royal aeronautical society heathrow branch the sir richard ......in 2002 don bateman, father of...

Royal Aeronautical Society Heathrow Branch

The Sir Richard Fairey Lecture

“Training to Avoid Loss of Control Accidents”

RAeS Heathrow Branch Sir Richard Fairey Lecture Hugh DIBLEY : “Training to Avoid Loss of Control Accidents” 16oct 12 1 /165

“Training to Avoid Loss of Control Accidents”

:

Hugh DIBLEY FRAeS, FRIN, CMILT

formerly BOAC/BA, AUH, AHK, MAU, Airbus Toulouse

(Busy slides for reading without audio!)

Hugh Dibley’s Main Aviation Activities


Training to Avoid to Loss Of Control Accidents

Main Accident Causes – CFIT (Controlled Flight in Terrain)LoC-I (Loss of Control In Flight)

CFIT now reduced – Read across to LoC-I preventionSymptoms and Causes

Examples of LOC-I - Instrument/system failure mis-handled


Crew induced on serviceable aircraftExtreme weather – icing, windshearControl/system failure causing upset

Examples of Negative Training

Work across the Industry to Prevent LOC-I


Same number of accidents


Why did CFIT decrease? Could have been reduced sooner?

What Have Been the Prime Causes of CFIT?What Have Been the Reasons for CFIT Reduction?



3°glidepath to runway



Since 1970s with DME in line with the Runway,NO excuse for NOT following

Constant 3°path to runway threshold –Using DME – Altitude Display


Using DME – Altitude Display

or by Altitude regularly calculated mentally -eg at 5 nm DME at Guam –

Approach Altitude = (5+3.3) x 300 + 310 = 2,800ft


Aids existed for crews not skilled in mentalarithmetic – like bookmakers’ clerks calculating betting odds





Similar to using the improvedADF RMI (Radio Magnetic Indicator) versus an old

RBI (Relative Bearing Indicator)to which Magnetic Heading must be added to calculate the

Magnetic course to the beacon – no longer in use!







RBI – Fixed Card Heading345° MagnetWhat is QDM(Direction M)to the NDB?

= 075+345=420-360 = 60°M







RBI – Fixed Card RMI Heading Mag


Published VOR-DME approach into Kuala Lumpurin 1976 was about 1.5°thus not sensible as drawn.

Circular slide rule defines a 3°final approachbased on the DME 12.5 nm from the runway.



In1976 a BAOD 747-136 brushed treesduring a Go Around from a VOR-DME

approach to KUL 16 –The approach procedure started 2,000ft

below a 3°glide path with no DME-Altitudechecks. The approach was a “Black Hole”


checks. The approach was a “Black Hole”over forest with no visual cues

The approach procedure was revised tofollow a 3°path with DME-Altitude checks,

which were being incorporated on all BAAerad charts and no similar NPA incidents

occurred afterwards in BA.

BA/Aerad Provided DME-Altitude TablesPermitting Constant Angle NPAs starting in 1975


By the 1980s Most European Authorities providedDME-Altitude Information for Constant Angle NPAs,

But information not universally available.....


In 1989 Flying Tigers B747 Crashed with the FOflying a VOR-DME Approach in to Kuala Lumpur


Final Approach Fix Altitude 2,400ftGPWS “Pull Up, Pull Up” ignored for 25 seconds

CFIT NPAs Continued –In 2002 Don Bateman, father of GPWS/EGPW,

published 9 NPA CFIT accidents which could havebeen saved if EGPWS had been fitted


But 5 had DME available but no DME-Altitude tableson the charts which could have avoided an accident.

FMS navigation started in the 1970s andnavigation database integrity improved

during the 2000s to allow RNP(Required Navigation Performance) ILS

type approaches without need forground based navigation aids


RNP Approaches particularly help Charter Operatorswith many NPAs – CFIT accidents should be reduced


Capt Steve Solomon DFO Thompson Ltd 7 Oct 2010

DME-Altitude Constant Angle NPAs remain a good backup


Hazards of a “Dive & Drive” NPA Profile


Approach Unstable – needing pitch, thrust & flap changes


Unstable profile



Chance of hard landing or runway over-run

Approach Unstable – needing pitch, thrust & flap changes


Experience shows that flying level at MDA while obtaining visual reference,especially in poor visibility, can lead to a late “dive” at the runway and chances

of a hard landing or deep landing with over-run off the end of the runway.


