role of consciousness-melbourne

8/2/2019 Role of Consciousness-Melbourne

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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought

Overview

1 Phenomenal intentionality theory

2 The content of concepts

3 Phenomenal intentionality and thought

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Overview




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Intentionality

The ofness or aboutness of mental states that we at leastsometimes notice introspectively

Ostensive definitionMental states with intentionality can be said to represent

A mental states content is what it represents

There might be other distinct semantic properties, such as

reference, truth conditions, and truth

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Ph l i i li h Th f Ph l i i li d h h


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Intentionality






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Ph l i t ti lit th Th t t f t Ph l i t ti lit d th ht


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Intentionality






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Theories of intentionality

Tracking theories

Functional role theories

Phenomenal intentionality theory

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Tracking theories



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Tracking theories



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y y p y g


Phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT) A mental states (orsubjects) intentional properties are identical with(some of) its phenomenal properties

Phenomenal character The particular what its like of a mental

state (e.g. redness, painfulness)

We either instantiate phenomenal characters or are otherwiserelated to them

Phenomenal property Instantiating a phenomenal property is eitherinstantiating a phenomenal character or beingotherwise appropriately related to a phenomenalcharacter

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y y p y g







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Basic idea: What your mental states represent is a matter ofwhat its like to be you

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Motivations for PIT

In clear introspectible cases, phenomenal properties andintentional properties do not appear distinct1

To the extent to which we can separately focus on phenomenalproperties and intentional properties, the two go together

1This is related to transparency intuitions. Gilbert Harman (1990). TheIntrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52, and Michael

Tye (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press.8 / 3 9



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Motivations for PIT







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Motivations for PIT







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PIT in perception

Perception is a good case for PIT

1 Phenomenal properties seem to co-occur with the intentionalproperties PIT wants to identify them with

2 Perceptual phenomenal characters seem to matchco-occurring perceptual intentional contents

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PIT in perception




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PIT in perception




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Matching

Phenomenal characters match intentional contents iff they

havea similar structurea similar quality

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Matching in perception

Its plausible that in perception, phenomenal charactermatches intentional content

E.g. represented blueness and phenomenal blueness

Plausibly similar simple structurePlausibly similar quality (the blueness bit)

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Complex perceptual states have intentional contents thatmatch their phenomenal characters too

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PIT in thought

For PIT to be plausible in the case of thought,

1 The phenomenal properties of thought must correspond to theintentional properties of thought that PIT wants to identifythem with

2

The phenomenal characters of thought must match theco-occurring intentional contents of thought

Ill grant (1)2

But (2) seems to fail

2See Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2002). The Intentionality ofPhenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers(ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. OxfordUniversity Press, and David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or,What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

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PIT in thought



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Ill grant (1)2



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PIT in thought



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Ill grant (1)2



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PIT in thought



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Ill grant (1)2



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PIT h h


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PIT in thought



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Ill grant (1)2



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Th f il f hi i h h


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The apparent failure of matching in thought

Similar structure: It seems that thoughts have

fairly complex intentional contentsbut fairly simple phenomenal characters

Similar qualities: What its like to think doesnt really seemsimilar to what thoughts represent

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Th f il f hi i h h


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Th t f il f t hi i th ht


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Th t f il f t hi i th ht


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Example


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Example

Modal realism is true.

Different structure: Fairly complex content possible worldsexist in the same way the actual world exists, but fairly simplephenomenal character

Different qualities: Nothing possible-worlds-y about thephenomenal character

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Possible solutions


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Possible solutions

1 The phenomenal character of thought is like what wecurrently think the intentional content of thought is like(David Pitt?, H&T?)

2 The intentional content of thought is like what we currentlythink the phenomenal character of thought is like3

Thoughts represent fairly simple contentsAnd that this makes it plausible that their contents are similarin quality to thought phenomenal characters

3David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Nos 44

(1):3258 employs a similar strategy. 16/39


Possible solutions


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Possible solutions






BackgroundThe problem of multimodal experiences

SummaryExtras


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Extras

The roles of content and modalities in the

phenomenology of sensory experience

David Bourget

Institute of Philosophy

University of London

Monash University, March 2, 2012

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Possible solutions


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Possible solutions







Possible solutions


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Possible solutions


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Possible solutions







Overview


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Overview




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The basic idea


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The basic idea

Thoughts and the concepts that compose them dont behaveas if they represented complex contents

So we shouldnt attribute complex contents to them

Concepts Vehicles of representation that constitute thoughts

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The basic idea


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The basic idea


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Candidate complex contents (CCCs)


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p ( )

What are candidate complex contents that concepts might besaid to represent?

DefinitionsCharacterizationsSets of featuresReal definitions or essencesComplex properties

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Candidate complex contents (CCCs)


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p ( )

What are candidate complex contents that concepts might besaid to represent?

DefinitionsCharacterizationsSets of featuresReal definitions or essencesComplex properties

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How might contents behave like theyre represented by


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concepts?

They might contribute to the phenomenologyThey might contribute to further thought and behavior

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How might contents behave like theyre represented by


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concepts?

They might contribute to the phenomenologyThey might contribute to further thought and behavior

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Concepts CCCs dont make a difference for


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phenomenology

Superveniences CCC: the relation that obtains betweentwo types of facts when, necessarily, two worlds that are alikewrt on set of facts are alike wrt the other

(Tables 1) The facts about tables supervene on the physical facts.

(Tables 2) Necessarily, two possible worlds that are alike with respectto the physical facts are alike with respect to facts about tables.

