russian revolution u3/4 notes

8/10/2019 Russian Revolution U3/4 Notes

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RevolutionsRussia: Area of Study 2

Creating a new society


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Contents

Key terms............................................................................................................... 2

Historical perspectives Historiograp!y................................................................ "

A#S2...................................................................................................................... $

%!e &rst si' mont!s of (ols!evi) Rule................................................................*

+arly decrees and policies................................................................................ ,,

%!e C!e)a......................................................................................................... ,"

-issolution of t!e constituent assem ly...........................................................,/

%!e %reaty of (rest01itovs)............................................................................... 2

Civil 3ar........................................................................................................... 24 %!e Red Army................................................................................................... 2/

%!e Red %error.................................................................................................. 2*

3ar Communism.............................................................................................. 44

+veryday impacts of t!e Civil 3ar....................................................................4$

%!e Kronstadt Revolt........................................................................................ 4*

5ew +conomic 6olicy........................................................................................ "2

-eat! of 1enin Summary..................................................................................""

Key Evidence: (Dates, Names,People, Places, Documents)

Review of key terms add them tothe main list!":

#rimary $uotes: (From the period)

%istoriography: How did key historians interpret this event?

&oviet' (estern)arxist

(esternliberal'conservative

Revisionist

Evaluation and *nalysis:


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Why was this policy / action taken? ( risis and response)

Was this policy / action consistent with !olshevik revolutionary ideals?

ompare this policy / action to the "sar#s re$ime% What has chan$ed?

How did the policy / action impact on a $roup in &ussian society? (e$% Workers, peasants)

Key terms

%istorians&oviet'(estern)arxist

(esternliberal'Russianliberal

Revisionist +ibertarian

-eutsc!er7 8saacHill7 C!ristop!er6onomarev7 (.5.Reed7 9o!n %en-ays t!at S!oo)t!e 3orld;

%aylor7 A.9.6

eneralKornilov7 >eneral1enin7 ladimir

*-&/C!ernov7 ictor role in ConstituentAssem ly;Sverdlov role in elections and-eclaration of t!e Rig!ts of %oilers


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1vov7 6rince1vov7 .5.=artov =ens!ivi)s;=ilyu)ov7 6aul union of unions andKadets;

=irs)ii7 6rince Sviatopol)05i)oleiveic!7 >rand -u)e 5i)olai6le!ve7 yac!eslav6le)!anov S-s;6rince 6otem)in (attles!ip;Rasputin7 >regoryRodBian)o7 =i)!ailStalin7 9osef Stolypin7 6eter

%rots)y7 1eon %sarevitc! Ale'ei %sarina Ale'andra

3itte7 Sergeiinoviev7 >rigory (ols!evi);

)ovements0 ideas and documents*-&.All Russian -emocratic 1a our 6arty

S-s;All Russian @nion of 6easantsApril %!esesAssem ly of Russian eorgians etc;reen Armies

Komuc! Committee of =em ers of t!eConstituent Assem ly7 relation to CBec!legion;

1eft SRs role in CA and (ols!evi)coalition;5ew +conomic 6olicy6eoples Army Komuc!;Sov5arKom Soviet of 6eoples

Commisars;State capitalism3!ite Armies


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SovietSt 6eters urg Soviet including arrest-ecem er ,* D;State Council

%sarist council of ministers

@nion of @nions@r an wor)ers demands and aims;emstvo

1ates*-&.+mancipation of t!e Serfs>reat Spurt

,* "7


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&oviet Historical records written wit!

t!e e'press approval of t!eCommunist 6arty. %!ese recordswere designed to present t!e

o cial record of events7 andwere often altered on t!ew!ims of particular leaders.

Soviet !istorians tend to focuson t!e scienti&c and inevita lenature of socialism7 using t!isinevita ility as Iusti&cation forany conJict.

8n t!e Soviet !istories7 arevolution is in!erently good7

ecause t!ey ring a outadvancement towards classe uality. ,* D and ,*,/ areseen as part of t!e samecontinuity towards socialism.

History is interpreted purelyt!roug! =ar'ist01eninist terms7w!ere t!e (ols!evi) 6arty is nota dictators!ip ut genuinelyrepresents t!e will and est

interests of t!e proletariat. %!ismeant t!at popular support fort!e (ols!evi)s was uns!a)a le.

As a result7 1enin is madeinfalli le ecause !e was t!esupreme advocate of t!e=ar'ist01eninist ideology.

8t was triump! of =ar'ism01eninism and demonstrated t!esigni&cance and role of t!erevolutionary =ar'ist party. %!ewor)ing class and all ot!er

wor)ing people of Russia wereled y t!e (ols!evi) 6arty7w!ic! was guided y t!erevolutionary t!eory of=ar'ism01eninism.

%!e 6etrograd wor)ers in t!osedays s!owed w!at a splendidsc!ooling t!ey !ad receivedunder t!e guidance of t!e(ols!evi) 6arty.

%!e cruiser urora trained itsguns on t!e 3inter 6alace7 andon #cto er 2D t!eir t!underus!ered in a new era7 t!e era of t!e >reat Socialist Revolution.

8n tsarist Russia t!e capitalistyo)e was aggravated y t!eyo)e of tsardom. %!e wor)ersnot only su?ered from capitaliste'ploitation7 from in!uman toil7

ut in com ination wit! t!ew!ole people7 su?ered from alac) of all rig!ts.

3!o led t!e


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in Russia wit! a constructiveprogram and t!e power toimpose it on t!e country. 8f t!ey!ad not succeeded t!egovernment w!en t!ey did7

t!ere is little dou t in my mindt!at t!e armies of imperial>ermany would !ave een in6etrograd and =oscow in-ecem er7 and Russia wouldagain e ridden y a tsar. Reed"en Days that *hook the

World)(estern liberal

>enerally written in t!eimmediate aftermat! of t!erevolution and during t!e Cold3ar.

S!aped y t!e political climateof t!e Cold 3ar7 t!e li eralinterpretation of t!e revolutionis politically conservative andfundamentally !ostile to t!enotions of socialism7 =ar'istt!eory and all t!ingscommunist.

Ac)nowledge t!e out datednessof t!e tsarist system7 and

viewed revolution in general asa necessary evil to produce afreer society7 ut preferred


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placing less inJuence on t!einevita ility of =ar'ism and itsparticular leaders7 and more onsecondary factors suc! asnationalism7 culture and religion

as drivers of social c!ange. =any would go as far asdeclaring t!at =ar'ism is afailed p!ilosop!y w!ic! couldnever e successfullyimplemented.

Classic interpretations do notplace muc! weig!t on class asa cause of social unrest. %!eyview class struggle as toosimple a notion to e'plain t!ecourse of !istory.

Some suc! as 6ipes disregardt!e inJuence of t!e masses7arguing t!at t!e revolution wasdriven y leaders rat!er t!anpopular movements. %!ee'ploitation of t!e masses wasa central element in t!e(ols!evi)s victory.

1i eral !istorians saw t!ecollapse of t!e Soviet @nion in,**, as a vindication of t!eir

views.

Russia. %!ey simply wiped outt!e eleven intervening years ofconstitutionalism. 6ipes

Revisionist >enerally written after t!e fall

of t!e Soviet @nion t!oug!some were written earlier andlater revised; and t!e openingof t!e Communist records7revisionist !istory is a synt!esisof earlier sources w!ic!attempts to interpret eventsfrom a new perspective.

Revisionists usually focus ont!e revolution from elow7portraying t!e revolution as t!eresult of long term pro lemsrat!er t!an t!e inJuence ofparticular leaders or ideologies.Saw revolution as inevita le

ecause of t!e out datedness of t!e tsarist system7 ut notnecessarily ecause of classtension.

Revisionists would de ate t!estandard interpretation of t!e(ols!evi)s as a tig!tly

After a relatively easyaccession to power7 !owever7t!e (ols!evi)s7 never a maIoritymovement in peasant Russia7were faced wit! t!e dissolutionof political aut!ority7 t!ecomplete collapse of t!eeconomy7 and t!edisintegration of t!e countryalong et!nic lines. Suny

1enin drew lessons from t!eitter e'perience of t!e war0

communism period7 and in !islast years counselled care andmoderation. 5ove

8t is inappropriate to suggestt!at t!e (ols!evi)s !ad no toe0!old in t!e mass revolutionmovement of ,*,/: t!ey couldnot !ave come to powerwit!out suc! a toe0!old.Service

Russias wor)ers were not oneuniform7 grey mass ut Jes!0


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organised party along t!e linesof 3!at is to e done L insteadt!ey were as comple' andmessy as any political party.However7 1enins strong

leaders!ip meant t!at unitycould e ac!ieved relativelyeasily7 suc! as after t!e issue of !is April %!eses to c!ange t!eparty platform.

%!ey generally argue t!at t!erewas at least some pu licsupport for t!e #cto erinsurrection7 t!oug! not to t!ee'tent contended y t!e Soviet!istorians.

Revisionists7 unli)e classicli erals7 recognise class as animportant factor in drivingsocial c!ange. However t!eystop s!ort of a full =ar'istinterpretation.

Argue t!at grassrootsmovements suc! as soviets7unions and wor)erscommittees !ad a muc! largerimpact on t!e revolution t!anpreviously t!oug!t.

Argue t!at t!e (ols!evi)s werenot divinely inspired orconspiratorial7 ut were simplyt!e est at articulating t!e willof t!e masses. %!ey later lostt!is a ility to represent t!emasses under 3ar Communism.

Are often more sympat!etic tot!e (ols!evi)s t!an classicli erals7 ecause t!ey view t!efailure of t!e revolution more asa result of outside factors t!ant!e in!erent nature of =ar'ism.

and0 lood individuals7 !ig!lydi?erentiated in terms of levelof s)ill7 cultural development7nationality and outloo). Rat!ert!an responding en masse to

events7 t!eir reactionsdepended closely on t!eir ownparticular e'perience. Acton

%ailoring t!e (ols!evi)programme so t!at it wouldreJect popular aspirations wasone of 1enins most importantcontri utions to t!edevelopment of t!e revolution.Ra inowitc!

