schiller, humanism
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JUL- 9 1947
Cornell University Library
B821 .S33Humanism; philosophical essays, by F.C.S
3 1924 029 012 171olin
The
original of this
book
is in
the Cornell University Library.
There are no known copyright
restrictions intext.
the United States on the use of the
http://www.archive.org/details/cu31 92402901 21 71
HUMANISM
BV THE SAME A UTHOR
RIDDLES OF THE SPHINXA STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTIONSECOND EDITION
LONDON SWAN SONNENSCHEIN AND:
CO.
PERSONAL IDEALISMPHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS BY EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORDEdited by
HENRY STURB
CONTAINING
AXIOMS AS POSTULATESBy:
F. C. S.
SCHILLER, M.A.CO., Ltd.1902
LONDON MACMILLAN AND
HUMANISMPHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
^'
~o
^/'c
a
BY
F? C.
S.
SCHILLER,
M.A.
FELLOW AND TUTOR OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD
ILottfcon
MACMILLAN ANDNEW YORK:
CO.,
Limited
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
I903
wAll rights reserved
h,\-\z\^C
TO MY DEAR FRIEND
THE HUMANEST OF PHILOSOPHERS
WILLIAM JAMESWITHOUT WHOSE EXAMPLE
AND UNFAILING ENCOURAGEMENTTHIS BOOK
WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN WRITTEN
PREFACETheusual
appearance of
this
volume demands more than theFor the philosophicits
amount of apology.
public,
which makes upseverity of
for the scantiness of
numbers by the
its criticism, might justly have expected me to up the apparently novel and disputable position I had taken up in my contribution to Personal Idealism
follow
with a systematic treatise on the logic of
'
Pragmatism.'
And no
doubt
if it
had rested with me to transform wishesrestrictions
into thoughts
and thoughts into deeds withoutI
of time and space,
should willingly have expandedfull
my
sketch in Axioms as Postulates into a
account of the
beneficent simplification of the whole theory of knowledge
which must needsI
result
from the adoption of the principles
had ventured
to enunciate.
But the work of a college
tutor lends itself
more
easily to the conception than to thetreatise,
composition of a systematic
and so
for the present
the philosophic public will have to wait.
Thefeasible
general public, on the other hand,to
it
seemed more
please
by an altogether smaller and moreviz.,
practicable undertaking,
by republishing from various
technical journals, where conceivably the philosophic public
had already read them, the essays which compose the bulkof this volume.toI
have, however, taken the opportunityessays, partly because they
add several new
happened
to be available, partly because they
seemed to be needed
viii
HUMANISMAndthe old material
to complete the doctrine of the rest.
also has been thoroughly revised
and considerably aughopesthat
mented.collection,
So
that
I
am
not
without
the
though discontinuous
in form, will
be found to
be coherent in substance, and to present successive aspectsof a fairly systematic body of doctrine.it
To me
at least
has seemed that,
when thus taken
collectively,
these
essays not only reinforced
my
previous contentions, but
even supplied the ground for a further advance of thegreatest importance.It is
clear to all
pulse of thought that
who have kept in touch with the we are on the brink of great eventswhich a time-honouredworld.satireintelligible
in those intellectual altitudes
has
described
as
the
The
ancientderi-
shibboleths encounter opension.
yawns and unconcealed
The
rattling
of dry bones no
longer fascinates
respect nor plunges a self-suggested horde of fakirs in
hypnotic stupor.
The
agnostic maunderings of impotent
despair are flung aside with a contemptuous smile
by the
young, the strong, the
virile.
And
there
is
growing up a
reasonable faith that even the highest peaks of speculation
may
prove accessible to properly-equipped explorers, while
what seemed so unapproachable was nothing but a cloudland of confused imaginings.
Among the more marked symptoms that the times are growing more propitious to new philosophic enterprise, I would instance the conspicuoussuccess of Mr. Balfour's Foundations of Belief; the magnifi-
!
cent series of William James's popular works, The WillBelieve,
to
Human Immortality,;
and
Tlie Varieties of Religious
Experience
James Ward's important Gifford Lectures on Naturalism and Agnosticism ; the emergence from Oxford, where the idealist enthusiasm of thirty years ago longseemedto
have
fossilised into sterile
logic-chopping or to
have dissolved into Bradleian scepticism, of so audacious amanifesto as Personal Idealism; and most recently, but not
PREFACEleastfull
ix
of future
promise, the work of the energeticIt
Chicago School headed by Professor Dewey. 1therefore not impolitic,
seemed
and even imperative, to keep up
the agitation for a
more hopeful and humaner view ofan
metaphysics; and at the same time to herald the comingof what will doubtless be
epochmaking work,
viz.,
William James's promised Metaphysics.
