SAFETY

REGULATION

COMMISSION

Intermediate Safety Report

2015

EU

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ATM Safety Performance

Key Safety Indicators

General Considerations

The analysis of the ATM Safety Performance contained in this report is based on the Annual Summary Templates (AST) submitted to EUROCONTROL SRC by the end of March 2015, by a new, all time record number of 40 Member States. The SRC Intermediate Safety Report 2015, based on the provisional dataset for 2014, now contains AST reports for 40 EUROCONTROL Member States and is based on the data received from an absolute record number of States. Only Monaco did not meet the requirements of Permanent Commission Decision No. 115 regarding the submission of an AST report. Nevertheless, the overall outcome of the analysis is not expected to change.

It is important to underline that this all-time record in respect of the number of Member States reporting ASTs for 2014 within the deadline is the result of extensive cooperation between the SRC, supported by the DPS/SSR Safety Analysis Team and the Member States. This achievement has only been possible due to the continued hard work and dedication of the AST Focal Points and their advisors.

It was also agreed that Estonia, although not a EUROCONTROL Member State in the report timeframe, would submit their first AST report in March 2015.

Accidents with Direct and Indirect ATM Contribution

The safety data received for 2014 from Member States via the AST reporting mechanism, together with the available information from ICAO, indicate that there were a total of 84 accidents, out of which 1 was fatal.

However, it is important to note that, with the traffic level increasing by 2.7% compared to the previous year, only one of the reported accidents had a direct ATM contribution (for accidents involving aircraft above 2250 kg MTOM). None of the accidents in 2014 had an indirect ATM contribution.

As indicated in previous reports, the number of accidents with ATM contribution remain low over time. The specific accident with a direct ATM contribution was related to a ground collision between two taxiing aircraft. A significant number of accidents are still under investigation and updated results are expected in the September 2015 AST reporting cycle.

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In line with the approach taken after the attacks in the United States in September 2001 (9/11), the tragic occurrence involving Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine in July 2014 is not considered to be an accident, but as an attack or act of war. As such, this occurrence is not included in the 2014 AST accident dataset. This approach is based on an agreement at the ICAO/SISG regarding this type of occurrence.

ATM-Related Incidents

The ATM-related incidents do not include the accidents and ATM Specific (Technical) Occurrences collected in the scope of the AST.

Following the constant increase in the total number of incidents reported by Member States during the previous years, the data submitted for 2014 continued the descending trend started in 2013. The last year’s decrease in the total number of ATM-related incidents in absolute figures was over 16%, as shown in the table below:

Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Total number of operational ATM-related occurrences 24061 27547 29610 24612 20567

The current evolution is mainly due to the fact that, starting with the previous reporting session, the Safety Analysis Team has increased its efforts to ensure a better filtering and validation of genuine ATM-related occurrences from Member States’ datasets coded in ADREP taxonomy. This was possible using an improved version of the so-called EASTER application developed in co-operation with the JRC.

This led to a substantial decrease in the occurrences that were previously placed in the category OTHER, but have now been filtered out with the enhanced quality assurance actions taken. Hence this accounts, to a large extent, for the significant decrease in the overall numbers. In addition, although to a lesser extent, some Member States still have a

considerable backlog of occurrences (ATM and others) to be processed.

Based on the support activities performed in this area over the past year, it needs to be noted that, despite the numerous SRC

recommendations adopted by the Provisional Council during the last years, the considerable shortage of resources available at national level remains a great concern.

To ensure the collection, appropriate and consistent coding, and assessment of ATM-related occurrences in a timely manner in order to enable validated AST report submission to EUROCONTROL, adequate resources should be allocated at national level.

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To enhanced the quality of the ATM-related safety data reported via the AST mechanism, the SRC has proposed to have a centralised validation and processing function as part of its support activities to Member States. However, this will require the approval and allocation of increased resources (at least at the level of 2014) for the Safety Analysis Team supporting the SRC to enable sustainable support to the AST reporting system by Member States.

Furthermore, it should be noted that, as in previous reporting cycles, the AST reporting sessions in September 2014 and March 2015 identified and confirmed a range of increasing safety data problems for ATM occurrences reporting. These issues range from incomplete occurrence data, coding and classification (RAT) problems/issues, incorrect format(s), occurrence data processing backlog, invalidated data-sets, remaining transition issues to the new ECCAIRS 5 version from either national database or earlier ECCAIRS applications/versions to other ATM data issues.

