evolution) in each of the

four stages of company growth (inception, launch,

growth and maturity).

The company founders all stated that their experi-

ence in other companies led to them starting up a new

business. Most of the products marketed are based on

software technologies and therefore the first steps of the

companies depended on technology knowledge. At this

stage, the technology had not been developed, and

therefore the company was only a business idea. This

means that accessing human and financial resources was

particularly difficult. In fact, some of the founders stated

that ‘they would not have been able to create the com-

pany and make it grow if it hadn’t been for government

grants’ of around €100,000. The development of the tech-

nology was a long, hard process, and required a large

amount of resources.

The entrepreneurial teams started out as around five

people with varying technical knowledge. Their lack of

experience in business aspects meant that several people

had to participate in different management tasks, which

means that, for example, ‘a person could belong at the

same time to the development department, the market-

ing department and the financial department. The

departments and positions of director emerged over

time and with the growth of the company’.

Once the prototypes had been developed, the launch

stage began, in which the company tried to enter the

market and attract the first client. Some of the compa-

nies already had their first client(s), whilst others contin-

ued to develop their technologies. The difficulties

encountered in the cases under study differed from one

company to another.

Almost all of the interviewees agreed that ‘the gov-

ernment grants continued to be very important in this

stage’. The interviewees had made the grant applications

themselves. In addition, some companies received risk

capital investments of around €100,000-€700,000, which

in some cases reached €1.5 M.

This stage ‘requires a highly specialized team’. The

expert technology team was working on new technolo-

gy developments, so the objective of the new team was

to enter the market and attract the first clients.

The following stage in the growth of a company

begins once it has its first clients and the first sales have

been completed. Instead of just having a product, the

company is now a producer. This is the stage in which

the companies demonstrated that they are international;

all of them have clients worldwide. To market their prod-

ucts globally, they required injections of private funds of

between €1.5 and 5 M.

All of the companies were developing new technolo-

gy products to complement or replace existing ones.

Some of them also considered the possibility of opening

new offices abroad; others were seeking a way to oper-

ate abroad successfully.

In this stage, it is very important to have qualified

staff in management. The companies hired people with

management knowledge, particularly in the areas of

marketing and sales. On average, the team expanded

from the five original founders to around thirty or more

people. As the focus was international, the team was

comprised of people of different nationalities.

All the companies under analysis are in the growth

stage. They are not sure what separates the growth stage

from maturity. Some agreed that ‘maturity begins when

the company is seeking an exit mechanism’, whilst other

believed that ‘maturity ends when the company is sold’.

Although it was difficult for the founders to predict

the size and location of their company in the future,

all hoped that their companies would be in a global

position.

In-depth interviews with 22@ Barcelona companies

We take as an example three leading companies in

the area of the 22@ Barcelona technology park. Due to

the creation of its conceptual model of economic and

urban development, this area continues to be one of the

city’s economic drivers. It has gone from being a driving

force of the textile industry during the last century, to a

driver of the knowledge economy this century; a place

where innovative, global companies can find a suitable

ecosystem for growing internationally from Barcelona.

The zone is based on a clustering model focused on the

fastest growing sectors: ICT, the mass media, health

care, environmental technology, and design. It currently

has over 1,500 companies and 45,000 workers, and 12

research and development centres associated with over

10 universities, and it is a clear example of a favourable

environment for the new knowledge economy.

Interviews were carried out in April 2011 with com-

panies in 22@ Barcelona: Adecq-BesTv, Groupalia and

Zyncro.

André Vanyi-Robin explained his business experience

as co-founder of Adecq, a company that developed the

solution BesTv, based on a non-linear platform of serv-

ices for digital television. BesTv introduces new services

for digital terrestrial television, via satellite and by cable,

which enables personalized content, 3D television and

dynamic publicity. After five years of operation, it has

been purchased by Motive Television, a company listed

on the AIM, the London Stock Exchange.

Vanyi-Robin explained the trajectory of his business,

which arose out of a previous failure and took advantage

of an opportunity at global scale: ‘the digital switchover’

announced in 2005. He did not have funds, but did find

an ecosystem in 22@ Barcelona and had a plan for inter-

nationalisation. Vanyi-Robin works from Barcelona but

mainly invoices abroad. The businessman stated that

international relations are very important. You have to

travel constantly despite the online globalisation.

Currently, BesTv has spread throughout Eastern Europe,

Turkey and Latin America.

Mònica Comalrena, who is the head of International

Development at Groupalia, described the rapid estab-

lishment and success of this business experience online.

Groupalia creates purchasing groups mainly in the areas

of leisure, health and beauty. ‘It’s a business in which

everyone’s a winner’, she explained. Users get very good

discounts and establishments find major sales channels


for their products. The key to its success is that ‘the more

collaborators you have, the more users you will have too,

and the more users you have, the more collaborators will

want to participate in the project’. After eleven months

in operation, the company employs 400 people, is estab-

lished in 6 countries, and could reach a turnover of 100

million in 2011.

Ms Comalrena explained that the success of

Groupalia was due to international market demand.

Groupalia’s head of International Development said

that there is a real ‘enthusiasm for group purchases in

the world’, which is why they have grown so rapidly.

This is a business that is expanding internationally

without barriers that enabled Groupalia to establish

itself aggressively and rapidly. The company has been

exceptionally well-received by users and clients. She

indicated that Latin America is an area with great

potential for the introduction of Spanish businesses.

Language is a favourable factor as are the economic

cycles, which are different and complementary to those

found in Europe.

The head of International Development at Groupalia

has drawn various conclusions from her business expe-

rience. Mainly, you have to know the product really well.

It is also important to know the market, to be flexible

and to work with local teams who understand their

environment. Comalrena stressed that it was essential

not to be afraid of failure and to correct any mistakes

quickly.

Finally, Lluís Font, CEO of Zyncro, explained his

experience as head of internationalisation of his compa-

ny, which is based on social network mechanisms. With

Zyncro, Lluís Font offers the opportunity to create inter-

nal online communication tools. He is also responsible

for the organization of the company and its knowledge

areas. Font supports the use of social networks in com-

panies. He believes that we should take more advantage

of the advantages they provide for communication. The

CEO of Zyncro stated that currently information does

not flow correctly within companies. Paradoxically,

whilst normal relationships between people are increas-

ingly carried out via social networks, such as Twitter or

Facebook, companies do not use them. During his inter-

view, Mr Font highlighted the difference in communica-

tion between different generations in workplaces. The

youngest use email less assiduously, but rely more on

chats and social networks. However, there are still cer-

tain departments in companies’ organizational charts

that are sceptical about the advantages of the new com-

munication tools.

Lluís Font proposed that in a few years companies

will have corporate social networks. Everything will be

organized through social networks: social games, social

intranet and project management, for example. He also

predicts that in five years the battle of the social net-

works will increase. A social revolution will occur that

will have its detractors and will be led by talent and mar-

keting managers. This will change a company’s relation-

ship with its employees.

Mr Font stated that it was important to move fast in

this changing situation, and to make decisions. The mar-

ket changes rapidly and managers need to adapt and

modify their objectives. ‘You shouldn’t be paralysed by

an analysis, you mustn’t waste time on market analyses.

If I’m wrong, I’m wrong and I change quickly.’

According to the CEO of Zyncro, in the next few

years a social battle will take place that will have its

critics, but it will be real. Entrepreneurs need to sell

their product on the Internet and they need to know

the international market and the differences between

countries. Productivity will increase in companies and

the relationship with workers will change, as well as

their location and their salary concepts. The market

must be global and collaborators shall carry out their

tasks thousands of kilometres from their company

headquarters.

Conclusions and discussion

As a set of clusters, a science park is a kind of busi-

ness network that is situated in a specific geographic

location, where the proximity between companies and

support institutions promotes links between them that

increases the frequency and impact of their interactions

(Porter, 1998). In this study, we analysed environmental



factors resulting from the interaction of the three agents

in the triple helix that are involved in most science and

technology parks: universities, government and indus-

try. On the basis of a literature review, we selected five

main variables (technology, talent, finance, location and

evolution) and analysed each of the four main stages in

the process of company growth (inception, launch,

growth and maturity). The importance of the support

agents, such as universities, government and industry,

was expected to vary depending on the stage of compa-

ny growth.

On this basis, we defined a model that showed that

universities and the government provide more support

in the initial stages of company growth, whilst business

relations within the industry are more important during

the growth and maturity stages.

We carried out an exploratory study of companies

founded with a global outlook to validate our model. We

interviewed company founders and found evidence that

confirmed our model. In the initial stage, new compa-

nies operating in a global market focus on the develop-

ment of technology, so they need knowledge and highly

qualified engineers. Consequently, the university is more

important in the first stages than in the following ones.

The most important form of government support is

through funding programmes that are aimed particu-

larly at the inception and launch stages. Prototypes and

basic technologies (developed during the start of

inception stages) are financed with public funds, and

private capital becomes more important when the first

clients have been attracted and the first sales made

(growth stage).

Global companies founded in a science park benefit

from relationships with other companies, particularly dur-

ing the last stages of company growth. The global market

forces companies to hire international staff from the time

of inception, which attracts other talent from around the

world: people with solid academic and professional train-

ing who may decide to create their own technology-based

company. As a result, it is easier to create global compa-

nies and enter international markets.

The results of this study contribute to detecting and

understanding how agents in an innovation system sup-

port companies in different ways in a company’s differ-

ent stages of growth. Governments and other organiza-

tions should take into account the results of this analysis

to improve and maximise the effectiveness of their sup-

port programmes.

The interviews internally validated the proposed

model. External validation requires further research that

could be carried out in a new analysis. In addition, we

expect all of the results to vary from territory to territory.

Due to the characteristics of a specific environment, the

agents will act in a certain way. Environmental and social

characteristics play a key role in understanding how tech-

nology parks support global entrepreneurial initiatives.

Due to the importance of the topic, this study is taken

as a starting point for further research to compare differ-

ent innovation environments that act as support plat-

forms. We hope that comparisons with other innovative

environments will provide evidence for identifying dif-

ferences and improving business support programmes.

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1. This article is based on a research project proposed by Josep Miquel Piqué,who collaborated in its development as part of his task of promoting studiesto better understand the business sector and innovation activities inBarcelona. I am grateful to Mònica Flores, Gonzalo Rodés and MarcSanmartí for their support during the study on which this article is based. Tocontact Francisco J. Granados, send correspondence to: IBEI, c/ Elisabets 10,08001 Barcelona; [email protected]; [email protected]

2. Some of the arguments presented in this article are based on informationfrom twelve interviews carried out during June and July 2011. The inter-views were the first in a research project on talent management inBarcelona. I am grateful to all of the people who were interviewed whounselfishly, and sometimes very enthusiastically, shared their personalexperience and professional knowledge of the business context and innova-tion activities in Barcelona.

22@ Barcelona and the management of innovative and entrepreneurial talent

Francisco J. GranadosBarcelona Institute of International Studies (IBEI)1

Abst ract

Professionals who work in innovation and the creation

and management of innovative companies are an essen-

tial element of the knowledge-based economy. Territories

that seek to use innovation to support their economic

development must increase the availability of innovative

and entrepreneurial professional talent. 22@ Barcelona

has been a leader in actions to manage the talent that is

available in Barcelona. This article presents the pro-

grammes that have been devised and proposes elements

of analysis for the local creation of innovative and entre-

preneurial talent, the attraction and retention of talent

from other territories, and the development of existing

innovative and entrepreneurial talent within a territory.

Int roduct ion

The availability of professionals who work in innova-

tion and in the creation and management of companies in

innovation-intensive sectors is essential to economic

competitiveness based on knowledge. Territories that aim

to base their economic development on the attraction and

creation of innovative companies must have enough peo-

ple with professional talent in innovation, entrepreneur-

ship and management (Florida, 2005 b; Björkman and Lu,

1999). In the area of business administration, the man-

agement of talent availability as a specific function of

human resources is considered an increasingly important

factor for business success (Hartman, Feisel and Schobel,

2010; Scullion and Collings, 2011). Furthermore, interna-

tional location strategies increasingly value the availabili-

ty of talent in a territory (Tarique and Schuler, 2010;

European Cities Monitor, 2010). International competi-

tion between cities, regions or countries justifies the

establishment of public policies to manage the creation,

attraction and development of innovative professional tal-

ent (OECD, 2008; Salvat and Marcet, 2008).

22@ Barcelona has been a pioneer in establishing a

set of actions to manage talent in Barcelona, which are

presented below. The following sections of the article

also propose elements of analysis, which are either gen-

eral or specific to Barcelona, for the management of

innovative and entrepreneurial talent. Some of the argu-

ments in this article are based on information drawn

from a set of interviews carried out with Spanish and

international professionals whose work involves innova-

tion or the creation and management of knowledge-

intensive companies in Barcelona.2 The sections cover


3. Further information on the 22@CreaTalent programme can be found athttp://www.22creatalent.cat/index.php?lang=ca.

the following topics respectively: the local creation of

innovative and entrepreneurial talent, the attraction and

retention of talent from other territories, and the devel-

opment of existing talent within a territory.

Local creat ion of innovat ive and ent repreneur ial

talent

This article looks at the management of the creative

talent that all people potentially have to contribute to

the discovery of technology innovations and their busi-

ness development. Whether or not people acquire this

or another kind of talent is closely related to the educa-

tion they receive in the education system. Territories

that aim to boost knowledge-based economic develop-

ment must consider how to adapt their education insti-

tutions, which tend to be mainly focused on the stan-

dard transmission of knowledge, so that the main

teaching objective becomes the promotion of creativity

through active, experimental learning (learning by

doing) that does not penalize mistakes caused by risk-

taking (Florida, 2010:183; Sahlberg, 2009; Robinson,

2001; Sacks, 2000). An educational system that pro-

motes the creativity of individuals is compatible with

obtaining academic excellence, as shown by the case of

Finland - a country that is outstanding for its academic

performance according to PISA reports. The focus of the

Finnish education system in preschool years (up to

seven years old) is mainly based on awakening the

child’s personal interest in the learning process, which

is achieved through creative activities that are mainly

based on play (formal learning of reading and writing

begins at seven years old, three years later than in the

Catalan education system ). The emphasis on creative

learning is maintained in the subsequent educational

phases (Sahlberg, 2004, 2011).

One of the most interesting actions to manage talent

promoted by 22@ Barcelona is the 22@CreaTalent pro-

gramme, which was developed during the 2008-2009

school year in the new primary and secondary schools in

the urban 22@ district. The aims of the programme were

to promote young people’s interest in science and tech-

nology careers, to develop their creative and entrepre-

neurial capacity, to incorporate English and new tech-

nologies as common teaching tools, and to foster the

participation of fathers, mothers and teachers in the

educational process. The teaching method and the pro-

gramme activities (for example, practical workshops to

build robots, on renewable energies, on information and

media technologies and on digital animation) were

designed by a team of experts from LEGO Education

and were contextualized in the context of the activities of

all the business clusters in 22@ Barcelona3.

Education systems can promote innovative creativity

and entrepreneurship by encouraging individual and

group projects that enable students to develop cognitive

and relational abilities that allow them to structure, tackle

and resolve problems; assess and improve the develop-

ment of their work; and guide their learning process effec-

tively (Darling-Hammond, 2010; Robinson, 2001).

People’s innovative and entrepreneurial capacity can be

promoted in all stages of the education system, from pre-

school to lifelong learning for adults (Sahlberg 2009). The

stages that precede the incorporation of students into the

labour market are ideal for carrying out placements that

enable students to develop creative projects in a business

context. Ideally, students should carry out their place-

ments in highly dynamic companies (for example, inno-

vative start-ups), where processes of business creation

and growth can be observed that require multifunction

professional profiles, combining technical activities and

project management. Education institutions that train

professionals in the area of innovation and company

management should boost the creation of projects that

bring students into contact with complementary knowl-

edge and abilities, as occurs in some excellent universities

(for example, MIT or the Imperial College London) whose

curriculums include joint projects between engineering

and business administration students.


4. Spain has the lowest level of English in the EU countries included in the EF EPI 2011 study (http://www.ef.com.es/sitecore/__/~/media/efcom/epi/pdf/

EF-EPI-2011-Spain.pdf), which is one of the few comparative analyses car-ried out on the level of English in different countries.

78

The impact that policies to create local talent could

have on the economic, knowledge-based development of

a territory may be influenced by the presence of a series of

factors in the region. These include the availability of

sources of financing for innovative business projects, a

regulatory framework that favours the creation of innova-

tive companies, and an innovative business sector in

which students can receive professional training and that

also provides employment opportunities. If a territory is

lacking one or more of these factors, it may be harder to

develop innovative business projects. In addition, a group

of professionals with innovation skills may be formed

who are overqualified for the available jobs in the territo-

ry or, in the worst case scenario, are unemployed.

In these cases, emigration to territories that pro-

vide job opportunities for innovation professionals or

to regions that facilitate the creation of innovative

companies becomes one way in which local talent can

fully develop the innovative potential they have

acquired during their academic training. The positive

effect of training these professionals on the economic

development of the territory in which they have been

educated either disappears or is postponed until their

possible return. In the best case scenario, talented

people that return will have a positive added effect on

local economic development, due to the knowledge

and international contacts they have made during

their period abroad (Saxenian, 2006). One way to

increase the local development of talent is to attract

innovative international business activity to the terri-

tory. This not only has a positive effect on the eco-

nomic development of the host territory, but also

increases the efficiency of actions aimed at local cre-

ation of talent. Thus, a symbiotic effect is produced

between the attraction of international business activ-

ity and the creation of local talent: local talent is nour-

ished by the opportunities for professional develop-

ment provided by the attracted business activity, and

the local talent makes the location of international

innovation-based companies in the territory more

attractive, as these companies need to locally hire

innovation professionals.

Last, but not least, a low level of English (and of

other foreign languages) among young people in a ter-

ritory dramatically limits their educational mobility in

the international arena. This mobility may be essential

in some areas of knowledge. A lack of language skills

also makes it difficult for the local education system to

incorporate excellent international lecturers who are

only able to teach in English, and to attract interna-

tional students who need English as the language of

instruction. A lack of English language skills among

locally created talent is a fundamental obstacle to inte-

gration into an international professional environ-

ment, whether this environment is located abroad or

corresponds to companies situated here that generally

use English as their working language. It is ironic that

a territory can train good innovation professionals

whose major competitive disadvantage to working in

companies located in the local environment is not hav-

ing the same level of English as professionals who

come from outside of the territory.

Despite the importance that education authorities

give to English teaching, the current education system

in Catalonia does not seem to result in a majority of

university graduates with a language level that

enables them to manage and produce professional

information in English and to communicate fluently

in this language at work, even though such English

proficiency is usually attained by students at

European universities.4 Perhaps the main reason for

the low level of English in the population of young

university students in Spain lies outside the education

system. To improve the English language skills of

future generations of young people from Barcelona,

we may need to boost the presence of English in their

cultural environment. For example, television formats

could be changed to bring them in line with those of

European countries with the best level of English

among their populations. This change would involve


5. The document ‘Ten years of 22@: the innovation district’ (available athttp://www.22barcelona.com/content/view/887/90/lang,en/) sums up themain urban development milestones of 22@ Barcelona, which has beendefined as a ‘benchmark model’ by the International Association of Science

Parks (IASP) and the TCI Network. Various cities in the world (Rio deJaneiro, Boston, Istanbul, Cape Town) have taken the urban developmentproject managed by 22@ Barcelona as a reference for their own plans forurban development transformation.

broadcasting all programmes for children and young

people in the original language with subtitles (that is,

programmes for children who are old enough to read

the subtitles). However, this change in the cultural

environment would not affect the low level of English

found in older generations.

At t ract ion and retent ion of int ernat ional talent

Countries, regions and cities worldwide are estab-

lishing different kinds of policy actions to attract people

with innovative and entrepreneurial talent from other

territories (Florida, 2005 b; OECD, 2008). Many aspects

to take into account in these policies (for example, adap-

tation to the new sociocultural context, settling the fam-

ily into the new place of residence) are the same as those

that apply to the expatriation of employees of multina-

tional companies - a topic that has been extensively

dealt with in the literature on business administration

(Collings, Scullion and Morley, 2007; Dowling, Festing

and Engle, 2008). The end objective of policies to attract

and retain talent is to boost innovation and the creation

of new companies in the territory, and to promote the

relocation of companies from other territories. Policies to

attract talent include adapting urban areas to establish

innovative business clusters and eliminating administra-

tive obstacles, in order to facilitate the entry into the ter-

ritory of innovation professionals and companies from

other places. Actions to retain talent are aimed at

encouraging people who come to the territory to train or

work temporarily to stay for longer and carry out their

professional activity of innovation or company creation

and management. The main objective of policies to

retain innovative companies is to foster a business envi-

ronment that increases the companies’ competitiveness

in terms of the generation of innovation.

22@ Barcelona has carried out notable work in the

area of attracting talent. Since its creation in 2000, urban

development has been carried out that has resulted in

the transformation of what was a declining industrial

district into an innovation district in which over a thou-

sand companies directly related to technological innova-

tion - many from other countries - have set up that are

as well as ten university centres and twelve research,

development and innovation and technology transfer

organizations. Currently, the model of 22@ Barcelona is

considered a benchmark at global scale in the area of

innovation-related urban, economic and social transfor-

mation, and it is internationally recognised for its task of

attracting innovative companies and talent.5

Since 2009, 22@ Barcelona has promoted a project

that could contribute to attracting and retaining talented

professionals who work in business management in

knowledge-intensive economic sectors. The objective of

the programme ‘Barcelona, seat of corporate universi-

ties’ is to make Barcelona an international centre for cor-

porate training activities for this kind of company. In

addition to attracting a high number of innovation pro-

fessionals to existing education centres and to the new

ones that could be established in the city, the initiative

will enable people to experience first-hand during their

stay in Barcelona the opportunities that the city offers for

carrying out professional activities in the area of innova-

tion and business projects associated with the knowl-

edge economy. This element of international dissemina-

tion is added to other actions that have been carried out

in 22@ Barcelona to promote Barcelona’s international

image as a city that welcomes professionals and compa-

nies in the area of innovation (for example, through its

presence in international forums of entrepreneurs and

innovators, such as BizBarcelona, or by presenting the

22@ Barcelona project in different international institu-

tions associated with the knowledge economy). The

project ‘Barcelona, seat of corporate universities’

involves the collaboration of various public and private

organizations, including Barcelona’s business schools,

which have been attracting people with talent in inter-


6. For more information on the ‘Barcelona, seat of corporate universities’ pro-gramme, see http://www.icufbcn.com/.

7. For more information on the 22@Staying in Company programme, seehttp://www.22barcelona.com/content/view/495/820/lang,es/. Another pro-gramme to attract talent developed by 22@ Barcelona and aimed at inter-national students is the ‘Barcelona Week Stage’.

80

national management for many years, and disseminat-

ing the image of Barcelona as a business city.6

Another action to attract talent carried out by 22@

Barcelona is 22@Staying in Company. This includes a

series of grant programmes for students from national

and international universities who wish to complete

their training at innovation companies in Barcelona.7

22@ Barcelona has also established actions to integrate,

and consequently retain, in Barcelona the international

community of professionals and businesspeople in the

area of innovation in the city. Since 2010, the IN22@ pro-

gramme has aimed to strengthen links between this

community (particularly professionals with a manage-

ment profile who are closely related to the international

arena) and the community of local businesspeople in the

area of innovation. To achieve this, a series of meetings

has been promoted, on topics related to different coun-

tries and regions of the world. Each meeting was attend-

ed by around a hundred professionals and also had an

online impact through the LinkedIn platform. The

IN22@ programme was established in response to the

low level of personal relations between the internation-

al community in Barcelona and the local community,

which was identified in 2007 by the study ‘Inter na -

tionalisation of 22@ Barcelona’ (Leon, 2008).

Public policies to attract professional talent must

take into account aspects related to the distribution of

scarce resources between local professionals and those

who have been attracted to the area, particularly in the

case of economic contexts in which there is a lack of

professional opportunities. We must also consider

whether policies have a negative impact on the working

conditions of local professionals (Salvat and Marcel,

2008:31). Policies that end up attracting professionals

with a similar level of talent to locally trained profes-

sionals could be questioned by the latter group. General

regulations on work permits for foreigners (in Bar ce -

lona, this affects people from outside the EU) tend to

assess the availability in the territory of people with

similar professional skills to those of the prospective

immigrants. Consequently, these regulations have an

impact on the capacity to attract talent.

Regulations on work permits do not tend to consider

specific aspects related to the creation of innovation

companies. A foreign entrepreneur who wishes to move

to the territory may have planned the creation (or the

relocation) of the company taking into account the par-

ticipation of a specific team of people who are also from

abroad. The entrepreneur may consider that the involve-

ment of these people is key to the success of his/her

business project (due to their specific skills and experi-

ences, or the trust and personal commitment between

them and the entrepreneur). Therefore, immigration reg-

ulations on employees should make it easier and faster

for innovative companies to hire the team of people that

the entrepreneur considers essential for his/her project.

In addition, in relation to work permits for foreigners, an

issue of great importance for entrepreneurs or for any

innovation professional who is considering moving to a

territory is whether spouses or partners can obtain per-

mits that allow them not only to live, but also to contin-

ue to develop their professional careers within the host

territory. This and other administrative issues (for exam-

ple, in relation to the process of obtaining visas, driving

licences, official recognition of children’s studies, private

health insurance requirements) considerably affect the

real capacity that a territory has to attract and retain

international talent.

Aspects related to the quality of life a territory offers

also have a considerable impact on its capacity to

attract and retain talent (Florida, 2002, 2005a, 2008). In

comparison with other major cities, Barcelona is a

pleasant place to life due to its climate, coastal situa-

tion, urban attractiveness, offering of leisure activities,

presence of international communities and direct air

connections with many other European cities (Florida,

2010b). Barcelona is highly valued in the international

arena according to city rankings (in the European Cities

Monitor of 2010, Barcelona was ranked the fifth best

European city for locating an international company

and the top city in terms of the quality of life of

employees). Barcelona’s strong reputation in the inter-

national arena is a very positive aspect for those weigh-

ing up whether to come to the city to live and work. The

city’s international attractiveness considerably boosts

the capacity of companies in Barcelona to attract inno-

vation professionals from other countries. Some com-

panies also take advantage of the major source of

human capital in terms of the language and cultural

diversity resulting from the high presence in Barcelona

of young people from abroad who initially come to

study, many of whom wish to prolong their stay in the

city by working for international companies that need a

range of staff who know the languages and cultures of

all the countries in which they operate. Barcelona’s

great language and culture assets are also due to immi-

grants who come to work in sectors of the economy

other than innovation and, in the future, to their chil-

dren, provided they maintain their parents’ language

and culture.

The great international attractiveness of Barcelona

does not mean that there are no obstacles to attracting

innovative, entrepreneurial international talent. The

offering of leisure activities and the general attractive-

ness of the city are possibly more decisive factors for

young professionals than for older ones whose lives are

mainly family-oriented. For these family-centred pro-

fessionals, other aspects of the city could be more

important when it comes to deciding whether to move

their professional and personal life to Barcelona. For

example, there is a high unemployment rate which

makes it difficult for partners to join the workforce;

there is a low level of English (and other foreign lan-

guages) in the population in general and in cus-

tomer/citizen services that make everyday tasks diffi-

cult during the phase of linguistic adaptation to the city

(for example, administrative procedures associated

with creating companies or with housing, shopping,

transport around the city, relations with local profes-

sionals and with neighbours). Another issue to take

into account in strategies for positioning the Barcelona

brand (Kavaratzis 2004; Smith 2005) is the possible

development of Barcelona’s international image as a

place that is excessively leisure focused, which may

clash with the image of formality and productivity that

some companies wish to be associated with their busi-

ness and their employees.

An important aspect to consider in policies to attract

and retain international talent is the suitability of the ter-

ritory’s education system for children of incoming pro-

fessionals. People in general and particularly those with

a high educational level, such as innovation profession-

als, place great value on their children’s education.

Professionals who are considering coming to Barcelona

with school-age children will analyse the characteristics

and quality of the city’s primary and secondary educa-

tion system. These people may aim to work in Barcelona

for a while, but may not plan to remain indefinitely, at

least not initially. Instead they may wish to return to

their place of origin or go to another country in the

future. Therefore, they are interested in an educational

offering in which their children’s main language of

instruction is either that of the education system in their

place of origin or at least an international language that

they speak (usually English). Normally, parents do not

want their children’s educational progress to be ham-

pered by a change in language of instruction, and they

want to have the language skills to participate fully in

monitoring and supporting their children’s education.

Various studies have confirmed the positive effect that

supporting children’s education has on their school per-

formance (Teachman, Paasch and Carver, 1997; McNeal,

1999; Marí-Klose, Marí-Klose, Maranzana and

Granados, 2010:51-53). The study ‘Internatio nalisation

of 22@ Barcelona’ indicates that the lack of schools

teaching in foreign languages is a major concern for pro-

fessionals from other countries who live in Barcelona

(Leon, 2008).

Development of exist ing talent

Policies for managing talent also include develop-

ment actions to enhance the performance of people



8. The task of 22@ Barcelona with respect to the creation of infrastruc-tures to support innovation and innovative companies is summed upin the document ‘Ten years of 22@: the innovation district’ (avail-able at http:// www.22barcelona.com/content/view/887/90/lang,en/).Further information on the 22@Urban Lab can be found athttp://www.22barcelona.com/content/view/698/897/lang,ca/.

9. Social capital is defined as the sum of potential and obtained resources thatan individual or organization can access through its network of personal

relations. Its existence is facilitated by mutual knowledge between agentsdrawn from previous cooperation experiences and from the existence of regu-lations and social institutions that promote mutual or collective trust(Coleman, 1988; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Cohen and Fields,1999).

10. Further information on the 22@SinergyS programme can be foundat http://www.22barcelona.com/content/view/679/893/lang,ca/.Further information on the Urban Cluster Day can be found athttp://www.22barcelona.com/content/view/354/752/lang,ca/.

with innovation and business talent who already live in

the territory. The spectrum of this kind of actions

includes the creation of infrastructures to support inno-

vation and business activities, and actions that promote

innovation and entrepreneurship. Examples of the first

type of actions are the creation of research and tech-

nology transfer centres, technological systems for

information and communication, and business incuba-

tors; the promotion of business clusters; and the cre-

ation of services to access public funding programmes,

risk capital and support for internationalization. The

second group of actions includes programmes for pub-

licly recognizing business success and excellence in

innovation and business, or tax policies that encourage

innovation and the creation of companies. The actions

of 22@ Barcelona to develop existing talent include the

promotion of knowledge-intensive business clusters,

the promotion of creating and attracting infrastructures

that support innovation, and the channelling or direct

offer of services to innovation professionals and inno-

vative companies. One new development action is the

establishment of the 22@Urban Lab programme, which

reinforces the availability of the 22@ Barcelona district

as a space for testing technology solutions of an urban

nature.8

The aim of a specific set of actions to develop local

talent is to promote relationships between innovation

professionals and companies. The literature on knowl-

edge-based clusters of companies and economic

regions shows the importance of personal relationships

between innovation professionals during their innova-

tive activity (Saxenian, 1994, 2006; Wolfe, 2002;

Subramanian and Youndt, 2005). In this literature, the

social capital of people and companies (that is, the

resources that can be accessed via their network of per-

sonal relationships) is considered a catalytic substrate

for the innovation process.9 22@ Barcelona has estab-

lished a series of programmes that promote the inter-

action of professionals and companies that carry out

their innovation activity in the district. The

22@Breakfast Update programme consists of monthly

professional meetings involving the presentation of an

innovation-related topic, after which the participants

have the opportunity to meet and talk informally. The

IN22@ programme aims to promote the establishment

of personal and professional relationships among the

local business community and communities of busi-

nesspeople and international professionals in

Barcelona associated with innovation and the knowl-

edge economy. The 22@SinergyS programme promotes

professional relationships between local innovative

companies and international researchers who attend

professional conferences in Barcelona. The organiza-

tion of specific events focused on promoting network-

ing or other kinds of events that bring together profes-

sionals and businesspeople in the area of innovation

(for example, the Urban Cluster Day organized by 22@

Barcelona) contribute to forging personal relations

between participants, and therefore can increase the

social capital of the members of the city’s innovation

community.10

Cultural aspects of a community of people or organ-

izations have an impact on the existence and character-

istics of relationships and social capital in the commu-

nity (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti,

1993; Saxenian, 1994; Granados, 2005). Cultural ele-

ments in the social context in which professional activ-

ities are carried out can affect the number and intensi-

ty of relationships between professionals, their level of

social capital, and their innovative performance. Some

of these cultural elements include the predominant

work and professional ethics in the group; the usual


work-life balance; the cultural values and norms estab-

lished in relation to gender, age and origin; the perme-

ability of groups to new members; and the importance

of group hierarchies. The level of social capital and

innovative performance in a community of profession-

als may also be affected by characteristics of the busi-

ness context in which they carry out their activity. Some

aspects to take into account are the concentration of

companies within a geographic area, their size and per-

meability with respect to the environment, their coop-

eration and competition strategies, and the job mobili-

ty between companies and between companies and

other institutions where innovation professionals carry

out their activity. Finally, the usual levels of language

skills in the group of local professionals and business-

people and those from abroad who work in the territo-

ry is also fundamental to the development of their per-

sonal relationships and social capital.

Conclusion

In the preceding sections, a series of elements to

analyse the management of professional talent associat-

ed with innovation and the creation and management of

innovative companies were proposed. Specifically dealt

with were issues related to the local creation of talent,

the attraction and retention of international talent, and

the development of existing innovative and entrepre-

neurial talent in a territory. The article also presented the

actions established by 22@ Barcelona to manage the

aforementioned issues. The arguments presented are

based on the idea that cities, regions or countries that

aim to base their economic development on knowledge-

intensive sectors have to tackle the management of

innovative talent, as this is an essential element for eco-

nomic competitiveness based on knowledge. The actions

must be focused on ensuring that the territory has excel-

lent professionals and companies - both local and from

other places - who work in innovation. Barcelona’s cur-

rent international reputation is a considerable competi-

tive advantage in the attraction and retention of interna-

tional talent to the city. In addition, it is possible to

establish new public policies that improve the availabili-

ty and development of innovative and entrepreneurial

talent in the city.

Many innovative activities take place in emerging

business projects. Unlike larger established companies

that have resources and experience, these are particularly

sensitive to the environment that is largely comprised of

the actions of public institutions (for example, administra-

tions that regulate business activity and centres for train-

ing talent). Entrepreneurial innovation projects tend to

depend much more than those carried out in large com-

panies on the external resources that the environment

offers (for example, appropriately trained talent, public

and private services to support innovation, the attainment

of funding, and business creation and management).

Their need for permeability with the environment means

that entrepreneurial projects are also particularly sensitive

to dissonance between the sociocultural context in which

they operate and the company’s needs to be competitive.

An analysis of the economic, administrative and sociocul-

tural context in which innovative, entrepreneurial projects

operate could contribute to the establishment of suitable

talent management measures that help to promote opti-

mum business development.

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A conversational capital (KCv) perspectiveof 22@ Barcelona

Joan Mundet and Michele GirottoDepartment of Business Management, UPC

Jord i Garcia Brustenga and Xavier GóngoraImpuls al Benestar, CIREM Foundation

Abst ract

There is not doubt that the success of the 22@

Barcelona throughout its ten first years can not be

explained only by looking at the management, promo-

tion and facilitation of placement of certain types of busi-

nesses to the district. The conversational capital theory,

an evolution of social capital, allows us to provide a dif-

ferent explanation, while complementary, to understand

the differential factor that this initiative has meant to the

Poblenou district. The productive conversation that has

been generated among the stakeholders of the district,

especially between businesses, city administration and

institutions has helped to generate emotions and atti-

tudes of trust and reciprocity, which have promoted a

higher level of partnerships and collective projects. All

this has resulted both in the enhancement of individual

competitiveness, expectations of change in the citizens

and attraction of more businesses to the district.

The learning process that generates the 22@ seen

from this perspective suggests that the systematic invest-

ment in this conversational capital can be a key issue in

order to address a major challenge: the metropolitan eco-

nomic conversation, still unsettled but crucial. Moreso

when the new challenge that the local administration

raises for the next 10 years, inspired by 22@, concentrates

on the economic domain and expects to add an ‘at sign’

to all the productive areas of the metropolis. The creation

of the metropolitan government this year is the opportu-

nity to generate conversation where there has long not

been, despite being more than relevant for the future of

the country.

In terms of economic and employment results, this

new metropolitan conversation will depend largely on the

cultural paradigm that will frame it. That’s why, having on

board the results and the general opinion related to this

‘conversational’ paradigm, 22@ Barcelona may constitute

a framework that could optimally anchor this major

national challenge. Nothing but this Barcelona, who

knows ‘how to chat’, could be the natural leader that gen-

tly integrates with the rest of the metropolitan municipal-

ities and creates conversation in an added value frame-

work with Catalonia. This new conversation which is just

beginning includes a change of scope regarding econom-

ic promotion. As such, it will be a cultural change and this

22@ conversational perspective could be the most appro-

priate approach in order to support it.

1. Int roduct ion

A quick look at the 22@ Barcelona project provides

clear indications of social, urban and economic renovation

and transformation. If we look more specifically at the eco-

nomic sector, we can find relevant indicators of business

and economic activity: the number of companies situated

in the district has doubled in the last ten years to the cur-

rent estimated figure of 7,064 companies and around 4,400

freelancers, and the number of workers in the area has

increased by 56,000. A total of 31% of the activities are

knowledge-intensive and a turnover of 8.9 billion

euros/year has been generated. On the basis of these pos-

itive project indicators, we can consider how an evaluation

of 22@ Barcelona’s conversational capital can help us to

understand the keys to the district’s success; and at the

same time contribute to the organization and formaliza-

tion of the conversational capital model in 22@, to face

new challenges in the next ten years.

2. Conceptualizat ion of the conversat ional capital

(KCv) model

In addition to physical capital, human capital and sym-

bolic capital (the territory’s brand and values in this case),

social capital, which is defined as the quality and quantity

of relationships between people in a territory, is a key fac-

tor in understanding why the efforts of economic promo-

tion policies have more impact in some territories than in

others. Putnam et al. (1993) consider that the quality of

representative governments and democratic economies is

determined by the presence of long traditions of public

commitment among its citizens. It is argued that the more

relations there are between agents, the more complete is

their information and the broader and richer the concep-

tual framework in which to take decisions. In addition, it is

considered that the greater the trust between agents, the

lower the transaction costs and the fewer the risks in eco-

nomic and commercial activity.

The concept of trust has also been explored by vari-

ous authors in the socio-economic field, such as

Fukuyama (1995, 2000), who stated that the stability and

prosperity of post-industrial societies demands habits of

reciprocity and trust. In addition, between a certain the-

ory of economics (individualistic utilitarianism) and

sociology (the socialized individual, governed by their

environment), Coleman (1988) proposed the theory of

social capital, which is considered the set of social rela-

tionship resources that an individual has in a certain

society. Social capital enriches physical and human cap-

ital. Coleman (1988) identified three types of social cap-

ital: (i) obligations and expectations and the trustworthi-

ness of social structures, (ii) the potential of information

in social relations and (iii) the norms and effective sanc-

tions for those who do not comply.

Cortina (2001) argues that social capital enables us to

overcome dilemmas in in group action, as dense networks

of interaction extend the sense of ‘I’, and develop the ‘I’

into ‘us’, by refining the ‘taste’ for collective benefits.