Missed step can cause terrain accident


It is easy to misread the chart and miss a step possibly flying into an obstacle.

28 Sep 1992 PIA A300 accident VOR DME approach into Kathmandu.06 Aug 1997 KAL 747 accident LOC No Glidepath DME approach into Guam.

(During an old HKG Kai Tak IGS No Glidepath approach, a UA 747 missed astep and descended early towards the hill on the approach, but the error wasadvised by Hong Kong Approach Radar and the aircraft stopped the descent.)

Benefits of a Constant Angle NPA Profile

Stable Approach – established as many orders safer

Stable approach, landing configuration, no pitch/thrust changes


NPA Minima may be reduced

6.5% 3.7° 393 f/nm

120 kts 140 kts 160 kts

790 fpm 920 fpm 1,050 fpm

Dist KLO Alt QNH (HAT)

D -7.4 4000' (2584')

D -7.0 3860' (2444')

D -6.0 3470' (2054')

D -5.0 3080' (1664')

D -4.0 2680' (1264')

D -3.3 2390' (974')

D -2.0 1900' (484')

D -1.0 1510' (94')

D -0.9 1470' (54')

DME-Altitude Tables can provide regular checks toconfirm aircraft on the correct profile to 30ft accuracy.Rather than checks at single points which might beinterrupted by ATC request, crew action etc.

A final Comment about Use/Underuse of DME!


Indicates Prevention of an event is Prime

Interesting that the recommendationsIn the FSF 1998-99 CFIT Task Force

made No mention of DME-Altitude TablesTo Fly

Constant Angle Non Precision Approaches

and One More!


Constant Angle Non Precision Approachesalthough known to be a prime safety aid.

A proposal that “At night and IMC the FO shall fly theapproach and the captain shall land” was not included.

Don Bateman’s EGPWS is certainly a marvellous aidwhich has contributed incomparably to flight safety.

A B747-400 out ofMauritius which

turned North to flystraight over LionRock as cleared


Rock as clearedby ATC was saved

by the EGPWSwarning

CFIT remains an accident causeas frequent as LOC-I,

and remains a high priority of


and remains a high priority ofauthorities such as ICAO

During 3 recent accidents crews have ignored oreven cancelled EGPWS warnings

10 April 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 continuedafter Terrain Ahead & Pull Up warnings

20 Apr 2012 Bhoja Air Boeing 737 into Islamabad.Captain continued downwind despite


Captain continued downwind despiteEGPWS warning and advice from FO.

10 May 2012 Sukhoi Superjet-100 descended belowMSA and into side of volcano

Behaviour can be read across to LOC-I events

Examples of LOC-IInstrument/system failure Mis-handled

Disorientation after Single/Simple Failure

21 Dec 1962 BEA Comet 4B Ankara. After rotation ontakeoff pitched up to 45°& stalled.Captain’s Flight Director was stuck.


01 Jan 1978 Air India B747 Bombay. After takeoffcaptain rolled to the left into the seaafter his horizon “toppled” in right bank.

22 Dec 1999 Korean Air Cargo Stansted. Aftertakeoff captain rolled left into theground after his horizon failed.



Solved by improved training andCRM (Crew Resource Management)

(The co-pilot of the Korean B747 could have beenpreoccupied with trying to change to a radio frequency


preoccupied with trying to change to a radio frequencywhich was not displayed as cleared.

The aircraft had an 833Mhz frequency selector required inEurope while the UK was still using/giving frequencies in the

older spacing.)

Examples of LOC-IDisorientation with No apparent Failures

Confusion with AutomaticsManual Handling Skills

03 Jan 04 Flash Airlines B737-300 Sharm el-Sheikh. Aftertake off the aircraft rolled right instead of turningleft reaching 110°bank and crashing into thesea. The (ex military) captain was engaging anddisconnecting the autopilot in different modes.


disconnecting the autopilot in different modes.