Also to be noted is the issue of incorrect coding of ATM occurrences in the ECCAIRS databases by Member States, which is partly due to the complex taxonomy aspects and changes in the system. EUROCONTROL and the EC/JRC are working together to find sustainable solutions that will enhance ATM occurrence coding. In addition, we need to keep focus on the issue regarding some Member States’ decisions to stop coding occurrences in their databases, which remains an area of immediate concern for meaningful safety analysis at national and European level and is a substantial problem that endangers the overall reporting and analysis system being implemented within the European Safety Regulatory Framework.

The chart opposite illustrates the situation with respect of the completeness of the safety occurrence data submitted by Member States via the AST reporting. It is to be noted with great concern that the data required to populate a number of fields is missing in high percentages.

However, it should be stressed that the chart is based on the preliminary data for 2014 as submitted to EUROCONTROL via the AST reporting mechanism. The situation could, and hopefully will, change during the next reporting session (September 2015) when the 2014 data will be updated.

In respect to the evolution of the risk posed by the reported occurrences on the ATM system, it is to be noted that, although there is a decrease in the total number of reported occurrences, a small increase is shown in the risk bearing categories (severities A and B). The severity C occurrences show a small decrease of 6.5% in absolute numbers compared to 2013. In addition, the number of incidents with no safety effect (severity E) shows an increase of just over 10%.

With respect to the occurrences NOT severity classified, the 2014 provisional data shows another considerable decrease in absolute numbers; 2012-11505, for 2013-5917and now 1748. It is possible that the SRC’s action taken on the severity classification issue with letters send to the PC Heads of Delegation, combined with required application of the Risk Analysis Tool (RAT) Methodology, has facilitated this enhancement.

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Cross-Border Service Provision – Specific Issue to be Addressed

As part of the AST data quality assurance and validation process for the 2014 dataset, it was noted that, for some areas where airspace has been delegated to a neighbouring Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP), some occurrence data were missing from the national AST dataset submitted to EUROCONTROL.

The relevant occurrences were reported by the ANSP providing the cross-border services to their national authorities. However, these data have not been shared and/or “transferred” to the national authorities of the Member States in charge of the safety oversight of the airspace where the occurrences took place.

To that end, the collated and reported ASTs did not reflect the abovementioned events. Action will be taken before the September 2015 reporting cycle to ensure that the missing occurrences are shared with the appropriate Member States and that AST reports are updated accordingly. The AST-FP Group will address this issue and provide support in finding an unambiguous and sustainable solution, and will report progress to the SRC at a later stage in 2015.

Separation Minima Infringements

For 2014, the provisional data shows an increase of almost 8.5% in the number of reported separation minima infringements (SMIs) compared with the previous year’s figures. This increase is in line with the trend started in 2011, following 2 years of decrease. The indicated increase is almost fully accounted for in the severity E category (i.e.no safety effect).

In the report on the 2013 data, it was noted that there was room for improvement in the classification of separation minima infringements in the national databases and that the Safety Analysis Team was eager to support Member States in improving the overall coding of the occurrences, including SMIs. For 2014, it is encouraging to see that the classification has improved and is now back to the level of 2012. However, focus needs to remain to ensure further improvements.

In respect of the risk bearing SMIs, there is a slight increase in severity class B (major) and a considerable decrease in severity class A (serious) events compared to the previous year’s figures. In absolute numbers, serious incidents (severity class A) decreased from 30 to 21, whilst major incidents (severity class B) decreased from 232 to 243.

With respect to the absolute number of significant incidents (severity class C), the number increased slightly from 1164 to 1222, whilst the number of occurrences NOT severity classified decreased significantly from 156 to 95. This could better reflect Member States’ efforts to classify SMIs with the RAT methodology because of the Performance Scheme Regulatory Framework requirements and the related support activities. In addition, as this type of occurrence usually takes the longest time to be investigated, we expect updates to be submitted in the September reporting cycle.

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Runway Incursions

The provisional data for 2014 shows an increase of just over 1% in the absolute number of this type of occurrence. The graph indicates a very small decrease (less than 1%) for runway

incursions (RIs) normalised to the number of aircraft movements (departures and arrivals). In absolute figures, the preliminary risk bearing RIs in 2014 (severities A and B) have increased from 14 events in 2013 to 25 (for severity A-serious) and from 61 in 2013 to 76 (for severity B-major).