In this context, and in line with Cortina’s explanations,

Brustenga and Gongora (2011) describe the theory of

conversational capital (KCv) in their study. This looks in

greater depth at the concept of social capital and focuses

on one of the key aspects of any kind of relation: emo-

tions. Relations, based on meeting and exchanging lan-

guage, are more than cold exchanges of information.

Emotions are also exchanged, and new realities are creat-

ed as well as collective goals. Language creates the future,

as has always been the case (we could not have pro-

gressed from settlements to cities without progress in lan-

guage). Conversation, which is the framework in which

language is developed and the basis of social capital, is

more powerful than Westerners tend to believe. The fol-

lowing figure sums up the differential contribution of

conversational capital, as an evolution of social capital.

In some way, the theory of conversational capital brings

Putnam into contact with Maturana (Maturana, 1992;

Maturana & Nisis, 2004). Maturana, a notable proponent of

cultural biology, explains that everything that humans do

they do in conversations, that talking is a continuous flow of

emotions and language. Basing his arguments on biology,

he states that, when we talk, emotions modulate language

and, at the same time, language modulates emotions.

However, in current Western culture, the need to

invest in conversational capital is not appreciated. In gen-


More complete informationfor decision making

Adopt emot ions the other can identify with

Language that generatesnew concepts and realities

Frameworkof jo intst rat egy

Me and

my interests

Us and the interestsof each one

KCv

KS

Figure 1

Conversat ional capital as an evolut ion of social capital


eral, territories do not have a strong culture of productive,

quality conversation. Maturana and Davila (2008) claim

that our society wants to move into the post-postmodern

era, which involves realising and accepting the responsi-

bility of knowing that we ourselves limit collective devel-

opment if we do not recognize and listen to others.

Therefore, if we wish to move into this new era, we must

focus on learning to converse at schools and on cultivat-

ing this cross-cutting skill throughout life.

In this context, a constructivist paradigm can be pro-

posed to increase the space for the development of a com-

munity’s social capital, by increasing awareness. In other

words, the aim is for every human community and every

person to accept full responsibility for the reality they

experience, and to eliminate the tendency to consider that

somebody else is responsible. Instead, we can envisage an

extensive space for conversation that encourages collec-

tive innovation through people’s actions and learning.

2.1. Theoretical model of KCv

Conversational capital is considered the product of

three interrelated factors: a suitable conversational

framework (constructive, representative, open and sys-

tematic), a good agenda for quality conversations (key

topics and challenges for the group that represents the

territory) and a high level of conversational skills among

people with responsibility in the territory and the facili-

tators of the conversations. There is a multiplicative rela-

tion between the three factors in the model, that is, an

increase or reduction in one factor affects the perform-

ance of the other two factors.

KCv = Conversational framework x Conversational agenda x Conversational skills

The theory and the practice of KCv is fully applica-

ble to territories (horizontal conversations), sectors or

value chains (vertical conversations), and organiza-

tions’ internal environments. The factors that are con-

sidered key to understanding the model of conversa-

tional capital in any of these environments are:

a) The conversational framework:

The first factor is the existence of a conversational

framework. This is an initial, essential element of the

model. The framework should be suitable and facilitate

the productive process that we wish to flow, which is

based on the conversation. The strength and benefits of

conversational capital will depend on the solidity and

care put into the framework of relations. The conversa-

tional framework is characterised by four qualities:

• Openness to all relevant actors: the environment

must be transparent and invite and actively welcome the

different views and interested parties in the territory. In

line with Florida’s proposal (2002, 2005), there is a corre-

lation between the degree of tolerance and integration of

different ways of life and the potential growth of cities.

• Neutral, trustworthy leadership: the institution

that develops the framework must be impartial and

generate trust among participants. In our environment,

the starting point is often a historical culture from the

postindustrial era, which is therefore based on competi-

tion, and a fight for the market or local resources. This

culture will not change without the leadership of an

institution that the agents can trust until the first results

of the process are obtained. Equally important is the

representative of the host institution; a person who

must generate confidence, encourage ethical, responsi-

ble action and ensure the collective interest.

• Continuity: the institution, the host and the conver-

sational process are permanently visible. Although the

process may be on hold for months, the vision of the

future that the participants have created must be kept

alive and present in what are considered ‘long-term con-

versations’. This is obviously easier to achieve if the vision

corresponds to collective ambitions and preferences,

which are a result of the participants’ involvement in the

process.

• A constructive nature: the conversational frame-

work must inspire collaboration and collective identity,

taking into account the physical space, the decoration,

the image of the process, the language used, the informal

moments, etc. It must trigger emotions in the participants

that help to build constructive, collaborative, creative

relationships in environments of confidence and respect.

b) The conversational agenda:

The second key factor in the model is the conversa-

tional agenda. In some models, such as participatory

action research (PAR) for business development, which

was developed by Greenwood and Levin (1998), the

importance of the ‘research question’ is described. The

KCv model also considers that questions are powerful.

The person and the institution that organize the con-

versation must have worked carefully on the conversa-

tional agenda, that is, the challenges and questions that

will lead to reflection in each session. In addition, col-

lective goals discussed in conversations on the territory

must be well expressed, clear and correspond to the

territory’s ‘challenges’ (language plays an important

role in the model, every word is important). In-depth,

comprehensive knowledge of conceptual and practical

aspects of the territory’s challenges, as well as sufficient

knowledge of the participants’ interests and cultures, is

a basic premise for drawing up a good conversational

agenda.

c) Conversational skills:

Finally, the third key factor in the model is the partic-

ipants’ conversational skills (the participants are the rele-

vant agents in the territory). By this we mean the person-

al skills that are required to have a good, collaborative,

intelligent conversation that is therefore a productive

conversation. To put it another way, the conversation

could end up having negative effects if these skills are not

present.

As mentioned above, these skills are not generally

those taught at school or in further education. They

are general, cross-cutting skills that include, for exam-

ple, active listening, building trust and support,

accepting the other’s legitimacy, eliminating dogma-

tism, opening up to new concepts and opinions and

incorporating other people’s interests into your own

solutions.

In addition, skills that facilitate conversations are

important. We must learn how to get the best results

beyond voting (which leads to polarization and the frus-

tration of many participants) and unanimous decisions

(whose result is not very ambitious and often irrelevant).

The tool to achieve this is dialogue. The conversational

process requires time and quality, so that participants can

incorporate different truths and from a shared emotion,

design the best strategy and make a collective decision.

Conversation must be an instrument for competitive-

ness, learning and strengthening the social capital that

has been generated.

2.2. Em otions and language in the developmen t of

KCv

As mentioned above and according to Maturana

(1992), conversation is a combination of language and

emotion. Therefore, language and emotions are much

more important to coexistence than considered to

date. Language is far more than a system of symbols

for communicating or describing a reality that is out-

side of us. New realities and new worlds can be gener-

ated through language. According to Maturana and

Nisis (2004), what an observer distinguishes in terms

of emotions are classes or domains of relational behav-

iour, that is, different predispositions to action. Hence,

emotions are the basis of all our doing and being. All

that is done is undertaken as a result of specific desires

and preferences, that is, as a result of emotions.

Consequently, we are responsible for the worlds that

we generate.

Our life passes from emotion to emotion (flowing

between different predispositions to action) and lead-

ing to the evolution of language. This flow in our

coexistence that links language and emotions, which

Maturana and Davila (2008) call conversation, is key

to the development of KCv. To generate conversations

that facilitate reflection, we need to first carry out an

exercise to identify and let go of our certainties. We

can only develop KCv if we truly abandon obvious

solutions and create a space for respect, trust and

legitimacy of opinions.

2.3. Sustainab le territorial developmen t as a con -

versational p rocess

If, as indicated above, conversation is a process of

transforming coexistence, a process of constructing the

individual and social reality at the crossroads between

language and emotions, we can consider, as Maturana

and Nisis (2004) argue, that cultures are closed net-

works of conversations. It is said that humans exist in

the conversation, in networks of conversations, and


nothing human happens outside the networks of con-

versations in which we exist. The particular character-

istic of humans is associated with the fact that we have

language, which enables us to share, understand and

develop in the areas of our life.

Therefore, we consider that sustainable territorial

development, as a conversational process, can lead to

a change in awareness that, through reflection, enables

us to see what we could not see before. To achieve this,

we need to abandon emotions that are found in our

culture such as certainty, domination, control and dis-

trust, and promote emotions such as legitimation, col-

laboration and trust.

In conclusion, here we conceptualize territorial

development as a conversational phenomenon, as a

process of socially constructing reality through inter-

action by talking to others. Consequently, conversa-

tion is considered a transformation for coexistence

with others, to continuously invent our shared con-

ceptual world.

3. The developm ent of KCv in t he fir st 10 years

of 22@

Below we use the key factors in the conversation

process described above (a framework, skills and con-

versation agenda) to analyse the experience in the first

ten years of 22@ Barcelona (2000-2010).

3.1. The conversational framework

The conversational framework or governance in the

22@ district has been characterised as an environment

that facilitates the process of business development

that has flowed there, and fulfilled its function of gen-

erating productive conversations between the agents

and people. Two strategies have been implemented

that have facilitated the conversational framework. The

first is clustering of the district’s economy, that is, the

creation of clusters in which science, technology, large

companies, small companies, the market and the

financial sector, among others, interrelate. Vertical con-

versations have been generated, led by the clusters

themselves. The most important example of these is

the annual Urban Cluster Days. The second strategy

has been to generate horizontal conversations,

through committees of the 22@ Association and open

meetings in the entire district in the form of breakfasts

(22@Breakfast).

The experience of the ten years of the 22@ district

shows that it is possible to align each actor’s interests

and concerns with a collective goal. To achieve this, it

is essential to create mechanisms for bringing actors

closer together and conversing; that is, it is essential

to create strong, effective conversational capital, based

on a conversational framework that has the character-

istics described above. Below we evaluate this aspect

of 22@.

Openness to all relevant actors:

As an example, we have used the logic of the triple

helix model, which is comprised of hybrid structures:

- universities, faculties, technology centres, profes-

sional associations (that generate and attract knowl-

edge and global talent);

- companies (that retain talent and generate

wealth);

- and local and regional government (that regulates

the sectors and ensures the collective interest).

This openness to all the actors has increased their

levels of interrelation, knowledge and involvement in

the district. It has facilitated the development of some

projects that would not have come about individually.

However, perhaps a more active, rather than purely

vigilant, role needs to be played by social agents

(boards and unions) and by citizens, who are consid-

ered the clients or urban users.

Neutral, trustworthy leadersh ip :

Barcelona City Council’s aim to develop and attract

economic activity to the district and its clear leadership

has been a key factor. The culture medium was already

in place, the universities and the companies were there,

but neutral, trustworthy leadership was needed, as well

as the capacity to include all the agents. The local gov-

ernment’s leadership has been, and continues to be, a

determining factor. Over the ten years, this leadership

has varied from working on the creation and constitu-


tion of the district; acting as its impetus; promoting the

development; and, in the current time, culminating the

process and boosting internationalisation, by dissemi-

nating the 22@ model in over 100 international presen-

tations made in forums in a range of countries includ-

ing Japan, Korea, the USA and Brazil. If the

government’s project in this new decade is to extend

the framework both throughout the region and in its

representativeness, we need to consider what form of

leadership it should adopt in this new stage.

Continu ity:

The continuity in the horizontal conversation has

been exemplary (meetings, breakfasts, etc.). The com-

munication and promotion of this conversation by 22@

Barcelona has influenced the high, constant participa-

tion of companies in events organized by their man-

agers. Different types of horizontal conversation

events have been held that have ensured that actors

can be in constant contact with the project. In other

words, they form part of an active, permanent conver-

sation.

One of the characteristics of the 22@ model is that

once the ‘direction’ has been defined , it is the compa-

nies in the cluster themselves that make the vision and

the strategy a reality, through each cluster’s projects.

Therefore, the task of 22@ has been to accompany

clusters in the beginning of the process, and then leave

them to operate on their own, which ensures that they

make the best progress possible.

This method is considered to be very effective, due to

the commitment of the sectors and the efficacy of decen-

tralization that it represents. However, it could lead to a

loss of learning as the cluster itself manages the conver-

sation and 22@ does not follow it. In this case, the spe-

cific learning in each sector will not be brought to the

general conversation in the district.

A constructive nature:

The innovation district has become a place for

learning, an urban lab. For the first time, a local centre

has a global competitive variable. This enables it to

enter a sophisticated market, an innovation market, in

which companies that move to the district can learn

locally to compete globally. As a result, the district is

generally perceived as Barcelona’s major commitment

to the new paradigm of innovation and internationali-

sation. Evidence of this is the interest generated in the

other districts of the city, and the local government’s

goal of extending the model of 22@ to the rest of the

city of Barcelona.

With respect to the above point, it has been impor-

tant that the initiative has not been too politicised.

Municipal political groups, social agents and large cor-

porations all share the idea that 22@ Barcelona has

been more positive than negative, and that it must

continue on its path as a model of regional competi-

tiveness. In general, the project has been well-received

by inhabitants of the district. However, this is not the

case of some minority, alternative groups of young

people in the district, who have been critical of the

project and protested that it has not taken their needs

into account.

3.2. Conversational sk il ls

In horizontal conversational events (22@Breakfast

and committees of the 22@ Association), institutional

representatives have been responsible for coordinating

the conversations, proposing new topics for the clus-

ters’ collective agenda, facilitating debate, and creating

new paradigms. In contrast, each of the cluster plat-

forms’ events has its own agent to moderate the con-

versation. However, in the process of drawing up the

conversational agenda in this case, there was no spe-


Dynamics

Co

nver

sati

ona

l ev

ents Themed committees of the 22@ Association

22@Breakfast

ClusterDays

Debates, meetings, sessions(in eachcluster)

(Vertical conversation) (Horizontal conversation)

Figure 2

Development of conversat ional events

cific aim to appoint a moderator and coordinator of

relational spaces, as it was considered that a person’s

job position and resulting authority, added to their

individual capacity, would implicitly lead to them

becoming a moderator. In either of the cases, we could

suggest that the second key factor responsible for the

results achieved in 22@ is the conversational skills of

both facilitators and participants in the process.

Greater investment in the skills of facilitators of the

conversational process would, according to the theory

of conversational capital, lead to more collaborative and

practical conversations, which would therefore be more

productive conversations. Nevertheless, the aim of

events such as 22@Breakfast was not conversation, but

to put on the agenda some important topics for compa-

nies in the district. In this case, facilitation skills should

be understood as the capacity to help those present at

the breakfast to take the challenge back to the internal

conversations in their respective organizations.

On the basis of the results, we could also suggest

that the skills described in the model were present

among participants in the process. These ways of

being, thinking and forming relations have made the

22@ district a dynamic, open space that leads

Catalonia and Spain in the generation of knowledge.

Professionals and researchers from other countries

have participated in this space and have had the

opportunity to share and improve the model. This has

led to a significant virtuous circle of generating knowl-

edge and skills which, and this should be stressed as it

is a key point, has only been possible because the par-

ticipants have been open to new approaches, new

challenges, the identification of new opportunities,

and new paradigms. All of this has taken place with a

high degree of commitment and a clear awareness that

it is possible to construct the future we want.

As stated above, we can confirm that these skills

have been present at the required level, and enabled

the results to be attained. It may also be of great use to

systematize the development of the conversational

skills of both facilitators and participants in the con-

versations. Fine-tuning the methodology of conversa-

tions is directly related to the effectiveness of sessions

and on learning from the process, and therefore has a

considerable impact on the results.

3.3. Conversational agenda

If we take into account the characteristics of the pro-

ject’s development, the conversational agenda was ini-

tially focused on very local policy. In particular, it was

closely associated with the inhabitants of the district. This

was because it was important for there to be complicity

between inhabitants and municipal political groups in

relation to urban development and cultural heritage. The

conversational agenda that was initially focused on the

inhabitants was then opened up to the main economic

actors. Subsequently, it became more closely associated

with each of the clusters. Finally, within this continuous

process, the current conversational agenda is no longer

focused solely on the district or on its clusters. Instead, it

is centred on developing an economic agenda for the city

from a metropolitan perspective.

The identification of challenges and topics in the cur-

rent and future conversational agenda is supported by

reflections in the Strategic Metropolitan Plan of Barcelona


Phase 1:Local agenda

Phase 2:Economic

agenda(key city agents)

Phase 3:Sector agenda

(clusters) Phase 4:City agenda

(Smart City - PEMB)

Figure 3

Formulat ion of the conversat ional agenda

(PEMB). The agenda for 2020 described in the PEMB is an

important resource for formulating the future conversa-

tional agenda of 22@, as its development involved a col-

lective, structured process of creating a strategic vision.

Over 600 people, with a high level of reflection, were

involved in discussing and agreeing on challenges, meas-

ures and levers of change. The relationship between gen-

erating strategy (a strategic plan) and implementing busi-

ness and sector policy (22@) shall have to be consolidated

in the future, particularly as the aim is to tackle all pro-

ductive land in the metropolitan area, and to be more

open to the governance of all actors.

At the level of each sector, the various editions of the

Urban Cluster Days have enabled companies to discuss

the direction that each one wants to take. In addition,

these conversation events have taken place at different

informal levels, both in groups and among specific

agents. 22@ Barcelona has discussed key topics with

inhabitants of the district, with companies, with univer-

sities, with major national and international corpora-

tions and with schools in the district, by creating rela-

tional spaces and facilitating conversational events.

These have enhanced credibility, helped to create the

brand, and established a sense of belonging. If we con-

sider the intensity of the conversational capital in 22@

Barcelona at different points of its development, we can

create a graph that illustrates the trends that have deter-

mined the district’s agenda. The intensity of the agenda

has varied at each level of action.

Different degrees of intensity can be observed in the

KCv that has developed in these ten years. At urban

development level, the dialogue was very intense at the

beginning. Currently, the objective is to innovate beyond

the borders of the district itself, and urban development is

no longer an essential component of the 22@ agenda.

Therefore, in terms of urban development, 22@ is now

leaving this dialogue to the district, and beginning new

ones, for example on La Sagrera or Blau@.

At a social level, there was also a very intense process

of dialogue at the outset. However, this has gradually

diminished during the development of the district. The

current conversation in this area is focused on a more spe-

cific dialogue with schools, which are a critical point in the

future social agenda. In addition to the schools, the

process of celebrating the tenth anniversary of the project

has revealed that, in general, Barcelona’s inhabitants con-

sider that the change in the city is very positive. For many,

it is the urban reality that best explains the direction that

Barcelona is taking. Therefore, the dissemination of the

values underlying 22@ should continue and be expanded

to all areas, among businesses and the general popula-

tion. As the project involves the transformation of busi-

ness culture (conversing and generating trust and strate-

gies for joint projects), it will be very important to

communicate the slow change in paradigm.

At economic level, new sectors have emerged. Above

all, the current challenge is the transformation of all the

zones of the city where there is a concentration of pro-

duction activities. In other words, the goal is to ‘clusterize’

the city. Therefore, the agenda also involves a change of

scale, from the district to the entire city. In addition, it is

important to consider whether the exclusive development

of knowledge-intensive sectors should be maintained at

this new scale.

The level of conversational capital during the ten years

of the 22@ Barcelona project has been characterized by a

combination of scheduled, regular events (22@Breakfast

and the clusters days) and other private events that are

organized according to specific needs at each time (meet-

ings, permanent dialogues with companies that are estab-

lished in the district, dialogue with workers, etc.). This has

enriched the conversational agenda and ensured the suc-


2000

Urban planning level

Social level

Economic level

2010

Figure 4

Development of the KCv in the different stages of theprocess

cessful creation of relational spaces in which conversa-

tions can be generated at local and general level (sectors

and the territory).

The physical and human capital of 22@ is strongly

associated with the concepts of talent, entrepreneurship

and innovation. Symbolic capital has achieved recognition

of the brand in environments outside the district itself, the

construction of the district’s own identity, and a feeling of

belonging among participants. With respect to social cap-

ital, the environment of general conversations and the

spaces for interrelation have created close bonds between

people. This environment reflects the great challenge of

identifying which conversations should be maintained

and which not. In short, which topics should be put on the

common agenda and which new channels of conversa-

tions and conversational events, such as the breakfast

meetings and the cluster days, should be proposed to

bring the conversational framework to a large part of the

territory. This is the main challenge of the current 22@

Barcelona.

4. Final considerat ions and perspect ives

In conclusion, it could be suggested that the 22@

Barcelona project has significantly developed the conver-

sational capital in the district, which is the area of its inter-

vention. Its strong points have been the capacity to attract

relevant companies and institutions and to generate a col-

lective, constructive spirit that is positive and permanent

and involves all the sectors that have acted as real drivers

of 22@ Barcelona. However, it is important to further sys-

tematize the conversations, to learn along with the partic-

ipants the best formula for developing conversational

capital in each territorial and sector-based area.

Furthermore, 22@ must consolidate its important role as a

manager of the city’s economic-business agenda. This

also means actively following the conversations in each

cluster, to ensure optimum learning in the process at a

general level.

Looking ahead, the potential improvements that can

be drawn from this analysis need to be qualified to take

into account the differences between the period that

ended with the celebration of ten years of the initiative

and the period that is beginning, in a recession, with the

constitution of the Barcelona metropolitan area (BMA)

and the presentation of the new Strategic Metropolitan

Plan of Barcelona (PEMB), which includes the vision for

2020. The table below illustrates these differences.

Taking into account these considerable differences,

below we describe ten proposals for the challenge of

22@, to ensure that it continues to be a decisive agent

for Catalan competitiveness. The first four proposals

are more general and conceptual in their nature. The

following six are much more specific and operational,

and are classified according to whether they are more

closely related to the framework, agenda or conversa-

tional skills.

1) In the framework of 22@, hold the economic

conversation on the Barcelona m etropolitan area

that has been pend ing for many years.The creation

this year of a metropolitan government is an opportuni-

ty to generate conversation where there was none in the

past, taking into account its great importance for the

future of the country. The success of this conversation

will depend largely on the conceptual paradigm that is

applied. After the success of the 22@ Barcelona para-

digm, it is considered ideal to apply this to this great

national challenge.

2) Com plement the m etropolitan economic con-

versation with a conversation on Barcelona-

Catalon ia. Although the scope of the new project is the

Barcelona metropolitan area, its future is closely linked

to that of Catalonia (both economically and politically).

The historical fears that Barcelona will swallow up its

environment or competes with Catalonia should be

countered by Barcelona generating trust and credibility,

and by the support of the Government of Catalonia.

This is the only way that the Great Barcelona will be

able to develop its full force as a driver of Catalonia. An

interesting gesture would be to incorporate into the

22@ Association companies and territories beyond the

metropolitan area, as part of a specific committee.

3) Complement the econom ic conversation with

the Barcelona-World conversation . The same applies

to the relationship with the world; a real game board of


the economy of our metropolis. This conversation

should take place without a political component. The

aim should be to encourage companies and their

employees to look towards the emerging regions in the

world.

4) Finally, the conversational cap ital must be

managed. We must consider that metropolitan eco-

nomic conversations do not just have to be promoted by

22@; their cycles must be managed too. Conversation

must be anticipated. We should take advantage of major

trade fairs, relevant changes in the situation within and

outside the city to introduce new agendas, generate

new frameworks or strengthen conversational skills. In

short, the role of the new 22@ is more active and com-

mitted. A specific action in this area would be to estab-

lish mutual collaboration agreements with Fira de

Barcelona, Turisme de Barcelona, the Chamber of

Commerce, the port and the airport, among others.

Conversational framework

5) Bring to the public agenda what the change in

business culture in the 22@initiative has meant to the

Poblenou district, to strengthen what has already been

achieved at school level. In addition, the aim is to change

attitudes in the business and citizen strategy, in view of

the future metropolitan scale of the initiative. Take advan-

tage of opportunities to explain what the metropolitan

area could be both within the area and for the rest of

Catalonia. The dissemination of these messages should

be focused on accompanying and managing the change

in scale represented by the common metropolitan goal

for Barcelona and the other cities. This must be explained

in depth, with educational actions. Complicity must be

attained before actions are taken.

6) Scale up the urban lab in itiative,by attracting en

mass (not only experimentally) citizens from the different

zones in which 22@ is applied, as the clients and users of

processes of open innovation, rather than mere recipients

of products and services of companies that have adopted

the 22@ model to increase their function in the entire

innovation process. This initiative must involve promot-

ing the open innovation between companies that are

members of 22@. The citizens and their institutions

should form part of the 22@ Association.

7) Incorporation of all kinds of relevant agents

into the conversations.The 22@ Association should

continue to open its doors to actors beyond companies,

universities and institutions. Other participants could be

relevant administrations in the economic area, social

agents and consumer and user associations.

Conversational sk ills

8) Programme of conversation agents. The conver-

sations, in the form of meetings, events, etc., could have

both a positive and negative impact on the competitive-

ness of their participants. This depends largely on the

methodological professionalism of the facilitators and the

capacity of all to learn. Therefore, a proposal inspired by

the Norwegian programme ‘Value Creation’, developed

on the basis of action-research (Greenwood & Levin,

2006), is to train expert facilitators for the different kinds

of conversations (horizontal and vertical), who will be

assigned to each of the clusters and cross-cutting events.

This will ensure the skills and efficacy of processes in each

sector, and that learning occurs through a specific conver-

sation between all the agents conversing around what

each one has experienced. Finally, this learning should be

capitalized in its contribution to theorizing conversation-


The first ten years (2001-2010) The next ten years (2011-2020)

Table 1

Per iods in the development of 22@ (between the past and the future)

Period of economic and real estate expansion Period of economic and real estate recession

Experiment on the development of urban economic districts Ten years’ experience in the development of economic urban districts

In general, prospects opened up as a result of the initiative Specific prospects in other metropolitan zones (of a different nature)

Project with a comprehensive aim (predominant urban development component) Project with an economic aim

Continuous, homogenous territory (22@) Discontinuous, diverse territory (BMA)

al capital through the participation of a representative of

academia.

9) Systematic train ing in conversational skills for

managers of companies who approach 22@. In addi-

tion, those involved in the conversation (not just the

facilitators) must be trained in action, and in understand-

ing and learning the new skills and attitudes required for

optimum conversations that have results.

Conversational agenda

10) Explain and increase the alignment between

the metropolitan strategic p lan and [email protected] necessary,

22@ can even be made into a committee for the plan. In

a general plan of conversation for the city and the

metropolis, 22@ develops and implements part of this

agenda: economy and business development.

References

BRUSTENGA, J. G., & GONGORA, X. (2011). KCv El Capital Conversacional.

Palanca de desenvolupament de les metròpolis. www.capitalconversa-

cional.net

COLEMAN, J. S. (1988). Social Capital in the Creation of Human-

Capital. American Journal of Sociology, 94, S95-S120.

CORTINA, A. (2001). Alianza y Contrato: Politica, Etica y Religion. Editorial

Trotta, S.A.

FLORIDA, R. (2002). The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It’s Transforming

Work, Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life.New York: Basic Books.

FLORIDA, R. (2005). The Flight of the Creative Class. The New Global

Competition for Talent. New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc.

FUKUYAMA, F. (1995). Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosper-

ity. New York (N.Y.): Free Press.

FUKUYAMA, F. (2000). La Gran ruptura: naturaleza humana y reconstruc-

ción del orden social. Barcelona: Ediciones B.

GREENWOOD, D. J., & LEVIN, M. (1998). Introduction to Action Research:

Social Research for Social Change. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

MATURANA, H. (1992). La Objetividad. Un argumento para obligar.

Santiago: Comunicaciones Noreste LTDA.

MATURANA, H., & DAVILA, X. (2008). Habitar Humano: En Seis Ensayos

de Biologia-Cultural. Santiago de Chile: JC Saez Editor.

MATURANA, H., & NISIS, S. (2004). Transformacion en la Convivencia.

Santiago: Comunicaciones Noreste LTDA.

PUTNAM, R. D., LEONARDI, R., & NANETTI, R. Y. (1993). Making Democracy

Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton

University Press.



The need to compete is perhaps more obvious than

ever in the Western world. In a scenario that is character-

ized by galloping deficits and the need to meet different

groups’ social demands, which are unfortunately increas-

ingly numerous, data on economic growth are no longer

cold statistics, but a harsh reality that affects millions of

people.

However, the way of competing has changed sub-

stantially. Poor countries and societies compete basically

for the price of goods and services. This was also the case

in Catalonia several decades ago. However, as success is

achieved, the price of factors rises and this also pushes up

the prices of products and services. Success therefore leads

to a change in situation that makes it impossible to contin-

ue to compete on price. At this point, reinvention is

required.

Reinventing oneself involves changing from compet-

ing on price to competing on productivity. Most Western

companies and societies are at this stage. This stage

requires a much more flexible, sophisticated society that

can adapt to the changing needs of demand and take on

investments and technologies whose returns will be

obtained in the middle to long term.

However, globalisation, the internationalisation of

financial markets and risk capital and the wide dissemi-

nation of even the most specialized knowledge has pro-

vided many countries with the opportunity to compete

on productivity. The success of the Asian countries is

without doubt the clearest example of this phenomenon.

Therefore, we cannot compete effectively by doing the

same things better. We need to do different things, which

is why innovation has become a fundamental element in

our societies. This is because competition, and conse-

quently economic growth, is now closely linked to the

capacity of economic agents, and society in general, to

innovate.

Nevertheless, the public sector is in a singular situa-

tion because it does not have the same incentives to

compete as the private sector. Therefore, it adopts

changes at a significantly slower rate.

The public sector, and particularly cities, therefore

faces the need to change completely, to transform their

objectives and their governance, and to incorporate inno-

vation as a central factor. However, the differences with

the private sector are clearly considerable. This article

aims to establish the main differences and explore how

the concept of open innovation is also being adopted by

the public sector.

Innovat ion in the public sector

The prevailing management model in the public sec-

tor has been described by Donald Kettl (2008) as ‘vend-

ing machine government’. In this system, citizens pay

their taxes and expect in return to receive a set of servic-

es from a predefined menu, in which a small number of

authorized vendors are the only suppliers.

However, these two characteristics, a) the existence of

a predetermined set of commonly accepted services, and

b) the existence of a set of suppliers who have enough

experience to provide them, are precisely what are absent

or in crisis in many areas. One of them, perhaps the most

striking, is that which corresponds to smart cities.

Open innovation in the public sector: the case of urban labs

Esteve Almirall, Henry ChesbroughESADE


Smart cities initiatives aim to reinvent cities and our

relation with them. This is a fundamentally exploratory

process in which the new services and the way of

implementing them still have to be defined. This

process probably has the potential to change not only

the offering of services, and therefore the options avail-

able to citizens and the way that services shape the

city’s operation, but also, as discussed in this article, the

way in which new services are managed and selected.

In fact, over time we have found evidence of how

this ‘vending machine’ method of public sector man-

agement has been progressively replaced by more par-

ticipative methods in which services are not only pro-

vided by cities, but by a combination of public and

private agents or through the direct involvement of cit-

izens (O’Reilly, 2010).

In this context, the role of governments and of the

administration changes radically. Instead of being serv-

ice suppliers, they become managers of platforms;

ecosystems that involve the participation of for-profit

and not-for-profit actors, companies, open source com-

munities and volunteers who give their time and imag-

ination to the community.

The management objectives change as well as the

management method. The aim is not just to supply

services efficiently for citizens, but also to manage an

ecosystem that encourages growth, experimentation

and innovation.

In recent years, we have seen the emergence of

examples and implementations of this concept that

demonstrate its viability. Perhaps one of the areas in

which its viability has been most clearly demonstrated

is that of open data.

In 2008, Vivek Kundra, who was then Chief

Technological Officer (CTO) of Washington DC,

announced a contest called Apps for Democracy1. In

this contest, software developers were asked to submit

applications based on the city’s open data that are

available to all citizens. The winners would receive a

prize of $10,000 and the deadline was short, at only 30

days.

Despite the short time available, 47 applications

were presented. The two winning applications provide

electronic support for historical walks around

Washington DC and present demographic information

on different areas of the city that helps new residents

who are looking for housing. The categories covered by

participants were highly diverse: from guides for cycle

rides to webs that show where the administration

spends taxpayers’ money, as well as some unexpected

applications, such as one that indicates the safest route

home for people who have drunk rather too much.

Apps for Democracy cost $50,000. However, the

applications that were developed as a result of the

competition were valued at $2 M in a subsequent study,

which indicated that the administration would proba-

bly have taken a year to obtain these apps through a

traditional competitive process.

Apps for Democracy and, in general, this kind of

open data-based contest in which public data is pro-

vided as an element that enables the development of

for-profit projects with social or any other kind of aim,

and that uses the visibility of the event as a motivating

factor for participants, represents a significant change

in the way of managing applications and services in

the cities.

We are no longer dealing with a set of predefined

services that are financed with public money and pre-

sented in the form of contract specifications. Instead,

the government is a catalyst that enables the mobiliza-

tion of external agents by providing them with an ele-

ment they can use to provide the service (in the previ-

ous example, this element was data). The government

therefore becomes an ecosystem manager.

These elements, which are new to the public sector,

are widely used in the private sector. Indeed, the basis

for Open Innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) is the same

elements as those mentioned above. Specifically, com-

panies need to compete in innovation and not only in

productivity and efficiency, and, therefore, they need to

significantly increase the quantity and quality of new

proposals.

1. http://www.appsfordemocracy.org, retrieved on November 14, 2010.


In a world that has undergone highly significant

changes and in which knowledge is not limited to just

a few experts, but instead is widely dispersed and avail-

able to practically anyone, it is not realistic to consider

that the best proposals can only come from small,

internal groups. We have to capture the most interest-

ing proposals wherever they can be found, and incor-

porate them into the company’s ecosystem. This is the

same reasoning as in the case of open data.

It seems perfectly plausible to consider that much of

what we know about the management of open innova-

tion in the private sector can be transferred to the pub-

lic sector. However, there are obviously significant dif-

ferences that we will try to define in this article.

Open innovat ion in t he public sect or

The first step we should take is to describe the sit-

uation of innovation management in governments

within Europe. Perhaps a suitable tool for this purpose

is the Innobarometer 2010 report published in January

20112.

This report is based on telephone interviews with

over 4,000 government professionals in management

positions who work in organizations that have more

than ten workers. The sample covered all European

countries, and considered those with the largest popu-

lations.

The first point that the report establishes is that

innovation also exists in the public sector and is gen-

erated to a greater extent in the large organizations.

An important part of the report refers to the motives

and incentives that produce innovations. The main fac-

tors were found to be new laws and regulations and

budget cuts (not budget increases). These motives

reflect a top-down approach, in which innovations

appear as a result of the promotion of new policies.

If we focus on the sources of public sector innova-

tion described in the report, we can see that most of the

new ideas and proposals come from the government

itself, citizens or similar administrations, but over-

whelmingly (67%) from the same country.

The groups that carry out these kinds of projects are

mainly small. In 18% of cases there was no group at all.

Another relevant piece of information from the

report is that most innovations are developed by the

organization itself or by the organization in collabora-

tion with others from the public sector.

This description, which is probably simplified but

accurate, enables us to easily characterize the type of

innovation management that is being practiced in the

public sector. Clearly, this is a closed kind of innovation

that is basically focused on developments that are con-

ceived internally, using internal or external ideas and

concepts, and developed under the guidance of internal

departments.

There is a certain degree of collaboration, but most-

ly between organizations of a similar type within the

same country. Therefore, we are far from open innova-

tion practices in which internal and external proposals

are put on the same level, and an active effort is made

to incorporate not only ideas that are developed inter-

nally, but also proposals that are in a mature stage of

development.

Probably one of the aspects that best characterizes

open innovation, in comparison to other ways of man-

aging innovation, is the existence of intermediaries

who approach the different groups that could provide

ideas and proposals.

This is also probably the aspect that differs most

between open innovation in the public sector and in

the private sector.

The groups that are approached in the private sec-

tor are mainly companies and research organizations

(universities, research institutes, laboratories, etc.). In

the public sector, we must add citizens, who play an

essential role.

In many cases, it is not enough for a proposal in the

public sector to be technically viable or economically

2. Innobarometer (2010). Analytical Report on Innovation in PublicAdministration. January 2011. Pro Inno Europe.

sustainable; it also has to be accepted by the popula-

tion. In the private sector, acceptance lies in the pro-

posal succeeding or failing on the market. In the pri-

vate sector, it lies in the initial process of conceiving

the product or service.

This particular importance of citizens in the inno-

vation process is one of the distinctive characteristics

of open innovation in the public sector and has led to

proposals such as crowdsourcing or living labs gaining

in importance and presence in this context.

Living Labs + Sm ar t Cit ies = Urban Labs

As a concept, living labs gathered force from 2006

onwards, with the European Commission involve-

ment. It has gradually spread to create an organization

with over 300 affiliated labs that have representatives

in China, Brazil, Taiwan, Japan, Korea and Africa.

The concept of living labs revolves around two

ideas. Firstly, the users (citizens, in the case of smart

cities) are involved in the joint creation of innovation

from the outset. Secondly, innovations are developed

through experimentation in real environments.

Therefore, innovation can be applied almost imme-

diately in the case of smart cities. The use of the urban

space as a living laboratory, in which innovation is

jointly created and developed with a high level of user

participation is an idea that not only fits in well with

Smart Cities, but also has probably been practiced in

various forms in other cities.

However, the concept of living labs cannot be

exactly transferred to cities as urban labs; there are sig-

nificant changes in its interpretation. The most notable

of these is probably determined by the presence of a

public organization, such as the city council, managing

the entire process.

In urban labs, the public organization that repre-

sents the cities has a more important role than the rest

of the participants. The asymmetry can be seen in three

key aspects.

Firstly, the cities are involved in the process of cre-

ating demand. Obviously, if the innovation is success-

ful, it will be purchased by the city. In any case, the

urban lab itself provides a level of dissemination of the

proposal that is difficult to equal.

Secondly, proposals that are chosen as urban labs

projects are implicitly given a certain amount of fund-

ing, either through privileged access to urban facilities

or projects involving joint creation with users, or more

directly with the introduction of elements such as

innovative public purchase (pre-commercial procure-

ment), so that small and medium-sized companies can

join projects.

Finally, there is a third element that is important for

transferring the concept of living labs to urban envi-

ronments in the form of urban labs. This is the role of

urban labs in reducing the cognitive distance between

city councils and citizens, start-ups and companies.

This last aspect is perhaps one of the most inter-

esting, as it is a differentiating factor. Indeed, due to

their history and structure, in many cases local corpo-

rations do not have the elements they need to acquire

good knowledge of the market in which they are situ-

ated. It is sometimes difficult for them to access new

developments, particularly at global scale . Urban Labs

form a bridge between administrative structures, local

corporations and leading companies and research

groups; a bridge that can be used to transmit knowl-

edge, even when the cognitive distance between the

two groups is large.

In other words, we can define urban labs as inter-

mediaries in the open innovation process. The process

of intermediation is sometimes led by an independent

organization, as in the Forum Virium in Helsinki,

Amsterdam Innovation Motor in the Netherlands,

IBBT in Belgium or 22@ in Barcelona.

These organizations play a similar role to other

open innovation intermediaries, such as Innocentive

or NineSigma. However, to solve the problem of

selecting the best innovation proposals in a glob-

alised world, in which there are thousands of propos-

als, they aim to provide governance and structure to

urban experimental environments, to close the cogni-

tive distance between between different actors and

communities.