II
Theobscure,
origin of great truths, as of great men,
is
usually
and by the time that the world has becomeIt
cognizant of them and interested in their pedigree, they
have usually grown
old.
is
not surprising therefore
that the central thought of our present Pragmatism, to wit
the purposivenesscharacter ofits
of our thought and
the
teleological
methods, should have been clearly stated
by Professor James so long ago as 1879. 2 Similarly I| was surprised to find that I had all along been a pragmatist myself without knowing it, and that little but the
name was
lacking to
my own3
advocacy of an essentiallyhas by
cognate position in 1892.
But Pragmatismthis
is'
no longer unobservedStrike, but hear
;
it
time reached thethe
me
! '
stage,
and
as
misconceptions due
to
sheer unfamiliarity are
refuted or
abandoned
it
will
rapidly enter on
the era
of profitable employment.
It
was
this latter probability
which formed one of1
my
chief motives for publishing
of articles in the Decennial Publications of Logical Theory are announced, but have not yet reached me. Though proceeding from a different camp, the works of Dr. J. E. MacTaggart and Prof. G. H. Howison should also be alluded to as adding to For while ostensibly (and indeed ostentatiously) employing the salutary ferment. the methods of the old a priori dogmatism they have managed to reverse its I have on purchief conclusions, in a charming but somewhat perplexing way. but in France pose confined this enumeration to the English-speaking world and even in Germany somewhat similar movements are becoming visible. 2 in Mind, O.S. No. 15. In his Sentiment of Rationality 3 Cp. pp. 119-121. In Reality and Idealism.'
They have published a number;
the University
their Studies in
;
'
'
'
xtheseessays.
HUMANISMThearepractical
advantagesthefield
of the pragto
matist methodis
so
signal,
be
covered
so
immense, and the reforms to be effected are soI
sweeping, that
would
fain
hasten
the acceptance of
so salutary a philosophy, even at the risk of prematurelyflinging these informal essays, as forlorn
hopes, against
the strongholds of inveterate prejudice.therefore thatI
It is in the
hope
may encourageI will
others to co-operate and
to cultivate a soil which promises such rich returns of
novel truth, that
indicate a
problems which seem to
me
urgently to
number of important demand treatment
by pragmatic methods.I will put first the reform of Logic. Logic hitherto has attempted to be a pseudo-science of a non-existent and im-
I
/[
possible process called pure thought.
Or
at least
we have
been ordered
in its
name
to
expunge from our thinking
\
every trace of feeling, interest, desire, and emotion, asthe most pernicious sources of error.It
has not been thought worthy of consideration thatall
these influences are the sources equally ofall-pervasive inlogic has been
truth and
our thinking.
The
result has
been that
rendered nothing but a systematic misIt
representation of our actual thinking.abstract
has been
made
and wantonly
difficult,
an inexhaustible source
of mental bewilderment, but impotent to train the mind,
by being assiduously kept apart from the psychology ofconcretethinking.
fAnd
yet a reverent
study of the
actual procedures of the
mind might have been a most
precious aid to the self-knowledge of the intellect^justify infull
To
detail
these grave strictures (from which
a
modern logicians, notably Professors Sigwart and Wundt, and Mr. Alfred Sidgwick, 1 can be more or less exempted) would be a long and arduousfewonlyof1
Whose
writings,
by reason perhaps of the ease of
their style,
have not
received from the experts the attention they deserve.
PREFACEundertaking.will sufficiently indicate the sort of difference
xi
Fortunately, however, a single illustration
Pragmatism
would introduce into theLet usfamiliar,
traditional maltreatment.
consider a couple of actual,reasoning,;
and probablyis
modes ofmust
(i)
The worldworldis
so
bad
that there
be a better
(2) thewill
so
bad that
there cannot
be a better.
It
probably be admitted
that both of these are
commonreach'
forms of argumentation,force,
and that neither
is
devoid of logicalit
even though
in neither case does
demonstration.'
And
yet
the two reasonings flatly contradict each other.
Now
my
suggestion
is
that
this contradiction
is
not verbal,
but deep-rooted in the conflicting versions of the natureof thought which they severally exemplify.
The secondto be strictly
argument alone'
itit
would seem could claim
logical.'
For
alone conforms to the canons of the
logical tradition
which conceives reasoning as the productvolition.all
of a
'
pure
'
thought untainted byreflections
And
as in
our
theoretical
we can
disregard
the
psychological conditions of actual thinking to the extent
of selecting examples in whichas examples,
we are interested merely we can appreciate its abstract cogency. In arguing from a known to an unknown part of theuniverse,it
is
'
logical
'
to
be guided by the indications
given by the former.the whole,
If the
known
is
a
'
fair
sample
'
of
sound
how can the conclusion be otherwise than At all events how can the given nature of the known form a logical ground for inferring in the unknown?
a complete reversal of
its
characteristics
?