%!e discourse of democracyput into place y t!e overnment ande'plains t!e ease wit! w!ic!armed resistance to t!e neworder was overcome. Acton

%!e #cto er Revolution was acoup detat7 actively supported

y a small minority of t!epopulationN ut it too) placeamidst a social revolution7w!ic! was centred on t!erealisation of soviet power.


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social event and t!e rulingpolitical party L a di?erence asfundamental as it !as eenfatal to t!e revolution.(er)man

8t !as een asserted y somet!at (ols!evi) accession topower in Russia was due to acoupN and dou t !as eene'pressed regarding t!e socialnature of t!e #cto er c!ange.5ot!ing could e furt!er fromt!e trut!. As a matter of!istorical fact7 t!e great event)nown as t!e #cto erRevolution was in t!eprofoundest sense a socialrevolution. (er)man

Examples of historiography in essays 3!ist Soviet !istorians view t!e #cto er Revolution as a mass

movement led y 1eninO li eral !istorians7 suc! as 6ipes7 argue t!at#cto er was a classic coup detat: t!e seiBure of power y a smallminority wit!out t!e support or consent of wider society.


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&ov,arKom %!e Soviet of 6eoples Commisars Soviet of 5arod Commissars in Russian; wasformed after t!e #cto er 2D coup to replace t!e 6rovisional >overnment. 8t wasmade up of ,/ Commissars7 w!ic! were ministers wit! di?erent portfolios7 similarto t!e tsarist and 6.>. systems.

8nitially t!e (ols!evi)s !ad di culty ta)ing over t!e administration of t!egovernment. =any civil servants went on stri)e in response to t!e coup7 !idingt!e )eys to government o ces and refusing t!e (ols!evi)s access to t!e State(an).

8nitially t!e (ols!evi)s !ad signi&cant pro lems ta)ing over t!e running of t!egovernment. %!e civil service went on stri)e to protest t!e coup L t!e )eys tostate o ces and facilities were !idden7 and o cials at t!e State (an) refused to!and over any money to Sov5arKom.

2ensions %!e railway union7 led y t!e =ens!evi)s and SRs7 t!reatened to stri)e L t!is led

to a num er of prominent moderate (ols!evi)s Kamenev and inoviev; enteringtal)s wit! ot!er political groups. 1enin and %rots)y refused to ma)e anycompromises wit! t!e rival parties. inoviev and Kamenev resigned from t!e(ols!evi) Central Committee in protest at 1enin and %rots)ys refusal tocompromise.


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t!e revolution7 despite !is elief in t!e revolution from a ove led y t!e tig!t(ols!evi) party. He said it was essential to im ue t!e oppressed and wor)ingpeople wit! con&dence in t!eir own strengt!.A war on privilege was t!us a )ey ideal of t!e revolution7 and t!e masses wereencouraged to ta)e matters into t!eir own !ands and punis! t!e ourgeoisie.

%!e (ols!evi)s were not anarc!ists7 !owever7 and wis!ed to prevent t!edestruction of property w!ic! would e useful for t!e creation of t!e socialisteconomy. 1enin told a delegation of wor)ers in ,*,/: Pou are t!e power: do allyou want to do7 ta)e all you want. 3e s!all support you7 ut ta)e care ofproduction7 see t!at production is useful.

#rimary $uotes: (From the period)2rotsky: 3!at sort of diplomatic wor) s!all we e doing7 anywayG 8 s!all issuea few decrees and s!ut up s!op.6orky: 3!en t!e (ols!evi)s too) power7 all t!e dar) instincts of t!e crowdirritated y t!e disintegration of life and y t!e lies and &lt! of politics will Jareup and fume7 poisoning us wit! anger7 !ate and revenge.%istoriography: How did key historians interpret this event?

Soviet 3estern =ar'ist 1i eral Revisionist2rotsky: %!ose w!olose y a revolution arerarely inclined to call it

y its real name. %rots)y2rotsky: %!ere isnot!ing immoral in t!e

proletariat &nis!ing o? aclass t!at is collapsing Lt!at is t!eir rig!t.

%rots)y#onomarev: @ndert!e leaders!ip of t!e(ols!evi) party7 t!ewor)ers and poorpeasants overt!rew t!e

ourgeoisie andesta lis!ed Sovietpower.2rotsky: 3e7 t!eSoviets7 are going to tryan e'periment uni ue in!istoryO we are going tofound a power w!ic! will!ave no ot!er aim ut tosatisfy t!e needs of t!esoldiers7 wor)ers andpeasants.

#ipes: %!e events t!atled to t!e overt!row oft!e 6rovisional>overnment were notspontaneous utcarefully plotted and

staged y a tig!lyorganised conspiracyN#cto er was a classiccoup detat.7lam: +'cept for t!ewor)ers at somefactories t!ere was nopro0(ols!evi)ent!usiasm in t!epopulation7 only apat!y.,ove: 5o uni&ed plane'isted. %!ere was a

priority for war7 andnumerous improvisationsas t!e economystaggered from criticals!ortage to outrig!t

rea)down. 5ove#ipes: %!e system oflegislation t!e(ols!evi)s set in placewit!in two wee)s of t!e#cto er coup7 for all itsrevolutionary r!etoric7mar)ed a reversion tot!e autocratic practices

8iges: %!e (ols!evi)swere psyc!ologicallyuna le to ma)e t!etransition from anunderground &g!tingorganisation to a

responsi le party ofnational government.&mith: Nit is t!e(ols!evi)s incapacity torealise t!eir ends7 t!eir

lindness rat!er t!ant!eir vision7 t!at isstri)ing. After t!ey cameto power7 t!ey faced a!uge range of pro lemsfor w!ic! =ar'ism01eninism left t!em ill0

e uippedN6olicy7t!erefore7 was fre uentlyt!e outcome ofimprovisation andpragmatism as muc! asof t!e !allowed tenets of ideology. 8n ot!er words7t!e relations!ip etween

elief and action wascomple'7 inJuenced y afar larger range offactors.


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of tsarist Russia. %!eysimply wiped out t!eeleven intervening yearsof constitutionalism.&ervice: As t!e

(ols!evi)smetamorp!osed from aparty of insurrection to aparty of government7t!eir perspective ofreality c!anged.

Evaluation and *nalysis: nalyse the challen$e +acin$ the revolution and the response to it%%!e creation of a new socialist society in Russia L spurred on y revolutionelsew!ere L was e'pected to !ave een in&nitely easier t!an it turned out to e.As t!ey would demonstrate again and again7 t!e response of t!e (ols!evi)leaders!ip to opposition for instance7 from stri)ing an) wor)ers and

ureaucrats; was to employ t!e Red >uards rat!er t!an see) a diplomaticsolution.

%!is could reJect 1enins policy of no compromise wit! revolutionary enemies.

Did the party compromise their revolutionary ideals? %!is was t!e period w!en t!e party &rst put t!eir pre0revolutionary ideals intopractice. 5ecessarily t!ere would always e some di?erence etween w!at was!oped could e ac!ieved and w!at actually could e done once t!e 6arty was inpower.8n t!is period t!e (ols!evi)s !eld fairly closely to t!eir original ideals7 particularlyt!ose of class enemies and t!e war on privilege.

How did this topic a ect a $roup/s in society? %!is period was largely positive for t!e peasantry L t!ey were allowed to e'pandt!eir !oldings y con&scating t!e land of t!e no les. However7 t!e middle classsu?ered as t!ey ecame t!e target of (ols!evi) class warfare7 particularly t!eviolent pogroms carried out y drun)en mo s in t!e cities.

5hange and 5ontinuity-valuate the chan$es 'rou$ht a'out 'y this topic in the revolution%

%!is was t!e period w!en t!e revolutionary spirit was strongest7 and was t!eperiod of t!e &rst widespread eruptions of violence. %!is violence was e'plicitly

endorsed y t!e (ols!evi)s7 ecause it was seen as t!e most direct way ofinvolving t!e masses in t!e revolutionary movement. also7 t!e (ols!evi)s li)elycould not !ave een a le to stop t!e drun)en looting and murder if t!ey !adtried.;

%!is pu lic violence ecame a recurring t!eme of t!e revolution.

Early decrees and policies


Review of key terms add them tothe main list!":,*,/7 #cto er 2/ w!ic! decreesG;


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Sov5arKom,*,/7 5ovem er ," w!ic! decree;,*,/7 -ecem er armistice;,*,$7 regorian calendar;,*,$7 April state capitalism;

Early aims %!e &rst policies of t!e new soviet government were primarily concerned wit!maintaining and strengt!ening t!eir own position.Radical economic improvement was also imperative.%!e early decrees were7 in part7 aimed at encouraging popular participation int!e revolution.

%!e (ols!evi)s declared t!at a glo al socialist revolution was now ripe7 and anew world was a out to e uilt.

+and decrees %!e 6.>. !ad deferred land reform until after t!e promised elections of 5ovem er,2.#n t!e 2/ t! of #cto er a decree was passed y Sov5arKom giving t!e peasantst!e rig!t to seiBe t!e land of t!e gentry. 1and seiBures !ad een occurring sinceermany was signed in early -ecem er.# cers were elected y t!eir su ordinate troops.After regorian calendar was adopted L Russia s)ipped twelvedays and moved in line wit! t!e rest of t!e world.