Conclusions

Innovation and cities are two concepts that have always

gone hand in hand. Geoffrey West, who for many years was

the director of the well-known Santa Fe Institute, has

described the positive correlation between the size of cities

and their innovation capacity in terms of a power-law

(Bettencourt et al., 2007). That is, a city that is 10 times larg-

er is 17 times more innovative, but a city that is 50 times big-

ger is 130 times more innovative.

Large cities have always been considered places that

welcome subcultures (Fischer, 1995) and non-conven-

tional residents (Florida, 2005).

In this article, we have described the theory that the

prevalent model of innovation in cities continues to be

based on a structure of providing predefined services.

This model does not include elements that enable cities

to reinvent themselves, which is what is sought in smart

city proposals (Florida, 2010).

The reinvention of cities, which should lead us closer

to smart cities, requires the reinvention of the governance

of cities themselves, particularly in terms of the manage-

ment of innovation. This point is further supported if we

consider the reality of cities as entities that compete for

talent and creativity (Florida, 2008), in a world where

competition is increasingly defined by the capacity to

innovate, not just by efficiency or productivity.

In the article, we have focused particularly on inter-

mediaries in innovation processes, particularly public

intermediaries. We centred on a specific mechanism: the

use of urban space as an area for research and experi-

mentation by the citizens themselves through urban labs.

The existence of intermediaries is possibly one of the

most relevant characteristics of open innovation process-

es. However, although open innovation is prevalent in

the private sector, it is only just beginning to be intro-

duced in the private sector. Urban labs will definitely

undergo considerable transformation in the coming

years, and shape this new scenario of open innovation in

the public field.

References

BETTENCOURT, L., LOBO, J., HELBING D., KÜHNERT C., WEST G. (2007).

‘Growth, innovation, scaling, and the pace of life in cities’. Proceedings of

the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, April 24,

2007, 104(17), 7301-7306.

CHESBROUGH, H. (2003). Open Innovation. Harvard Business Press.

FISCHER C. (1995). ‘The Subcultural Theory of Urbanism: A Twentieth

Year Assessment’. American Journal of Sociology 101(3), 543-577.

FLORIDA R. (2005). Cities and the Creative Class. Routledge.

FLORIDA R. (2008). Who’s Your City?: How the Creative Economy Is

Making Where to Live the Most Important Decision of Your Life. Basic Books.

FLORIDA R. (2010). The Great Reset: How New Ways of Living and Working

Drive Post-Crash Prosperity. HarperBusiness, HarperCollins.

INNOBAROMETER (2010). Analytical Report on Innovation in Public

Administration. January 2011. Pro Inno Europe.

KETTL, D. (2008). The Next Government of the United States: Why our

Institutions Fail us and How to Fix Them. Norton & Company, 2008.

O’REILLY, T. (2010). ‘Government as a Platform’, Open Government:

Collaboration, Transparency, and Participation in Practice, Lathrop D. &

Ruma, L. (editors). O’Reilly Media.



22@Urban Lab, t heexample of Barcelona

Anna MajóBarcelona City Council

Can government promote business innovation?

With what tools? Can government innovate internally?

Is public purchase (or pre-purchase) an effective

instrument to achieve this? How is it organized?

The aim of this document is to reflect on how urban

labs are instruments used by governments to promote

innovation in the administration of cities and specifi-

cally in their business sector. It is based on experience

led by Barcelona City Council’s Economic Promotion

office.

1. Int r oduct ion

Governm ent innovation policies: innovative pub -

lic p rocu remen t

Traditionally, there have been three types of public

policies for promoting innovation: structural policies,

policies for a specific purpose, and drivers. In the time of

economic prosperity, it was relatively easy to apply fairly

closed innovation measures (structural: specific depart-

ments, agencies, etc.; or for a specific purpose: grants,

funding, etc.). However, in the current economic situa-

tion, the role of governments is increasingly to act as

driving forces, facilitators and ecosystem managers. The

government acts as an intermediary. In particular, it gov-

erns public and private collaboration processes.

Clearly, one instrument that has great potential to

contribute to the transformation (and improvement)

of society is public procurement, which currently rep-

resents 16% of the European Union’s GDP. Public

procurement must meet its main objective, which is to

offer the best public services to citizens. However, its

use for other objectives (to promote employment,

improve the environment, and drive innovation,

among others) is not only justifiable, but also a

healthy obligation of governments that has been on

the agenda since 2006 (OECD, World Economic

Forum, Europe 2020, etc.). Therefore, the promotion of

policies to foster innovation through public procure-

ment, which creates sophisticated demand, is very

much on the agenda.

Innovative public procurement may refer to the

purchase of innovative technology (procurement of a

technologically innovative product/service) or the pre-

commercial procurement of innovative products (pur-

chase motivated by the challenge of products that do

not exist but that could be developed in a ‘reasonable

amount of time’). In this article, the discussion is

focused on the second concept and its link to the

urban lab, specifically in the case of Barcelona.

Benefits of innovative pub lic p rocuremen t

The creation of sophisticated demand has clear

benefits in at least four areas: the city itself and its

administration, as well as its citizens, business sector,

and science and technology environment.

In a first reading, the creation of sophisticated

demand from public institutions is of clear benefit for

citizens. It implies an offering of better products and

services, which are also more sustainable, by the gov-

ernment. Innovation also means learning to learn.

Therefore, if there is an effort to systematically incor-

porate innovation into purchasing processes in which

there is room for it, the value to citizens will be further

maximized in terms of products and services.

Secondly, purchasing capacity, as the capacity to

generate demand, is one of the main drivers of busi-

ness innovation. When projects foster sophisticated

demand, the pressure on employers increases, which

favours the creation of more competitive companies

that learn locally how to compete globally.

Thirdly, the search for innovative solutions also

implies the involvement of different stakeholders in a

country’s innovation system (universities, technology

centres, clusters and investors, among others).

Therefore, it is a powerful instrument to promote sci-

entific and technological knowledge transfer and to

bring research to the market.


As a fourth and final point, when the government

and its public managers wish to purchase innova-

tion, they gain knowledge and incorporate more effi-

cient or less standardized services that are better

adjusted to meet specific needs. These factors are

particularly important in a context of tight budgets

and a greater desire for actions to reflect the needs of

citizens. In addition, the city/region/country that

makes public procurement a tool for innovation

positions itself as a pioneer in innovation, strength-

ens its brand, and increases its capacity to attract tal-

ent and companies.

Obstacles to its estab lishment

Given the benefits of using public procurement as a

driver of innovation, it is surprising that this practice is

not more widespread in European governments. There

are two main reasons why this this system is difficult

to implement: the legal framework of public procure-

ment and the attitude and knowledge of the buyer. The

legislation on public procurement is complex, and has

traditionally prioritised price (and secure provision)

above any other concept. At the same time, there is

sometimes a lack of knowledge in legal departments of

innovative public procurement procedures. In addi-

tion, the purchaser’s attitude, which is often directly

associated with the legal framework, may mean that

public buyers are not willing enough to accept the

risks associated with buying products/services that

have not been previously tested and consolidated. In

addition, the fast pace of development of markets and

offerings means that public managers are frequently

unaware of the current market trends and the latest

technology.

A possib le solu tion : the p ilot

According to various European publications, a key

factor for reducing risks in innovative pre-commercial

procurement that enables us to keep up to date with

the latest technologies is the development of small-

scale pilots. Concepts such as open innovation or liv-

ing labs enable both companies and governments to

learn from the pilot process, assess the benefits and

anticipate any problems in moving to a larger scale.

IDEA DESIGNOF SOLUTION

PROTOTYPE FIRST PILOT TESTCOMMERCIAL

PRODUCTOR SERVICE

PRE-COMMERCIALPROCUREMENT

FIRSTCOMMERCIALAPPLICATION

Explorationof the solution

Developmentof prototype

Limited developmentof the first pilot

products/ servicesCommercialisation

of products/ services

D EVELO PM EN T TA KEO VER A N DC O M M ERC I A L I SAT I O N

Source: EU, 2010.

2. Barcelona Urban Lab

Under this framework, and to take advantage of the

power of public procurement as a driver of innovation

through the promotion of specific pilots, Barcelona City

Council launched the 22@Urban Lab project in 2008.

22@Urban Lab: definition

With the 22@Urban Lab, Barcelona became an urban

laboratory for testing future infrastructure and services.

This project made the 22@ Barcelona district available to

companies with innovative projects in the pre-commer-

cial stage. It is a real environment in which to develop

pilot tests that have an urban impact.

However, the aim is not to test for the sake of testing or

transform the city into a showroom, but to carry out tests

that are of clear benefit to the city, its companies and its

citizens. The tests must always be in line with real munic-

ipal needs.

In addition, for the government to meet the legal crite-

ria of transparency and objectivity in any purchase, compa-

nies are informed that setting up a pilot as part of the

Urban Lab does not in any way imply that Barcelona City

Council is committed to introducing the solution that has

been tested in the long term. It is stressed that what the

public managers learn in the process will improve their

knowledge of solutions on the market. They will be able to

use this knowledge to draw up contract specifications. What

companies learn will enable them to better adapt their

products/services to market needs.

Thus, the 22@Urban Lab aims to innovate by testing

urban solutions that have the potential to be transformed

into public purchases.

Urban Lab and Smart City

For several months, the concept of a smart city has

filled the pages of newspapers, specialized journals, the

portfolios of consultancy companies, and the agendas

of international conferences. The city of Barcelona also

has smart cities on its agenda and is drawing up its own

model. The city already has many assets in this area,

including infrastructure established in 22@ Barcelona,

Barcelona Open Data projects, municipal Wi-Fi or dark

fibre and the LIVE project for electrical mobility, among

others. The aim of the 22@Urban Lab was to create an

element that could be used by companies and the City

Council itself to develop the Barcelona Smart City

strategy.

Therefore, the fields of action of the 22@Urban Lab

are in line with the fields of action of Smart City

(mobility, environment, social administration, adminis-

tration, economy, etc.). What is sought are mechanisms

that can be used to apply knowledge created in cities

through public and private collaboration to the devel-

opment of new products, services or patents that can be

marketed in Barcelona and, above all, scaled up to the

rest of the world.

Given the nature and flexibility of the infrastructure in

22@ Barcelona, most of the pilots are implemented in this

zone, although pilots in other areas of the city are not

ruled out.

22@Urban Lab p ilots

Since the beginning of the project, around fifty pilot

project proposals have been received, of which 12 have

been developed or are being developed currently. Most of

these are cross-cutting pilots that address different

municipal areas, such as the environment, energy, mobil-

ity, urban development and telecommunications.

To improve mobility in the city, pilots have been carried

out on electric vehicles to examine what their use could be

and how to charge them (company: Circuitor, Quimera,

among others). In addition, pilots have been undertaken

on the introduction of sensor systems for parking places

above grade (company: Worldsensing), to increase sustain-

ability. New models for controlling traffic lights and differ-

ent models for bike lanes have also been tested.

In the area of the environment and energy, capacity sen-

sors have been installed in bins (company: Urbiòtica) to

provide data on how full they are and thus increase the

efficiency of collection. In addition, sensors have been

installed to create an acoustic map of the city (company:

Zolertia). Different types of LED lighting (company: Acisa,

Endesa-SantaCole, among others) have been tested. In

addition, new systems for remote reading of water, light

and gas metres have been experimented with (company:


Wimet) that enable real-time readings for the citizens and

personalized information on consumption.

In telecommunications, new protocols and ICT have

been tested, as well as different sensor models.

Some testimonials from the p ilots

Pilot: sensors for parking spaces. Company:

Worldsensing.

The FASTPRK system enables the occupation of 30

parking spaces in 22@ Barcelona to be detected by sen-

sor devices located in each space. The sensors transfer

information on the availability of spaces to municipal

applications, mobile phones and driver’s satnavs in real-

time. This pilot contributes to the study of measures to

improve mobility and facilitate parking in the city.

It has been an amazing, lucky opportunity to have a

space like this in our city. The opportunity to install

our system in the 22@Urban Lab has not only helped

us to optimise the operation of the system in a real

environment, but also provided us with an unparal-

leled showcase of our technology: Barcelona itself!

Thanks to the Urban Lab, an ecosystem of companies

is emerging that has extraordinary potential. Urban

Lab is a great step towards making Barcelona the

Silicon Valley of the Mediterranean. Ignasi Vilajo -

sana, Director of Worldsensing

When we considered that the system was fully opera-

tive, we entered the 22@Urban Lab. This real experi-

ence enabled us to improve aspects that we could not

replicate in the laboratory and that we would not

have been able to consider. In fact, the Urban Lab has

been the best laboratory that we could have. Jordi

Llosa, Head of Development at Worldsensing

The truth is that it was very easy. We filled in the

application online, and we were not too hopeful, but

immediately we received a reply and began to draw

up the project. The most surprising factor of all is that

a person was assigned to us as an interlocutor with

the different departments involved in the City

Council. The process was much more dynamic than I

could ever have expected. Ignasi Vilajosana, Director

of Worldsensing

Pilot: SIIUR. Companies: consortium formed of

Arelsa, Circutor, e-Control, Prysm ian, Santa&Cole,

SECE and Semai Lighting, coord inated by Barcelona

Digital. www.siiur.com

An ecodigital example of urban lighting made up of

12 lights that use LED technology and include environ-

ment and presence sensors. The lights also include

telecommunications services, electric vehicle chargers or

information points for citizens. SIIUR is a leader in the

integration of urban infrastructure and services, in the

search for more efficient, ecological and smart manage-

ment of cities.

On the basis of an international competition and the

pilot experience in 22@Urban Lab, the city of

Eindhoven (Holland) has chosen the SIIUR project to

develop and introduce innovative solutions for smart,

sustainable lighting in one of the main districts of the

city. Gemma Batlle, Head of the ICT Cluster

The SIIUR project is a challenge and a source of learn-

ing and has acted as a lever to generate new products,

services and business models, for its member compa-

nies and for the entire sector. Eloy Hernández,Head

of Projects for SECE.

The experience of SIIUR has served to develop

SmarTower(r), a new family of urban multiuse control

panels for smart city installations. Anna Urbiztondo,

Head of Projects for SECE.

For Santa&Cole, the SIIUR project, in the framework

of the 22@Urban Lab, has been important in terms of

research and innovation. To be able to work with

technologically innovative companies has given us

the opportunity to learn about and improve the fea-

tures of street lights. Josep Maria Serra, Editor of

the urban division of Santa&Cole

Impact of the 22@Urban Lab

The main beneficiaries of the 22@Urban Lab are

the same four participants described above in the sec-

tion on innovative public procurement. Firstly, the cit-

izens, who receive better products and better munici-

pal services. Secondly, the companies who can test

their products/services in a real environment. This



facilitates direct contact with potential clients and

potentially faster entry to the market, which enables

them to increase their local and global competitive-

ness. Thirdly, new opportunities arise for the science

and technology community to de-stock and transfer

local and international knowledge. The last beneficiary

is the city/City Council, as the urban labs promote the

introduction of new solutions (continuous improve-

ment), enable public managers to learn about market

opportunities, and facilitate interdepartmental coordina-

tion in innovation projects. In addition, the urban labs

help to situate Barcelona as an innovative city.

Therefore, considering the objectives of 22@Urban

Lab and its potential beneficiaries, the main indicators of

its impact are:

• Production and success in marketing new prod-

ucts/services that been developed by companies at the

request of the government or in response to technologi-

cal challenges posed in the framework of the 22@Urban

Lab.

• Introduction by the government of new products/ser-

vices that have been tested and shown to be more efficient

and/or sustainable in the framework of 22@Urban Lab.

Given that this is a new relatively new initiative, it is

difficult to objectively analyse the results, but there are

indicators such as the testimonials gathered in this article

that indicate the effectiveness of the initiative and show

that is has been well received by companies and by the

government. Currently, none of the pilots have been

transformed into contracts or real purchases, but various

pilots have served to rule out products. Above all, many

pilots have helped to improve products, make then safer,

more robust and better adapted to the city’s real needs,

and helped the government to discover potential new

functions.

3. Conclusions and future challenges

A city that aims to attract economic activity must be

committed to the innovation of its companies and facili-

tate their entry to the market. At the same time, it must

offer its citizens the best products and services.

Urban Lab is a tool to support in the city the strategy

of innovation, knowledge generation, economic and

social development. Although 22@Urban Lab is an initia-

tive that is still too young to properly assess its impacts,

initiatives like this enable the city and its government to

learn, the companies to learn and increase their compet-

itiveness, the citizens to enjoy the best services, and the

city to be positioned in the world of innovation. One of

the current challenges of this initiative is, however, to

increase the proactiveness of governments and the

launch of specific goals at international scale, which will

globalise markets and make them more efficient.

At times of economic difficulty for companies and

governments, innovative public procurement and the

22@Urban Lab1 as a tool in this process provide a great

opportunity to support companies and to progress in the

Barcelona Smart City strategy.

1. More information at: www.22barcelona.com/urbanlab


1. Int roduct ion

The 22@ Barcelona plan began as a unique opportuni-

ty to recover the productive potential of Poblenou and cre-

ate a major centre for scientific, technological and cultural

activity that would make Barcelona into one of the main

platforms of innovation and the knowledge economy in

the international arena.

With this idea in mind, Barcelona is transforming the

industrial district of Poblenou, which was the city’s main

economic driver for over a hundred years, into a new

model of a knowledge area that promotes collaboration

and synergies between universities, government and com-

panies to boost the development of a culture of talent and

knowledge.

The Poblenou neighbourhood is situated in the Sant

Martí district, which houses the past and the future of

Barcelona in the same territory. This combination is partic-

ularly obvious in the transformation of the old industrial

Poblenou into the new technological 22@ district.

Poblenou occupies almost all the eastern quadrant of

the Eixample area that was designed by Ildefons Cerdà in

1859. During the second half of the nineteenth century

and the first half of the twentieth century, most of the city’s

industry was located in this area and it became known as

the ‘Catalan Manchester’; an industrial zone that was

based on the textile sector and subsequently diversified

into the mechanical, chemistry and food sectors. In the

1960s, the area began to decline as a result of the new

dynamics of industrial location resulting from the need for

large-scale production and the improvements in mobility

systems. Both of these factors led to the creation of spe-

cialized plots in metropolitan corridors and the metropol-

itan ring, which in turn brought about the relocation of tra-

ditional industry out of the city centre. This process became

more pronounced in the recessions of the 1970s and

1980s, and led to the physical and economic degradation

of the area.

The transformation of the industrial zones of Poblenou

began with interventions carried out for the 1992 Olympic

Games, including the construction of the Vila Olímpica

(Olympic Village) and the ring roads, the restoration of the

coastline, as well as actions to open up Avinguda

Diagonal.

At the end of the 1990s, this new perspective led to an

interesting discussion about the future of the 200 ha of

remaining industrial land in Poblenou, whose uses were

increasingly precarious and on which there was consider-

able pressure to bring about transformation for housing.

Previous actions had led to a change from industrial to res-

idential use, and the complete transformation of existing

structures. In contrast, the approval in 2000 of the

‘Modification of the General Metropolitan Plan to redevel-

op industrial areas of Poblenou, the 22@Barcelona district

of activities’ made a decisive, unequivocal commitment to

maintaining the productive potential of this territory, and

to bringing about progressive urban transformation over

time. This would be achieved through regeneration of the

industrial zone by revaluing its architectural environment

and improving the quality of public spaces. However,

actions would not follow the conventional method of

working by areas that completely changes the urban struc-

ture. Instead, a balance would be created between what is

kept and what is renovated. This method would enable

22@ Barcelona: exporting the modelAurora López, Andreu Romaní, Ramon Sagarra

and Josep Miquel PiquéBarcelona City Council

new urban images to be created in a context of continuity

with the preceding forms.

Therefore, the plan’s objectives are the urban and eco-

nomic renewal of Poblenou through the proposal of a

compact, diverse model of a city. Instead of promoting

specialization of the territory by (industrial) uses, it opts for

a combination that fosters social cohesion and leads to

urban and economic development that is more balanced

and sustainable. Thus, new economic activities coexist with

research, lifelong learning and technology transfer centres,

housing, facilities and shops in a high-quality environment

in which the density is compatible with balanced provision

of open spaces and facilities.

The 22@ Barcelona plan modifies the characteristics of

the 22a industrial zoning regulations for Poblenou by

introducing a new urban development classification, that

of 22@, for land uses and building intensity in the new

subzone. The regulations define a new classification for

facilities, known as 7@ facilities, creates new standards for

the complete redevelopment of the area, establishes the

rights and duties of land owners and determines the

resulting planning methods and mechanisms for carrying

out the transformation. The Special Infrastructures Plan

(PEI) for Poblenou, which specifies the provisions in the

22@ Barcelona plan for infrastructure and service net-

works, was approved on 27 October 2000.

Through a system of incentives that improve the urban

development of the area, with a progressive increase in

uses and building area from 2 m2 of gross floor area/m2 of

land to 3 m2 of gross floor area /m2 of land, the urban

renewal processes contribute to the redevelopment of all of

the streets and the renewal of infrastructure, an increase in

the quality and capacity of urban services, and the reorgan-

ization of mobility. In addition, land is transferred free of

charge to the community. This land was initially 100% pri-

vate, but as a result of the transformation, 30% will be made

public for the creation of new green areas, facilities and

social housing. The presence in the district of @ activities

shall also be promoted. These are activities in which talent

is the main productive resource. They are all basically urban

activities that are intensive in the use of space and infor-

mation and communication technologies, and dense in the

number of qualified workplaces that are generated.

Thus, the progressive transformation of industrial land

shall help to resolve the area’s historical shortcomings, and

to recover the social and business dynamism that charac-

terized Poblenou in the past.

From the beginning of the project in 2000 to 2011, the

22@ Barcelona municipal company has carried out an

urban redevelopment project that involves the creation of

a diverse, balanced environment in which the most inno-

vative companies coexist with research, training and tech-

nology transfer centres, shops, dwellings and green zones

that promote social and business dynamism.

After an initial stage that basically involved urban

renewal, from 2004, 22@ Barcelona began a new phase of

intense economic and cultural renewal. Around forty proj-

ects are being carried out to create areas of European

excellence in sectors in which Barcelona could attain inter-

national leadership: the audiovisual sector, information

and communication technologies (ICT), media technolo-

gies, energy and design. This is achieved by creating clus-

ters in the 22@ territory of companies, public organizations

and leading science and technology centres in the afore-

mentioned strategic areas of knowledge.

Clusters are one of the most competitive options for

development and consist basically in groups of actors (uni-

versities, technology and research centres, companies,

government, private and public financial resources) that

are interested in working together to find synergies in a

specific economic sector. 22@ Barcelona gives clusters the

opportunity to grow in their natural habitat: the city. As a

result, 22@ Barcelona promotes urban modernization and

social progress in the district and the city.

These areas of excellence enable the creation of a

dynamic model of innovation based on the ‘triple helix’

concept. The model fosters the convergence of government,

universities and companies so that the synergies generated

between these strategic agents increase the competitive-

ness of the productive system and contribute to the cre-

ation, growth and consolidation of quality employment.

22@ Barcelona participates actively in the economic

promotion of the district, innovation and the international

reach of its business, science and teaching activity. It leads

a range of projects and provides companies with various

support services.



2. Process inst rum ent s

In a short period of time during the second half of

2000, the Modification of the General Metropolitan

Plan was approved to redevelop the industrial areas of

Poblenou (MPGM 22@). The Special Infrastructures

Plan (PEI) was also approved, and the 22@ Barcelona

municipal company was founded. Subsequently, gover-

nance decisions were adopted (the Mayor’s Office

Decree of 19 March 2001 and the agreement of the

Plenary Meeting of 22 March 2002) and various com-

mittees were formed (the Advisory Committee,

Technical Committee and Heritage Committee) to give

the company the tools it needed to carry out its task.

These three factors, the MPGM 22@, the PEI and

the 22@ Barcelona company, are all singular and inno-

vative. Together they comprise an inseparable unit that

is also singular and innovative.

1. Although it is brief, the MPGM 22@ is notable

mainly because: a) it establishes specific guidelines and

a clear framework of reference, with a wide range of

transformation mechanisms adapted to the situation;

b) it includes in the urban discourse some structures

that go far beyond standard urban development; c) it

incorporates economic promotion as a crucial objective,

beyond the promotion of a real estate product that has

no content; d) it systematizes mechanisms for recover-

ing capital gains to re-balance urban and social aspects

(subsidized housing, facilities and open spaces); e) it

gives the different operators a leading role; and f) it

opts for the recovery of historical heritage and for the

maintenance and renovation of housing stock.

2. The PEI is notable because, more than a conven-

tional urban development project, it is a comprehensive

plan that focuses on high-quality service networks that

incorporate new technologies and meet sustainability

criteria. It also takes into account the productive poten-

tial of the territory.

3. The 22@ Barcelona company is notable because it

was created as a direct management body attached to

the City Council. It integrates an overall vision for the

entire district of 22@ activities and for all the stages in

each transformation as a single, continuous process. This

process ranges from the identification of specific realities

in each case to the introduction of new activities, as well

as: a) the identification of needs; b) the establishment of

objectives; c) urban development planning to regulate

not only physical aspects, but also contents; d) manage-

ment to obtain land and resources to implement plans

and infrastructure; e) the execution of infrastructure; f)

the support of agents to bring together supply and

demand and ensure that the real estate product is filled

with content; g) the creation of public facilities and the

generation of clusters and business networks that are

cornerstones and in which operators interrelate and

cooperate in projects at local and global scale (universi-

ty, company, government, users, etc.); h) the renewal and

extension of housing stock, with particular attention

paid to those affected; i) the promotion and monitoring

of administrative procedures, among others.

The basic organization of the 22@ Barcelona com-

pany clearly reflects the objective of carrying out the

tasks that it has been given. The company is divided

into the following areas: urban development planning,

urban management, infrastructures and economic pro-

motion, as well as cross-cutting areas that support the

others. All of these are established under their own

management, but they are not independent. Instead,

they are totally interdependent and interrelated, and

have some common objectives.

The company has been present and active in the

process of territorial transformation since the begin-

ning, in the stages of drawing up and processing the

planning and urban management, in the urban devel-

opment and redevelopment of roads and public spaces,

in the creation and extension of service networks and

infrastructures, and in the reception and management

of galleries, technical rooms and other spaces, etc.

In parallel to these physical transformation process-

es, the company collaborates with property developers,

companies and institutions to facilitate their establish-

ment in the area and actively incorporate them into

clusters and leading business networks. All of these

tasks are carried out with a cross-cutting, interdiscipli-

nary approach and are the driving force behind the 22@

Barcelona company.

3. Urban developm ent and infrast ruct ures

3.1. Urban p lann ing

The old industrial area of Poblenou is characterised by

the superimposition of irregular, diverse urban fabrics,

due to the fact that the land has been used over a long

period of around 200 years. The construction logic was

determined by the industrial production needs, the posi-

tion of dwellings in relation to workplaces and the con-

nection with the city and infrastructures.

The result of this process was the coexistence of a rich

diversity of urban fabrics. Despite the regular grid of the

Eixample, Poblenou is clearly distinguished by considerable

variations in a series of alignments, traces of agriculture, old

industrial premises, narrow streets, as well as buildings with

a range of dimensions, uses and styles that form the urban

fabrics. Cerdà’s grid takes on very different hues in each part

of Poblenou and in comparison with the rest of the city.

With this complex reality as a starting point, the gen-

eral planning regulations do not determine the final result

of the transformation, unlike traditional urban develop-

ment plans. In other words, they do not establish detailed,

precise urban planning for the territory. Instead they pro-

mote its gradual redevelopment over a twenty-year peri-

od. The redevelopment is adapted to the existing struc-

tures, so that the industrial and residential buildings that

are maintained are integrated with the new buildings, to

create fabrics with combined functions and complex

forms, in an environment of great cultural value that

brings together tradition and innovation, and fosters con-

tinuity in the process of urban evolution.

To promote this transformation of the territory and

attain a balance between replacement and the permanence

of fabrics and representative elements of the neighbour-

hood’s industrial past, a flexible system of transformation

mechanisms has been established. Various types of derived

plans are adapted to the different situations and require-

ments, and enable projects of different dimensions to be

promoted, including direct interventions on existing plots or

buildings, plans that cover an entire block, promoted by the

private sector, and the six public initiative plans for prede-

termined areas that transform axes or strategic areas, act as

benchmarks, condense the urban fabric, and are drivers of

transformation in the project. The predetermined areas are:

Perú-Pere IV, Parc Central, Llull-Pujades-Llevant, Llacuna,

Llull-Pujades-Ponent and the Audiovisual Campus. They

have a combined surface area of 925,482 m2 of land and

represent 47% of the total area of transformation.

The development of the plan through derived planning

instruments has enabled the transformation to be adapted

to the real characteristics of each territory, through a

detailed study of the fabrics, buildings and uses. Thus, the

range of elements to maintain has been increased from

those initially included in the general planning (heritage

buildings of interest, residential facades and industrial

buildings above grade). Additionally, land divisions, build-

ings and, in short, urban fabrics shall also be kept.

3.2. Urban development management

In terms of implementation of the planning, 22@

Barcelona is responsible for promoting, drawing up, pro-

cessing and monitoring the urban development manage-

ment instruments envisaged for the areas of action outlined

in the planning. In the first few years of the 22@ project,

many of the plans that were approved were the result of

public initiative and related to management in areas of

action also through public initiative. Most of these plans

were approved and are either completed or in very advanced

stages of implementation. In recent years, the number of

private initiative developments has increased. Private plan-

ning and management proposals have been submitted and

processed and are now in various stages of implementation.

In any case, one immediate, essential consequence of

the drive to implement urban planning is the description

of the transformations in physical, legal, economic and

social orders. These generate and impose expectations

and obligations, benefits and charges, rights and duties.

The most specific task in urban development manage-

ment is compliance with various urban development obli-

gations, charges and duties, including: the payment of

charges and compensation for those affected; the reloca-

tion of activities; the rehousing of residents; demolitions

of buildings; soil remediation; compulsory cession of land

for facilities, open spaces and public uses and subsidized

housing; payment of the costs of urban development; and

the provision of infrastructure, among others.


In the first ten years since the launch of the 22@

plan, urban development management, an activity with

a high legal content, has been affected by considerable

changes in the legal framework and a series of rulings

on the few disputes that have arisen, which not only

questioned the initial model but also strengthened and

consolidated it.

3.3. Infrastructures

In addition, the ‘Modification of the General

Metropolitan Plan’ envisages the provision in the district of

new infrastructures that meet the current urban develop-

ment, social, economic and environmental needs, and ful-

fil criteria of sustainability, and competitive service provi-

sion. A new standard of urban development is determined

that goes far beyond the traditional model. Through the

Special Infrastructure Plan for Poblenou, the new standard

specifies the basic elements and main characteristics that

must be included in plans for the surface area and the

service networks.

The Special Infrastructure Plan details the urban devel-

opment of the district (including 37 km of roads), and

specifies the urban development charges and the needs for

each service. It provides a comprehensive solution that

reconsiders the role of public spaces and private commu-

nity spaces to support the infrastructures that coexist with

the current networks.

Notable aspects of the Special Infrastructure Plan are

the creation of a district heating and cooling system that

reuses heat from the waste recovery plant in the Forum

and has considerable environmental advantages; the

development of a pneumatic waste collection system for

selective collection; and the installation of fibre optic

networks that reach all buildings. The urban develop-

ment’s finishing will be sober, in line with what is

already found in the Eixample, and the pavement at

crossroads between blocks have been widened to gain

space for pedestrians.

With respect to the planning of works, and to ensure

the availability of services in the new urban developments,

the PEI specifies the construction of proximity and cover-

age networks for the entire area. These activities represent

30% of the total budget for the planned actions.

4. Economic development

4.1. Promotion of urban clusters

In 2004, to strengthen and highlight the physical trans-

formation (urban development and infrastructures) of the

22@ Barcelona district, economic activity promotion poli-

cies were implemented that focused on emerging sectors

in which a competitive position could be obtained at inter-

national level, including the audiovisual, information and

communication technologies (ICT), medical technologies

and energy sectors. In 2008, a new line of action was

launched in a fifth strategic, relevant sector for Barcelona:

the design sector.

The aim of promoting urban clusters in the 22@ terri-

tory was to increase the innovative capacity of companies

through the creation of productive environments that

bring together leading companies, institutions, public

agencies, universities and research, development and

innovation centres in each sector. The clusters promote

innovation value chains for each sector, through science-

technology-company-market projects. Companies in the

district benefit from an innovation ecology that increases

their capacity to compete internationally.

Each of the five clusters in 22@ is at a different point of

development depending on its characteristics and level of

maturity. In 2010, projects that had started in the previous

years continued, and some new projects began. In all

cases, the method followed in 22@ Barcelona has been

based on establishing close relationships with an entity

that manages the cluster and draws together the sector.

This entity has the mission, shared with 22@ Barcelona, of

boosting companies’ competitiveness.

In 2007 and early 2008, strategic plans were drawn up

for the following sectors: ICT, audiovisual, energy and

media technologies. In 2008, operational plans were drawn

up to implement the strategic plans and a model of gover-

nance and management was designed for each cluster. The

strategic plan for the design cluster, which is jointly led by

the Barcelona Design Centre (BCD), was drawn up in 2009

and the cluster was recognized by the Spanish Ministry of

Industry (MITYC) as an Innovative Business Cluster (AEI).

In the past, 22@ Barcelona collaborated on the creation

of sector-based centres for technology transfer (CTs).


These centres act as instruments to connect research (uni-

versities) and companies. 22@ Barcelona helps to consoli-

date these centres, which include the Barcelona Media

Foundation in the audiovisual sector, and the Barcelona

Digital Foundation in the ICT sector. In 2009, 22@

Barcelona supported the creation of a technology centre

for medical technologies and helped to consolidate the

Catalonia Institute for Energy Research (IREC), which

together with b_TEC is leading the energy cluster.

4.2. Business establishment and support

In 2008, the 22@PLUS initiative was launched to

meet the strategic objective of strengthening support for

companies seeking to move to 22@. Work on this initia-

tive continued in 2009 and 2010. 22@PLUS is conceived

as a value proposal for companies that are studying the

option of moving to the district. It is comprised of a cat-

alogue of services in which the added value elements of

22@ are presented: technology infrastructure, knowl-

edge infrastructure, business cooperation networks,

clusters strategy, access to public and private funding,

access to talent, access to the market, facilities and inno-

vative spaces for companies and entrepreneurs, plat-

forms for companies landing and taking off, among oth-

ers. Part of this service is Business One Door, by which a

company that wants to move to the district is supported

throughout the process. It is given the information

required to join a cluster and to access the services and

tools available in 22@ Barcelona.

The programme of actions of the 22@Network, which

is the association of 22@ companies, aims to facilitate the

integration of companies, institutions and their employees

into the area, and to strengthen relationships between

them and the Poblenou neighbourhood and its rich fabric

of associations. One very effective instrument has been the

monthly 22@Update Breakfasts, which are organized in

conjunction with the 22@Network to discuss current busi-

ness issues and to bring together and connect companies

located in the 22@ district.

To support and adapt spaces offered in the district to

ensure that they meet company needs, marketing tasks

have been coordinated with property developers and real

estate consultants.

5. 22@: 2000-2010

5.1. Urban p lanning

Planning is the first phase in the urban development

process. The next stage is urban development manage-

ment and the final stage is new building or renovation

projects.

The process of transforming Poblenou’s industrial areas

has been carried out through a series of actions that have

been implemented over the ten years of the project. In the

middle term, these actions ensure substantial changes in

the physical environment, in the presence and type of

companies and institutions in the territory and, conse-

quently, in the types of relationships established between

the people who coexist there.

The total surface area of 22@ covers almost 200

hectares. Of these, the area for redevelopment (land that is

not classified as roads) is 1,323,357 m2, that is, over 130

hectares. The final aim of the plan is to create almost

4,000,000 m2 of gross floor area above grade for production

spaces, dwellings, technical services and facilities.

A total of 47% of the 200 hectares corresponds to six

areas that will be developed through predetermined, pub-

lic initiative plans that have already been definitively

approved, although some still require work on certain

areas through specific plans.

The planning stage has been completed for more than

68% of the redevelopment area. This represents

2,975,161 m2 of floor area and 909,332 m2 of land. Of this

area, 123,678 m2 of land is classified for facilities and

148,388 m2 for green zones. In addition, the planning that

has been carried out defines conditions for the develop-

ment of over 3,000 dwellings as part of a public subsidized

housing scheme.

In terms of the number of planning instruments, in the

ten years since its launch, 127 plans have been approved

definitively for the 22@ district, of which 80 have been pro-

moted by private initiative. In private initiatives, the plans

that are being processed have been monitored and advice

and guidance given to the teams responsible for drawing

them up. Information has also been provided for the inter-

ested parties during the process. The plans define the posi-

tion of land for private use and land to be transferred to the


municipality for social housing, facilities and green zones,

the characteristics of the new buildings and all of the urban

development parameters that, after the processes of urban

development management, enable the implementation of

building projects and the marketing of the resulting real

estate products.

The ‘Modification of the Special Plan for the Protection

of Architectural Heritage in the District of Sant Martí.

Industrial Heritage of Poblenou’ was approved in 2006. It

incorporates urban planning for existing structures in the

area. The Special Protection Plan includes 68 elements and

industrial buildings, in addition to the 46 that were already

protected. This demonstrates even more clearly that the

Poblenou extension area has its own urban structure that

differs from that of the central Eixample district.

In addition to planning for the 22@ district, plans have

also been developed for outside the boundaries of the

urban development area, notably the ‘Diagonal-Besòs

Interuniversity Campus’, which covers almost 8 hectares.

The uses envisaged for the future Campus are focused on

university activity, including teaching, research, technology

transfer and services for the university community, as well

as other research and innovation activities associated with

the core areas of the new Campus: energy, mobility, water

and sustainability.

In addition, the Modification of the General Metro pol -

i tan Plan for the historical centre of Poblenou, which cov-

ers around 43 hectares of the district, has been modified

and the Heritage Catalogue has been expanded. This

Catalogue has the following main objectives: a) maintain

the general character of Poblenou as a neighbourhood

with urban streets (old streets, narrow streets and urban

extension area streets); b) identify and protect the build-

ings and groups of buildings that are most relevant in

terms of architectural and urban development heritage in

the defined area (currently there are 12 elements cata-

logued; this number will rise to 65 elements that have

some kinds of heritage protection and 492 buildings with

urban development protection); and c) promote actions to

redevelop instead of replace.

Up to the end of 2010, eleven green areas had been

developed covering a total of 26,226 m2; a total of

14,224 m2 are under construction; and 33,073 are being

designed. Up to 31 December 2010, a total of 101,132 m2

of gross floor area above grade had been built for facili-

ties. In the first half of 2011, another 7,000 m2 had been

completed. Examples of the completed facilities include:

Ca l’Aranyó/Pompeu Fabra University, the Media -

complex building, Can Jaumandreu, CEIP Llacuna, the

MediaTIC building and the Audiovisual Council of

Catalonia (CAC).

With respect to subsidised housing, up to the first quar-

ter of 2011, the 22@ plan had already drawn up planning

for the urban development of over 75% of the subsidized

housing envisaged. A total of 1,160 dwellings have already

been built and a further 410 are under construction, which

brings the total to 1,570. In addition, a permit has been

granted for a further 96 dwellings, whose construction

should begin in the near future. The 1,666 dwellings, plus

the 445 whose management has been approved, amounts

to over 50% of the 4,000 envisaged in the ‘Modification of

the General Metropolitan Plan’.