The AST-FP Group have discussed a number of typical scenarios of runway-related occurrences to better classify the reported

runway incursions as per the definition.

The number of RIs NOT severity classified decreased significantly from 128 to 52. This could again reflect Member States’ efforts to classify occurrences using the RAT methodology because of the Performance Scheme Regulatory Framework requirements and the related support activities.

In addition, Member States should keep focus on the classification of this type of occurrence, as it remains related to the continued performance monitoring activities in the context of the Commission Regulation EU No. 691/2010 (the Performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions), taking into account Member States’ responsibility to establish and monitor the severity of these types of events during the first reference period (2012-2014). However, Member States may choose not to apply the RAT methodology for units with less than 50,000 IFR traffic movements. This threshold will be raised to 70,000 in RP2 (2015-2019), for which the AST reporting mechanism will remain the main vehicle.

Performance Scheme Regulation and Associated Key Pe rformance Indicators for Safety

Commission Regulation (EU) No. 691/2010 defines three Key Performance Indicators (KPI) for safety. These Safety KPIs have been developed by the EC, EASA and EUROCONTROL, in consultation with Member States, and adopted by the EC. During the first reference period starting in 2012, no targets have been laid down for these safety KPIs.

One of the safety KPIs is the application of the severity classification methodology of the Risk Analysis Tool (RAT) to allow the harmonised reporting of severity assessment of Separation Minima Infringements, Runway Incursions and ATM-specific occurrences.

Over the last year, the EUROCONTROL Safety Analysis Team has continued to support a number of Member States in putting in place the necessary arrangements at national level for the successful implementation of the RAT methodology in accordance with the provisions of the Performance Scheme Regulation (e.g. Bulgaria, Malta, Norway, Spain, Estonia and Nordic States).

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Similar activities are planned for 2015, principally to better prepare EU Member States to meet the targets considered for the next reference period (RP2), both for the severity for ATM Ground and ATM Overall and to ensure the best possible quality of the AST data. In addition, support for the application of the RAT Methodology by the States Authorities has been provided to a number of non-EU EUROCONTROL Members (e.g. Turkey, Ukraine and Georgia) to facilitate the improvement of the severity assessment of the occurrences reported via the AST and to help achieve harmonisation at pan-European level.

Commission Regulation (EU) No. 691/2010 was still applicable during 2014, the last year of RP1, whilst Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 390/2013 (laying down a performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions) became applicable on 01 January 2015 addressing RP2 (2015-2019).

It is expected that the current working arrangements in respect of the reporting of the application of the RAT Methodology will be maintained during RP2. To accommodate the expected changes for the reporting of the application of the RAT methodology in RP2, necessary actions have been taken to ensure the necessary adjustments of the AST template to facilitate the reporting of the KPI and associated targets.

The 2014 analysis of the application of the RAT methodology addresses the 30 SES Member States. The data presented below is dis-identified in line with the SRC’s confidentiality policy and takes into account the information reported by the end of March 2015 covering the whole 2014 reporting year. Updates are expected during the September 2015 AST reporting cycle.

It should be noted that the information is also made available to the PRB and published electronically on their dash-board. The data contained in the dash-board shall be updated in a timely manner to reflect changes as they occur.

RAT Methodology – Separation Minima Infringements

Sixteen Member States used the RAT Methodology to derive the severity of all reported SMIs. The scope of the assessment was ATM Overall only in 11 of these Member States, whilst 5 Member States assessed the severity of all reported SMIs taking into account the ATM Ground component only.

In two cases (State 8 and State 21), no Separation Minima Infringements were reported , hence there was no scope for the application of the RAT Methodology.

Two Member States did not report the application of the RAT methodology.

DPS/SSR will continue to support Member States in improving the score on the RAT Methodology in the view of the upcoming performance targets set for RP2 and their monitoring.

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RAT Methodology – Runway Incursions

Fourteen Member States used the RAT Methodology to derive the severity of all reported Runway Incursions. The scope of the assessment was ATM overall in 11 of these Member States.

Three States did not report any Runway Incursions (States 14, 25 and 28), hence there was no scope for the application of the RAT Methodology.

Two other Member States did not report the application of the RAT Methodology for any of the reported occurrences.

RAT Methodology – ATM Specific Occurrences

Ten Member States used the RAT Methodology to derive the severity of all reported ATM-Specific Occurrences.