.n total, 0 decrees were issued 'y the !olsheviks in the

1rst year%1ecree 1etails


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3!o was a?ected positivelyWho was a ected ne$atively

2/ t! #cto er 0 -ecree on 1and 6easants L t!ey increased t!eir!oldings"he 2entry 3 they lost most o+ their

land2/ t! #cto er L -ecree on 6eace (ols!evi)s2/ t! #cto er L -ecree on t!e 6ress (ols!evi)s L t!ey silenced t!eir

opposition4pposition parties 3 they lost theirin5uence

," t! 5ovem er L -ecrees on 3or)ersControl

@r an wor)ers L t!ey egan toregulate t!eir own pay and wor)ingconditions.ndustrialists L +actories were run to'ene1t the workers rather than theowners

2" t! 5ovem er 0 -ecree on 6eoplesCourts

(ols!evi)s L counter revolutionariescould e easily punis!ed

/ t! -ecem er L -ecree on C!e)a (ols!evi)s L t!eir position wasstrengt!ened4pposition parties 3 they werela'elled counter revolutionaries

-ecem er L -ecree on 6rivate#wners!ip

>overnment and proletariat!our$eoisie6 7ost most o+ their wealth

-ecem er L -ecree on 6olitical 6arties (ols!evi)s4pposition parties

-ecem er L -ecree on (an)ing >overnment and proletariat

.ndustrialists and merchants-ecem er L -ecree on t!e Separationof C!urc! and State

(ols!evi)s and proletariat"he hurch, the peasants, the no'les

-ecem er L -ecree on =arriage 3omen &eptember .;.< = 1ecree >-n

Red 2error9?Creation of concentration camps andC!e)a powers of e'ecution

2he Economic situationovernment declined fromAugust L t!e peasants seiBed and redistri uted land7 t!e soldiers formedcommittees7 and t!e wor)ers seiBed control of t!eir own factories.=uc! of t!is occurred efore t!e (ols!evi)s o cially too) power.&tate capitalism

%!e (ols!evi)s tried to introduce policies t!at would ring t!e economic crisisunder control.Some (ols!evi)s were causing for a full lown communist economy. 1enin7!owever7 was more pragmatic and designed a policy called state capitalism.


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to t!is transitionary stage of socialism.At t!is point7 1enin envisaged a uasi0capitalist economy7 w!ere small scalecommerce would persist ut t!e government would control maIor enterprise.+enin9s compromise1enins compromise dictates t!at for t!e time eing capitalism could persist

under proletarian control. #nce t!e wor)ers !ad learnt from t!e managers t!eycould eventually ta)e over production.#rimary $uotes: (From the period)3e are going to found a power w!ic! will !ave no ot!er aim ut to satisfy t!eneeds of t!e soldiers7 wor)ers and peasants. %rots)yPes7 we s!all destroy everyt!ing7 and on t!e ruins we s!all uild our temple.1enin3e will turn Russia upside down. 1enin+conomics>state monopoly capitalism inevita ly and unavoida ly implies a step7 or severalsteps7 towards socialism.socialism is not!ing ut state0capitalist monopoly w!ic! !ad een turned in t!einterest of t!e w!ole people and !as t!erefore ceased to e a capitalistmonopoly. 1enin%istoriography: How did key historians interpret this event?

# cial Soviet History 1i eral RevisionistReed:


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departure from t!e (ols!evi) principle of a dedicated elite7 ut one could arguet!at t!is policy was less relevant after t!e revolution !ad een ac!ieved.

How did this topic a ect a $roup/s in society?


What similarities are there with the old re$ime?=ention decrees on t!e press5ew court system

2he 5heka


Review of key terms add them tothe main list!":C!e)a-Ber!in)sy7


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to growing needs for a strong political police force to defend t!e (ols!evi)leaders!ip.

%!e rea)down in negotiations at (rest 1itovs) in 9anuary ,*,$ and t!e t!reat ofa renewed >erman invasion also led to demands for a stronger C!e)a to com at>erman espionage.

%!e t!reat of >erman invasion prompted t!e release of an emergence decree:%!e Socialist fat!erland is in dangerU y 1enin %!e decree declared: +nemy agents7 pro&teers7 marauders7 !ooligans7 counter0revolutionary agitators and >erman spies7 are to e summarily s!ot.

%!e punis!ment of t!ese individuals was ar itraryO t!ey did not !ave to e triedprior to eing e'ecuted or e'iled.


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1zerzhinsky: %!e C!e)a is nota court.1zerzhinsky 8twas necessary to

ma)e t!e foe feelt!at t!ere waseveryw!ere a out!im a seeing eyeand a !eavy !andready to comedown on !im t!emoment !eundertoo)anyt!ing againstt!e Soviet>overnment.

assimilated t!epractices of t!etsarist secretpolice to suc! ane'tent t!at as late

as t!e ,*$ s7 t!eK>( distri uted toits sta? manualsprepared y t!e#)!rana nearly acentury earlier.

to t!econcentrationcamps7 employingmore t!an a uarterof a million peopleT.

Bolkogonov:As during t!e


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enforcing laws designed to )eep t!e (ols!evi)s in power y criminalisingopposition7 Iust as t!e %sar !ad done prior to t!e legalisation of political partieswit! t!e #cto er =anifesto.

1issolution of the constituent assemblyKey Evidence: (Dates, Names,People, Places, Documents)

Review of key terms add them tothe main list!":Sverdlov

Elections

+lections were originally proposed for t!e ,/ t! of Septem er7 ut were postponedy t!e 6.>. to 5ovem er ,2.

%!e (ols!evi)s seiBed power on #cto er 2D7 and were faced wit! t!e uestion of!ow to respond to t!e elections t!ey were unli)ely to win.1enin argued in favour of delaying t!e elections7 giving t!e (ols!evi)s time toincrease t!eir inJuence7 particularly among t!e peasantry w!ere t!e SRs weretraditionally t!e dominant socialist party;.#t!ers disagreed L Sverdlov7 C!airman of t!e Soviet +'ecutive Committee7overruled 1enins o Iections and ordered t!e elections to go a!ead.

oting went a!ead on 5ovem er ,2 as planned.ResultsAs e'pected7 t!e (ols!evi)s lost t!e election L t!ey won 2"V of t!e vote7 or ,/Dof / / seats in t!e Constituent Assem ly.

%!e SRs won a maIority7 wit! 4/ of / / seats. %!e SRs !ad a clear maIority wit! t!e peasant vote7 w!ic! made up t!e vastmaIority of t!eir support. %!e (ols!evi)s7 !owever7 !ad resoundingly won t!eproletarian vote L t!at of t!e wor)ers7 soldiers and sailors.

%!e (ols!evi)s considered t!e winning of t!e ur an votes was more signi&cantt!an winning t!e rural vote.+enin9s response wa wa wa wa"1enin claimed t!at t!e elections went a!ead too early L efore t!e (ols!evi)swere well )nown t!roug!out Russia. As a result7 many peasants supposedlywould !ave voted for t!e (ols!evi)s.

He also claimed t!at t!e people were not aware of t!e SR split7 and eventuallyconvinced t!e 1eft SRs w!o won " seats against t!e Rig!t SRs 4/ ; to form acoalition wit! t!e (ols!evi)s in t!e Sov5arKom government from -ecem er.>bourgeois9 parliamentarianism91enin decided t!at Soviet government was a !ig!er form of democracy t!an t!e

ourgeois parliament.He t!oug!t t!at t!e role of t!e Constituent Assem ly s!ould e to endorse andlegitimise t!e actions of t!e (ols!evi)s w!o !ad of course seiBed power in t!ename of t!e people; since #cto er.8t was not e'pected to ma)e decisions on matters of political power and structureL t!ese would e t!e concerns of t!e (ols!evi)s and t!e soviet.)artial law#n D 9anuary ,*,$7 t!e day t!e Constituent assem ly was due to open7 martiallaw was declared in 6etrograd and pu lic gat!erings were made illegal.


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6ro0(ols!evi) troops were roug!t into 6etrograd to intimidate protestors7particularly near t!e %auride 6alace.A pro Constituent Assem ly marc! made up mostly of w!ite0collar wor)ers wasdispersed y mac!ine gun &re.2he 3rst meeting of the 5onstituent *ssembly

At around "pm on t!e Dt!

7 t!e delegates gat!ered at t!e %auride 6alace for t!e&rst session. %!e (ols!evi)s set out to undermine t!e proceedings7 ringing in Red >uardsmenand drun)en sailors.

%!e SR maIority leader ictor C!ernov was elected C!airman.>2he 1eclaration of the Rights of 2oilers and Exploited #eople9Read y Sverdlov7 a prominent (ols!evi)7 t!is was a call for t!e ConstituentAssem ly to recognise t!e actions of t!e Soviet +'ecutive Committee andSov5arKom since #cto er.-pposition

%!e =ens!evi) and SR deputies made clear t!eir disapproval on t!e (ols!evi)policy of reducing t!e Constituent Assem ly to a to)en institution.(alkoutuards and Kronstadt sailors remained and intimidated t!e deputies w!oremained.=any of t!e sailors were drun) and randis!ed t!eir weapons at t!e =ens!evi)and Rig!t SR spea)ers.

%!e Assem ly proceeded regardless7 and issued two maIor decrees L on land andon peace. %!ese were not very di?erent from t!e (ols!evi) decrees of 5ovem erL allowing peasants to seiBe land and promising a peace wit! >ermany.1issolutionAt "." A=7 t!e !ead guard ordered C!ernov to close t!e assem ly7 as t!eguards on duty were too tired.3!en t!e delegates refused7 t!e guards cleared t!e c!am er forcefully.

%!e assem ly was supposed to reconvene at D6= on t!e F t! 7 ut on arrival7 t!eyfound t!e c!am er loc)ed and guarded.

%!e (ols!evi)s issued a decree o cially dissolving t!e Constituent Assem ly.

Revolutionary violence1enin made it clear t!at force was to e employed if necessary7 saying %rust int!e mood7 ut do not forget your riJes.Some !istorians !ave argued t!at violent intimidation wor)ed well for t!e(ols!evi)s w!en dealing wit! political opponents.