25 Jan 10 Ethiopian Airlines B737-800 Beirut. Aircraft tookoff out of trim which the captain did not correct& lost control of the aircraft reacting incorrectly toprolonged stall warning stick shakers. The captainand co-pilot were both relatively inexperienced.

Examples of LOC-IStalls due to Flap/Slat Mis-Handling?

27 Oct 1965 BEA Vanguard London Heathrow. During aGo Around after the 3rd approach the aircraftpitched up then crashed on the runway in asteep dive. Flaps had been retracted to zero.Flight’s comment: FDRs are Pilot’s Training aids.

18 Jun 1972 BEA Trident London Heathrow. Aircraft stalledafter the co-pilot retracted the droop/slats


after the co-pilot retracted the droop/slatsprematurely.

12 Feb 2009 Colgan Air Bombardier DHC-8-400 Buffalo. Onapproach after flap selection with speeddecreasing the stall warning sounded. Theco-pilot retracted the flaps & the aircraft stalled.More about this later.

Examples of LOC-IStalls due Excess Thrust Causing Pitch Up at Low Level

26 Apr 1994 China Airlines A300-600 Nagoya. During theapproach the FO applied TOGA thrust in error &pushed forward on the control column while theautopilot trimmed back. The aircraft pitched up,stalled, pitched down & crashed on the runway.The captain tried to arrest the descent by pulling back.

11 Dec 1998 Thai Airways Int A310 Surat Thani. During 2 GoArounds the captain slowly applied TOGA thrust


Arounds the captain slowly applied TOGA thrustand controlled the pitch up, but on the 3rd GAfor a diversion TOGA was applied rapidly by theautothrust, the aircraft pitched to 45°& crashed.

23 Sep 2007 Thomson Fly B737-300 Bournemouth. After the autothrustdisconnected without warning the autopilot trimmed backto maintain the glideslope. During Go Around theaircraft pitched up with full foward stick and stalled. Thecaptain recovered by reducing thrust & trimming forward.

Examples of LOC-IExtreme Weather – Turbulence Windshear, Icing,

5 Mar 1966 BOAC 707-436 near Mt Fuji. The aircraftencountered severe clear-air turbulence causinga sudden structural failure. Acceleration +9/-4G.

02 Aug 1985 Delta Air Lines L1011 Dallas. Crashed afterencountering a microburst-induced, severewindshear from a developing thunderstorm


windshear from a developing thunderstormlocated on the final approach course. Windsheardetection/recovery systems were developed.

12 Feb 2009 American Eagle ATR 72 near Chicago. Controlwas lost when holding due to icing causingsudden aileron hinge moment reversal.

Icing – Aircraft may StallBefore the Stall Warning/Stick Pusher


Examples of LOC-ILoss of Normal Pressure Instruments

6 Feb 1996 Birgenair B757 Puerto Plata. Continued takeoffwith captain’s pitot blocked, control was lostdue to confusion between flight instruments.

01 Oct 1996 AeroPerú B757 Lima. Took off with static ventscovered causing multiple warnings - rudderratio, mach trim, overspeed, underspeed and


ratio, mach trim, overspeed, underspeed andflying too low. With no reliable barometricaltimeter and airspeed readings & experiencingseveral stalls the aircraft crashed into the sea.

This spurred manufacturers/operators to introduce unreliableairspeed procedures for all aircraft types.

.

Early aircraft –Input/sensor failures affected single systems

Current aircraft –Input/sensor failures affect multiple systems –With perhaps.....

Examples of LOC-IControl/System Failure Causing Upset


With perhaps.....multiple consequences .....disconnections .....multiple warnings.....possibly startling –But if crews understand the systems and are prepared –Need not be quite so startling – hopefully!

