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REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS XVII 4 - 7 DECEMBER 2013

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA PAGE 1 OF 1

S C B A C K G R O U N D G U I D E

NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

5 - 8 MARCH 2014 | NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK

CJ Stavrakos Secretary-General

University of Pittsburgh

Ryan Youra Director-General

American University

Lizzie Kubo-Kirschenbaum Conference Director

George Washington University

Courtney LeNoir Chief of Staff

New York University

Maggie Lawrence Director of Security

Trinity College

Alec Guertin Under-Secretary General University of California,

Berkeley

Elika Mazhar Under-Secretary-General

University of California, Santa Barbara

Brody Duncan Under-Secretary-General

McGill University

Lily O'Connell Under-Secretary-General

University of Pennsylvania

Shirley Wu Under-Secretary-General

Princeton University

Emily Goldenberg Under-Secretary-General

University of California, San Diego

NHSMUN is a project of the International Model United Nations

Association, Incorporated (IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-for-profit, all volunteer organization, is dedicated to furthering global issues education at the secondary

school level.

NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS T h e 4 0 t h A n n u a l C o n f e r e n c e • M a r c h 5 – M a r c h 8 , 2 0 1 4

November 2013

Dear Delegates, It is with the absolute highest level of excitement that I welcome you all to NHSMUN 2014! My name is Emily Goldenberg, and I am the Under-Secretary General (USG) of the Specialized Agencies. I started my time at NHSMUN three years ago as an Assistant Director for the International Court of Justice, then as the Director of the same committee, and now I am a USG. I’ll provide some fun tidbits here. I am a junior at UC San Diego where I am majoring in Political Science, and minoring in Economics and Arabic. From September to December, I will be living in Rabat, Morocco for a study abroad program focused on Arabic language immersion. Travelling is one of my most beloved passions, and over the course of the past year I have been privileged enough to travel to Israel and Russia and spend six months living in Washington, D.C. On those rare occasions that I do find myself actually present on campus, I’m involved in the competitive Latin Ballroom Dance Team and spend extra time stirring up trouble as part of the College Republicans. The Specialized Agencies at NHSMUN undoubtedly provide the most unique experience of any committees. Not only are the topics more focused but also the smaller size of the committees allows for more intense and deeper discussion of the issues. Whether historical or present-day, all of the topics are relatable to current affairs and should consequently be very applicable to discussions both in and outside the committee room. The Directors have put countless hours into writing the Background Guides, and I know they are just as excited as I am about seeing those hours of research come to fruition in debate by all of you! If you have any questions on any of the information found in the Background Guides please do not hesitate to contact either myself, the Directors, or the Assistant Directors. We are all here as a resource for you to use. Being a member of the staff at NHSMUN is undoubtedly one of the most rewarding experiences I’ve had in my life. Everyone on staff is exceptionally dedicated to their work, and as delegates on the Specialized Agencies you will have the unique experience of getting to know your Dais on a personal level—an opportunity that may not be found in other committee rooms. Until March, good luck on preparation and research, and please never ever hesitate to reach out to anyone on staff should you have any questions! “Special” regards, Emily Goldenberg Under-Secretary General, Specialized Agencies [email protected]

CJ Stavrakos Secretary-General

University of Pittsburgh

Ryan Youra Director-General

American University

Lizzie Kubo-Kirschenbaum Conference Director

George Washington University

Courtney LeNoir Chief of Staff

New York University

Maggie Lawrence Director of Security

Trinity College

Alec Guertin Under-Secretary General University of California,

Berkeley

Elika Mazhar Under-Secretary-General

University of California, Santa Barbara

Brody Duncan Under-Secretary-General

McGill University

Lily O'Connell Under-Secretary-General

University of Pennsylvania

Shirley Wu Under-Secretary-General

Princeton University

Emily Goldenberg Under-Secretary-General

University of California, San Diego

NHSMUN is a project of the

International Model United Nations Association, Incorporated (IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-for-profit, all volunteer organization, is dedicated to furthering global issues education at the secondary

school level

NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS T h e 4 0 t h A n n u a l C o n f e r e n c e • M a r c h 5 – M a r c h 8 , 2 0 1 4

November 2013

Dear Delegates, My name is Max Kober, and it is with great enthusiasm that I welcome you to the Security Council (SC) at NHSMUN 2014! I will be your Director as we simulate the most powerful body of the United Nations. Charged with the duty of using all necessary methods to maintain peace and security throughout the world, the SC is hailed time and again as a voice for the world and a force for good. It deals with only the most violent, contentious, and controversial topics that exist; the ongoing crises in Somalia and Côte d’Ivoire are no exception. Too often, it seems, Africa is overlooked with respect to conflict resolution and state building, when in reality so many African countries demonstrate the potential to lead by example. Such is the case in Somalia, where a civil war has caused decades of anarchy and chaos. But with the Federal Government of Somalia established and ready to take charge, the SC must ensure its efforts are not hampered by militants and factionalism. African potential has likewise reared its head in Côte d’Ivoire, where a democratic government has taken power for the first time in the 21st century. But the recent civil war has devastated the economy and infrastructure, leaving the fragile West African state in an uncertain position as free and fair elections loom. To give you a little information about myself, I am a sophomore at Tufts University in Boston where I am majoring in International Relations with a minor in Arabic. UN has been a part of my life for over five years, and last year I was the Assistant Director for this very committee. I am an active member of the Tufts Model UN Team, and I have attended fifteen conferences in all, including four NHSMUNs as a high school delegate. When not researching post-conflict African states, my hobbies include the violin and piano, as well as watching my New York Mets lose. Since attending Tufts I have become a bit of a language nut. In addition to studying Arabic and Portuguese, I am fluent in Spanish, and hope to learn Italian, French, and Hebrew. Over the course of your research, the Background Guide will serve as an important source of knowledge. It is by no means an exhaustive analysis of the topics presented, but it provides a comprehensive and thorough base from which to gather research. With al Shabaab still in control of much of Southern Somalia and constant perpetrations of violence in Côte d’Ivoire, a true understanding of these topics can be reached through a combination of research and following the news. I can be reached 24/7 at [email protected] to answer questions, address concerns, and help out. You should feel free to contact me with anything you need, or just to introduce yourself! I look forward to seeing you and debating these topics in March, until then, keep in contact and keep up the good work! Don’t forget to be awesome, Max Kober Director, Security Council @NHSMUN_SC [email protected]

National High School Model United Nations 2014 SC

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Note on the NHSMUN Difference ..................................................................................................... 1!

A Note on Research and Preparation .................................................................................................... 3!

Committee History ................................................................................................................................. 4!

Simulation ............................................................................................................................................... 6!

Topic A: The Situation in Somalia ......................................................................................................... 8!

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................... 8!

History and Description of the Issue .......................................................................................................................... 9!

Somali Civil War: Initial Engagement and Ceasefire ........................................................................................... 9!

Battle of Mogadishu (Black Hawk Down) .......................................................................................................... 10!

1995-2000: Failed Solutions ................................................................................................................................... 11!

History of Semi-Autonomous Somali Regions ................................................................................................... 12!

Establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia ..................................................................................... 13!

Piracy, Lawlessness, and al Shabaab ..................................................................................................................... 15!

Mandate and Influence of UNSOM/AMISOM ................................................................................................ 18!

Current Status ............................................................................................................................................................... 18!

Human Rights Issues .............................................................................................................................................. 18!

Ongoing Military Operations ................................................................................................................................. 20!

Investment and State-Building .............................................................................................................................. 21!

Bloc Analysis ................................................................................................................................................................. 22!

Central and Southern Africa .................................................................................................................................. 22!

North Africa and the Middle East ........................................................................................................................ 22!

North America and the EU ................................................................................................................................... 23!

Asia ............................................................................................................................................................................ 24!

Latin America ........................................................................................................................................................... 24!

Committee Mission ...................................................................................................................................................... 25!

Topic B: The Situation in Côte d'Ivoire ............................................................................................... 26!

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 26!

History and Description of the Issue ........................................................................................................................ 26!

Independence and Gbagbo's Rise to Power ....................................................................................................... 26!

2010 Election Crisis ................................................................................................................................................ 29!


!

Second Ivorian Civil War ....................................................................................................................................... 30!

Human Rights Violations and Militia Action ...................................................................................................... 32!

Ouattara's Victory and Aftermath ......................................................................................................................... 34!

Current Status ............................................................................................................................................................... 35!

Ongoing Humanitarian Crises ............................................................................................................................... 35!

Future of Elections, Infrastructure, and Economics ......................................................................................... 36!

Mandate and Responsibility of UNOCI .............................................................................................................. 37!

Bloc Analysis ................................................................................................................................................................. 38!

Africa ......................................................................................................................................................................... 38!

EU and the Western Bloc ...................................................................................................................................... 39!

Asia ............................................................................................................................................................................ 39!

Committee Mission ...................................................................................................................................................... 40!

Research and Preparation Questions .................................................................................................... 41!

Topic A .......................................................................................................................................................................... 41!

Topic B .......................................................................................................................................................................... 41!

Important Documents .......................................................................................................................... 42!

Topic A .......................................................................................................................................................................... 42!

Topic B .......................................................................................................................................................................... 42!

Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................... 46!

Committee History and Simulation ........................................................................................................................... 46!

Topic A .......................................................................................................................................................................... 46!

Topic B .......................................................................................................................................................................... 51!


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A NOTE ON THE NHSMUN DIFFERENCE

Esteemed Faculty and Delegates, Hello and welcome to NHSMUN 2014! My name is Ryan Youra, and I am this year’s Director-General. I hope you are as excited as I am to experience the conference. Our staff has been working all year to ensure that you have an engaging, educational, and rewarding experience in committee. NHSMUN strives to assure that the quality of our debate and in-committee interaction is unmatched. NHSMUN focuses on the educational value of Model UN. We believe that the experiences in our committee rooms extend skills originally developed in the classroom, and prepare students to become future leaders. NHSMUN thrives on well-researched, realistic, and diplomatic debate. We are thrilled with the substantive program for NHSMUN 2014 and look forward to vibrant discussion and cooperation. NHSMUN Practices In order to fulfill our mission, our conference has adopted practices that are key to the continued tradition of excellence in our committees and the NHSMUN difference. NHSMUN prohibits the usage of personal electronics during committee in order to ensure that delegates do not gain an unfair advantage in debate. We feel strongly that the interpersonal connections made during debate are enhanced by face-to-face communication. Enforcing a strict no laptops policy also helps us to ensure that all our delegates have an equal opportunity to succeed in committee. The Dais is permitted a laptop for the purposes of communicating with respective Under-Secretary-Generals and other Senior Staff Members as well as attending to administrative needs. The Dais will only be limited to using their laptops for NHSMUN purposes, and the majority of their focus will be on the needs of the committee. In addition, we staff a dedicated team in our office to assist in typing and formatting draft resolutions and working papers so that committee time can be focused on discussion and compromise. An additional difference that delegates may notice about NHSMUN is the committee pacing. While each BG contains two topic selections, NHSMUN committees will strive to have a fruitful discussion on and produce resolutions on a single topic; prioritizing the quality of discussion over quantity of topics addressed. In order to respect the gravity of the issues being discussed at our conference as well as the intellect of our delegates, NHSMUN committees will focus on addressing one topic in-depth. BGs contain two topics in order to allow delegates to decide what problem ought to be prioritized, a valuable discussion in and of itself, and to safeguard against the possibility that an issue will be independently resolved before conference. NHSMUN uses a set of the Rules of Procedure that is standardized across all IMUNA-brand conferences. These rules provide a standardized system of operation that is easily translated across committee or conference lines. While the general structure and flow of committee will be familiar to any delegate who has previously participated in Model UN, there may be slight procedural differences from other conferences. All delegates are encouraged to review the Rules of Procedure


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before attending the conference in the Delegate Preparation Guide and are welcome to direct questions to any member of NHSMUN Staff. While NHSMUN does distribute awards, we feel that it is crucial to de-emphasize their importance in comparison to the educational value of Model UN as an activity. NHSMUN seeks to reward delegations that excel in the arts of compromise and diplomacy. We always prioritize a dedication to teamwork over solitary achievement. Directors will judge delegates on their ability and willingness to cooperate with their peers while always maintaining an accurate representation of country policy. At the core of the NHSMUN philosophy is an emphasis on education and compromise. As such, we do not distribute awards to individual delegates, with the exception of committees where students represent their own separate delegation (ICJ and UNSC, for example). Instead, awards will be distributed to delegations that exhibit excellence across all committees. The awards system is standardized so as to give equal weight to delegations of all sizes. Awards will also be offered for schools that demonstrate excellence in research and preparation based on the position papers submitted by their delegates. Detailed information on the determination of awards at NHSMUN will be available in Faculty Preparation Guide and online in November. As always, I welcome any questions or concerns about the substantive program at NHSMUN 2014 and would be happy to discuss NHSMUN pedagogy with faculty or delegates. It is my sincerest hope that your experience at NHSMUN 2014 will be challenging and thought provoking. Best, Ryan Youra Director-General, NHSMUN 2014 [email protected]


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A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

Delegate preparation is paramount to a successful and exciting National High School Model United Nations 2014 Conference. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in your committee. These papers are designed to give you a description of the topics and the committee. This Guide is not intended to represent exhaustive research on every facet of the topics. We encourage and expect each delegate to fully explore the topics and be able to identify and analyze the intricacies of the issues. Delegates must be prepared to intelligently utilize their knowledge and apply it to their own country’s policy. You will find that your state has a unique position on the topics that cannot be substituted by the opinions of another state. The task of preparing and researching for the conference is challenging, but it can be interesting and rewarding. We have provided each school with a copy of the Delegation Preparation Guide. The Guide contains detailed instructions on how to write a position paper and how to effectively participate in committee sessions. The Guide also gives a synopsis of the types of research materials and resources available to you and where they can be found. An essential part of representing a state in an international body is the ability to articulate that state’s views in writing. Accordingly, it is the policy of NHSMUN to require each delegate (or double-delegation team) to write position papers. The position papers should clearly outline the country’s policies on the topic areas to be discussed and what factors contribute to these policies. In addition, each paper must address the Research and Preparation questions at the end of the committee Background Guide. Most importantly, the paper must be written from the point of view of the country you are representing at NHSMUN 2014 and should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference. All papers should be typed and double-spaced. The papers will be read by the director of each committee and returned at the start of the conference with brief comments and constructive advice. Each delegation is responsible for sending a copy of their papers to the Director-General via email on or before January 22, 2014. Please email the entire delegation’s papers at one time to [email protected]. Complete instructions for online submissions may be found in the Delegate Preparation Guide and the Faculty Preparation Guide. If delegations are unable to submit an online version of their position papers, they should contact the Director-General ([email protected]) as soon as possible to find an alternative form of submission.

Delegat ions that do not submit pos i t ion papers to direc tors or summary s tatements to the Direc tor-General wi l l be ine l ig ib le for awards.

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COMMITTEE HISTORY

Following the end of World War II, the international community created the United Nations (UN) as an organization that would embody the idea of collective security. The UN Security Council (SC), among the first main bodies created, was declared responsible for establishing and maintaining peace and security on a global scale. Under the original UN Charter, the SC was entrusted with important powers ranging from the ability to authorize military action to the creation of peacekeeping missions. Today, the SC investigates disputes, formulates systems to monitor sources of international friction, applies sanctions, and determines the existence of potential or current hazards to international stability. In addition, the UNSC’s Charter includes a “responsibility to protect” clause, ensuring that the committee exercises its diverse powers for the good of humanity, especially in times of war, genocide, or other crimes against humanity.1 The original founding members of the SC are the Allied Powers of World War II: United States, Russian Federation, People’s Republic of China, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and France. These members are called the Permanent 5, or the P-5, because their position on the SC is permanent and because they uniquely possess the ability to veto proposed resolutions.2 The remaining ten members of the SC rotate membership based on geographic distribution requirements and upon approval by the General Assembly. After election to the Council, these members remain on the body for a two-year period. Additionally, the Presidency of the Council rotates every month based on English alphabetical order.3 The mandate of the SC is outlined in Chapters V-VIII of the UN Charter. Under Chapter 5, Article 26 of the UN Charter, the SC works “to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armament of the world’s human and economic resources.”4 To ensure that its mission is accomplished and its mandate maintained, the SC utilizes a wide array of powers, of which the major ones include:

• Peacekeeping: Though not expressly outlined in the UN Charter, the SC’s peacekeeping power was acknowledged by the International Court of Justice in the Certain Expenses case as being implied.5 It is important to note that states must consent to a peacekeeping mission before one is deployed. Peacekeepers are made up of volunteers from UN member states, and they are deployed in situations to monitor troop withdrawal, oversee a ceasefire, or to prevent aggressive powers from committing further acts of brutality. Peacekeepers are used to solely monitor the situation, report on its progress, and implement confidence building

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 “Charter of the United Nations,” United Nations, accessed 1 September 2013, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.1. 2 “UN Security Council: Background,” United Nations, accessed 1 September 2013, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html. 3 “Membership of the Security Council,” United Nations, accessed 1 September 2013, http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp, 1. 4 “Charter of the United Nations,” 1. 5 Wood, The UN Security Council and International Law (Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge, 2006), 7.