4olshevik ideals(ols!evi) activities at t!e Constituent Assem ly were consistent wit! t!eirpolitical ideology7 w!ic! did not recognise t!e legitimacy of t!e ourgeoisassem ly.1enin proclaimed 3e will not e'c!ange our riJes for a allot.

%!ere was little pu lic protest to t!e closure of t!e Constituent Assem ly. ictorSerge recalled %!e dissolution of t!e Constituent Assem ly made a greatsensation a road. 8n Russia it passed almost unnoticed.Apat!yG

#rimary $uotes: (From the period) 5aturally7 t!e interests of t!e revolution stand !ig!er t!an t!e formal rig!ts of


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t!e Constituent Assem ly. 1enin%!e toiling masses !ave ecome convinced y t!eir e'perience t!at ourgeoisparliamentarianism is out0datedO t!at it is completely incompati le wit! t!econstruction of Socialism. 1eninN t!e town cannot e e ual to t!e countryN t!e town inevita ly leads t!e

country. 1enin%!e CA considers t!at its own tas) is con&ned to esta lis!ing t!e fundamentalprinciples of t!e social reconstruction of society. or)y)isc +enin3e will not e'c!ange our riJes for a allotU%rust in t!e mood7 ut dont forget your riJes.%istoriography: How did key historians interpret this event? -Ccial &oviet%istory

+iberal Revisionist

#rotasov: t!eactions of t!e(ols!evi) leaders!ip inregard to t!eConstituent assem lywere in face ot!logical and consistent7

ecause t!ey were

appropriate to t!epolitical and et!icalprinciples of !e party.

#ipes: %!e mac!inegun ecame for t!emt!e principle instrumentof political persuasion.

%!e unrestrainedrutality wit! w!ic! t!ey

!encefort! ruled Russiastemmed in large part

from t!e )nowledge7gained on 9anuary Dand F; t!at t!ey could

use it wit! impunity.Bolkogonov : 8t seemsunli)ely t!at t!e(ols!evi)s gave anyt!oug!t to t!e fact t!atgiving promise w!ile inopposition is a di?erentt!ing from ful&lling it ingovernment. #n everypoint 0 peace7 land7 li erty7Constituent Assem ly7freedom of t!e press andall t!e rest L t!eirpromises rapidly c!angedinto coercion7 limitation7alteration7 a di?erentreading or an outrig!tdenial. +ven t!e land7w!ic! t!ey did give7 t!ey


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made undesira le ycon&scating everyt!ing itproducedT.

Evaluation and *nalysis:How did this event chan$e the course o+ the revolution?

%!is event was not une'pected L it was clear t!at t!e (ols!evi)s would nevera ide y any decisions of t!e Constituent Assem ly and vice versa. 8t !oweverdid s!ow t!at t!e (ols!evi)s were completely unwilling to negotiate wit! any oft!e opposition parties.

nalyse the challen$e +acin$ the revolution and the response to it% %!e c!allenge facing t!e revolution was organised opposition from ot!er socialist

parties7 w!o disagreed wit! !ow t!e (ols!evi)s were directing t!e revolution. %!e response was to silence t!e opposition7 &rst y censors!ip and intimidationand t!en t!roug! t!e formal dissolution of t!e Constituent Assem ly.

Did the party compromise their revolutionary .deals?5ot really. %!e (ols!evi)s always maintained t!at t!e Constituent Assem lywould e ourgeois7 so t!eir dissolution of t!e ody con&rmed to =ar'ist01eninistideology.

How did this topic a ect a $roup/s in society? %!e dissolution o viously angered t!e opposition parties7 many of w!ic! werestill dominated y t!e ourgeoisie.


%!is was t!e &nal !urdle for a solute (ols!evi) control of t!e government L fromt!is moment onwards any legal opposition was essentially impossi le.

What similarities are there with the old re$ime? %!e marc! on 9anuary D in support of t!e Constituent Assem ly was put down yarmed troops in muc! t!e same way as protests !ad een dealt wit! under t!etsar and t!e provisional government.

%!e dissolution of t!e constituent assem ly was ordered on similarly autocratic

lines to t!e tsars dismissal of t!e &rst and second -umas.

2he 2reaty of 4rest@+itovskKey Evidence: (Dates, Names,People, Places, Documents)

Review of key terms add them tothe main list!":.;.


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elieved would e invigorated y t!e victory of t!e (ols!evi)s in Russia. %!espread of communism across +urope was e'tremely desira le.1enin elieved t!at t!e imperialist countries were using t!e wor)ers and soldiersto furt!er t!eir ourgeois aims. He !oped t!at proletarians on ot! sides would

and toget!er to &g!t t!e ourgeois governments.

1ecree on #eace8ssued on #cto er 2/7 t!is decree was met wit! widespread approval. %o 1enin7o taining a peace wit! >ermany would give Russias socialist revolution time toconsolidate its gains. %!is would need to !appen efore t!e international socialistmovement could succeed.)ilitary collapse(y ,*,$ Russias army !ad simply lost t!e will to &g!t. A succession of c!angesin command led to massive desertions.As a =ar'ist7 !e viewed t!e idea of Russia as an inconvenient artefact of

ourgeois government7 w!ic! would !opefully cease to !ave meaning associalism was uilt.* 4olshevik split

%!e (ols!evi) party was divided over t!e issue of war.+eft faction Right faction 2rotsky1ed y (u)!arin7 t!ey

elieved t!at t!erevolutionaryconsciousness would ereignited y t!e t!reat of a>erman invasion.

%!e >erman proletariatwould sympat!ise and

egin to overt!row t!e>erman government. Atreaty would e anendorsement of >ermanimperialism.

1enin was not convincedy t!e 1eft faction L !e

t!oug!t t!at >ermanywas not yet ripe forsocialist revolution.8f t!e >ermans wereallowed to advance t!eywould pro a ly evictorious7 since t!erewould e no unrest at!ome to desta ilise t!earmy.

%rots)y pursued apolicy !e descri ed asneit!er peace norwar L essentiallystalling t!enegotiations for aslong as possi le int!e !ope of t!e eit!era socialist revolutionin >ermany or defeatat t!e !ands of t!eAmericans. He gavet!eatrical and long0winded speec!es int!e !ope of disruptingt!e proceedings.

,egotiations %!e >erman negotiators ecame increasingly frustrated wit! %rots)ys antics.(y ermans presented Russia wit! an ultimatum L accept t!etreaty or !ostilities will resume.#n ,$ ermans ran out of patience and launc!ed an o?ensive wit!

/ 7 troops. %!e national capital was moved to =oscow7 as 6etrograd was inimmediate danger.+enin wins the debate1enin t!reatened to resign unless !is proposal for peace was accepted. %!erevolutionary p!asemongering among t!e (ols!evi)s ceased immediately ast!e >ermans advanced on 6etrograd.#n ,* ermans ignored t!em for t!ree days and continued t!e advance L on t!e 22 nd t!ey set fort! a new treaty demanding even !ars!er terms.#n 4 =arc! Sov5arKom signed t!e treaty.2erms of the treaty4" per cent of Russias population was lost7 appro'. F2 million people.Russia gave up 42 per cent of its farmland7 including t!e productive @)raine7muc! of 6oland and t!e (altic states.


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>ermany was promised t!ree illion rou les in reparations.Russia lost $* per cent of its iron and coal reserves7 as well as D" per cent of itsindustrial enterprises and 2F per cent of its railways.&etbacks

%!e enormous losses reversed 2 years of Russian e'pansion.

5ational !umiliation forced resentment among opposition groups7 particularlysenior generals and anned political parties suc! as t!e Kadets;. %!e wit!drawal of Russian forces from t!e @)raine7 6oland and t!e (altic statesmeant t!e end of any prospect of socialist revolution in t!ose areas.&R opposition

%rots)y refused to sign t!e 22


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+iberal Revisionist

)alone: %!e %reaty of(rest01itovs) merelye'c!anged one war foranot!er.

Evaluation and *nalysis:Why was this policy / action taken? ( risis and response)Russia !ad to secure a peace wit! >ermany or t!e country would certainly !ave

een occupied atleast partially.Was this policy / action consistent with !olshevik revolutionary ideals?

%!e policy of peace was )ey to t!e (ols!evi) programme7 from t!e April %!esesto t!e #ctover 2/ -ecree on 6eace.

ompare this policy / action to the "sar#s re$ime% What has chan$ed? %!e treaty was as !umiliating to Russian nationalists as t!e %reaty of 6ortsmout!7w!ic! ended t!e Russo09apanese 3ar in Septem er ,* D.

Did the treaty have a ne$ative e ect on &ussia, despite it 'ein$ renounced a+ter; months?

Pes. %!e (ols!evi)s lost a !uge c!un) of national production during a criticalperiod of crisis7 and t!is !ad a signi&cant e?ect on t!e economic situation duringt!e Civil 3ar.

5ivil (arKey Evidence: (Dates, Names,People, Places, Documents)

Review of key terms add them tothe main list!":3!ite ArmiesAreen Armies;Kolc!a)s Si erian armies

-eni)in7 >eneral role in Civil 3ar andAeneral nort!0western armies;CBec! legion=a)!no7 5estor>reen ArmiesSeptem er ,*,$ Komuc! turns into All0Russian 6rovisional >overnment in #ms);

Early con ictAfter #cto er t!e (ols!evi)s were a le to control 6etrograd easily. 8n =oscow7!owever7 street &g!ting wit! loyalists went on for over a wee).Kerens)y led some Cossac) troops against t!e (ols!evi)s on 4 #cto er at6ul)ovo Heig!ts. He was eventually defeated y t!e Red >uards and Kronstadt


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soldiers. Kerens)y disguised !imself and went into !iding. %!e new regime survived t!e counter0revolution in =oscow7 ut t!e Cossac)regions of t!e -on7 t!e Ku an and t!e @)raine.5zech legionCBec!oslova)ia was controlled y >ermany7 and t!ere was a strong CBec!

movement for independence. %!e CBec! legion were " 7 troops w!o !ad een given permission to travelacross Russia and e pic)ed up on t!e Si erian coast to travel to t!e 3esternreen Armies were peasant partisans w!o did not support t!e Reds or t!e3!ites. %!ey were led y t!e anarc!ist 5esto =a)!no , and !eld control overmuc! of t!e sout!eastern @)raine in ,*,*02 . 1enin said t!at t!e peasantinsurgents were far more dangerous t!an all t!e -eni)ins7 Pundenic!es andKolc!a)s put toget!er.(hite *rmies

%!e diverse array of forces opposed to t!e (ols!evi) regime were )nown as t!e3!ite Armies.