Airbus A320 – Flight Control Laws Reconfiguration after failures


Examples of LOC-IControl/System Failure Causing Upset

Table assumes failed systems are flagged invalidInputs/data can “fail” in different ways –

Erroneous/incorrect and flagged as Invalid –Inputs to systems switched off.Reconfigurations made as per design.


Reconfigurations made as per design.

Erroneous/incorrect but not flagged as invalid –Bad information fed to systems, perhaps causing anomalies(Like 737 into AMS when Radio Altimeter fed 0 ft soautothrust reduced to idle as if landed.)

Unreliable – incorrect but may return to normal

Examples of LOC-IFly By Wire Control/System Failure Causing Upset

1 Aug 2005 Malaysian 777-200 from Perth. When climbingthrough FL380 the airspeed indicated near theoverspeed and stall speed limits. The aircraftpitched up, climbed to FL410 with the airspeeddropping to 158 kt and the stall warning/stickshaker activated. The crew took control andreturned to Perth flying manually throughout.


returned to Perth flying manually throughout.One of several accelerometers had failedanother accelerometer had failed in June 2001.

7 Oct 2008 Qantas A330 from Perth. ADIRU #1 fed veryhigh false AoA values to the flight controlcomputers commanding a nose-down aircraftpitch of about 8.5 degrees. The aircraft divertedto Learmonth.

Examples of LOC-IClassic Aircraft Control/System Failure Causing Upset

03 Mar 1991 United Airlines 737-200 Colorado Springs.08 Sep 1994 USAir 737-300, near Pittsburgh.

Both aircraft crashed due rudder PCU jammingwhich could reverse the pilots inputs.

The FAA ordered that the servo valves be replaced and thatnew training protocol for pilots to handle unexpected


new training protocol for pilots to handle unexpectedmovement of flight controls be developed.

Some airlines implemented upset training procedureswhich were not approved by the manufacturers therefore in1998 Airbus, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas published the

Airplane Upset Recovery Aidremains “bible” for Upset Prevention & Upset Training

Bill Wainwright, Airbus Chief Test Pilot,one of the 3 signatories to the AURTA manual,


one of the 3 signatories to the AURTA manual,gave more advice in an Upset Recovery article

in the June 1998 Airbus FAST magazine

Bill Wainwright’s Advice


Prevention is Prime

Bill Wainwright’s AdviceTogether with Boeing & McDonnell Douglas

Do NOT use Rudder in an Upset


But AA persisted withtheir Upset Recoverypolicy of using rudder

LOC Accidents –American 587 – Airbus A300-600

ex JFK October 2001

Copilot applied full rudder travel both ways after passingthrough B747 wake vortex, thus exceeding the designed loadsof the vertical stabiliser/fin which broke off.

Crews had been trained to use rudder in an upset and flightsimulators’ roll control response modified to require this –


simulators’ roll control response modified to require this –against the advice of both major aircraft manufacturers.

Indicates the need for upset recovery training to be accordingto the manufacturer’s recommendations, otherwise negativetraining can result.

AA had modified the flightsimulator reaction in roll soonly rudder was effective

Recent LOC-I Accidents –14 Oct 2004 Pinnacle Bombardier CL-600-2B19

Ferry flight – only 2 pilots on boardFailed to monitor autopilot Vertical Speed Mode climbing to FL410,

Speed reduced to stall which was not recovered.Should have been prevented by improved knowledge of aerodynamics


Should have been prevented by improved knowledge of aerodynamicsand thus use of automatics –(There is an official view that crews must not VS mode as the modenot understood. This indicates a failure in training.VS has to be used routinely when climbing fast in busy airspace toavoid unnecessary ACAS/collision avoidance warnings, etc.)Could have been recovered by better knowledge of aerodynamics and ifhad been given proper stall/stick pusher training..

Avoided by proper crew discipline.

Most Significant LOC-I Accident

Colgan Air - Bombardier DHC-8-40012th February 2009

Crew airspeed monitoring lapsed – due to fatigue?Speed reduced after flap selected & stick shaker activatedFO had discussed icing several times during flight –Had seen NASA tailplane icing video instructing flap retraction


Had seen NASA tailplane icing video instructing flap retractionReacted as per training video to retract flaps & pull aft stick?Should have been prevented by type training on tailplane icingCould have been recovered by training/knowledge for type.