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measures, though they can be authorized to use force in self-defense and to defend the mission’s mandate.6

• Peace Enforcement: This is not to be confused with peacekeeping. Peace enforcement operations are used to restore security in situations where there is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. Enforcement operations require explicit authorization of the SC, do not require state consent, and troops are volunteered by member states.7

• Sanctions: The SC can levy economic sanctions as a method of enforcement of its resolutions or against states that fail to obey international law.

The SC has been involved in every major war and international crisis since its inception. It authorized the international coalitions that fought in the Korean War and the Persian Gulf War. The peacekeeping program has been held in high regard, winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.8 The SC continues to be a vital presence and a catalyst for preventing further conflict with 17 ongoing peacekeeping missions on four continents and dozens of successful retired missions.9 In order to critically examine and dissect global issues, it is crucial to understand the function and overall structure of the SC. Because of the body’s unique and complex agenda, work at the National High School Model United Nations conference will need to encompass varying degrees of strategies utilized by the SC for the purpose of upholding the committee’s mandate and ensuring peace and stability worldwide.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6 “Role of the Security Council,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed 1 September 2013, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/rolesc.shtml, 1. 7 “UN Security Council: Background,” 1. 8 “History of Peacekeeping - The Early Years,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed 1 September 2013, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/early.shtml, 1. 9 “Peacekeeping,” Global Policy, accessed 1 September 2013, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/peacekeeping.html, 1.


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SIMULATION

As delegates serving on the Security Council at NHSMUN 2014, all members will have the opportunity to put forth resolutions aimed at addressing some of the world’s most complex international issues. These resolutions are meant to embody the work of the UNSC and should reflect the central objective of the body: to maintain global security and stability. The five permanent members of the Security Council, known as the P-5, posses veto power on substantive issues. The ten remaining delegations, which bring total committee membership to fifteen, do not have veto power. Also, the Council may, from time to time, invite non-SC states, organizations, and/or members to participate in the proceedings. Such members may only vote on procedural matters; once the committee has entered formal voting procedure on any resolution, the invitee is not permitted to cast their vote. In the simulation of the SC at NHSMUN, the Director and Assistant Director (AD) will chair debate. Together, the Director and AD are referred to as the dais. The dais is charged with the task of maintaining decorum throughout the committee session. The dais will also assist delegates in their use of parliamentary procedure and work to ensure that all points of order are handled appropriately. Furthermore, the Director and AD will provide directional advice, and delegates may ask the dais any questions they have about the topics themselves and/or procedural matters. A delegate’s first job before coming to committee is to research both topics before the committee and to feel comfortable advocating their assigned country’s policies. It is important that even if a delegate does not agree personally with a country’s policies, he remains true to country policy and continues to voice these ideas to the committee, remaining cognizant of how these policies are reflected in resolutions written during the simulation. As members on a very specialized committee, delegates are encouraged to work together towards a viable solution, and all members should seek to collaborate with states whose policies and opinions on the issues similar to their own. The first task in committee will be to set the agenda. To do this, a Speakers’ List will be established solely for this purpose. Delegates are not allowed to substantively discuss the issues at this time, but instead, should voice their opinions on the order in which the issues will be debated. Following the vote on the setting of the agenda, delegates are encouraged to motion to open a new Speakers’ List intended for substantive debate on the first issue on the agenda. Debate will move in the order of this Speakers’ List until a vote by the Council moves the discussion into either a moderated or unmoderated caucus. Votes on procedural matters such as unmoderated or moderated caucuses are procedural matters and will require a simple majority vote with any abstentions being prohibited. The goal of this simulation is to produce well-written, comprehensive resolutions to the issues at hand. Through formal and informal debate, delegates will begin this resolution writing process by creating a working paper, which is essentially a collection of ideas on possible solutions. Once the dais accepts the working paper it becomes a draft resolution and may be edited, withdrawn, or merged with another draft resolution at any time prior to formal voting procedure. When the dais accepts a motion to close debate or the Speaker’s List is exhausted, the committee moves into voting procedure on the draft resolutions. During this time, veto power for the P-5 is active and


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abstentions are permitted. The final resolution is passed by a simple majority, however if one or more of the P-5 votes negatively on the resolution it automatically does not pass. Working on the Security Council at NHSMUN is a unique, unparalleled opportunity for students to take control of their own education. Delegates’ abilities to work together, compromise, and accurately advocate the policies of the states they represent will ultimately determine the success of the committee.


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TOPIC A: THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

INTRODUCTION

For more than 22 years the world has watched Somalia fall apart. Since the start of the Somali Civil War in 1991, no single force has been able to create a unified state on the Horn of Africa. There exists, after years of conflict, a recently instituted federal government that has had fleeting success in fighting the criminals and militants running rampant. Somalia has been Number One on Foreign Policy's Failed States Index for the past four years running, and without significant overhaul this is unlikely to change.10 The consequences and effects of this crisis are far-reaching, with political, economic, and humanitarian influences. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates the current Somali Refugee Population at slightly fewer than one million, with the highest concentrations located in nearby Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen.11 Additionally, there exist more than 1.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) within the country itself.12 Amid accusations of human rights violations by both sides in this conflict, it has been the goal of the international community to revitalize and restore the Somali government and economy. State building efforts include investment from developed countries, and there is potential for progress on the horizon. However, future solutions are hindered and existing problems compounded by violent clashes across the country. International efforts to stem the violence in the ungoverned provinces of Somalia have led to extensive commitment of troops by various UN member states, a topic regulated directly by the Security Council (SC). In addition to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping forces, who continue to fight militant groups like al Shabaab, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was formed in May of 2013, replacing the now defunct United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).13 Additional security issues arise in the Puntland and Somaliland regions, areas that are internationally recognized as part of Somalia but that possess semi-autonomous governments. UN recognition of the regions, or lack thereof, has not been concretely established, and if the land attributed to Somalia should instead be considered two or more separate countries, this position must be reflected with a unifying international voice – one the Council can provide. As a body dealing principally with issues of international peace and security, the Security Council must set a clear tone and address these issues on a macroscopic and microscopic level. Military cooperation between UNSOM, AMISOM, and Somali troops is a necessity to build stability. Somalia’s lack of infrastructure, reliable elections, and rule of law represents a region as it once was, not as it can be. With its far-reaching influence and member-states representing all areas of the world, the SC has the authority and responsibility to revitalize Somalia and bring it into the present.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10 "Failed States: An Annual Special Report by FP and the Fund for Peace," Foreign Policy, 2013, accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/2013_failed_states_interactive_map. 11 "Somalia Briefing Sheet," UNHCR, 20 May 2013, accessed 22 June 2013, http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/regional.php. 12 Ibid. 13 SC/10994, "Security Council Establishes United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, to be Operational by 3 June for Initial Period of 12 Months," UN, 2 May 2013, accessed 22 June 2013.


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HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE

Somali Civil War: Initial Engagement and Ceasefire

As the Cold War came to a close in the late 1980s with the fall of Soviet and Communist governments across the world, insurgency and strife plagued Somalia. With the United States no longer concerned about the spread of communism in developing countries, Somalia was of little importance to the West, and vital humanitarian aid all but ceased.14 It is important to note that, up until this point, there was strong American support for Somalia that resulted in healthy aid for the otherwise impoverished country. The catalyst for this aid was the 1977 Ethio-Somali War, also called the Ogaden War, which pitted Somalia against neighboring Ethiopia in an effort to unite all Somali-speaking people under one flag.15 At this time, Somalia under General Mohamed Said Barre was experiencing a much colder attitude from the United States, which supported the non-communist regime in Ethiopia.16 However, when Somalia invaded and the war began, Ethiopia’s government fell apart, leading the USSR to believe a Marxist revolution was underway and resulting in the most relevant effect of the war: the Soviet Union began supporting Ethiopia rather than Somalia, leading to American endorsement of the leadership in Mogadishu.17 This endorsement would bring about the previously mentioned humanitarian aid to the Barre regime that became so vital to Somalia’s future, and its removal resulted in disastrous consequences once the Cold War came to an end. The sharp decline in aid, combined with increasing crackdowns by the Somali government against rogue militant groups, fractured the country, resulting in the 1991 civil war that continues to this day.18 The government of General Barre fell apart, and local leaders began military engagements to carve out territory. Most significantly, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) would later become the Puntland State of Somalia, and the Somali National Movement (SNM) evolved into the semi-autonomous Somaliland. By April 1992, a tentative ceasefire between the conflict’s principal belligerents, Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, was brokered with the help of the UN.19 However, the country's economy and infrastructure had already been irreparably damaged, with nearly half the country starving and 300,000 dead.20 Any humanitarian aid that could have been offered to these people was never administered due to the end of the Cold War, and without the vital importance to the United States that Somalia served as a non-communist East African ally, the region dropped into the realm of ridicule and obscurity, chalked up by much of the Western World as yet another member of the “Third World.” As such, much of the country still suffers today.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!14 Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy, "Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict," Conflict Trends 21 (2009), accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord%2021_3Endless%20war_a%20 brief%20history_2010_ENG.pdf. 15 Louise P. Woodroofe, Buried in the Sands of the Ogaden: The United States, the Horn of Africa, and the Demise of Détente (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2013). 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Bradbury and Healy, "Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict." 19 Ibid. 20 "United Nations Operation in Somalia I," UN Department of Public Information, last updated 21 March 1997, accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm.


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Following the ceasefire was an implementation of the first UN peacekeeping efforts in Somalia, which were recently renewed with the establishment of UNSOM in May 2013. The primary operation was titled United Nations Operation in Somalia I, or UNOSOM I. Its mandate stretched until March 1993, when it was declared defunct and replaced with UNOSOM II.21 Over the course of its mandate, UNOSOM I served as a small but vital piece of the ceasefire efforts, stationing a small number of unarmed uniformed observers protected by a provisional army of a few hundred. As the crisis in Somalia became more exacerbated, and it was clear that more peacekeepers were necessary to maintain a ceasefire, the number of blue helmets increased from 500 to over 4,000.22 However, cooperation between the UNOSOM peacekeepers and the parties of the ceasefire did not last. The battalion of UN troops was caught between competing interests: while Mahdi insisted that UNOSOM take control of transportation in and out of Mogadishu, General Aidid objected to peacekeeper supervision in Somali ports.23 The forces under Mahdi and Aidid attacked both the peacekeeping forces and incoming humanitarian aid, not to mention each other in what became a disastrous bloodbath, leading to an almost complete collapse and failure of UNOSOM I.

Battle of Mogadishu (Black Hawk Down)

In December 1992, outgoing U.S. President George H.W. Bush set in motion Operation Restore Hope, an initiative to provide ease of access for humanitarian aid and UN observer personnel into Somalia.24 The SC simultaneously established a Unified Task Force to supplement the arriving American troops and lend international credibility to the operation's efforts.25 Together, 28,000 U.S. troops joined 17,000 UNITAF peacekeepers, and swiftly captured critical points of infrastructure in and around Mogadishu.26 However, despite the appearance of unity, the presence of U.S. forces and what became UNOSOM II was never enough to stop local leaders from garnering power. International cooperation and unity through Restore Hope had a detrimental effect. In fact, the presence of a single enemy strengthened the influence of various factions, mostly notably that of General Aidid. Aidid’s forces still held sway over much of Mogadishu, a fact that would eventually lead to the withdrawal of American troops and continuation of the Civil War. What followed was one of the most important military engagements of the 20th century, and one that is still burned into the collective consciousness of the West. In late 1993, UNOSOM began to clash with General Aidid in an area of the capital controlled by his forces. During the subsequent Battle of Mogadishu, nicknamed Black Hawk Down for the targeted shooting of U.S. helicopters, the ultimate result was Aidid's escape and the death of eighteen American troops.27 While U.S. operations and objectives were technically successful, as their intent has been to capture Aidid's advisors and top personnel, the extreme tendencies of local Somali leaders, dubbed warlords by the West, had been revealed. This disastrous encounter led to the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia under Operation Restore Hope in 1994 and the end of all Somali peacekeeping mandates

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!21 Ibid. 22 S/RES/775, "UN Security Council Resolution 775," 28 August 1992. 23 "United Nations Operation in Somalia I.” 24 Ibid. 25 S/RES/794, "UN Security Council Resolution 794," 3 December 1992. 26 "United Nations Operation in Somalia I." 27 Bradbury and Healy, "Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict."


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in 1995.28 In the opinion of the international community, this marked not only a reversal of the progress made by the UN, but established Somalia as a failed state and an untamable region.

1995-2000: Failed Solutions

With the complete withdrawal of UN and American forces from Somalia by mid-1995, the region was plunged into uncertainty and chaos over the next five years, with competing entities attempting to bring an end to the conflict. At this point, humanitarian aid to Somalia, which had spiked following the U.S. military intervention, screeched to a halt and seemed unlikely to resurge.29 Unfortunately, this policy shift meant that the largely ungoverned Somali people would receive little help from Western states. The possibilities of an additional military intervention seemed far off as well, with President Clinton adjusting his foreign policy doctrine to carefully avoid any entanglement in regions like Somalia, and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali not being optimistic about a future investment of troops to the region.30 All in all, this meant that Somalia would have to reconcile and survive without aid from major powers or international organizations, instead relying on internal political groups and the involvement of nearby African states. The civil war continued through the 1990s, with no unifying force ever able to reconcile the splintered political groups present in the region. During this time period, lack of government led to strong influence by outside parties, who held more of a sway over local political priorities than any ruler. Most notably, strong Islamic movements swept through local Somali politics, and Sharia courts were established in most of the country, deciding legal disputes based on the law of the Quran.31 These religious influences persist today in much of Somalia, and Islam has always served as a semi-unifying force for the Somali people. However, much of the Western world considers continuing Islamic influence in Somalia to be dangerous, as it could lead to the kinds of militant and terrorist activity already present in nearby Yemen. Indeed, the Muslim militant group al Shabaab has held sway over much of Somalia in the 21st century, and it is only recently that their territory has begun to diminish.32 The country holding the most influence in the attempted Somali reconciliation process of the 1990s was Ethiopia, whose efforts to broker peace were unmatched but often lacked the necessary cooperation from more influential organizations and states. While Ethiopian peace initiatives like the Sodere conference in 1997 were admirable efforts, competing peace talks sponsored by Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and the Arab League undermined the conference's legitimacy and ultimately resulted in no progress towards reconciliation.33 Ethiopia's approach largely sought to bring regional stability by installing legitimate local leaders, with the hopes that the stable regions would then unify and produce a federal government. These hopes died out a year after the Sodere conference, when competing peace talks in Cairo produced a regional government in coastal Benadir, which ultimately !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!28 Ibid. 29 Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," Foreign Affairs, March/April 1996, accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51844/walter-clarke-and-jeffrey-herbst/somalia-and-the-future-of-humanitarian-intervention. 30 Ibid. 31 Bradbury and Healy, "Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict.” 32 Rob Wise, "Al Shabaab," Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 2011, accessed 23 June 2013, http://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf. 33 Bradbury and Healy, "Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict."


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fell apart, delegitimizing the Ethiopian building block methods.34 The turn of the millennium came and went, and Somalia was still without a federal government.