%!e 3!ite Armies were made up of:0 =onarc!ists w!o wanted to restore t!e %sar;0 6atriots w!o wanted to restore t!e 6rovisional >overnment;0 Supporters of t!e Constituent Assem ly0 =inorities suc! as Cossac)s7 >eorgians7 @)rainians;0


28/51

Kolc!a) was e'ecuted in eneral Pudenic!7 t!ey launc!ed twocampaigns against 6etrograd in =ay and 5ovem er

,*,*. %!e second o?ense reac!ed t!e outs)irts of6etrograd7 ut t!ey were repelled after t!e arrival of

%rots)y. Punic!s army num ered only ,"7" and weredisarmed after t!e failure of t!eir second attac) in5ovem er ,*,$.

8oreign interventionists %!e >ermans were t!e &rst foreign power to send troops to Russia after ,*,$.Commonwealt! forces landed in =urmans) and Arc!angels) in =arc! ,*,$.

9apanese forces landed in ladivosto) and were Ioined y American andCommonwealt! troops in August ,*,$.

%!e (ritis! and


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socialism as a glo al movement. He was a le to issue propaganda declaring a&g!t against ot! t!e ourgeoisie and capitalist imperialist invaders.338 !ad wearied t!e Allied troops7 w!o wit!drew y ,*2,.

%!e disIointed nature of t!e 3!ite Armies made it di cult for t!em to ma)e realadvances7 and t!ey were also defeated y ,*2,.

2he &oviet@#olish (ar6oland was created y t!e %reaty of ersailles after 338. 6oland soug!t toe'pand its inJuence y invading t!e @)raine in April ,*2 .6olis! forces captured Kiev ut were pus!ed ac) y t!e Red Army7 w!olaunc!ed a counter attac) and nearly too) 3arsaw.1enin elieved 6olis! wor)ers would welcome t!e Red Army. %!e 6oles7 !owever7saw t!e Red Army as Russian invaders rat!er t!an proletarian rot!ers

#rimary $uotes: (From the period)+enin: 6eace L t!is is a slogan for p!ilistines and priests. %!e 6roletarian sloganmust e: Civil 3arU+enin: 3ar is war. >uns are not Iust for decoration.4ukharin : Pou cannot ma)e an omelette wit!out rea)ing eggs.+enin: E +very scoundrel t!at incites anyone to retreat7 to desert or not to ful&la military order will e s!ot.+enin: t!e >reen Armies were far more dangerous t!an all t!e -eni)ins7

Pundenic!es and Kolc!a)s put toget!er.

Karl Radek a (ols!evi);: 3e were always for revolutionary war. %!e ayonet isan essential necessity for introducing communism.)ayakovsky a Soviet poet;:%!ey came and foug!t li)e mad7

%!ey marc!ed on 6etrogradN %!ey came supplied wit! tan)s7

3it! dollars7 pounds and francs7 %!ey came and t!oug!t t!eyd win7(ut got t!eir !eads as!ed in.

2rotsky : Q%!e o cers of t!e 8mperial Army would e S ueeBed li)e lemons7t!en t!rown away.+enin: 8f we are not ready to s!oot a sa oteur and a 3!ite >uard7 w!at sort of

Revolution is t!atG 5ot!ing ut tal) and a owl of mus!.6eneral 1enikin 3!ite Army;: 8 s!all not &g!t for any particular form ofgovernment. 8 am &g!ting for Russia.2rotsky: An army cannot e uilt wit!out repression. %!e commander willalways &nd it necessary to place t!e soldier etween t!e possi ility t!at deat!lies a!ead and t!e certainty t!at it lies e!ind.


&oviet' (estern

)arxist

+iberal Revisionist


30/51

6reenwood: =uc! wasdue to t!e drivinginitiative7 t!e disciplinedorder7 and t!erut!lessness of t!e

(ols!evi)s t!emselves.&wain: 8t Qt!e Civil 3arwas primarily a clas!

etween di?erent versionsof revolution.(olfson: ...t!eparticipation of t!e Alliesand t!e e!avior of t!e3!ite Armies undou tedlygave t!e Reds additionalsupport among ordinarypeople 0 were t!ey notdefending t!e !omelandfrom ac uisitiveforeignersG 6easants didnot love t!e (ols!evi)s7

ut t!ey loved t!e 3!iteseven less7 especially w!ent!e latter were suspectedof aiming to restore landto t!e former owners.

#erfect: %!e one factort!at united t!e 3!iteArmies was t!eir !atred oft!e (ols!evi)s.#erfect: %!e Russian Civil

3ar was a vastly comple'conJict. 8t was a war ofmovement wit! rapidlyc!anging fronts7 w!ic! wasnot at all li)e t!e statictrenc! warfare of 3orld3ar ,.#erfect: %!e emergenceof >reen forces7 and t!e

rief reign of t!e Komuc!and SR government inSi eria7 indicates t!at t!eCivil 3ar was also a attle

etween di?erent visionsand claims as to w!atconstituted t!e truerevolution. 8t was not astraig!tforward Red vs3!ite conJict.8iges: 5ot!ing did moreto s!ape t!e rulingattitudes of t!e (ols!evi)st!an t!e e'perience of t!e

Civil 3arN%!e (ols!evismt!at emerged from t!eCivil 3ar viewed itself as acrusading rot!er!ood ofcomrades in arms7con uering Russia and t!eworld wit! a red pencil inone !and and a gun in t!eot!er.

8iges: %!e 3!ites weret!e avengers of t!ose w!o!ad su?ered at t!e !andsof t!e revolution.



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Why was this policy / action taken? ( risis and response) %!e Civil 3ar was out of t!e direct control of t!e (ols!evi)s7 t!oug! it wascertainly spurred on y policies suc! as land redistri ution.

Was this policy / action consistent with !olshevik revolutionary ideals?

8t was e'pected t!at at some point a counter0revolution would e mo ilised7 sot!e Civil 3ar was largely e'pected and consistent wit! t!e =ar'ist01eninistnarrative.

2he Red *rmyKey Evidence: (Dates, Names,People, Places, Documents)


Bictory(y t!e end of ,*2 t!e Red Army !ad won a decisive victory against t!e 3!ites7>reens and foreign interventionists.However7 t!ousands of Red Army soldiers were )illed over t!e t!ree years of civilwar7 and vast portions of Russian territory was outside of Soviet control. %!is ledto maIor famines during t!e war w!ic! )illed far more t!an t!e actual &g!ting.

Explanations for the Red victory6eography/ million people in Red areas7 lesst!an , million in 3!ite areas.

%!e (ols!evi)s controlled t!e centralregion of Russia7 w!ic! was t!e mostdensely populated and containedmost of t!e maIor cities.

%!is was largely +uropean Russia7w!ic! was culturally !omogenouscompared to t!e outer regions.+uropean Russia also !eld most of t!ecountrys war industries and railways.

%!e 3!ites !ad constant supplypro lems ecause of t!eir scatteredterritory.

Adeology %!e Red Army s!ared a more unitedsense of purpose t!an t!e disparate3!ites.

6ropaganda could easily e producedand distri uted7 allowing t!e(ols!evi)s to politically motivate t!eirtroops.

%!e Reds drew !eavily on t!e r!etoricof class struggle and t!e promise oft!e e uality to come.

%!e 3!ites were less ideologicallyco!esive L many were &g!ting fordi?erent ends7 corruption wasendemic7 and desertions andinsu ordination were constant.

2rotsky9s leadership %rots)y imposed !ars! disciplinary


32/51

(y t!e end of ,*,$7 t!e Red Armynum ered D 7 .(y t!e end of ,*2 7 t!ere were Dmillion men under arms.

%!e 3!ites num ered around 2.Dmillion over ,*,$0,*2 7 ut most oft!ese soldiers were not &g!tingsimultaneously.

%rots)y travelled in a private train7wit! its own li rary7 radio and printingpress. 8t was manned y commissarsin lac) leat!er coats. %!e train alsocarried stores of to acco7 oots andfood w!ic! could e used to improvetroop morale.

measures to maintain order in t!erapidly growing army.

%!e deat! penalty was imposed formany transgressions. #n occasiondetac!ments of C!e)ists were

stationed e!ind lines of advancingtroops.

%rots)y also pursued a policy ofrecruiting often coercively; formertsarist o cers7 w!o !ad t!e re uirede'pertise for military command. Allregiments were also assigned apolitical commissar7 w!o wasresponsi le for ensuring orders werecarried out.

%rots)y was also willing to rewardsoldiers w!o performed t!eir dutieswell. He was )een to incorporate t!ee'pertise of t!e tsarist o cers into t!eRed Army.

(hite *rmy weaknesses

Corruption and drun)enness was rifeamong t!e o cers.

%!e 3!ites did not capitalise onpropaganda as t!e Reds did7 leadingto dwindling support among t!epopulace w!o were lured y t!e(ols!evi)s class r!etoric.

%!ey also failed to set upgovernmental administration in t!eiroccupied areas.