Colgan Air - Bombardier DHC-8-40012th February 2009

NASA Tailplane Icing Video


Colgan Air Cockpit Voice Recorder

Captain pulled back on stick as per NASA video?


FO Retracted the flaps

Video of Colgan Air Bombardier Accident into Buffalo


Colgan Air Bombardier Accident into Buffalo


NASA Icing Video showed aircraft with a similar configurationto Colgan Air – High wing turboprop with high T tailplane


Most Significant LOC-I AccidentFamilies of those lost formed a focus group & website


Families of passengers killedIn the Colgan Airways Accident

into BuffaloLobbied congress to

Pass a Law



Pass a LawRequiring Stall Training

For All Airline Pilotsand more hours’ experience.

(New president & administration)

US Law


Large Number ofLoss Of Control / Stall-Stick Pusher Related Groups

Set Up/Existing in the Industry

FAA Stall and Sticker Pusher GroupRAeS ICATEEICAO LOCART etc etc

Other activities:


Other activities:ITQI (IATA Training & Quality Initiative) leading toEBT (Evidence Based Training)MPL (Multi-Crew Pilot’s Licence)ICAO NGAP (Next Group of Aviation Professionals)RAeS FSG IWG (International [Flt Sim Stds] Working Group)RAeS IPTC (International Pilot Training Consortium)EASA Rule Making Tasks

FAA Advisory Circular 6th August 2012...to provide best practices and guidance

for training, testing, and checking forpilots, within existing regulations, to


pilots, within existing regulations, toensure correct and consistent responses

to unexpected stall warnings and stickpusher activations

FAA Stall Training ACRequirement for Instructors to HighlightFull Flight Simulator Motion Limitations


Development of Simulation

Angular motions are sensed in humans by canals in the inner ear

5. Motion Systems



Angular motions are sensed in humans by canals in the inner ear

5. Motion Systems


computeaerodynamic

computeaerodynamic convert axes

stability to body

and moment

forces compute linearaccelerations

compute a,b

a,b

P,Q,Rengine forces

r ,MXp,Zp

Xs,Ys,Zs

Xb,Yb,Zb U',V',W'

U,V,W

Ps,Qs,Rs

Vc

r

a,a ,b,b' '

and moments,M

Vc,

Vc,


The inputs to the motion platform are calculated by the Equations of Motion

5. Motion Systems


coefficients

computeaerodynamic

and moment

moments

convert axesstability to body

compute angularaccelerations

computeEuler compute DCM

convert axesbody to Euler

convert axesbody to stability

atmosphericmodel

P',Q',R'

Ps,Qs,Rs

L,M,N

r, M

P,Q,Re0,e1,e2,e3

inceptorsLp,Mp,Np

r

inceptors

and moments

q,f,y

U,V,W

Vx,Vy,Vz

Pn,Pe,h

Ls,Ms,Ns

,M

parameters


As movement is limited, platform motion must be washed out ready for next event

5. Motion Systems


Centrifuges are needed for high G acceleration (seen only in civil aircraft rejected takeoffs)


Acceleration sense available from motion platform

5. Motion Systems


1g



5. Motion Systems


1g

1g * Sin 20° = 0,34



5. Motion Systems


1g

1g * Sin 20° = 0,34g

1g * Cos 20° =0,94g

20°

Maintaining ControlThe ICATEE Approach

RAeS Flight Crew Training Conference27 September 2012Dr. Sunjoo Advani, Chairman of ICATEE

901Royal Aeronautical SocietyFlight Simulation Group

ICATEE

• International Committee for Aviation Training inExtended Envelopes

• Initiated by RAeS Flight Simulation Group in June 2009

• MISSION: To deliver a comprehensive long-term strategyto reduce the rate of Loss of Control In-Flight accidents

91

to reduce the rate of Loss of Control In-Flight accidentsand incidents through enhanced UPRT