For this type of occurrence, the scope of the assessment is ATM Overall only.

Six Member States did not apply the RAT methodology for deriving the severity of any of the reported ATM-Specific Occurrences.

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Operational Safety Issues This chapter provides an analysis and progress report on a number of operational safety issues that are currently under the focus of the SRC and its specialised working group (AST Focal Point Group). A full analysis of all European Key Risk Areas will be included in the SRC’s 2015 Annual Safety Report later this year, which will also be presented to the Provisional Council in December 2015.

Unauthorised Penetration of Airspace / Airspace Inf ringements

After the adoption of several recommendations by the Provisional Council in respect to the implementation by Member States of “the provisions of the European Action Plan for Airspace Infringement Risk Reduction”, a remarkable range of actions has been taken by all

regulatory / oversight / competent authorities, ANSPs, Military, General Aviation (GA) Community and other stakeholders at national level, supported by EUROCONTROL over the past 5 years. Notably, a number of Member States repeat their annual efforts, i.e. with respect to the national GA community, before starting the seasonal flying, to re-raise the awareness on airspace, routes, restrictions, danger area’s TSA’s, etc.

Contrary to 2013 (which showed an almost 32% decrease), the provisional data for 2014 shows a very significant increase of nearly 25% in the number of reported Unauthorised Penetrations of Airspace (UPA) / Airspace Infringements (AIs). Most of the increase is accounted for by a considerable increase (from 1475 to 2551 in absolute numbers) in severity C (significant) occurrences and to some extent by the occurrences where severity was either not determined or classified as severity E (no safety effect). The overall increase is also accounted for by the increased number of Member States reporting this type of occurrences and by one State in particular who reported 30 in 2013 and more than 400 in 2014.

In addition, it needs to be taken into account that the absolute number of occurrences NOT being severity classified has dropped very significantly (from 776 in 2013 to 172 in 2014). However, the number of occurrences of which the severity was NOT determined (severity class D) has increased considerably compared with 2013 and is almost back to the level of 2012.

In this occurrence category, the 2014 provisional data shows that the risk bearing incidents (severities A and B) amount to almost 1.5% of the total number of airspace infringements. In absolute numbers this represents 53 ‘severity B’ and 9 ‘severity A’ events.

As in previous years, Member States are still in different phases of implementing the European Action Plan for Airspace Infringement Risk Reduction, approved by the EUROCONTROL Provisional Council in December 2009.

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Continued support and facilitation is offered by EUROCONTROL, including for the seasonal awareness campaigns. The overall implementation efforts of the relevant recommendations of the Action Plan by Member States are monitored through the existing LSSIP/ESSIP mechanism.

The safety risk posed by AIs / UPAs is evident when an aircraft penetrates the controlled airspace and comes too close to another aircraft. Depending on the airspace infringed, such encounters are classified as Separation Minima Infringements or Inadequate Separation, which collectively are called Losses of Separation (LoS).

The chart opposite shows the number and percentage of UPAs which resulted in a LoS. The percentage of LoS in the overall number of UPAs has seen a decreasing trend over the last years. The number of LoS in UPA events represented 4.3% of the total UPAs in 2013 and 3.2% in 2014. It is to be noted that one of the airspace infringements that ended up in a loss of the prescribed separation minima between

the aircraft involved was assessed as a serious occurrence (severity class A) and in 7 cases it was assessed as a severity B occurrence (major).

There is a close link between the risk associated with the UPAs and the number of those ending up in a LoS (i.e. the “opportunities” that the infringing aircraft enters into conflict with another aircraft). Therefore, the SRC intends to continue monitoring the relationship between UPAs and LoS.

Level Busts

The chart below shows the evolution of this key risk area over the last five years.

An increase in the total number of this type of occurrences is shown in the 2014 preliminary data, mostly accounted for in categories C (significant events) and E (no safety effect). We also note a slight increase in the number of level busts NOT being severity classified.

For the risk bearing occurrences, a 2.6% increase in serious (severity class A) and major (severity class B) events assessed in this category is seen compared to the previous year.

Just under 10% of the Level Busts ended up in a loss of separation between the aircraft involved. This is consistent with the previous three years.

The chart opposite shows the percentages of Level busts that resulted in a loss of the prescribed separation minima between the aircraft involved (Loss of Separation), associated with the spread of different severity categories in absolute numbers.