%!e 3!ites !ad great trou lemotivating t!eir troops andmaintaining discipline.Some factions7 suc! as t!e Cossac)s7were reluctant to &g!t outside t!eir!ome region.

%!is caused antagonism etween t!edi?erent groups represented in t!e3!ite forces.

%!e 3!ites often tried to restore t!eformer landlords and rutally punis!edt!e peasants w!o !ad con&scated it.

%!is red resentment among t!epeasantry.

Soviet rule t!us regained its allure to

t!e peasants.

#rimary $uotes: (From the period)2rotsky: 3e are &g!ting to settle t!e uestion of w!et!er t!e !omes7 palaces7cities7 sun and !eavens will elong to t!e people w!o live y t!eir la our7 to t!ewor)ers7 peasants and t!e poor7 or w!et!er t!ey elong to t!e ourgeoisie.1enikin: 8 can do not!ing to control my army. 8 am glad w!en it carries out mycom at orders.1enikin: > 8f 8 raise t!e repu lican Jag7 8 lose !alf my supporters. (ut if 8 raise t!emonarc!ist one7 8 lose t!e ot!er !alf. (ut we !ave to save Russia.+ockhart0 head of the 4ritish forces: Q%rots)y stri)es me as a man w!owould willingly die &g!ting for Russia provided t!ere was a ig enoug! audience


33/51

to see !im do it.



+iberal Revisionist

Reed: -uring t!e war7t!e Red cause in generalwas a le to mo iliBee'tensive wor)er7peasant and soldiersupportN it was notrepression alone ut apotent com ination of

repression plus t!epower to mo iliBe )eyareas of support w!ic!e'plain (ols!evi)survival.

6reenwood: %!ere waslittle co0operation of policyor strategy etween t!e3!ite leaders7 and t!islac) of unity was to provefatal to t!e counter0revolutionary cause.

&wain: 8t Qt!e Civil 3arwas primarily a clas!

etween di?erent versionsof revolution.

#erfect: > %!e one factort!at united t!e 3!ites wast!eir !atred of t!e(ols!evi)s.

8iges: Red victory was;more a result of 3!itewea)ness t!an Redstrengt!.

8iges: %!e failure of t!e3!ites to recognise t!epeasant revolution was t!ereason for t!eir ultimatedefeat.

Evaluation and *nalysis:Why was this policy / action taken? ( risis and response)(ols!evi) Russia was under attac) on all sides from disparate counter0revolutionary forces. %!e natural response was to mo ilise t!e country for war7

ot! against t!e 3!ites and against class enemies.

Was this policy / action consistent with !olshevik revolutionary ideals? %!e (ols!evi)s )new t!at t!ey would e faced wit! counter0revolution7 and a )eypart of (ols!evi) ideology was t!e struggle against counter revolutionaries and

class enemies.How did the policy / action impact on a $roup in &ussian society? (e$% Workers,

peasants) %!e Civil 3ar directly led to t!e e'pansion of C!e)a0led persecution of classenemies suc! as t!e ourgeoisie and )ula)s.

2he Red 2errorKey Evidence: (Dates, Names, Review of key terms add them to


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People, Places, Documents) the main list!":DF *ugust .;.< assassinations".G Huly .;. %!e ullet was not directed against 1enin7 ut against t!e proletariatas a w!ole.1zerzhinsky: -o you t!in) t!at 8 see) forms of revolutionary IusticeO we are notnow in need of Iustice. 8t is war now L face to face7 a &g!t to t!e &nis!. 1ife ordeat!.1zerzhinsky: %!e C!e)a is o lis!ed to defend t!e revolution and con uer t!e

enemy7 even if its sword does y c!ance sometimes fall on t!e !eads of t!einnocent.1zerzhinsky: 3e stand for organised terrorN t!is s!ould e fran)ly stated. Kaplan0 8anya: 8 !ave long !ad t!e intention of )illing 1enin. 8n my eyes !e !as

etrayed t!e revolution.Kaplan0 8anya: =y name is


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+iberal' Russian Revisionist

1eutscher: (esiegedfortresses are !ardlyever ruled in ademocratic manner.1eutscher: #ver andover again emergencies!ad driven t!e rulingparty to act against itsoriginal intentions7 tocontradict and overreac!itself.1eutscher: +ventscompelled t!e party oft!e revolution to give upsome of its aspirations7!opes and illusions inorder to save t!eessential framewor) oft!e revolution.1eutscher: %rots)y !adnot s!run) from usingterror in t!e Civil 3ar7

ut !e can e said to!ave een as little fondof it as a surgeon is fond

of loods!ed.%ill : %!e attempt toovert!row t!e(ols!evi)s after t!erevolution producedcruelties indeed7 ut t!erevolutionary processa olis!ed a regime ofdespair and created anew world of !ope.2rotsky: %!e e'ecutionof t!e %sar and !is familywas needed not only tofrig!ten7 !orrify andinstil a sense of!opelessness in t!eenemy7 ut also to s!a)eup our own ran)s7 tos!ow t!at t!ere was noretreating7 t!at a!eadlay total victory or totaldoom.

5herniaev: %rots)y earsa great deal ofresponsi ility ot! for t!evictory of t!e Red Army int!e civil war7 and t!eesta lis!ment of a one0party aut!oritarian statewit! its apparatus forrut!lessly suppressingdissent. As a 9aco in inspirit7 !e was notfrig!tened y t!e smell offres!ly spilled lood. Hewas an ideologist andpractician of t!e Red

%error.+incoln : -isciplineimposed from a ove !adalways distinguis!ed t!e(ols!evi)s revolutionaryorganisation from itsrivals. 5ow it ecame a)ey element in t!eirstruggle against t!e c!aosof ,*,/0,$.

+ynch: 8t is dou tful7even wit!out t!e t!reat ofcivil war and organisedopposition7 t!at(ols!evism could !avedeveloped ot!er t!an asan oppressive system. 8tsdogmatic =ar'ist creedmade it as intolerant ofot!er political creeds astsardom !ad een.#ipes: 1enin assumed t!eprerogatives of t!e tsars

efore !im L !is will waslaw.#ipes: %!e Red %errorwas not a reluctantresponse to t!e actions ofot!ers7 ut a prop!ylacticmeasure designed to nipin t!e ud any t!oug!ts ofresistance to t!edictators!ip.

Bolkogonov : 1eninwanted eart!ly !appiness

8iges: %!e (ols!evi)terror came up from t!edept!s. 8t started as asocial revolution7 a meansfor t!e lower classes toe'act t!eir own loodyrevenge on t!eir formermasters and classenemies.8iges: %!e murder of t!eRomanovs was adeclaration of t!e %error. 8twas a statement t!at fromnow on individuals wouldcount for not!ing in t!ecivil war.8iges: (ut it is dou tfult!at eit!er t!ey7 or any oft!e 3!ites7 would !avewanted to ma)e suc! asad and discredited &gureas 5ic!olas t!eir Elive

annerE. A martyred %sarwas more useful to t!emt!an a live one w!o was

politically dead. (ot!-eni)in and Kolc!a) wereintelligent enoug! torealiBe t!at a monarc!istrestoration was out of t!e

uestion after ,* 8 /7alt!oug! ot! !admonarc!ists among t!eiradvisers.8iges: 5ic!olas !ad today so t!at t!e revolutioncould live.8iges: %!e Red %error didnot come out of t!e lue. 8twas implicit in t!e regimefrom t!e startN t!e(ols!evi)s were forced toturn increasingly to terrorto silence t!eir politicalcritics and su Iugate asociety t!ey could notcontrol y ot!er means.8iges: @nder 1enins

regime L not Stalins L t!eC!e)a was to ecome a


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for t!e people7 at leastt!ose !e called t!eproletariat. (ut !eregarded it as normal to

uild t!is !appiness on

lood7 coercion and denialof freedom.

vast police state. 8t !ad itsown leviat!aninfrastructure7 from !ousecommittees to t!econcentration camps7

employing more t!an auarter of a millionpeople.&ervice: 1enin7 %rots)yand -BerB!ins)y elievedt!at over0)illing as ettert!en running t!e ris) of

eing overt!rown.&ervice: Certainly 1eninwas t!e founder of t!eone0party7 mono0ideological state.&mith: %!e elief t!at t!eend Iusti&ed t!e meansserved t!em well7 lindingt!em to t!e way in w!ic!means corrupt ends.8iges: %!e 3!ite

%error...was a mirror imageof t!e class resentmentand !atred t!at drove t!eRed %error.

Evaluation and *nalysis:Why was this policy / action taken? ( risis and response)

%!e C!e)a was created and empowered in response to t!e assassination attempton 1enin7 as well as t!e growing t!reat of t!e civil war. 1i eral !istorians arguet!at t!is was done deli erately to ensure t!e (ols!evi)s stayed in power7 w!ilerevisionists argue t!at t!e granting of additional power !appened y default andwas not premeditated.

Was this policy / action consistent with !olshevik revolutionary ideals?Recall -eutsc!er uote: +vents compelled t!e party of t!e revolution to give upsome of its aspirations7 !opes and illusions in order to save t!e essentialframewor) of t!e revolution.

%!e creation of t!e powerful7 centralised C!e)a was not counter to (ols!evi)ideology7 w!ic! !eld t!at %error was necessary to wipe t!e country clean inpreparation for t!e uilding of socialism.

ompare this policy / action to the "sar#s re$ime% What has chan$ed? %!e C!e)a was not unli)e t!e %sars #)!rana7 ut its powers were far moresweeping and its mem ers!ip muc! !ig!er.

How did the policy / action impact on a $roup in &ussian society? (e$% Workers, peasants) =uc! of t!e C!e)as persecution was directed against t!e ourgeoisie and t!e)ula)s7 w!o were viewed as class enemies.


