russia, the us, and smaller europe (the eu):...

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Workingpaper№14,2015(№14)

Russia,theUS,andSmallerEurope(theEU):CompetitionforLeadershipinaPolycentricWorld

AlexeyGromyko

DoctorofPoliticalSciences,DirectorofIERAS

The author analyzes relations within the triangle – Russia, the EU, and the US and provides anoverviewofbasicresearchonthecontemporaryworldorderandthepositionsofEuropeandRussia.Theauthorelaboratesonfivetypesofrelationships,whicharepossiblewithinthistriangle.

TherearenumerouslandmarkworksandinternationaldocumentsonthedestinyofEuropeand the world in which Europe had lived and lives. In varying degrees, these issuesconcerned people throughout modern and contemporary history. One can recall theWestphalian Peace Treaty of 1648, the Congress of Vienna of 1814-1815, the VersaillesTreaty.Backin1918thefirstvolumeofoneofthemostpopularbooksontheOldContinent–“TheDeclineoftheWest”byOswaldSpenglerwaspublished.

WhilereasoningaboutthefatesofEuropeandtheworld, it is importanttorememberthedecisionsoftheYaltaandPotsdamconferencesin1945,theCharteroftheUnitedNations(June26,1945).LaterlifeinEuropewasarrangedintheHelsinkiFinalActof1975andtheCharterofParisin1990.

Aftertheendofthecoldwarthetwomostpopularizedconceptsoftheworldorderbecame“The End of History” by Francis Fukuyama and “The Clash of Civilizations” by SamuelHuntington. However, both concepts have largely remained speculative and weresubstantiatedbyrealityonlypartly.

ИнститутЕвропыРАНInstituteofEuropeRAS

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TheheydayoftheapologeticsofanewformofEurocentrismintheshapeoftheEuropeanUnioncameat thebeginningof theXXIcentury.Hereare just twoexamples: thebookbyJeremyRifkin“TheEuropeanDream”[JeremyRifkin,2004]and“TheEuropeanSuperpower”byJohnMcCormick[JohnMcCormick,2007].AmuchmorerealisticpictureoftheworldandtheplaceofEuropeinitcanbefoundinHenryKissinger's“WorldOrder”[HenryKissinger,2014].

Inrecentyears,anumberoffundamentalstudiesonthecontemporaryworldorderandthepositions of Europe and Russia have appeared in Russia. Here are some of them: a bookundertheeditorshipofAcademicianA.A.DynkinandAcademicianN.I.Ivanova“RussiainaPolycentricWorld” – the result of research by the institutes of theDepartment ofGlobalProblemsandInternationalRelations(RAS)[Rossijavpolicentrichnommire,2011],aswellas “Global Governance: Opportunities and Challenges” [Global'noe upravlenie:vozmozhnosti i riski, 2015]; a book of the Institute ofWorld Economy and InternationalRelations “Global Perestroika” [Global'naja perestrojka, 2014]; a number of books fromamulti-volume series “Old World – New Times” (“Staryi Svet – Novye vremena”) of theInstituteofEurope,RAS:“GreaterEurope.Ideas,Reality,Prospects”[Bol'shajaEvropa.Idei,real'nost', perspektivy, 2014], “Russia in the Diversity of Civilizations” [Rossija vmnogoobrazii civilizacij, 2011], “The European Union in the XXI century: a Time of Trial”[EvropejskijsojuzvXXIveke:vremjaispytanij,2012].

ThebooksbyAcademicianA.A.Kokoshin[Kokoshin,2006.Kokoshin,2011],dedicatedtotheissuesofstrategicstabilityandplanning,theworkofAcademicianA.O.Chyubaryan“RussianEuropeanism”[Chyubaryan,2005],thebookbyAcademicianN.A.SimoniyaandAcademicianA.V. Torkunov “Globalization. Structural Crisis and World Leadership” [Simonija N.A.,TorkunovA.V.Globalizacija, strukturnyj krizis imirovoe liderstvo, 2013] - drewextensiveattentionoftheacademiccommunityandthepoliticalclass.ConceptualideasarepresentedintheworkbyAcademicianV.V.Zhurkin“EuropeanArmy:DefeatsandVictories”[Zhurkin,Evropejskaja armija: porazhenija i pobedy, 2012]; in a number of studies of the RussianInternational Affairs Council (RIAC) “Russia – European Union: Potential for Partnership”,[Rossija – Evropejskij sojuz: vozmozhnosti partnjorstva,2013]andofMGIMO (University)“ConcertofGreatPowers”of theXXICentury” [Koncert velikih derzhav”XXI veka,2015].ThebookbyDr.V.A.Nikonov“ModernWorldand itsOrigins[Nikonov,Sovremennyjmir iego istoki,2015] isamongthemostrecentstudiesofthehistoryofRussiaanditsplaceintheglobalsystemofcoordinates.