Up to the end of 2010, permits had been granted for a

total of 1,401,789 m2 of gross floor area, of which

959,847 m2 are above grade and 441,942 m2 are below

grade. The distribution of this floor area by use is 70% for

financial activities, 17% for dwellings and 13% for facilities.

5.2. Urban development management

From the start of the 22@ plan to the end of 2010, a

total of 190 management instruments were promoted,

including agreements. These directly involved over 900

people, including individuals and legal entities, and

affected around 270 activities, most with 2 or 3 employees,

which required compensation and relocation, and around

80 dwellings whose inhabitants had to be rehoused.

The land managed throughout this period amounts to

around 625,000 m2 (approximately 47% of that envisaged

in the 22@ plan), of which around 200,000 m2 will be

transferred to municipal ownership for open spaces,

facilities, roads, subsidized housing and economic activi-

ty. This land will have a managed area of 1,920,000 m2 of

gross floor area, of which 120,000 m2 of gross floor area

will be transferred to public ownership for subsidized

housing and a further 30,000 m2 of gross floor area will be

transferred to public ownership for economic activity.


Finally, private property developers have participated

in urban development management, with 45.26 million

euros of funding for the Special Infrastructure Plan, and

the City Council has taken in 24.55 million euros in com-

pensation for the value of compulsory transfers that can-

not be carried out physically.

5.3. Infrastructures

The Special Infrastructure Plan (PEI) envisages the

redevelopment of 37 kilometres of roads, determines the

urban development charges and the needs for each serv-

ice, and offers a comprehensive solution that reconsiders

the role of public spaces and private community spaces

as an infrastructure support.

The redevelopment of 98 stretches of roads has been

completed, and a total of fifty projects have been carried

out. Consequently, about 40% of the PEI has been exe-

cuted, with around 14,400 lm (linear metres) of roads

resurfaced out of a total of 37 km and an urban develop-

ment area of almost 310,000 m2. All of the corresponding

infrastructures have been transformed, including the over

5,100 ml of new sewers and the 34,820 ml of ductbanks

(for electric and telecommunications cables), as well as 44

galleries constructed and three more underway.

To strengthen these new infrastructures, two new

pneumatic waste collection centres have been built as

well as an electrical substation. A district heating and

cooling system is being constructed in Carrer Tànger,

whose expected completion date is 2011.

One singular project is the extension and adaptation

of the historical chimney at Ca l’Aranyó for use as an

exhaust for fumes from the future heating and cooling

system substation.

The introduction and continuity of renting dark cable

has also been important. A total of 41 km of fibre have

already been installed to serve the companies in the district.

To sum up, the main indicators in the first ten years

are as follows: 98 stretches of road completed; 44 public

galleries; 880 lm of public galleries; 2,200 lm of private

galleries; 13,100 lm of cooling and heating network; 59

clients connected to the heating and cooling network;

11,050 lm of pneumatic waste collection network for

municipal waste and 65,112 lm of ductbanks.

5.4. Economic development

The transformation of the district has enabled the

installation of ten university centres with over 25,000 stu-

dents, and 12 research and development and technology

transfer centres. The latest business census carried out

within the geographic area of 22@ Barcelona has shown

a continuous increase in companies established in the

area since 2000.

This census, which was drawn up several years ago,

excludes individuals (freelancers) and companies in the

sectors of trade, hotels and catering, construction, real

estate activities, travel agencies and bank offices. If we

take these exclusions into account, on 31 December 2009,

the number of companies established in 22@ Barcelona

since 2000 was 1,502, which is 4.2% more than in the

2008 census. Thus, in terms of evolution and despite

being in the most severe recession in the last 70 years,

22@ Barcelona continues to grow in the number of com-

panies. This fact has a direct influence on the financial

activity of all the shops, hotels and offices in the area.

Out of the new companies set up in the 22@

Barcelona district in 2009, 50.7% provide business servic-

es, 21.9% manufacturing industry services, and 9.6% per-

sonal services and other social activities.

The pace of economic renewal in the district is clear

and, despite the current economic climate, the rate of

installation is obviously positive. Thus, between 2000 and

2003, a total of 489 companies set up in 22@ Barcelona;

between 2004 and 2006 the number was 552; and during

2007 and 2009, it was 461.

The latest data on the number of workers, which were

drawn from the business census, indicate that the num-

ber of workplaces within the geographic area of 22@

Barcelona has risen to reach 44,600.

The rise in the total wage bill for the district is due to

the increase in the number of companies and in the work-

force of companies that are already present in the zone.

In 2009, half of the companies (51%) had not experi-

enced any changes in the number of employees, 24%

employed less people and 21% employed more. The large

companies and those dedicated to ICT are those that, in

proportion, experienced the most growth in the creation

of workplaces. The proportion of knowledge- and tech-



nology-intensive activities was considerable. Thus, 74.2%

of the 1,500 companies (1,114) were dedicated to activi-

ties considered @, which highlights the relevance of the

new economy in the district.

In fact, many of the companies that have folded in

recent years were involved in the manufacturing industry,

whilst the ‘new economy’ has been able to attract more

companies and workers and has helped 22@ Barcelona to

grow and create quality employment for the city. In com-

parison, in Catalonia as a whole, @ activities account for

58% of the total economic activities.

A study of companies who carry out their activity

within the geographic region of 22@ Barcelona estimated

that their turnover was approximately 6 billion euros,

which is 300 million more than in 2008; that is, 5.4% more

than in the previous census.

At total of 8.1% of companies with headquarters in

22@ Barcelona have a turnover of over 15 million euros;

12.2% have a turnover between 3 and 15 million euros;

20.3% between 600,000 and 3 million euros; and almost

60% have a turnover of up to 600,000 euros.

Almost 7 out of every 10 companies (68%) that have

work centres in the 22@ Barcelona district are ‘micro-

companies’ that have no more than 10 employees. Of

these microcompanies, most (9 out of every 10) have their

entire workforce in 22@ Barcelona.

In terms of the activity carried out by companies, 1 out

of every 2 companies (54%) forms part of, or is associated

with, one of the five clusters in the 22@ Barcelona district

(ICT, audiovisual, medical technologies, energy and

design).

- 26% of companies carry out ICT activities.

- 24% of the companies carry out design activities.

- 11% of the companies carry out audiovisual activities.

- 5% of the companies carry out activities linked to

medical technologies.

- 4.5% of companies carry out activities associated

with the energy sector.

One in four companies carry out research and devel-

opment activities. ICT and medical technologies are the

two strategic sectors in which research and development

is carried out by the highest proportion of companies

(4 out of 10).

A total of 23.5% of companies in the 22@ Barcelona

district export goods and services. Among medium-sized

and large companies, this percentage stands at 38%. By

clusters, the companies dedicated to medical technolo-

gies export the most (4 out of every 10 or 39%), followed

by design companies (31%).

The data obtained from the study indicate that

human capital is a differentiating factor in the district,

due to the high degree of training of the people who

work there.

On average, 72.5% of employees of @ companies in

the district are university graduates. In fact, one out of

every two companies in 22@ Barcelona has more than

50% of staff with a university qualification. In Catalonia

as a whole, according to the results of the labour force

survey (EPA), only 37% of the employed, salary-earning

population has reached higher education level.

6. 22@ Barcelona: expor t ing the model

Today, 22@ Barcelona is an international benchmark

for urban, economic and social transformation for cities

such as Rio de Janeiro, Boston, Istanbul and Cape Town.

It is is a model that is studied and followed by universi-

ties and science and technology parks worldwide.

The experience in the Innovation District is being

made available to other districts in the city through the

accumulated know-how. Thus, the model is being

extended to the rest of the city of Barcelona.

The model of urban clusters promoted by 22@ has

established the bases for a dialogue on territory-econo-

my-society by bringing together universities, companies

and government in an economic transformation that

goes beyond the borders of the 22@ innovation district.

22@ Barcelona is one of the benchmarks for the

International Association of Science Parks and the

Competitiveness Institute, in terms of the number of

companies and number of professionals established in

the district.

Next year will be the 25th anniversary of the the El

Vallès Technology Park: the first technology park to be

created in Catalonia and the first to begin its activity

with companies that are situated in Spain. The year 2012

will also mark the 15th anniversary of the first science

park in Spain, Barcelona Science Park, where for the first

time a university, the University of Barcelona, led the

development of a park. Next year, 22@ Barcelona will

celebrate 12 years of developing a model that is close to

the Knowledge City of Scandinavia and the dimensions

of some current Chinese parks, but also embraces inno-

vation management based on tools, experiences and

structures such as clusters, living labs and the smart city.

This has already made the district into an international

benchmark, as stated by Jan Annerstedt (2011) at the last

International Association of Science Parks (IASP) World

Conference in Copenhagen. The progress of science and

technology parks in Catalonia has gathered speed in the

last two decades1. Initially, the aim was to import suc-

cessful models; now international benchmarks are cre-

ated that incorporate ‘sticky knowledge’ (Townsend,

Soojung-Kim & Weddle, 2009) from the territory, which

generates unique economic value that is difficult to copy

- sticky - to link the agents in the innovation system and

their dynamics with a specific geographic location.

Existing theoretical models, such as the triple helix

drawn up by Henry Etzkowitz and Loet Leydesdorff

(1997) and the National Innovation System by Lundvall

(1992), place science and technology parks as central ele-

ments in the innovation system and as the basis of eco-

nomic and social development in the territory. An

overview of the history and time scale of Catalan parks

enables us to make an initial analysis of the empirical

reality in Catalonia.

The emergence of knowledge-based economic and

development models position the university as the

central agent in the process of knowledge capitaliza-

tion (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997). The classical

sociological model formulated by Merton (1977) con-

siders scientists as unselfish in their task, but compen-

sated for by the recognition of their professional col-

leagues. In the second academic revolution, knowl edge

The triple helix at the science and technology parks of Catalonia

M. Carmen Adán and Joan BellavistaCatalan Network of Science and Technology Parks (XPCAT)


1. More recent projects in Catalonia are also being led by universities, suchas the UPC’s Innovation Park, the UAB Research Park, LaSalle TechnovaBarcelona, ESADE Creapolis and the UPF Research Park. Other projectssuch as the Barcelona Biomedical Research Park and Biopol’H supportthe creation of an environment in which universities, clinical laborato-ries, companies and hospitals collaborate to lead innovations in thehealth sector. The experience of the oldest incubator in Europe, BarcelonaActiva, led to the creation of the Barcelona Nord Technology Park tohouse technology companies when they leave the incubator. Innovation intraditional sectors in Catalonia, such as the wine, tourism and leisureindustries, is central to two projects led, among others, by Rovira i VirgiliUniversity, the Science and Technology Park for the Wine Industry andthe Science and Technology Park for Tourism and Leisure. The tradition-al automotive industry in El Baix Llobregat also constitutes the basis of

the industrial sector in this territory. The potential transfer of technologyand innovation from companies situated in this territory to sectors whoseimportance is increasing, such as aerospace and mobility, led to the cre-ation of Deltabcn in Viladecans. Closely associated with the territory andits economic and social development are the Science and Technology Parkof the University of Girona, the Lleida Agri-food Science and TechnologyPark, the Technology Park of Tarragona, the Tecnoparc of Reus, theTecnoCampus Mataró-Maresme, the Catalunya Central Technology Parkand Orbital 40. All of these were created to interact and relate withagents in their environment and contribute to promoting competitivenessin the relevant business sector. More recent park projects such as the BZBarcelona Innovation Zone, a project led by the Zona FrancaConsortium, and the Parc de l’Alba, designed around the Alba synchro-tron, aim to attract large-scale business projects.

is transformed into profitable capital, and science and

technology are considered an endogenous variable in

the economic system (Schumpeter, 1949). In this con-

text, economic motivation acquires a status that is

comparable with scientific progress, which has signifi-

cant consequences. It affects the definition of the role

of scientists, as the task of entrepreneur is added to the

more traditional roles of teaching and research. In

addition, it affects the social organization of science:

the production of knowledge in this new context is

characterized, according to Gibbons’ Model 2, by the

participation of a heterogeneous group of actors who

must collaborate in a multidisciplinary context

(Gibbons et al., 1994). Furthermore, a new mission of

universities is introduced: economic and social devel-

opment is added to the functions of teaching and

research that universities have carried out to date.

Universities are increasingly adopting this third

mission to transfer their knowledge to industry and

society in general. According to the triple helix model,

we must add institutional differentiation between pub-

lic control (government and public research) and pri-

vate control (the company and the market) to the ini-

tial relationship that links science and the market. The

dynamic relationship between universities, companies

and government is what lies behind the new paradigm

of knowledge-based economic and social develop-

ment. Integration and conflict between the three helix-

es is what guides the course and direction of innova-

tion. The interactions between these three institutional

areas promotes the exchange of structures and func-

tions in new ‘interface’ spaces that act as intermediaries

between the agents that comprise the innovation sys-

tem. Some examples of these hybrid spaces are offices

for technology transfer, business incubators and sci-

ence and technology parks. According to the triple

helix model, this emerging system is configured at a

global scale. However, the subsystems that make up

the system are the result of local trajectories (Etzkowitz

& Leydesdorff, 1997).

Currently, economists, sociologists and politicians

agree on promoting a more relevant future for local,

regional and megaregional territories by developing

research and innovation ecosystems, and boosting the

number of connections in networks that help to attain

development objectives (Florida, 2009; Munroe &

Westwind, 2007; Townsend, Soojung-Kim & Weddle,

2009). The importance of the location of economic

agents to economic and social development was high-

lighted by Alfred Marshall (1920) when he defined the

concept of economies of agglomeration in the industri-

al districts of northern Italy; by the GREMI group when

it included cultural and social aspects as innovation

resources (milieux innovateurs, Maillat, 2002); by Porter

(1991), in the development of the concept of ‘cluster’;

and by Krugman when he included the spatial dimen-

sion as a key element in explanations of the nature of

economic forces (Krugman, 1991). As well as the spa-

tial dimension, the triple helix model links local and

global strategies, based on the dynamic interaction

between different institutional and functional spheres -

universities, companies and government - and enables

an analysis of the emerging knowledge-based para-

digm (Etzkowitz et al., 2000).

As the involvement and dynamic relationships

between universities, companies and government

have increased in the configuration of the innovation

system, science and technology parks have become

more prominent. Parks are agents of the innovation

system that act as intermediaries in the value chain

(science-technology-business and market) and con-

tribute to creating bridges between other agents in the

system, on the basis of a shared language and culture:

that of entrepreneurship. Parks fulfil the third mission

of universities. This is revealed in the numerous defini-

tions of the concept of a park, which, among other

characteristics, highlight their role in the management

of knowledge, technology and innovation. This man-

agement is highly specific and the responsibility of a

team of professionals who are qualified for the task.

Parks also boost mechanisms of knowledge and tech-

nology transfer from universities to help in the cre-

ation of companies and in their growth. The most

widely used definition of a science and technology

park is that of the International Association of Science

Parks (IASP):


A science and technology park is an organization

managed by specialized professionals, whose main

aim is to increase the wealth of its community by

promoting the culture of innovation and the com-

petitiveness of its associated businesses and knowl-

edge-based institutions. To enable these goals to be

met, a science and technology park stimulates and

manages the flow of knowledge and technology

amongst universities, R&D institutions, companies

and markets; it facilitates the creation and growth

of innovation-based companies through incubation

and spin-off processes; and provides other value-

added services together with high-quality space and

facilities. (IASP Board, 2002)

One of the functions of enterprising universities is

to improve the contribution of the university to inno-

vation and to the creation of value in production and

business processes, and to facilitate the interaction

between public and private research. Catalan universi-

ties are currently in a strong position in research, as

shown by rankings of Spanish public universities for

2009 (Buela-Casal et al., 2010). According to the crite-

ria analysed in this article, six of the Catalan public

universities are situated among the eleven top posi-

tions in global rankings of research productivity.

Two Catalan universities are among the top 200

universities in the world according to the Times Higher

Education (2010) ranking, which takes into account

the quality of universities’ teaching, research, interna-

tionalization and innovation. However, the quality of

universities in Catalonia continues to be more focused

on parameters of research than those of innovation, as

reflected in a recent study on the Catalan innovation

system drawn up by the OECD (2010). Catalan univer-

sities have successfully adopted teaching and research

roles, but their role as enterprising universities is still

relatively new.

In Catalonia, universities have gradually incorporat-

ed entrepreneurial functions through the establishment

of technology transfer offices (OTRI), and subsequently

through the creation of the first park in Spain to be asso-

ciated with a university, Barcelona Science Park (PCB), in

1997. Currently, nine of the twenty-four Catalan parks

have been directly promoted by universities. In addition,

universities are directly or indirectly present in almost all

park projects, not only through ownership or promotion,

but also through contracts, collaboration agreements,

offering of science and technology services and innova-

tion management services. In addition, Catalan parks

house 192 public R&D and public technology centres. A

total of 43% of Catalan parks house university OTRI

offices, to unify objectives and bring services associated

with R&D groups and centres to the companies that are

located in the same environment.

Nevertheless, knowledge is generated not only

through research in university departments, but also

through studies carried out in corporate research and

development departments, technology platforms and

other advanced services that provide knowledge for

the development of future products and processes. The

services that are offered by universities and the parks

themselves to public and private R&D units housed in

park spaces would not be available if the companies

had to cover the costs of investing in and maintaining

the highly specialized equipment and services. The

availability of these services is particularly relevant for

the survival of spin-offs or small technology-based

companies that can be founded and grow due to the

easy, economical access to these infrastructures.

According to Tapan Munroe (2010), the sharp increase

in the number of workplaces in the USA over the last

decade is not due to large companies, but to jobs cre-

ated by start-ups. The growth of this kind of company

promotes employment and economic growth.

In Catalonia, the total number of workers in parks

in 2010 was 65,043 (XPCAT, 2011). Employment

growth in Catalan parks since 20052 has been very pos-

itive, with an average year-on-year increase of 28%3


2. The first year for which official data are available on parks in the CatalanNetwork of Science and Technology Parks (XPCAT).

3. In the analysis of these data, we should take into account that during the2005-2010 period, projects were consolidated for parks that had been inoperation for over ten years, and the number of park projects in Cataloniaincreased in the same period.

(Graph 1). In the last year, the growth slowed down,

possibly as a direct result of the economic situation,

even though the trend continued to be positive. These

data are particularly relevant if we compare them with

the year-on-year variation in the employed population

of Catalonia, which dropped from the end of 2008 to

the end of 2010 (Idescat, 2011).

Catalonia has quickly recognised the central role of

people and talent in its transition to a knowledge-

based economy (OECD, 2010). The percentage of

R&D staff who work in Catalan park facilities has

been very high since data have been available4, at

around 50% (XPCAT, 2011). This figure contrasts with

the percentage of R&D staff in the total employed

population in Spain, which, according to data avail-

able for 2007, was only 9.8 in every thousand


70,000

0

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

Graph 1

Evolut ion of t he number of workers at Catalan parks (2005-2010)

Source: drawn up by the authors on the basis of the ‘Activity Report’ of the Catalan Network for Scienceand Technology Parks for 2010, 2009 and 2008.

Table 1

Services offered by Catalan parks

Financial and legal services X X X n.d n.d X n.d X n.d X n.d

Company relocation assistance X X X X X X X X X

Own risk capital and seed funding X X X X X X X

Access to financing (risk capital and seed funding) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Meeting rooms, auditorium X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Bank office and services X X X X X X X X X X

Cafeteria, restaurant X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Catering service X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Event organization X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Hotel X X X X X X X X X X

Intellectual property consultancy service X X X X X X X X X X X X

Nursery X X X

Laboratory services X X X X X X X X X

Management support services (consultancy, etc.) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Marketing and communication services X X X X X X X X X X X X

Medical services X X X X

Public transport X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Nearby residential areas X X X X X X X X X X X

Administrative services X X X X X X X X

Security services X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Shops in the park X X X X X X X X X

Sports services X X X X X X X X X X X X

Training X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Travel agency X X X X X

Videoconference room X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

PTV

PCB

PR U

AB

22@

Tech

nova

PRBB

PRI U

PC

PCT

UdG

PTC

Lle

ida

PT T

arra

gona

Tecn

opar

c

PT B

CN

ord

TCM

b_T

EC

PT C

atal

unya

Cen

tral

ESA

DE

PR U

PF

P To

uris

m L

eisu

re

P W

ine

Indu

stry

Del

tabc

n

Biop

ol’H

BZ

P A

lba

Orb

ital 4

0

Source: XPCAT (2010), ‘Activity Report’, Catalan Network of Science and Technology Parks.

4. Data are available from 2009 onwards.


Yes71.43%

No14.29%

In progress14.29%

Graph 2

Incubators in Catalan parks


5. According to the definition of an innovative company used by the SpanishNational Statistics Institute (INE), which is the basis of the data used inthis study.

employed people (Cotec, 2010). Although it appears

contradictory, in periods of high unemployment, a

considerable number of vacancies are reported for

skilled posts in areas in which there are not enough

trained professionals to carry out the tasks (Munroe &

Westwind, 2007). Attracting and retaining talent is

important. Richard Florida (2010) stated in his recent

book, The Great Reset, that territories that have talent

working in high value-added services and that have a

high concentration of the creative class attain higher

revenues, more innovation and a better aggregate

economic performance.

In addition to exchange between science and the

market, an efficient innovation system requires other

externalities produced by agents in the territory that

can be exploited by the production system. Parks are

one of the few spaces in which the concentration and

creation of knowledge is proactive and drives this eco-

nomic change (Rooks, 2011). Investing in incubators

and science and technology parks is a successful for-

mula for the creation and growth of start-ups and to

revitalize the economy (Munroe, 2010). The creation of

start-ups and technology-based companies is key to

the sustainability of employment and economic growth

(Munroe & Westwind, 2007). Science and technology

parks help start-ups to grow in the different stages of

company development, and support all of the needs

that they have in this process of growth (Townsend,

Soojung-Kim & Weddle, 2009).

In Catalonia, 85.72% (Graph 2) of parks have, or are

in the process of creating, an incubator. In 2010, Catalan

parks had incubated 328 companies in 26 operating incu-

bators, and the number of companies incubated has

increased steadily since data have been available, which

is for the period 2007-2010 (XPCAT, 2011).

The number of innovative and technology-based

companies in Catalan parks in 2010 was 2,385, which is

10% more than in the previous year. Over 80% are small

companies or microcompanies, that is, companies that

have fewer than 49 employees. In a highly competitive

economy with continuous technological change, it is

essential to have as many interactions as possible to be

able to respond to the uncertainties of new knowledge

(OECD, 2002). In many cases, the company in the

strongest position is not the fastest, the most economical

or that which launches the best product or process, but

that which is best adapted to the environment (Ferràs,

2011). Small and medium-sized companies can adapt to

the rapid, frequent changes in a dynamic environment

such as the knowledge-based society. The survival of

SMEs in a changing environment has meant that the lab-

oratories of large companies, which were relatively self-

sufficient until the mid-twentieth century, and had their

own technology support systems for developing products,

are now increasingly open to combining internal and

external innovation fronts (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff,

1997). Henry Chesbrough’s (2010) model of open innova-

tion explains how the way of interacting in the innovation

process between the supplier and the customer becomes

a real relationship system that we can see reflected in

parks, which are open, immediate environments that

reach beyond their own physical boundaries to other units

located at a distance.

According to the initial conclusions of a study led by

Aurelia Modrego, professor of Economy at the Carlos III

University of Madrid, the revenue of innovative SMEs5

located in parks is 40% higher than that of SMEs with

similar characteristics situated in other environments (El

Economista, 2011). There is still little available data on the

revenue of parks in Catalonia. However, using the par-

tial data that are available, the evolution since 2005 indi-

cates that the total revenue of parks, including that of

companies and the other agents housed in their spaces,

has risen to over seven billion euros in 2010. The study

also estimates that the tendency for companies to launch

new products, services or processes on the market is

25% higher in innovative companies in parks than in

innovative companies located outside parks. This is par-

ticularly relevant if we consider that according to inno-

vation indicators (Cotec, 2010), Catalonia continues to

be below the European average in the number of inno-

vative companies out of the total number of firms. The

location of SMEs in parks may help not only to boost

innovation, but also to accelerate the entire process and

to facilitate the transition to a decisive change in pro-

ductive model that would give Catalonia a competitive

advantage over other territories.

The list of the main sectors in Catalan parks (Table 2)

reflects the emergence of new production sectors among

parks’ priority areas. The most prevalent sector is that of

ICT, telecommunications and the media. A total of

54.17% of Catalan parks include this sector in their prior-

ity areas. This is followed by environmental technologies,

which are present in 50% of science and technology

parks, biotechnology and life sciences in 37.50%, agrifood

in 29.17%, and materials technologies, also in 29.17%. A

comparison of data from 2010 and 2009 shows that the

number of parks that cover the sectors of environmental

technologies, agrifood and materials technologies has

increased (XPCAT, 2011).

In the public policy sphere, state governments and,

particularly in recent years, regional and local govern-

ments have realised the benefits of bringing together

R&D and knowledge and technology resources in one

space as a strategy for the growth of knowledge-based


Table 2

Sectors in Catalan parks Name of park

El Vallès Technology Park X X X X X X

Barcelona Science Park X X X X X X X

UAB Research Park X X X X X X X X

22@ Barcelona X X X X

La Salle Technova Barcelona X X X

Barcelona Biomedical Research Park (PRBB) X X X

Research and Innovation Park of the UPC X X X X X X X X X X X X X

UdG Science and Technology Park X X X X X X X X X X

Lleida Agri-food Science and Technology Park X X X X X X

Technology Park of Tarragona X X

Tecnoparc Technology Park X X X X X X X X X X

Barcelona Nord Technology Park X X X

Tecnocampus Mataró (TCM) X X X X

b_TEC Barcelona Innovation Technology X X X X

Catalunya Central Technology Park X X

ESADE Creapolis X

UPF Research Park (Social Sciences and Humanities) X

Science and Technology Park for Tourism and Leisure X X

Science and Technology Park for the Wine Industry X

Deltabcn-Aerospace and Mobility Park of Viladecans X X

Biopol’H X X X X

BZ Barcelona Innovation Zone X X

Parc de l’Alba X X X X X X X X X

Orbital 40. Science and Technology Park of Terrassa X X X X X X X X

Space

engin

eerin

g and

aeron

autics

Agrifo

od

Archi

tectur

e

Biotec

hnolo

gy and

life sc

iences

Huma

n and

socia

l scien

ces

Desig

n and

engin

eerin

g serv

ices

Electr

onics

, micr

oelec

tronic

s

Enolo

gy

Pharm

acy

Financ

es

Trainin

g and

educa

tion

Indust

ry and

manu

factur

ing sy

stem

IT an

d soft

ware

Metal

, meta

llurgy

Mobili

ty

Nano

bioeng

ineerin

g, nano

techno

logy

Optic

s

Health

Food

safet

y and

nutrit

ion

Food

techn

ology

Energ

y tech

nolog

ies

Mater

ials te

chnolo

gy

Envir

onme

ntal te

chnolo

gies

Medic

al tech

nolog

ies

ICT, te

lecom

munic

ations,

med

ia

Touri

sm, le

isure

Chem

istry

Innova

tive un

its in a

ny sec

tor


economies (Rooks, 2011). Regulatory measures, incen-

tives, funding and various park development pro-

grammes are used as part of political strategy in various

countries and regions of the world, including the USA,

Brazil, England, China and Poland.

The availability of strong infrastructure and an analysis of

the experience of funding and managing this infrastructure,

including its successes and mistakes, can provide new

guidelines for formulating strategy and public policy for the

mid- to long-term future of science and technology parks

(Chesbrough, 2010). The Government of Catalonia’s public

policy on parks has been mainly focused on the creation and

promotion of some of the existing projects, in collaboration

with organizations such as universities and city councils. In

addition, since 2005 the Government of Catalonia has estab-

lished a system of agreements with the Catalan Network of

Science and Technology Parks (XPCAT) to promote activity

as a network and the development of the entire movement

of Catalan parks and its impact on the territory.

As can be seen in the following graph (Graph 3), 26%

of the owners or promoters of Catalan parks are local or

regional government bodies such as city councils and

provincial councils, followed by universities and higher

education centres, at 19%, and then by private companies

and entities that support companies, including associa-

tions or groups of businesses, at 18% (XPCAT, 2011).

According to these indicators, which take into account the

presence of the different institutions rather than their

degree of participation, the three helixes of the innovation

system coexist in Catalan parks. The result of coordinating

all the actions of the three helixes and the rest of the agents

in the system outlines the path that should be followed to

guide the Catalan innovation system.

To complement the analysis of Catalan parks, we

should add a new helix to the model: that of internation-

alization (Leydesdorff, 2011). A total of 54% of foreign

companies in Spain are located in Catalonia (OECD,

2010). The percentage of international companies in sci-

ence and technology parks is almost 10% (Graph 4)

according to data from 2010, which represents a growth of

5 points as compared to the previous year (XPCAT, 2011).

The private sector illustrates that the coordination of

local and global trajectories is key to promoting innovation.

Most companies in Catalan parks are of local origin, at over


Spanish Government

Autonomous Community Government

Local or regional government

Universit ies or higher education centres

Financial entit ies

Chambers of Commerce

Companies or other supporting entit ies

Institute or research centres

Professional associations

Other

0% 10% 20% 25%15% 30%5%

Graph 3

Ent it ies t hat are owners and promoters of Catalan parks

Source: XPCAT (2011), ‘Activity Report 2010’, Catalan Network of Science and Technology Parks.


Rest ofSpain

10.06%

International 9.07%

Catalonia80.87%

Graph 4

Or igin of companies in Cat alan parks

Source: XPCAT (2011), ‘Activity Report 2010’, Catalan Network of Science and Technology Parks.

6. Other examples of innovations with an international impact can be foundin XPCAT’s e-newsletter (www.xpcat.net).

7. Information from the news section of the 22@ Barcelona website,www.22barcelona.com.

8. Catalan Network of Science and Technology Parks (XPCAT).9. Association of Science and Technology Parks of Spain (APTE).10. Internacional Association of Science Parks (IASP).11. World Alliance for Innovation (WAINOVA).

80% (Graph 4), but many of them are founded with a glob-

al mentality and product. There are numerous examples of

this, including: Zolertia, a company in El Vallès Technology

Park whose activity on the international market accounts

for over 80% of its total revenue (APTE Tecno 2011);

Estacions Nàutiques, a company whose headquarters are in

the Science and Technology Park for Tourism and Leisure

(PCT), which has recently exported its know-how to the

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the Smart

Mobility project promoted by Creafutur, a foundation

hous ed in ESADE Creapolis whose collaborators include

the MIT Media Lab in Boston and the company Hiriko

Driving Mobility; the first augmented reality project pre-

sented in Europe and created with Google technology by

companies in the Lleida Agri-food Science and Technology

Park (PCiTAL); the company Miraveo, a UPC university

spin-off housed in the Barcelona Nord Technology Park,

which for strategic reasons develops its business in Silicon

Valley from its headquarters in Barcelona6. Catalan parks

are also attractive locations for international companies

seeking new spaces to expand their market. Over 9% of

companies in Catalan parks are international. For example,

Airborne is an aeronautics company in the UdG Science

and Technology Park. In addition, the Danish company

Winners World Wide recently set up its first Spanish office

in 22@ Barcelona7 as part of its internationalization strategy.

For the overall efficiency of the system, the aim is ‘not

only to increase and improve the technological capacity

of the production system or the stock and the scientific

and technological capacity of lecturers and researchers,

but also to increase the complexity of paths of internal

relationships and connections of all agents in the global

world’ (Piqué, Bellavista & Adán, 2008). That is why

parks are organized in networks in the local environ-

ment through XPCAT8, in the state environment through

APTE9 and connected with international nodes through

IASP10 and WAINOVA11, to ensure the flow of both local

and global knowledge.

The evolution of the financial system will have a

considerable influence on the development potential of

the instruments and infrastructures that enable progress

towards the future research and innovation system.

Currently, limited access to loans and the instability of

the financial system has dragged all the sectors of the

economy into an economic recession that has already

had a noticeable impact on employment, companies

and governments (Castells, 2011). It should be taken

into account that financing of technology-based com-

panies through risk capital is effective, but needs to be

complemented by the increasing participation of busi-

ness angels and new networks of local investors

(Townsend, Soojung-Kim & Weddle, 2009).

According to its Greek origins, the word crisis means

separation or rupture. Crises are situations of change that

open up a wide range of opportunities for the future, as

well as periods of reflection to select the social and eco-

nomic model that we want for our country. It is the ideal

moment to establish a new social contract and a new con-

tract between the people, resources and the capacities that

we have to move forward. In this context, science and

technology parks in Catalonia and in the rest of the world

are in a privileged position as a tool that groups all ele-

ments of research and innovation in the same physical

space and in an organized network for the transfer of

activities that outline the future paradigms (Bellavista &


Sanz, 2009; Bellavista, 2009). It has been shown that tech-

nological and innovative companies are withstanding the

recession better than other kinds of companies. In addi-

tion, some of the most successful current companies, such

as Google, were created in periods of crisis (Engel, 2007;

Munroe, 2010). Richard Florida stated that Barcelona was

the hub of a megaregion in a process of development that

could play a very important role in the future (Florida,

2010). The result will depend on whether Catalonia knows

how to make use of its strategic advantages by coordinat-

ing universities, companies and the government through

instruments such as science and technology parks, whose

effectiveness has been demonstrated in many countries of

the world. This will put Catalonia in a leading position in

the global economy. Thus, it will opt for a sustainable

model of economic and social development, which

ensures the transfer of knowledge, technology and inno-

vation into social and economic well-being for citizens.

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Econom ic change and globalisat ion in t he cit y

The widespread arrival of globalisation at the end

of the last century brought about changes in the pat-

terns of behaviour of most agents worldwide.

Citizens, companies and institutions have had to rein-

vent themselves to meet the demands of a new con-

text in which innovation and creativity play an essen-

tial role.

Historically, cities have always been at the cross-

roads of processes that occur at global scale (Sassen,

2001). Furthermore, the factors that distinguish the

exceptional change created by globalisation in the

twenty-first century are, firstly, the intensity, complex-

ity and scope of the networks that emerge with the

new dynamics of economies of agglomeration gener-

ated between companies, and, secondly, the exponen-

tial increase in the relative importance of intangible

and digital production systems. At the same time, the

percentage of cities that participate in the global

urban hierarchy is rising: large or small cities, those

that are economically strong or structurally weak,

multicultural or monocultural, diversified or special-

ized, face similar economic and social challenges.

Regardless of their specific characteristics, they seek

the best recommendations to position themselves

successfully in the international context.

The phenomenon of globalisation accompanies

and provides the frame for a paradigm shift in local

agents. Interrelation, interdependence and the inter-

nationalisation of flows of capital, goods and jobs are

creating a new picture of the competitiveness of cities.

This change is not new: the different structures adopt-

ed by the capitalist system over time (from the first

factories, mass production or Fordism to the new

knowledge-based economy and the emergence of cre-

ativity as a key driver of competitiveness) have gener-

ated various forms of economic and social reproduc-

tion that, in turn, have led to new processes of urban

development and the emergence of different models

of the city. Two key aspects have been central to the

considerable change in the way actors relate with each

other. The first is digitalization and a lack of standard-

ization in production processes. Thus, whilst new

technologies are no longer a sector on their own, but

a cornerstone in the behaviour and operation of new

strategic sectors of the economy, the specific nature

and uniqueness of processes and products have

become key in the new rules of competition. Secondly,

a new division of labour has emerged in which the

distinction between manual workers and managers

has become blurred, and the capacity to create and

talent have become essential input for the value chain

(Scott, 2008).

The transference of the economic interrelations of

a knowledge-based economy to the territory estab-

lishes a new dimension in the ability of cities to attract

economic activity. The importance of human capital in

the new production methods is behind the structural

changes in urban behaviour. Thus, the comparative

advantage of lower costs or tax benefits for companies

located in a specific place is being replaced by a new

way of competing, not only to attract companies, but

also to attract talent and highly qualified workers.

Creative cities: a new paradigm for local agendas?

Montserrat Pareja-EastawayCreativity, Innovation and Urban Transformation (CRIT) research group, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Barcelona


Consequently, given that the growth and develop-

ment of cities is increasingly centred on knowledge

sectors dominated by creative workers with talent,

local agendas are more focused on the factors that

attract this kind of employee.

In this context, the label ‘creative city’ has become

a popular recipe for gaining a place in the competitive

global urban scene. Authors such as Landry (2008) or

Florida (2002) have outlined the conditions required

to successfully meet the goal of attracting the ‘creative

class’1 and making each city into a hive of innovation.

However, two different views polarize the general rec-

ommendations for local government. Some consider

that is it essential to boost both the elements of cities

that are associated with quality of life and those that

are mainly linked to the cultural and environmental

context, rather than those that are directly related

with the production system. In contrast, others believe

that the need to interact and generate synergies

between people with skills and/or talent makes it

essential for cities to create informal and formal meet-

ing spaces that facilitate the creation of positive exter-

nalities between workers, which in turn opens up

channels for collaboration and increases creativity.

According to some empirical evidence2, the diver-

sity and special characteristics of cities form contexts

in which it is difficult to apply a one-size-fits-all

urban policy. Others (Hall, 2004; Musterd and Gritsai,

2010) recognize the importance of the time, specific

features and pathways of each city in the design of

policies to support competitive strategies. Nev er the -

less, cities face diverse kinds of challenges both in the

strategic planning of their future (for example, to

become a creative, innovative, inventive, sustainable

city) and in the resolution of everyday problems that

ensure the quality of life of their inhabitants. In fact,

many ‘official’ or ‘unofficial’ reports by institutions

such as the European Union or the ministerial depart-

ments of culture and economic promotion in many

Member States3 see creativity not as a solution, but as

an approach or process to attain both an improve-

ment in economic indicators and in the collective

standards of quality of life and cohesion of citizens.

The approach in this article reflects a need to ques-

tion the direction that cities are taking: if creativity,

talent and knowledge are the new keys to competi-

tiveness recognized by both large and medium-sized

cities, in developed and developing countries, with a

diverse production sector or one strong sector, then

what is the main paradigm used to draw up the local

agenda? What are the questions and needs that really

must be resolved? How does innovation outline the

future of cities?

The ter r it ory and at t ract ion of economic act ivit y

Cities are the dynamos of economic activity and

are constantly subject to change and instability as a

result of technological progress, socio-demographic

changes and transformations at institutional scale.

Cities are the main source of economic prosperity,

given that it is the territory that provides incentives

for the location of production activity. Thus, whilst

historical patterns of urban behaviour are based on

the ability to attract resources, which is clearly a zero-

sum game, it is now more important for the city to

form part of of the urban network at global scale, to

become a node for flows of experience and knowledge

exchange (Castells, 2010; Pareja-Eastaway and Piqué,

2010). In this new approach, some cities clearly offer a

better set of attributes for business and economic

1. The definition of ‘creative class’ is subject to a controversial debate thatranges from covering all people with talent and professional success(Florida, 2002) to a more romantic, marginal and bohemian view of thecreator (Gardner, 1993).

2. For example, the Accommodating Creative Knowledge -Competitiveness of European Metropolitan Regions within theEnlarged Union (ACRE) project and its analysis of 13 European citiesand metropolitan regions.