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(ar 5ommunismKey Evidence: (Dates, Names,People, Places, Documents)

Review of key terms add them tothe main list!":2$ 9une ,*,$ decree on 5ationalisation;2, 5ovem er ,*,$ private trade;,, 9une ,*,$ Kom edy;Kom edy

(ar 5ommunism3ar communism is not a single policy or decree L it is a collection of !undreds ofdecrees and policies issued from mid ,*,$0,*2,.

%!e term 3ar Communism was not used at t!e time L it was coined afterwards asa Iusti&cation for t!e failure.8t emerged as a result of t!e governments attempt to sta ilise t!e economy7after t!e successive s!oc)s of t!e %reaty and t!e 3!ite control of many of t!eproductive regions.


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Stri)ers were punis!ed y e'ecution. %owards t!e end of t!e Civil 3ar %rots)y advocated t!e use of Red Army soldiersin la our armies7 for t!e uilding of roads7 unloading of freig!t etc. oluntary wor)7 called Communist Saturday7 was encouraged. %!ere was greatpressure for wor)ers to engage in t!ese voluntary programs.

Compulsory la our y t!e ourgeoisie was fostered L t!ey were generallyassigned to worse Io s t!an proletarians. %!is was an important source ofsupport for t!e revolutionary regime.-espite t!e critical s!ortages7 a new Red elite emerged. %!ey !ad access to


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%!e enticement was t!at t!e Kom edy mem ers were a le to )eep some of t!egrain t!ey con&scated.

%!is was not particularly e?ective7 !owever7 as many peasants were relunctantto turn against ot!ers.

%!e Kom edys were a andoned y t!e end of ,*,$.

Requisition squadsStarting in 9anuary ,*,*7 armed wor)ers and C!e)ists were formed into grainre uisitioning s uads7 and sent out to seiBe !oarded surplus from t!e villages.

%!is was )nown in Russian as prodra


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At t!e (enBene %rust7 D ureaucrats to oversee ,D wor)ers.

#rimary $uotes: (From the period)+enin: He w!o doesnt wor) s!all not eat.

+enin: 1ong live civil war in t!e name of read7 for c!ildren and old people7 fort!e wor)ers and t!e Red Army7 in t!e name of direct and merciless struggle wit!counter0revolution.+enin: %!e Russian Communist 6arty will strive as speedily as possi le tointroduce t!e most radical measures to pave t!e way for t!e a olition of money.#R*B1* .;/F": %!ere is no economic plan.#ropaganda slogan: 6roletariat7 you didnt fear !eavy weapons L dont fear!eavy la our. %!e wor)ers country is uilt y la our.&logan: -own wit! t!e (ols!evi)s and !orsemeat. >ive us t!e %sar and por).2rotsky: A deserter from la our is as contempti le and despica le as a deserterfrom t!e attle&eld.2rotsky: +veryt!ing for t!e frontU2rotsky: #ne may say t!at man is rat!er a laBy creature. As a general rule7 !estrives to avoid wor)N t!e only way to attract t!e la our force re uired foreconomic tas)s is to introduce compulsory la our service.%istoriography: How did key historians interpret this event? Soviet !istorians regard 3ar Communism as a response to conditions outof t!e (ols!evi)s control.3estern li eral !istorians regard 3ar Communism as a demonstration oft!e in!erent wea)ness of communism as a political and economic system.Revisionists are in etween L 3ar Communism was a failed policy7 ut itwas due to ot! e'ternal conditions and t!e wea)ness of t!e (ols!evi)government and policyma)ing7 rat!er t!an t!e in!erent nature ofcommunism.



Revisionist

+enin: 3e were forcedto resort to 3arCommunism y war andruin.

#ipes: 8nstead raisingproductivity tounprecedented !eig!ts73ar Communism !adreduced it to levels t!att!reatened Russias verysurvival.#ipes: (efore t!erevolution7 t!e (ols!evi)sidealised t!e ur an wor)eras a creature endoweredwit! uni ue moral

ualities. 6oliticalresponsi ility uic)lydispelled t!ese illusions:t!e wor)er turned out to

e neit!er etter nor

worse t!an anyone else7and Iust as concerned wit!

8itzpatrick: %!e(ols!evi)s too) over a wareconomy in a state of nearcollapse7 and t!eir &rstand overw!elmingpro lem was to )eep itrunning.8itzpatrick:


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!is personal well eing.#ipes: %!ey considered

an)notes a temporarye'pedient.#ipes: =ar' wrote a great

deal of sop!isticatednonsense a out t!e natureand function of money.#ipes: %!e intention wastoma)e a universal cartel tooversee !uman as well asmaterial resources.#ipes: %!e programs1enin !ad approved !ad all

ut destroyed Russianindustry and !alved t!eindustrial la our force.#ipes: %!e governmentfound itself in t!e a surdsituation w!ereenforcement of its rulesagainst private tradewould !ve caused t!eur an population to starveto deat!. 8t !ad no c!oice

ut to tolerate t!enumerous lac) mar)etst!at sprouted in all t!ecities.

as!es.

Evaluation and *nalysis:Why was this policy / action taken? ( risis and response)3ar communism was supposedly a response to t!e conditions roug!t on y t!eCivil 3ar. 1i eral !istorians argue t!at t!is was not entirely true L it was agenuine attempt at uilding a communist society.

Was this policy / action consistent with !olshevik revolutionary ideals? %!e measures ta)en under 3ar Communism were consistent wit! =ar'istideology7 ut far more aut!oritarian t!an !ad een suggested efore t!erevolution.


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Everyday impacts of the 5ivil (arKey Evidence: (Dates, Names,People, Places, Documents)


#roduction

(y ,*2 7 wages oug!t less t!an a Dt!

of w!at t!ey !ad in ,*,". As foodecame critically scarce7 over !alf t!e population of t!e maIor cities escaped tot!e countryside.

%!e siBe of t!e proletariat !alved etween ,*,/ and ,*2 .8ndustrial production fell to ,4V of ,*,4 levels.

8amine and disease


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c!ildren. #easant: 5ivil (ar" %!e land elongs to us ut t!e read elongs to youO t!ewater elongs to us ut t!e &s! to youO t!e forests are ours ut t!e tim er isyours.#easant 5ivil (ar" 3e welcome Soviet power7 ut give us ploug!s7 !arrows

and mac!ines and stop seiBing our grain7 mil)7 eggs and meat.%istoriography: How did key historians interpret this event?



Revisionist

2rotsky: Send mecommunists w!o )now!ow to o ey.

5hamberlin: > %!e realmt!e (ols!evi)s !adcon uered ore a strongresem lance to a desert.

#erfect: %!e Civil 3arred a generation of men

w!o were uic) to reac!for t!eir pistols w!en t!eiraut!ority was uestioned.#erfect: (y con ueringt!e counter0revolutionaryring of &re7 t!e Sovietregime survived t!e Civil3ar.

Evaluation and *nalysis:Why was this policy / action taken? ( risis and response)

%!e institution of dictatorial policies lead to t!e cementing of a dictatorial state. %!is led to t!e restructuring of t!e party into t!e Secretariat7 #rg uro and6olit uro7 w!ic! allowed even more autocratic rule y t!e senior (ols!evi)s.

ompare this policy / action to the "sar#s re$ime% What has chan$ed? %!e polit uro was not unli)e t!e tsars ca inet of ministers7 w!ic! wassupposedly su ordinate to t!e -uma ut in reality ruled autocratically.

How did the policy / action impact on a $roup in &ussian society? (e$% Workers, peasants) %!e aftermat! of t!e Civil 3ar !ad a devastating e?ect on t!e proletariat7 w!ic!more t!an !alved etween ,*,/ and ,*2,. 6easants were also !eaviy impactedin t!e later years y famine and disease.

2he Kronstadt RevoltKey Evidence: (Dates, Names,People, Places, Documents)

Review of key terms add them tothe main list!":, =arc! ,*2, Kronstadt petition;$ =arc! ,*2, Kronstadt attle;

2he end of the 5ivil (ar(y t!e end of ,*2 7 it was clear t!at t!e Civil 3ar !ad een won ut t!eCommunist regime was in dire straits.

%!e Kronstadt revolt forced a maIor e'amination of Communist 6arty policies. -espite t!e war eing mostly over y early ,*2,7 t!e (ols!evi)s made no move


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towards ending most of t!e !ars! measures of 3ar Communism.

(ar 5ommunism continues8n ,*2, grain re uisitioning was increased7 and t!e military administration ofindustry was strengt!ened.

%!is caused furt!er discontent L t!e peasants were even less li)ely to !and overt!eir surplus if it was not eing given to t!e soldiers.3or)ers wanted a return to economic and social sta ility7 rat!er t!an moredictatorial controls.

2ension rising %!e winter of ,*2, saw renewed discontent in t!e cities.S!ortages of fuel led to t!e closure of t!e 6utilov steelwor)s in 6etrograd.8n late Reddest of the red9 %!e Kronstadters !ad een present in t!e 9uly -ays and t!e #cto er Coup andfoug!t wit! distinction in t!e Civil 3ar.Alt!oug! most sailors were (ols!evi)s7 t!ere was still support for t!e left SRs.Some also supported t!e anarc!ist (lac) Armies. (y supporting t!ese groupst!ey !ad positioned t!emselves as furt!er to t!e left t!an t!e (ols!evi)s.

Kronstadt turns8ncreased grain re uisitioning and t!e ongoing stri)es led to a turn in t!eKronstadters position towards t!e (ols!evi) government.

2he Kronstadt #etition#n , =arc! ,*2,7 t!ousands of sailors rallied on Kronstadt island. %!ey endorseda petition w!ic! called for maIor c!anges in t!e (ols!evi) government.

%!ey condemned t!e replacement of t!e tsarist autocracy wit! t!e communistcommisarocracy. %!ey called for new soviet elections L Soviets wit!out(ols!evi)s.