The very formulation of this range of problemsmay raise a question: “Why is a regionalorganizationput inone rowwith twonation-states?”The fact is that theEuropeanUnionhasbroadlyandlongagobeenaspiringtoimitateafederalstate.Meanwhile,RussiaandtheUSareexamplesofexactlysuchanarrangement.InthebeginningoftheXXIcentury,theEUhaspracticallybecomearegionalorganizationwithelementsofboth–aconfederationanda federation. The EU is the only international organizationwhere the scope and areas ofsupranational and international regulation are comparable. One can say that the EU is aquasi-statesystem(Table1).Itisworthnoting,thatvariouscompetencesoftheEUarenot


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static, but dynamic. The trend towards adding confederate and federal competencesprevails,butthereisareversemovementaswell1.

What else justifies such a selection of actors? We are speaking here of the European(Christian) civilization, keeping in mind its several branches [The Treaty on EuropeanSecurity, Dogovor o evropejskoj bezopasnosti, 2011. Gromyko, Civilizacija kak ob#ektissledovanija i rossijskaja identichnost', 2011. Gromyko, Civilizacija i Rossija. Sporyprodolzhajutsja,2009.TheRussianFederationForeignPolicyConcept,KoncepcijavneshnejpolitikiRF,2008.RussianFederationForeignPolicyConcept,KoncepcijavneshnejpolitikiRF,2013].ThesebranchesarerepresentedbyRussia,thecountriesoftheEuropeanUnionandthe US. Together they form a sort of a civilizational triangle (“Europe from Vancouver toVladivostok”).Allverticesofthistrianglecomefromasinglehistoricalcore.Further,intimetheirpathshavedivergedinmanyrespects,butacertainpartoftheircommonheritagewaspreserved,forexample,theexperienceofanallianceduringtheWWII.

A few words on terminology. “Smaller Europe” in this context denotes the sum of 28countries–membersoftheEuropeanUnionasof2015.This isthesmallerEurope,as it isonly a part of the Old Continent, the history of which is unthinkable without Russia andsomeothercountries2.Fromageographicalpointofview,RussiaiscertainlymorethanjustaEuropeancountry.That iswhytheterm“GreaterEurope” iswidelyused. It isnotanewterm. In itsessence, it ismore thanahundredyearsoldand incorporates the ideaof the“UnitedStatesofEurope”of theearlyXXcentury, the ideaofpan-Europe in the interwarperiod,theGaullistideaofacommonEuropeanspaceandthemorerecentinterpretationsofEurope“fromLisbontoVladivostok.

Inaddition,thesethreesubjectsofworldpolitics–Russia,theEuropeanUnion(tobemoreprecise–severalofitsmember-states)andtheUSareunitedintheirdesiretoproduceanddevelopstrategicthinking.Thisassumesthattheyhavetheirownpictureoftheworldorder,strong science, experienced diplomacy, large resources, long-term statehood. Few woulddenythatMoscow,Paris,London,BerlinandWashingtonhistoricallyhaveaninherentdrivetowardsstrategicthinkingandattimestheyshowsuchthinking.However,thisabilityhasanegativesideandcarriesitsownrisks:themorepowerfulthecountryis,thegreaterarethenegative consequences of strategic thinking if it is applied incorrectly. For example, anumberofUSmilitarycampaignsintheearlyXXIcenturyclearlyconfirmthis.

AsfortheEU,itspretensionstostrategicthinkingsofarhavenotcometofruition.However,some experience and progress is visible. For example, a strategic, on a European scale,historical reconciliation between France and Germany has been successfully achieved. Intermsofdoctrines,thefirst(andsofartheonlyone)Europeansecuritystrategyappearedin2003. This doctrine, in particular, states: “As a union of 25 states with over 450 millionpeopleproducingaquarterof theworld’sGNP, theEuropeanUnion is inevitably a global1Theanalysisofthesituationfrompointofviewofgovernancemethodsisgivenin:KaveshnikovN.Yu.Metodyupravlenijavevropeiskomsojuze//MEIMO,8August2015,M.:Nauka.