In thinking (Tables 2), you seem to grasp contents likepossible worlds and likeness

But not in thinking (Tables 1) 21/39


Concepts CCCs dont make a difference for


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phenomenology







Concepts CCCs dont make a difference forh l


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phenomenology







Concepts CCCs dont make a difference forh l


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phenomenology







Concepts CCCs dont play a role in further thought andb h i


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behavior

Sometimes we need a concepts CCC to answer certainquestions

What is supervenience?Does a necessary god supervene on everything?

Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definitionor characterization of supervenience

Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizationsare retrieved

This suggests that (Tables 1) doesnt representsuperveniences CCC

Failure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks

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Concepts CCCs dont play a role in further thought andb h i


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behavior







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Concepts CCCs dont play a role in further thought andbeha io


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behavior







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Concepts CCCs dont play a role in further thought andbehavior


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behavior







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behavior







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behavior







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behavior







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Might CCCs play a role in unpacking?


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One might suggest that a concepts CCC determines how it isunpacked, so this is evidence that it is represented byconcepts and is not inert

Response:There are other explanations of unpacking - perhaps from astory of concept acquisitionIf this suggestion is correct, wed expect CCCs to play otherroles as well in the generation of thought and behavior, but

they dont

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they dont

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they dont

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they dont

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Concepts dont represent CCCs


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Concepts dont behave as if they represent their CCCs

So we shouldnt attribute their CCCs to them - such contentswould be inert

Similar points apply to other concepts

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Two questions


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1 What do concepts represent?

2 What is the status of CCCs?

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2. The status of CCCs


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Concepts derivatively represent at least some of their CCCs(possibly definitions or characterizations)4

Derived mental representation is a matter of dispositions to

unpack and have experiences of accepting certain unpackingsof concepts

4David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Nos 44(1):3258, Angela Mendelovici (2010). Mental Representation and CloselyConflated Topics, PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, and Uriah Kriegel(forthcoming). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In U. Kriegel(ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.

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2. The status of CCCs


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Concepts derivatively represent at least some of their CCCs(possibly definitions or characterizations)4

Derived mental representation is a matter of dispositions to

unpack and have experiences of accepting certain unpackingsof concepts

4David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Nos 44(1):3258, Angela Mendelovici (2010). Mental Representation and CloselyConflated Topics, PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, and Uriah Kriegel(forthcoming). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In U. Kriegel(ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.

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Example of derived content


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Circumstances


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In different circumstances, we might accept different contentsas the contents of our concepts

E.g. In some circumstances, you might unpack bachelor as

unmarried man, in others as man available for long-termrelationship

We might consider certain circumstances authoritative,e.g. circumstances in which you arent drunk, etc.

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Circumstances


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Circumstances


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Pluralism about derived content


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Focusing on different circumstances might yield differentnotions of content, which might be useful for ifferent purposes

Circumstances in which you do not discover new informationyield a kind of narrow content

Circumstances that allow for worldly interaction might yield akind of broad content

E.g. Burges Bert

Summary: There are only right or wrong ways to cash out

your concepts relative to circumstances.

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E.g. Burges Bert



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E.g. Burges Bert



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E.g. Burges Bert



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E.g. Burges Bert



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1. What concepts really represent


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There is reason to think that concepts have some content,even if its not their CCCs

There is some content that plays some role:

In phenomenologyIn further thought and behavior

Since concepts dont represent CCCs, their contents are fairlysimple (the alternative would be that they represent otherconcepts CCCs)

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Which fairly simple contents? Some options


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Proper parts of CCCs (e.g. some possible worlds view)

Jesse Prinzs proxytype theory (perceptual imagery)

Verbal representations (e.g. supervenience or some modal

relation)Chris Viger, others who think we think in words

New simple contents (e.g. supervenience)

Tim Williamson with knowledge, G. E. Moore with good

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Which simple contents? Some options


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Different options might be true of different concepts

All these options are compatible with PIT, so I will not try toadjudicate between them

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Which simple contents? Some options


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Different options might be true of different concepts

All these options are compatible with PIT, so I will not try toadjudicate between them

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Back to thoughts


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Thoughts are composed of concepts, and their contents aredetermined by the content of their constituent concepts

So its plausible that thoughts dont represent their CCCs andthat they represent simpler contents instead

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Back to thoughts


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Thoughts are composed of concepts, and their contents aredetermined by the content of their constituent concepts

So its plausible that thoughts dont represent their CCCs andthat they represent simpler contents instead

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Overview


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Challenge


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The phenomenal characters of thoughts dont seem to matchtheir intentional contents

Different structureDifferent qualities

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Challenge


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Challenge


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Response


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Same structure: Concepts represent fairly simple contents andhave fairly simple phenomenal characters

Similar features: Some options:

Intentional content Phenomenal character

words verbal phenomenology

perceptual perceptual

new simple content new simple phenomenology

parts of intuitive content depends

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Response


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Response


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Response


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PIT meets the challenge


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Thought phenomenal characters arguably match thoughtintentional contents

This removes an important obstacle from applying PIT tothought

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PIT meets the challenge


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Thought phenomenal characters arguably match thoughtintentional contents

This removes an important obstacle from applying PIT tothought

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PIT about thought


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Intentional properties are phenomenal properties

But the content of thoughts is fairly simple - it is not thecomplex content we intuitively associate with thoughts

Some of the contents we intuitively associate with thoughtsare derivatively represented by thoughts, where derived mentalrepresentation is a matter of dispositions to unpack conceptsand dispositions to accept certain unpackings

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PIT about thought


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PIT about thought


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The End

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role of consciousness-melbourne

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