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As such, the 2014 provisional data indicates that, of the events that were assessed, there were NO serious events (severity A), whilst 16% were classified as major (severity B). This is a slight improvement compared to the previous year (severity A – 4% and severity B – 17%).

It is important to note that, from an occurrence coding perspective, all ‘Level Bust’ events were also correctly classified as ‘Deviation from ATC Clearance’ events. This is a major improvement in this coding aspect. The Safety Analysis Team of EUROCONTROL supporting the SRC will continue to provide customised support to Member States to ensure the consistent coding of the reported occurrences throughout ECAC.

Laser Interference

As in previous years, the AST-FP Group presented information gathered by States on the activities and actions developed and the steps taken/implemented with respect to laser interference / malicious use of lasers, as well as the numbers of this type of incidents, both domestic and abroad. The information provided clearly shows, despite the increased number of States reporting laser interferences that this type of occurrence represents a key risk area at European level.

Some Member States are still of the opinion that EU legislation covering the production, distribution, purchase, carriage and use of certain types of laser, should be developed.

In addition, a number of Member States have taken initiatives at national level, mainly in the regulatory area, but also by applying police and aviation law through prosecution, supported by the media. Others have addressed the issue at a more local level because of interference hotspots or have taken action because of laser interference reports from aircraft operators.

The SRC (through the AST-FP Group) and the EUROCONTROL Network Management will continue to monitor laser interference-related developments, through the following mechanisms, and continue to co-ordinate with EC and EASA:

• AST-FP Group Gathering of laser interference data from national representatives – continuous monitoring – gathering of best practice information and its dissemination – coordinate and inform SRC and other bodies.

• DNM/Ops/Safety Safety Warning Messages – Continuous monitoring through the voluntary reporting mechanism of EVAIR.

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Severity Classification of ATM Incidents

Any safety analysis at national, European or global level is dependent on a complete and consistent severity assessment in order to give full visibility of the real levels of risk.

The analysis of the severity assessment of the ATM-related incidents reported through the AST mechanism to EUROCONTROL over the last decade shows that severity assessment has deteriorated. Consequently, the AST-FP Group prepared a number of recommendations and an Action Plan agreed by the SRC and approved by the Provisional Council.

Part of these actions is the continuous monitoring of the completeness of the severity assessment.

After a peak in 2011 (20% and 40% of the total number for each category) the number of occurrences not severity classified showed some improvements in 2012 and a mix of increase/decrease in different occurrence categories for 2013. This section presents the latest update based on the provisional data as submitted by Member States in March 2015, covering the 2014 reporting year.

The graph shows the number of ATM-related incidents not severity classified for different types of incidents (including a number of already identified key risk areas). Although not yet fully and clearly identified in terms of background, we need to take note that progress has been achieved in respect of the severity assessment of all categories of ATM occurrences, with the most significant enhancements seen in airspace infringements and deviations from ATC clearance (>75% and >55% improvement respectively).

For SMIs and RIs, an improvement in severity classification of these occurrences is noted of almost 40% and 60% respectively compared to the previous year. This improvement, which is not yet confirmed, could have been achieved due to the increased implementation of the RAT methodology application related to the requirements for the Safety KPIs in the Performance Scheme, in combination with the increased DPS/SSR support activities (i.e. with respect to RAT workshops and facilitation in over a dozen Member States in the past year and a half).

If we look at the total percentage of occurrences NOT being severity classified and add the incidents where the severity is classified as “not determined” (i.e. some data provided but not enough to fully assess the severity), the percentages for 2013 and 2014 (provisional) indicate that the total for 2013 was just over 30% and 13.5% for 2014. Whilst this is a major improvement, focus needs to be maintained on enhancing severity assessments, inside and outside the context of performance regulatory requirements and therefore, the full implementation of the agreed recommendations and Action Plan approved by the Provisional Council is vital to keep improving the current situation.

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ATM-Specific Occurrences

The total number of reported ATM-specific (Technical) Occurrences has seen a decrease of over 15% in absolute numbers compared with the previous year’s data.

When the total number is normalised against flight hours, the decrease is even more important at over 25%. This is also related to the approach taken by Member States in respect of what technical failures are considered as an ATM-specific occurrence. Hence, a considerable variation has been noted in the level of reports filed by different Member States with similar traffic levels.