2Theterm“SmallerEurope”hasbeenusedintheworksoftheInstituteofEurope(RAS)forseveralyears,forexample,see:MaksimyichevI.F.Est’libudushheeuBol’shoiEvropy?//SovremennayaEvropa,No1,2013.


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player... Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and inbuildingabetterworld”[ASecureEuropeInaBetterWorld,2003:1].Thisdocumentshowsplentyambitions:“Weneedtodevelopastrategicculturethatfostersearly,rapidand,whennecessary,robustintervention”[ASecureEuropeInaBetterWorld,2003:11].

Table1.

If in2003theword“strategy”,“strategic”wasused13times, inthestrategicreviewasof2008–18times(ReportontheImplementationoftheEES.Dec.2008S407/08).Hereisjustone quote: “To ensure our security... we must be ready to shape events. That meansbecomingmorestrategicinourthinking,andmoreeffectiveandvisiblearoundtheworld”.

The EU has no shortage of strategic claims. Traditionally, the EU documents and the

Federation

(exclusivecompetencesoftheEU)

Confederation(mixedcompetences)

Interstateassociation

(competencesofnational

governments)CustomsUnion(1968)EMU—Eurozone(19ofthe28member-states)EUSingleMarketSectoralpoliciesSocialpoliciesaspects,especiallyoccupationalsafetyandhealthTheSchengenAreaSystemoflaw(primacyovernationallawincludingconstitutionallaw)OwnbudgetofEUR143bln(2015).Forcomparison:theUNbudgetis$2.8bln.Atthesametime,thisisonlyabout1%oftheEU-28GDP.

ForeignpolicyFiscalpolicy(“Europeansemester”)BankingUnionEnergyUnionLegislativeprocess(acquiscommunitaire)ImmigrationpolicyEmploymentpolicyTheEUcommonspaceoffreedom,securityandjusticeThegrowthofpowersofnationalparliaments(the“yellowcard”mechanism)

SecurityanddefensepolicyTaxpolicyGovernancearrangements(therightofvetowhentheEuropeanCouncil-summitofthemember-states’leaders-takescertaindecisions)Partofsocialpolicy


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statementsofitsleadersmentionstrategicpartnershipwithNATO.Suchpartnershipshavebeencreatedwith Japan,China,Canada, Indiaand,until recently,withRussia.Therehavebeenadopted:TheAnti-TerrorismStrategy(2005),TheStrategyfortheExternalDimensionoftheAreaofFreedom,SecurityandJustice(2005),TheStrategyforaSecureInformationSociety(2006),TheEUandAfrica:Towardsastrategicpartnership(2006),TheEUStrategytowardsCentralAsia(2007),etc.

It is also clear that the intertwining of competition and cooperation between the threeplayers isgrowing.This is complicatedby increasing internalcontradictions in theEU. It isworth noting that all parts of the triangle compete in various forms. For example, weremember well year 2003, when the Euro-Atlantic structures became split due tocontradictionsovertheinvasionofIraq.ThetopicofRussiatodayremainsperhapstheonlyone in relation to which the traditional notion of an collective West remains in forcealthough the attitudes here vary even against the background of the Ukrainian crisis.Manifestations of this are visits to Russia in 2015 of Angela Merkel, Francois Hollande,MatteoRenzi,NikosAnastasiadis,AlexisTsipras,RobertFico,thepresidentsofFinlandandtheCzechRepublic,Turkey,etc.

InadditiontointernalinterdependencewithinthespacefromVancouvertoVladivostok,allthethreeplayers–Russia,theUSandtheEU–areexposedtoanincreasinginfluencefromabroad, primarily fromChina, India, Brazil andother emerging centers of power. In thesedynamicsofrelationships–bothbetweenthethreeplayersandwithothercountries–thefactorofstatesovereigntybecomesofgreatimportance.

Wewitnessasortofarenaissanceofthenation-statephenomenaintheearlyXXIcentury.Unlike the EU, neither Russia nor the US, nor China, nor India, nor Brazil are seeking totransferpartoftheirsovereigntytosupranationalstructures(althoughelementsofthisarealreadyinplacewithintheframeworkoftheEurasianEconomicUnion).Atthesametime,however,theerosionofthestatewithintheEuropeanUnionhasnoticeablysloweddown,as isevidencedby, forexample, theUK intentiontoreclaimpartof thepowerspreviouslydelegatedtoBrussels.Allacrosstheworld,thegrowingnewcentersofinfluenceadheretotheviewthatastrongnationalstateisessential.