3. For example, the European Commission document ‘Unlocking the poten-tial of cultural and creative industries’. COM (2010) 182 (http://eur-lex .europa.eu/ legal -content /EN/TXT/PDF/?ur i=CELEX:52010DC0183&from=EN), the EU Council Conclusions on Culture as aCatalyst for Creativity and Innovation(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressda-ta/en/educ/107642.pdf) and directives from the Lisbon Strategy, Europe2020.


activity in general than others. These attributes

include both tangible assets in the form of easily

measurable physical elements (i.e. motorways and air-

ports) and aspects that are more difficult to describe,

such as image, quality of governance and social and

cultural features (Begg, 2002).

Although they are from different academic disci-

plines and geographic origins, most of the theories

that analyse the determining factors in the location of

economic activity in a territory can be grouped into

five approaches (see Figure 1):

1. Economic pathway of the city (path dependency).

The historical development of cities has a great influ-

ence on their current situation. The association of a

city with a specific economic profile does not emerge

overnight: the past largely determines the present of

cities. Consecutive economic transformations

unavoidably leave their legacy on the territory.

2. Classic factors: ‘hard’ factors. The availability of

capital and workers with the required qualifications,

as well as an institutional context that promotes busi-

ness location through specific programmes and ac -

tions as well as subsidies or tax rebates are tradition-

ally considered to be determining factors in economic

location. The availability of good infrastructure and

transport links as well as higher education centres

have also been considered important factors.

3. Classic factors: clusters. Traditionally, great

importance has been given to the advantages of

agglomeration, economies of scale and economic

clusters as promoters of economic growth. Industrial

clusters have been the object of analysis and reflec-

tion, as they play a major role in the assessment of

innovation and the definition of policies that support

industrial activity (Porter, 1990). Industrial clusters are

concentrations in one location of companies that

work in the same sector or sectors and are related

throughout the value chain, collaborate or compete

with each other, and have links with other actors

(such as universities). Clusters are clearly the result of

political action in a territory: they are non-random

agglomerations of economic activity.

4. ‘Soft’ factors. These factors highlight the impor-

tance of certain urban facilities or attributes that con-

tribute to creating an environment that is attractive to

certain people. From the moment that talent becomes

Classic factors (hard) Classic factors (clusters) Soft factors

Table 1

Summary of t heor ies on the locat ion of economic act ivit y

- International accessibility. International trans-port links (airports, high-speed trains, ports,etc.).

- Employment. Job offers and opportunities forpromotion.

- Working conditions. Types of contract, salary.

- Education. Universities and other higher edu-cation institutions.

- Technical infrastructure. Accessibility of publictransport, etc.

- Social infrastructure. Nursery schools, healthservices, etc.

- Housing conditions. Stock, price, accessibility,diverse offer of holdings, etc.

- Living conditions. Cost of living, other expens-es, tax system, etc.

- Geographic concentrations of institutions inone economic environment that establishesinterconnections between them to createeconomies of agglomeration.

- Participants: suppliers of specialized infrastruc-tures, clients, manufacturers of complementaryproducts, companies associated with excel-lence or technology, knowledge-intensive insti-tutions or organizations associated with busi-ness and trade.

- Quality of the environment. Geographicdimension, urban landscape, image of the city.

- Quality of the urban architecture. History, cul-tural inheritance, important buildings.

- Quality of the residential environment.Diversity in the neighbouring environment,including parks and public spaces.

- Working conditions (environment). Flexitime,work environment, attractiveness of the work-place and its environment.

- Quality of life. Pace of life, cultural opportuni-ties, leisure, sports, services, shopping, gastron-omy.

Source: based on Musterd et al., 2007.

the motor of the new economy based on creativity and

knowledge, these territory-associated aspects become

more important as factors in the location of economic

activity. Quality of life, the urban atmosphere and tol-

erance are some of these factors.

5. Network factors. Personal or professional net-

works, which may be implicit or explicit, form connec-

tions between the actors that participate in the differ-

ent forms of economic activity. In fact, network factors

are an alternative formulation of classic location fac-

tors, both in the form of the connections resulting

from good infrastructure provision, and in the impor-

tance of links established between companies and

people within a cluster. In addition, they add to the

theory of the location of economic activity aspects

such as people’s individual pathways and their links

with the territory.

The prominence of certain factors over others

depends on the priorities required by the dominant

economic system. Therefore, the transformation of an

essentially industrial economy into one that is post-

Fordian or post-industrial has led to changes at the

geographic scale of analysis (from the town to the

global city), changes in internal regional structures

(from monocentrism to polycentrism), changes in

economic specialization (from industry to services)

and changes in production modes and the division of

labour (Musterd et al., 2007). The economic paradigm

that currently defines both production relationships

and the role of the city is based on creativity and tal-

ent. The capacity to attract and foster both of these

factors depends essentially on the city’s innovative

and competitive potential.

Creat ivit y, innovat ion and creat ive

environm ent s

The term ‘creativity’ emerged at the end of the

1990s as the touchstone for most of the solutions and

proposals associated with innovation and the strategic

planning of cities in the academic arena and in local

political agendas. This phenomenon has gathered

force since the recession and requires urgent meas-

ures to recover rates of growth. Like most widely used

terms, creativity has different and even contradictory

meanings depending on who uses the word. The cre-

ative class, the creative economy, the creative city - all

of these concepts have become commonplace in dis-

cussions and analyses that range from the study of

creativity at individual scale, which is considered peo-

ple’s capacity to create in an intrinsic, brilliant and

socially collaborative way, to the analysis of the con-

tribution of creativity, transformed into talent, as

innovative input in recent production processes that

are successful in the new competitive situation.

Simultaneously, the concept of creativity has become

‘commonplace’ in many academic disciplines and has

obtained different dimensions associated with the

specialization of each science. Thus, a range of studies

fit under the umbrella of ‘creative’: from research

related to the bohemian and/or bourgeois classes to

symbolic analyses, the industrial district itself or the

evolutionist economy.

The concepts of ‘creativity’ and ‘talent’ go hand in

hand and are directly associated with the term

‘human capital’, which is considered the accumulated

experience, abilities and skills that people bring to the

production process as input. This is clearly an endoge-

nous factor of growth, as it is through education and

training that individuals become qualified workers.

Traditionally, human capital has been perceived as

one of the essential primary resources of companies

and it legitimises the location of businesses together

in a territory as a cluster, given the ease of knowledge

transfer, the stimulation of entrepreneurship, and the

potential creation of partnerships. In the specific case

of creative and innovative sectors, clusters foster com-

petition and, at the same time, innovation.

In this article, we do not intend to describe in

detail the theories that define creativity and associate

it with the production process through innovation.

However, there is general agreement that while we

can associate creativity with the individual capacity to

produce genuine ideas without the motivation of

compensation or economic incentives, innovation is


considered the standardized, systematic application of

creativity in the value chain, to attain economic bene-

fits. Economic innovation refers to the development of

new ideas and new production methods that ulti-

mately could become new products. Innovation is

associated with the presence of creativity and knowl-

edge and, in economic terms, is directly linked with

the capacity to generate economic growth.

Creativity is always defined in relation to structures

of time and space. Historically, creativity has enabled

us to change the existing economic paradigms through

new ideas. Beyond individual creative genius, the

application of creativity to specific production systems

triggers processes of innovation associated with the

territory. Thus, the link between economic transforma-

tion and change at local scale is a fact that is hard to

dispute. In recent years, some cities appear to have

rapidly improved their positions in the urban hierarchy

due to their ability to attract new economic activities

with a high capacity to generate growth, whilst other

cities have remained stagnant. The key to understand-

ing these differences lies in the city’s fundamental role

in promoting ‘creative environments’.

The association between creative sectors and the

creative city is not necessarily direct. As Pratt (1997)

stressed, a city that has a high percentage of GDP

generated in creative economic sectors is not the same

as a creative city. Although there are many definitions

of creativity, few examine its association with the ter-

ritory. From the relatively scarce academic contribu-

tion to the definition of ‘creative territory’ (Törnqvist,

1983, and Andersson, 1985, among others) we can

sum up that the following aspects are essential:

- The existence of channels that can generate a

high density of flows of information and knowledge

(infrastructure).

- Presence of qualified workers and/or workers

with skills and abilities (people).

- Conditions that promote synergies of all kinds

between actors, whether they are companies, people

or institutions (atmosphere).

In addition to these features, the creative milieu has

the characteristics of instability and chaos; it is the envi-

ronment from which ideas emerge. Hall (2000) high-

lighted another two aspects of a creative environment:

wealth and culture. In the origin of cities, culture and

those who promoted it, who were mainly the enterpris-

ing, rich bourgeois, are inextricably linked with the cre-

ative environment, so many creative cities were bourgeois,

but in no way were all or even most bourgeois cities creative

(Hall, 2000: 645). The differentiating element is talent,

and the personification of talent in the creative individ-

ual or group. The association between culture, creativity

and knowledge has been extensively studied and

defined. The cultural industries, which form part of the

hard core of creative industries, are those that produce

and distribute goods and services, and contribute some

specific attributes, uses or proposals involving some

form of cultural expression, without underestimating

the potential commercial value they could have. The

creative industries are those that use culture as input,

but their output is primarily functional.

Although the emergence of a favourable environ-

ment for creativity seems to be a random process and

the product of chance, in many cases a specific local

urban political strategy can be identified that is

focused on attracting talent, provoking chaos, and

fostering instability to trigger ideas and innovation.

Therefore, one current priority objective on many local

public agendas is to define what requirements and

conditions foster the development of processes that

help to generate creativity.

Economic production relations take different forms

in the territory, and are defined by some authors

(Munroe, 2009; Harrington, 1990) as a ‘creative or

innovative ecosystem’. The key elements that come

together in this environment include networks com-

prised of specialized, complementary producers and

local labour markets defined by the availability of cer-

tain skills and qualifications. The magnitude of both

aspects is largely responsible for the territory’s innova-

tive and learning capacity. The territory is a determin-

ing factor as it produces creativity: in fact, some

authors consider that it is easier to stimulate creativity

by changing conditions in the environment than by trying

to make people think more creatively (Czikszentmihalyi,



1996: 1). The generation of a creative environment in

the city must be supported by interrelations that pro-

mote exchanges and transfers of experiences between

territories with a global dimension. Due to the current

tension between the local and global arenas, methods

are required to insert the city into a broad frame of ref-

erence. As indicated by Pareja-Eastaway and Piqué

(2010), cities have become clusters of innovation,

nodes of global networks that contribute knowledge

and, at the same time, benefit from the flows of talent

and innovation that are created and develop around

the processes of generating value in the territory.

The construction of an innovative environment that

facilitates the exchange of talent, cross-cutting expe-

riences in different value chains and stimulates the

creation of new ideas is part of the political agenda

and one of the strategic objectives of many cities and

regions at global scale. (Pareja-Eastaway and

Piqué, 2010: 188)

In creative ecosystems, universities have another

function in addition to their traditional role as drivers

of innovation (Florida et al., 2006). Academic centres

contribute not only by providing new technologies

and innovative elements for the production process,

but also with their capacity to generate an attractive

environment that revitalizes the generation and mobi-

lization of talent. Universities become a true catalyst

of synergies in the territory, which is an essential (but

insufficient) condition for stimulating the creative and

knowledge economy.

From t he creat ive and knowledge econom y

t o t he cr eat ive cit y

The recession has affected the world and revealed

the obsolescence of certain production models based

on low productivity and a lack of skilled labour. The

Spanish economy is a clear example of this process.

This structural change directly affects cities, which

must transform themselves and (rapidly and immedi-

ately) replace the attributes of their production sector

for new tools based on knowledge and innovation.

The question that arises is to what extent the city that

is defined as creative can become the new physical

space for the new economy. Can a close link be

formed between the creative economy and the cre-

ative city?

To start with, the creative economy is very difficult

to define and analyse. A freelancer who works in the

audiovisual sector part-time or on a temporary con-

tract is as much a part of the creative economy as an

engineer who works in the innovation department of

a multinational company. The genius of individual

creativity contrasts with its standardized application

in innovation processes in the heart of a company.

Without intending to draw up a comprehensive

list, below we present some of the difficulties in con-

ceptualising the creative economy4.

- The d ivision between sectorsthat are creative

and those that are not is risky and often inaccurate.

The use of the same statistical codes in most European

countries (and in studies and research of various kinds,

such as KEA, ACRE and NESTA5) involves the inclu-

sion of a wide range of sectors that use creativity indi-

rectly or partially in their production.

- The creative economy brings together very differ-

ent types of com pan ies. There is space for large

multinational companies that have big departments

dedicated to innovation (or applied creativity), in

which uncertainty and the risk of each idea failing

economically is compensated for easily by the eco-

nomic success of past or future operations. In con-

trast, in certain creative sectors, the participation of

4. For an excellent study on creative industries see HKU, (2010), TheEntrepreneurial Dimensions of the Cultural and Creative Industries,Hogeschool vor de Kunsten Utrecht, Utrecht. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/key-documents/doc/studies/entrepreneurial/EDCCIreport.pdf.

5. KEA European Affairs. Consultancy specialising in culture and cre-ativity. http://www.keanet.eu/en/index.html. ACRE: Ac com mo -

dat ing Creative Knowledge. Competitiveness of European Met ro pol -i tan Regions within the Enlarged Union, funded by the 6thFramework Programme of the European Union. http://acre.soc-sci.uva.nl/index.html. NESTA: National Endowment for Science,Technology and the Arts. British institution in charge of promotinginnovation in the UK. http://www.nesta.org.uk/aboutus.


microcompanies and freelancers is more common; the

companies are small and operate by ‘projects’, and

work teams are formed for each job or product.

- The job m arket for ‘creatives’ is one of extremes

as, depending on the sector, the working conditions

are diametrically opposite: high salaries and ease of

finding work coexist with job instability, part-time

work, a large amount of uncertainty and non-conven-

tional forms of employment.

- Professional and/or academic qualifications are

not necessarily associated with creative talen t.There

is a wide spectrum of the levels of studies, abilities

and skills of creative workers, and a very wide mix of

job profiles ranging from highly qualified workers to

craftspeople.

- The production cond itionsin creative sectors

are extremely diverse: some involve standard, system-

atic production processes, with defined criteria in

terms of the value of the innovation that they incor-

porate, whilst others involve product development

without a clear definition of quality, in which routine

and the replacement of human capital for capital

goods is clearly impossible. In this case, it is unfeasi-

ble to outsource part of the production process.

- The kin ds of m arketsfor products in the cre-

ative economy have very varied characteristics: there

are volatile, unpredictable markets based on ‘emo-

tions’ and ‘intuitions’; and there are also situations in

which there is considerable knowledge of the

demand, and only a very small margin of uncertainty.

One surprising aspect is the approach to quality con-

trol in these sectors: is it really possible to measure the

quality of a show by the number of tickets sold?

Alternatively, why are numerous prizes organized for

innovation? The interest in a new product is not based

on the purchases that are made, but on its potential

success.

The creative and knowledge industries tend to be

closely connected to urban environments, to the

extent that the creative economy is automatically

associated with the ‘creative city’. Certainly, some

cities have attained the classification of ‘creative’ in

recent years mainly due to the increasing presence of

creative sectors in the composition of their economic

fabric. In addition, the specific attractiveness of some

cities for certain creative workers makes them into

places that must be visited and even into ideal places

to live. It is useful to identify under what conditions

the development of creative industries could be posi-

tively promoted.

Urban com pet it iveness: fact or s t hat shape

t he creat ive cit y

Paradoxically, in the era of information and inno-

vation, cities are more than ever spaces for generating

value and the raw material where power is exercised,

and cultural production and social selection takes

place (Hall, 1998).

One fact that has become clear in the most recent

urban transformations is that a more cross-cutting,

horizontal analysis (that is not purely economic) has

been incorporated into what is considered a competi-

tive city. Cities can only achieve a competitive econo-

my on the basis of new game rules. At the same time,

there is a disassociation between a city’s economic

dynamism, which may be related to traffic jams, a

degraded environment and housing shortage, and an

ideal city to live in: a competitive (urban) economy

should be one that increases the quality of life of those who

live and work there (Begg, 2002: 3).

Creativity interpreted as an individual capacity or

as a defined and socially accepted process is nothing

new; it has as references the structures of time and

space; and creation does not necessarily imply inno-

vation. Critical factors for innovation are the skill of

workers and access to funding.

According to Musterd and Gritsai (2010), Bontje et

al. (2011) and others, a set of factors determines the

(creative) economic structure of cities today:

- Th e pathway.Dependence on the past and

deep-rooted urban histories are the reason for many

of the opportunities available to cities and those that

live in them. A city’s legacy should not only be con-

sidered in economic terms, but also in relation to the

society’s culture and traditions. Cities that can adapt

their profile to new conditions of economic competi-

tion and incorporate the legacy of the past as an asset

in this transformation have great chances of success.

The creative and knowledge economy finds a

favourable environment in cities that have been cen-

tres of political and/or economic decisions in the past,

determining that they have traditionally had incen-

tives to generate more competitive and innovative

structures. This gives a city a certain degree of flexibil-

ity (a multifunctional profile) that enables it to

respond as needed to adapt to new economic chal-

lenges over time. In Europe, the existence of a system

of cities dating back to the Middle Ages, with strong

historical specializations in terms of trade, universities

or cultural centres, is particularly attractive for certain

sectors associated with creativity. In addition, the

impact of the industrial revolution and each city’s past

capacity to undergo transformation, move into the

tertiary sector and diversify its productive fabric pro-

vides it with certain opportunities in the present, and

facilitates its adaptation to new contexts of global

competitiveness.

These arguments do not exclude the possibility of

breaking with the past or making a decisive commit-

ment to new options. A city’s past pathway influences,

but does not determine, its present: the wealth of a

city’s legacy means that it is advisable to build on

what already exists, and unadvisable to break the his-

torical dependency on the past. However, there are

exceptions to this general rule, although the associat-

ed risks are clear.

- Classic factors of location .Beyond the availabil-

ity of capital and labour, territories today consider that

classic location factors are an essential condition, but

not enough on their own. Communications and con-

nections have improved considerably everywhere, and

are no longer the factor that differentiates between

cities. In contrast, some aspects associated with clas-

sic factors still make a relevant contribution to the

generation of economic growth, for example, the

availability of capital and a qualified workforce. One

aspect to take into account is that classic location fac-

tors may be essential for large multinational compa-

nies, but less important for smaller or recently found-

ed creative companies.

However, we should bear in mind that much of the

economic activity, particularly that related with cre-

ative and knowledge sectors, is still found in concen-

trations or ‘clustered’ in the territory. Consequently,

some of the features that characterise the synergic

operation of a cluster, such as personal relationships,

the exchange of information and explicit and implicit

knowledge, are essential to the emergence and expan-

sion of the creative economy. In fact, sectors that are

considered creative tend to choose locations close to

each other, even more than other sectors. Elements

that determine the existence of a creative and innova-

tive cluster are a shared location for creative activities,

with the presence of strong interrelations and the

generation of collaborative synergies between compa-

nies. As Castells (2010) stated, key processes in inno-

vation and decision making occur in face-to-face con-

tacts, which still require a shared space.

- Soft factors. Certainly, the set of factors that

comprise a city’s attractiveness, based on the availabil-

ity of amenities, the cultural offerings, the atmosphere

or tolerance, are aimed at attracting the attention of

people rather than companies. Many authors have

identified these as determining factors in the attraction

of talent and, therefore, the attraction of ‘creative’

workers or directors who are ready to generate new

ideas, new technologies and new creative contents

(Florida, 2002:8). According to Florida, the attraction of

talent is followed by the generation of economic activ-

ity. Therefore, one of the prerequisites of becoming a

creative city is its capacity to attract talent through the

formation of spaces that are considered attractive, in

the broadest definition of the term. This approach is

diametrically opposite to the proposal of other authors

(i.e. Scott, 2006; Castells, 2010; Musterd and Gritsai,

2010) who, in different studies, conclude that greater

availability of amenities that make a city attractive or

the existence of an open and tolerant atmosphere do

not contribute decisively to attracting talent. In con-

trast, it is creative capacity itself that needs other tal-



ented people to share ideas, spirit and projects, and a

city that is receptive to this need.

- Network factors. Personal relationships and

networks are crucial for workers in creative and

knowledge sectors. Those who have talent move to

find work opportunities in a city; if these opportuni-

ties do not arise, the only reason that they move is

because they have links with the territory in which

they were born or studied, or they have personal or

professional networks of contacts there. Talented peo-

ple appreciate in a city its capacity to incorporate new

forms of working as well as the possibility of interest-

ing work opportunities for those who were born and

studied there. The ability of some cities to incorporate

spaces for knowledge and networks of communica-

tion is now one of the factors that drives the new

economy, in the same way that the availability of nat-

ural resources and the distribution of power were

determining factors in the time of the industrial econ-

omy (Castells, 2010).

Recipes? Element s for t he design of urban policies

The future of cities is intrinsically linked to the

future of countries, which simultaneously determines

the opportunities for cities. As indicated by the OECD

(2006), a national strategy for competitiveness cannot

overlook the spatial structure of the economy or the

quality and characteristics of the cities that affect eco-

nomic behaviour, social cohesion and environmental

conditions. In the past, many of the urban policies

were reactive and curative, rather than proactive and

dynamic. Therefore, new formulas are needed to cre-

ate new collaborative structures between levels of

government, which clearly assign responsibilities and

134

Pathways Place Personal networks

Table 2

Leitmot if of t he new paradigm for local agendas

- Improvement of local leadership and thecapacity to make strategic decisions on knowl-edge and creativity.

- Innovation in institutional cultures and behav-iour.

- Maximization of the use of existing assets,whether they are cultural, physical or econom-ic, to develop a creative future.

- Identification of distinctive and unique ele-ments of local development throughout histo-ry. Enabling the development of this potential.

- Improvement in the coordination of existinginstitutionsin their strategic and everyday action.

- Connection of existing economic activity withthat based on creativity and knowledge.

- Consideration of the state of hard factors oflocation in the city and ensuring the availabilityand quality of these factors.

- Provision of suitable spaces for the interactionof creative employees and knowledge indus-tries.

- The attraction of external talent should not beat a cost to the communities that live in thecity.

- Use of cultural and/or creative facilities forrevitalizing depressed areas of the city.

- Definition of a realistic image of the city, basedon its identity.

- Involvement of resident groups in the promo-tion of the city.

- Representation of the city in the context of itsregion and planning of joint strategies at met-ropolitan scale.

- Guarantees of high-quality housing, adapted tothe needs of creative workers.

- Promotion of all kinds of incentives that facili-tate mobility and increase the networks ofcreative and talented workers.

- Recognition of the importance of universitiesas centres for the entry and exit of talent.

- Promotion of student networks.

- Provision of tools to facilitate long-term staysin the city.

- Design of policies aimed at attracting andretaining talent.

- Promotion of synergetic and joint action ofthe different actors in the city: government,companies and citizens.

- Design of spaces that enable co-working andthe use of existing networks.

Source: based on the results of the ACRE project (http://acre.socsci.uva.nl/).


functions. Nevertheless, while certain states currently

apply models that are more inclusive of territorial

dynamics, others are creating opportunities for action

for local territorial policies.

The recent recession has rekindled the debate

about how to return to the path of growth. To a large

extent, countries depend on cities to adapt to the new

context. However, there are certain limitations that

can make this adaptation difficult: shortfalls in infra-

structure, a workforce that is either not highly quali-

fied or not suitably qualified and the excessive weight

of the public sector in the past, among others. Budget

cuts leave the creation of workplaces in the hands of

the private sector: it is in this context that creativity

and innovation, as keys to competitive advantage,

play a crucial role.

As cities are considered centres of competitive-

ness, the phenomenon of grouping together many of

the production processes has become widespread as a

potential strategy for attaining specialization in key

sectors in the territory, particularly in the case of cre-

ative and knowledge sectors. Taking advantage of

existing synergies (industrial districts) or creating new

interactions through strategic planning processes

(clusters) is an essential element in the design of local

agendas that identify and recognize the change in

context and the role of the city. In fact, in recent years,

the recession has meant that local governments in the

USA and Europe have renewed their interest in this

kind of policy, and have promoted sectors that are

removed from everything that has a difficult or uncer-

tain future. In fact, the European Commission (2008)

has outlined a strategy for fostering innovative clus-

ters around Europe.

Designers of local public policy have selected the

most appropriate interventions, based on the context

and on local demand. As stated by Musterd et al.

(2011), local policies cannot be implemented if they

follow a standard recipe. Tailor-made designs are

required that build on what already exists in the city.

Three points become the leitmotif of the new para-

digm in the definition of strategies in the local agen-

da: pathways, place and personal networks6 (see

Figure 2).

Cities need to continue to maintain their identity,

despite opting for similar approaches in their goal of

increasing competitiveness; the heterogeneity of cities

continues to be an essential added value in their com-

petitiveness. The use of elements from their historical

pathways and the need to find a balance between

reinvention and their own identity is one challenge

for most cities. Some authors suggest that cities that

can associate local attractiveness (local buzz) with

global trends (global pipelines) could become the

most inventive and economically profitable in the

long term (Bontje et al., 2011).

Cities must create suitable conditions so that inno-

vative companies with high potential to create jobs

choose them as a location. This task must guarantee

both economic and social improvement. To stimulate

innovation in general, the organizational and cultural

formulas that have been implemented by government

bodies up to now need to be reconsidered. In short,

cities must incorporate new ways of thinking that give

greater importance to the consumer, the user, and, in

short, to the citizen.

References

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Press.

BONTJE, M.; S. MUSTERD AND P. PELZER (2011) Inventive City-

regions. Path Dependence and Creative Knowledge Strategies. Farnham:

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Int roduct ion

In recent years, governments have been very creative

defining their innovation agenda. Ingenious initiatives to

promote entrepreneurship have been started and some

have been relatively successful. It is evident that many

governments want to promote innovation and entrepre-

neurial activities, and aspire to emulate the success of

Silicon Valley as a Cluster of Innovation (COI). In the

recent period of economic crisis many regions have

redoubled their efforts at fostering the creation of an

innovation culture to further economic vitality. Despite

these efforts, few of the initiatives have succeeded.

In this paper we look at the case of Barcelona and

their 22@Barcelona initiative. 22@Barcelona represents a

sustained commitment to the creation of a COI as a

source of economic renewal. It is beginning to show pos-

itive results.

In a previous paper we defined a framework to char-

acterize Clusters of Innovation (COI) and the networks

among them (Engel and del-Palacio, 2009). We define a

COI as an agglomeration of individuals and organiza-

tions that are specialized in the different stages of the

entrepreneurial process rather than in an specific indus-

try. This makes COI different from Porterian clusters,

which are defined as industry specific agglomerations.

Four elements characterize COI. The first element is

mobility. In COI, people, technology and capital are

highly mobile and have a heightened affinity to collabo-

rate, combine or recycle. Second, in COI companies are

born with a global perspective and consider the opportu-

nities and implications of global markets and resources

from the start. Third, in COI standard business practices

use structures of ownership and incentives that align the

goals of entrepreneurs, managers and venture investors.

Further these standard practices build a culture of agreed

“rules of the game” that narrow and simplify arrange-

ments and reduce transaction costs. And fourth, in COI,

innovation tends to occur rapidly, nurtured by the mobil-

ity of resources, global perspective and aligned goals.

Further, entities in COI, when seeking collaborations

with others in distant locals, tend to collaborate with

entities in other COI, due to shared business perspectives

and practices. Initially, their relationships are diffuse and

relatively weak (weak ties), but over the time selectively

some may become more durable (durable bond) leading

to the creation of Networks of COI (NCOI). When the

durable bonds are frequent or intensify to the point of

mutual dependence, they may give rise to the emergence

of Super-COI, where entities in remote locations collab-

orate and inter-relate as in if in one economic zone, even

though they are clearly in distinct and separate geo-

graphic regions.

In a previous paper we suggest that policymakers can

use this Framework to promote innovation and entrepre-

neurial activities (Engel and del-Palacio, 2011). Public

intervention has evolved over time, from a National

Innovation System (NIS) approach defined by Freeman

(1987) and Nelson (1987), to a cluster policy defined

mainly by Porter (1990, 1998) all the way through the

Regional Innovation System (RIS), Sectorial and

Technological Innovation System approaches. The ques-

tion now is how can these approaches can be extended

and enhanced to promote innovation in the current glob-

How can governments create clusters of innovation? The case of 22@Barcelona

Itxaso del PalacioInnovation and Entrepreneurship Group, Imperial College London

Jerome EngelHaas School of Business, Lester Centre for Entrepreneurship, UC Berkeley


al context. What is the global approach of NIS, RIS and

cluster theory? Is their global context strong enough to

help regions become globally competitive? In other

words, are locally focused initiatives sufficient in an

increasingly global and interdependent economy? In this

paper we answer these questions by developing a litera-

ture review of previous innovation system frameworks

and analysing the case of the 22@Barcelona to illustrate

how the Framework can guide policymakers in defining

their innovation agenda to create successful COI and

enhance its integration into the global economy through

NCOI linkages.

The goals of this paper are twofold. First, we want to

build upon existing well-known models on innovation

systems to explain the value of the Framework as an

extension of these models. Second, we will analyse the

case of the 22@Barcelona to illustrate the usefulness of

the Framework to create globally connected COI. By

doing so, this paper contributes to the literature of inno-

vation systems with an extension of the existing academ-

ic models. The paper also illustrates how policymakers

can use the Framework for developing a self-assessment

of their innovation system and for creating a globally

connected COI.

The paper is structured as follows. In the first section,

we present a literature review of the systems of innova-

tion and their evolution. In the second section, we

describe the Global Cluster of Innovation Framework

that will be used as a guideline for the subsequent analy-

sis. In the third section, we describe the methodology and

sources of data used in study. In the fourth section, we

present the results of the analysis. In the fifth and final

section, we discuss the results and present the conclu-

sions of the study.

Literature Review: from Nat ional Innovat ion

Syst ems (N IS) to Clusters of Innovat ion (COI)

In the past two decades, the concept of innovation

has been widely studied. As a result, we have now a bet-

ter understanding of the nature of the process and of the

stakeholders involved in it. The initial linear definition of

innovation has evolved towards a dynamic and interac-

tive process. The innovation system literature emerged

alongside this dynamic view of the innovation process. For

many years policymakers have used the frameworks

evolving from the innovation system literature to effec-

tively articulate their innovation policies. The focus of this

innovation system literature suggests that an economy’s

ability to generate innovations depends on the perform-

ance of the stakeholders including small and big corpo-

rations, universities, research centers, and government

institutions, as well as on the interactions among them

(Gregersen & Johnson, 1996; Eriksson, 2000).

According to Lundvall (1985), Freeman (1982) was

the first academic to introduce the concept of an innova-

tion system in an unpublished paper. He was also the

first to introduce the concept of a National Innovation

System (NIS) defined as a “network of institutions in the

public and private sectors whose activities and interac-

tions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technolo-

gies” (Freeman, 1987). Almost at the same time Nelson

(1987) stated that, it is these institutions and their inter-

actions that determine the performance of national firms.

This first framework of the innovation system had a

national approach that as Lundvall (1992) suggested,

motivates the production, diffusion and use of knowl-

edge located within the boarders of the nation state.

Shortly thereafter, the discussion of the innovation

system moved from the national to the regional context.

Regions have supra-local administrative, cultural, politi-

cal, or economic power and cohesiveness, and these are

often different from its state and from other regions

(Cooke et al., 1997). Inspired by the NIS, the Regional

Innovation System (RIS) approach suggests that the inno-

vating firms are surrounded by a number of local actors

who are all in one way or another linked to the innova-

tion process of the local firms and other local actors

(Meeus et al., 1999). Governments began to focus their

initiatives on building and consolidating their regional

strengths.

These definitions of a NIS and RIS were generic and

sometimes too abstract for policymakers to effectively

articulate new public initiatives. In response some aca-

demics developed models and schematic representations


to help identify the stakeholders involved and describe

the innovation systems and their dynamics. Some of

these models are very well known such as Autio’s (1998)

illustration of the structure of the RIS, Etzkowitz and

Leydesdorff (2000) representation of the innovation sys-

tem as a Triple Helix Model, and the Knowledge Triangle

model that was used to define the Lisbon Strategy and

the principals of the European institute of Technology

(EIT). Governments have extensively used these models

to define their innovation agendas.

The abovementioned frameworks and models were

not industry specific. In the late 90s concepts such as

“economies of scale” and “positive externalities” took

over and lead to articulation of industry specific innova-

tion systems. Both, the Sectorial Innovation System (SIS)

and the Technological Innovation System (TIS) emerged

from this industry agglomeration approach. The SIS is

defined as a group of firms developing sector’s products

and generating and utilizing sector specific technologies

(Breschi and Malerba, 1997). The TIS is focused on the

exchange of a specific technology or knowledge rather

than on the exchange of goods and services, and inte-

grates the network of agents that interact in that specif-

ic technology area (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997).

Extending these two industry specific innovation sys-

tems, cluster theory is probably one of the frameworks

most frequently used by policymakers to develop and

articulate innovation policies.

The concept of clusters was developed principally by

Porter in the late 90s. According to Porter (1998, 2000), a

cluster is a geographic concentration of a critical mass of

interconnected companies and institutions in a particular

field. In a cluster, companies benefit from external

economies of scale (Fujita, Krugman, & Venables, 2000;

Krugman, 1991); easy access to information (Doeringer

& Terkla, 1995); proximity to specialized suppliers and

customers; and reduced transaction costs, among others

(Porter, 1998, 2000). In a cluster, firms have free access to

local information and networks because of their physical

proximity (Gertler, 1995, 2003). For many years, govern-

ments have used cluster policies to promote innovation

in many regions around the world, especially in Europe

and Asia. The rather recent book published by the

European Commission (2008) is a good example of the

attention that cluster policies are attracting as a model to

nurture economic development. Recently there is

increasing recognition that regional economic develop-

ment must go beyond local production systems and be

assessed in a global context. Since the launch of the

Lisbon strategy in March 2000, the EU has aimed to

“become the (most) competitive and dynamic knowl-

edge-based economy in the world” (European Council,

2000 p.2).

Cluster policies have been widely used and validated

by several governments. However, proximity and indus-

try specific agglomeration of businesses does not explain

the nature and dynamics of certain clusters, nor the rapid

emergence and development new industry concentra-

tions/clusters within existing clusters. For example, the

Porterian cluster model does not explain why in clusters

such as Silicon Valley new industry concentrations have

emerged (e.g. biotech in the ‘80s, clean tech in the ‘00s),

unrelated to the pre-existing sectors that benefit from

agglomeration externalities (e.g. semiconductors and

ICT). Neither does it explain why some clusters such as

Israel and Taiwan, have emerged so rapidly and robustly

in geographically distant environments and are attracting

large concentrations of venture capital (Saxenian, 2006),

or how their development was accelerated through inter-

actions with other clusters. The Global Cluster of

Innovation Framework (Engel and del-Palacio, 2009)

builds upon the cluster literature to define environments

characterized by new patterns of innovation and com-

mercialization that favor the creation and development of

high potential entrepreneurial ventures, and the connec-

tions among them. These clusters are the Clusters of

Innovation (COI) and their connections form the

Networks of Clusters of Innovation (NCOI), and eventu-

ally, the Super Cluster of Innovation (Super-COI).

Global Cluster of Innovat ion Framework

The Global Cluster of Innovation Framework (Engel

and del-Palacio, 2009, 2011) extends Porterian cluster

theory:


1. It focuses on Clusters of Innovation (COI) that

favour the creation and development of high growth

entrepreneurial ventures rather than on pure agglomera-

tion of industry specific organizations.

2. It highlights a global approach of localized COI and

their relationships with geographically distant individu-

als, organizations and groups of organizations.

3. It characterizes the connections among COI.

A COI is the basic unit of the Global Cluster of

Innovation Framework. It is formed as an agglomeration

of individuals (i.e. entrepreneurs, professionals,

investors,…), small and big corporations, universities,

research centers and other organizations, that are spe-

cialized in entrepreneurship. There are four main differ-

entiating characteristics of a COI, in comparison to a

Porterian cluster:

1. Entrepreneurship is a core competence of COI.

The components in a COI are specialized in entrepre-

neurship and new firm creation. They benefit from their

proximity to other entrepreneurial players rather than

industry specific firms, among whom information and

other resources easily move.

2. Resources in a COI are h ighly mobile and com-

ponents have a heightened affin ity to collaborate.

COI are characterized by mobile assets – most impor-

tantly people, capital and technology, which facilitates

rapid innovation utilizing new venture formation, exper-

imentation, scaling and, if necessary, failure (Freeman

and Engel, 2007).

3. In a COI new startup ventures are said to be

‘‘born global”. Start-ups in a COI use cross-border

resources, build upon international partnerships and tar-

get global markets earlier in the venture development

cycle than the historical norm.

4. Alignm ent of incentives and goals. A culture of

goal alignment is achieved through economic mecha-

nisms that align economic interests among entrepre-

neurs, investors and other professionals. This helps sup-

port a bias toward collaboration both within and among

firms [Open Innovation (Chesbrough 2003a, 2003b,

2007)].

As a result of the continuous mobility of resources,

the global perspective of the players, the aligned goals

and heightened affinity to collaborate, COI get connect-

ed to other, sometimes globally distant COI. The linkages

among individuals, organizations and COI are can be

weak ties, durable bonds and covalent bonds:

1. Weak ties are the most frequent connections creat-

ed by mobile people using networking and face-to-face

relationships. Based on Granovetter’s (1973) definition,

these ties do not incur high management costs, and pro-

vide easy access to information, resources, influence, and

opportunities (Chaskin, Brown, Venkatesh, & Vidal,

2001).

2. Durable bonds are created when a dense mass of

weak ties is strengthened and when the connection

enhances the longevity of the relationships among COI.

Weak ties and durable bonds are both flexible and

dynamic and so are created and recreated. When a high

number of these ties connect individuals and organiza-

tions in often geographically distant COI, the linkages

lead to the creation of Networks of Clusters of Innovation

(NCOI). The global NCOI is essentially a web of individ-

ual and institutional relationships. In limited instances

the elements of these networks intensify to the point of

mutual dependence, giving rise to the emergence of

Super-Clusters of Innovation (Super-COI).

3. Covalen t bonds are permanent connections

among players in a COI and emerge if the durable bonds

are nearly permanent and the role of each COI is embed-

ded in the business and processes of the other.

A Super-COI is formed when multiple covalent

bonds are continuously created and recreated between

individuals and entities in two or more geographically

dispersed COI such that they operate in a coordinated

fashion. The Global Network of Clusters of Innovation

consist of COI, NCOI and Super-COI, and characterize

the linkage among them —principally weak ties, durable

bonds and/or covalent bonds.

Met hodology: t he Framework as an Analyt ical

Framework

In this paper, we use a case study methodology as an

exploratory research method. Specifically, we aim to


illustrate the usefulness of the Global Network of

Cluster of Innovation Framework to analyse to what

extent a cluster can be considered a COI as part or a

NCOI. It also illustrates the areas that need to be

addressed by policymakers in their intent to create a

globally connected COI.

The unit of analysis is the city of Barcelona and the

22@Barcelona initiative to ignite the creation of a COI.

The data was gathered through primary as well as sec-

ondary sources of information. We started by developing

an accurate literature review to better understand the

idiosyncrasy of this urban cluster. Following, we inter-

viewed 5 stakeholders that play different roles in the

development of the clusters and that are involved in dif-

ferent stages of the innovation process. The interviewees

include public as well as private stakeholders.