History of Semi-Autonomous Somali Regions

Following the power vacuum created by the abolishment of all government and lack of authority in 1991, the region of Somaliland in Northern Somalia declared its independence as a sovereign state. To this day, however, no country or international organization recognizes it as such. Years later, in 1998, with the civil war raging and no end in sight, the Harti people of central Somalia declared the creation of a non-secessionist Puntland State of Somalia, which possesses an autonomous federal government but does not wish to be independent from the rest of the country.35 In layman’s terms, it was the intention of the Puntland state to bring a unifying force to Somalia by becoming independent and incorporating the rest of the country into its fold. The internal claims for the independence of Somaliland are strong, dating back to the initial period during which Somalia transitioned from a colony into a sovereign state. When this transition took place in 1960, the North (now Somaliland) and South were to be independent countries. However, the provisional government of Somaliland decided to merge with Somalia, resulting in a brief and unsuccessful rebellion that sought to gain the North’s independence from a purportedly oppressive federal government.36 Until the anarchy brought on by the civil war, Somaliland existed as an unwilling part of a larger state, without the autonomy it now possesses. Today, the region is unique in the world, having declared its independence but lacking any international recognition. Somaliland's motivation for asserting its independence was largely populist in nature, with a 2001 referendum showing 97% of the population in favor of continued independence.37 One of the most persuasive arguments in favor of the recognition of a Republic of Somaliland is its current status. Politically, the region has an elected government that asserts its authority through the rule of law–they even print their own passports (not recognized anywhere in the world).38 Economically, Somaliland was largely unaffected by the civil war still raging throughout the rest of the country, and while not exactly prosperous the region is nevertheless stable. Despite the obvious progress made by the semi-autonomous government in Somaliland, there are obvious challenges that have presented themselves. Two civil wars ravaged the region between 1992 and 1996, and while police hold authority in the major urban areas like Hargeisa, the capital, criminality and violence are far from eradicated.39 The UN never officially recognized Somaliland, and neither the UN nor its member states have any formal diplomatic relations with President Silanyo or the government in Hargeisa. Likewise, the African Union and its member states have cited conflict in Somalia as a justification for not recognizing Somaliland, fearing that this would only exacerbate existing violence.40 The case can be made that Somalia as a whole must be unified !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!34 Ibid. 35 "Puntland Facts and Figures," Ministry of Planning and Statistics: Puntland State of Somalia, 2003, accessed 22 June 2013, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOMLIAEXTN/Resources/PuntlandFigures.pdf. 36 Marc Lacey, "The Signs Say Somaliland, but the World Says Somalia," New York Times, 5 June 2006, accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/05/world/africa/05somaliland.html?_r=0. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Bradbury and Healy, "Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict.” 40 Lacey, "The Signs Say Somaliland, but the World Says Somalia."


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for it to rise from the ashes of civil war, and encouraging the fracturing of an already damaged country would drive local leaders back into power. This argument is asserted by the Puntland state, which seeks to unify, not divide, Somalia.41 Puntland, an autonomous state with numerous regions, is unified by its people's common allegiance to the Harti clan, a fact that facilitated the state's original formation. But while the region is the most stable area that still considers itself part of Somalia, it is plagued by numerous internal and external security issues that prevent it from serving as a truly notable example of Ethiopia's original state building plan. This goal, that individual regions first gain autonomy and are later unified under a single government, requires the semi-autonomous region to declare its status as a part of Somalia, something that Puntland has done and would ideally like to extend to regions like Somaliland. However, it is also necessary that Puntland remain relatively stable, something that has been more challenging for the region. It is also most notably the home of the Somali pirates, that infamous and far-reaching criminal organization that has demonized the country in the eyes of the West.42 And while perpetration of piracy is much lower than it has been over the past decade, it has not been eradicated entirely. Joint cooperation between Puntland and international forces stationed in Somalia will be necessary. Finally, there exists a dramatic ongoing territorial dispute between Somaliland and Puntland, threatening the stability of their borders. Illustrated in Figure 1.1 is the division of Somalia’s provinces, highlighting the immediate conflict between Somaliland and Puntland at their border as it existed in 2007; Somaliland is to the west, Puntland to the east, the disputed territory is between the red and orange lines. The founding treaties of both states claimed the region of Sool as a territory within their borders, and following minor military incursions Somaliland occupied the area.43 However, the people of Sool belong to the same clan as those of Puntland, and as such, the Puntland state claims sovereignty over the region. This dispute has cost lives, and today is largely locked in a stalemate, with Sool’s Harti people desiring unification with Puntland.

Establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia

A key step in the reconciliation of a fractured Somalia was the creation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) in August 2000, a process that would lead to the formation of an official Somali government. The TFG was the breakthrough that came out of the Somalia National Peace Conference in Arta, Djibouti, which was notable for its strategy allotting equal representation to each of the major clans, and a half spot of representation to women.44 For the first time, there

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!41 "Puntland Facts and Figures." 42 Bradbury and Healy, "Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict." 43 Said Ismail, "Puntland and Somaliland Clash in Sool Region," Somalia Report, 30 May 2011, accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/866. 44 Bradbury and Healy, "Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict."

Figure 1.1: Somaliland/Puntland Border Dispute, 2007

(Source: Wikimedia Commons)


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existed a force with the potential to unify the Somali states that was backed by both the UN and other major international organizations, such as the Arab League. This opportunity, however, was largely wasted when Western countries and close neighbors did not acknowledge the TNG's legitimacy, with Ethiopia going as far as establishing the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council to actively compete for legitimacy.45 By 2004 it was replaced by the Transitional Federal Government, when the Parliament of the TNG passed provisions initiating the transition as per its charter.46 The TFG’s mandate lasted through 2012. Although the transitional government continued to exert control over much of the capital region, it faced a clear threat to its authority from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). With its extensive influence over the religious southern regions, the ICU battled against the authority of the TFG with the support of some Muslim countries. By 2006, an Islamic alliance led by the ICU had gathered enough support to attack and defeat the U.S.-backed leaders controlling Mogadishu.47 This unprecedented display of power by chiefly Islamic influences was worrisome for Western powers, specifically the U.S., fearing that militant movements would spring up faster under the ICU’s leadership. Ethiopia helped abate these fears by first invading Mogadishu, ousting the Islamist government, and then reinstating the TFG as the regional authority.48 Despite this new victory, fighting continued, with insurgencies throughout Mogadishu assaulting government forces. As the problems worsened, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established in 2007 to fight the remaining ICU militants, known as al Shabaab.49 In August 2012, as the coalition of TFG and AU forces continued their efforts against al Shabaab and various criminal organizations, the transitional government's mandate came to an end. What immediately followed was the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), an organization that today is internationally recognized as the official government in control of central Somalia. After approving a draft constitution, considered a landmark moment, there was a relatively uneventful transition to install a government that is, for the most part, approved by the Somali people.50 Today, when the government of Somalia is mentioned, it is referring to the FGS. However, after its establishment in 2012, the FGS did not unify with the Puntland State of Somalia, nor did it make any efforts to reintegrate Somaliland into the country. The lack of unification is somewhat worrisome, as is the current state of presidential elections. The Federal Parliament elected the current president of the FGS, Hassan Sheikh Mohamed, indirectly in 2012 and there is virtually no progress towards the establishment of free popular elections. As all SC member states should be aware, elections would be a vital step towards legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.51

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!45 Ibid. 46 "The Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic," Institut d'Etudes dé Secúrite, Feb 2004, accessed 22 June 2013, http://web.archive.org/web/20050425015339/http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Somalia/charterfeb04.pdf. 47 Jeremy O'Kasick, "Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia," Global Policy Forum, 14 August 2007, accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/153/26334.html. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Gabe Joselow, "Somali Leaders Agree on Draft Constitution, Voice of America, 22 June 2012, accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.voanews.com/content/somali_leaders_agree_on_draft_constitution/1246077.html. 51 "The Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic."


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Piracy, Lawlessness, and al Shabaab

Since 1991, one of the most dangerous consequences of a lawless Somalia has been the rise of militant groups, pirate gangs, and various other criminal organizations across the region. Somali piracy is infamous across the world, with hundreds of millions of dollars stolen every year from the Horn of Africa. While the problem has diminished in recent years thanks to the efforts of the FGS and AMISOM, it is by no means eradicated, and pirate gangs still hold high status in coastal towns across the Puntland State. As for the militant groups threatening domestic security, the chief belligerent is al Shabaab, an Islamic group formed out of the remnants of the ICU. After the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Mogadishu, the subsequent installment of the TFG as a local power resulted in the eradication of the ICU and splintering of al Shabaab.52 Ever since the Islamist courts began to gather power in Somalia, it was the suspicion of the Western bloc that they would give way to extremist elements. As if to confirm that fear, in 2012 al Shabaab allied itself with al Qaeda, and has consequently been labeled a terrorist organization by the United States.53 These clear security threats have been combated using various means, with the most success achieved when full cooperation between FGS forces and AMISOM was in effect. Without an established government to maintain land and sea borders, Somalia's coastal waters, a common route for traders who also do business in the the Strait of Hormuz, became a hotbed of piracy and lawlessness. The most prevalent problems arose in 2006, when the complete lack of coastal security saw a UN-estimated USD 300 million worth of goods stolen over the course of a single year.54 Along Africa's longest coastline, the fertile seas attracted fishermen with more advanced gear and more manpower than the Somali villagers who held claim over the waters. As a result, the pirate gangs, which never intended to be criminal organizations, sprang up in an effort to combat poaching of Somali fishing grounds by foreign powers.55 The tragedy of piracy in Somalia is that it is largely praised by the people, who see the gangs as protectors defending the ancestral rights of the local fishermen. Equally as tragic, the initial motives of the pirate gangs were probably justified, with strong evidence pointing to European companies dumping toxic waste along the Somali coast, leading to disastrous consequences for nearby villages.56 The lack of responsibility in proper disposal of waste led to a Somali crusade for better coastal security, one that culminated in the formation of the numerous pirate gangs. However, there is no doubt that they evolved over time into purely criminal organizations, despite how actively they are still praised by local villagers for their supposed efforts to keep the Horn of Africa safe. Hijackings and pirate attacks off the Somali coast have had an extremely detrimental effect on international efforts to help the ravaged country, and on Somalia's global reputation. Most importantly, interruption of the delivery of humanitarian aid has taken its toll. Famine became a persistent problem across the region at the start of the civil war and remains one today, and one of the consequences of piracy has been the hijacking of thousands of tons of food aid. The problem reached its peak in 2005, when dozens of vessels captained by UN and NGO humanitarian !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!52 O'Kasick, "Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia." 53 "Al-Shabaab Joining al-Qaeda, Monitor Group Says," CNN, 10 Feb 2012, accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/09/world/africa/somalia-shabaab-qaeda/. 54 Ishaan Tharoor, "How Somalia's Fishermen Became Pirates," Time, 18 April 2009, accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892376,00.html. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid.


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personnel were captured and looted by pirates, endangering an important source of food for the drought-riddled Somalia and demonstrating yet again the unreliable nature of humanitarian aid.57 Even when aid organizations manage to send resources to countries like Somalia, it often ends up stolen or in the wrong hands, as was the case with these attempts at humanitarianism. As the problem of Somali piracy attracted more attention, greater resources were funneled to combating the issue. In 2011 alone, governments across the world spent almost USD 1.3 billion protecting trade routes to and from the Suez Canal, which pass close to Somali waters; however, this seems trivial compared to the USD 7 billion stolen by pirates in the same year.58 And while these investments effectively fight the symptoms of Somali piracy, they can never treat the disease, which is the persistent political instability in the state. The key problem exists as a domestic security issue for the Somali government, and no amount of security maintained by foreign governments will discourage pirates from taking matters into their own hands. Figure 1.2 shows the economic costs of ransoming of ships by Somali pirates in 2009 and 2010, a trend that has continued through today. Water travel remains today the most common method of shipping goods, but if pirate gangs continue to attack and hijack ships, aid to Somalia and worldwide trade will be unable to recover.

An even more pressing criminal problem in Somalia, and one that has spiraled further out of control than piracy, is the existence of the militant group al Shabaab. While initially a wing of the more moderate Islamic Courts Union, the militant group was radicalized and broke free of its allegiances following the 2006 invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian troops. After the eradication of the ICU, al Shabaab fled the heavily populated regions of the country, opting instead to gather extremist support on the rural fringes until such a time as they were ready to launch an all-out assault to regain lost territory.59 Their time came in 2008, when previous tactics including guerilla warfare and improvised explosives were replaced with an all out military campaign supplemented by suicide attacks on key targets. Eventually, this strategy forced Ethiopian influences out of Somalia entirely by 2009. At the same time, they were replaced by the existing peacekeeping force of AMISOM, composed of troops from a variety of African states.60

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!57 "Hijackings Cut Aid Access to South Somalia, Lives at Risk,” World Food Programme, 11 March 2005, accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/hijackings-cut-aid-access-south-somalia-lives-risk. 58 Alaric Nightingale and Michelle Wiese, "Somali Piracy Falls to Six-Year Low as Guards Defend Ships," Bloomberg, 22 October 2012, accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-22/somalia-piracy-attacks-plunge-as-navies-secure-trade-route. 59 Wise, "Al Shabaab." 60 Ibid.

Figure 1.2: Economic Cost of Piracy, 2009-2010 (Source: Oceans beyond Piracy)


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The alignment of al Shabaab with al Qaeda in 2008, with the former willing to serve the interests of the latter, caused a dramatic change in the Somali militant group's agenda. Rather than fighting for a Somalia more independent of outside influences and Islamic in its intentions, al Shabaab saw fit to declare global jihad against the West, receiving orders directly from Osama bin Laden.61 While this was most likely an attempt to court followers of the more powerful, influential, and global al Qaeda organization, it nevertheless influenced al Shabaab's objectives and methods. Ultimately, it is not Somali natives who pose the most threat as members of the militant group. Rather, foreign nationals loyal to al Qaeda who have been implanted as al Shabaab's leaders pose the greatest threat to the FGS and the world, mainly because their extensive experience in insurgency and terrorism makes it that much harder for government and AMISOM forces to combat them.62 A dedicated offensive against al Shabaab began in 2010, and has had limited success in eradicating their influence in regions under the grasp of the extremist organization. However, much of Southern Somalia remains lawless, with militants running rampant controlling local towns and villages, despite the efforts of the FGS and AMISOM. Figure 1.3 shows just how drastically Somalia is still affected by al Shabaab’s

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!61 Ibid. 62 Ibid.

Figure 1.3: Territory of al Shabaab, June 2013 (Source: Political Geography Now)


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influences, detailing territory throughout the country still under militant control in June 2013, and including recent advances made by FGS and AMISOM forces.

Mandate and Influence of UNSOM/AMISOM

Today, one of the most important challenges facing the newly minted Somali federal government is how to cooperate with the UN and AU troops stationed as peacekeepers to fight domestic criminality and insurgency. Understanding the history of these military forces in Somalia is the key to presenting the government with a proper method of cooperation that will bring a swift end to both al Shabaab and the pirate gangs. AMISOM, an assistance mission established in 2007 by the AU, was designed as a burden-sharing asset to support Ethiopian troops who less than a year before had ousted the Islamic Courts Union from Mogadishu. The AU strongly endorsed the initial plan to send Ethiopian forces into Somalia, which the ICU and its supporters of course strongly rejected.63 After the establishment of AMISOM, the organization took on a much larger role as al Shabaab insurgent efforts drove all Ethiopian troops out of Somalia, leaving behind only the AMISOM contingent to aid the federal government.64 However, it should be noted that the countries contributing to AMISOM may not be entirely willing to continue the fight in Somalia, a topic that will be further addressed in the Bloc Positions section. An additional asset for the Somali government in their fight against insurgency is the recently established United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. UNSOM is distinct from the previous UNOSOM I/II and UNITAF, organizations that were formed and abolished in the 1990s to oversee the peace process in a civil war that never ended. Whereas UNOSOM was established primarily as an observer organization, UNSOM was created in May of 2013 with the specific purpose of cooperating and coordinating with the Federal Government of Somalia, providing expert advice in the fields of state building, security, and human rights.65 The unique role taken on by this new peacekeeping organization is sweeping and its consequences are at present unknown. Only time will tell whether its mandate should be renewed in early 2014.