Nevertheless, we also witness opposite processes, such as crisis developments in thefunctioningofanation-state.Within theEU, theexperimentwithblurring theprincipleofstate sovereignty has led to several unintended consequences and side effects. Regionalnationalism and separatism increased in Spain, the UK, Belgium. The situation on theperiphery of the European Union – In the Balkans – is even worse and is completelydisastrousintheregionsadjacenttoEurope.Theseareentireregionsoffailedandcollapsingstates inAfrica, theMiddleEast,on theArabianPeninsula.Anumberof theEUmember-states and the US have played a negative role in aggravating these negative processes,includingtheuseofmilitaryforceinthealreadyfragilestatestructures’environment.

In the past fewdecades globalization hasworked to “tie” countries together, to enhancetheirinterdependence.Thetradeboominthe1990s–early2000sbetweenRussiaandthe


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EuropeanUnionisavividexampleofthisprocess.

However, this process has its own counterforce – regional integration, which, similar togravity, pushes towards each other geographically close countries most intensely. TheexamplesoftheEU,ASEAN,MERCOSUR,NAFTAandnowtheEurasianEconomicUnionarequite telling. In other words, the “tyranny of geography” is showing through. Hence theparadoxofourtime:topromoteone’s interestssuccessfully it isnecessarytobecomethecoreofaregionalintegrationproject.Nocountryisabletodothisaloneanymore.Thisway,Germanyhadreceivedundoubtedbenefits frombecomingde-factotheeconomicheartoftheEuropeanUnionandtheEurozone.

Mega-integrationprojects,or“integrationofintegrations”,representthemostrecenttrendin history. In a way, such projects have already been implemented in the form of, forexample, NATO, the Warsaw Pact, COMECON, the Non-Aligned Movement. But in mostcases these projects came as a response to a bipolar world and were driven largely bypoliticalandideologicalreasons.Foursuperprojectsarecurrentlybeinglobbied.ThisistheTrans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) of 22 Asia-Pacific countries led by the United States; theTransatlanticTradeandInvestmentPartnership(TTIP)betweentheUSandtheEU;theAsia-Pacific Free Trade Zone led by China and the Economic Belt of the Silk Route also led byChina.ItmustbenotedthatinthoseprojectswheretheUSandtheEUparticipate,Russiaisanoutsider,inotherprojectsithasuncertainprospects.

It isnecessary tomentiononemore factor that isstrongly influencingtherelations in thistriangle. This is the “sliding”, shifting character of the centre/centers of globalization. Forseveralcenturiesuntil1945theworldwaseurocentric;untiltheearly1990s itwasbipolarwiththedominanceoftheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion.Then,until2001,therewasa“unipolar moment” with a bias towards the US. Following that, polycentrism began toestablish itself,while retaining thehierarchy (multilevel structure)of states.ThecenterofgravitystartedtomovetowardstheAsia-Pacificregion(tobemoreprecise–towardsAIPR–theAsian-Indian-PacificRegion).

Whatunitesanddistinguishesthethreecivilizationallydistantrelatives?

Below are basic indicators on population and territory. All three parts of the triangle indifferent order belong to the group of top ten countries of theworld (line “EU” includesleadingmember-statesbypopulation,Table2).

By GDP PPP and GDP at the official exchange rate, they belong to the top ten leadingcountries of theworld. The GDP per capita draws them far apart, but the indicators stillremaincomparable,withanumberofEUmemberslaggingbehindRussia(Table3showsinbracketstheplaceintheranking;line“Russia”showsforcomparisonasample-groupofEUmembersbyGDPpercapita;column5showsasamplegroupofEUmembers-states).

It isworthnoting that21countries in theworldhaveaGDPPPPofmore than$1 trln. Insum,bythisindicatortheyhave$82trln.Butonlynineofthembelongtowhattraditionallyiscalledthe“West”(theEUrepresentedbyGermany,France,Britain,ItalyandSpain,aswell


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astheUS,Canada,JapanandAustralia).Therest,non-Westerncountries, includingRussia,accountfor54%oftheGDP($45trln)ofthementioned21countries.

Table2.

Territory(mlnsq.km)

Population(mln)

1. Russia 17 142(10)2. Канада 9.98 3. USA 9.8 318,9(4)4. China 9.596 1355(1)5. Brazil 8.514 202.6(5)6. Australia 7.741 7. EU 4.325 512(3) 80.9(18)

Germany66.2(22)France63.7(23)Britain61.6(24)Italy

8. India 3.287 1236(2)

TheshareofRussiaintheEUcombinedforeigntradein2014amountedto8.4%,takingthethirdplaceaftertheUS(15%)andChina(14%).Forcomparison:theshareofRussiaintheUSforeigntradeis1%andChina–2%.TheEUisthelargesttradingpartnerforRussia,whiletheUSisatthe20thplace.