We guided the interviews using the Table 1. We asked

them to filled the table indicating one of the four

responses available. We also asked them to tell us about

the programs and initiatives that are being employed by

public organizations to foster the elements of the COI.

Once the interviews were completed, we analysed the

results and draw some conclusions as well as recom-

mendations to accelerate the creation of a globally con-

nected COI in the metropolitan area of Barcelona.

Barcelona and the 22@Barcelona init iat ive: is it a

COI and par t of a NCOI?

The 22@Barcelona is a productive district located in

the heart of Barcelona (Spain). Today, Microsoft, Yahoo,

GE, American Express, T-Systems and Telefonica are

some of the companies located in this area. Known as

the “Innovation District”, the 22@Barcelona has been

pointed to be one of the most innovative areas in

Southern Europe. This current urban technology cluster

was a former peripheral industrial manufacturing space.

In the mid-nineteenth century, the area hosted many

vibrant and successful textile manufacturers. As the city

grew, the textile industries moved to peripheral neigh-

bourhoods and towns, and this district remained unin-

habited and almost abandoned.

In 2000, the City Council of Barcelona approved a

plan to transform this old industrial neighbourhood into

a new innovative district consisting of universities,

research centres and knowledge-based industries, as well

as social and public facilities. In June 2000, the “General

Metropolitan Plan” was unanimously accepted. Among

others, this plan aims to promote the sustainable urban,

economic and social development of the 22@Barcelona

district. Ten years after the approval of the plan, more

than 1,500 firms have already been established in the

22@Barcelona district or are in the process of building

their corporate headquarters there. The impact of the ini-

tiative is reaching also close by neighbourhoods; many

entrepreneurs and managers are located in other areas of

the metropolitan city of Barcelona and are involved in the

22@Barcelona tech community.

Public initiatives promoting innovation and entre-

preneurship are focused on five main economic areas:

media, ICT, medical technologies, energy and design.

These areas were identified to be driving the economic

development of the region and were also attracting tal-

ent to the city from all over the world, especially from

North West European countries. Today, around 70% of

the companies that have moved to the 22@Barcelona

district belong to one of these five strategic economic

sectors. The goal of the government is to focus the efforts

on these clusters and to make Barcelona a worldwide

landmark in these areas.

Based on the model of the Triple Helix Innovation

System (Etzkowitz and Leydersdorff, 2000), each eco-

nomic sector is represented by government institutions

and high-technology enterprises, as well as by universi-

ties and other research bodies. Each cluster also includes

a technology incubator, housing spaces for researchers

and specialized service providers, among others. The

close location of these agents eases knowledge fluency

between and collaboration among the entities.

Additionally, in order to promote fluent and frequent

relationships, networking events, such as meetings, con-

ferences and training programs, are organized periodi-

cally. These events are excellent opportunities for profes-

sionals, researchers and government representatives to

interact with each other.



Policies in place or potentially started

Table 1.

Analysis of t he Barcelona and 22@Barcelona init iat ive according t o t he character ist ics of t he Global Network of Clust ers of Innovat ion Framework

…is there a critical mass of entrepreneurs,lawyers, investors,… specialized in new-firmcreation?

…are individuals highly mobile (e.g. highrotation of jobs, open to re-locate, willing tomove internationally,…)?

…is capital invested and re-invested in newtechnology inventions and small companies?

……is knowledge easily shared and transfe-rred from individuals working in start-ups touniversities and big corporations and all viceversa?

…are companies born global, employingglobal resources and targeting internationalmarkets from the start?

…do all the players involved in the entre-preneurial process (e.g. founders, entrepre-neurs, governments) collaborate and havealigned incentives? Do all of them respectthe same “rules of the game”?

…is there a critical mass of entrepreneurs,professionals, small and big corporations,…which frequently interact and collaboratewith geographically distant individuals andorganizations?

…is there a critical mass of entrepreneurs,professionals, small and big corporations,…which closely collaborate and have mutualdependency with individuals and organiza-tions in geographically distant clusters?

Conferences in entrepreneurship (e.g. Entrepreneurs’ Day)Support to start companies (e.g. Barcelona Activa,University Incubators)Investing as fund of funds (e.g. Ingenia Capital, Ysios Biofund,Inveready Seed Capital, Nauta Capital)Supporting private angel investor networks and facilitatingthe individual investments in early stage high-tech companies(e.g. BCN BA, ESADE BAN)

Programs that support international mobility of graduatesand researchers (e.g. La Caixa grants for local students tostudy abroad, Balsells Fellowships for engineers to study inCalifornia, icrea for attracting international researchers andsenior managers)

Creation of shared spaces (e.g. cafeterias, meeting rooms)Networking events and conferences (e.g. monthly breakfast)Mobility from universities to big start-ups (e.g. from uni-versities to start-ups in Technology Parks)Mobility from big corporations to big start-ups (e.g.internship programs in big corporations) Knowledge exchange among industries (e.g. Disonanciasfor knowledge exchange between designers and mediacorporations)Collaboration between investors and start-ups (e.g.Inmediate program)

Internationalization programs with offices in Barcelona aswell as internationally (e.g. NYC, Montreal, Tokio,… officesof ACCIO)

Technological Bridges to US and AsiaPartnerships with international incubators (e.g. PlugTechnology Center in Silicon Valley)Promoting cross-country collaboration (e.g. Inmediate project)Global conferences (e.g. BizBarcelona)

To certain extent,without public support

To certain extent, withpublic supportIn your cluster/ region... Yes No

X

X

X

X

X

X1

X

X

1. The question is if the government should operate in that area, or leave it grow organically.

Overall, the interviewees agree that Barcelona hosts a

dynamic and growing entrepreneurial community. They

support that today there is a critical mass of individuals

trying to start new companies. In order to increase the

awareness in this area, government entities are organiz-

ing conferences about entrepreneurship and innovation

(e.g. Entrepreneurs’ Day) and providing support for

starting entrepreneurs (e.g. though organizations such

as Barcelona Activa and University Incubators).

However, the interviewees also agree that there are not

enough investors financing high-tech entrepreneurial

opportunities. Although the number of private investors

interested in early-stage opportunities is now higher

than five years ago, there is still a gap of capital for start-

ups. Specially, emerging industries such as design start-

ups face substantial difficulties to raise capital. In order

to fill this gap, several public initiatives have been start-

ed to support private angel investor networks such as

BCN BA and ESADE BAN. Fortunately, interviewees

agree that despite the number of investors is limited, the

ones who are actively investing are aligned with entre-

preneurs: defining realistic milestones, working together

to achieve them and using staged investments to reduce

the risk.

Mobility of resources seems to be limited. If culturally

mobility of people has never been substantial, nowadays

the situation has worsened with the economic crisis of

2008. Limited job opportunities make even more difficult

for employees to move from one company to another. In

some cases, mobility of people has been perceived nega-

tively for moving to the competition. In terms of interna-

tional mobility, there are certain programs that support

graduates’ and researchers’ mobility to foreign universi-

ties and relocation of employees in foreign countries.

Examples of programs that facilitate the mobility of stu-

dents are Balsells Fellowships for engineers to study in

California and the icrea program for attracting interna-

tional researchers and senior managers. In spite of the

programs, some of the interviewees have pointed that

there is still some kind of fear to increase the brain drain

towards countries such as the US.

As mobility of capital is concerned, interviewees

agree that there are still not enough successful disinvest-

ments to evaluate if the capital will be reinvested cycli-

cally in new ventures. The feeling is that the entrepre-

neurs and investors that are performing well are willing

to reinvest their returns. Now, there is not any public

support promoting the reinvestment of the returns.

Several policies and activities have been stated in

order to promote interactions and mobility of knowledge

among individuals, in small and big corporations and

universities. Having some common spaces such as cafe-

terias and meeting rooms shared by entrepreneurs and

professionals in small and big corporations is facilitating

this interaction. Additionally several networking activities

such as monthly breakfast and conferences are being

organized for promoting interaction within and among

the five economic areas (media, ICT, medical technolo-

gies, energy and design). Finally, some programs have

been started to connect universities (e.g. professors, stu-

dents and researchers) with companies by promoting

internships of students in small and big corporations.

There are also some programs aiming to facilitate collab-

orations among companies in diverse industries (e.g.

Disonancias, for facilitating collaborations among

designers and media companies). The connection among

big corporations and start-ups is still limited.

In terms of the global perspective of the companies,

the interviewees agree that while traditionally Spanish

companies have not targeted international markets, new

ventures tend to born global and look internationally

from the start. In recent years, the government as well as

the Chamber of Commerce have been focused on pro-

moting the internationalization of companies. Some of

the organizations have offices internationally to help

local companies to explore the opportunities in places

such NYC, Montreal, Tokio and Silivon Valley. Currently,

it seems that new companies are certainly employing

global resources and targeting international markets for

the start.

In order to promote collaboration with international

organizations, several initiatives have also put in place.

As an example, the “Innovation Bridges” organized by

the Chamber of Commerce bring companies from

Barcelona to meet organizations in other countries such

as Asia (with trips to China) and the US (with trips to


Silicon Valley, Boston and Seattle). Another example is

the European Inmediate project in which the regional

government is participating to promote collaborations

and partnerships with other European organizations.

And finally another example are the global conferences

that bring international entrepreneurs, investors and

professionals to interact with local actors (e.g.

BizBarcelona). As a result of these initiatives, new start-

ups born global and are collaborating with geographical-

ly distant individuals, small and big corporations and

other organizations from the start.

Discussion and conclusions

In this paper, we have used a case study methodolo-

gy to illustrate how the Global Network of Cluster of

Innovation Framework can be used by policymakers for

making an evaluation of the innovation activities in their

region and for identifying the areas and elements that

should be improve to create become a globally connect-

ed COI. Table 1 has served as a guideline to do the self-

assessment and to define suitable policies to create a

globally connected COI.

Specifically, we have studied the case of Barcelona

and 22@Barcelona initiative. The results of the interviews

show that the government is actively promoting entre-

preneurship by facilitating interactions and collabora-

tions among local as well as international individuals

and organizations. However, there is seems to be still

much to be done to integrate some of the actors in the

entrepreneurial community. The community of investors

as well as their interactions with entrepreneurs seem to

be limited. Additionally, despite of the proximity to big

corporations such as Yahoo and Microsoft, it seems that

there is limited mobility and interaction between big

corporations and start-ups.

In terms of mobility, there is limited mobility of

employees among local organizations and towards

international countries. Promoting international reloca-

tion of people has been traditionally avoided for brain

drain-fear. Other countries such as Israel have shown to

benefit from this mobility. This fact might motivate gov-

ernments in countries such as Spain to promote interna-

tional mobility and relocation of employees.

In summary, the analysis has shown that the Global

Network of Innovation Framework is a useful tool for

analysing innovation clusters and for identifying the ele-

ments that should be promoted to create globally con-

nected COI. Specifically, the 22@Barcelona initiative

seems to be successfully promoting entrepreneurship

and innovation, but public institutions have still much to

do to transform it in promoting mobility and facilitating

durable and mutually dependent collaborations with

local and geographically distant agents.

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1. Innovat ion and ter r it ory

Along with Route 128 in Boston, Route 202 in

Philadelphia, the Microsoft premises in Seattle, the

Research Triangle in North Carolina, the link between

London and Cambridge in England, the science cities in

Japan or Bangalore in India, Silicon Valley is a privileged

place for innovation, in which the knowledge society has

expressed its particular qualities, its capacity to accumu-

late creativity, technological development, innovative

dynamism and wealth. These places are close to impor-

tant universities, but also near to large business clusters.

They are places in which the future is considered; many

companies are founded and many others fold almost

without trace, and restart; information is exchanged; and

human intelligence has special potential for interaction.

Silicon Valley, in the County of Santa Clara, is an area

in which innovation associated with new technologies

has emerged with an unrepeatable intensity. Santa Clara

Valley, which is south of San Francisco Bay and close to

San José, was a peaceful agricultural area in the 1950s

that had once been colonized by Spain. At the end of the

nineteenth century, three small universities were estab-

lished in the Valley: that of the Jesuits of Santa Clara, the

state university in San José and Stanford University, on a

ranch called Palo Alto.

Those who have analysed the success of Silicon Valley

speak of the coexistence of internal factors, such as the

universities and their commitments, and external factors,

including public funds for weapons development. The cre-

ation of networks that enable interaction is a determining

factor. Innovative companies in Silicon Valley tend to

develop in clusters, as they need to learn from each other

and because there are competitive advantages of working

in an innovative environment with interrelated companies.

Support for this concept of the need to create clusters

to encourage the concentration of companies with a high

level of technology and innovation is precisely what led in

the 1980s to the promotion of science and technology

parks, which had very uneven results. A discussion began

on how to promote innovation and how to create places

of excellence designed specifically for technological devel-

opment. The question of who would finance and promote

these places led in many cases to public initiative.

The case of Japan shows how the pioneering experi-

ence of a science city, Tsukuba, which was conceived at

the end of the 1950s, developed from a model of spatial

concentration created by public initiative in the sur-

roundings of Tokyo, to the collaboration of public and pri-

vate initiative in the more successful case of Kansai, in the

1980s, based on a polycentric model and linked to cities in

the surrounding environment such as Kyoto and Osaka.

Experts conclude that the advantage of Kansai lies in the

fact that its isolation has been avoided and its position on

the populated island of Honshu facilitates synergies and

interactions.

This also appears to be what happened in Bangalore,

when the Indian state decided to concentrate its forces on

technology research in this ‘Silicon Valley of India’.

The case of Finland is also relevant, with Nokia as its

flagship and strong public support for new technologies.

In response to the apparent spontaneity and singulari-

ty of the places in which the development of new tech-

nologies begins, since the 1980s public initiative has tried

Smart territoriesAlfonso VegaraPresident of Fundación Metrópoli

to promote spaces under the general label of technology

parks. Parks aim to foster R&D companies, and represent

an evolution of industrial areas. Public initiative selects

their location and draws up the urban planning of com-

plexes for the development of small production and

research units under very different conditions. In addition,

there is a need to encourage business creation through the

concept of business incubators. These are spaces with a

single management structure designed to facilitate the

success of start-ups on the market by providing advice,

access to networks of contacts and risk capital institutions,

and jointly managed basic services. These initiatives have

been developed unevenly, with very different results in

countries and cultures, although public initiative is always

involved, as is the aim of attracting private investment.

Institutions and financing opportunities influence the

potential success of a technology promotion initiative. In

addition, local social networks, information systems and

the relationship systems that these enable are also influ-

ential. New organizational forms emerge that mean that

initiatives can begin whose results are not guaranteed.

Innovation tends to occur when the network society, the

substance of the information society, works. The promo-

tion of technology parks rapidly became a strategy for eco-

nomic development and regional policy for promoting

innovation.

In France, the state promoted a technology park in

each leading city of a region. The results were sometimes

successful, as in the case of Sophia Antipolis, near Nice,

which is in the pleasant surroundings of the Blue Coast. In

Germany, technology has spread with the support of uni-

versities and, above all, that of large companies who devel-

op their own innovation initiatives, with singular process-

es of concentration such as on the outskirts of Munich.

Due to its political and administrative structure, Spain has

a singular strategy of developing technology parks in

autonomous communities. The El Vallès Technology Park

in Barcelona, Tres Cantos in Madrid, the Cartoixa in Seville,

Zamudio in Bilbao or Boecillo in Valladolid are some

notable examples. They illustrate that the real innovative

development takes place in the environment of metropo-

lises with greater critical mass and potential for global

exchange, particularly Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao. In

Spain, the interaction between technology parks and uni-

versities has not functioned well to date.

In Great Britain, in addition to the university-centred

developments that are led by Cambridge, innovation has

been associated with urban development efforts of a very

different kind. The latest generation of new cities offered

attractive spaces for new activities. However, the local gov-

ernments try hard to associate urban regeneration

processes with the information society, by proposing suit-

able areas for the development of emerging companies, as

in the cases of Glasgow or Newcastle. In these areas,

industrial change had created a bleak outlook, but at the

end of the 1980s an unprecedented effort was made to

transform the economic base. Strategies for urban regen-

eration are bringing the new network society to the heart

of the old urban system.

There are also some almost spontaneous phenomena,

such as the emergence in the heart of New York of what

some call Silicon Alley, or the area around the High Line in

the Meat Packing District, or initiatives aimed at promot-

ing the new economy such as 22@ BCN, which has been

developed in Poblenou, Barcelona, and is gradually

becoming an international benchmark. All of these exam-

ples show that the digital revolution can take place in the

heart of our cities, where places that are under transfor-

mation are available at a reasonable price, where there is

an opportunity for synergies with the intensive life of the

city, in environments with mixed uses and urban spaces

with an identity.

As mentioned above, creativity and innovation are

most likely to emerge in places with high urban density

and with an identity, in which members of our society’s

creative classes prefer to live. The technology parks of the

future may be areas under transformation in the heart of

our cities. In the following sections, we present two

examples of cities that are committed to promoting inno-

vation processes in their centres: Singapore and Bilbao.

1. one-nor th, Singapore

This is an innovative initiative promoted by the

Jurong Town Corporation (JTC), Singapore’s public


agency for the promotion of areas of economic activity.

The project is being developed in the area known as

Buona Vista, located in the heart of the island of

Singapore. one-north is Singapore’s latest-generation

technology centre. It was designed to be an innovation

node that strives to incorporate the goal of excellence,

efficiency and realism that has characterized Singapore

since its independence in 1965. On the basis of its incred-

ible social and economic success, the government of this

small state, with the advice of international experts, has

developed a place of excellence designed to promote

imagination and creativity, a quality environment that

stimulates innovation in thought and action. one-north is

on a small scale of just 200 ha, and is situated in a strate-

gic environment for the development of its biotechnolo-

gy and multimedia profile. It is situated beside estab-

lished science parks, the campus of the National

University of Singapore, one of the main hospitals in the

country and the surroundings of Holland Village, which is

one of the city’s fashionable neighbourhoods. In addi-

tion, it has good access to the city’s main public transport

links.

one-north was designed with a solid mix of teach-

ing, research, business, artistic, commercial, residential

and recreational uses. It was first proposed a decade ago

with a 15-year horizon of development. It is already in a

very advanced stage of development. The first stage to

be implemented is called Biopolis. The description of

uses highlights that the selection was very different to

that commonly found in traditional technology or inno-

vation parks. The aim was not to create a workplace, but

a space to live and work where ideas could grow. For

this reason, new technologies, in their capacity as com-

munication infrastructure and a tool for work, were

used in the project to create a habitable and suitable

environment. The aim of the project was not the space

in itself, but the people; people with talent who could be

attracted by a unique environment in their efforts to

attain excellence in their respective fields of work. These

people include scientists, as well as visual artists, musi-

cians, young people with a vocation for business, etc.

The aim was to provide the new creative class with a

pleasant space, where they can carry out different activ-

ities, even leisure activities, in the best amenities and

infrastructure possible, in other words, in world-class

facilities. The aim of the project is highly unique and dif-

ferentiates it from other international experiences. It is

no other than to train and attract talent, creative profes-

sionals who can generate innovation, which is the basis

of the new economy, in key sectors of the future such as

biotechnology and multimedia. Creativity can be stimu-

lated through art and artists. The magnetism of a place,

the creation of an innovative environment, the capacity

for global interaction, the network of contacts of excel-

lence associated with the project, etc., are critical aspects

that inspire the urban design, architecture, the parks

and the facilities, all with a solid, latest-generation dig-

ital infrastructure.

one-north has been designed to stimulate the senses

and the imagination.

The key or strategic points of the project are:

Talent,creating the conditions to attract and develop

innovative activities that enable the new economy to

progress.

Lifestyle, to ensure the environmental quality of

spaces and of the infrastructure that serves them.

Connections between places, institutions and pro-

fessionals that are rapid and efficient.

Opportunity, facilitating synergies between research

and industry and promoting investment when innova-

tions emerge.

We can conclude that one-north is an area for people.

Its developers believe that, in the framework of the new

economy, there is a lack of spaces for creating, promoting

and maintaining a vibrant and varied community of inno-

vative professionals, students, entrepreneurs, researchers,

capital risk agents, lawyers, bankers, specialists in e-com-

merce, artists and journalists who can interact, do busi-

ness and have fun together.

This active, varied population needs spaces that can

draw together leisure, work, housing and life. The chal-

lenge of these spaces is their capacity to attract people

with talent from around the world, and to generate inno-

vation through the promotion of R&D activities.

Therefore, a coherent local identity needs to be estab-

lished, in which a community that is open to numerous


stimuli and characterized by its wide freedom of choice

can develop activities in a public space, and that this is a

place for social contact, meeting and experimentation.

The developers of one-north speak of the importance

of connectivity, that each person can be connected with

the rest of the world through smart networks of informa-

tion, knowledge, transport and business. one-north is

designed as an experimental community.

The urban design of one-north was conceived by a

council of international advisors and drawn up by the Zaha

Hadid office. The project is based on the existing reality

and has an organic design. Rather than highlighting the

aesthetics of the design, which some call futuristic, the

importance of the project lies in its imprint on the land-

scape and its singular urban development structure, which

is the result of a very soft geometry to aid the organization

of functional mixes. The core of the design is a winding lin-

ear central park that connects a system of nodal subcen-

tres, which are almost all accessible from the park and are

graphically called ‘Xchanges’. Each Xchange has a specific

profile and focuses on a certain area. These are places in

which there is a greater density, mix of uses and exchange

of ideas. The interior public transport system is highly

adapted to the urban design and perfectly connected with

the island’s strong public transport system.

The overall design of one-north is reminiscent of the

structure of a historical European centre with organic

streets on a small scale and a series of nodes or meeting

places; areas that foster meeting and exchange. This

human interaction occurs in the physical space and

doubtless also in the virtual space through the solid dig-

ital infrastructure that has been created.

2. Bilbao Guggenheim

Today, Bilbao is considered one of the most success-

ful European experiences in urban redevelopment and

reinvention of the production model. In some cities in

Spain, such as Barcelona, Girona, Santiago de

Compostela, Vitoria or Bilbao, the question of the histor-

ical centre goes beyond a conservationist or traditional

heritage approach. Historical centres are essential to

cities’ reflections on their future. The role the historical

centre may play in the city as a whole and in its metro-

politan environment varies in each case. Not all histori-

cal centres are the same, not only because of differences

in form and function, but also because relatively new

areas tend to be considered historical centres. Therefore,

cities often protect urban areas such as populated

expansion areas and some more or less homogenous

complexes of buildings from the start of the twentieth

century, such as those associated with the garden city

movement, the first examples of social housing, and

even singular industrial developments.

In Bilbao we can see many of the challenges and

expectations related to the question of the centre of

European cities, even some contradictions in terms of the

objectives and forms of the proposed transformations.

Bilbao has a singular urban history that has been

affected by defined events: the medieval enclave, the fact

that it is a port, its apathy during the Renaissance, an

illustration of its provincial nature, its entry into moder-

nity with the industrial revolution, an expansive post-war

period also based on industry, and a tense end of the

twentieth century, due to the search for a solid, prosper-

ous identity. Today, the urban centre of Bilbao, which is

determined by its historical spaces, catalyses and guides

life in an urban region with a million and a half inhabi-

tants at a distance of 45 minutes.

The Casco Viejo, or old town centre, coincides with

the space that marks the origins of the town of Bilbao,

which we can easily recognize today. In the twentieth

century, the historical centre was a popular area; one of

the city’s neighbourhoods. However, despite its heritage

elements, it gradually deteriorated as the central func-

tions moved to other places in the city. Its restoration

was tackled efficiently in the 1980s, after the floods in

the city in August 1983, which destroyed buildings and

shops and triggered the transformation of the neigh-

bourhood. As a result, it was declared a Comprehensive

Redevelopment Area and a special redevelopment plan

was drawn up. In 1985, a public office was created to

manage the actions. Bilbao’s old town centre was rede-

veloped by public initiative with its economic support,

maintaining its ‘old town’ feel and its connection with


trade as well as tourism, hotels and caterings and cul-

ture. Thus, actions were undertaken on its main build-

ings, including churches and mansions, museums and

markets, and completion of work on the Arriaga

Theatre, on the Arenal. At the same time, actions were

carried out in public areas, and private buildings were

restored with subsidies. The municipal redevelopment

office worked efficiently; today almost all of the build-

ings have undergone some actions to improve them.

The Bilbao of the seven streets and the Plaza Nueva, of

the Arenal and the Volantín has recovered its splendour.

The right bank of the Estuary of Bilbao, in sequence

from the market to the University of Deusto, has

become a fine, modern urban façade.

The Ensanche, or urban expansion area, continues to

be the central space in urban life. The area on its left had

been occupied by activities associated with industry, the

port and the railway. The Ensanche, at the heart of the

metropolitan city, was turned inwards, towards the Gran

Vía that was the site of the finest buildings. On the first

river terrace, a labyrinth of factories was built, connected

with the estuary of the Nervión and its small tributaries.

The right side of the Ensanche, where industry was

established at different times along the course of the

estuary, reaches the sea at Getxo, which is the traditional

residence of the local mercantile bourgeoisie. On the left

side, beyond the factories, lies the working class area of

Bilbao on the slopes of Barakaldo, Sestao, Portugalete

and Santurtzi. Thus, we can speak of a medieval Bilbao, a

commercial Bilbao, a popular Bilbao, a bourgeois Bilbao,

a working class Bilbao. We have socio-formal images of a

city constructed historically at various paces. The indus-

trial crisis and the resulting transformation have created

great uncertainties.

Architecture plays a role in the urban revival and is

being used to lead it. In this respect, Bilbao is exception-

al, with the central image of the Guggenheim Museum

that Frank Gehry fitted brilliantly into one of the most

difficult and degenerated areas at the heart of the estu-

ary. The process of reindustrialization from the end of

the 1970s involves great challenges, and social and eco-

nomic problems need strategies for the future into which

society can throw itself enthusiastically. This is the func-

tion of the major projects implemented in Bilbao. They

are focused on the space that has already been devel-

oped and on the backbone of the metropolitan system

defined by the estuary, which is the heart of the old

industrial area, and by the geographic impossibility of

expansion into the outlying areas.

The Bilbao of the Casco Viejo is, as we have indicated,

the site of the first major urban action, rooted in the con-

cepts of restoration and redevelopment. However, the

Bilbao of the Ensanche, the directional centre par excel-

lence, is undergoing major functional change. Of note is

the recovery of the bank of the Nervión River that delim-

its the Ensanche, the Abandoibarra area, where the

Guggenheim Museum and the Euskalduna Conference

Centre and Concert Hall were built on sites that had pre-

viously been occupied by the railway, warehouses, cus-

toms and shipyards.

Some state that the convergence of Bilbao and the

Guggenheim is coincidental. However, the Museum was

built because Bilbao has an open attitude to innovation.

From the perspective of urban planning, Bilbao is an

exemplary case: it has used all the available urban devel-

opment tools in a coordinated effort from the City

Council, Bizkaia Provincial Council, the Government of

the Basque Country, the Spanish Central Government

and society itself.

It cannot be denied that Bilbao has made one of the

greatest city planning efforts on different scales. In addi-

tion, it is interesting that for the public and the interna-

tional press, architecture plays the leading role and the

Guggenheim is the main benchmark. The ‘Guggenheim

effect’ that has occurred in Bilbao cannot be transferred to

other cities merely by constructing an emblematic build-

ing. The Guggenheim effect symbolizes a society’s desire

to change, and the confidence and determination that it

is possible to reinvent and construct the Bilbao of the

twenty-first century on the ruins of a territory and an

outdated production system.

Since the mid-1980s, major urban transformation

projects have been proposed for the urban centre of

Bilbao; many of which have failed. However, it was at the

end of the 1980s and above all in the 1990s when the

projects began to succeed. These included the new metro,


which is now in full operation and was designed by

Norman Foster in a contest, the expansion of the port

that freed up spaces inside the estuary, the airport

designed by Santiago Calatrava, the crucial programme

to clean up the estuary and the development of

Abandoibarra, a new central area designed by Cessar

Pelli, where for a number of years the Guggenheim

Museum and the Euskalduna Conference Centre have

been open, alongside housing, hotels, commercial cen-

tres, university buildings and an office block that is the

Iberdrola headquarters. In addition, the Alhóndiga proj-

ect is notable, as is an ambitious project to introduce

pedestrian areas in the Ensanche. The company Bilbao

Ría 2000 has played an important role in this process of

urban transformation.

Future projects that are already on the horizon are

Zorrozaurre, a peninsula of around 50 hectares in the estu-

ary that may be crucial to the necessary new revolution of

Bilbao: the knowledge revolution. Bilbao already experi-

enced an industrial revolution, followed by a successful

urban revolution developed over the last 25 years. In the

future, Bilbao faces a knowledge revolution that will

enable the creative economy to be promoted. The project

Bilbao DC (Digital and Design City) aims to transform the

heart of Bilbao, the Ensanche and the historical centre, into

one of the most innovative spaces in Europe. That is, the

areas of excellence created in the recent urban revolution

of Bilbao will be used as a reference to attract talent and

develop innovative activities. In addition, the concept of

BBNext has been proposed recently. This is a major alliance

between Bilbao and Bizkaia Provincial Council to

strengthen strategic complementarities and physical, func-

tional and operational connections with a territory that has

a population of close to 1.5 million people, which will pro-

vide critical mass for the main economic centre of the

Basque Country.

In recent decades, and before the current recession,

almost all of the medium-sized and large European cities

have been immersed in major processes of transforma-

tion. In this context, the experience of Bilbao and the

Guggenheim effect may be a very valuable reference. The

importance of the Bilbao experience is not the past, but

the future, and particularly the commitment to transform

the successes of the urban revolution into a platform for

internationalisation and an impetus to attract talent and

to develop the creative economy.

3. Towards a design of the cit y

At the start of the twenty-first century, new situations

are emerging in all facets of our lives: the development of

new information and communication technologies is

exponentially increasing the capacity for global interac-

tion at all levels; the opening of international markets

introduces new norms for behaviour and new risks for

companies that operate globally; the current political

structure in the world makes it difficult to tackle in a fair

and consistent manner the redistribution of resources

generated by the international economy, and this accen-

tuates inequalities and generates a huge gulf between

countries, cities and people; the global opening up and

unbalanced growth of countries is having a spectacular

effect on the flows of migration and in some countries

serious problems of integration have arisen, as well as an

increasing lack of safety, among other factors.

All of these changes also affect cities and the way of

managing them. Today, the inhabitants of our cities inter-

act in a global environment that is increasingly extensive

and that goes beyond the local limits. In addition, com-

panies that are founded or decide to move to our cities

must operate in markets that are increasingly broad and

are subject to a pattern of competition that goes beyond

the physical limits of cities and their immediate regional

environment.

Consequently, cities need to use as a basic reference

for their organization and design the context of globali-

sation, even if it is still only to bring together and provide

suitable services for their citizens and the companies that

are located there.

Increasingly, companies need to operate globally to

survive and a greater number of citizens need to interact

with ideas, information, territories and people situated

outside the limits of the city itself.

In recent years, much has been written and discussed

about competition between cities. It has frequently been


stated that cities and their regional environments, rather

than states, are the economic units that are really opera-

tional and important in the new economy. The key issue is

to think about the nature of the aforementioned competi-

tion, that is, to ask whether it is really the cities that com-

pete, or the people and companies who live and work in

them.

There is no doubt that companies compete today. Not

only locally, but also globally due to the availability of

information, the increasing transparency of markets and

the progressive elimination of barriers to international

trade. Our theory is that urban policy and urban devel-

opment could provide basic support for the competitive-

ness of companies and for quality of life that could make

a perceptible difference for citizens.

The key question for the government of cities is

knowing whether the mayor and municipal or regional

government teams can do something to increase the

competitive capacity of companies in their municipality

or region, or whether, in reality, these territories are per-

ceived as competitive because the companies established

in them are competitive. In our research for the CITIES

project, we found that cities and regions can develop

‘certain’ competitive advantages for ‘certain’ activities.

In the past, comparative advantages were very

important, that is, those related to geography, nature

and climate, among other factors. However, in the new

economy, competitive advantages created by people

increasingly prevail. This is true in particular in cities.

Cities and territories can contribute to the competitive-

ness of companies by simplifying bureaucracy; effec-

tively and efficiently managing the public sector; and

providing appropriate education facilities for the profile

of companies, as well as solid, quality digital infrastruc-

ture, airports, logistic services, financial services, effi-

cient mobility, land at a reasonable price, high quality

public spaces, etc. In particular, a city can provide com-

petitive advantages if there is a local ‘economic cluster’

or a specific composition of activities and services for

founding or establishing companies with a certain pro-

file.

Cities need a specific profile and a specific lifestyle

that, if selected with intelligence, can be a powerful

instrument for creating added value and attracting a cer-

tain kind of people, companies and activities.

This reflection reveals that much of the support that

companies need to be competitive and the features that

citizens need to attain significant levels of quality of life is

closely related to the model of city, its urban structure and

its functional profile, and these aspects are managed by

local and regional authorities. In short, urban policy is an

essential factor for creating a competitive advantage and

sustainable quality of life.

One of the main and most difficult missions of local

governments is to guide the model of the city in an intel-

ligent direction, inspired by the idiosyncrasy of the place

and its elements of excellence, and with the considerable

participation of different actors. In this context, the key

for local governments, which are often just a short time

in power, is to choose well: to identify which critical proj-

ects the city should adopt, in which to pour the energy,

enthusiasm and leadership required to progress in this

direction. This is a viable way of creating a competitive

advantage and magnetism in the convulsive stage of

globalisation. For this reason, leadership is crucial, as it is

the gelling agent that makes the different components of

the city act in an integrated way.

For decades, the city and regional governments have

been organized through rigid sector-based departments

that leave little opportunity for interrelation and synergy.

Specific bodies are increasingly important for the devel-

opment of smart projects, which are almost always joint

projects that emerge in places of convergence or at urban

acupuncture points, as they were brilliantly named by

Jaime Lerner. We cannot only work on one scale; projects

need to be alternated to tackle different urban and terri-

torial scales, implement solid projects and create syner-

gies. Some of the most innovative and imaginative proj-

ects in the twenty-first century, such as one-north in

Singapore, are being created through a specific agency, in

this case called JTC (Jurong Town Corporation). Such

agencies can integrate aspects of urban design, innova-

tion, universities, infrastructure, biotechnology, new

technologies, art, housing and leisure. Other spaces in

the city such as residential areas, some environmental

reserves, port areas, etc., could easily be developed by a


range of actors through conventional procedures, but the

critical projects that can strongly boost the city’s transfor-

mation are cross-cutting and require intelligent, specific

management.

The city of the twenty-first century is based more

than ever on innovation and this is produced at the

intersection between disciplines, at the meeting places

between diverse philosophies and attitudes, in physical

spaces for exchange, in the nodes of physical and virtu-

al convergence, in places frequented by the most cre-

ative and tolerant people in society. The traditional

instruments of urban planning are often incapable of

providing a suitable response to the needs that our

cities have today. Our urban development culture,

expressed in the traditional way of drawing up urban

plans and managing them, runs the risk of become out-

dated and rigid in its bureaucracy.

In the research on the different cities in the world that

we are carrying out at the Fundación Metrópoli through

the CITIES project, we have found a basic distinction

between cities, apart from their size, in their level of eco-

nomic development or their urban profile. There are

‘cities with a plan’ and ‘cities without a plan’. The smart

territories are those that can draw up a city plan and find

a balance between their economic strategy, their cohe-

sion and social development, as well as sensitivity to and

solutions for the environment.

Smart territories use territorial strategies and partici-

pative urban planning to develop sustainably and to

attain an intelligent balance between the environment,

society and economy. Research excellence and the

opportunity to draw up plans for the future do not only

arise in cities that are well developed economically.

Levels of coherence and balance can be obtained in dif-

ferent stages of economic development. The good news is

that the best message we can transmit to cities that have

problems is that the time has come for cities that have

traditionally been outside circuits of success and innova-

tion. Through leadership, the participation of actors and a

smart plan for the future, they can create their own com-

petitive advantages in a short period of time, and meet

their objectives in a world that is increasingly open and

has vast possibilities.

Urban development in the twenty-first century is not

a zero-sum game. Basic management of municipal budg-

ets has a very limited impact on the potential transfor-

mation of a city. A plan for the city, with leadership and

the capacity for collaboration between the different

actors in the city exponentially increases the future

opportunities. The key may lie in local and regional gov-

ernments having the vision, required credibility, and abil-

ity to stimulate the private sector and civil society in the

development of objectives and projects of collective

interest. In our opinion, to create a human and attractive

habitat in the knowledge society, we need to reinvent the

governance of cities. We need more political and eco-

nomic power for cities and their regional environments

and new horizons of quality in urban development. We

must strengthen the creative leadership of cities, come up

with new formulae for the participation of the popula-

tion, deal with sensitivity with local idiosyncrasies, and

strengthen the feeling of belonging. These aspects are

essential to collective projects.

In an economy based on knowledge, innovation and

smart capital, the factors of competitiveness are not just

economic; they depend on social balance and environ-

mental quality. In the future, large, medium-sized and

small cities can obtain competitive advantages by high-

lighting their identity and strengthening their global con-

nections. Cities in the globalised world must reinvent

themselves and be aware that the most attractive territo-

ries, those that can have a magnetic effect over their sur-

roundings, will be those that have an enthusiastic, shared

project for the future; not just those that have specific ini-

tial conditions.


1. Just a sample of these plans include Sydney Metropolitan Plan 2036; ParisSDRIF 2031; Chicago Metropolitan Plan GO TO 2040.

1. Int roduct ion

Major cities across the world are currently address-

ing the imperatives and challenges of the Next

Economy. World cities in particular are emerging as the

indispensable sites of knowledge creation, entrepre-

neurship, and face to face transactions. Dynamic

processes of economic and spatial restructuring to har-

ness the potential of the knowledge economy were

already underway prior to the global economic down-

turn. For the last decade cities throughout Europe,

North America and East Asia have been deploying a

range of instruments to enhance their knowledge econ-

omy. Policies to attract talent, to create clusters of high-

value specialisation, to improve local skills and educa-

tion, to support entrepreneurs, and to deepen

knowledge transfer links between business and univer-

sities, are now very common among forward-thinking

cities.

Although academic literature often separates the

discourse about world cities as hubs of corporate loca-

tions and decisions making, from knowledge economy

and innovative cities, the places where new knowledge

creation and commercialisation occur, the obvious

truth is that these things increasing happen in the same

cities. It is the world cities that have embraced the

knowledge economy most directly. On one hand, the

major source of knowledge economy enterprise has

often been former ‘knowledge economy workers’ leav-

ing large corporate. On the other hand world cities that

have large scale corporate, institutional, and hospitality

functions often have to deliberately ‘make space for’

knowledge economy activity to ensure that it is not

‘crowded out’ by other activities that can yield greater

returns in the short term. Therefore we have seen the

rise of both diversification of world city economies to

include greater innovation activity, and the emergence

of a group of ‘smart world cities’ where innovation

activity is at the core of the world city proposition. In

both groups new knowledge economy districts are

emerging as means to make space for the new econo-

my in the context of older cities that need urban

restructuring.