• Approach: Upset Prevention and Recovery Training

• Provide recommendations to ICAO, FAA and industry

ICATEE Participants

Category Participants

Organization RAeS-FSG, ICAO

Airframe Manufacturer Boeing, Airbus, Bombardier

Regulator/Government FAA, NTSB, IATA (ITQI/EBT), Transport Canada, EASA, Russian CAA

Training Provider CAE, FlightSafety, Boeing Flight Training, APS, CALSPAN, Embry-Riddle

Simulation Provider CAE, FlightSafety, Thales, Opinicus, ETC, Bihrle

9292

45 organizations, over 80 individuals

Industry Body ALPA, IFALPA, ATA, BBGA

Airline KLM, Alaska, Flybe, FedEx, Air Canada, Lufthansa, several airlines

Research AIAA MSTC, NASA, UTIAS, NLR, TNO, IDT, DLR, U Liverpool, SOS, Volpe

ICATEE Meetings to Date

1 11-09 London

2 03-10 Washington

3 04-10 Orlando

4 06-10 London

5 11-10 Oklahoma

6 03-11 Mesa

7 04-11 Daytona

9393

7 04-11 Daytona

8 04-11 Orlando

9 06-11 Amsterdam

10 08-11 Seattle

11 09-11 Montreal

12 11-11 London

13 04-12 Lutz

14 09-12 Cologne

ICATEE Team

9494

ICAO, Montreal - September 2011

Loss-of-Control In-Flight

• Normal flight

• Upset

• Loss-of-Control

PreventionPrevention

RecoveryRecovery

9595

Today’s Training Assumptions

1. Aircraft is within normal operational envelope and ina non-agitated flight condition

2. Situational awareness and information can beaccurately correlated by the pilot with respect toobserved flight condition

3. Airplane handling skills and strategies established by

96

3. Airplane handling skills and strategies established byregulatory licensing can directly resolve anescalating condition

4. Human psychophysical response is predictable andreliable.

96

All-Attitude Daily Threat

All-Attitude Knowledge Deficiencies

Roll (Right)Roll (Left)

Pitch (+up)+ 90

o

+ 50o

+ 30o

+ 25o

+ 10o

- 10o

60o

90o 180o180o 135o135o

45o

100 % All-Attitude Training (180 AOB, +/- 90 Pitch)

97

11.1 % Max Licensing Limits (60 AOB, +/-30 Pitch)

4.9 %

Upset DefinitionUpset Definition

Airplane Upset RecoveryAirplane Upset RecoveryTraining AidTraining Aid

Upset Definition (45 AOB, +25 & -10 Pitch)

Pitch (-down)

- 50o

- 90o

All-Attitude Daily Threat

All-Attitude Knowledge Deficiencies

Roll (Right)Roll (Left)

Pitch (+up)+ 90

o

+ 50o

+ 30o

+ 25o

+ 10o

- 10o

60o

90o 180o180o 135o135o

45o

100 % All-Attitude Training (180 AOB, +/- 90 Pitch)

98

11.1 % Max Licensing Limits (60 AOB, +/-30 Pitch)

4.9 %

Upset DefinitionUpset Definition

Airplane Upset RecoveryAirplane Upset RecoveryTraining AidTraining Aid

Upset Definition (45 AOB, +25 & -10 Pitch)

Pitch (-down)

- 50o

- 90o

Approximate limits, Colgan 3407

All-envelope knowledge deficiencies

L/D MaxL/D Max

Stall WarningStall Warning

Full StallFull Stall

9999

4-Psychophysical response is predictable & reliable

STARTLE

100100

Training Assumptions

1. Aircraft is within normal operational envelope and ina non-agitated flight condition

2. Situational awareness and information can beaccurately correlated by the pilot with respect toobserved flight condition

3. Airplane handling skills and strategies established by

101Flight Simulation Group - Royal Aeronautical Society - London, UK

3. Airplane handling skills and strategies established byregulatory licensing can directly resolve anescalating condition