CURRENT STATUS

Human Rights Issues

Somalia has been a hotbed of human rights violations for years, with sources citing the civil war and lack of government as concentrated zones of atrocities. The most notable tragedy is the growing population of Somali refugees, who number more than a million and are most intensely concentrated in Kenya and Ethiopia, both of which have a vested interest in Somalia's stability and the return of displaced people.66 In these million, the UNHCR estimates that there exist just shy of 200,000 households, with the most heavily populated demographic being women aged 18 to 59.67

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!63 "Somalia: African Union Endorses Regional Peace Plan," UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 14 September 2006, accessed 23 June 2013, http://www.irinnews.org/report/61065/somalia-african-union-endorses-regional-peace-plan. 64 Wise, "Al Shabaab." 65 SC/10994. 66 "Somalia Briefing Sheet." 67 Ibid.


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Figure 1.4: Somali Refugees and IDPs, February 2013 (Source: UNHCR)


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Somalia has the power to remedy this travesty with the help of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGOs. Once violence is curbed in the southern regions, returning refugees will be much easier. Figure 1.4 shows the still desperate situation encountered by Somali refugees, in a statistical report released by UNHCR in February 2013. Outright violations of human rights subject to criminal charges have been common since the outbreak of the Somali Civil War in 1991. The U.S. State Department charges militias with the unlawful deprivation of life of members of the Transitional National Government just after the turn of the millennium, as well as attacks on NGO workers and the murder of hundreds of civilians.68 Within the Somali government, the State Department's report called the police force "corrupt" and purported that it frequently engaged in arbitrary detention, jailing or excessive fining of non-hostile forces.69 Most egregiously, the report cites the complete lack of a national judicial system in Somalia, recognized as a fundamental human right.70 Attacks from militants are obvious violations of human rights to the world, but the biggest problems Somalia faces may come from corruption and lack of infrastructure in its own government, which by itself is doing as much to deprive civilians of their rights as the militia. Finally, a human rights issue that must be immediately addressed is the accusation of the use of child soldiers by the Islamist militant group al Shabaab. Human Rights Watch released a 2012 report citing the use of child soldiers by Somali militants, saying they are taken from their homes and forced to fight on the front lines as cannon fodder to take the pressure off the more experienced troops.71 This serves as an unfortunate reminder to the world of the largely barbaric conditions under which Somalis live. It is important for the Security Council to keep in mind that, whatever the flaws of the FGS, those living outside of its influence are in constant fear of death or subjugation at the hands of groups like al Shabaab.

Ongoing Military Operations

As AMISOM and the government continue the fight against al Shabaab, the forces of the militant organization are resorting to increasing guerrilla tactics. In June 2013, a suicide bomber and several gunmen assaulted an office of the United Nations Development Programme in Mogadishu, killing fifteen people in the most violent recent attack against UN forces.72 This incident is indicative of much of the fighting between pro-government and pro-militant forces, which since the 2010 AMISOM initiative has consisted mostly of insurgent attacks on the part of al Shabaab with occasional retaliation. Despite the best advice of security experts on how to combat militant forces, attacks by al Shabaab are somewhat frequent, and the 18,000 AMISOM troops present in the region are in need of either strategic assistance or the addition of a new security force to stem the growing violence.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!68 "Somalia: Country Reports of Human Rights Practices," U.S. Department of State, 25 Feb 2004, accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.state/gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27751.htm. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 Kathryn Tancos, "More Child Soldiers in Somalia Fighting," CNN, 21 Feb 2012, accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/21/world/africa/somali-child-soldiers. 72 "Somalia UN Office Attack by Al-Shabaab 'Kills 15,'" BBC, 19 June 2013, accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22965842.


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Investment and State-Building

With the current state of the Somali economy virtually unknown, there are dozens of countries quietly weighing the possibility of investing in this recovering region. A recent gathering of investors, the Somali Reconstruction and Investment Conference and Exhibition in nearby Nairobi, Kenya, attempted to assuage investor concerns regarding the complex government tax codes and lack of infrastructure, assuring visiting organizations that "when a country is recovering from lawlessness, disputes abound over land and the government needs to put clear legal protections so that investors do not encounter problems."73 The government and its allies in Somali business have been working since the transition to a full federal government to initialize real investment in what they hope will be a growing Somali economy, and these efforts have largely paid off through large donations by Western countries. When these powers, including the U.S., invest citing the opportunity of state building as their motivation, the government welcomes this prospect. For interested parties, there are numerous fields, including oil, gas exploration, and shipping, that could provide lucrative returns; however, the government encourages investments in infrastructure to provide much-needed jobs to the millions of those who live below the poverty line.74 Figure 1.5, part of an economic report from the World Bank, shows somewhat steady growth in the Somali GDP since 2000, a positive sign for investors. State building as it is ongoing today does not always involve investments in the Somali economy. Oftentimes, it means helping war-ravaged regions recover from decades of conflict. A perfect case study is Jubaland, Somalia's southernmost region. Ruled by al Shabaab militants and stricken by poverty, Jubaland is the target of an extensive state building effort by the African Peacebuilding Agenda called the Jubaland Initiative, aimed at ousting al Shabaab and restoring regional power to the TFG.75 The message to take away from state building efforts in this region is that much of Somalia that is still ruled by al Shabaab is recovering in the same way as Jubaland – slowly, and only with international help from humanitarian aid organizations. When state building can mean so much

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!73 Bosire Boniface, "Somalia Investment Conference Spurs Interest, Government Pledges," Sabahi, 31 May 2013, accessed 22 June 2013, http://sabahionlie.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/05/31/feature-02. 74 Ibid. 75 "Jubaland in Jeopardy: The Uneasy Path to State-Building in Somalia," International Crisis Group, 21 May 2013, accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.crisisgroupblogs.org/africanpeacebuilding/2013/05/21/jubaland-in-jeopardy-the-uneasy-path-to-state-building-in-somalia/.

Figure 1.5: Somali GDP Growth, 1982-2008 (Source: EIU)


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more than investment, as it does in Somalia, the world must recognize that humanitarian intervention can be just as effective as domestic efforts.

BLOC ANALYSIS

Most UN member states are in general agreement that the situation in Somalia is a dire one, and all efforts must be made to restore some kind of order to the region. However, whether that order includes a unified government, whether it is achieved through intervention or isolation, how much stimulus is needed to get the Somali economy on track, and whether Somalia is the next opportunity in state building are hotbeds of controversy. For the most part, countries divide with the most friction along the pro or anti-intervention line, supporting or opposing UNSOM and AMISOM. Additionally, there is open competition between the Western bloc, whose members have long engaged in humanitarian efforts in Somalia, and Asia, whose economic powers are looking to the recovering region as a potential opportunity. Asia’s flirtations come much to the chagrin of Western countries, many of whom wish to take the next step towards state investment and state building in Somalia. The decaying status of human rights is largely agreed upon, but again, some methods differ; while the North America and EU bloc would charge militants (and some government officials) with human rights violations, Asian and African states would be less hasty to do so.

Central and Southern Africa

The member states of the AU, made up mostly of central and southern African states, are largely bound by their diplomatic commitments to the organization to support the AMISOM initiative that is ongoing in Somalia. Recently, the AU approved a new strategy to fight al Shabaab, one that included a dramatic troop increase and the dedication of forces from numerous AU member states including Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, and Kenya.76 Despite this significant investment, there are AU states that clearly disagree with AMISOM's mission and vocally express their opinions to that effect. Leading that group is Ethiopia, whose previous peace efforts in Somalia and subsequent 2009 withdrawal have led it to question AMISOM's motives and methods. Ethiopia has invested no troops in the AU peacekeeping mission, and continues to lead the fight against continuing troop increases. The key division in ideology in the African bloc exists over whether or not peacekeeping is the correct answer to Somalia's problems. As a whole, the AU says that peacekeeping is the only reliable way for the world to keep an eye on Somalia, monitor the situation as it develops, advise and guide the growing government, and combat the insurgent forces terrorizing the region. Ethiopia leads a bloc of countries who have no investment in the AMISOM effort but are AU member states, instead opting to try economic or social solutions to combat Somalia's problems. Some of these solutions may include investment, NGO and other non-state charitable action, and state building.

North Africa and the Middle East

Muslim nations have been long divided over the Somali issue, with some supporting the establishment of the ICU and its control over Somalia in the early 21st century, then lamenting its

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!76 "African Union Approves New Strategy to Fight Al-Shabaab," Midnimo, 23 June 2013, accessed 23 June 2013, http://www.midnimo.com/2013/06/23/african-union-approves-new-strategy-to-fight-al-shabaab/.


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fall to Western-backed Ethiopian intervention, and others insisting that an Islamic Somalia must grow on its own. Egypt, Sudan, and Djibouti are among the Islamic nations pledging to train and develop existing Somali military institutions, a prospect that the federal government welcomes as a source of vital aid from its allies.77 Djibouti, specifically, has often been entangled in the Somali conflict, sharing a land border with northern Somaliland and the only country in the world to recognize the Somaliland passport. Yemen, which is home to over 250,000 Somali refugees, has adopted, along with more conservative Muslim countries, a less accepting attitude of the FGS. The Federal Government stands as a reminder of its predecessor the TFG and a strong opponent of the now defunct ICU.78 Prominent Arab League states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have joined Egyptian efforts to strengthen the Somali military however, and in alignment with that bloc is Turkey, whose efforts have helped rehabilitate institutions that were left largely in disrepair following the civil war.79

North America and the EU

Powerful coalitions of the West, primarily the U.S., EU, and its allies, have long viewed Somalia as a stricken region desperately in need of aid, and have provided enormous amounts of humanitarian assistance since the fall of organized government 22 years ago. Today, with Somalia’s operating federal government working to build up the defunct infrastructure left in disrepair after the start of the civil war, the West sees an increasing opportunity to harness the power of state building and invest in a rising Somali economy. In May of 2013, the U.K. pledged almost GBP 200 million to invest in Somali security, famine aid, and overall state building efforts; simultaneously, the U.S. pledged USD 40 million and the EU 44 million.80 These significant investments were made with the hope of spurring on and encouraging the Somali government to restore and revive its economy, making it ripe for involvement by big business. Investments such as these demonstrate a positive attitude and increased willingness by the West to deal with Somalia, which has become more and more relevant as the region has called for aid. Diplomatically, the Western world has also started to open up to Somalia. Though relations between Somalia and the West have been cool at best as a result of the Operation Restore Hope and Black Hawk Down debacles of the 1990s, there are signs of a thaw. Following an easing of sanctions by the UNSC, the U.S. eased its own weapons restrictions against Somalia, leading to speculation that further diplomatic involvement was around the corner.81 Surely enough, to substantiate the rumors the U.S. government exchanged notes with the FGS immediately after lifting the sanctions, indicating a more open diplomatic relationship than has been seen between America and Somalia since the fall of the Somali government in 1991. Other countries of the Western bloc are anticipated to follow suit.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!77 "Somali Military Bolstered by East Africa, Middle East Allies," Hiraan Online, 18 June 2013, accessed 23 June 2013, http://www.hiraan.com/news4/2013/Jun/29892/somali_military_bolstered_by_east_africa_middle_east_allies.aspx. 78 "Somalia Briefing Sheet." 79 "Somali Military Bolstered by East Africa, Middle East Allies." 80 Damien McElroy, "Britain Secures £200m to Help Build a Somali State," Telegraph, 7 May 2013, accessed 23 June 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/10042403/Britain-secures-200m-to-help-builda-Somali-state.html. 81 "U.S. Eases Arms Restrictions for Somalia," UPI, 9 April 2013, accessed 23 June 2013, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/04/09/US-eases-arms-restrictions-for-Somalia/UPI-82061365516759/.


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Asia

The positions of the various Asian states on the issue of Somalia are not entirely established; however, what is clear is that some countries are starting to come out of their insular shells on the issue. Most notably, Asian powers are beginning to open up diplomatic relationships with Somalia, a sign that they may be ready for future investment. In May 2013, South Korea officially established an embassy in Somalia, joining Japan, whose Kenyan embassy is also accredited to Mogadishu.82 Non-domestic accreditation of an embassy means that a country can have diplomatic representation without domestic presence. Essentially, Japan maintains contact with leaders in Mogadishu without maintaining an embassy in Somalia. Willingness by the Four Tigers (Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) to invest in state building could cause diplomatic friction with the Western bloc, whose desire to invigorate the Somali economy could clash with those of Asia. However, it should be noted that unlike China and other Asian states, South Korea and Japan often bloc with the United States and its allies. Ultimately, increased interest by Asia can only mean good things for Somalia, especially in its current situation.

Latin America

Although no Latin American countries maintain diplomatic relations with Somalia or operate diplomatic missions therein, there is nevertheless a substantial amount of policy that can be applied between the two regions. Most notably, increasingly involved foreign intervention and aid in Somalia has sparked ire from numerous organizations throughout South and Central America for its parallels with American corporate intervention that created the Latin American “banana republic” in the 19th and 20th centuries. Most Latin American states are, by principle, anti-intervention because of this history. Even today, any U.S. actions seen as trampling on the sovereignty of South America would risk raising accusations of imperialism and colonialism. Such was the case as recently as July 2013, when a plane carrying Bolivian President Evo Morales was diverted by U.S. influence in an attempt to locate Edward Snowden.83 Multiple Latin American leaders, including Rafael Correa of Ecuador and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner of Argentina, who called the incident “colonialism,” expressed their outrage that the West still possessed what they viewed as imperialist tendencies seeking to influence and control other sovereign states.84 Doubtless, Latin America’s long history of anti-imperialist attitudes will have a strong influence when discussing the issues present in Somalia. With U.S. and Western involvement growing, and other countries looking towards Somalia as a potential for state building and investment, the Latin American bloc will be sure to insist that national sovereignty be considered above all else. Economically, considerations will have to made, including estimates as to what extent Somalia can solve its own problems.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!82 Abdalle Ahmed, "Somalia: President Receives Credentials From South Korean Ambassador to Somalia," RBC, 16 May 2013, accessed 23 June 2013, http://www.raxanreeb.com/2013/05/somalia-president-receives-credentials-from-south-korean-ambassador-to-somalia/. 83 Stephen Kinzer, “Latin America Sees US Diverting Morales’ Plane as Yankee Imperialism,” The Guardian. 5 July 2013, accessed 9 August 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/05/latin-america-us-morales-imperialism. 84 Ibid.


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COMMITTEE MISSION

As the principal organ dealing with international peace and security, the SC possesses a unique and dedicated prerogative to address the problems present in Somalia. A fractured region, numerous local governments, increasing violence, human rights violations, the weight of history, and questions of autonomy are all issues that hang ominously over Somalia's future, and all wait to be addressed by a body as powerful and influential as the Security Council. The Charter of the United Nations grants the UNSC the unique ability to use any and all methods to carry out the maintenance of international peace and security, and binds UN member states to follow its directives.85 Wielding this power, the SC is directly responsible for setting an international policy on how to deal with Somalia's ongoing crisis, and there are several specificities that any forthcoming resolution must address. Primarily, the SC must unilaterally come to a decision on the alleged human rights violations committed by both the government and militant forces, and decide whether it wishes to work with other UN bodies, like UNHCR or UNHRC, or humanitarian NGOs to combat the refugee crisis alongside the possibility of leveling criminal charges against perpetrators. Next, the mandate of UNSOM will be up for review, a responsibility under the purview of the SC. Despite the fact that UNSOM has only recently been established, as the organization begins its works with the federal government, it will hopefully become clear whether it is appropriate to renew its mandate, and whether that mandate should be expanded or retracted with respect to troop numbers. Thirdly, the FGS and its present status, including the unclear state of elections, should be discussed. The U.K. has promised 2016 elections following its massive financial investment in Somali state building, but this is uncertain considering the volatile nature of local politics in the region.86 Finally, any discussion about Somalia should of course address the controversial and unclear status of Somaliland, which claims independence but is not internationally recognized. While the UN has not acknowledged Somaliland as a sovereign state, if there is a desire by a majority of the Council for the region to rejoin or break free from Somalia this should be stated outright and the appropriate action encouraged or implemented. During any UNSC debate concerning Somalia, the prospect of economic investment and the status of state building will loom heavily over the Council. Delegates must work to avoid the kind of conflict that has prevented successful Security Council resolutions in the past, and ensure that all parties can come to an equitable agreement regarding future economic opportunities. Ultimately, the SC has the unique power of serving as a barometer for levels of development in conflict-ridden states, and with Somalia it is no different. Member states must recognize that Somalia has been ridden with conflict for decades, and is only just beginning to recover. There is still no cessation of hostilities following the start of the civil war 22 long years ago, and Somalia's hopes for peace may rest in the hands of this Council.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!85 "Chapter V: The Security Council," Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945. 86 McElroy, "Britain Secures 200m to Help Build a Somali State."


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TOPIC B: THE SITUATION IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

INTRODUCTION

Over the past 15 years Côte d'Ivoire has undergone some of the starkest changes of the modern age. Following independence from France in the 1960s, the country was seen for decades as a hope for West Africa, what could be a shining example of success in one of the poorest regions of the world. However, in the 1990s, with the death of first Ivorian president, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Côte d'Ivoire underwent a series of violent and rapid changes. The country was plunged into a civil war in 2002 following the passage of a series of xenophobic laws that served to alienate the predominately Muslim north, and saw the implementation of a United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire to keep the peace. Following the ceasefire that ended the 2002 civil war, its democratically elected president suspended elections a staggering five times.87 Finally, in 2010, the country erupted in a second civil war that pitted two competing President-elects against one another for control of the country. Although the conflict is now over, there is a democratically elected president, and the country is on the long road to recovery, numerous problems persist that threaten its integrity. As Côte d'Ivoire's second civil war progressed, it became apparent that both sides of the conflict were guilty of perpetrating numerous human rights violations, and the legal ramifications of this issue persist today, highlighting the inadequacies of the Ivorian justice system. Refugees, hundreds of thousands abound in nearby Liberia, devastated by conflict and entirely unwilling to go back to their former homes.88 UNOCI continues its mandate, one that will be up for renewal soon and whose extension or retraction will determine whether Côte d'Ivoire continues to receive the kind of international aid that has allowed it to begin its recovery in full. The SC is also facing crucial decisions in the fields of economics, politics, and infrastructure, with little progress currently being made by the incumbent government. It has been the responsibility of the Security Council to set an international tone on issues of peace and security, In this case, the body must make it clear to the world exactly how and when Côte d'Ivoire will recover from its recent devastation.

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE

Independence and Gbagbo's Rise to Power

The Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, formerly a French colony, was granted its independence in 1960 following the wave of decolonization after World War II.89 Located on the West African coast, this small state was from the start divided between its Muslim north and predominantly Christian south, introducing friction that continued into the 21st century. The accession of Henri Konan Bédié as Côte d'Ivoire's President in 1993 is particularly important, as it served to widen the divide between north and south, and set the stage for Laurent Gbagbo's rise to power. Once reelected in 1995,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!87 S/RES/1528, "Security Council Resolution 1528," 27 February 2004. 88 "2013 UNHCR Country Operations Profile - Côte d'Ivoire," UNHCR, 2013, accessed 5 July 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e484016.html. 89 "Timeline: Ivory Coast," Al Jazeera, 30 Nov 2011, accessed 4 July 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/afreica/2010/12/2010121971745317811.html.


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Bédié introduced the term "Ivoirite," initially intended to refer to the people of Côte d'Ivoire as a whole; however, the Ivorian media and government-supported sources instead used the word to refer only to the country's southern half and not the Muslim north.90 The wave of xenophobia and nationalism that swept Côte d'Ivoire under Bédié allowed for the enactment of numerous laws that would spark the 2000 presidential election crisis. In the months leading up to the presidential elections of 2000, increasing nationalism prompted the passage of a law requiring both parents of a presidential candidate to be born in Côte d'Ivoire.91 This technicality disqualified Alassane Ouattara, the current president, from competing in that presidential contest because he was not of full Ivorian descent. After Bédié was ousted in a 1999 coup, the remaining candidates were General Robert Guéi, who had deposed the president, and Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI).92 The election was tumultuous, causing riots across the country and accusations of tampering from both parties. Although Guéi claimed victory and attempted to declare himself president, the evidence pointed to Gbagbo as the victor, who deposed his opponent and took power as Côte d'Ivoire's president.93 One source registered Gbagbo with about 60% of the vote in 2000, cementing his claim of legitimacy and lending him credibility as he postponed elections over the next ten years.94 Despite winning the presidential election with international support, Gbagbo could not retain control over the tumultuous north, long populated with extremist militant groups seeking to break free of southern control. Shortly after the 2000 election, 2002 saw the eruption of civil war in which, through the perspective of the international community, the legitimate Gbagbo government was attacked by Muslim extremists seeking independence for northern Côte d'Ivoire. International aid was concentrated towards groups allied with government forces, and in the fighting thousands were killed. Notably, forces commanded by the French government were sent to the aid of Gbagbo's soldiers, and by the end of the civil war in 2003 the north remained under rebel control.95 From 2003 to the 2010 elections Côte d'Ivoire was largely fractured and the government failed to maintain control over the country as a whole. Figure 1.1 demonstrates how radically the country was splintered after the ceasefire, with the northern and mostly Muslim half under control of the New Forces militia. Throughout the 2010s, violence flared without warning, and it was dangerous for any foreign nationals to be present. In one case, nine French peacekeepers and an American civilian were killed in a mistaken raid by the government aimed at a rebel base.96 This example of miscommunication and chaos between international and government forces is a microcosm of the sporadic violence of this period in Ivorian history. Despite the effects of the civil war, much of the death and destruction was brought about by lack of infrastructure and clear chain of command in peacekeeping efforts.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 "Elections in Côte d'Ivoire," African Elections Database, 15 March 2012, accessed 4 July 2013, http://africanelections.tripod.com/ci.html. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 "Timeline: Ivory Coast." 96 Somini Sengupta, "Ivory Coast Violence Flares; 9 French and 1 U.S. Death," New York Times, 7 Nov 2004, accessed 4 July 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/07/international/africa/07ivory.html.


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The legitimacy of the Gbagbo administration was noteworthy following the 2002 civil war, but began to fall when the question of presidential elections was raised. When Bédié was in power, there was a system of presidential elections roughly every five years: one in 1995, and one in 2000. However, five years after the election that swept Gbagbo into power and initiated the civil war that tore Côte d'Ivoire apart, there were no signs of new elections. In fact, the President had decided to use his executive powers to postpone the 2005 elections for about a year, a plan that was surprisingly endorsed by the United Nations and the African Union.97 It was around this time that the Security Council established the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire to maintain a peace between the New Forces militia in the north and the Gbagbo government in the south, enacted by Resolution 1528 in February 2004 and still in operation today.98 Regardless of the fact that the constitutionality of Gbagbo's decision was dubious, and the decision was opposed by both rival political factions and the rebels in control of the northern half of the country, the postponement was accepted by the international community. After a statement by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union that endorsed Gbagbo and cited extreme circumstances for the postponement of elections, the Security Council followed suit. Because the parties of the conflict, namely militant forces, had not yet met the criteria it believed necessary for elections, including the forfeiture of all weapons by militias, the SC deemed it necessary to back Gbagbo’s postponement.99 There is an argument to be made that UNSC and AU endorsement allowed Gbagbo to stay in power without elections for longer than was appropriate or prudent. Despite the fact that elections were to be held one year after the initial plan to delay them, October 2006, the country saw no fair

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!97 "Côte d'Ivoire: UN Endorses Plan to Leave President in Office Beyond Mandate," IRIN, 14 Oct 2005, accessed 4 July 2013, http://www.irinnews.org/report/56730/cote-d-ivoire-un-ensorses-plan-to-leave-president-in-office-beyond-mandate. 98 S/RES/1528. 99 Ibid.

Figure 1.1: Division Following the 2003 Ceasefire (Source: Developing Democracies, 2010)


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and free presidential contest for an additional five years. The civil war raged on, killing thousands of civilians, militia, and pro-government forces. Member-states of the SC should note that the lack of clear leadership and continuation of a chaotic political environment in Côte d'Ivoire was due largely to the actions of the Council itself, because it endorsed Gbagbo in his abuse of executive power. An attempt to schedule elections around 2007 was again unsuccessful, and Gbagbo's promise that nothing would stop the elections was not honored.100 The president again delayed elections, this time for an additional three years, reducing the amount of progress made following the 2003 civil war ceasefire.101 All in all, elections were postponed five times between 2005, when they were initially scheduled, and their final date of implementation.102 When elections were finally reinstated in 2010, and there existed a tentative ceasefire between the northern militia and southern government, an entirely new crisis arose when Gbagbo battled Alassane Outtara for leadership.

2010 Election Crisis

The implementation of a fair presidential contest in 2010 had disastrous results for Côte d'Ivoire, setting in motion a series of events that culminated in a brief second civil war and destroyed the already fragile Ivorian economy and infrastructure. In the first round of voting, held in October 2010 after a decade of postponement, the three serious candidates were Laurent Gbagbo, the incumbent president who oversaw the first civil war; Alassane Ouattara, leader of an opposition party who was forced out of the 2000 election because of a last minute piece of legislation; and former President Henri Konan Bédié, who returned from exile following the 2000 election which initially ousted him.103 A presidential runoff, held later that year, saw Gbagbo and Ouattara emerge as the two leading candidates: Gbagbo with about 38% of the vote, Ouattara with about 32%.104 These figures are incredibly important, as Gbagbo's initial lead following the first ballot aided his claims of legitimacy after the runoff. However, voters who had been in support of Bédié refused to back his former rival once their candidate was out of the running, and instead backed Ouattara in the second round of voting, giving him more than 54% of the vote and propelling him to victory over Gbagbo.105 Unfortunately, these election results, published by the Independent Electoral Commission, were not accepted by all parties, and a significant amount of controversy followed. The Ivorian Constitutional Council, a body separate from the executive but functionally loyal to Gbagbo, nullified a significant amount of votes in parts of the country seen as more loyal to Ouattara, declaring that Gbagbo had won with 51.5% of the vote, contrary to the results proclaimed by the IEC.106 The reaction by opposing political parties was swift and intense, with members of the opposition taking to the streets in nonviolent and violent action against the government. Numerous civilians were killed in the first week of protests, and many more in the weeks to come, with government

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!100 "Ivorian President Vows to Hold Elections as Scheduled," Xinhua, 10 July 2007, accessed 4 July 2013, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/6211745.html. 101 Ibid. 102 "Cote d'Ivoire: Injured Protestors Denied Medical Care," Amnesty International, 17 December 2010, accessed 4 July 2013, http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/cote-d'ivoire-injured-protestors-denied-medical-care-2010-12-17. 103 "Elections in Côte d'Ivoire." 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid.


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security forces shooting protestors mainly concentrated in Abidjan, the largest city, throughout December 2010.107 According to Amnesty International, those injured by Gbagbo forces in the protests were denied medical treatment, and one official called the security forces' actions "deplorab[le]."108 At this point, there was little to no power commanding forces loyal to Ouattara. The world had yet to decide on the candidate it would support, and before UN and French forces could act to support the protestors the Gbagbo administration had used brutal measures, including tear gas and live bullets, against them. It should be noted that Ouattara himself had called for the protests, and there was strong evidence that most protestors were acting out of loyalty to their alleged President-elect.109 At this time, the only major international support granting Ouattara legitimacy was a unanimous Security Council resolution calling for his accession to the presidency and insisting that Gbagbo step down, a document that carried some weight but did not ultimately convince Gbagbo.110 The Constitutional Council stood by its revision of the voting results, and both Gbagbo and Ouattara were sworn in as president in separate ceremonies, the latter sponsored by the government led by Prime Minister Guillaume Soro. By this point, Ivorians were not optimistic about the possibility of a unifying government emerging from the 2010 elections. Despite the ruling by the Constitutional Council, a Gbagbo victory was not the outcome agreed upon by the international community and major international organizations, nor by political organizations within the country. The Ivorian Prime Minister Soro, a longtime rival of Gbagbo and former rebel leader who was appointed PM to ease tensions following the 2002 civil war, resigned his post and offered Ouattara leadership of the government.111 Soro was joined by the United States, France, Nigeria, and other countries, as well as the UN, AU, and the International Monetary Fund, in declaring Ouattara the rightful president.112 It is important to note that the UN peacekeepers already present in Côte d'Ivoire took immediate action to protect President-elect Ouattara, surrounding his compound and the compound of the IEC officials who declared the accepted election results. From this point on, the country was divided dramatically along political lines, with the northern rebels largely supporting Ouattara and Gbagbo in control of government resources in the south. Ouattara was aided primarily by French, AU, and UN forces, and had almost unanimous support of the international community on his side. Western states, Côte d'Ivoire's neighbors, and a slew of countries and organizations had pledged their support to the new president, but there would be no transition of leadership without war.

Second Ivorian Civil War

Gearing up for war, it appeared that forces loyal to Gbagbo were far superior to Ouattara's in number, experience, and organization. Ouattara's traditional allies consisted of the New Forces, the militia in control of Côte d'Ivoire's north, and his supporters in and around Abidjan; Gbagbo was in command of the 50,000-strong Ivorian military and police, as well as the country's Republican

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!107 "World Leaders Back Ouattara as Ivory Coast Poll Winner," BBC, 4 Dec 2010, accessed 4 July 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11917359. 108 "Cote d'Ivoire: Injured Protestors Denied Medical Care.” 109 Ibid. 110 S/RES/1975, "Security Council Resolution 1975," 30 March 2011. 111 "World Leaders Back Ouattara as Ivory Coast Poll Winner." 112 Ibid.


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Guard, all totaled outnumbering his rival ten to one.113 But while Gbagbo was in command of superior forces, especially in number, Ouattara was supplemented by the peacekeeping missions of France in the form of troops and the UN in the form of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, which beyond a doubt secured his military victory. Without international support and legitimacy, Ouattara could not have triumphed, but the kind of military action that assured his victory was not in place at the beginning of the conflict. In December 2010, when the first major uprisings by Ouattara forces sought to overturn the Constitutional Council's revisions, UNOCI forces were willing to protect the person whom they viewed as the true president but did not provide the kind of tactical support that was necessary to win the war for Ouattara.114 That action came from France, whose status as Côte d'Ivoire's former colonial master surely encouraged their eventual intervention and decisive victory. Several months after the start of the fighting, in April 2013, Ouattara's forces were largely outmatched and in retreat. A failed raid on Gbagbo's stronghold that left rebel forces decimated seemed to be the final straw for the French. That same Gbagbo compound was then bombarded by the French, after bilateral talks broke down, unleashing the full firepower of French forces.115 The French intervention is notable, not only for its decisive turnaround in favor of Ouattara, but also because the forces were the same forces who once fought for Gbagbo in the 2002 civil war, and were now attempting to destroy his stronghold. In addition to the Gbagbo compound, French artillery also assailed bunkers, ammo depots, and other locations of strategic importance, making the small number of Ouattara troops irrelevant when combined with the French military.116 It was the UN that made the most vocal call for France's intervention, citing the increasingly chaotic nature of the conflict and the continuing degradation of infrastructure that resulted from a lack of leadership, especially in the north, where New Forces loyal to Ouattara still controlled politics.117 Notably, the assault was largely supported by most member-states, international organizations, and domestic Ivorian institutions. Prime Minister Soro, who by this point had pledged his support to Ouattara, accused Gbagbo of "crimes against the civilian population" and assured the international community that French military support, as well as the efforts of UNOCI, was not unwanted foreign influence, but rather a welcome display of friendship.118 The mission was obviously also supported by Ouattara and his northern allies, resulting in unquestionable support for French efforts. Fresh off of championing the no-fly zone over Muammar el-Qaddafi's Libya, the French were again on the path to war in Côte d'Ivoire with their military intervention, and the argument has been made that their interests were more related to colonialism than humanitarianism or peacekeeping.119 The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!113 Iztok Potokar, "Côte d'Ivoire: International Response and Origins of the Conflict," United Explanations, 4 April 2011, accessed 4 July 2013, http://www.unitedexplanations.org/2011/04/04/international-repsonse-to-the-current-situation-in-cote-divoire-and-the-origins-of-the-conflict/. 114 Ibid. 115 Ann Talbot, "France Intervenes in Ivory Coast's Civil War," WSWS, 7 April 2011, accessed 4 July 2013, http://www.wsws.org/en/artiles/2011/04/ivor-a07.html. 116 Ibid. 117 Adam Nossiter, "Strikes by U.S. and France Corner Leader of Ivory Coast," New York Times, 4 April 2011, accessed 4 July 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/world/africa/05ivory.html?r=2&. 118 Ibid. 119 Talbot, "France Intervenes in Ivory Coast's Civil War."


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military agreement signed by France and Côte d'Ivoire following the latter's 1960 independence allows for constant garrisoning of French troops, a policy still in effect today, and this along with the apparently cruel methods utilized by French forces (one source claimed civilians were assaulted with concussion grenades and Abidjan's bridges were shut down) has led some to doubt the peaceful nature Paris had claimed for its intervention.120 Evidently, whether the French military action was colonial in nature or not, its result was a clearly established and legitimately recognized Ouattara administration, and for better or worse it appeared to put Côte d'Ivoire on the right track. Days after the French artillery strikes, Gbagbo's negotiation terms, namely that he be allowed to stay in Côte d’Ivoire under protection, were not being met by any of the negotiating parties, and consequently the former president surrendered to UN forces and Alassane Ouattara was internationally hailed as the country's new president.121

Human Rights Violations and Militia Action

One of the more controversial historical occurrences in the Second Ivorian Civil War was the alleged perpetration of countless human rights violations by both parties to the conflict. Before French forces were involved in the conflict, militia loyal to Alassane Ouattara and government forces under Laurent Gbagbo were accused of equal numbers of violations, but rarely prosecuted by international organizations. These allegations arose at their earliest form in a special session of the Human Rights Council (HRC) in December 2010, one in which numerous violations, among them abductions, detentions, executions, and acts of sexual violence, were noted, and the body demanded a report from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation.122 According to the same report, the mandate of UNOCI, as established by UNSC resolution in 2004, granted the peacekeeping mission the ability and responsibility to note and report on any and all human rights violations in Côte d'Ivoire.123 Because one of UNOCI's chief responsibilities is monitoring the condition of human rights, allowing the mandate of the peacekeeping mission to expire would have subjected the country to violations that would have gone unnoticed and unchecked. However, the reports by UNOCI to the HRC were not specific with respect to the identities of the perpetrators, and more evidence was necessary for conviction and persecution.124 Nevertheless, the HRC did inevitably call for the end of all human rights violations, regardless of the identity of those committing said atrocities. But despite efforts by NGOs and the international community, violations of human rights continued through the end of the conflict with little or no prosecution for the perpetrators. As the civil war continued, human rights violations began to emerge more clearly on both sides. In April, at the height of the fighting, international organizations and NGOs began to report concrete slaughtering and disappearances of civilians by militias and government security forces. To note one example, in the town of Duékoué the Red Cross claimed 800 died in a single day following brutal

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!120 Ibid. 121 "Ivory Coast Strongman Laurent Gbagbo Arrested," CBS, 11 April 2011, accessed 4 July 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20052728.html. 122 "Special Session of Human Rights Council on Côte d'Ivoire Concludes After Adopting a Resolution Calling for End to All Human Rights Violations," United Nations Human Rights, 23 December 2010, accessed 4 July 2013, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10615&LangID=E. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid.


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attacks by both rebel and government troops, and over 200 "disappeared."125 However, while both sides were to blame and government forces loyal to Gbagbo killed over one hundred civilians, witnesses said most of the killing was done by militants loyal to Ouattara, but not under his command.126 Contrary to the popular opinion of the international community, the militia forces were not publicly endorsed by Ouattara, despite being loyal to his cause. The Republican Forces, as they called themselves, were the men directly under Ouattara's command and were comprised not of militia but of trained soldiers.127 It was these men who claimed responsibility only for killing Gbagbo's troops in the village of Duékoué, and who blamed the civilian killings on militiamen loyal to Gbagbo, distancing themselves from association with any militia, even those loyal to Ouattara.128 Conversely, some sources cite a "massacre by Western-backed forces" related to the incident in Duékoué, accusing Ouattara of warmongering and human rights violations.129 This opposing viewpoint again paints France as a colonial power, interfering unnecessarily in the affairs of the former French-occupied territory. However, it also makes important points of debate, including statements by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that Ouattara cease killing civilians, as well as concerns by UNOCI that it was Ouattara and his order that resulted in civilian deaths in Duékoué.130 Perhaps even more disturbing is the report from UNOCI that cites constant patrols by over 200 peacekeepers the night of the attacks, noting that UN forces were unaware of the slaughter taking place.131 While many in the international community had been quick to point fingers at Gbagbo when it came to human rights violations, it should be noted that Ouattara had as much of a responsibility to protect civilians, especially because he was recognized across the world as the legitimate leader. However, this heavy responsibility was apparently not being met. During the night of the attacks, eyewitnesses say the forces loyal to Ouattara approached neighborhoods of the village known to support Gbagbo, and in the morning civilians of those neighborhoods were found dead or had disappeared.132 Figure 1.2 shows the location of Duékoué relative to the rest of the country. It was revealed recently that during the incident in Duékoué most of the killing of civilians was perpetrated by a militia loyal to Ouattara and commanded by Amade Oueremi, a local leader.133 Until

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!125 Fran Blandy, "Battle for Abidjan Rages, Carnage in Western I. Coast," Associated Foreign Press, 2 April 2011, accessed 4 July 2013, http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/battle-for-abidjan-rages-carnage-in-western-icoast-20110402-1csa6.html. 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 Ann Talbot, "Civilians Massacred by Western-Backed Forces in Ivory Coast," WSWS, 4 April 2011, accessed 4 July 2013, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/04/ivor-a04.html. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid.

Figure 1.2: Location of Duekoue (Source: BBC, 2013)


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Oeremi's arrest in 2013, he stood as an example of the Ivorian government's failure to prosecute its perpetrators of human rights violations, especially considering the overwhelming evidence against them.134 Interestingly, there exists no significant incident in which Gbagbo forces killed a large number of civilians, as was the case with forces loyal to Ouattara, and it would appear Ouattara-loyal militias are unique in their perpetrations of human rights violations. Despite the apparent ferocity of the Ouattara-supported militia and the Republican Forces themselves, the United States, France, and NATO powers, as well as the UN and much of the world, remained adamant in their opposition to Gbagbo, making Ouattara the only viable candidate for Ivorian president. Choosing to largely ignore the ongoing violations of human rights, French forces then intervened in the region and propelled Ouattara to victory following Gbagbo's surrender and arrest, finally bringing an end to the civil war.

Ouattara's Victory and Aftermath

On 11 April 2011, after almost five months of fighting and with thousands dead, Laurent Gbagbo was arrested after the security forces guarding his bunker fell to French bombardment and he surrendered, turning power over to Alassane Ouattara.135 In a victory for international law and justice, Gbagbo was held by UNOCI forces and awaited trial at the International Criminal Court. The international reaction to the arrest was overwhelmingly positive, and one of relief that the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire had at last come to an end, or at least had ceased militarily. NATO members and the Western bloc rejoiced that the man they viewed as the legitimate president had triumphed, and U.S. Secretary of State Clinton commented that Gbagbo had joined the ranks of the hundreds of failed tyrants, citing the necessity of free elections in a democracy.136 However Ouattara's victory was not entirely an event of jubilation, as refugees in the village of Duékoué fled in panic following celebration by rebel militia forces.137 It is important to note in this case that while Ouattara's accession did give Côte d'Ivoire a unifying figure and a president by national consensus, there were large swathes of Gbagbo supporters who were inevitably oppressed following the victory. One important question raised was the nature of UN support for Ouattara in the civil war, considering the intended nature of peacekeeping missions to be purely neutral forces. In the days after Gbagbo's arrest and in the months following there were countries and organizations that took issue with the role of UN peacekeepers in the conflict. Throughout 2011, a wave of accusations pointed fingers at the extensive use of military intervention present during the civil war, despite claims by the Security Council that it did not explicitly support or oppose any one figure, but was merely there to keep the peace. Russia, a permanent member of the SC, was one of the countries to accuse UNOCI of violating its alleged neutrality, citing the extensive air strikes and no-fly zone as evidence.138 A P5 country doubting the validity of a UN peacekeeping mission, one that was implemented by the SC, was a clear indication that UNOCI had its troubles. In addition, the AU levied several accusations against the mission, calling it "unjustified."139 Counters to this argument !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!133 Joe Bavier, "Ivory Coast Arrests Militia Chief Accused Over Massacre," Reuters, 18 May 2013, accessed 4 July 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/18/us-ivorycoast-arrest-idUSBRE94H0B320130518. 134 Ibid. 135 "Ivory Coast Strongman Laurent Gbagbo Arrested." 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 Barbara Plett, "Did UN Forces Take Sides in Ivory Coast?" BBC, 7 April 2011, accessed 4 July 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13004462. 139 Ibid.


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say the duty of a peacekeeping mission is not to prevent violence but instead to protect citizens. In this charge, some argue, the mission was justified by attacking forces loyal to Gbagbo, precisely because they claimed his forces were the ones perpetrating human rights violations.140 However, this argument does not hold up as well when the issue of the Duékoué massacre is raised, because the militia forces loyal to Ouattara committed atrocities against civilians without intervention from UNOCI, who was unaware of the events transpiring.141

CURRENT STATUS

Ongoing Humanitarian Crises

The refugee crisis in and around Côte d'Ivoire is ongoing and presents numerous problems for the recovering region. West Africa as a whole has faced increasing instability in recent years, and an influx of fleeing Ivorian refugees is sure to detract from any recovery by surrounding countries. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there are over 100,000 refugees from Côte d'Ivoire, and thousands of internally displaced persons.142 Militia movement and assaults on both sides during the 2010-2011 civil war were the principal cause of the displacement issue, with the largest concentration of refugees located in neighboring Liberia.143 Doubtless, the reason for the high percentage of refugees originating from Western Côte d'Ivoire is due to the massacre in the Duékuoé village, driving thousands out of their homes and in some cases out of the country. Unfortunately, the conditions in the country are not at present encouraging repatriation, despite the fact that the civil war has ended. In many cases, refugees have viewed their adopted countries as an improvement over their former home, especially because of the dismal state of the Ivorian economy and its failing infrastructure.144 Low levels of state building and international investment have also contributed to the problem. Financially, the UNHCR has a comparatively small operations budget in Côte d'Ivoire, but fundraising increased at the start of the civil war.145 Unfortunately, this led to fears that after the civil war ended, the now supplemented UNHCR Ivorian budget would plummet due to a fall in donations. All told, the issue is not so much that refugees out of Côte d'Ivoire are increasing in number, but that the existing expatriates have no desire to return to their homes. Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of Ivorian refugees in UNHCR camps on the border with Liberia, including a detailed representation of the various refugee locations. While issues concerning refugees are important symptoms of the Ivorian civil war, and ones that must be quickly addressed, solutions to this problem do not treat the disease itself, which is the litany of economic, political, and social problems within Côte d'Ivoire. Most notably, the government has yet to address a failed or failing justice system, one that currently cannot provide the necessary human rights entitled to every citizen; additionally, full access to water and power for every citizen is a far away goal, and one that the government could use international aid to address.146

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 "2013 UNHCR Country Operations Profile - Côte d'Ivoire." 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 "Côte d'Ivoire: 2 Years in, Uneven Progress," Human Rights Watch, 21 May 2013, accessed 5 July 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/21/cote-d-ivoire-2-years-uneven-progress.


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In regards to the justice system, trying criminals who perpetrated human rights violations during the civil war is an absolute necessity, and one that would help the country move on from what has been a brutal period in its history. However, there are many leaders loyal to Gbagbo who have been detained by the government for years, and who are not likely to face trial soon.147 Without a clear and efficient judiciary system, Côte d'Ivoire cannot hope to bring to justice to those who prolonged an unnecessary war, and instead serves as a clear example of how a legal system can go wrong.

Future of Elections, Infrastructure, and Economics

In areas concerning state building and monetary recovery, Côte d'Ivoire has made notable, if not significant, progress. Possibly the most significant of these steps towards modernization and recovery was the May 2013 arrest of Amade Oueremi, a militia leader who is accused of playing a major part in the Duékoué massacre that saw the murder of more than 1,000 civilians in 2011.148 Oeremi had been accused of the crime for years, but until now had walked free, much to the indignation of human rights organizations and NGOs. In fact, Oeremi's militia supported President Ouattara during the fighting, so his arrest represents an admission of some guilt by the new administration. While this has been a huge step forward, the issue that the arrest raises is rather disturbing: there are dozens of militia commanders loyal to Ouattara, and there is no telling how !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!147 Ibid. 148 Bavier, "Ivory Coast Arrests Militia Chief Accused Over Massacre."

Figure 2.2: Refugee Camps in Cote d'Ivoire (Source: UNHCR, 2013)


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many of them committed or are accused of committing human rights violations. Most of those arrested in connection with massacres and violations of human rights have been Gbagbo supporters, and some are outraged that the Ouattara administration has not arrested more of its own fighters, despite promises from Ouattara himself that perpetrators on both sides of the conflict would be swiftly brought to justice.149 Economically, Côte d'Ivoire has made better progress than was expected, with nearly 10% economic growth in 2012, and a revolutionary campaign against corruption implemented by President Ouattara.150 Additionally, while problems with infrastructure have been an issue, and the roads systems as well as access to power and clean water were devastated during the civil war, the government has started to implement solutions. Roads have been largely restored in major metropolitan areas, with campaigns to bring water and power to the whole country underway.151 However, this is not to say that there is no progress to be made. Significant challenges await the Ouattara administration, still young and just out of the bloodiest conflict in the country's history. Notably, there are elections scheduled for 2015, which could finally help get the country back on track considering it went without elections for ten years. Ouattara has announced his candidacy in the election, and will be running in the first presidential contest since the 2010 bloodbath.152

Mandate and Responsibility of UNOCI

The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire has been in place since 2004, when it was implemented by resolution to oversee a ceasefire between New Forces in the Muslim north and the Gbagbo administration in the south following the 2002 civil war.153 Since that time, its role has shifted through the passage of numerous SC resolutions to include a protective role for Ivorian citizens during the 2010 civil war, and the mission also currently oversees the peace building process. The role of the mission was most notably amended to include the protection of citizens, especially to report all human rights violations, during the civil war in early 2011.154 As it stands today, UNOCI has been authorized and charged with the responsibility of disarming the existing militia who supported Outtara in the conflict, as well as reinstituting legal organizations that would encourage a greater acceptance of the rule of law in Côte d'Ivoire.155 Neither of these present easy challenges to overcome, and to solve them will require creativity and dedication on the part of peacekeepers. Dealing with these issues may necessitate an extension of UNOCI's mandate when it is up for renewal, or, if the Council considers the progress made by the Ivorian government to be significant and far-reaching, the mission's mandate may be retracted. Especially in the field of disarmament, UNOCI has faced significant opposition and challenges. In July 2013, a convoy implementing disarmament policies in the countryside and carrying the national

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!149 “Côte d’Ivoire: 2 Years in, Uneven Progress.” 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 "Côte d'Ivoire President to Seek a New Term in 2015," Business Day, 4 July 2013, accessed 5 July 2013, http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2013/07/04/cote-divoire-president-to-seek-a-new-term-in-2015. 153 S/RES/1528. 154 S/RES/1998, "Security Council Resolution 1998," 12 July 2011. 155 "UNOCI Mandate," UN, 2013, accessed 5 July 2013, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/mandate.shtml.


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authority head of UNOCI was attacked and resulted in at least four casualties.156 Supported by the UN peacekeeping mission, the Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (ADDR) is an Ivorian government program designed to disarm militias and restore police authority in the tumultuous rural regions of the country.157 Continuing attacks on ADDR convoys could have disastrous consequences for those hoping to restore Côte d'Ivoire's state authority, as well as those who wish to move completely past the effects of the 2002 civil war, after which militias controlled the anarchic north. Security must be a priority in ensuring a continued role for UNOCI, and history has shown that a weak peacekeeping mission has had the unintended consequence of allowing death and human rights violations to go unchecked, as was the case in the Duékoué massacre.

BLOC ANALYSIS

The main issues facing Côte d'Ivoire are agreed upon by the international community, but the presence of international organizations, peacekeeping missions, aid, and investment are not. The developmental recovery of the country will largely be based on the country or group of countries contributing the most aid and investment, a topic that will become heated if Côte d'Ivoire is viewed as a rising developing economy. Africa and the members of the AU see the country as a recovering friend, one whose problems may be spilling over a little too close to home, but nevertheless a challenge to overcome. The Western bloc, most specifically France, has a strong investment in a recovering Côte d'Ivoire, especially now that Alassane Ouattara, a leader they backed in his electoral contest with Laurent Gbagbo, is the Ivorian president and must demonstrate to the world where he wishes to lead his country. It is in the best interests of the West to lead Côte d'Ivoire into an age of modernization and help it build itself up. As for Asia, its economic powers are always looking for the next rising economy in which to invest, and for all they know Côte d'Ivoire may be that country. With positive growth in recent years, the country may look to Asia for future investment.

Africa

Over the course of the civil war, the AU has taken an inconsistent stance on Côte d'Ivoire in terms of who it supports politically and what it wants to happen in the future development of the country. While Gbagbo was a great friend of the AU during his time as Ivorian President, the organization had no objection when Ouattara took his place as president at the end of the conflict. However, it did object to the international community overlooking certain human rights violations committed by forces loyal to Ouattara, demonstrating that it does not entirely support the country's new leader.158 Additionally, an initial report by the AU observer mission at the start of the civil war noted discrepancies in the 2010 elections, including abuses by militia loyal to Ouattara, a report that has been largely overlooked but was cited frantically by Gbagbo as evidence of his legitimacy.159 Côte d'Ivoire was suspended from the AU during its civil war, because of its perceived lack of a democratically elected president.160 As the conflict progressed, AU member states like Angola were

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!156 "Côte d'Ivoire: UN Mission Strongly Condemns Attack on Disarmament Convoy," UN News Centre, 2 July 2013, accessed 5 July 2013, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45327&Cr=unoci&Cr1=#.UdoadPm1E1I. 157 Ibid. 158 "Côte d'Ivoire: Testing Time for the African Union – Briefing," IRIN, 7 January 2011, accessed 5 July 2013, http://www.irinnews.org/report/91570/cote-d-ivoire-testing-time-for-the-african-union-briefing. 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid.


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violently opposed to international intervention, including the involvement of UNOCI forces and the French military assaults that ultimately ended the war.161 In addition to military issues, the African bloc has dealt with humanitarian issues that for them are a little too close for comfort. This is especially true for countries like Liberia, which has received thousands of Ivorian refugees fleeing the conflict who refuse to return to their home country. More than a year after the end of the war, in September 2012, there were more than 64,000 Ivorian refugees in Liberia, with fewer than 100 returning to Cote d’Ivoire each month.162 These numbers are deeply unsettling, and represent a clear decline in repatriation that could put undue burdens on those African countries with significant populations of Ivorian refugees.

EU and the Western Bloc

It is fair to say that Europe and the Western bloc took a gamble investing in Côte d'Ivoire's future when they endorsed Alassane Ouattara as the rightful president, culminating in French intervention that installed him as president. Today, the bloc is staring the future of Côte d'Ivoire in the face, with French forces still patrolling the country and the West ready to hail it as the next democratic success story. Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had already praised Ouattara for being democratically elected once the conflict came to a close, and the advantages Côte d'Ivoire stands to offer the West are substantial.163 One challenge facing the West in this region is the decision of whether it is necessary to stay in Côte d'Ivoire and when it will be prudent to withdraw – a choice that must be made by the French in conjunction with the other countries of NATO. Doubtless, the decision must be coordinated with an expansion or retraction of UNOCI's mandate, an important issue for the Council. Recently, the British minister for Africa visited the country, which is economically significant as the world's largest producer of cocoa; the visit served as a stepping stone for increased positive relations between Côte d'Ivoire and the West, including job creation and investment in education and finance.164 Should proposed investment deals go through, the region and its state building potential could appear very attractive to Western backers.

Asia

The Asian powers are constantly looking for new investments, and Côte d'Ivoire is no different. Reconstruction has been expensive for the Ouattara administration, and the government is looking for investors to offer loans in the rebuilding process. Recently, in June 2013, the Ivorian finance minister began talks with Chinese banks looking for loan opportunities, assuring the corporations that they would receive significant returns on the investments.165 This could cause potential friction

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!161 Ibid. 162 Travis Lupick, "Ivorian Refugees in no Rush to Leave Liberia," Al Jazeera, 12 October 2012, accessed 5 July 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/10/20121098463737778.html. 163 "Ivory Coast Strongman Laurent Gbagbo Arrested." 164 "British Africa Minister Visits Côte d'Ivoire to Boost Cooperation," Xinhuanet, 2 July 2013, accessed 5 July 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-07/02/c_132505826.htm. 165 "Côte d'Ivoire to Seek China's Support for Post-Crisis Reconstruction," Xinhua, 28 June 2013, accessed 5 July 2013, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8304161.html.


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between the Asian and Western blocs, and the two may both wish to encourage growth in the Ivorian economy through continuing investment and economic programs. Asian policy with respect to Côte d’Ivoire may be noted through past interactions with African countries. In the past, Nigeria and other growing economies of Africa have turned to the United States and other Western powers for investment and state building opportunities. However, nowadays, China has increased its influence and is looking for new areas in which to invest. Over the last nine years, the number of Chinese firms in Africa has grown exponentially, USD 20.8 billion invested in Africa in the last decade alone.166 For Côte d’Ivoire, the potential for growth is unlimited, and whether or not it draws more extensive investment attention from more developed countries has yet to be seen.

COMMITTEE MISSION

When addressing solutions to Côte d'Ivoire's recovery, the Security Council and its members should keep in mind the limitations of this body's power outside of its normally considerable scope. Because the military conflicts still going on are few and relatively far between compared to those during the civil war, there is less of a need for the UNOCI forces to be present and maintain peace. The SC must decide whether to extend or retract the mandate of UNOCI, and what tone to set with respect to the French troops still positioning themselves as peacekeepers. Legally, issues have arisen with respect to human rights violations. As a body, the SC may wish to encourage other UN organizations, including the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court, to investigate certain claims of abuse, unnecessary deprivation of life, etc. from the civil war. An additional responsibility in the field of justice is the restoration of the Ivorian legal system and the rule of law in the country, a goal that includes a nationwide disarmament campaign. The campaign has not been particularly successful and has been vulnerable to attack, and it will be the responsibility of the Council to decide whether or not it wishes to encourage or discourage this campaign. Next, debate will surely be heated over the legitimacy of President Ouattara. While he was elected by a majority of voters (according to the UN and other sources, but not agreed upon without dispute), and had announced his candidacy for the 2005 elections, there are organizations and countries that disagree with both the manner in which he was made president, which some see as a display of Western imperialism, and with the way he has handled the country while in office. The SC must be cautious in addressing this issue, and ensure that it is resolved in a manner amenable to both Ivorian and international standards. All told, the war in Côte d'Ivoire is over, but the challenges of building a country and establishing it as an example of West African rebirth and restoration are up to the Security Council.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!166 Toh Han Shih and Adrian Wan, “African Leaders Prefer China’s Hard Cash to US Overtures,” South China Morning Post, 18 July 2013, accessed 22 August 2013, http://www.scmp.com/business/economy/article/1284919/african-leaders-prefer-chinas-hard-cash-us-overtures.


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RESEARCH AND PREPARATION QUESTIONS

As mentioned in the Note on Research and Preparation, delegates must answer each of these questions in their position papers.

TOPIC A

1. Has your country contributed troops, resources, or humanitarian aid to Somalia? If so, what were the motivations for doing so? If not, what is your country’s position on providing aid?

2. Does your country have an established position on international piracy (e.g. Conventions on the Law of the Sea)? If not, how has your country reacted to piracy in the past?

3. To what extent does your country consider an ethnic people to be sovereign regardless of the country in which they exist? More specifically, would your country support the right of the ethnic Harti people of the Sool region to join Puntland rather than Somaliland?

4. Does your country have experience investing in developing countries? If not, is your country a developing country with investors? Whichever is more appropriate to your country, apply to the question of investment and state-building in Somalia.

5. How has your country reacted to allegations of human rights violations around the world? How would they react to the alleged violations in Somalia?

6. Does your country condone international intervention to encourage peace (use UN initiatives and initiatives of NATO/AU/Arab League/etc. as a start)?

7. Are there any obvious conflicts of interests between your country and another country or group of countries with respect to Somalia?

TOPIC B

1. What history, if any, does your country have with colonialism or imperialism? In general, what is your country's stance on this issue as it pertains to modern international relations?

2. Has your country had to deal with past refugee crises, either as a recipient or contributor of refugees? If not, is your country a party to international humanitarian agreements?

3. To what extent has your country been involved in the persecution of international criminals or domestic war criminals, especially through the International Criminal Court?

4. Is your country a recipient or donor of international aid to developing countries? How does this position affect your country's opinion of state building in Côte d'Ivoire?

5. How has your country reacted to allegations of human rights violations around the world? How would it react to the alleged violations committed by both sides in the civil war?

6. Has your country ever contributed troops to a UN peacekeeping mission, and what does this say about your country's position on peacekeeping? If not, what policy if any does your country have regarding UN peacekeeping missions?

7. Are there any obvious conflicts of interest between your country and another country or bloc of countries with respect to Côte d'Ivoire? Elaborate.


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IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS

TOPIC A

Bradbury, Mark and Sally Healy. "Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict." Conflict Trends 21 (2009). Accessed 22 June 2013. http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord%2021_3Endless%20war_a %20brief%20history_2010_ENG.pdf.

This magazine article uses both history and current events to provide structure and background to the Somali civil war that began in 1991 and continues today. The chronological nature of the article makes it an ideal jumping-off point for anyone seeking knowledge about the conflict. "Somalia Briefing Sheet." UNHCR. 20 May 2013. Accessed 23 June 2013.

http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/download.php?id=1198. One of the most recent updates on the humanitarian conditions in Somalia, this report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees provides pertinent facts and figures relating to the ongoing Somali refugees crisis. It serves as a clear and comprehensive fact sheet of the background and current situation. Wise, Rob. "Al Shabaab." Center for Strategic & International Studies. July 2011. Accessed 23 June 2013.

http://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf.

This study of militant group al Shabaab analyzes the origins, structure, and operations of the organization, from its founding as an offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union through its status as a guerrilla fighting force loyal to al Qaeda. With al Shabaab as the principal adversary of the FGS, AMISOM, and UNSOM forces, understanding its origins and motivations is key.

TOPIC B

"2013 UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Côte d'Ivoire." UNHCR. 2013. Accessed 5 July 2013. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e484016.html.

This report by the High Commissioner for Refugees provides invaluable facts and figures relating to the current status of Ivorian refugees in countries like Liberia. It is one of the most recent sources of information providing a reliable analysis of the current humanitarian crisis that leaves thousands of Ivorian citizens unwilling to return home. It serves additionally as a report on refugee conditions in West Africa. "Côte d'Ivoire: 2 Years in, Uneven Progress." Human Rights Watch. 21 May 2013. Accessed 5 July

2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/21/cote-d-ivoire-2-years-uneven-progress. This report by an NGO analyzes past humanitarian grievances committed in Côte d'Ivoire and how the country can begin to recover with respect to human rights. It is recently written and notes that while the country has made significant strides there is a long way to go, and gives the Ouattara administration (as well as the international community) a clear set of benchmarks. "Elections in Côte d'Ivoire." African Elections Database. 15 March 2012. Accessed 4 July 2013.

http://africanelections.tripod.com/ci.html. This analytical database gives the facts and figures related to the disputed 2010 election, showing Alassane Ouattara as the victor over incumbent Laurent Gbagbo, who disputed the elections, leading to civil war. There is little to no bias


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in this source: it notes the results declared by sources loyal to Gbagbo, but makes it clear that the accepted numbers were those recognized by the international community, an Ouattara victory.


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APPENDIX A: MAPS FOR TOPIC A

Figure 1.6: Somali Factionalism Following Divisive Civil War, 1992 (Source: Wikimedia Commons)


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Figure 1.7: Lack of Central Control by FGS, March 2010 (Source: Free Republic)


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

COMMITTEE HISTORY AND SIMULATION

“Charter of the United Nations.” United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/. Complete text of the UN Charter, refer to this for the specific language regarding the Security Council’s powers and mandate. “History of Peacekeeping - The Early Years.” United Nations Peacekeeping. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/early.shtml. A look at the early years of the peacekeeping operations of the Security Council. “Membership of the Security Council.” United Nations. http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp. Explains how membership is selected. “Peacekeeping.” Global Policy. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/peacekeeping.html. Another look at the ever-important peacekeeping operations. “Role of the Security Council.” United Nations Peacekeeping. Accessed 1 September 2013.

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/rolesc.shtml. Describes the functions of the Security Council. “UN Security Council: Background.” United Nations. Accessed 1 September 2013.

http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html. A historical perspective of the Security Council. Wood, Michael. The UN Security Council and International Law. London: University of Cambridge,

2006. Provides a legal perspective of the Security Council’s powers.

TOPIC A

UN Sources

“Chapter V: The Security Council.” Charter of the United Nations. 24 October 1945. As the founding document of the United Nations and one of the most important international agreements ever ratified, the UN Charter represents an end to centuries of fighting in Europe, and concretely established the UN as it stands today. Its section detailing the Security Council grants the body expansive powers, as well as the responsibility to maintain peace and security. SC/10994. "Security Council Establishes United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, to be

Operational by 3 June for Initial Period of 12 Months." UN. 2 May 2013. Accessed 22 June 2013.

This UN report introduces the newly formed UNSOM and its mandate in Somalia.


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"Somalia: African Union Endorses Regional Peace Plan." UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 14 September 2006. Accessed 23 June 2013. http://www.irinnews.org/report/61065/somalia-african-union-endorses-regional-peace-plan.

This report describes the beginnings of AU involvement in Somalia, culminating in AMISOM. "Somalia Briefing Sheet." UNHCR. 20 May 2013. Accessed 22 June 2013.

http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/regional.php. This UN report provides invaluable facts and figures regarding refugees in Somalia, and is one of the most recent and trustworthy sources for this information. S/RES/775. "UN Security Council Resolution 775." 28 August 1992. This SC resolution dramatically increased the number of troops in UNOSOM I and expanded and extended the organization's mandate in mediating a peace to the Somali Civil War. S/RES/794. "UN Security Council Resolution 794." 3 December 1992. This SC resolution established UNITAF, the joint task force with the purpose of aiding the United States in its troop commitment to Somalia following Operation Restore Hope, the initiative to unify Somalia and allow the passage of humanitarian aid into Mogadishu. "United Nations Operation in Somalia I." UN Department of Public Information. Last Updated 21

March 1997. Accessed 22 June 2013. http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm.

This informational document introduces both facts and figures relating to the various UN missions in Somalia preceding the current UNSOM. Other Sources

"African Union Approves New Strategy to Fight Al-Shabaab." Midnimo. 23 June 2013. Accessed 23 June 2013. http://www.midnimo.com/2013 /06/23/african-union-approves-new-strategy-to-fight-al-shabaab/.

This recent article reports the continuing efforts of AU countries to combat militants in Somalia, starting with a renewed troop increase. Ahmed, Abdalle. "Somalia: President Receives Credentials From South Korean Ambassador to

Somalia." RBC. 16 May 2013. Accessed 23 June 2013. http://www.raxanreeb.com/2013/05/somalia-president-receives-credentials-from-south-korean-ambassador-to-somalia/.

This article describes the opening of South Korean diplomatic relations with Somalia, a process happening in numerous Asian countries that is indicating an increasing willingness by the Four Tigers to trade with Somalia. "Al-Shabaab Joining al-Qaeda, Monitor Group Says." CNN. 10 Feb 2012. Accessed 22 June 2013.

http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/09/world/ africa/somalia-shabaab-qaeda/. This news article presents militant organization Al-Shabaab as more of a threat than it had been to Somalia.


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Boniface, Bosire. "Somalia Investment Conference Spurs Interest, Government Pledges." Sabahi. 31 May 2013. Accessed 22 June 2013. http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/05/31/feature-02.

This African article discusses the Somali government's renewed efforts to encourage investment and business engagement to spur growth. Bradbury, Mark and Sally Healy. "Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict." Conflict

Trends 21 (2009). Accessed 22 June 2013. http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord%2021_3Endless%20war_a %20brief%20history_2010_ENG.pdf.

This magazine article uses both history and current events to provide structure and background to the Somali civil war that began in 1991 and continues today. Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey Herbst. "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention." Foreign

Affairs. March/April 1996. Accessed 22 June 2013. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51844/walter-clarke-and-jeffrey-herbst/somalia-and-the-future-of-humanitarian-intervention.