2. A ft er t he crash… new cit y economies

The impact of the 2008-9 downturn has accelerated

this policy horizon, bringing with it a clearer spatial

vision for the city. In particular it is clear that knowl-

edge-based urban development has become a critical

tool for the acceleration of innovative cities. Creativity

and knowledge production are acknowledged as pre-

dominantly urban phenomena that demand the scale,

intensity, infrastructure and diversity that only cities can

offer. Knowledge is now recognised as a, perhaps the,

key driver in future urban competitiveness in numerous

world city plans devised in the years up to 2011.1 These

Do world cities need knowledge districts?Observations on 22@Barcelona and its counterparts

Greg ClarkGlobal Advisor on City Development


cities recognise the forthcoming intensity of competi-

tion to attract talent and foster innovation, and are

adopting an assortment of policy measures and incen-

tives to prepare for it. The current buzz concepts of the

Smart City, Cognitive City, Knowledge City, Intelligent

City, Creative City and others all seek to capture this

overarching trend towards urban development that

puts the economic value of knowledge first.

Within this context knowledge economy districts

are gradually being endorsed as a key engine of such

development. Sometimes described as ‘knowledge

precincts’, ‘innovation quarters’ or ‘urban villages’,

these spatial designs have been initiated by a handful

of pioneering cities committed to the long-term proj-

ect of knowledge urbanism, and the idea has been

followed by other cities aspiring to the status of a

knowledge city through urban development pro-

grammes. Examples of the latter include Brisbane,

Dubai, Melbourne, Riyadh, Monterrey, Kochi and

Shanghai.

In most cases knowledge economy districts are

devised to function as part of a city’s economic devel-

opment strategy that brings together ideas about inno-

vation, global markets, and human capital under a

medium or long-term plan. In some cases they demon-

strate a city’s intention to increase the skills and knowl-

edge of residents as a tool for urban regeneration and

social development. They may also be created as a cat-

alyst to building strong spatial relationships between

urban economic clusters.

Knowledge economy districts are rarely created as a

stand-alone project. They tend to be accompanied by

citywide initiatives which include:

– Maintaining a diversified economic base, fed by

extensive supplier and distribution networks and spe-

cialised services

– attracting and nurturing large pools of human

capital

– installing high technology into the city hardware

and into social life more generally

– investing in internal and external transport infra-

structure

– providing a competitive quality of life and place,

through housing, environmental and cultural invest-

ments

3. Knowledge econom y dist r ict s in wor ld cit ies

The specific investment in urban knowledge-econ-

omy districts is growing rapidly. Whereas previously

science and technology parks were mostly constructed

on ‘greenfield’ sites beyond the central city, these new

urban districts are built to be integrated into the urban

terrain. This is largely because urban economics has

shown that innovation and the optimisation of knowl-

edge is achieved through iterative and interactive

processes that rely on citizen involvement, diversity

and more mixed-use environments. In Europe for

example, eight cities including Newcastle and Aarhus

have formed the REDIS network - a group with com-

mitted plans to develop centrally located ‘knowledge

quarters’ devoted to the innovation economy.

Knowledge environments are therefore being located

firmly within the everyday circuits of the city, while still

possessing a distinctive character, clear sense of place

and a perceived internal homogeneity.

Urban knowledge districts take many forms; urban

science parks, technology incubators, media hubs,

knowledge campuses, creative districts, and science

quarters are just some of the ways knowledge-based

economic development take shape in twenty-first cen-

tury cities. In each case they involve the clustering of

R&D activity linked by mixed-use environments bene-

fiting from housing, business, education and leisure

within an organic or artificial urban setting. Three types

of district can be identified:2

1. Business-finance clusters. This usually consists

of the clustering of knowledge-intensive service activi-

ties—e.g. law and management consultancy—around


2. Tan Yigitcanlar, Koray Velibeyoglu and Cristina Martinez-Fernandez(2008), ‘Rising knowledge cities: the role of urban knowledge precincts’,Journal of Knowledge Management, Vol.12 (5).

corporate head offices and other multinational compa-

nies, operating in sync with high-end financial servic-

es. Typically these are located very centrally and

enhance trust and tacit knowledge transfer.

2 High-tech production, usually of ICT or biotech-

nology. A major illustration of this model is Silicon

Valley in the San Francisco metropolitan region, which

functions as a knowledge hub comprising regional uni-

versities and for-profit industry research. Innovations

produced in the hub are then developed by nearby

industries operating in a highly flexible manner.

Sometimes these clusters are developed in suburban

areas with an atmosphere more resembling a universi-

ty campus due to the specific preferences of their engi-

neering knowledge workers.

3 Creative industry clusters —e.g. movie-making,

music and fashion. These clusters rely more heavily on

tacit knowledge and face-to-face communication, and

less on ICT-based social networking.

Because knowledge districts are designed as mixed-

use projects (in order to achieve a critical mass of firms

and knowledge workers), they present a challenge to

the modern city traditionally designed according to

fixed zoning, or mono-functional, planning principles.

Declining housing affordability has presented a

major barrier to the development of knowledge

precinct strategies

What benefits can knowledge districts provide the

actors involved?

– opportunities for sharing resources (i.e. the joint

use of expensive laboratories)

– enhance networking and face-to-face interaction

to produce greater innovation

– strengthens links between firms and universities

– ideal space for incubating start-up firms

– ability to test products on the ‘living lab’ that is the

immediately adjacent city.

What benefits can knowledge districts provide

cities?

Despite the mutual benefits outlined, the effect of

the global recession has been considerable on the

uptake and proposition of knowledge districts, even if

the impact varies across cities. This relates to the firm

division along the lines of how knowledge districts are

financed; there are public sector-led knowledge quar-

ters, which rely on national, regional and supranation-

al (e.g. EU) funding that has been secure through the

crisis. Other cities’ districts involve the private sector as


Theme ExampleHow does a knowledge district benefit?

Branding

Economic agglomeration

Revitalisation

Human capital

Events

Social cohesion and place-making

Leadership

Markets the city as a progressive forward-thinking city committed toknowledge. The district associates the city with a landmark develop-ment committed to grasping the future not the past.

Provides central focal point for all local knowledge economy activity.

Policy tool for urban regeneration, especially of de-industrialisingand/or environmentally degraded zones in the inner or near-innercity.

Attracts highly skilled talent both domestically and from abroad.

Lever for attracting business events and potentially larger-scale inter-governmental activity.

Provide a setting for enhanced interaction, pedestrianisation, face-to-face contact, place identity and generally improved social capital.

Offers an ideal setting for identifying and supporting talent that, if suitably mentored, can become the future business leadership of the city.

Barcelona 22@, Taipei 101

Crossroads Copenhagen, Boston InnovationDistrict

Helsinki Digital Village, Seoul Digital Media City

Dubai Media City, Silicon Alley

Masdar, Abu Dhabi

one-north Singapore

one-north Singapore

the primary investor, and the value proposition has

dramatically declined.3 Land prices and real estate val-

ues have fallen, meaning that private investors achieve

lower than expected revenues. As a result, developers

have downsized their infrastructural ambitions for such

districts, and much of the private funding for districts

has evaporated altogether.

This has happened for example in Newcastle’s

Science central knowledge quarter, where public sector

funding is struggling to fill the gap over the short term.

Other impacts elsewhere include a lack of funding and

risk capital for firms which occupy the knowledge dis-

tricts. Bio-technology and life-science companies are

particularly affected, meaning many end up looking for

alternative locations. The medium-term fate of knowl-

edge districts also is heavily dependent on how sup-

portive national governments are in boosting R&D and

knowledge investments.

4. Case st udies from Singapore, New York,

Seoul, Bost on, and Barcelona.

one-north Singapore

Announced in 2000, One North is a 500-acre dis-

trict in south-west Singapore, close to the National

University of Singapore, National University Hospital,

and Singapore Polytechnic. Modeled on Silicon Valley,

and named because Singapore is lies 1 degree north of

the Equator, the entire project is to cost $7 billion up to

2025. When fully completed, One-North will house

state-of-the-art R&D infrastructure to provide a wider

focal point for R&D and entrepreneurial activities in

the bio-sciences and information technology. One-

north has been described by the city-state government

as ‘the icon of the new economy in Singapore’ and an

opportunity to ‘transport Singapore's economy into

the knowledge age.’4

One North hosts a series of interconnected re -

search clusters for biosciences, interactive media,

physical sciences, and health care. The target is to cre-

ate a space for firms in one sector to draw upon talent

in others.

One North is committed to mixed-use development

that can create a vibrant 24-hour community. Res tau -

rants, cultural facilities, housing, international schools

and integrated public transport all feature in the One-

North Master Development Plan.

The Biopolis cluster is the most advanced. The idea

for the complex has influences from the US National

Institutes of Health, where government researchers

work alongside private pharmaceutical counterparts.

Since construction began in 2001, the first two phases

of Biopolis have managed to house 1,000 scientists

from seven public research institutes and 20 compa-

nies. Areas include cancer, metabolic disease, and

tropical diseases. The third phase, opened in 2010,

expanded the site to 5,000 scientists, making the one

of the leading clusters of its kind in the world. Firms

have access to low-cost, state-of-the-art lab facilities

equipped with world-class apparatuses. Generous

financial incentives, in the form of tax relief, R&D

grants and training subsidies, have been given to

attract international firms. Equally incentives to for-

eign talent are abundant in order to enrich the talent

pool. The government is providing full scholarships

worth $700,000 to 1,000 PhD candidates. In return, the

graduates agree to work in Singapore for 10 years,

moving back and forth between the public and private

sectors. Singapore’s government hopes this elite will

form a future research core for the city.

Fusionopolis is a 24-story building which works to

drive collaboration in media, communications, and IT.

It has 2 million square feet of office and lab space, an is

home to retail shops, international restaurants, and

recreation facilities. Fusionopolis includes apartments

that function as living labs equipped with experimental

appliances, so prototypes can be tested in action.

Solutions made and tested in Singapore—such as

seamless information technology, GPS-enabled de -


3. Willem van Winden (2010), ‘Urban knowledge Economies Affected by thecrisis?’, URBACT Tribune, http://urbact.eu/fileadmin/general_library/arti-cle-WINDEN_01.pdf.

4. Kai Wen Wong, Tim Bunnel (2006), `New economy' discourse and spacesin Singapore: a case study of one-north’, Environment and Planning A2006, volume 38, pages 69-83.

vices, and home-communicating mobile phones—are

to be presented as the future for Asian cities.

Vista Xchange, is a third cluster, a corporate and

business support hub, while Infopolis is another. One-

North is fairly unusual in that the entire project is

intentionally designed to offer seamless connectivity at

the individual level, by nurturing the face-to-face inter-

actions important for sustaining the innovation ecolo-

gy of the knowledge economy. In the One-North case,

social value is realised by an ecosystem ecology that

promotes endless places of interaction for tacit knowl-

edge transfer among firms and citizen entrepreneurs.

One North, like Silicon Valley, is also pioneering the

‘brain mobility’ of its workers. Its international profes-

sional community is deeply engaged with proximate

firms in the district, but is also creating an exceptional

worldwide network, developing ties with their original

community by leveraging their international social

links. Smaller companies in China, Australia and across

South and East Asia are providing many important out-

sourced services for these cutting edge One-North

occupants, showing the importance of having the

widest possible trade connectivity.

Overall, the One-North research park reflects the

traditional Singaporean approach of investment in

hard infrastructure. It is part of a systematic effort to

refashion its institutions and hardware to manage the

transition to an innovation-based economy.5 One


Font: www.jtc.gov.sg

5. Winston T. H. Koh (2006), ‘ Singapore’s transition to innovation-based eco-nomic growth: infrastructure, institutions and government’s role’, R&DManagement Vol.36 (2).

North is helping the effort to forge global network links

with key high-tech regions to expose research institu-

tions to global collaboration opportunities.

Singapore has shown how a smaller city can com-

pete on the world stage with greater public funding for

investment in basic research, and support for technolo-

gy commercialisation from universities and public

research institutes.

New York Silicon Alley

Silicon Alley is the name given to a vibrant cluster of

technology and new media firms in Lower Manhattan.

First described in 1995, Silicon Alley does not have

defined geographical boundaries. Originally, the cluster

consisted of new media firms in the Garment District

and Chelsea, but this spread to Flatiron District, SoHo

and TriBeCa.

New York’s technology scene was thought to have

evaporated with the dotcom crash in 2000, and doubts

have regularly been expressed because of the city’s

high real estate prices, competing industries and a

shortage of software engineering talent.6 But in fact the

city’s technology hub has actually prospered over the

past 7 years, led by an elite cluster of entrepreneurs. A

couple of years after the dotcom crash, Silicon Alley

began to recover thanks to the initiatives of NY Tech

meetup and NextNY. Innovation has shifted from

chips and hardware to software and design and social

networking, where New York thrives. As of 2009, New

York's Silicon Alley has become the startup leader in

advertising, new media, financial technologies, hosting

many of the world’s most dynamic web 2.0 companies.

247 venture capital deals worth $1.4 billion were struck

in New York in 2009 alone, despite the recession. The

city now attracts a huge volume of venture capital,7

surpassing number 2 city Boston in 2010. Seed funding

is up 50% between 2009 and 2011.8 Google purchased

the largest office space in New York in 2011, while

Apple and Facebook now have firmly established

bases in the city. New York’s success over the past few

years has been such that start-ups are now appearing

in boroughs beyond the original hub of Lower

Manhattan.

In New York’s case its technology (re)structuring has

proceeded fairly organically, as a dependent and deriv-

ative effect of global market forces and the concentra-

tion of wealth and talent already in place in the city. Yet

despite the image that this success has developed out-

side of city government input, New York City’s admin-

istration has worked hard to invest in the city’s start-up

potential.

The New York City government in 2011 has created

a ‘Road Map for the Digital City’ inviting institutions

across the world to send in plans to build a new applied

science research campus in New York. The report aims

to make New York ‘the world’s top-ranked Digital City,

based on indices of Internet access, Open Government,

citizen engagement, and industry growth.’ The city has

partnered with Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, and Four -

square to launch official accounts on each social net-

work that will serve as ‘one-stop shops’ for city news

and feedback from citizens. New York will also ‘unlock

important public information’ and increase access to

WiFi in parks and other public areas.9

We are going to be the IT capital of the world. New

York may be where the next Google or Facebook gets

born, or has already been born.

Mayor Michael Bloomberg, 2011

Led by the New York City Economic Development

Corporation (NYCEDC), the city is continuing to sup-

port a vibrant digital media sector in the following

ways:

– The establishment of a new engineering insti-

tu tion . In December 2010, NYCEDC invited leading

institutions around the world to explore the opportuni-

ty to build or expand an applied sciences facility in New

York City, leveraging City-owned property and a

potential capital investment to augment their own.


6. NYConvergence (2011), http://nyconvergence.com/2011/07/ny-tech-council-director-skeptical-that-ny-is-the-next-silicon-valley.html.

7. New York Observer (2010), “Silicon Alley High”, http://www.observer.com/2010/silicon-alley-high-guide-new-yorks-new-technology.

8. Business Insider (2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/silicon-alley-is-dead-2011-4.

9. http://bx.businessweek.com/silicon-alley/view?url=http%3A%2F%2Fc.moreover.com%2Fclick%2Fhere.pl%3Fr4631508910%26f%3D9791.

– Expand workforce development p rograms to

support growth and d iversity in the d igital sector

—in particular JumpStart and FastTrac.

– Su pp or t techn ology star t-up in frastru ctu re

needs, both in terms of incubators and broadband

quality/range. The city has a network of eight incuba-

tors, with the Administration providing access to low-

cost office space, as well as training and networking

opportunities, to hundreds of start-ups and small busi-

nesses. Up to mid-2011, these incubators raised more

than $20 million in venture funding and created or sus-

tained over 500 jobs.

– Provide fund ing support. In 2010, the NYCEDC

launched the New York City Entrepreneurial Fund, the

first City-sponsored seed and early-stage investment

fund. In partnership with FirstMark Capital, the fund

makes up to $22 million available to New York City-

based technology start-ups.

– Promote and celebrate NYC’s d igital sector

th rough events and awards. The NYC BigApps 2.0

Competition, for example, has been running since

2010, and allows software developers and members of

the public to create web and mobile applications using

City data. Prizes of up to $40,000 are on offer. The com-

petition is one of the largest open government initia-

tives of its kind, offering more than 350 sets of New

York City official data for the public to download and

use to create digital applications. The initiative pro-

motes transparency across City government, increases

public access to information, and spurs entrepreneur-

ship and job growth in the technology sector. Such a

competition illustrates the opportunity for cities to

stimulate innovation by opening up data for public cre-

ativity.

New York has identified that the biggest drivers of

its digital sector ambitions are the following:

– Attracting and develop ing engineering talen t.

Equipping New York’s future industry and workforce

with an institution to cultivate expertise is seen as

important in helping to fuel the city’s innovation and

economic growth. NYCEDC is also expanding its

FastTrac and JumpStart business training programmes

with tracks for both emerging and existing entrepre-

neurs interested in launching and growing their ven-

tures. FastTrac and JumpStart provides this training at

no cost, with support from the Department of Small

Business Services, SUNY’s Levin Institute, and the

Kaufmann Foundation.

– Broadband connectivity—especially in commer-

cially and industrially zoned areas where there are cur-

rently shortages.

– Real-time access of city data and services in a

cloud-based infrastructure, thereby accessible to start-

ups looking to make their products as user-friendly as

possible.

– Bu siness-fr iend ly in ternal efficiency. New York

is committed to streamlining new business creation,

building on the success of the Business Express wizard

for starting new businesses, and the New Business

Acceleration Team, a taskforce that supports new busi-

nesses as they navigate the process of incorporating

and securing necessary permits and licenses. As much

as possible the streamlining looks to convert processes

that require in-person registration to online formats. A

faster procurement process and improved visibility of

Requests for Proposals (RFP) are also priorities

In order to gauge success the NYCEDC has created

the NYCEDC Innovation Index, a method for meas-

uring innovation using six dimensions: R&D, Finance,

Human Capital, Intellectual Property, High-tech Gross

City Product, and Entrepreneurship and Employment

Dynamic.

New York’s lesson is to cultivate a very large cluster

of medium-sized start-ups rather than focusing on one

or two keynote firms. A major reason for Silicon Alley’s

unlikely success has been its diversity. The cultural

breadth has brought an exceptional knowledge of glob-

al opportunities as well as a range of different

approaches that provide the best tools for overcoming

challenges. A large number of European and Israeli

start-ups have taken advantage of the smaller time dif-

ference between home and Los Angeles’ Silicon Valley.

In addition, New York’s access to other industries,

including media and advertising, has made it very

attractive to start-ups looking to match technology

with content.


Seou l D igital Med ia City

Seoul Digital Media City (SDMC) is a project initi-

ated by Seoul’s metropolitan government to design a

new city that could become the centre of Korean

broadcasting, music, film, computer game, and other

digital media based-industries. Based in the inner-city

area of Mapo-gu, a former decayed logistics hub just 8

kilometres from Seoul CBD, the SDMC is set for full

completion in 2015. A major part of the design of the

district was developed in co-operation with MIT.

Designers and students in the university prepared

design concepts for the city, involving new mixes of

use, advanced wireless communication, and flexible

public spaces. 8,000 apartments are planned for in

SDMC (almost 7,000 of which have already been

delivered).

SDMC benefits from being a consisten t concept.

Unlike Songdo business district, which stretches over 6

million square metres outside the city near the airport,

the SDMC covers just 570,000 square metres—one a

half times the size of London’s Canary Wharf—and is

operated by the metropolitan government well within

the city limits. The centrality of the district and its prox-

imity to all sorts of facilities has generated unprece-

dented interest from all kinds of actors, with already a

significant portion of tenants having migrated from

previous sub-clusters. By late 2010, over 300 companies

had moved in, creating over 20,000 jobs, with 80,000

targeted by 2015. At this point 43% of firms are in IT, a

similar proportion (38%) in Media & Entertainment,

and 13% in services. But SDMC’s strength is that all the

media and entertainment industry's major firms have

already decided to join the district, including TV broad-

casters (such as KBS, SBS, YTN, MBC), press groups

(Chosun Ilbo, Hankook Ilbo, DongA, Seoul Daily), and

media and internet giant CJ E&M. Thus not only is the

proportion of media/entertainment sector firms set to

rise, there is also a very reliable cluster formation with

strong ambitions for the future. The presence of such

major industry-leaders has accelerated the creation of a

genuine city ambience, with amenities growing very

quickly to meet needs.

The metropolitan government has provided an

enabling infrastructure to encourage a thriving media-

entertainment-IT ecosystem. This includes an R&D

Centre called the Business-University Collaboration

Research Centre), a High-Tech Industry Centre provid-

ing cheap rental space and DMC Ville with purpose-


11. http://www.innovationdistrict.org/about-2/.

built serviced apartments for foreign populations, cre-

ated through a public-private partnership. It is impor-

tant to note that the national government also has sup-

ported the project by placing some of its institutions

there, including the Culture Content Centre (Korea

Creative Content Agency, Korean Film Archive) and

the National IT Industry Promotion Agency. Business

leadership is also significant despite the public sector

direction of the project, and this is reflected in the busi-

ness federations which have set up in the district; the

Korea Electronics Association, the Korea Federation of

SMEs, and the Korea German Institute of Technology

(KGIT) and the Korea Film Museum.10

SDMC’s advantage as a district is the major urban

development taking place immediately beyond its bor-

ders. Susaek New Town in Eunpyeong-gu and Gajaeul

New Town in Seodaemun-gu are being built adjacent

to the district, and rail connections are connecting all of

them as well as the city centre and airport. The SDMC

will also host the Japan School in Seoul, while many

many universities and international schools are already

located very closely to the district.

Seoul Lite is the landmark building around which

the city is built. With 133 floors and a height of 640m, it

offers an iconic building around which to build inter-

national recognition and presence. The SDMC also has

a green ‘lung’, the World Cup Park, next to the nearby

World Cup Stadium used in 2002, as well as an eco-vil-

lage that provides much of the low-carbon housing.

Another compelling element of the district, from

both an experiential and marketing perspective, is the

world’s first d igitally ‘m ed iated ’ street, where design

approaches and media technologies are tested in a

reinterpretation of the traditional Korean street.

Conceived by MIT’s design team, the street is to be

equipped throughout with wireless network stations

enabling access to the Internet from any place on or

near the street. A kiosk orchard is on-hand for tempo-

rary workstations and game stations. A composite

video wall will display real-time web camera feeds from

Seoul's sister cities around the world, and a display of

giant bar graphs registers the volume of data flowing in

and out of the district in real-time. Intelligent street

lamps respond to pedestrians as they move along the

street, the colours changing according to people's prox-

imity. And a fleet of free personal transport pods is

available for cruising the street, equipped with voice

recognition software that responds to rider inputs, and

provides spatial information via a spoken-text inter-

face. This unique concept-within-a-district is an exam-

ple of how to brand the district’s concept through its

public design.

Seoul city Business Agency plays a significant role in

facilitating the emergence of a strong SDMC identity.

In terms of nurturing venture capital investment, the

agency has supported the creation of cooperative net-

works between venture firms, SMEs and research insti-

tutes. The district has benefited from an established

cluster of venture capitalist firms in the capital with

established investments in the media industry.

Overall SDMC has been extremely successful thus

far, primarily due to its premium location, compelling

focus, clear purpose and unbending political support at

local and national levels.

Boston Innovation D istrict

Already one of the world’s most advanced knowl-

edge economies, in 2010 Boston belatedly opted to

construct its own innovation district along the South

Boston waterfront. The 1,000 acre District is situated

on underdeveloped land between Boston’s transporta-

tion gateways: next to Boston Harbour, Logan

International Airport, and between two major inter-

state motorways. The city intends to leverage off its

already existing knowledge base nearby, the world-

class infrastructure and the opportunities these bring

for a more focused attempt to create globally appeal-

ing products and services.11

The district vision consists of key projects between

2010 and 2015 to make maximum use of its residential,


10. Seoul Village (2010), http://seoulvillage.blogspot.com/2010/07/seoul-digi-tal-media-city-tour.html.

commercial and industrial space. Ultimately the district

aims to become a ‘unique and vibrant cultural and eco-

nomic centre’.12 There is a very wide range of sectors

already represented in the district. These include phar-

maceuticals and life sciences, small tech firms and

clean energy companies.

The strategy of the district is to forge a culture of

Work, Live and Play: Acknowledging that the cluster-

ing of talent produces innovation at a quicker rate, as

well enabling the sharing of technologies and knowl-

edge, the district seeks to place small firms in close

proximity to large firms who have access to capital and

the ability to scale and grow ideas. The city is creating a

number of collaborative venues and open-plan space

to foster the creative process, offering ‘unparalleled

opportunities to organically grow projects and net-

works among entrepreneurs.’13 This includes an

Innovation Center, which will serve as a meeting and

networking space for companies.

Alongside this the city government is also working

closely with design professionals and developers to

produce a range of new housing options to fit the wide

diversity of lifestyles and needs of the innovation work-

force. Finally Boston’s innovation district makes an

explicit commitment to social infrastructure, to shared

innovation across sectors and across income groups,

with citizens gaining new supportive job opportunities

at a range of skill levels. The city is prepared to open up

many districts to the living lab tests of technology

firms.

Although the district’s planned life sciences

strengths are challenged by the popularity of nearby


12. http://bostinnovation.com/2011/07/13/mayor-menino-announces-natio-nal-endowment-for-the-arts-awards-50000-to-fund-our-town-project/.

13. http://bostonherald.com/business/healthcare/view.bg?articleid=1349819&srvc=business&position=4.

14. http://bostonherald.com/business/healthcare/view.bg?articleid=1349819&srvc=business&position=4.

15. ttp://www.wbur.org/2011/06/22/vertex-groundbreaking.

16.http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2011/07/01/marine_tourism_gaining_steam/?page=1.

17. http://www.fp3boston.com/html/boston-welcomes-its-newest-skyscraper-the-atlantic-wharf/.

Cambridge, closer to Harvard University and MIT, the

city is hopeful that many, even most, young graduate

researchers and scientists would prefer to be based

more centrally in Boston. Therefore the city is seeking to

persuade out-of-state and international life sciences

companies to base themselves there. Pharmaceutical

companies have already moved to the district; working

in and around the Seaport Center which is leasing top-

quality lab space.14 Cancer drug firm Acetylon Phar ma -

ceuticals already has a presence, while Vertex Phar ma -

ceuticals formally begun construction on a two-building

complex with more than a million feet of office space in

mid-2011, at a rental cost of $73 million. The construc-

tion is the largest private construction contract current-

ly underway anywhere in the US.15

In terms of funding, Boston’s city government has

been highly proactive. It put together a massive $72

million package of government incentives for Vertex

move. It is also aiming to leverage the city’s status as a

magnet for federal research funding as part of its inno-

vation district brand campaign. Boston drew more

National Institutes of Health grant dollars in 2010 than

any other US city in every year since 1995 – approxi-

mately $2 billion a year. The district also hopes the dis-

trict’s hosting of the annual BIO convention in 2011,

which attracts 20,000 biotechnology executives and

investors, will provide further valuable exposure, and

will make the area more attractive as a life sciences

centre.

Public-private partnerships are critical for the city’s

plans to use the intensive community to impact on city

quality of life. The district is aiming for a PPP that can

bring solar power to Boston municipal, commercial and

residential uses. Elsewhere, in July 2011 a Boston-based

PPP between the city, and a number of design col-

leges/museums attracted national funding to support

its new artist community in the district and a new con-

temporary art museum. The PPP has already started to

plan a number of community outreach programmes to

show how design can positively impact the built envi-

ronment.

Other sources of funding naturally are sought from

venture capital firms. Boston’s city government is hop-

ing to appeal to venture capital firms from other parts

of the state and elsewhere with attractive real estate

within the project’s borders. The city envisions a hub

where smaller early stage companies can rub elbows or

collaborate with larger companies and venture capital-

ists with both capital and connections. The city plans to

launch Venture Boston to attract venture capital firms to

be more involved in the district and the work being

done in the area.

On the branding and marketing front, Boston antic-

ipates that this district will become a pioneer of envi-

ronmental leadership – showing more openly than

other smart city environments what technologies can

change resident and worker behaviour. Not only does

the district intend to become known as a ‘ResilienCity’

up to 2035, it hopes to become something of a tourist

destination, thanks to its green agenda and riverside

location.16 The $550 million Atlantic Wharf, a mixed-use

development that is Boston’s first LEED green sky-

scraper, is in the heart of the Innovation district. The

Wharf development, opened in 2011, offers restaurants,

residences, boating tours, and cultural institutions,17

and digital media firm Brightcove is one of the big

names to have subsequently relocated there. Atlantic

Wharf represents the last major building to be built on

the Waterfront in the district, as the city plans to trans-

form the Fort Point Channel into a recreational water-

way as an entrance to the District.

Other environmental branding initiatives include

the ‘Solar Challenge’ which combines the city’s vision

for reducing energy costs via clean technology with an

incentive for bright young minds to take up residence

in the area. The goal of the initiative is to generate 1

megawatt of solar powered electricity in the Innovation

District by the end of 2013. As if to indicate its success


Greentown Laboratories, has doubled the number of

resident companies using its start-up clean technology

incubator to 9 in 2011, with the incubator mostly fund-

ed by sponsorship from private entities.18 Similarly the

Fraunhofer Center for Sustainable Energy Systems

(CSE) recently announced that it will be developing a

sustainable energy research and building innovation

centre in the District, and is currently seeking compa-

nies interested in becoming part of what it envisions as

a living laboratory demonstrating the future of green

buildings.

The innovation district is also attracting higher edu-

cation institutions in a city with outstanding credentials

already. Babson College announced that classrooms

and conference room space for MBA courses would

begin in September 2011, as it aims to gain a foothold

by building its Boston presence close to downtown

businesses.19 The higher education angle is critical to

the global appeal of the district, given the proximity to

several of the world’s leading universities.

Overall Boston has a compelling economic develop-

ment strategy for attracting the creative class to its

Innovation District. Its place-based, innovation-driven

strategy has institutional support and is stabilised by

the volume of young talent already in the city suitably

qualified to start new firms or join larger ones.

Barcelona 22@ d istrict

The 22@ district of innovation is emerging within

the former industrial neighbourhood of Poblenou, once

a major centre of industrial activity—textiles, metals,

logistics—serving Catalonia. The area, as a collection of

brownfield former industrial sites to the north east of

central Barcelona, and south of Sant Marti, was suffer-

ing very serious marginalisation and fragmentation

prior to its revitalisation.

The major stimulus for revitalising the area was the

1992 Olympic Games. The transformation of Poblenou

formed part of a wider strategic plan developed for

eastern Barcelona, including a new high-speed inter-

modal railway station (La Sagrera), a new

regional/international hub (Plaza de las Glories), and

the creation of quality multi-functional spaces (such as

the Media-Tic building and Torre Agbar). One of 22@’s

major objectives was to leverage the centrality of

Poblenou to dramatically increase the density of

employment in the city, rather than witness further

urban sprawl. Beginning in 2000, the plan proposed to

use these interventions to develop a more confident

socio-economic identity for the area. Policies have

aimed to create a high-technology neighbourhood rich

in firms from the ICT, multimedia, energy, biotechnol-

ogy, and design sectors, with a specific and pioneering

aim to encourage synergies between the clusters.20

Infrastructure played a key role here; more than 3

million square metres of technologically advanced

space was made available for innovative firms, as well

as ample green space and thousands of quality apart-

ments. Unusually for many such regeneration schemes

begun at this time, the 22@Barcelona plan included

some provision for housing and social amenities,

including affordable housing, health facilities, leisure

and sports amenities, international schools and full 24

hour services.

A central role in boosting the clustering effect in

22@ has been played by research centres and specialist

university departments. These institutions have sup-

ported the agglomeration process and have forged

intensive relationships with many of the larger firms.

Since its foundation in 2000, the innovation district has

managed to attract more than 1,500 firms, successfully

attracting talent from all around Spain and many EU

countries. Nearly 50,000 jobs have been created, with

an ambition to reach 100,000. 70% of the new firms

operating within 22@ are working in the five strategic

clusters.


18. http://www.bizjournals.com/mobile/boston/news/2011/06/21/new-boston-cleantech-incubator-grows.html.

19. http://www.milforddailynews.com/archive/x1260738069/Business-Digest-for-June-21#ixzz1SfCGlf9F.

20. Angélo Battaglia and Diane-Gabrielle Trembla (2011), ‘22@ and theInnovation District in Barcelona and Montreal : a process of clusteringdevelopment between urban regeneration and economic competitiveness’,Télé-université of the Université du Québec, http://www.teluq.uqam.ca/chaireecosavoir/pdf/NRC11-3A.pdf.

Some of the primary obstacles the project faced

have included the fact that the human capital of the

area initially did not meet industry cluster needs, with

a low degree-level education ratio, while entrepreneur-

ship was minimal. This has meant that there was a low

initial base of local firms ready to collaborate, share

information, and take risks with new technologies and

business models. Secondly there was no substantive

provision of venture capital funding, always crucial to

attracting firms and supporting start-ups in industry

clusters. Furthermore Barcelona had few large estab-

lished firms outside financial services, with Madrid

being recently favoured (often with national Gov sup-

port), and as a result it has been only weakly embedded

in international corporate circuits.21

Despite these initial challenges, Barcelona’s 22@

project demonstrates how sustained public sector-led

initiatives can stimulate economic transformation and

cluster development. Using municipal capital,

Barcelona City Council also created Barcelona Activa,

an ‘enterprise agency’ operating on a city wide basis,

that would help generate new enterprises for the area.

Effectively the agency functioned as an independent

management tool for economic local development. It

deployed the instruments needed for a transformation

to the knowledge and entrepreneurship mode.

The agency plays a strategic role in supporting and

attracting local and foreign companies. 22@ has

sought to develop local assets that are capable of gain-

ing global networking skills through international

partnerships, with mixed results. The project is a dis-

tinct example of how urban planning has comprehen-

sively transformed a district’s territorial use, and in so

doing redirected the city’s ambitions to the global

level. The city now enjoys international leadership in

many of its strategic centres, and the international

community in the 22@ district constitutes close to 20%

of the population. What is remarkable is the success of

SMEs; two-thirds of the firms in 22@ have 10 or fewer

employees.22

Barcelona’s strategy with 22@ has been heavily ori-

ented to economic revitalisation rather than deeper

socio-cultural impacts. Nevertheless there has been an

emphasis on mixing high-end services with more tradi-

tional shops in order to increase overall socio-economic

dynamism. The Poblenou district has evolved from an

infrastructure-deprived area to a connected hub embed-

ded in global communication networks, although

encouraging an international vision among smaller firms

has proven difficult. Most importantly 22@ has proven a

powerful brand symbolising the city’s past and future,

and has been compelling enough to unite professionals,

technicians, land promoters, civic associations, munici-

pal councillors and other actors. This also has a clear

design element to it, embodied in the ambition of Agbar

Tower. Its transformation functions as a statement, a

commitment to creating a model of a compact, diversi-

fied and economically sustainable city.

The 22@ district continues to face several barriers to

business-to-business and knowledge worker engage-

ment. The comparatively limited number of major

national and international firms headquartered in

Barcelona are seen as limiting career opportunities and

partly responsible for fairly uncompetitive pay levels.

The predominance of Catalan as the working, internet

and social language has proved a barrier for interna-

tional workers more likely to be competent or prepared

to learn Spanish than Catalan. Strong internal hierar-

chies are also thought to be disincentives, while despite

strong efforts by the city to promote venture capital

funds, small firms have found access difficult.

Considerable overlap has been identified among the

city’s local economic development institutions, such as

the Chambers of Commerce, CIDEM, ACI and COPCA,

while their capacity to meet the expertise, responsive-

ness and funding needs of firms and entrepreneurs is

limited.

Barcelona’s experience overall demonstrates best

practice in terms of confidence-boosting branding and

urban regeneration which many policymakers world-


22. Marc Gafarot (2010), ‘City Knowledge and Innovation in the 21stCentury’, Catalan International View.

21. Nick Leon, Volume 10, Issue 2-3, October-December 2008.


Clusters Range of amenities Leadership Investment

typesMethod

of brandingInternational firm

presenceCity government

initiatives

Singapore(one-north)

New York(Silicon Alley)

Seoul(Digital Media City)

Boston(InnovationDistrict)

Barcelona(22@)

Biotech, interactivemedia, physical sciences, health care

IT, TechnologyNew Media

Media, film,music and IT

Life sciences/pharma-ceuti-cals; Cleantechnology

ICT, multi-media, energy,bio-technology,and design

24-hr communityecology: restaurants,cultural facilities, liv-ing-lab housing,internationalschools, integratedpublic transport

Compre-hensive asorganically insertedinto city centre, buthousing is notori-ously expensive

Mixed-use publicspace; 8,000 apart-ments—some pur-pose-built for for-eign populations;sporting facilities,eco village, adjacentnew towns withinternationalschools

Collaborative com-mercial spaces; resi-dential and recre-ational facilities onwaterfront

Housing and enter-tain-ment for cre-ative classes, butlimited educationand nightlife facilities

Research institutesand university-led,with clear publicstrategy

Mostly organic busi-ness-led, nowactively facilitatedby city govt at armslength

Metropolitan govtprovides businesssupport backedheavily by nationalgovt. Local develop-ment agencies lookafter relationships

Brainchild of CityMayor, who isdirecting the agen-da through branch-es of city govern-ment. Limitedbusiness leadershipthus far.

City administration-led; subsidiary agen-cies eg. BarcelonaActiva provideindependent man-agement. Researchdepts and businesshas played a guidingrole. Collective cityproject.

Substantial public-private investmentin hard infrastruc-ture and technologycommercialisation

Huge backing fromventure capitalfirms providesimpetus. Investment drivenby business to busi-ness consumption

Mostly city govern-ment funds, somePPPs for housingfacilities. Publicfinance toSME/micro creativeenterprises. SeoulBusiness Agencynurtures venturecapital investment

Big tax incentives toincoming firms.Leverage nationalfunding especially inhealth sector,new VentureBoston initiative toattract VCs

Infrastructuralinvestment fromthe public sector. Local business insti-tutions provide lim-ited support toentrepreneurs

Forge globalnetwork linkswith key high-tech regions

Using city’sestablished cre-dentials to com-pare favourablywith SiliconValley

Tight, consistentconcept toattract all majorplayers. Iconiclandmark SeoulLite, World Cupstadium incor-porated,keynote digitalstreet.

Environmentalleadership—ResilienCity; linkto higher educa-tion branding

Using the con-cept, design andlandmarks tosymbolise gen-eralised trans-form-ation andglobal position-ing

Strong and growing,with internationalprofessional com-munity creating anetwork, throughold community ties,esp in China,Australia and SouthAsia

Began with mostlySMEs, recentlyattracted largerfirms with estab-lished subcontract-ing linkages andhighly developed(inter)national Markets

Reliance mostly onlarge national firmsto set the founda-tion for local start-ups and internation-al linkages

Heavily sought afteralthough mostlynational and statefirms so far.

Some, but manySMEs. Developinglocal and regional markets.International firmshave under-devel-oped links withlocal companies

Low-cost, state-of-the-ar tlab facilities; generous finan-cial incentives in the formof tax relief, R&D grantsand training subsidies toattract international firms;Incentives to foreign tal-ent—1,000 $700,000scholarships

Engineering talent attrac-tion scheme, new scienceresearch campus, makingpublic data accessible, lowcost office space, work-force development pro-grammes, broadbandimprovement, events andcompetitions, InnovationIndex

Moving city institutions intodistrict; enabling infrastruc-ture such as and R&DCentre/High Tech Centre

Venture Boston; InnovationCenter for explicit collabo-ration; Solar Challengecompetition; well-resourcedPPPs and national fundingpleas; trust relationshipswith incoming firms

Efforts to internationalisemarket reach; improvingentrepreneurship anddeveloping local assets sothat they are capable offorming international part-nerships; promotion of ven-ture capital investment

wide herald as an exciting model to emulate. The 22@

district is one of the world’s first dedicated to creating

an environment for the ‘creative classes’ and aiming to

maximise opportunities of international and local col-

laboration within and between sectors. However the

strategy and experience of the district development

demonstrate that the infrastructure and investment

has not been able to overcome large pockets of the

city’s risk-averse and introspective business culture.