To this end, the RAT User Group has taken important steps towards the harmonisation of the approach considered by ECAC Member States.

With respect to the severity of the reported occurrences, it is noted that the number of risk bearing occurrences (severity categories AA and A) is similar to previous years, whilst a decrease (over 20%) is seen in severity category B. The decrease seen in severity category C (ability to provide safe but degraded services) was also notable (around 30%) compared with the 2013 figures.

If we take into account the number of occurrences where the severity was not determined (severity category D), the percentage amounts to 20% of the total number of reported ATM-specific occurrences.

The analysis below embraces the evolution of the availability of a number of services (COM, SUR, Flight Data Processing and Distribution) delivered by ANSPs. The failure of each service is analysed independently by severity and normalised by a million flight hours. In addition, the total number of occurrences in each category normalised by million flight hours is displayed in red. As a result, the scales used in all 3 charts are identical and do not represent absolute number of occurrences but normalised figures that facilitate comparison between the last five years.

Communications

The ‘Failure of the Communication Function’ has seen an increase of over 25% compared with the previous year’s data. The total number of failures has seen a dip in absolute numbers to the level of 2012 (2853).

The number of risk bearing losses of COM function (severity categories AA, A and B) has remained at the levels of the previous year. Calculated against the increased traffic levels, the risk bearing COM failures represent around 45% of the total number of such technical events. The number of occurrences ‘not severity classified’ has increased by 15% compared to the 2013 figures.

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Surveillance

Based on the 2014 preliminary AST data, the total number of ‘Failures of the Surveillance Function’ was 1599, which is over a 20% decrease compared with the previous year’s data.

It is to be noted that the number of total inability to provide the SUR function increased from 1 event in 2013 to 2 events, reaching the level of 2012. The other risk bearing events (severity categories AA, A and B) slightly increased compared to last year. When presented against traffic levels, the risk bearing SUR failures amount to over 7% of the total number of such technical events, which is similar to the 2013 final figures. The number of occurrences not severity classified has increased to approximately 7% of the total number of occurrences in this category.

Flight Data Processing and Distribution

Based on the 2014 preliminary AST data, the total number of events in this category decreased by 26% compared to last year’s figures. However, when normalised against the traffic level the decrease is 35%.

The risk bearing events showed there was 1 severity AA failure of the ‘Flight Data Processing and Distribution Function’. The aggregated severities A and B, in absolute figures, amounted to similar numbers compared to 2013 (54 in 2013 vs. 56 in 2014).

The events placed in categories C and E from a severity view point show significant decreases of 30% and 55% respectively when compared to the 2013 figures and normalised against traffic levels. This evolution is in line with the trend already identified in the previous year’s report.

Notably, the number of events where the severity is either ‘not classified’ or ‘not determined’ has increased by over 65% compared with the previous year.

As many Member States are struggling with backlogs, some improvements are expected in this area during the September 2015 reporting session when the final 2014 AST data will be presented.

(Space Left Intentionally Blank)

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Appendix A

ECAC ATM Safety Performance Indicators for 2014

Accidents – Overall Numbers

Based on the provisional 2014 Annual Summary Template (AST) returns for 40 Member States and the data available from ICAO (covering all ECAC States), there was one accident with direct ATM contribution.

However, a significant number of accidents are still under investigation and updated results are expected in the next AST reporting session in September 2015.

Fatal Accidents

The 2014 provisional data shows 84 accidents were reported in the ECAC area involving aircraft above 2250kg MTOTM. Despite the increase in the number of such occurrences

compared with the previous year (67), the number of fatal accidents remains at the level of 2013 (18).

(Space Left Intentionally Blank)

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Accident Categories

The graph below presents the number of accidents in the categories that are specifically tracked in the AST reporting system. Preliminary data for 2014 shows that the most significant accident category is related to ground collisions.

Amongst them, there were 12 each of ‘Collisions on the ground between a/c and vehicle / person / obstruction(s)’ (12) and ‘Collisions on the ground between aircraft’.

The next most significant accident category is ‘Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) ’, with 11 events reported. In addition, there were 2 Mid-Air collisions reported, one of them between a civil and a military aircraft that occurred during military exercises.

As many accidents are still under investigation, changes may surface when further results become available to AST Focal Points.

ATM-Related Incidents

The classification of ATM-related incidents is based on the severity of their effect on the safe operation of aircraft and occupants (refer also to EAM 2 / GUI 1 and EAM 2 / GUI 5 for more details).

The trend analysis is based on the AST data reported by 40 Member States. To ease interpretation, incident-related performance indicators are normalised based on millions of flight hours, except for runway incursions which are normalised based on millions of aircraft movements (departures and arrivals).

There was a 2.7% increase in the number of flight hours in the ECAC States and about a 0.7% decrease in the number of arrivals/departures. One incident can be sub-categorised in more than one type of incident. For example, one incident can be categorised as a Deviation from ATC Clearance, Level Bust and Separation Minima Infringement. As opposed to accidents analysis, there is no MTOM limit for ATM related incidents.

(Space Left Intentionally Blank)

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General Trends

Initial data for 2014 shows a 16% decrease in the total number of incidents reported compared with the same period in 2013. When measured against traffic levels, the decrease

is even more important at 27%.

The number of serious incidents (severity A) increased in 2014 to 101 events from 99 reported in the previous year. A more significant increase is seen in the number of major events reported in 2014 (576 in 2014 vs.479 in 2013). However, when this is normalised against traffic levels, it represents only a 5% increase compared with 2013.

Separation Minima Infringements

The initial data reported for 2014 shows a small increase (just over 8%) in absolute numbers compared with the 2013 figures. However, when measured against traffic levels, there is a 5% decrease compared with the previous year’s data. Although such an evolution may seem confusing, it can be explained by the fact that more Member States have reported the AST compared with previous years. The traffic volume considered in the calculation has considerably increased while the number of reported SMIs remained at a low level.

However, as this type of occurrence usually takes the longest time to be investigated, updates are likely to be submitted in the September 2015 reporting session.

With respect to the number of serious incidents (severity category A), there is a decrease compared with 2013 data from 30 to 21. The major SMIs (severity category B) have seen a small increase in absolute numbers from 232 in 2013 to 243 in 2014.

Near Controlled Flight into Terrain (Near CFIT)

The preliminary data reported for 2014 indicates an increase in absolute numbers from 40 in 2013 to 61 near-CFITs in 2014. In the risk bearing incidents (severity A), 4 serious incidents are reported. A similar increase is seen in the number of the major (severity B) incidents from 4 in 2013 to 7 in 2014.

The percentage not severity classified still constitutes a matter for concern, with over 30% of the total number of events severity not classified or not determined. This is in line with the situation of 2013, when the figure was 25%.

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Runway Incursions

Preliminary data shows a 1.2% increase in the total number of runway incursions reported in 2014 in absolute numbers.

The number of serious runway incursions increased in absolute figures from 14 in 2013 to 25 in 2014, with the number of major occurrences increasing from 61 to 76 events in 2014. The same increase is shown in the significant RIs (category C) from 564 to 764.

The percentage of incidents “not classified” has remained low at 3.6% of the total occurrences. When taking into account those with severity category D (severity not determined), the percentage reaches over 8%. This represents a noticeable decrease compared with the situation of 2013 (over 15%).

Unauthorised Penetration of Airspace

The initial data for 2014 shows a significant increase of over 25% in absolute numbers. The number of occurrences not being severity classified in this category has decreased to just

over 4% of the total number of reported events. When combining the airspace infringements not severity classified with those incidents where the severity was not determined, we reach around 10% of the total number of reported events in 2014.

The risk bearing events increased marginally compared to 2013. The serious airspace infringements (severity A) reached 9 events in 2014 (versus 1 in 2013). There was an increase in absolute numbers of serious airspace infringements from 37 events in the

2013 to 53 in 2014.

Aircraft Deviation from ATC Clearance

The preliminary data reported for 2014 indicates an increase of over 15% in the total number of this type of occurrence. However, when assessed against traffic levels, the increase is 1.6%.

The number of events not severity classified has seen a significant decrease from almost 17% in 2013 to just over 8% in 2014.

The number of serious events (severity A) remains almost at the level of the previous year (10 events in 2013 versus 11 in 2014). A significant increase is noted in the major events from 57 in 2013 to 108 in 2014.

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Level Busts

The chart below shows the percentage of serious and major level busts that resulted in a loss of separation (LoS) between the aircraft involved.

It is to be noted that in 2014 none of the Level busts resulting in a LoS were classified as a serious occurrence (severity A). The percentage of major events that led to a loss of separation stayed at the level of 2013.

( End of Document )