4. Human psychophysical response is predictable andreliable.

101

Upset Mitigation Levels

• Awareness

– Knowledge, Skills and Attitudes to prevent an Upset

• Recognition & Avoidance

– mitigation of a developing threat, as early as possible

• Recovery skills to regain control

P

R

102102

R

Prevent undesirable aircraft states

Current Training

Loss-of-Control

Upsetincapacitation

103103

Normal flight

first recognition

recoveryawareness

Enhanced UPRT

Loss-of-Control

Upset

incapacitation

104104

Normal flight

first recognition recovery

awareness

Learning Elements

Competency-based approachto UPRT

105105

to UPRT

Developing Integrated UPRT Skills

FSTD

aircraft

UPRT RequiresIntegrated Training

Elements

UPRT RequiresIntegrated Training

Elements

106106

AcademicsElementsElements

Element 1 - Academics

• Airplane Upset Recovery TrainingAid (1998) is the industry reference

• New ICATEE UPRT Manuals

– Pilot Academic Knowledge & SkillPreparation

– Instructor Guidance in UPRT

107107

– Instructor Guidance in UPRT

– Authorized Training Providers

– Regulatory Guidance

Element 2 - Airplane

• Exposure to

– Psychological component

– Physiological component

– Accurate recovery environment

• Require

– qualified aircraft

108108

– qualified aircraft

– qualified instructors

CALSPANAPSTTCTCA

• Upset Prevention & Recovery Training is NOTAerobatic Training

– Aerobatics focuses on precision maneuvers for aerobaticpilots

• UPRT focuses on recovery from dangeroussituations, and is designed for commercial pilots

Element 2 - Airplane

109109

situations, and is designed for commercial pilots

• UPRT includes significant surprise elements

• Management of startle

• Training of instructors

Element 3: Appropriate Use of FSTD’s

• Better use of today’s devices

• Enhanced feedback in today’ssim’s

• Improved simulation fidelity inextended envelope

11010

– aero model

– pilot cueing (buffet, motion)

graduatedapproach

UPRT learning objectives

FSTD A/CEITHER

111111

• FSTD + All-Envelope All-Attitude A/C skills needed

• Current pilot fleet possibly had adequate on-aircraftcomponent

• A/C exposure can be very small, if done properly

• Despite few training elements, UPRT a/c training is critical

UPRT Instruction

112112

UPRT Instruction

• Instructor Inputs• upset initiation

• surprise-inducing situations

• LOC training scenarios

• Instructor feedback

113113

• Did you stay reasonably within thevalidated flight envelope?

• Did you over stress the airframe?

• Did you apply incorrect/inappropriatecontrol inputs?

• Did you recover?

Instructor Feedback

• UPRT is NOT about flying on the edge of theenvelope

• Bring the aircraft back to the heart of the envelope,THEN maneuver!

• Challenge: Provide the right tools for instructor andpilot

114

pilot

114

IOS Feedback

117117

3

2

1

Lo

ad

Facto

r

Flapsdown

Flaps up

VS1 = flaps up 1-g stallspeed

VA = design maneuverspeed, flaps up

VC = design structured

Load Factor Envelope Showing Speeds and Load Factors

118

0

-1

Airspeed

VS1 VA VC VD

Flaps up

VC = design structuredcruising speed

VD = design divespeed

-2

118

Controls usage

119119

AVOID NEGATIVETRAINING

AVOID NEGATIVETRAINING

12010Flight Simulation Group - Royal Aeronautical Society - London, UK

120

TRAININGTRAINING

UPRT Simulation Requirements

• Simulation requirements specify

– Representative stall model characteristics

– Performance tests for high-altitude stalls

– Tighter objective performance standards inapproach-to-stall region

– Stall evaluations for additional flight conditions

121121

– Stall evaluations for additional flight conditions

– Objective stick pusher force tests

– Objective buffet tests for additional flightconditions

– Buffet onset requirements

– Improved icing model

– Wake vortex modelling

Simulator-Based UPRT

• Learning Objective:

– Managing angle-of-attack / energy

– Recognizing and reacting to signs

• buffet

• reduced lateral control

• reduced stability

122

• reduced stability

• Main objective: UNLOADING

– Maneuver-oriented familiarization: Experience a full stallunder standardized instruction