%!ere were maIor similarities wit! t!e petition of t!e marc!ers on (loody Sunday* 9an ,* D;:

0 4olshevik betrayal9

%!e Kronstadters were not counter0revolutionary L t!ey were not calling for anend to t!e revolution.

%!ey accused t!e (ols!evi)s of etraying t!e revolution L t!eir demands werefrom t!e left7 calling for soviet power.

%!ey insisted on a return to t!e values of #cto er ,*,/.

)ilitary and moral crisis %!e revolt was a maIor c!allenge to t!e (ols!evi)s7 ot! ecause t!eKronstadters were a military t!reat7 and ecause it represented a maIor moralpro lem. %!e Kronstadters !ad een t!e most steadfast defenders of t!erevolution.


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%!e communists refused to negotiate7 leaving t!e possi ility t!at t!e ice couldt!aw after t!e winter. %!e Kronstadters would t!en e a le to attac) t!e capital7as t!ey !ad in #cto er.

Reasoning

%!e (ols!evi)s t!oug!t t!at if t!ey gave in to t!e Kronstadters7 ot!er re ellionswould rea) out across Russia.

4attle#n / =arc! ,*2,7 %rots)y ordered D 7 Red Army soldiers to launc! ano?ensive on t!e ,F7 Kronstadters.

%!e Red Army was ac)ed y C!e)ist mac!ine gunners. %!e Kronstadters resisted for over a wee) ut eventually were defeated y t!elarger (ols!evi) force.At least , 7 Red Army soldiers were )illed and D Kronstadters.

+essons learned

A fundamental c!ange in policy occurred after t!e putting down of t!e armedrevolt. 1enin accepted t!at t!e fundamental economic policies in place wereunfeasi le.

#rimary $uotes: (From the period) Kronstadt sailors: %!e autocracy !as fallen. %!e Constituent Assem ly !asdeparted to t!e realm of t!e damned. %!e commisarocracy is collapsing. %!emoment !as come for a true government of toilers7 a government of soviets.Kronstadt petition: Soviets wit!out (ols!evi)s.Kronstadters : #ne mig!t !ave t!oug!t t!at t!ese were not factories ut t!eforced la our prisons of tsarist times.

&erge0 Bictor: %!e revolt was t!e eginning of a g!astly fratricide.%istoriography: How did key historians interpret this event?=any view t!e suppression of Kronstadt as t!e moment w!en t!e (ols!evi)s

ro)e t!eir last lin)s wit! t!e wor)ing classes and t!e ideals of #cto er.



Revisionist

+enin: %!is t!eKronstadt revolt; wast!e Jas! w!ic! lit upreality etter t!ananyt!ing else.2rotsky: %!eKronstadters; were t!epride and glory of t!erevolutionN t!e reddestof t!e red.2rotsky: #nly t!osew!o surrenderunconditionally maycount on t!e mercy of

t!e Soviet Repu lic.

8itzpatrick: 8t was asym olic parting of t!eways etween t!e wor)ingclass and t!e (ols!evi)6arty.


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and some factories ecame privately owned. +conomic relations wit!some foreign countries normalised L Russia signed a treaty wit! (ritain in,*22.

4. A new currency ac)ed y gold was introduced7 and rationing and somefree pu lic services came to an end.

". 1a our armies7 and some ot!er militaristic aspects of wor) conditions7were rela'ed or a andoned.1enin stressed t!at t!e Supreme +conomic Council would still control t!ecommanding !eig!ts of t!e economy. (usinessmen and capitalists would not eallowed to ta)e ac) control.8t was not a return to capitalism7 ut a return to t!e State Capitalism w!ic! !ade'isted in ,*,$ efore t!e Civil 3ar.

Adeological crisis=any senior (ols!evi)s were reluctant to allow t!e peasants to mar)et t!eir ownproduce.

%!e party split into factions7 as during t!e treaty negotiations. =any elievedt!at esta lis!ing centralised control over t!e economy !ad een a greatac!ievement. 1enin argued7 !owever7 t!at t!e 5+6 was a transitional p!ase7 andan opportunity for t!e new society to regroup.

8or the ,E# *gainst the ,E#1enin L t!e 5+6 provided reat!ingspace and time to recover

inoviev L %!e 5+6 was a clearing oft!e land for a new and decisive attac)of la our against t!e front ofinternational capitalism.(u)!arin L supported t!ea andonment of re uisitioning andt!e non0confrontational approac! tot!e peasantry.

1eft wing (ols!evi)s called t!e 5+6t!e 5ew +'ploitation of t!e6roletariat7 ecause it involved t!ea andonment of policies suc! as food!andouts and free pu lic services.

,epmen %raders w!o Jouris!ed under t!e 5ew +conomic 6olicy. %!ey drew t!eir wealt!from t!e free mar)etO t!e (ols!evi)s saw t!em as a new ourgeoisie L anunwelcome lemis! on a new socialist economy.

Results of ,E# %!e famine of ,*2,022 caused D million deat!s. >radually7 !owever7 t!e 5+6

egan to ta)e e?ect.(y ,*2F0/ production in many industries !ad reac!ed pre0war levels.=anufacturing and lig!t industry7 as well as oil e'ports7 e'perienced signi&cante'pansion.However7 !eavy industry and mining was still very wea). @nemployment reac!edD per cent among !eavy industry wor)ers.

%!e economy needed to modernise to remain competitive.

&uccessesStri)es egan to decline from ,*22.Agricultural production outpaced industrial production.>rain production recovered to t!e levels of ,* *0,4.

&cissor 5risis


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(y ,*24 a maIor gap etween t!e prices of manufactured goods and grain !ademerged. >rain !ad ecome c!eaper ecause of t!e increased supply andsmaller population. =anufactured goods were still e'pensive7 !owever.8t was feared t!at t!e peasantry would e reluctant to trade t!eir grain foroverpriced goods.

%!e (ols!evi) solution was7 of course7 to introduce price controls in t!emanufacturing sector.

#arty reactionAs t!e regime loosened its control on t!e economy it strengt!ened its grip ondiscipline ot! inside and outside t!e party.1enin was wary of t!e possi ility of internal discontent at t!e %ent! 6artyCongress from $ =arc! ,*2,. He elieved t!e opposition factions wereunrealistically idealistic.

1ecree >-n #arty 7nity9At t!e %ent! 6arty Congress 1enin unveiled a decree called #n 6arty @nity. Hesaid 8 do not t!in) it will e necessary for me to say muc! on t!is su Iect.@nder t!e decree7 factions wit!in t!e (ols!evi)s were ordered to e dis anded.8ndividual (ols!evi)s could still voice t!eir discontent7 ut t!ey could notorganise factional groups wit! ot!ers.

%!ose w!o violated t!is order could e e'pelled from t!e party and ultimatelypunis!ed y t!e C!e)a.As a result7 it was impossi le for any individual to openly oppose 1enin and laterStalin;

#rimary $uotes: (From the period)+enin: 1et us retreat and construct everyt!ing in a new and solid mannerOot!erwise we s!all e eaten.+enin: 3!at is needed now is an economic reat!ing spell.+enin: %!e national economy must e put ac) on its feet at all costs. %!e &rstt!ing to do is restore7 consolidate and improve peasant farming.4ukharin : 3e must say to t!e w!ole peasantry7 to all its strata: enric!yourselves7 accumulate7 develop your economy.




Revisionist

Reed: 1enin neverattempted to disguiset!e fact t!at is was alarge scale retreat7 a(rest01itovs) on t!eeconomic front.+enin: %!e nationaleconomy must e put

ac) on its feet at allcosts. %!e &rst t!ing to

do is restore7 consolidateand improve peasant

#erfect: %!e peasantre ellions and Kronstadtrevolt !ad made it cleart!at t!e aut!oritarianeconomic policies of warcommunism were creatingmore pro lems t!an t!eywere solving.)c5auley: 8f 3arCommunism was a leap

into socialism t!en 5+6was a leap out of


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farming. socialism.


Why was this policy / action taken? ( risis and response)3ar Communism !ad wrec)ed t!e economy and reform was urgently needed.

Was this policy / action consistent with !olshevik revolutionary ideals?5o L it was a maIor retreat in t!e attle against class enemies7 suc! as t!e

ourgeois factory owners and t!e )ula)s7 w!o were allowed to engage in tradeagain.

ompare this policy / action to the "sar#s re$ime% What has chan$ed? %!is policy was not dissimilar wit! 3ittes policy on t!e peasants7 w!ic! weredesigned to increase economic prosperity y creating a merc!ant class.

How did the policy / action impact on a $roup in &ussian society? (e$% Workers, peasants) Slowly7 t!e proletariat regrew after !alving etween ,*,/0,*2,. 5epmen7 orsmall scale merc!ants7 egan to ma)e a pro&t from t!e new system y trading

etween cities and t!e countryside.

1eath of +enin'&ummaryKey Evidence: (Dates, Names,People, Places, Documents)


&trokes1enin su?ered !is &rst stro)e in =ay ,*227 w!ic! left !im paralysed down !is leftside. He su?ered two more in -ecem er and was left w!eelc!air0 ound.2estament8n late -ecem er ,*22 !e dictated a testament to one of !is secretaries. Hedenounced Stalin as rude and power !ungry7 one planned to appoint someone

else efore !e died.1eathHe !ad anot!er stro)e in =arc! ,*24 t!at left !im totally paralysed and una le tospea). He died on 2, 9anuary ,*2".8uneral2/ 9anuary ,*24. Stalin delivered t!e eulogy7 %rots)y was not present. At " pmcannons were &red across t!e nation as !e was lowered into t!e ground.

#rimary $uotes: (From the period)



51/51



Revisionist

#erfect: %!erevolutionary regime !ad

roug!t not only turmoil7su?ering and nig!tmares7ut also !ope7 opportunity

and utopian dreams.Rosenberg: Sovietpolicies were essentially aradical e'tension7 rat!ert!an a rea) wit! t!epast.#erfect: