san francisco city government city attorney - srpresskit

8/15/2019 San Francisco City Government City Attorney - Srpresskit

1/41

CITY ATTORNEY DENNIS HERRERA

NEWS RELEASEFOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: MATT DORSEY

MONDAY, MARCH 28, 2005 PHONE: (415) 554-4662

[MORE]

U.S. Supreme Court Hears ArgumentsIn San Remo Hot el Case Today

High Court Considers Whether Plaintiffs Can Relitigate Failed Claim That S.F.sHotel Conversion Ordinance Amounts to Unconstitutional Taking

WASHINGTON (Mar. 28, 2005)The City and County of San Francisco argued in the United StatesSupreme Court today that local and state governments regulating private property to protect theenvironment, affordable housing, and other community interests should not be forced to defend theseregulations twice: first in state court, and then again in federal court. The City contends that onceproperty owners challenging regulations have a full and fair hearing in state court, they are not entitled torefile the same challenge in federal court and try their claim a second timeas if the state courtproceeding had never occurred.

Before the high court today we are seeking to solidify the legal foundation upon which San FranciscosHotel Conversion Ordinance stands, and finally end the costly and duplicative attempts to retry a case onwhich weve prevailed, Herrera said. Though the issue before the court is a narrow one, our effortsunderscore the continued importance of thoughtful and effective public policies to protect affordable

housing for our Citys most vulnerable tenantsespecially elderly, disabled and low-income SanFranciscans.

San Francisco finds itself in the U.S. Supreme Court defending its Hotel Conversion Ordinance (HCO)after a decade-long onslaught by attorneys for the San Remo Hotel. The HCO, enacted in 1981, preventsowners of single-room-occupancy residential hotels from converting their units historically used fortenants into lodging for tourists, which is typically more lucrative, unless steps are taken to ameliorate thelost housing. Those steps include: replacing the converted units through construction of an equal numberof units for residents; rehabilitating an equal number of residential hotel units; or making an in lieupayment to the San Francisco Residential Hotel Preservation Fund to cover some of the constructioncosts for new units to replace those being converted. The longstanding measure is critically important topreservation of affordable housing in one of the nations least affordable housing markets.

The San Remo Hotel, whose owners illegally converted their hotel to a permanent tourist hotel in 1993,filed their suit in federal court, claiming that the HCO effected a taking of the hotel because the HCOdid not substantially advance any legitimate government purpose. When the federal district courtdismissed their claim because San Remo waited too long to bring the suit, San Remo decided to shop fora different, hopefully more favorable, forum. After five years of litigation, San Remo snatched delayfrom the jaws of defeat by asking the federal appellate court to vacate the district courts judgment andsend San Remo to state court to reassert its takings challenge to the HCO.


2/41

CITY ATTORNEY DENNIS HERRERA NEWS RELEASEPAGE 2 OF 2 MONDAY, MARCH 28, 2005

San Remo, however, was no more successful in the state courts. After four more years of litigation in theCalifornia courts, the California Supreme Court ruled against the San Remo, finding that the HCOsubstantially advanced the Citys legitimate interest in preserving affordable housing for the elderly,disabled, and low-income families. The California high court also rejected San Remos claim that itshould be exempt from the HCO because it was historically a tourist hotel. The Court found to thecontrary and ruled that San Remos historic use was primarily as a residential hotel.

Not satisfied with a full and fair hearing on the merits of its challenge to the HCO in states trial, appellateand supreme courts, the San Remo again shopped for a more favorable forum. It attempted to return tofederal court with the same arguments it had pressed initially in the federal court, and later in the statecourt. San Remo claimed that because it reserved its federal takings claim in state court for laterlitigation in federal courtit was entitled to another hearing of its takings claim in the federal court.

It is hard to conceive of a more wasteful and unfair result than the outcome urged by the San Remo here,where the government must win a suit twice to defend one of its laws, but a property owner need only winonce. Federal law prevents this unfair result, said Andrew Schwartz, the former deputy San Francisco

city attorney who recently joined the law firm of Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger LLP and has workedcontinuously on the case since its inception. The Full Faith and Credit Act, one of the oldest federalstatutes, requires the federal courts to give the same respect to a judgment of a state court that a court ofthat state would give to that judgment. Here, the California Supreme Court ruled against the San Remoon every one of its claims. California courts would certainly not allow the San Remo to simply refile itscase and have another bite at the apple. Therefore, under the Full Faith and Credit Act, the federal courtsare also bound by that judgment. The Ninth Circuit correctly ruled that San Remo had its day in courtand lost. San Francisco is urging the Supreme Court today to affirm that result.

Supporting the City and County of San Francisco as amici curiae (friends of the court) in the case are theConference of Chief Justices; the states of New York, Connecticut, Vermont, New Jersey, Colorado,Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma and West Virginia; National Association of

Counties; National League of Cities; Council of State Governments; National Conference of StateLegislatures; U.S. Conference of Mayors; International Municipal Lawyers Association; InternationalCity/County Management Association; California State Association of Counties; League of CaliforniaCities and the American Planning Association.

The case is San Remo Hotel et al. v. City and County of San Francisco et al, Supreme Court of the UnitedStates, No. 04-340. An electronic version of the Citys Brief for the Respondents is available online onthe City Attorneys Web site at http://www.sfgov.org/cityattorney/. In addition, copes of the brief will beavailable at the press availability outside the U.S. Supreme Court (First Street NE side, in front of theVisitors Entrance) following oral arguments.

# # #


3/41

ForumLOS ANGELES DAILY JOURNAL

MONDAY, MARCH 28, 2005

PAGE 6

High Court Must End Developers Relitigation Campaign

By Robert L. Shapiro

Why did Scott Peterson get thedeath penalty while RobertBlake got to go home?

Some commentators have suggestedthat as both cases were based on circum-stantial evidence the results should havebeen the same. Certainly the public viewis that Peterson got what he deservedwhile Blake got off.

Others point to the differencesbetween the victims. Laci, a young, preg-nant, beautiful woman captured thehearts of America, while Bonnie Lee wasportrayed as a grifter who exploited lone-ly men. In this view, the persona of theaccused also played a role. Both pro-claimed their innocence though nei-ther took the stand. Yet the desperation ofBlake, an aging actor supposedly manipu-lated by Bonnie Lee, generated somesympathy. The womanizing, smug Peter-son generated none.

I dont dismiss that personalities havesome bearing on a jurys thinking. But Icontend that the single most importantdifference in the outcome of these cases was the strategy employed by thelawyers.

Mark Geragos, Petersons lawyer, tookthe position that his client was stone-coldinnocent. He told the public that this wasnot a case of reasonable doubt, and that

they would find the real killer.In contrast, Gerald Schwartzbach,

Blakes attorney, rested his case primarilyon reasonable doubt and asked the juryto carefully follow the judges instruc-tions. He argued successfully that even ifjurors believed Blake may have killed hiswife, that was not enough under the law.Proof in our justice system must bebeyond that elusive concept of a reason-able doubt.

Blake jurors afterwards didnt evidence

huge sympathy for the defendant. There

was little discussion of his innocence. Itslikely that, like most of the public, jurorscame away thinking it was probablyBlake who committed the crime.

Blakes defense wisely focused on thescientific evidence, or lack thereof, andthis played well with a jury conditioned bytelevision shows that establish conclusiveproof of guilt, always in less than an hour,with fancy technology. The absence ofsuch certainty focused the jurys attentionon whether the prosecution had estab-

lished the case or left reasonable doubt.

In Petersons case, the lawyers focusedthe jurys attention on the implausiblecontention that someone else committedthe crime.

But under the law, juries dont have tobelieve that someone else committed oreven could have committed the crime.Most defense attorneys naturally jump atany such alternative scenario, howeverunlikely. Schwartzbach was wise not tomake this mistake. His strategy for Blakesdefense reminds us that an alternativeexplanation isnt necessary. A jury canbelieve a defendant committed a crime andstill acquit, in fact must acquit, if the prose-cution didnt sufficiently make the case.

My argument about the importance oflegal skill and strategy can be taken tounderscore the view that defendants inthe American justice system get the bestdefense that money can buy. And there issome truth to this. But in these two cases,the lawyers representing Peterson andBlake both were well compensated andsubstantial legal figures. Yet even the bestlawyers will bring subtly differentapproaches to similar situations. And asin almost all things, the devil is in thedetails. Slight adjustments of legal strate-gies could well have sent Peterson homeand Blake to prison.

There were no significant errors by theBlake prosecution, poor decision-makingby the jury or misplaced sympathy for thedefendant, simply shrewd choices by abrilliant defense lawyer.

In Blake Versus Peterson, Difference Was Defense Strategy

Robert L. Shapiro is a partner inthe Los Angeles office of Chris-tensen, Mil ler , Fink, Jacobs,Glaser, Weil & Shapiro.

By Timothy J. Dowling

The chief executive officer of the National Associa-tion of Home Builders once candidly referred tothe threat of federal court litigation as a hammer

to the head of local officials.This graphic locution recognizes that developers use

litigation threats during land-use negotiations to extractfavorable permit terms at the expense of neighboring

landowners and the community at large. Because 90 per-cent of municipalities have populations of less than10,000 and cannot afford even one full-time attorney, thehammer often proves effective.

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral argu-ment in San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 04-340, to con-sider whether developers and other takings claimantsshould be given two hammers. The developers lobbyurges the court to allow regulatory takings claimants torelitigate, in federal court, factual and legal issuesalready fully litigated and resolved in state court.

The homebuilders association advances this positionnotwithstanding the express commands of the federalFull Faith and Credit Act, which requires federal courtsto give a state court judgment the same preclusive effectit would have in the states own courts.

Proper respect for state court rulings has special sig-nificance in regulatory takings cases. In WilliamsonCounty v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the courtheld that no federal takings claim arises against a stateor local government until the claimant seeks compensa-tion in state court.

In the words ofWilliamson, if a State provides an ade-quate procedure for seeking just compensation, theproperty owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Com-pensation Clause until it has used the procedure andbeen denied compensation.

The specific question presented in San Remo iswhether federal courts should respect state court rul-ings in cases filed by takings claimants in accordanceWilliamsons mandate. Underlying the case, however, isa relentless campaign by the homebuilders association

to secure as many hammers to the head of local offi-cials as it can get.

The developers lobby dislikes Williamsons state-courtmandate because it would rather threaten local officials with litigation in a distant, unfamiliar federal court,where the proceedings often are costlier and more time-consuming. During the 1990s, the homebuilders associa-tion launched a well-financed campaign to overturnWilliamson through federal legislation, and therebyallow developers to sue local officials in federal courtwithout going to state court first. After drafting the bill,the association backed it up with a phalanx of lobbyistsand a mountain of campaign contributions.

Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., ranking member of the Sen-ate committee with jurisdiction over the bill, declared hehad rarely seen anything so arrogantly special interest,adding that the bill wouldnt pass the smell test in anytown in America.

Because the homebuilders association bill would haveshifted the balance of power in favor of developers andagainst neighboring landowners and the public, it pro-voked a firestorm of opposition, including the NationalGovernors Association, 40 state attorneys general, reli-gious and labor organizations, environmental groups andvirtually every group that represents local governments.

The Judicial Conference of the United States, chairedby Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and the Conferenceof State Chief Justices also opposed the bill.

In the House of Representatives, 13 of the bills origi-nal co-sponsors voted against it, perhaps a record for co-sponsorship abandonment. They explained they had

been misled into believing that the bill was an uncontro-versial procedural tweak. Fortunately, the bill died in theSenate.

The developers lobby then turned to the AmericanBar Association for help. Homebuilders association func-tionaries helped organize a takings retreat, co-spon-sored by the American Bar Association Section on Stateand Local Government Law, to recommend changes totakings law. Although local government groups andother opponents of the homebuilders association bill were excluded from the retreat, the developers lobbyand the so-called property rights movement were wellrepresented. The report produced by the retreat was soone-sided that the sponsoring ABA section refused to

endorse it.The developers lobby continued its campaign in the

lower courts, going so far as to argue in the 8th U.S. Cir-cuit Court of Appeals that Williamson had been over-ruled by a 1997 decision. The court rejected this argu-ment because the 1997 ruling nowhere mentionsWilliamson, and because the Supreme Court emphatical-ly reaffirmed Williamson in 1999 in City of Monterey v.Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687.

Of course, at no time during its legislative campaigndid the developers lobby argue thatWilliamsonwas nolonger good law, a contention that would have renderedits bill largely moot. Such inconsistencies seldom deterthe homebuilders association juggernaut.

Fast-forward to 2005. The developers lobby now seeksto have its cake and eat it too. In San Remo, the home-builders association asks the court to give every takingsclaimant two bites at the apple (or, in the developers del-icate phrasing, two hammers) by ignoring the unequivo-cal mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Act and allowingtakings claimants to relitigate issues in federal courtafter they have been resolved by state courts.

San Remo is hardly the ideal litigant to press the issue.Much as the developers lobby relentlessly forum-shopped its campaign to overturn Williamson, San Remoforum-shopped its takings challenge to San Franciscosaffordable housing ordinance.

San Remo first filed a mandamus action in state courtin 1993, which it failed to prosecute for five years. It thenfiled a takings suit in federal court, relating the case toothers pending before a judge who had publicly criti-cized the ordinance. When that judge died, the case wasreassigned, and the new judge dismissed San Remosfacial claim the central claim in the case as time-barred, not surprising given that the ordinance was 12years old when San Remo filed its federal suit. He alsodismissed San Remos as-applied takings claim becauseSan Remo had failed to seek compensation in state court

as required byWilliamson.San Remo appealed to the 9th Circuit, and for the first

time asked the appeals court to abstain from deciding itsfederal claims. Although the 9th Circuit recognized thatthe request appeared designed to secure a tacticaladvantage in view of San Remos loss in the trial court,the appeals court granted the request with respect toSan Remos facial takings claims. It also affirmed dis-missal of San Remos as-applied takings claim due to SanRemos failure to seek compensation in state court.

San Remo then returned to state court in 1998 andadded takings claims to its mandamus action. It litigatedthese claims through the entire state judicial system, ulti-mately losing in the California Supreme Court.

After fully and fairly litigating its takings claims to noavail in state court, San Remo returned to federal courtto file federal takings claims virtually identical to its stateclaims, seeking to relitigate every factual and legal issuealready decided by the California judiciary. The federaldistrict court ruled that because federal and Californiatakings law are co-extensive, the Full Faith and Credit Act requires the court to respect the state court judg-ment. The 9th Circuit affirmed.

Now, 24 years after enactment of the challenged ordi-nance and 12 years after it first filed suit, San Remourges the U.S. Supreme Court to give it yet another biteat the litigation apple.

The federal Full Faith and Credit Act, one of the oldestprovisions in the U.S. Code, has been described as acritical part of the architecture of federalism because itpromotes comity between state and federal courts thathas been recognized as a bulwark of the federal system.Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003).

The provision is so important that the Conference ofState Chief Justices has made an exceedingly rare ami-cus appearance in San Remo, urging affirmance of therulings below to vindicate comity, finality and federalism.

In contrast, the homebuilders association and SanRemos other amici take an ostrich-like approach to theact, with only one of its nine amici even mentioning it.Evidently recognizing that the act compels the applica-tion of issue preclusion, San Remos amici instead askthe court to overrule Williamson, an issue not raised bythe petition for certiorari and thus not properly beforethe court.

Of the several takings cases pending before the highcourt this term, San Remo is the most straightforward.For municipal groups that fought against the home-builders associations takings bill, the takings retreatreport and other association efforts to secure additionalhammers, the case is an unpleasant walk down memorylane. Time and again, the homebuilders association has

been rebuffed. After each defeat, it has shifted ground tomount a new attack.

The Supreme Court should do some hammering of itsown and drive a final nail into the coffin of the home-builders associations interminable campaign.

Timothy J. Dowling is chief counsel of theWashington, D.C.-based public interest firmCommunity Rights Counsel, which prepared anamicus brief in San Remo in support of SanFrancisco on behalf of California municipalitiesand the American Planning Association.

Submissions

The Daily Journal welcomes your opin-ions. Send articles of no more than1,500 words to [email protected].

Right and Left Must Unite to FixAmericas Gun Violence Problems

By Chuck McCutcheon

In the wake of another spate of gunmayhem this time in Red Lake,Minn., just nine days after a mass

shooting in Brookfield, Wis. thequestion resurfaces: Why cant a gun

control compromise be found to pre-vent such incidents?

The answer is complex politicallyand morally, advocates on both sidessay.

Gun control measures are beingdebated in state legislatures from Cali-fornia to Florida, but the topic haslargely vanished from the nationalpolitical agenda. Relatively few law-makers are willing to risk alienatingthe influential National Rifle Associa-tion and its supporters.

With Republicans controlling the White House and Congress, Democ-rats remain at a disadvantage inadvancing gun control legislation. Twoof the Democratic Partys leading fig-ures Senate Minority Leader HarryReid of Nevada and DemocraticNational Committee ChairmanHoward Dean support some gunrights.

Peter Hamm, spokesman for theBrady Campaign to Prevent Gun Vio-lence/Million Mom March in Wash-ington, said the political climate deeplyfrustrates activists, particularly when-ever a mass shooting occurs.

We always feel like were stuck inthe position of saying We told you sotime and time again when these hap-pen, Hamm said. You have politi-cians in Washington doing everythingthey can to ignore whats going on,because it doesnt fit with the political

equation to maximize votes to oneparty or another. The end result is aremarkable series of incidents theselast few months. Everythings going inthe wrong direction.

In a recent interview, Sen. OrrinHatch, R-Utah, said the situation mere-ly reflects Democrats inability to suc-cessfully make their case to the public.

All these Democrats who thoughtthey had a real big issue with guns,theyve all backed off, said Hatch, alongtime champion of gun rights. The

only people who havent backed off area very liberal minority.

Some activists said they need to bet-ter convey their belief that gun vio-lence is morally wrong.

Its important that we look at thisfrom a moral values framework, said Joshua Horwitz, executive director ofthe Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence, a Washington lobbyinggroup. We need to have a real dis-cussion. The solutions arent just leg-islative.

Horwitz and some gun-control pro-ponents said politicians shouldapproach the issue with the same fer-vor surrounding the debate over TerriSchiavo, the brain-damaged Florida woman whose family is fighting overwhether she should be kept alive. Con-gress passed emergency legislationover the weekend allowing federalcourts to hear a case brought by Schia-vos parents in favor of keeping her onnutritional support.

Our leaders are preaching aboutthe culture of life, Brady CampaignPresident Michael Barnes said in astatement. They should spend thesame amount of energy taking steps tostop our nations culture of death.

But opponents and skeptics of guncontrol respond that putting gun con-trol in a moral context is fraught withproblems.

If you start casting this in moralterms, people will say, What about themoral obligation to protect my family

from a criminal attack? said Universi-ty of Central Florida sociology profes-sor James Wright, author of severalbooks on guns and society.

UCLA law professor EugeneVolokh, a frequent commentator onSecond Amendment issues, agreedthat such arguments are unlikely tocarry much weight.

If (gun control advocates) are toprevail, they would have to make apragmatic argument: Even thoughwere going to take away some of your self-defense rights, were goingto give you something back withmore value, more safety, Volokhsaid. However, given that peoplequite rightly estimate that people willalways be able to get guns, it seemsmany of their initiatives are unilateraldisarmament.

Instead of focusing so much onguns, Volokh said, society might pre-vent mass shootings by adding moresecurity guards in schools, or by per-haps toning down sensationalizedmedia coverage in an attempt to dis-courage copycat offenders.

But given the current state of affairs,Wright said he doesnt see much roomfor a middle ground.

Ive always felt that the terms of thedebate around gun control are sowhite-hot that its almost impossiblefor any central position to emerge orbe argued for, he said. Ive never fig-ured out what the pro-gun-control peo-ple want us to do. Practically every-thing kids do to acquire firearms isalready against the law.

Chuck McCutcheon is a colum-nist for Newhouse News Ser-vice.

CHARLEST. MUNGER GERALD L. SALZMANCha irma n of the Board Publishe r / Editor-in-Chief

J. P. GUERIN ROBERTE. WORKV ice Chairman of the Board Publisher (1 950-1986 )

KATRINAM. DEWEYEditor

DONJ. DEBENEDICTISManaging Editor

PATALSTON GALE HOLLAND JIMADAMEK Profiles Editor City Editor Regional Editor

WENDYMAYA AMYKALIN HUGHWILLIAMS News Editor Legal Editor Photo Editor

JANELLEFAIGNANT,Assistant News Editor

CYNTHIAGOLDSTEIN , DAVID GRUNWALD, Copy Editors

Los Angeles Staff

GARRYABRAMS, BLAIRCLARKSON, DAN EVANS, DAVID HOUSTON, ADRIANNAKHOO, LORELEI LAIRD,DRAEGERMARTINEZ, SUSAN MCRAE, RYAN OLIVER, DON RAY, JOHN RYAN, LESLIE SIMMONS,

TINASPEE, LIZVALSAMIS, GENEVAWHITMARSH, ERON BEN-YEHUDA, Staff WritersROBERTLEVINS,Photographer

KENNETH DAVIS, ALLISON SCHIFANI Editorial Assistants

San Francisco Staff

MARTIN BERG,Editor, MICHAELMOLINE,Managing EditorCRAIGANDERSON, PETERBLUMBERG, ERIKCUMMINS, TYLERCUNNINGHAM,

DONNADOMINO, ANNAOBERTHUR, DENNIS OPATRNY,DENNIS PFAFF, JOHN ROEMER, AMYSPEES, ROBERTSELNA, Staff Writers

S. TODD ROGERS, XIANGXING ZHOU,Photographers

Daily Journal EXTRA

MELISSAANDERSON,EditorSTEFANIE KNAPP,Managing EditorARIS DAVOUDIAN,Design Editor

Bureaus

BRENTKENDALL, Washington, D.C.LINDARAPATTONI , HUDSON SANGREE Sacramento

CLAUDEWALBERTSan Diego, JASONW. ARMSTRONG Riverside,TIMWILLERTOrange County

Rulings Service

JULIE SUNG,Rulings Editor, STEPHEN MAITLAND-LEWIS,POLIN MARDIROSSIAN, CYNTHIAPRADO, JOSH SOLBERG,Legal Writers

AUDREYL. MILLER, Corporate Display Advertising DirectorMONICAFORTHUN, MARIARAMIREZ, MICHELLEWRIGHT,Account Managers

CLAUDIAHUITRON,Display Advertising Coordinator

The Daily Journal is a member of the Newspaper Association of America,California Newspaper Publishers Association, National Newspaper Association and Associated Press


4/41

No. 04-340

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

SAN REMO HOTEL L.P., THOMAS FIELD,ROBERT FIELD, AND T & R INVESTMENTS CORP.,

Petitioners,v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, CITY PLANNING COMMISSION,

BOARD OFPERMIT APPEALS, BOARD OF SUPERVISORSOF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THEUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS

DENNIS J. HERRERACity Attorney

THERESE M. STEWART

Chief Deputy CityAttorney

CITY AND COUNTY OFSAN FRANCISCO

City Hall, Room 2341 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett PlaceSan Francisco, CA 94102

ANDREW W. SCHWARTZCounsel of Record

FRAN M. LAYTON

ELLISON FOLKMATTHEW D. ZINNGABRIEL M. B. ROSSSHUTE, MIHALY &

WEINBERGER LLP396 Hayes StreetSan Francisco, CA 94102(415) 552-7272

SETH P. WAXMANEDWARD C. DUMONTNOAH A. LEVINE

WILMER CUTLERPICKERINGHALE AND DORR LLP2445 M Street, N.W.Washington, DC 20037


5/41

(i)

QUESTION PRESENTED

This Court limited review to the following question:

Is a Fifth Amendment takings claim barred by issue preclu-sion based on a judgment denying compensation solely under statelaw, which was rendered in a state court proceeding that was re-quired to ripen the federal takings claim?


6/41

(iii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED..........................................................i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..................................................... iv

STATEMENT...........................................................................3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................................................13

ARGUMENT..........................................................................16

I. THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT ACT BARSRELITIGATION OF ISSUES PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED

BY THE STATE COURTS.....................................................16A. The Act Requires The Federal Courts To Give

Issue-Preclusive Effect To The CaliforniaJudgment In This Case...............................................16

B. Petitioners Do Not Come Within Any Recog-nized Exception To The Full Faith And CreditAct...........................................................................19

II. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR CREATING AN EXCEPTIONTO THE FFCA IN THIS CASE .............................................23

A. Williamson County Does Not Require An Ex-

ception......................................................................23B. There Is No Justification For Refusing To Re-

spect State Judgments In This Context........................30

CONCLUSION.......................................................................34


7/41

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASESPage(s)

ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989) ........................... 25Allen v.McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) ................................passimAmerican Continental Insurance Co. v. American Casu-

alty Co., 86 Cal. App. 4th 929, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d632 (2001) ..................................................... ..................18

Bennettv. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).......................................29Breneric Associates v. City of Del Mar, 69 Cal. App. 4th

166, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 324 (1998)........................................26

Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979) .......................................26Bruley v. City of Birmingham, 675 N.W.2d 910 (Mich.Ct. App. 2003), appeal dismissed,679 N.W.2d 66 (Mich. 2004).............................................25

Calhoun v. Franchise Tax Board, 20 Cal. 3d 881, 574P.2d 763 (1978) ........................................................ ........18

City of Monterey v.Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,526 U.S. 687 (1999)............ .............................................. 24

Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566 (10thCir. 1995) ....................................................... ..................25

Commercial Builders v. Sacramento , 941 F.2d 872 (9thCir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992) ..................... 13

Daniels v. Area Plan Commission, 306 F.3d 445 (7thCir. 2002) ....................................................... ..................25

Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey,920 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1990)............................................25

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)..................................26Department of Taxation & Finance v. Milhelm Attea &

Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61 (1994) .......................................... 19District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462 (1983) ........................................................ ........28Doddv. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir.

1998) .................................................... ...........................27Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) ..............................9Englandv.Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners ,

375 U.S. 411 (1964)....................................14, 19, 21, 22, 23FERCv.Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).................................30


8/41

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIESContinued

Page(s)

Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn, Inc. v. McNary,454 U.S. 100 (1981)............ .............................................. 28

Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie ,452 U.S. 394 (1981)............ .............................................. 16

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County ofLos Angeles , 482 U.S. 304 (1987) ........... ........................... 25

Galbraith v. Planning Department, 627 N.E.2d 850 (Ind.Ct. App. 1994).............................. .................................... 27

Guetersloh v. State, 930 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App. 1996)...............25Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.

1986) .................................................... ...........................27Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983)................... ............ 18, 20 Harlen Associatesv. Incorporated Village of Mineola,

273 F.3d 494 (2d Cir. 2001) ............................ ..................30Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach, 6 Cal. 3d 279,

491 P.2d 369 (1971) ................................................. ..........6Idaho v. Coeur dAlene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261

(1997) ................................................... ...........................32Kremerv. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461

(1982) ................................................... .......... 17, 19, 20, 32Lumpkin v.Jordan, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 57 Cal. Rptr.

2d 303 (1996) ................................................. ..................18

MC Associates v. Town of Cape Elizabeth , 773 A.2d 439(Me. 2001) ..................................................... ..................25

Marrese v.American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons ,470 U.S. 373 (1985)............ ........................................ 17, 19

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein,516 U.S. 367 (1996)............ ........................................ 17, 20

Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Educa-tion, 465 U.S. 75 (1984)................................... 20, 22, 28, 32

New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City ofNew Orleans , 491 U.S. 350 (1989) .................................... 28

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825(1987) ................................................... .............................9

Ohio v.Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001) ........................................... 26Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank,

474 U.S. 518 (1986)............ ........................................ 17, 19


9/41

vi


Page(s)

Penn Central Transport Co. v. New York City,438 U.S. 104 (1978)............ .............................................. 11

Pennsylvania v.Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) ........... ..................26 Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496

(1941) ................................................... .............................8Rookerv. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)......................28San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco ,

100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ..............................9San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco , 145

F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1998) ....................................................7

Sierra Lake Reserve v. City of Rocklin , 938 F.2d 951 (9thCir. 1991), vacated, 506 U.S. 802 (1992) ........................... 27

South Dakota v.Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) ............................26Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) ...................... ..................32Stolz v. Bank of America, 15 Cal. App. 4th 217,

19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19 (1993) ...................... ........................... 18University of Tennessee v.Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986) ...... ........16Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.

Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,473 U.S. 172 (1985)... ............................ .............. 2, 7, 24, 25

Yee v. City of Escondido, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1349,274 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1990), affd, 503 U.S. 519

(1992) ................................................... ...........................27Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) .......... 18, 19, 24, 27

Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,433 U.S. 562 (1977)............ .............................................. 26

STATUTES AND RULES

28 U.S.C. 1257 ................................................... ..................25Full Faith and Credit Act

28 U.S.C. 1738...................................................... .passim42 U.S.C. 1983 ................................................... ..................20


10/41

vii


Page(s)

S.F. Admin. Code 41.3................................................... .............................3 41.4................................................... .............................3 41.6................................................... .............................3 41.12-41.13 ............................................... ................ 3, 4 41.19.............................................................................. .3

S.F. Planning Code 722.1 etseq. ..................................................................4 722.55............................................................................ .4

S. Ct. R. 14.1(a)................................................................. 18, 19

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The Private PropertyRights Implementation Act of 1998, S. Rep. No.105-242 (1998)......................................................... ........33

OTHER AUTHORITIES

4 Davis, K., Administrative Law Treatise 21.9 (2d ed.1983) .................................................... ...........................16

Juergensmeyer, J. & Roberts, T.,Land Use Planning andControl Law 10.10(c) (1998) .......................................... 31

Kovacs, Kathryn E.,Accepting the Relegation of Takings

Claims to State Courts: The Federal Courts Mis-guided Attempts to Avoid Preclusion Under Wil-

liamson County, 26 Ecology L.Q. 1 (1999) ................. ........31McManus, Susan A., The Impact of Litigation on Mu-

nicipalities: Total Cost, Driving Factors, and Cost

Containment Mechanisms, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 833(1993) ................................................... ...........................33

Michael A. Pagano, National League of Cities, City Fis-cal Conditions in 2004 (2004), available athttp://www.nlc.org/content/Files/RMPctyfiscalcondrpt04.pdf ............................................... ...........................32

Schimmel, J., San Remo Hotel 1906-1976, Historical

Resource Manual (1998) .................................................... .4


11/41

viii


Page(s)

18B Wright, Charles A., et al., Federal Practice andProcedure (2d ed. 2002) 4469.............................................................................. 17 4471.1........................................................................... 21 4471.2........................................................................... 20


12/41

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 04-340

SAN REMO HOTEL L.P., THOMAS FIELD,ROBERT FIELD, AND T & R INVESTMENTS CORP.,

Petitioners,v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, CITY PLANNING COMMISSION,BOARD OFPERMIT APPEALS, BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THEUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS

This case involves a takings challenge to a San Francisco or-dinance that protects the stock of affordable housing available tocity residentsparticularly the elderly, the disabled, and thosewith low incomesby regulating the conversion of hotel roomsfrom residential to tourist use. The state courts considered andrejected petitioners takings claims under state law, applying stan-dards identical to those of federal law. Petitioners now seek theright to relitigate every issue underlying the identical federalclaims in federal court, as if the state proceedings had never oc-curred.

Petitioners themes are unfairness and delay. There is, how-ever, no unfairness in holding petitioners bound by the statecourts resolution of issues common to their state and federal


13/41

2

claims. Doing so merely applies a basic principle of preclusionembodied in California law, and binding on the federal courts un-der the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738. As to delay,the federal courts could have resolved petitioners central claimtheir facial challenge to the hotel ordinance on the ground that itdoes not substantially advance legitimate goalswhen petition-ers first brought it. In petitioners first federal proceeding the dis-trict court dismissed that claim as time-barrednot because anystate proceeding was required to ripen it (Pet. Br. i). It was peti-tioners who snatched delay from the jaws of defeat on that claimby persuading the court of appeals to order abstentionin favor ofa state administrative mandamus proceeding that they had allowedto languish for the previous five years. Likewise, with respect topetitioners compensation-seeking claims, it is petitioners whochose to spend five years pursuing relief in the federal courtswhen, under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.

Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), they wereplainly required to proceed first in state court. Having unsuccess-fully presented the state versions of all their takings claims, includ-ing the facial claim, to the California courts, petitioners have nowreturned to the federal courts seeking to press the parallel federalclaims once again. They can hardly complain about unfair delay.

To the contrary, it is the courts whose patience should bewearing thin. The current proceedings are petitioners third itera-

tion of essentially identical takings claims. Issue preclusion, andthe FFCA, are designed to prevent exactly this sort of abuse. Inthe end, petitioners argument for relitigation of the issues underly-ing their takings claims rests less on any promise[] (Pet. Br. 7)made by this Court in Williamson County than on petitioners evi-dent distrust of the state courts. Yet both Congress and this Courthave made very clear that state courts determinations are entitledto full respect. Terminating this litigation risks no unfairness topetitioners. Prolonging it would be inconsistent with the Full Faithand Credit Act and with its underlying principles of comity andfederalism, and would impose unwarranted burdens on state andlocal governments and the federal courts.

STATEMENT

1. a. In the late 1970s, San Franciscos Board of Supervisorsconcluded that a progressive loss of residential hotel rooms was


14/41

3

contributing to a severe shortage of decent, safe, sanitary and af-fordable rental housing in the City. See Pet. App. 195a-197a(S.F. Admin. Code 41.3). Because [m]any of the [Citys] eld-erly, disabled and low-income persons and households reside inresidential hotel units, this trend posed a particular threat tothose persons who are least able to cope with displacement in SanFranciscos housing market. Id. at 196a-197a ( 41.3(c), (h)). In1979, the Board instituted a moratorium on the demolition or con-version of residential hotel units, and in 1981, it enacted a Resi-dential Hotel Unit Conversion and Demolition Ordinance (HCO).See id. at 5a, 196a-197a.

The HCO required each hotel in San Francisco to report the

number of residential and tourist units in the hotel as of September23, 1979. Pet. App. 203a, 205a-209a ( 41.4(q), (s), 41.6). TheCity would then issue a certificate of use, designating the hotelsbaseline number of residential and tourist units. Id. at 207a (41.6(d)). The HCO permits unlimited tourist use of rooms desig-nated as tourist units. Under certain conditions, rooms designatedas residential units may also be used as tourist rooms during thesummer tourist season (May through September). Residentialunits must be returned to residential use during the winter, whendemand for tourist rooms declines. Id. at 236a ( 41.19(a)(3)).

An owner may convert historically residential units to perma-nent tourist use if the owner elects either to arrange for the con-

struction or rehabilitation of replacement units, or to pay into theCitys Residential Hotel Preservation Fund an in-lieu fee equal to adefined portion of the cost to replace the converted units. See Pet.App. 224a-230a ( 41.12-41.13). The Citys Department ofBuilding Inspection, which administers the HCO, has no discretionto vary the amount of replacement housing required or the amountof the in-lieu payment. See id. at 137a-138a.1

b. The Citys Planning Code also separately restricts changesin the use of residential property in some districts. Pet. App. 6a.The North Beach Neighborhood Commercial District zoning ordi-

1

In 1990, the City revised and reenacted the HCO. Among other changes,

the revision increased the construction cost component of the in-lieu fee from40% to 80%, but exempted owners (such as petitioners) who applied for conver-sion permits before the revised ordinance took effect. See Pet. App. 6a, 110a n.3;id. at 227a-230a ( 41.13(a)(4), (d)).


15/41

4

nance, S.F. Planning Code 722.1 etseq., requires property own-ers who seek to establish a new permanent tourist hotel use to firstsecure a conditional use permit from the Citys Planning Commis-sion. Id. 722.55.

2. Petitioners are the San Remo Hotel, a 62-room hotel lo-cated in North Beach, and its owners. See JA 71-72. In 1981,when the HCO first went into effect, petitioners agent submittedan Initial Unit Usage Report stating that all of the San Remosrooms were in residential use on September 23, 1979. Pet. App.7a; JA 78-79. Based on petitioners own report, the City con-firmed the number of residential units in an HCO certificate of use.JA 78-79. Petitioners did not challenge the Citys classification

under the procedures provided by the HCO, and the certificate ofuse became final. Seeid.; Pet. App. 7a; id. at 208a-209a (HCO 41.6(f)-(g) (procedures for appealing initial unit status determina-tion)).2

In May 1990, petitioners applied for a permit under the HCOto convert all of the San Remos residential units to permanenttourist use. Pet. App. 7a. Because petitioners chose not to offsetthe conversion by creating or renovating comparable units else-where, the HCO required them to pay into the Citys housing fundan in-lieu fee for 62 replacement unitsa total of $567,000, basedon two independent appraisals. See id. at 110a, 118a, 227a.

Independently, the North Beach zoning ordinance required

petitioners to obtain a conditional use permit before establishing a

2Petitioners allege that the HCO interfered with the historic use of the San

Remo as a tourist hotel. See Pet. Br. 3-4. They maintain that the hotel operatorwho filled out the HCO use report on their behalf mistakenly over-reported thenumber of rooms in residential use on the HCOs baseline date. Seeid. at 3; JA78-79. There is reason to question the degree of any misstatement. See Pet. App.114a-116a (describing state administrative record); J. Schimmel, San Remo Hotel1906-1976, Historical Resource Manual 5-16 (1998) (indicating that before 1979the San Remo was used primarily, if not exclusively, as a residential hotel). Inany event, as the state and lower federal courts recognized, the HCO certificate ofuse was reasonably based on self-reporting by petitioners or their agents, and itbecame legally final when petitioners failed to invoke the procedures provided formaking any correction. Pet. App. 7a, 56a-57a, 152a-153a. As petitioners stressed

in their reply at the petition stage (at pp. 9-10), in this Court the relevant facts areundisputed or are a matter of public record. The undisputed, public-record factis that for purposes of the HCO and related ordinances, the historical use of all theSan Remos rooms is legally established by the HCO certificate of use.


16/41

5

new tourist use. Pet. App. 7a-9a, 59a. Petitioners challenged theapplicability of that requirement, but in December 1992 the CitysBoard of Permit Appeals (BPA) rejected their objection. Id. at 8a,60a. In January 1993, the Planning Commission approved peti-tioners conditional use permit subject to certain conditions, in-cluding compliance with the HCO through payment of the in-lieufee. Id. at 60a-61a.3

In March 1993, petitioners filed a petition for administrativemandamus in California Superior Court, challenging the BPAsrequirement that they obtain a conditional use permit under thePlanning Code. See Pet. App. 9a. Petitioners based their chal-lenge on California law allowing the continuation of nonconform-

ing uses under certain circumstances.

4

3. a. San Remo I. In May 1993, rather than bringing takings

claims in state court or pursuing their mandamus actionwhichthey allowed to lie dormant until 1998petitioners filed this law-suit in federal court.5

Petitioners complaint (as with subsequent complaints de-scribed below) advanced several theories for relief. See JA 88-94

3As the California Supreme Court recognized, the Planning Commissions

decision imposed no fee of its own; it merely required petitioners to comply withthe HCO, as petitioners had represented that they would. Pet. App. 129a. Pet i-tioners began operating the San Remo as a permanent tourist hotel in September1993 when the federal district court enjoined the Citys enforcement of the HCO.

See p. 6 n.5, infra. In December 1996, after the district court dissolved that in-junction, petitioners paid the HCO fee under protest. JA 85. In March 1997, theCity issued a conversion permit under the HCO. JA 86.

4A legal nonconforming use under California law is a lawful use existing

on the effective date of the zoning restriction and continuing since that time innonconformance to the ordinance. Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach, 6 Cal. 3d279, 285, 491 P.2d 369, 373 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).

5In filing their suit, petitioners designated it as related to a case brought

by other hotel owners challenging the constitutionality of the HCO. Pet. App.61a. That case was pending before district judge John Vukasin, who had alreadypublicly indicated that he thought the HCO was invalid. In September 1993,Judge Vukasin declared the HCO facially unconstitutional in the related case, andthen granted petitioners request for a preliminary injunction. See id. at 62a.Soon thereafter Judge Vukasin died, and the case was reassigned. See id. After

further proceedings in both cases (during which the court of appeals vacatedJudge Vukasins declaration and remanded for consideration of the statute oflimitations), the district court ruled for the City, as described in the text. See id. at63a, 66a.


17/41


18/41

7

473 U.S. 172 (1985), because petitioners had not sought compen-sation through available state procedures. August 26, 1996 Orderat 18; see id. at 15-18; Pet. App. 66a.

The court of appeals affirmed in part. The court agreed that,under Williamson County, any economic impact claim was un-ripe until the owner has sought, and been denied, just compensa-tion by the state. App. 8a (facial claims); App. 10a (as-appliedclaims). On the other hand, the court recognized that, because theremedy for a successful facial substantially advance claim is notan award of just compensation but rather invalidation of the regu-lation, petitioners claim that the HCO is a facial taking because itis not sufficiently related to legitimate state interests . . . [was]

ripe. App. 10a. The court therefore could have affirmed the dis-trict courts holding that that claim was barred by the statute oflimitations, and brought at least a substantial portion of this litiga-tion to an end.

On appeal, however, petitioners for the first time invokedRailroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). SeeApp. 7a-8a, 14a-17a. They argued that the federal courts shouldabstain from deciding any of their federal takings claims, becausetheir administrative mandamus challenge to the conditional usepermit requirementwhich they had failed to prosecute in the fiveyears since its filingmight moot the issue of whether the [HCO]is a facial or an as-applied taking under the Fifth Amendment[.]

JA 68 (petitioners brief); see JA 50-68 (same); App. 16a. Thecourt recognized the irony in petitioners request for abstention,given that they had sought federal jurisdiction in the first place.The court also noted the possibility that petitioners, whose facialclaim had been dismissed with prejudice as untimely, were seekinga tactical advantage[] through their belated argument forabstention. App. 15a. The court nonetheless accepted petitionersrepresentation that the state administrative mandamus proceedingsmight moot or narrow their facial substantially advance claimand thus remanded with instructions that the district court abstainon that claim. App. 16a-17a.7

7It is unclear how, if at all, the court of appeals addressed the as-applied

substantially advance claim.


19/41

8

b. San Remo II. Upon return to state court, petitionersamended their petition for administrative mandamus to add a fullrange of taking claims under the California Constitution. Pet. App.67a; JA 103-123. These included not only some economic im-pact claims, but alsoindeed, principallysubstantially ad-vance claims, predicated on the theory that the HCO and zoningrequirements force [petitioners] and other similarly situated prop-erty owners to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and jus-tice, should be borne by the public as a whole. JA 103-104; see,e.g., id. at 106 (fee imposed not roughly proportional to impactof petitioners use on government interest), 107, 119-120, 120-121(no close nexus between fee and public harm). As finallyamended, the state petition and complaint also briefly set out, butpurported to reserve[], an as applied federal takings claim. JA125 (capitalization altered); see Pet. App. 67a-68a.

The superior court rejected petitioners administrative man-damus challenge to the application of the North Beach zoning or-dinance. SeeSan Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Fran-cisco, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (describing trialcourts determination). The court also sustained a demurrer to pe-titioners facial takings challenge to the HCO, concluding thateven if the facts they pleaded were true, the law would not supportpetitioners claim. Id. at 7-8. The court reasoned that, as a generallegislative regulation, the HCO was not subject to the heightened

scrutiny established by this Court for certain federal takings claimsinNollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 834(1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).See Pet. App. 119a. The court rejected any as applied claims onwaiver grounds. Id.; 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8.

The state court of appeal reversed. 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 4.With respect to the administrative mandamus challenge, it heldthat the trial court should make factual findings about the actualuse of the San Remos rooms before enactment of the North Beachzoning ordinance. Id. at 16-19. As to the takings claims, the courtconcluded that petitioners substantially advance challenge to theHCO should be evaluated under the heightened scrutiny ofNollan

andDolan, and that the takings issues should be remanded for fur-ther proceedings. Id. at 9-16.


20/41

9

In March 2002, the California Supreme Court reversed. Pet.App. 106a-194a.8 On the mandamus issue, the court upheld appli-cation of the conditional use permit requirement, regardless of theactual proportions of tourist and residential use at the hotel beforethe North Beach zoning ordinance took effect. Id. at 122a-130a.On the takings issues, the court noted that it was not deciding anyfederal claim. Id. at 107a n.1. It explained, however, that becauseCalifornia and federal takings law are largely coextensive, it wouldanalyze [petitioners] takings claim under the relevant decisionsof both this court and the United States Supreme Court. Id. at130a-131a.

Like the state court of appeal, the Supreme Court recognized

that petitioners arguments turned on the substantially advancestrain of takings analysis. Pet. App. 131a, 144a & n.14.9 Thecourt held that petitioners claim was not subject to the Nol-lan/Dolan heightened standard of review. See id. at 131a-144a.The court then carefully considered and rejected petitioners vari-ous arguments that the HCO does not substantially advance legiti-mate government interests. See id. at 144a-155a. It concluded, forexample, that the HCOs housing replacement fees bear a reason-able relationship to loss of housing (id. at 144a); that the use of adefined historical measurement point is reasonably related to theHCOs housing preservation goals (id. at 145a); that [t]he HCOwas clearly not designed as a means of raising general revenue

(id

. at 147a); and that [m]aintaining the availability of residentialhotel rooms is a reasonable means of serving one segment of SanFranciscans housing needs (id.). It also rejected the argumentsthat the HCO targets an arbitrary small group of property own-ers, or deprives all the burdened properties of so much of theirvalue, without any corresponding benefit, as to constitute a takingon its face. Id. at 150a. It noted that the HCO on its face allowsthe property owner to continue the propertys preordinance use

8Justices Baxter and Chin concurred in part and dissented in part. Pet.

App. 155a-174a. Justice Brown dissented. Id. at 175a-194a.9

Responding to Justice Baxters separate opinion, the court specifically

held that the scope of its analysis reflected choices [petitioners] ha[d] made inrefining their claims as they climbed the appellate ladderincluding failing topress any compensation-seeking, economic-impact claim. Compare Pet. App.144a n.14 withid. at 172a-173a (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).


21/41

10

unhindered, and therefore does not interfere with what must beregarded as [the property owners] primary expectation concerningthe use of the parcel. Id. (quoting Penn Central Transport Co. v.

New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978)).

The court specifically considered and rejected petitionersclaims not only as a facial matter, but also in the context of theirparticular factual allegations. Pet. App. 152a-155a. It held, forexample, that the designation of all the San Remos rooms as resi-dential was reasonably based on the hotel managements ownreport of the rooms use on the HCOs initial status date (id. at152a & n.17); that the HCOs method of determining the in-lieuhousing replacement fee was reasonable even if no current resi-

dent were required to move (id. at 153a-154a); and that becausethe converted residential housing had not been previously aban-doned or demolished, a mitigation fee measured by the units lostwas reasonably related to the impacts of [petitioners] proposedchange in use. Id. at 155a.

c. San Remo III. In June 2002, petitioners returned to federalcourt and amended their complaint to seek de novo relitigation ofcommon issues raised by their state and federal takings claims.See Pet. App. 68a-69a. While the amended complaint invokesmultiple theories, petitioners only pressed their substantially ad-vance claimthe same claim they eventually sought to raise onthe merits in their petition to this Court. Compare, e.g., JA 31

(#167) with Pet. 10-18 (seeking review of court of appeals con-clusion that there is no heightened scrutiny [under Nollan andDolan] for exactions imposed by legislation). As the districtcourt emphasized, petitioners sought to argu[e] a violation of theTakings Clause based on the exact same facts and circumstancesargued before the state courts. Pet. App. 96a.

In two extensive opinions, the district court first heldas ithad in the first federal litigationthat petitioners substantiallyadvance challenges are barred by the statute of limitations. Pet.App. 31a-32a, 72a-85a. In any event, the court held, the Full Faithand Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738, required it to give issue-preclusive effect to the state courts prior judgment, because the

substantive laws of takings in California and federal courts are co-extensive[.] Pet. App. 86a-87a. After reviewing the CaliforniaSupreme Courts decision (id. at 88a-90a), the district court con-


22/41

11

cluded that the state court decided the identical issue[s] now pledin the Amended Complaint with respect to the HCO. Id. at 90a;see also id. at 50a-51a (same as to challenge to application of zon-ing ordinance). The court rejected petitioners argument that pre-clusion should not apply because the California court applied a lessstringent standard of scrutiny than the proper federal standard. Id.at 91a-94a. Considering the question independently as a matter offederal law, the court agreed with the California Supreme Courtsconclusion thatNollan/Dolan heightened review do[es] not applyin this case. Id. at 94a; see also id. at 44a-48a. Accordingly, thecourt applied issue preclusion, which in turn had the effect of re-solving each of petitioners federal takings claims. Id. at 50a-51a,104a-105a.10

The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 3a-21a. Like thedistrict court, it concluded that petitioners federal takings claimswere based on the same factual allegations and legally identi-cal to those they had already litigated in state court. Id. at 17a. Ittherefore affirmed judgment for respondents on the basis of theissue preclusion required by the Full Faith and Credit Act. Id. at16a-21a. The court noted that the California Supreme Court con-strued the state and federal takings clauses congruently and hadapplied the relevant decisions of both [the California] court andthe United States Supreme Court. Id. at 17a (quoting id. at 130a-131a). Like the district court, the court of appeals also considered

and rejected petitioners argument that California law was in factnotcoextensive with federal law, because federal law would re-quireNollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny. Id. at 17a-21a. The courtspecifically noted that it had rejected the applicability of Nol-lan/Dolan to monetary exactions such as the ones at issue here.

Id. at 19a (citing Commercial Builders v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992), forproposition that deferential review applies to generally applicabledevelopment impact fee). The court of appeals did not considerthe statute of limitations. Id. at 11a.

4. In their petition for certiorari, petitioners acknowledgedthat the court of appeals had held that the California Supreme

Courts refusal to apply heightened scrutiny to legislative exac-10

The district court further indicated that if it had reached the merits itwould have agreed with the California Supreme Court. Pet. App. 101a-103a.


23/41

12

tions under state law is consistent with federal Takings law. Pet.i; see also Pet. 10-11. Petitioners sought review of that refusalin the second question presented in the petition (Pet. i), but thisCourt declined to review that question. Instead, the Court grantedcertiorari solely on the question whether a judgment under statelaw should have issue-preclusive effect where the state judgmentwas rendered in a state court proceeding that was required toripen the federal Takings claim. Pet. i.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioners argue that they have been caught in an unfair trap:They were forced to litigate their state takings claim in state courtbefore they could bring a federal claim, but once they had litigatedthe state claim they found that litigation of issues relevant to theirfederal claim had been precluded. Petitioners characterization ofthe proceedings is misleading, but in any event there is nothingunusual or unfair about the application of issue preclusion in thiscase.

The Full Faith and Credit Act (FFCA) requires federal courtsto give a state judgment the same preclusive effect that it wouldhave in the States own courts. Here, petitioners litigated theirstate takings claims through to a final judgment from the state su-preme court, which held that they had failed to state a valid claim.They then presented the same allegations to the federal courts, ar-guing largely that federal takings law required application of thehigher Nollan/Dolan standard of scrutiny that the state supremecourt had refused to apply under state law. Having considered andrejected that argument on the merits, the federal courts recognizedthat in every other respect the claims petitioners were pressingturned on issues identical to those already addressed by the statecourt. Concluding that the California courts would give the statesupreme courts judgment issue-preclusive effect, the federalcourts properly refused to permit de novo relitigation of identicalissues in federal court.

This Court has recognized only limited exceptions to thecommands of the FFCA, and none of those exceptions applies

here. Petitioners rely by analogy on Englandv. Louisiana StateBoard of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), but that caseinvolved whether state proceedings following a federal-court ab-stention would preclude the later federal litigation of substantially


24/41

13

different federal claims, as to which the plaintiff had properly in-voked federal jurisdiction in the first instance. That situation dif-fers markedly from the Williamson County context contemplatedby the question presented, in which a claimant alleging a taking bya state or local government must use available remedies to seekcompensation under state law before a claim that the State has de-nied just compensation in violation of federal law can even arise.Moreover, an England reservation of federal claims provides nobasis for an exception from issue preclusion in a case, like this one(but unlikeEnglanditself), in which the state law issues presentedand resolved in the state proceedings are substantially identical tothose underlying a federal claim. And if, as petitioners argue,Eng-land is analogous here because in both instances plaintiffs are re-quired to present certain issues first to the state courts, certainlynothing in Englandsuggests that a federal court should deny pre-clusive effect to the state courts resolution ofthose very issues.

Petitioners in effect ask the Court to create a new exception tothe FFCA based on Williamson County . Yet nothing in that casesuggests that the Court intended to displace the statutory rules thatgovern the preclusive effect of state judgments. Where federaltakings law differs (or is alleged to differ) materially from statelaw, the unresolved and distinct federal issues will be open for lit i-gation in any appropriate forum once the limits of state relief areclear and the federal claim has matured under Williamson County.

Where, however, state law considers the same issues and affordsthe same rights as federal law, and the state courts have providedan adequate forum for the assertion and testing of those rights,there is no reason to permit relitigation of the very same issues inany subsequent federal proceeding.

Ultimately, petitioners position is that it is unacceptable toconsign their compensation claim to state courts. Petitionerscannot, however, argue that the California courts failed to offerthem an adequate forum; and any more general argument for refus-ing to respect state judgments is untenable. State courts are, ifanything, better suited than federal courts to hear and resolve con-stitutional claims involving local land-use issues, and there is no

basis for speculation that they are systematically less receptive totakings claims than federal courts. In any event, this Court hassoundly rejected inchoate distrust of the state courts as a groundfor resisting application of the FFCA. The unusual and unfair re-


25/41

14

sult in this case would be to deny state judgments preclusive effect,thus condemning local and state governments to bear the enormousburden of relitigating in federal court issues already considered andfairly resolved by the state courts.

ARGUMENT

I. THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT ACT BARS RELITIGATIONOF ISSUES PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED BY THE STATE

COURTS

A. The Act Requires The Federal Courts To Give Issue-

Preclusive Effect To The California Judgment In This

Case

As this Court has long recognized,[p]ublic policy dictates that there be an end of litigation;that those who have contested an issue shall be bound bythe result of the contest, and that matters once tried shallbe considered forever settled as between the parties.We have stressed that [the] doctrine [of preclusion] isnot a mere matter of practice or procedure inherited froma more technical time than ours. It is a rule of fundamen-tal and substantial justice, of public policy and of pr i-vate peace, which should be cordially regarded and en-forced by the courts . . . .

Federated Dept Stores, Inc. v.Moitie , 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981)

(citations omitted). To these ends, principles of preclusion re-lieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve

judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, en-courage reliance on adjudication. Allen v.McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,94 (1980); see also, e.g., Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788,798 (1986) ( The law of res judicata, much more than most othersegments of law, has rhyme, reason, and rhythmsomething incommon with good poetry. Its inner logic is rather satisfying. Itconsists entirely of an elaboration of the obvious principle that acontroversy should be resolved once, not more than once. (quot-ing 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 21.9, at 78 (2d ed.1983))).

In addition, rules of preclusion reflect the respect that courtsfrom one system owe to the judgments of those in another. Honor-ing them not only reduce[s] unnecessary litigation and foster[s]


26/41

15

reliance on adjudication, but also promote[s] the comity betweenstate and federal courts that has been recognized as a bulwark ofthe federal system. Allen, 449 U.S. at 95-96.

In that context, since 1790 Congress has required, through theFull Faith and Credit Act, that the judicial proceedings of eachState be given the same full faith and credit in every court withinthe United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts ofthe rendering State. 28 U.S.C. 1738; see Act of May 26, 1790,ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. This Court has made clear that the Act directsall [federal] courts to treat a state court judgment with the samerespect that it would receive in the courts of the rendering state.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373 (1996);

see also, e.g., Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518,523 (1986);Marrese v.American Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons,470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985); Kremerv. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456U.S. 461, 466 (1982); 18B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Prac-tice and Procedure 4469, at 70 (2d ed. 2002). The FFCA doesnot allow federal courts to employ their own rules in determiningthe effect of state judgments, but rather goes beyond the com-mon law and commands a federal court to accept the rules chosenby the State from which the judgment is taken. Kremer, 456 U.S.at 481-482; see alsoMatsushita, 516 U.S. at 373; Parsons Steel,474 U.S. at 523; Marrese, 470 U.S. at 380; Allen, 449 U.S. at 96([T]hough the federal courts may look to the common law or to

the policies supporting res judicata and collateral estoppel in as-sessing the preclusive effect of decisions of other federal courts,Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclu-sive effect to state -court judgments whenever the courts of theState from which the judgments emerged would do so.).

Under the FFCA and this Courts cases, the court of appealswas not free to disregard a judgment of a California court address-ing petitioners cognate state-law claims. Rather, the court of ap-peals properly looked to California law to determine the issue-preclusive effect of that adjudication in the federal case. First, itdetermined that the California courts would invoke the prior judg-ment to bar relitigation of identical issues in a later case. Pet. App.

16a-17a (citing Stolz v. Bank of America, 15 Cal. App. 4th 217,


27/41

16

222, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 22 (1993)).11 The court of appeals thencarefully considered petitioners only suggestion that the federalissues were not identical: the contention that federal law shouldapply heightened Nollan/Dolan scrutiny to petitioners claim of amonetary exaction, which the state court had refused to do understate law. Pet. App. 17a; see id. at 17a- 21a.12 Having rejected thatcontention, the court concluded that the California SupremeCourts determination of the issues underlying petitioners state-law takings claim was equivalent to a determination of the issuesrelevant to the parallel claim under federal law. Id. at 21a. In lightof that conclusion, it properly refused to allow petitioners to reliti-gate the same issues in federal court.13

11Petitioners now argue (Br. 19-21) that the Ninth Circuit misapplied Cali-

fornia preclusion law. That issue of state law was not raised in the petition, and isnot fairly included in the question presented. See S. Ct. R. 14.1(a); Yee v. City of

Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535-536 (1992); see also Allen, 449 U.S. at 93 n.2 (de-clining to address specific application of state preclusion rules); cf. Haring v.Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 314 n.8 (1983). In any event, the argument lacks merit.California courts apply issue preclusion to identical issues litigated and decided ina prior proceeding. See, e.g., Lumpkin v. Jordan, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 1229-1230, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 307 (1996); Stolz, 15 Cal. App. 4th at 222, 19 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 22. An issue may be identical for these purposes even if the claimraised in the subsequent proceeding is governed by a different sovereigns law.SeeCalhoun v. Franchise Tax Bd., 20 Cal. 3d 881, 884-886, 574 P.2d 763, 764-765 (1978);Lumpkin, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1231-1232, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 308. In

American Continental Insurance Co. v.American Casualty Co., 86 Cal. App. 4th929, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 632 (2001), on which petitioners rely, the court refused toapply issue preclusion because California and Arizona law divergedon the rele-vant issue. See id. at 945, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643 (refusing to bind a Californialitigant to a principle of law adopted in the prior foreign court litigation which iscontrary to the law of California) (emphasis added). Here, if the court of ap-peals had concluded that federal takings law differed materially from state takingslaw, as petitioners argued, it would not have treated the state judgment as conclu-sive. Instead, as described in the text, it concluded that the applicable state andfederal law were equivalent. Pet. App. 21a.

12Respondents have never conceded that petitioners substantially ad-

vance challenge to the HCO states a proper theory of relief under the Just Com-pensation Clause. To the contrary, respondents contend that such challengesproperly arise only in the narrow context, exemplified by Nollan and Dolan, inwhich government officials condition individual land-use permits on uncompen-

sated public access to private property.13

This Court denied review of petitionersNollan/Dolan question, and nei-ther petitioners nor their amici have identified any other differencereal or al-legedin the substantive law applicable to petitioners state and federal claims.


28/41

17

B. Petitioners Do Not Come Within Any Recognized Ex-

ception To The Full Faith And Credit Act

Petitioners scarcely discuss the federal statute that controlsthis case. See Pet. Br. 12, 17-19. (Likewise, only one of petition-ers nine amici even cites the FFCA. See Brief Amici Curiae ofEquity Lifestyle Properties, Inc. et al. at 13.) Petitioners have notsought to invoke either of the established grounds for an excep-tiona superseding statute or a challenge to the basic fairness ofthe state proceedings. To the extent they address the FFCA at all,they seek to rely by analogy on this Courts decision in Englandv.

Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411(1964). That case is inapposite here.

1. The Court has made clear that a statutory exception to theFFCA will not be recognized unless a later statute contains anexpress or implied partial repeal. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468; seealso Parsons, 474 U.S. at 523;Marrese, 470 U.S. at 381. Indeed,despite the theoretical possibility, the Court has seldom, if everrecognized an implied repeal. Matsushita , 516 U.S. at 380. Peti-tioners make no argument that any statute has repealed the FFCAin the context presented here, nor could they. The Court has twiceheld that 42 U.S.C. 1983, which creates petitioners cause of ac-tion here, does not impliedly repeal the FFCA. Allen, 449 U.S. at97-98 (nothing in the language of 1983 remotely expresses anycongressional intent to contravene the common-law rules of pre-

clusion or to repeal the express statutory requirements of thepredecessor of 28 U.S.C. 1738); Migra v. Warren City Sch.Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83 (1984) (Allen . . . made clear

To the contrary, the application of issue preclusion is so clear that even some ofpetitioners amici take that conclusion as their starting point, arguing that theCourt should reconsider its decision in Williamson County in light of the effect ofthe FFCA. See Brief of Amici Curiae Defenders of Property Rights et al. at 12-14; Brief of Amicus Curiae Franklin P. Kottschade at 16-27; Brief Amici Curiaeof Evandro S. Santini et al. at 13. Whatever the merits of that suggestion, pet i-tioners themselves have not questioned Williamson County, and the current casepresents no occasion for revisiting it. See, e.g., Dept of Taxation & Fin. v. Mil-helm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61, 77 n.11 (1994) (declining to address argu-ment made by amicus that was not raised by parties or court of appeals); see also

S. Ct. R. 14.1(a). Moreover, the Court should not consider overruling WilliamsonCounty without affording the City, thousands of other state and local govern-ments, and other interested parties the opportunity to develop an appropriate re-cord and respond to amicis evidence and arguments. SeeYee, 503 U.S. at 538.


29/41


30/41

19

submit his federal claims to the state courts for resolution on themerits, the prudential doctrine of abstention should not result inthose claims being precluded once the case returned to federalcourt. Id. at 415, 421-422.

As we discuss below, under Williamson County , a federalclaim for just compensation based on a state or local taking doesnot arise, for purposes of federal jurisdiction, until the claimant hasinvoked available state remedies and the state has refused to pro-vide compensation. See pp. 24, infra. Thus, in contrast to the ab-stention situation, a claimant cannot properly invoke[] the juris-diction of the federal court (England, 375 U.S. at 415) to decide afederal compensation claim until he has first litigated a parallel

state claim through any available and adequate state procedures.There is accordingly no concern here, as there was in England, thata prudential judicial abstention will lead to the effective abdicationof federal jurisdiction. See id. at 416. As petitioners themselvesrecognize (Br. 13-14), Williamson Countys jurisdictional rule isnot prudential, but is rooted in the nature of the Just CompensationClause itself. At a claimants first opportunity to invoke federal

jurisdiction over a federal just compensation claim, the FFCA in-structs the court to accord any prior state-court judgment the samepreclusive effect the State itself would give it.

As this Court has recognized, England is limited to the ab-stention context. SeeAllen, 449 U.S. at 101 n.17;Migra, 465 U.S.

at 85 n.7. Even if the decision could properly be applied morebroadly, however, it would not aid petitioners here. First, therewould be no reason to extendEngland to bar issue preclusion in aWilliamson County case. England held only that a plaintiff couldexplain his federal claim to a state court, to inform the state courtsdecision on a predicate and distinct issue of state law, withoutshifting the entire claim from federal to state court for final deci-sion. See 375 U.S. at 419-421. The Court had no occasion to con-sider circumstances in which the plaintiff submitted to the statecourt state claims substantially identical to those potentially avail-able under federal law, or in which adjudication of the submittedstate claims necessarily addressed issues identical to those underly-

ing a parallel federal claim. Englanddid not hold that a plaintiff instate court may reserve any right to two full litigations of is-sues that are relevant to both state and federal claims.


31/41

20

Second, if petitioners are correct that England is analogoushere, then the analogy is fatal to their case. Englandinvolvedpredicate state-law issues that the federal court decided should beresolved by the state courts. Certainly, the Court contemplatedthat the state decisions as to those issues would be fully preclusiveif and when the case returned to federal court. Indeed, obtaining abinding state-court adjudication of those issues is the sole purposefor the federal courts abstention. If the issues underlying petition-ers federal just-compensation claims are analogous to the issuesdeferred to the state courts in England, then the state courts reso-lution of those issues is final and preclusive.15

II. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR CREATING AN EXCEPTION TO

THEFFCA IN THIS CASE

The FFCA and this Courts cases thus provide a straightfor-ward answer to the question presented: The federal courts mustaccord the California Supreme Courts decision in this case thesame issue-preclusive effect it would receive under California law.In seeking the opposite answerallowing de novo federal litiga-tion of issues already resolved by the state courtspetitioners ef-fectively ask the Court to craft a new exception to the FFCA. Inessence, they argue that this Court should displace the FFCA in

15England is perhaps relevant, by its terms, to petitioners facial substan-

tially advance claim, as to which the court of appeals originally ordered Pullmanabstention. Petitioners, however, did not reserve that facial claim in state court.See JA 125-127. Nor have they even argued that applying issue preclusion to thatclaim was erroneous under England itself. The question presented concerns onlythe claim that the court of appeals originally found unripe under WilliamsonCounty. See Pet. i. In any event, an Englandreservation should not bar issuepreclusion under the circumstances here for the reasons stated in the text. Thecourt of appeals ordered abstention in this case only to permit the completion ofpetitioners state administrative mandamus challenge to the Citys application ofthe North Beach zoning ordinance, which the court thought might conceivablyhave some effect on petitioners status under the HCO. See App. 16a. Nothing in

England suggests that in light of that abstention, petitioners were entitled toamend their state complaint, as they did, to present a state facial substantiallyadvance challenge to the HCO, while reserving the right to relitigate identicalfederal issues de novo if they should lose on the state-law claim. To the contrary,

Englandindicates that to the extent a plaintiff unreservedly litigat[es] claims instate court that the abstention order did not require him to resolve there, he shouldnot later be allowed to ignore the adverse state decision and start all over againin the District Court. 375 U.S. at 419.


32/41

21

light of Williamson County , because if it does not then claimantssuch as petitioners will be required to litigate issues relating to al-leged state takings in state forums, and be bound by the results tothe extent the issues resolved are also relevant to federal claims.

A. Williamson County Does Not Require An Exception

1. Petitioners contend that when this Court decided William-son County it implicitly promised that because . . . state courtproceedings were required to ripen [a] federal takings claim, oncethose proceedings were concluded the federal courts [would be]required to disregard them. Pet. Br. 7-8. Otherwise, they argue,Williamson County creates a trap that effectively precludesconsideration of the merits of federal takings claims in both state

and federal court, with no opportunity at all for this Court to re-view the merits. Id. at 16-17; see id. at 14. But WilliamsonCounty creates no such trap; and it assuredly never promisedthat if, in adjudicating a state takings claim, a state court resolvesissues substantially identical to those underlying a federal claim,the claimant would nonetheless have the right to relitigate thosevery issues in federal court.

Williamson County holds that a federal cause of action seek-ing just compensation for an alleged taking by a state or local gov-ernment does not accrue until the claimant has used available stateprocedures for obtaining compensation and can properly allegethat the State has denied it. See 473 U.S. at 195; see alsoCity of

Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,710 (1999). As petitioners recognize (Br. 13), that approach ismandated by the nature of the Just Compensation Clause, whichguarantees compensationnot freedom from the underlying tak-ing.16 Nothing in Williamson County suggests that the Court wasconcerned with providing a federal forum for takings claims. In-deed, the Court sim

san francisco city government city attorney - srpresskit

Documents