– Line-oriented training/checking: Recognize and applyrecovery at FIRST SIGNS

122

Training media

123123

Training media

124124

Deliverables

• Recommendations to FAA:

– Stall/Stick-Pusher WG

– Stick Pusher Adverse Weather ARC

• ICAO

– Manual of Upset Prevention & Recovery Training

✓

✓

125125

• Regulatory framework for pilot, instructor, trainingprovider

– Simulator technical standards appendix (9625 or other)

• RAeS Report

– ICATEE UPRT Research and Technology Report

• IATA FSTD Data Document revisions

✓

✓

Take-Away

• Loss of Control in Flight can be mitigated throughintegrated Upset Prevention and Recovery Training

– Academics

– In-Flight

– Simulator

• Simulator Standards Recommendations

126

• Simulator Standards Recommendations– Improved simulator usage, scenarios, IOS, model

• ICATEE is working with industry to improve thetraining paradigm, effectively.

www.icatee.org

[email protected]@idt-engineering.com

+31 655 737 345+31 655 737 345

Sunjoo AdvaniSunjoo Advani

127127

2 pilots & Flight Engineer

2 pilots


Dealing with Black Swans


Some Black Swans?

Examples of Crew actions saving loss of life :

Eric Gennotte’s crewlanded a A300 B4 withno hydraulics usingdifferential engine thrustalone after hit by missileat Baghdad

Captain Peter Burkillretracted the 777 flaps to


retracted the 777 flaps toreduce drag thus avoidingfences before the runwaywhen engines lost thruston final approach into LHR

Captain Sullenbergerstarted the APU out ofsequence to keep the A320powered normally whenditching in the Hudson

Other Black Swans?

Examples of Failures requiring Considerable Crew Activity :


After an A380 engine 2 uncontained failure, while the aircraft wasbeing flown manually, Richard de Crespigny’s crew had to action 53ECAM messages taking some 50 minutes to complete.It took the 5 man crew some 2 hours to prepare the aircraft forlanding. When on the ground they still had matters to resolve –engine 2 could not be shut down, wheels brakes reached 900°C.

PRIORITIZATION OF TRAINING TOPICS

1.50

2.00

2.50

Gen1

Gen2

Gen3

Gen4

Factors in accidents / 1M TOs - Last 15 years


0.00

0.50

1.00

PRIORITIZATION OF TRAINING TOPICS

25%

30%

35%

40%

45% Gen1

Gen2

Gen3

Gen4

What % of accidents had each factor - Last 15 years


0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

EASA’s Rule Making Tasks


Training toAvoid to Loss Of Control Accidents

Prevention is Prime,Eliminate the Cause.

Everything is important


Everything is importantRight from the start –

Pre-selection to...........retirement....

Cruise – Crews Need to be Aware of Aircraft PerformanceTable of Airbus A320 All Engines and Engine Out information – easier to access than FMS.All Engines Max Altitude is always limited by Climb Thrust. Available after FMS failure.


Paper type presentations can still be useful,giving essentials of aircraft performance

for background knowledge & gross error checks -Cruise Speeds, Thrust & Attitude,

Max/Optimum Altitudes - all engines & engine outTakeoff/Landing Speeds & distances

Training toAvoid to Loss Of Control Accidents

Manual flying practiceversus rigid use of automatics -

Trident, 747, DC10, TriStar


Trident, 747, DC10, TriStardifferent policies.

FDR event if flown manually?Whatever system we aim for:

from Capt David Mason of Emirates


Remember


Remember

MCC Courses

All airline pilots must pass aMulti-Crew Cooperation Course

These concentrate on the fact that:We all make mistakes,

We should admit our mistakes/we were wrong


We should admit our mistakes/we were wrong

We must help each other work together for thecommon good – of not having an accident.

MCC Courses should becompulsory for bankers!

Thank you


Thank you

royal aeronautical society heathrow branch the sir richard ......in 2002 don bateman, father of...

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