This article from Foreign Affairs proposes a hypothetical precedent for further humanitarian aid around the world, citing U.S. action in Somalia. "Failed States: An Annual Special Report by FP and the Fund for Peace," Foreign Policy, 2013,

accessed 22 June 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/2013_failed_states_interactive_map.

This is a comprehensive list compiled annually by Foreign Policy magazine that include what it considers the most notable failed states of the world; Somalia has always been number one. "Hijackings Cut Aid Access to South Somalia, Lives at Risk." World Food Programme. 11 March 2005.

Accessed 22 June 2013. http://www.wfp.org /news/news-release/hijackings-cut-aid-access-south-somalia-lives-risk.

This WFP article predicts far-reaching humanitarian consequences for ongoing criminal activity, most notably piracy, in Somalia. Ismail, Said. "Puntland and Somaliland Clash in Sool Region." Somalia Report. 30 May 2011. Accessed

22 June 2013. http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/866. This report details the territorial dispute between Somaliland and Puntland over Sool. Joselow, Gabe. "Somali Leaders Agree on Draft Constitution." Voice of America. 22 June 2012.

Accessed 22 June 2013. http://www.voanews.com/content/somali_leaders_agree _on_draft_constitution/1246077.html.

This report marks the historic occasion of the TFG agreeing on a basic constitution. "Jubaland in Jeopardy: The Uneasy Path to State-Building in Somalia." International Crisis Group. 21

May 2013. Accessed 22 June 2013. http://www.crisisgroupblogs.org/africanpeacebuilding/2013/05/21/jubaland-in-jeopardy-the-uneasy-path-to-state-building-in-somalia/.

This report uses a case study in the Somali region of Jubaland to illustrate the many challenges of state-building and the risks it represents.


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Kinzer, Stephen. “Latin America Sees U.S. Diverting Morales’ Plane as Yankee Imperialism.” The

Guardian. 5 July 2013. Accessed 9 August 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/05/latin-america-us-morales-imperialism.

This recent diplomatic incident, in which the President of Bolivia was delayed in the search for Edward Snowden, perfectly illustrates the continuing complexities of the relationship between the United States and Latin America. Amid accusations of imperialism and colonialism, the U.S. faces increased criticism in its dealings in Somalia and the world. Lacey, Marc. "The Signs Say Somaliland, but the World Says Somalia." New York Times. 5 June 2006.

Accessed 22 June 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/05/world/africa/05somaliland.html?_r=0.

This newspaper article describes the odd semi-autonomy that "states" like Somaliland and Puntland possess. McElroy, Damien. "Britain Secures £200m to Help Build a Somali State." Telegraph. 7 May 2013.

Accessed 23 June 2013. http://www.telegraph .co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/10042403/Britain-secures-200m-to-help-build-a-Somali-state.html.

This article delves into Anglo-Somali relations, noting that they mostly exist in an economic or military capacity, when the U.K. fights insurgents or helps spur growth. Nightingale, Alaric and Michelle Wiese. "Somali Piracy Falls to Six-Year Low as Guards Defend

Ships." Bloomberg. 22 October 2012. Accessed 22 June 2013. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-22/somalia-piracy-attacks-plunge-as-navies-secure-trade-route.

This article notes the significant progress made by Somali and international forces in their efforts to curtail the violence plaguing the Horn of Africa. Noting that piracy has plunged as efforts to eradicate the illegal practice increased, the article nevertheless points out the significant progress that has yet to be made. O'Kasick, Jeremy. "Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia." Global Policy Forum. 14 August 2007. Accessed

22 June 2013. http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/153/26334.html. This rather biased report explains the point of view that Ethiopia violated Somalia's sovereignty by invading Mogadishu and ousting the ICU, installing the TFG. "Puntland Facts and Figures." Ministry of Planning and Statistics: Puntland State of Somalia. 2003.

Accessed 22 June 2013. http://siteresources.world bank.org/SOMALIAEXTN/Resources/PuntlandFigures.pdf.

This statistical analysis provides numerous points of data regarding the Puntland region. "Somali 'Jihad' on Foreign Troops." BBC. 25 March 2005. Accessed 22 June 2013.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4382311.stm. This article describes the dangers facing foreign troops from UNSOM and AMISOM. "Somali Military Bolstered by East Africa, Middle East Allies." Hiiraan Online. 18 June 2013.

Accessed 23 June 2013.


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This article describes the various levels of support offered to Somalia through both the Muslim countries of North and Northeast Africa and by Middle Eastern countries.

"Somalia: Country Reports of Human Rights Practices." U.S. Department of State. 25 Feb 2004.

Accessed 22 June 2013. http://www.state. gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27751.htm. This report from the State Department is a brief summary of Somali political history followed by a detailed outline of the allegations of human rights violations in Somalia. These include conflicts between rival militias and lack of central government resulting in civilian deaths and perpetration of violence against humanitarian organization and NGO workers. "Somalia UN Office Attack by Al-Shabab 'Kills 15.'" BBC. 19 June 2013. Accessed 22 June 2013.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22965842. This recent article describes a militant assault on a UN facility that illustrates the ongoing violence in today's Somalia. Tancos, Kathryn. "More Child Soldiers in Somalia Fighting." CNN. 21 Feb 2012. Accessed 22 June

2013. http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/21 /world/africa/somalia-child-soldiers. This article accuses Al-Shabaab of recently recruiting an increasing number of child soldiers as young as 10 to replenish their ranks in fights against the FGS, UNSOM, and AMISOM. Tharoor, Ishaan. "How Somalia's Fishermen Became Pirates." Time.

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892376,00.html. This in-depth analysis explains the mindset of a Somali people whose fishing industry, beset by problems, became a piracy hub. "The Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic." Institut d'Etudes dé Secúrite. Feb 2004.

Accessed 22 June 2013. http://web.archive. org/web/20050425015339/http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Somalia/charterfeb04.pdf.

The charter of the TFG outlines their purpose and mandate. Wise, Rob. “Al Shabaab.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. July 2011. Accessed 23 June 2013.

http://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf.

This detailed and comprehensive report expands upon the history, methods, goals, and future of the militant organization known as al Shabaab. Al Shabaab is the most significant threat that exists in today’s Somalia, and represents a dark time in the region’s history; therefore, a thorough understanding of the organization is necessary. Woodroofe, Louise P. Buried in the Sands of the Ogaden: The United States, the Horn of Africa, and the

Demise of Détente. Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2013. This recent in-depth historical analysis takes a deeper look at the Cold War as it was fought by proxy war in African countries, including Somalia and Ethiopia. More specifically, during the Ogaden War between these two countries, the USSR backed Ethiopia in the hopes of raising a Marxist regime. This resulted in strong American support in Somalia continuing through 1991.


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"U.S. Eases Arms Restrictions for Somalia." UPI. 9 April 2013. Accessed 23 June 2013. http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013 /04/09/US-eases-arms-restrictions-for-Somalia/UPI-82061365516759/.

This special report is a landmark decision on the part of President Obama to open up U.S.-Somali relations by easing sanctions alongside a recent UNSC decision to do the same.

TOPIC B

UN Sources

"2013 UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Côte d'Ivoire." UNHCR. 2013. Accessed 5 July 2013. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e484016.html.

This report by the High Commissioner for Refugees provides invaluable facts and figures relating to the current status of Ivorian refugees in countries like Liberia.

"Côte d'Ivoire: UN Mission Strongly Condemns Attack on Disarmament Convoy." UN News Centre.

2 July 2013. Accessed 5 July 2013. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? NewsID=45327&Cr=unoci&Cr1=#.UdoadPm1E1I.

This UN article reports a recent attack on a caravan carrying important personnel and notes the violence still ongoing against UNOCI forces. S/RES/1528. "Security Council Resolution 1528." 27 February 2004. This SC resolution first established the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, abbreviated as UNOCI. The peacekeeping mission was designed to maintain peace following a ceasefire of the 2002 civil war. S/RES/1975. "Security Council Resolution 1975." 30 March 2011. This SC resolution was a unanimous decision endorsing Alassane Ouattara as the legitimate Ivorian president. The document also levied sanctions against Laurent Gbagbo. S/RES/1998. "Security Council Resolution 1998." 12 July 2011. This SC resolution expanded the mandate of UNOCI to report human rights violations following the mass murders committed during the 2010 Ivorian civil war. "UNOCI Mandate." UN. 2013. Accessed 5 July 2013.

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/mandate.shtml. This primary source is the mandate of the UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire and fully outlines the history of the peacekeeping mission, as well as all notable Security Council resolutions granting UNOCI its authority. Other Sources

Bavier, Joe. "Ivory Coast Arrests Militia Chief Accused Over Massacre." Reuters. 18 May 2013. Accessed 4 July 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/18/us-ivorycoast-arrest-idUSBRE94H0B320130518.

Recently, the former head of an Ivorian militia loyal to now-President Ouattara was arrested for massacring civilians during the civil war.


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Blandy, Fran. "Battle for Abidjan Rages, Carnage in Western I. Coast." Associated Foreign Press. 2 April 2011. Accessed 4 July 2013. http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news- world/battle-for-abidjan-rages-carnage-in-western-icoast-20110402-1csa6.html.

Over the course of the civil war, as this article explains, numerous roving militias and forces loyal but not beholden to one side or the other committed violations of human rights. "British Africa Minister Visits Côte d'Ivoire to Boost Cooperation." Xinhuanet. 2 July 2013. Accessed

5 July 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-07/02/c_132505826.htm. This article notes an important visit by the British Minister for Africa, opening up possibilities of investment and cooperation between West Africa and the West. "Côte d'Ivoire: 2 Years in, Uneven Progress." Human Rights Watch. 21 May 2013. Accessed 5 July

2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/21/cote-d-ivoire-2-years-uneven-progress. This report by an NGO analyzes past humanitarian grievances committed in Cote d'Ivoire and how the country can begin to recover with respect to human rights. "Cote d'Ivoire: Injured Protestors Denied Medical Care." Amnesty International. 17 December 2010.

Accessed 4 July 2013. http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/cote-d'ivoire-injured-protestors-denied-medical-care-2010-12-17.

This article details the conditions under which supporters of Alassane Ouattara were treated following the rejection of his electoral victory by government forces. These forces attacked protestors all over the country with varying levels of lethality. "Côte d'Ivoire President to Seek a New Term in 2015." Business Day. 4 July 2013. Accessed 5 July

2013. http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2013/07/04/cote-divoire-president-to-seek-a-new-term-in-2015.

This recent article notes that incumbent Ivorian President Ouattara will seek reelection in a future election; however, whether that election will take place in 2015 in unclear. "Côte d'Ivoire: Testing Time for the African Union – Briefing." IRIN. 7 January 2011. Accessed 5

July 2013. http://www.irinnews.org/report/ 91570/cote-d-ivoire-testing-time-for-the-african-union-briefing.

This briefing is an outline of AU involvement in the Ivorian Civil War, and how the international organization viewed the crisis. "Côte d'Ivoire to Seek China's Support for Post-Crisis Reconstruction." Xinhua. 28 June 2013.

Accessed 5 July 2013. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8304161.html. Asia may have a big part to play in Cote d'Ivoire's future, as this article shows. China, among other states, is helping the country recover from the body-blow to its economy and infrastructure dealt by the civil war. "Côte d'Ivoire: UN Endorses Plan to Leave President in Office Beyond Mandate." IRIN. 14

October 2005. Accessed 4 July 2013. http://www.irinnews.org/report/56730/cote-d-ivoire-un-endorses-plan-to-leave-president-in-office-beyond-mandate.

This article shows how, rather ironically, the UN allowed President Laurent Gbagbo to stay in office and delay elections, only to then oppose his declaration that he won the elections of 2010, when they were finally held.


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"Elections in Côte d'Ivoire." African Elections Database. 15 March 2012. Accessed 4 July 2013. http://africanelections.tripod.com/ci.html.

This analytical database gives the facts and figures related to the disputed 2010 election, showing Alassane Ouattara as the victor over incumbent Laurent Gbagbo, who disputed the elections, leading to civil war. "Ivorian President Vows to Hold Elections as Scheduled." Xinhua. 10 July 2007. Accessed 4 July

2013. http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/6211745.html. This article details how, after delaying scheduled elections, Gbagbo pledged in 2007 to hold a presidential contest; however, they were again delayed until 2010. "Ivory Coast Strongman Laurent Gbagbo Arrested." CBS. 11 April 2011. Accessed 4 July 2013.

http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20052728.html. This article explains that, as the civil war came to a close, Gbagbo was arrested and handed over to the ICC for prosecution. This marked the first time a world leader was arrested and held by the ICC. Lupick, Travis. "Ivorian Refugees in no Rush to Leave Liberia." Al Jazeera. 12 October 2012.

Accessed 5 July 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/10/20121098463737778.html.

With refugees still in numerous countries following the civil war, this article details how some of them may be less than willing to go home. Nossiter, Adam. "Strikes by U.N. and France Corner Leader of Ivory Coast." New York Times. 4

April 2011. Accessed 4 July 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/world/africa/05ivory.html?_r=2&.

Written towards the end of the major fighting, this article describes the assault on Laurent Gbagbo by combined UN, French, and Ivorian Ouattara forces in 2011 that resulted in Gbagbo's arrest. Plett, Barbara. "Did UN Forces Take Sides in Ivory Coast?" BBC. 7 April 2011. Accessed 4 July

2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13004462. This analysis examines UN forces during the Ivorian civil war, and to what extent they supported one side or another in the conflict. Potokar, Iztok. "Côte d'Ivoire: International Response and Origins of the Conflict." United

Explanations. 4 April 2011. Accessed 4 July 2013. http://www.unitedexplanations.org/2011/04/04/international-response-to-the-current-situation-in-cote-divoire-and-the-origins-of-the-conflict/.

This report gives not only a detailed explanation of the fighting that occurred during the civil war, it also explains the motivations of the parties involved. Shih, Toh Han and Adrian Wan. “African Leaders Prefer China’s Hard Cash to US Overtures.”

South China Morning Post. 18 July 2013. Accessed 22 August 2013. http://www.scmp.com/business/economy/article/1284919/african-leaders-prefer-chinas-hard-cash-us-overtures.

This article analyzes the potential for investments from Asian powers in African countries. It was useful for comparing past examples of investment with the potential Côte d’Ivoire has to be a future economic opportunity.


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Sengupta, Somini. "Ivory Coast Violence Flares; 9 French and 1 U.S. Death." New York Times. 7 November 2004. Accessed 4 July 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/07/international/africa/07ivory.html.

There existed violence across the country even before the 2010 civil war, as this article shows, detailing attacks on foreign nationals in Côte d'Ivoire.

"Special Session of Human Rights Council on Côte d'Ivoire Concludes After Adopting a Resolution

Calling for End to All Human Rights Violations." United Nations Human Rights. 23 December 2010. Accessed 4 July 2013. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10615&LangID=E.

Following the allegations of human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, this report from the UNHRC implicated both pro and anti-government forces, including those backed by Western powers, that were later charged for their crimes.

Talbot, Ann. "Civilians Massacred by Western-Backed Forces in Ivory Coast.” WSWS. 4 April 2011.

Accessed 4 July 2013. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/04/ivor-a04.html. This biased article places the blame on Western powers for the massacres committed by militias loyal to Alassane Ouattara, the political candidate backed by the West. Talbot, Ann. "France Intervenes in Ivory Coast's Civil War." WSWS. 7 April 2011. Accessed 4 July

2013. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/04/ivor-a07.html. This article provides an important perspective on the intervention of French troops during the Ivorian Civil War. The author has a negative view of the intervention, comparing it to colonialism and insisting that the French government was attempting to exert control over its former colony. "Timeline: Ivory Coast." Al Jazeera. 30 Nov 2011. Accessed 4 July 2013.

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/2010121971745317811.html This timeline is invaluable, providing a clear and succinct summation of the events leading up to the Second Ivorian Civil War, as well as the war's major events and outcome. It details the independence of Côte d'Ivoire in the 1960s and moves through 2012. "World Leaders Back Ouattara as Ivory Coast Poll Winner." BBC. 4 December 2010. Accessed 4

July 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11917359. This article details the overwhelming international opinion that Alassane Ouattara won the 2010 Ivorian presidential contest with approximately 54% of the vote, despite claims by Laurent Gbagbo.