The precise offer and significance of 22@ is not as

effectively marketed internationally as it could be,

while the links between local and international firms

are not as strong as in Singapore’s One-North, for

example. The partnership and leadership of the inter-

national presence in 22@ is not as systematic as it has

needed to be.

5. Observat ions

Arising from the case studies are some clear obser-

vations about successful knowledge districts. The com-

mon ingredients are that such districts:

- develop a rigorous and com pelling concept.

Firms and institutes involved, as well as ancillary

organisations, operate best when working around a

‘tight’ idea of the district, so that there is no focus on

weakly related activity that detracts from the area’s

intensity. Even as districts must be ready to adapt to

hyper-mobility and to provide settings for temporary

networking, there must still be a clear physical struc-

ture and collective ambition. This can be achieved

through strict admission criteria for tenants, specific

architectural styles, and purposeful design of public

spaces

- have a clear and shared identity. Occupants

have similar ambitions and motivations for location. In

such a situation they forge a series of joint initiatives

designed to promote exchange and predict trends,

enabled by a well-designed district layout. This creates

an environment of belonging, as well as providing the

groundwork for displaying an image to the outside

world.

- are well-connected to the city, both geograph i-

cally and admin istratively. Knowledge parks benefit

from clear physical and social links to the historic parts

of the city and other major gathering places. Tenants in

a district learn directly from the wide range of activities

taking place elsewhere in the city, and are able to cre-

ate synergies with urban trends if the connections

allow. In the same way knowledge districts should be

well synergised with the identity of the city, which is

best achieved through regular engagement and collab-

oration with the city government.

- look to host m u ltip le knowledge fields. The

favouring of just one or two knowledge fields can ham-

per other forms of new knowledge, resulting in a

decline in knowledge attraction and, perhaps, urging

scientists to emigrate. Policies are best oriented towards

fundamental knowledge circuits, accepting that com-

mercialisation outcomes are not always foreseeable and

cannot be consistently manufactured over the long-

term.

- are in attractive settings. Many studies have

shown the crucial importance of knowledge workers’

desires and attitudes in the shaping of successful

knowledge precincts.23 Knowledge workers are most

productive in mixed-use developments that provide

quality recreational and informal networking opportu-

nities. Highly skilled, creative and entrepreneurially-

minded people need dynamic environments with suit-

able ambiances and strong connections to the rest of

the city and to key transport links.

- exp loit all in ternational links of its knowledge

workers. The most vibrant and sustainable technology

districts, such as Silicon Alley in New York, make max-

imum use of its population diversity, mobility and

international social networks to create systematic and

reliable global trade links. These districts embrace their

‘brain mobility’ - individuals working in one or more

locations and moving seamlessly between them. The


23. eg Yigitcanlar, T., Baum, S. and Horton, S. (2007), ‘Attracting and retai-ning knowledge workers in knowledge cities’, Journal of KnowledgeManagement, Vol. 11 No. 5, pp. 6-17.

benefits of skilled professionals and senior managers

returning ‘home’ part time or for a short period to

establish local businesses that can supply firms in the

knowledge district are understood and promoted.

- capture the knowledge sp ill-overs in to local

firm s. This is achieved through a culture, often fostered

by the city government, of collaboration and desire to

share knowledge among local and new international

communities. Providing local institutions with the con-

fidence and know-how to interact on a mutually bene-

ficial level with global giants is vital. Reliance on

attracting international human capital to catalyse eco-

nomic development without considering the needs for

proper measures to connect this new population to the

existing one, its firms and institutions is rarely success-

ful. Proactivity is needed in making connections

between key players.

However, reliance on one or even a small set of

linked initiatives, in very specific locations, is insuffi-

cient for success in developing knowledge city status a

systemic approach is required. Supply-side policies

alone are insufficient and need complementing with

demand-side initiatives. What else do urban economic

strategies need to achieve in world cities?

- Innovation embedded across the city. In no va -

tion concepts need to include perspectives on social and

economic development, R&D and job creation and

business and economic value creation across all busi-

ness sectors. As such cities need to embrace social inno-

vation and public sector innovation, in addition to the

spatially confined knowledge districts. Such a holistic

approach is now being developed in Hong Kong.24

- In tegrated knowledge strategies need to be

properly linked to the development and planning pri-

orities in the region so that support policies can be

designed more effectively. Often land-use and and

infrastructure plans for population growth fail to take

into account the absence of knowledge institutions in

that area of the city, which will lead to serious knowl-

edge access deficits.

- Wide d iversity of sector skills is crucial to help

knowledge hubs re-invent themselves when confront-

ed with industry, technological or marketplace

changes. Narrow specialisms will result in a lack of

human capital to generate new industries and employ-

ment and to attract new firms and investment.

- Deep, rich and varied network connections.

Infrastructure is not enough. Even talent and infra-

structure is not enough. Hard and soft incubator infra-

structures with state-of-the-art office space cannot

produce commercial innovations without a more com-

prehensive grasp of how knowledge is generated,

transmitted and transferred. Cities need to have strong

dialogue with knowledge-producing centres such as

universities and research institutes to ensure needs are

being met and that the functional operations of knowl-

edge networks are being catered for. Although high

quality human and social capital will aid the chances of

successful high value services being developed in a

knowledge district, suitable connections and network

opportunities remain critical to the hub retaining a last-

ing zeitgeist.

- Facilitate cluster relationsh ips. Local policies

still have a key role in enabling the spatial relationships

of urban development clusters. Accessibility between

collaborative networks (and their constituent firms and

workers) across the city is vital for retaining the vitality

of knowledge. Effective networking programmes (eg

business events) and enhanced business friendly ICT

services can play their role here. Equally demand-side

initiatives to involve all clusters in a district can be

deployed, such as collaborative teaching models or dig-

italisation of services.

- Com mitment to un iversal h igh-quality educa-

tion with particu lar investm ent in English -lan -

guage train ing. Knowledge districts devoted to inter-

national creative clusters are held back when the level

of English and other foreign languages spoken in the

city generally is modest. The extension of English lan-

guage training in schools and colleges is important to


24. Alan Lun (2011), ‘Hong Kong’s Innovation and Technology Role inMainland China’s 12th Five Year Plan’, http://www.apicc.asia/wp-con-tent/uploads/2011/03/HKs-Inno-Tech-Role-in-12-5.pdf.

all non-English speaking cities. Alongside this is the

importance of wide and varied international school

provision in or nearby to the district to cater for the

children of knowledge workers. This factors is often

overlooked but is one of the first priorities for the inter-

national knowledge community in any city.

Overall, this short review of knowledge economy

districts shows that they are now a key part of world

city economic development strategies. But it also

reveals that more is needed to create and foster the

long term success of the knowledge city.

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Abst ract

In the New Economy, knowledge-based companies are

integrated in urban environments and create synergies

with artistic, cultural and social sectors. Where policymak-

ers are working together with urban planners, technologist

and sociologist, governments are trying to create these

Knowledge Cities in old industrial areas of the inner cities.

In this article we analyze Knowledge Cities as the

resulting organization from the natural evolution that start-

ed with the promotion of a suburban Science Park. The

22@Barcelona is a project which is trying to transform an

old industrial area of the inner city into an innovative dis-

trict consisting of universities, research centres and knowl-

edge-based industries, as well as social and public facilities.

The project entails an integrated urban, economic and

social development.

Int roduct ion

The integration of design, architecture, art and

advanced technologies is transforming the landscape and

structure of cities around the world. In spite of the propen-

sity of urban planners to move industries out of metropol-

itan areas, various studies have evidenced that the com-

pact nature of the cities facilitates communication and thus

that metropolitan environments are the most natural con-

text in which to understand the mechanics of economic

growth (Jacobs, 1984; Lucas, 1993; Feldman and

Audretsch, 1999; Etzkowitz and Dzisah, 2008). Larger

cities support industrial development as they concentrate

services and resources, and provide excellent possibilities

for internal and external communication (Anderson,

1985).

Cities play an important role in the New Economy

where face-to-face interaction, networking and trade

remains vital (Landry, 2000). The tendency of urban plan-

ners is now to replace old manufacturers and industrial

metropolitan areas with Knowledge Cities, which emerge

from the equilibrium between the production system and

the urban cultural environment (Scott, 2006). Cities that

stimulate and rejuvenate various forms of knowledge

serve as knowledge centres (Knight, 1995) and attract a

creative and highly skilled workforce (Florida, 2008).

Unlike traditional Science Parks, Knowledge Cities

host significant concentrations of creative industries,

including high-technology, artistic and cultural sectors,

and are integrated in a wider social context (Scott, 2000).

The goal of this paper is to analyze the evolution of tradi-

tional Science Parks into Knowledge Cities. Many studies

have been developed around cluster organizations (see

e.g. Porter 1990, 1998) and around the location of knowl-

edge-based clusters in the inner cities (see e.g. Porter,

1997; Leibovitz, 2004; Godospini, 2006). In recent years,

some scholars have also included the artistic, cultural and

social approach in this research field and have focused on

analyzing Creative Cities (see e.g. Scott, 2000, 2006;

Lazzeretti and Nencioni, 2005), Industrial Districts

(Becattini, 1990, 1986) and Knowledge Cities (see e.g.

O’Mara, 2005). However, none of them have analyzed the

development of Knowledge Cities as a product of the nat-

ural evolution from traditional suburban Science Parks to

Knowledge Cities, all the way through Industrial Districts

22@ Barcelona: a knowledge city beyond science parks

Henry EtzkowitzStanford University

Josep Miquel PiquéBarcelona City Council


and Urban Science Parks. Specifically, we aim to define a

Knowledge City as a further developed Urban Science

Park that in many cases can be successfully promoted by

urban policymakers. We use the case of the 22@Barcelona

as an example of a Knowledge City that is being promot-

ed in the metropolitan area of Barcelona.

Our contribution builds upon the results of the study

presented at the Triple Helix Conference (New York-1998) by

Bellavista and Albericio (1998), which analyzed the

Barcelona Science Park. Our analysis contributes to a bet-

ter understanding of the benefits and idiosyncrasies of

Knowledge Cities where a diversity of high-technology,

art, social services and entertainment activities are co-

located within metropolitan areas. By identifying the main

characteristics of an integrated and highly creative

Knowledge City, the study may help urbanplanners maxi-

mize their efforts to successfully develop science and inno-

vation clusters in the inner cities.

The paper is divided into five sections. The first section

analyzes the potential of the metropolitan area to support

economic activities. The second section studies the syner-

gies between art and technology when both components

are combined and integrated in the inner cities. The third

section studies the differences and similarities between

traditional Science Parks and Knowledge Cities by pre-

senting them as different stages of an evolutionary devel-

opment process: from Science Parks towards Knowledge

Cities. The fourth section analyzes the case of the

22@Barcelona as an example of a Knowledge City. Finally,

the fifth section presents the conclusions and discusses the

results of the practical analysis. Further research questions

are also proposed in the last section.

Transformat ion of cit ies: new economy

met ropolit an clust ers

In the last twenty years, many studies have analyzed

how cities are adapting to the global economy. The stud-

ies consider different approaches, ranging from general

overviews of development and organization of inner

cities (Sassen, 1991, 1998, 2002; Knight, 1995;

Gospodini, 2006) to more specific subjects such as gen-

trification effects (Atkinson, 2004), sustainable develop-

ment (Hall, 1997), urban environment and health

(McMichael, 2000), urban regeneration polities

(Marcotullio, 2003; Atkinson, 2004; Thomson et al.,

2006), and cities’ competitiveness (Brotchie et al., 1995;

Jensen-Butler et al., 1997; Lever, 1999; Strambach, 2002),

among others. Among the subjects, special attention has

been paid to the development of the New Economy in

the inner cities (Hutton, 2000, 2004) and the consequent

development of Urban Knowledge Parks (Bugliarello,

2004) and Creative and Knowledge Cities (Lever, 2002;

Florida, 2005; Costa et al., 2008; Pratt, 2008).

New cities retain hardly any of their former tradi-

tional, local and static nature. Old manufacturers and

other industrial factories that are associated with decay-

ing, polluted environments are moved away from met-

ropolitan areas while other industries such as finance

and health care remain. These industries, in turn, ease

the emergence and promote the growth of new compa-

nies and industries that benefit from access to service

providers, logistical infrastructure and entertainment or

tourist centers; from satisfying the big demand of the

local market especially in retailing, financial services,

and personal services; from capitalizing nearby regional

clusters; and from having access to widely skilled labour

(Porter, 1995).

In the inner cities, clusters of interlinked firms and

organizations operate at world-class levels of competi-

tiveness (Porter, 1998). Companies take advantage of

social agglomeration factors such as critical masses of

skills and relationships, access to information, and the

availability of specific infrastructure in a given field

(Uterback, 1998; Hutton, 2004; Porter, 1995). Because of

their compact structure, cities facilitate face-to-face

communication and networking (Anderson, 1985;

Batten, 1995; Malecki, 2002) and thus are the most nat-

ural context in which to understand the mechanics of

economic growth (Lucas, 1993; Jacobs, 1984; Feldman

and Audretsch, 1999; Etzkowitz and Dzisah, 2008). As a

result of agglomeration effects, New Economy

Metropolitan Clusters comprise not just isolated firms

but rather substantial ensembles of dynamic industries

(Hutton, 2004). Many of these agglomerations of eco-


nomic activities have been promoted by public and pri-

vate institutions to renew old industrial areas in the

inner cities while others have resulted from the natural

evolution of these areas and their transformation into

Urban Science Parks. These urban innovation hubs ben-

efit from easy access to a large and diverse pool of

labour and other resources that benefit the companies

in technology hubs (Luger and Goldstein, 1991).

Previous studies have shown that medium- and large-

sized metropolitan areas seem to be the suitable loca-

tions for Science Parks (Massey et al., 1992). In fact,

some studies have shown that workers that have to

commute long distances to their jobs in suburban

Science Parks experience considerable costs and incon-

veniences (Luger and Goldstein, 1991).

Increasingly, knowledge-based and technology-

intensive industries are taking the place of old industri-

al—and, in some cases, even residential—districts in the

large urban agglomerations (Hutton, 2004). As cluster-

ing forces drive talented, innovative and creative people

to concentrate in the most knowledge-intensive cities

and regions (Florida, 2008), in the New Economy the

tendency is to attract the talent by promoting the cre-

ation of New Economy Metropolitan Clusters. These

highly skilled employees are more sophisticated about

their quality of life (Knight, 1995), and thus business

agglomerations must provide an environment very dif-

ferent from that required by commodity-based, manu-

facturing activities in the production sector; they must

offer amenities, entertainment opportunities as well as

“soft factors”, software and orgware and (see Knight

and Stanback, 1970; Knight, 1973). Quality of life has

become a competitive tool for cities (Landry, 2000;

Malecki, 2000), and a successful urban structure seems

to be the one that has a rational and homogeneous dis-

tribution of economic and social activities, as well as of

housing spaces, green areas and other spaces, and cre-

ates a perfect equilibrium among economic develop-

ment, sustainability and quality of life (Lever, 1999). In

the New Economy, attractive cities offer quality educa-

tion, public transportation and health-care systems, as

well as cultural and entertainment amenities (see e.g.

Lyne, 1988; Hart et al., 1989; Decker and Crompton,

1990; Evans, 1994; Halstead and Steven, 1997). In urban

productive agglomerations, high- and clean-technology

knowledge-based enterprises coexist together with cul-

tural and leisure industries (Hutton, 2004). These

Science Parks combine technology, including computer

graphics and imaging, software design, multimedia

industries and graphic design industries that have been

deeply influenced by technological development; culture

represented by creative human capital and design func-

tions; and place and more specifically the innovative

milieu of the inner city (Hutton, 2004).

Cult ure, ar t and technology int egrat ion

in creat ive cit ies

A creative city is a socio-economic-productive organ-

ization that heightens its creative advantage by hosting

cultural industries and employing creative workers

(Lazzeretti and Nencioni, 2005). In general, these cities

are developed around a network of industries that gath-

er together in a geographic space or cluster and attract

many professionals, managerial, and technical workers

(Scott, 2006). Creative cities emerge where New

Economy is well developed and where there is an equi-

librium between the production system and the urban

cultural environment (Scott, 2006). The industries in

these clusters are creative industries, an extension of the

cultural sector that includes the multimedia sector and

other industries related to new technologies1 (Lazzereti

and Nencione, 2005). They are industries that supply


1. In many recent studies all three terms “Arts Industry”, “Cultural Industries”and the “Creative Industries” have been used interchangeably. We will use theconcept of creative industries as a compilation of three of them. According tothe Creative Industries mapping Document (2001) creative industries inclu-de advertising; architecture; art and antiques trade; crafts; design; designer

fashion; film, video, music and photography; music, visual and performingarts; publishing; software, computer games and electronic publishing, andtelevision and radio industries. Cultural industries as well as cultural goodsand services, are extremely heterogeneous as the outputs are strongly depen-dent on place-specific contexts and cultural environments (Scott, 2000).

goods and services associated with cultural, artistic and

entertainment values (Caves, 2000).

The convergence of technology, economy and art is

a competitive advantage in attracting creative workers

(Lazzeretti and Nencioni, 2005). These workers

demand the cultural, artistic and entertainment goods

and services that are produced in creative industries.

Thus employees in creative cities are both producers

and consumers of creative outputs (Scott, 2000). As a

result, creative cities consist of high-qualified employ-

ment; offer a wide pool of cultural amenities such as

museums, art galleries, concert halls, and multifaceted

entertainment districts; and provide a visible example

of a social and sustainable city dominated by green

spaces and upscale streetscapes, shopping facilities,

and well-appointed residential enclaves (Scott, 2006).

In these cities, culture plays a strategic role in sus-

tainable economic development (OECD, 2005). Creative

industries attract creative people, and, in turn, these

skilled and creative people attract other skilled and pro-

ductive people (Florida, 2008). Cosmopolitan cities

emerge as a result of the attraction of people from dif-

ferent countries and cultures, and the diversity becomes

a “vital spur to innovation” (Florida, 2008). Cultural

diversity activates new innovation clusters (Sacco and

Pedrini, 2003) and contributes to the rejuvenation of tra-

ditional sectors (Lazzeretti, 2007). In a high-cultural local

system, a large endowment of artistic, natural and cul-

tural resources is sustainably and efficiently managed by

a network of economic, non-economic and institutional

actors (Lazzeretti, 2003). If these “high culture” clusters

evolve into creative ones and transform the culture from

a production factor into a source of innovation (Cooke

and Schwartz, 2007), the environment may be able to

initiate or redevelop a variety of new clusters of innova-

tion and to attract creative professionals (Lazzeretti,

2007). When creative professionals are attracted by cre-

ative industries and these professionals reinforce the

innovation cycles that attract new creative workers, a

creative city emerges (Florida, 2005, 2008).

In some cities, the transformation of culture into

productive factors, and ultimately, into creative cities,

has occurred spontaneously. New York City is probably

one of the most well-known examples of a concentra-

tion of a large number of interconnected organizations

of art, culture and media. In New York City, the result-

ing art and technology clusters have spontaneously

emerged as a result of the activities of a critical mass of

artists and engineers. Now the city has a unique artis-

tic and intellectual nature that attracts creative talent

from all over the world.

Unlike New York, other cities are now on the path to

transform cultural heritage into creative production

factors. For example, Florence has a substantial number

of firms that economically exploit the culture, art and

natural heritage of the city (Lazzeretti, 2003). The

region has more than five thousand private restoration

firms that, although mostly concentrated in the city, are

organized in a network that integrates the local com-

munity. However, the empirical studies have also

shown that cultural heritage in Florence is not a mas-

sive agglomeration of production factors; that the cre-

ative class is not concentrated in this node; and thus

that the city of Florence, despite its rich cultural identi-

ty, cannot strictly be considered a creative city

(Lazzeretti and Nencioni, 2005).

In the same way that policymakers play an impor-

tant role in influencing economic forces, they also play

an important role in making cities within the same

global framework urbanistically different (Marcotullio,

2003). Policymakers can help manage externalities,

resolve free-rider problems, develop high-quality

infrastructure, and provide services such as labour

training and technological advice that otherwise

would be lacking (Scott, 2006). In many countries, the

economic-development programs are already being

defined in combination with cultural promotion efforts

(Scott, 2006). The primary challenge is to create new

types of opportunity and to develop in a way that is

sustainable culturally and environmentally (Knight,

1995).

Currently, Dubai is probably the most significant

example of a public plan that is trying to create an

attractive environment. “Dubai blasted itself on to the


world map” (Landry, 2006). The goal of the plan, which

includes the development of the “The Palm” and the

Burj al-Arab, the world’s tallest hotel, was to diversify

away from the oil and turned the country into a knowl-

edge-based society and economy. The economic trans-

formation is supported by an advanced business infra-

structure that is the platform for investors to create

value. The creation of Dubai’s Media City, the Dubai

Internet City and the Dubai Knowledge Village, are all

attempts to build clusters of expertise by convincing

companies to relocate (Landry, 2006).

From t radit ional science parks

t o knowledge cit ies

The evolution of Science Parks may be easily under-

stood within the framework of the learning region theo-

ry (Morgan, 1997). First, this theory supports that the

evolution of the development is based on an iterative

process where policymakers act in a cycle of defining

and re-defining innovation projects. Second, the theo-

ry supports that in many cases innovation is shaped by a

variety of institutional routines and social conventions.

Many efforts and resources have been wasted as a

result of these routines instituted by various govern-

ments in an effort to replicate Silicon Valley in their

countries. Real experiences have shown that the impact

generated by archetypal Science Parks has been, in many

cases, limited.

While traditional conceptualization of Science

Parks has been rough-and-ready (Massey et al., 1992),

now the tendency is to promote new flexible, diverse

and creative innovation hubs. The archetypal Science

Park whose goal was to linearly bring ideas from basic

research—developed in close universities and research

centres—towards commercialization (Massey et al.,

1992) is now transformed into a co-location of knowl-

edge-based creative industries. Where social scientists

and technologists are working together with urban

planners, new technology-intensive spatial organiza-

tions aim to promote a sustainable social and eco-

nomic reconstruction and to reduce current social

polarization.

The first steps of the Science Park evolution started

with the extraordinary success of Silicon Valley. This

ecosystem emerged spontaneously from university

research and grew based on a new generation of semi-

conductor and computer start-ups that emerged along-

side established companies (Saxenian, 1994). This

healthy, resilient and sustainable innovation ecosystem

arose from the co-location of research universities,

investment capital, entrepreneurs and a talented work-

force in an environment offering a high quality of life

(Munroe and Westwind, 2008).

The success of this Cluster of Innovation2 was rap-

idly recognized, and many regions around the world

tried to reproduce this experience by creating a defined

and particular spatial form and content for enterprises

to bring ideas into fruition. However, these agglomera-

tions of knowledge-based organizations that, in gener-

al, were located in semi-rural regions (1) close to acad-

eme and (2) separate from production activities

(Massey et al., 1992) failed to become active Clusters of

Innovation. Unlike Silicon Valley, new firm creation was

not a rapid and frequent mechanism for innovation and

global collaboration (Engel and del-Palacio, 2009).

Companies in archetypal Science Parks did not prove to

be producers of “leading-edge” high technology just by

being part of a “Science Park” structure, and, despite

their co-location, a significant gap in and lack of com-

munication were characteristic of these types of

Science Parks (Massey et al., 1992).

As a general routine and in order to get political

power, policymakers pushed initiatives promoting

archetypal Science Parks for many years. This has been

often justified as an attempt to (1) stimulate the forma-

tion of start-ups, spin-offs and, in general, new tech-

nology-based firms; (2) facilitate the technology trans-

fer and commercialization of academic research; (3)

create new jobs; and (4) encourage the growth of tech-

nology firms by providing them with high-quality


2. See Engel, J. and del-Palacio, I. (2009).

premises and creating synergies among them.

However, in reality, most of these spaces became pure

property initiatives (Massey et al., 1992) that sold or

leased spatially contiguous land and/or buildings to

businesses or other organizations whose principal

activities were basic or applied research or develop-

ment of new products or processes (Luger and

Goldstein, 1991).

Most of these archetypal Science Parks failed in the

incubation stage or early stage, unable to (1) create new

jobs or attract a critical mass of R&D activity, (2) estab-

lish productive relationships with universities, or (3)

provide enough amenities to make research parks a

friendly environment in which to live and work (Luger

and Goldstein, 1991). Moreover, as companies in these

Science Parks were designed for high-status occupa-

tions, their creation led “to increase social polarisation

and to grow geographical inequality” (Massey et al.,

1992). The lack of a social dimension and the gap

between the university and industries, and among

industries themselves, led to the abandonment and

disintegration of the archetypal Science Parks.

As the cities grew, the old industrial areas that orig-

inally were located in suburban spaces got to be part of

the cities. In many cases, the old industrial buildings

have been reused; in London for example, a power sta-

tion along the Thames River became the Tate Modern

Museum and in Paris, a train station on the Seine

became the Musee d’Orsay. Both, in Paris and in

London the renewal projects have been promoted by

diverse public and private organizations. In some other

cases the charm of the old buildings has attracted

diverse art and cultural movements, and the old

Science Parks have been spontaneously rebirth with art

galleries, antiques, as well as with other artistic and

cultural activities; in Berlin for example, a former

department store which was bombed out during the

war and virtually left to disintegrate, is now trans-

formed by squatters into a bohemian art forum as well

as café and bar.

Where social scientists and technologists are work-

ing together with urban planners, new technology-

intensive spatial organizations are being promoted.

These so-called Cities of Knowledge are consciously

planned communities that were physical manifesta-

tions of a particular political and cultural moment in

history and shaped into new and influential high-tech

urban environments (O’Mara, 2005). These remodelled

Industrial Districts3 are artistic representations of new

architectonic styles, include comfortable spaces and

facilities, and, as in “garden cities”, contain small satel-

lite communities separated by parks and countryside

(O’Mara, 1992). They provide exclusive environments

to promote universities’ research capacity, generate

industrial research and production, and make them

attractive to national and global businesses (O’Mara,

2005). These metropolitan areas have a positive eco-

nomic impact in their environment as they put into

play many dynamic and innovative institutions and

attract educated and skilled workers who consume cul-

tural products of all kinds at an accelerating pace

(Scott, 2000). The higher the level of technology and

knowledge, the faster the growth of regional innova-

tion rates (Boix and Trullen, 2006). The goal is to pro-

mote a sustainable social and economic reconstruction

to reduce social polarization.

Despite the diversity of goals and contexts, the basic

factors in an innovation system’s success are the exis-

tence of technical human resources, contacts with

entrepreneurial universities, the availability of seed

capital and government support, the industries’ com-

mitment and the acknowledgement to activate and

renew the economy of the region (Etzkowitz and

Dzisah, 2008). Universities provide a highly skilled

workforce, expert consulting services and specialized

laboratories to nearby industries. In Knowledge Cities,

these industries are creative industries, including cul-

tural, art and technology sectors. Co-location of inter-

disciplinary clusters creates synergies between the cul-

tural economy and industrial community and promotes


3. We call Industrial Districts to intra-metropolitan cluster organizationsconsisting of companies/producers that are collaborating with each otherand have shared values (Becattini, 1990).

collaboration, the flow of information among them,

and the emergence of new creative ideas (Scott, 2000).

Unlike in archetypal Science Parks, in Cities of

Knowledge, creativity and innovation are integrated in

a wider social context (Scott, 2000). Like Industrial

Districts, Knowledge Cities are embedded in a network

of firms in the local social system (Becattini, 1986,

1990). These communities of scientific production are

places to live as well as to work, home to a range of

related and complementary production activities, cul-

tural amenities and services4 (O’Mara, 2005). Both the

creative industries together with cultural amenities and

services are magnets of highly skilled workers (Scott,

2000; Florida, 2005) that fuel the creative development

of the Knowledge City. If the new technology-based

companies do not collaborate and interact with univer-

sities, research centres, cultural organizations and art

associations, among others, Science Parks may still be

seen as isolated islands of science located within mul-

ticultural metropolitan environments.

22@Barcelona—t he innovat ion dist r ict

Since 2000, the City Council of Barcelona has

worked to transform an old industrial neighbourhood

of the inner city into a new innovative district consist-

ing of universities, research centres and knowledge-

based industries, as well as social and public facilities.

Known as the 22@Barcelona, these 200 hectares of land

hosted a large number of textile, food, metallurgy and

other factories in the past. However, between 1963 and

1990, the industrial area lost more than 1,300 factories;

some of them moved to cheaper nearby areas, while

other closed during the economic crisis of the seventies

and eighties.

The district’s recovery began in 1992 with the cele-

bration of the Olympic Games: new housing was built,

and communication with the city centre and with other

neighbourhoods grew. Subsequently, in June 2000, the

General Metropolitan Plan was unanimously accepted.

This plan includes the 22@Barcelona Project, which

aims to promote the sustainable urban, economic and

social development of the district. Specifically, it seeks

(1) to contribute to the urban development planning by

offering high-quality facilities and infrastructure and a

large pool of services and amenities; (2) to encourage

economic growth by providing specific support and

spaces for innovative companies by attracting interna-

tional high-tech industries, hosting universities and

research centres and building housing for university

students and researchers5; (3) and to increase the social

and cultural services by offering social housing, more

public green areas, new mobility plans and public

transport, and by facilitating other cultural services and

spaces.

Urban innovation

The first phase of the project seeks to renovate and

restore the area’s old industrial buildings. The project

aims to maintain the few traditional economic activities

still remaining in the neighbourhood and combine

them with knowledge-based activities, public facilities,

social housing and green spaces, among others. In

order to achieve this goal, the City Council of Barcelona

gave private owners the opportunity to vertically

increase their productive space on two conditions. The

first condition is that knowledge-based industries

should replace old industrial activities. The second con-

dition is that private owners should provide 30% of the

space for public uses: 10% will be used for social hous-

ing; 10% will be used for public and social activities,

including education, civic centres and libraries, as well

as research and innovation centres; and the last 10%

will be transformed into green spaces.

Externally, the area exhibits a clean, open and mod-

ern morphology. During the renovation, 114 old archi-

tectural elements have been protected and creatively


4. The access to services has been pointed as one of the most important fac-tors for a Science Park to success (Sanz, 2002).

5. Although some studies about Spanish university system state that technolo-gy transfer and, in general, university-industry relationships in Spain are

weak and sporadic (see Bellavista et al., 1998 and the Informe CYD 2006),the integration and important role played by the university in this projectshows the growing interest of Spanish higher education to get involved in theinnovation system (Bellavista, 2000).

combined with new, architectonically impressive build-

ings. Internally, the area houses the most advanced and

sustainable infrastructures to meet the needs of busi-

nesses and residents in the area. The infrastructure

planning is defined ad hoc for supporting the compa-

nies’ activities and needs identified by a group of inter-

national managers. For the social community, high-

quality infrastructures have been developed, including

sustainable trash collection, mobility infrastructures

(such us a dense net of crosswalk and bike paths, bus-

preferential roads and tram connections) and sustain-

able heat and air-conditioning systems.

Because of the diversity of the spaces, including

industrial, education, entertainment, housing and

green spaces, and thus the diversity of people agglom-

erated in the area, the 22@Barcelona is a suitable space

for testing and experimenting with new innovative

products and services. The goal is to encourage innova-

tion at the industry and government levels by creating

a space that can be use as an Urban Lab where new and

innovative products can be tested.

Economic innovation

In the 22@Barcelona, knowledge based-activities

coexist with social organizations, housing and other

services and cultural activities. The area maintains

some of small, traditional family businesses, while new

knowledge-based industries have already been estab-

lished in the area. An accurate study of the opportuni-

ties and threats to the environment, as well as of the

needs of customers and residents, was developed in

order to identify the potentially most successful and

demanded industry clusters. As a result, 22@Barcelona

focused on four main economic areas: media, ICT,

medical devices and energy. A design cluster has

recently been included in the strategic planning. The

goal is to focus the efforts on these clusters and to

make Barcelona a worldwide landmark in these areas.

Each cluster is internally managed by a nonprofit

organization, whose goal is to promote innovation and

entrepreneurship within and among the companies, as

well as technology transfer with universities and other

research organizations. Based on the model of the

Triple Helix Innovation System (Etzkowitz and

Leydersdorff, 2000), each cluster is represented by gov-

ernment institutions and high-technology enterprises,

as well as by universities and other research bodies.

Each cluster also includes a technology incubator,

housing spaces for researchers and specialized service

providers, among others. The close location of these

agents eases knowledge fluency between and collabo-

ration among the entities. Additionally, in order to pro-

mote fluent and frequent relationships, networking

events, such as meetings, conferences and training pro-

grams, are organized periodically. These events are

excellent opportunities for professionals, researchers

and government representatives to interact with each

other.

Social innovation

Social programs at the 22@Barcelona aim to involve

professionals, residents and regular citizens in the

knowledge-based economy. The goal is to use technol-

ogy to involve residents in the professional, research

and education networks. The Education Project, for

example, aims to make it possible for students at the

schools and universities at the 22@Barcelona to get

involved in real industrial projects. Additionally, the

Digital District Program supports the development of

innovative projects based on new ICTs and developed

by multidisciplinary and multiage groups. The area is

equipped with multiple Multimedia Classrooms that

offer free support and training to older residents who

are not used to use Internet and similar technologies.

22@Barcelona also includes diverse cultural pro-

grams. Can Ricart is one of the main facilities in the dis-

trict and was specifically designed to host public cul-

tural and artistic activities. This historic building

previously housed various independent cultural move-

ments. The 22@Barcelona project cleared and cleaned

the area and created several public spaces for cultural

and artistic uses in order to normalize the activities of

the former independent and unregulated artistic move-

ments in the space. The facility now consists of several

working spaces and showrooms specifically designed

for young painters, artists and designers. In order to


promote the diversity of cultures, Can Ricart also hosts

a multicultural project named The House of the

Languages, whose goal is to create a space to share

knowledge about and to promote the conservation and

stimulate the use of the different languages of the

world. The House includes a centre of documentation, a

specialized library and an academic research space, as

well as a conference room.

Development and curren t status of the project

The development of the 22@Barcelona project is

planned for a fifteen-year time frame. According to the

Study of Economic Activity in the 22@Barcelona6, more

than one thousand new companies have already

moved to the area. Most of the new start-ups are relat-

ed to one of the five targeted clusters and require of

highly skilled and qualified workforce. The number of

employees grew 60.6% and exceeded 25,500 employees

by March 2007. Additionally, several primary and sec-

ondary education centres, as well as four universities,

are already set up at the 22@Barcelona. Apart from the

universities, five technology and research centres will

be also located in the area (Yahoo Research Europe,

Orange R&D and Telefonica R&D are already operating

from the 22@Barcelona), and five specific spaces will be

reserved for use as incubators to support the new start-

up creation.

The project also promotes the integration of 114,000

square meters of green areas and 145,000 square

meters of new public spaces, as well as the construction

of four thousand subsidized housing units. At the end

of 2008, around 700 new houses had been built, and the

construction of another 1,100 had started.

The district has now recovered the economic

dynamism of its past. Housing spaces and entertain-

ment opportunities liven up the streets, even during

the nights and weekends. International researchers and

professionals are attracted by this knowledge-based

environment, and their arrival is contributing to the

creation of multicultural networks and associations.

New immigrants, professionals and residents demand

high-quality services, and thus the plan is being adapt-

ed to improve the quality of the district. In the

22@Barcelona, high-tech productive industries coexist

with creative industries; with universities and research

centres; with public spaces, such as civic centres,

libraries and social housing; and with entertainment

services and amenities, such as shopping centres and

theatres.

Conclusions

In this article we have analyzed how cities are rap-

idly changing in order to respond to the requirements

of New Economy activities. We have also shown why

inner cities now house clean and knowledge-based

companies and how, within a sustainable economic

and social development plan, these industries are cre-

ative industries that require and attract a large number

of skilled people. In fact, we support O’Mara’s frame-

work, which suggests that the coexistence of creative

industries, including technology and art industries, cre-

ative people and universities and research centres, as

well as social and entertainment services, give rise to

new Knowledge Cities.

In this article we have contributed to the under-

standing of Knowledge Cities as successful manifesta-

tions of archetypal Science Parks. We analyzed the evolu-

tion of governments’ focus, from the promotion of

archetypal Science Parks to the actual urban, economic

and social development plans. We also showed that

one of the goals of the new sustainable urban develop-

ment is to promote the co-location and integration of

technology and art industries in order to attract a large

number of skilled people and to create a high-quality

environment.

We have studied the case of the 22@Barcelona as an

example of a Knowledge City development plan. This

project aims to transform an old industrial neighbour-


6. Carried out by the Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) and the Universityof Barcelona (UB) (January 2008).

hood of the inner city into a new innovative district

consisting of universities, research centres and knowl-

edge-based industries, as well as social and public

facilities. Currently, the district is a hybrid landscape of

the old industrial district combined with and a new

green, clean and modern area. The 22@Barcelona has a

strategic location in the inner city, close and perfectly

connected to the city centre and other neighbour-

hoods, and within Europe and Mediterranean markets.

The project entails a sustainable urban, economic

and social innovation. The urban transformation aims

to combine some old architectural elements with new

creative and impressive modern buildings. Additional -

ly, the few traditional economic activities still remain-

ing in the neighbourhood may be combined with

knowledge-based industries, public facilities, social

housing and green spaces, among others. From an

economic point of view, five clusters of creative indus-

tries are promoted, each represented by specialized

research centers, universities, companies and govern-

ment institutions. According to the Triple Helix Model,

the co-location of these specialized agents promotes

synergies and collaborations among them. Additional -

ly, as in an Industrial District, the co-location of diverse

industries provides the environment the opportunity

to “mix and match” and create new products (Pyke et

al., 1990).

Finally, from a social point of view, and unlike tra-

ditional Science Park organizations, the 22@Barcelona

entails an important social development. More than

four thousand housing units are planned for the area,

and several programs already exist to help integrate

the residents with the technology and economic devel-

opment.

As in other urban redevelopment projects, 22@Bar -

celona project has caused some controversy. The most

significant problems have emerged as a result of the

spontaneous creation of independent and unregulated

cultural and artistic movements in the area. In order to

offer an alternative venue for these cultural organiza-

tions, public spaces have been designed for use by

young painters, artists and designers. Even though the

independent organizations are not satisfied with the

transformation, many residents support the change as

they agree that these buildings were significantly dete-

riorated.

The 22@Barcelona is an example of the new trend of

urban planners to create Knowledge Cities by renewing

old archetypal Science Parks or industrial areas in inner

cities. Often, these areas contain multistory factories

and warehouses, and it is a challenge for governments

to develop a sustainable development project that inte-

grates New Economy activities while maintaining some

traditional economy activities, as well as cultural and

environmental meaning. The new organization avoids

the differences between academe and industry,

between technology and cultural movements, and

among social statuses, as occurred in the archetypal

Science Parks (Massey et al., 1992). There is still much to

do to create successful Knowledge Cities, as well as to

identify the factors that best contribute to the promo-

tion of sustainable urban, economic and social trans-

formation of old Industrial Districts.

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