Inthebeginningof2015,theEU'sshareinRussia'sforeigntradeamountedto46%,oraboutEUR285bln, the shareofChina–about11%,orabout$90billion. The trade turnoverofRussiawiththeUSisbelow$30bln,whilethetradeturnoverbetweentheEUandtheUSisEUR 515 bln; between the EU and China it is EUR 467 bln. From this point of view, the“gravity” pushing Russia towards the EU is still several times greater than in the case ofChinaandespeciallytheUS.

TheUkrainiancrisisbroughtitsowncorrections.In2014thetradeturnoverbetweenRussiaandtheEUfellby10%comparedto2013andcontinuestofall.However,fromcountrytocountrythepicturevaries.Thisway,mutualtradewiththeUKfellin2014byseveraltensofpercent,anditincreasedby1-2%withBulgariaandMalta.ThetradeturnoverofRussiawithnon-Europeancountriesin2014ingeneralhasincreased:forexample,by30%withMexico,by86%withEgypt,by7%withChinaandby6%withtheUS.

TheEuropeanUnion ispassingthroughanextremelycomplicatedstage in itshistory,withnoguaranteesagainstabackwardmovementorfromfragmentationoftheEurozone.


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Table3.

1 2 3 4 5

2014;$GDPPPP(trln)

GDPatofficial

exchangerate(trln)

GDPpercapita(K)

GDPPPP(trln)

GDPto2013+/-(%)

1. China 17.630 10.36(3)

12.9(113) 7.4(14)

2. EU 17.610 18.4(1)

38.3(42) 1.4(171)

3. USA 17.460 17.42(2)

54.8(19) 2.4(131)

4. India 7.277 2.048(11)

5.8(160) 5.6(43)

5. Japan 4.807 4.77(4)

1.3(173)

6. Germany 3.621 3.8(5)

44.7(27) 1.4(165)

7. Russia 3.456 2.057(10)

24.8(69) Poland(72)Hungary(73)Latvia(75)Romania(85)Bulgaria(93)

0.5(196)

8. Brazil 3.073 2.244(8)

15.2(101) 0.3(198)

9. France 2.587 2.9(6)

40.4(39) 0.4(197)

10. Indonesia 2.554 0.856(12)

11. Britain 2.435 2.848(7)

37.3(44) 3.2(101)

…13.Italy 2.066 2.129(9)

34.5(49) -0.2(202)

-0.2Finland -0.8Croatia -3.4Cyprus

Source:CIAWorldFactbook2015.

Inthefirstquarterof2015theGDPoftheEurozonecountriesgrewupby0.4%.ThreeEUcountries still remained in recession (Finland, Croatia, Cyprus) and this is despite the factthat the ECB has started a large-scale program of quantitative easing exceeding $1 trln.Leading EU countries balanced on the brink of recession: the GDP growth in the UKwas0.3%,0.6%inFrance,0,3%inItalyafterthreeyearsofrecession,0.3%inGermany(0.7%inQ42014).

Up until now, the EU is unable to resolve twoother dangerous problems – deflation and


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unemployment. The prices remaineddepressed in Europe throughout 2014 and stayed inthe negative zone while the ECB target indicator was 2%. Unemployment in the EU inaverage exceeds 12%; the situation is especially dramatic in Spain – around 25%, and inGreece–around30%.Youngpeoplebelow25yearsareinthemostdesperatesituation.Forexample,morethan40%ofyoungmeninItalyareunemployed.

Theimmigrationproblemstandsalone.In2014thenumberofonlyillegalmigrantstotheEUhasreachedalmost300ths.In2015thesituationrapidlydeterioratedandbytheendoftheyearthenumberof illegalmigrantsandrefugeeswhohadarrivedwithapoorlycontrolledflowontheterritoryoftheEUexceededonemillion.

Whatarethepossiblecombinationofforcesinthistriangle?Allinall,therearefiveofthem(thoughtheyareconditional):

1. GreaterEurope–arapprochementbetweenRussiaandtheEUagainstthebackdropof the sunset of the American dream as theworld knew it in the 20th century. ThemainimpedimenthereisalackoffullpoliticalsubjectivityoftheEuropeanUnionandstronganti-Russiansentiments insomeEUcountries. Inthiscasethestakescanbeplacedonamulti-speedmovementinthedevelopmentoftheEuropeanUnion’scommonforeignpolicy.InitsinternaldevelopmenttheEUovertimehaspaidmoreandmoreattentiontoa“two-speedmovement”(forexample,increatingtheSchengenarea,theEurozone,theBankingUnion),wheresomecountriesbecamethe“core”ofaspecificprocessandothers-the“periphery”.Similarly,thisprinciplecanplayapositiveroleinthecommonforeignpolicy,includingRussia–EUrelations.2. ThereinvigoratedpartnershipbetweentheEUandtheUS intheeventofescalatingtensionsbetweenRussiaand theWest to the levelofa structural rivalry.Toprevent this,muchdependsbothonexternalfactorsandonRussiaitself,whichneedstomovetowardsmodernization.ThemainobstaclesfortheaforesaidvariantareAmerican“exceptionalism”and, at the same time, skeptical sentiments and even anti-Americanism, in the EU.WashingtonhasbeenlosingitsinterestinEuropeforalongperiodoftime.ThenegotiationsontheTTIP,therevitalizationofNATOinEuropeamidtheUkrainiancrisishaveslowedthistrend.However,itisunlikelythatinthemediumtermitwillweaken.ThepossibleelectiontoUSpresidencyofafigurewithneoconflavor,cangiveanadditionalimpetustotheEUtoreturnonthepathofstrengtheningtheautonomyofitsforeignpolicy.3. Anew“restart”ofrelations,arapprochementbetweentheUSandRussiaagainstthebackdropofdecreasingattractivenessof theEuropean integrationprojectandthebuildupofglobalproblemsrequiringcooperationofmajorpowers.ThemainimpedimenthereagainisstillthesameAmericanmessianism,deeplyrootedanti-RussiansentimentsintheUS,loweconomic interdependence between Moscow and Washington. However, recentdevelopments,includingthesuccessofnegotiationsofthe“5+1”andIran,anewwindowofopportunities for combating ISIS in Syria with the participation of Russian military, thenegotiations of the presidents of Russia and the US on the margins of the UN GeneralAssembly on September 29 – show that the ideaof a “concert of powers” can remindofitselffromtimetotimeevenintheXXIcentury.


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4. Strategic partnership of all three parts of the triangle on equal footing with theparticipationofothermajorcountries,forexample,attheplanformofOSCE,G20ortheUNSecurity Council. The main obstacles here are described in options 1-3. However, thisscenario also has a chance to be implemented in case of positive developments in therelationsbetweenRussiaandtheEUorRussiaandtheUS.Inthiscase,thethirdpartymaybe convinced toadapt to thenew trend rather than resist it. Thegrowing factorofChinamayalsoworktobuildbetterrelationshipsbetweenothercentersofinfluence.Globaland,therefore, common challenges such as terrorism, climate change, further exploration ofspace,uncontrolledmigration,etc.willpushallinternationalplayerstowardsinteraction.5. Adriftof“allfromall”.Likeoption2,itisleastbeneficialforRussiainparticularduetoitspositionintheinternationaldivisionoflaborandtheundesirabilityoflimitingitsspacefor geopoliticalmaneuvering solely in the eastern direction. Clearly, the strengthening ofstrategic cooperation with China will be one of the pillars of Russia’s strategy on theinternational arena in the XXI century. However, taking into account the imbalancesappearing between the two countries, it will be important for global stability – In theconditions of a polycentricworld – tomaintain amore balanced systemof relations thatprecludetheoppositionofonegroupofstatesandorganizationstoanother.

Each of these five options is possible, though with a different degree of probability. Asalways,inpracticallifeprocesseswithelementsofallofthementionedoptionswilldevelop.Itisimportantwhichoftheseelementswillbedominantandwhichwillbesecondary.ItisintheinterestsofRussiatoensurethatnotasingleconfigurationofmajorpowersisexclusive,andthatnotasinglestrategicdrift is irrevocable.Asinthecaseofmarketeconomy,“self-regulation” has long ago been recognized as a dangerous myth. If major states wish toensurethat“themixofingredients”ininternationalrelationsofthenewcenturyiscorrectand universally acceptable, they should not make the mistake of relying on tacticalmaneuveringandtheautopilot.Politicalwill,strategicthinking,pragmatismandrepudiationof national egoismswill be crucial for the success of all the components of the Europeancivilization.

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