Andof an
yet
this
is
preciselythis
what the
first
argumentIt
called for.
Must not
be called the
illogical capriceis
irrational
desire?
By no
means.
the
intervention of an emotionalfirstits
postulate which takes the
step in the acquisition of
new knowledge.
But
for
beneficent activity
we should have
acquiesced in our
xii
HUMANISMBut once an unknown transfiguration of theit
ignorance.actualis
desired,
can be sought, and
so, in
manya'
cases,
found.
The
passionless
concatenations
ofstill
pure
thought never could have reached, andjustified,
less
have
our conclusion
:
to attain
it
our thought needsvolition
to be impelled
and guided by the promptings of
and
desire.
NowIndeed
that such
ways of reasoning are not infrequentwill,I
and not unsuccessful,if
fancy, hardly beit
denied.
matters were looked into
might easily turn
out that reasonings of the second type never really occurin
actual knowing,failed
and that when they seemto pretend to bee.g.,
to
do
so,
we have only
to detect the hidden interest'
whichIn
incites the reason
dispassionate.'
the example chosen,
it
may have beenstupidityin
a pessimist's
despair that clothed itself in the habiliments of logic, orit
may haveit
been
merely
and
apathy,
a
want of imagination and enterpriseBut,
questioning nature.
may bewhatis
said,
the
question of the justificationstill
de jure of
done de facto
remains.
The votary
of an abstract logic
may?
indignantly exclaim
'
Shall Iis
lower
my
ideal of pure
thought because thereI
little
or no pure thinkingeternal, sacred
Shall
abandon Truth, immutable,and sanction asofis?
Truth,
as unattainable,
her
substitute
a
spurious
concretionit
practical
ex-
perience,
on the degrading plea that andall
what we needShallI,
to live
by,
we need
to live
by
in
other words, abase myself?
NoI
!
Perish the thought
Perish the phenomenalof
embodiment of Pure Reason outpopularly term "myself")
Time and Place (which
rather
than that the least abatement should be
made!
from the rigorous requirements of
my theoryare
of Thought
Strong
emotional
prejudices
always
hardis
to
reason with, especially when, as here, their naturefar
so
misconceived that they are regarded as the revelations
PREFACEof Pure
xiii
Reason. Still, in some cases, the desire for knowledge may prove stronger than the attachment to habitual modes of thought, and so it may not be whollyfruitless
to point out (i) that our objections are in'
no
wise disposed of by vague charges of a
confusion of
psychology and
logic
'
;
(2)
that the
canons
of right
Thought must, even from the most narrowly logical of standpoints, be brought into some relation to the pro-|cedures of actual thinking;
(3) that in point of fact thelatter;
former are derived from thefirst
(4) that if so, our
mode
of reasoning must receive logical recognition,
because (5) it is not only usual, but useful in the 'discovery of Truth (6) that a process which yields' '
;
valuable resultsthat, conversely,
mustIn
in
some sense be
valid,is
and (7)realis-
an ideal of validity whichshort,
not
able
is
not valid.to
how canof thought
a
logicset
whichasif
professesirrelevantit
be
the
theory
aside
a normal feature of our thinking?is it
And
when reformed by Pragmatism, it must assume a very different complexion, more natural and clearer, than while its movements were impeded by the conventions of a strait-laced Intellectualism ?cannot,
not evident that,
Secondly,exhaustible
Pragmatismfield
would
findinin
anthe
almostsciences,
in-
of
exploration
by
examining the multifarious wayshave
which
their
'
truths
come
to
be
established,
and
showing how. thehas acceleratedit
practical value of scientific conceptions
and determined
their acceptance.
And
is
not over-
sanguine to suppose that a clearer consciousness of theactual procedure of the sciencescritical rejection
would
also lead to the
of conceptions which are not needed, andfacilitate the
are not useful,
and would
formation of
new
1 conceptions which are needed.1
Most opportunely
scientific ideas
for my argument the kind of transformation of our which Pragmatism will involve has received the most copious and
admirable illustration in Professor Ostwald's great Naturphilosofhie.
Professor
b
xiv
HUMANISMIn the field of Ethics Pragmatism naturally
demands
to
know what
is
the actual use of the ethical
'
principles
which are handed on from one text-book to another. But it speedily discovers that no answer is forthcoming.
Nextvery
to nothing:
is
known aboutis
the actual efficacy of
ethical principleslittle
Ethics
a dead tradition which has
relation to the actual facts ofis
moral sentiment.
And
the reason obviously
that there has not been a
sufficient desire to
know
to lead to the proper researches
into the actual psychological nature
and distribution ofis
the
moral
sentiments.
Hencefor
there
implicit
in
Pragmatism a demandsterile
an inquiry to ascertain theIn the end this
actual facts, and pending this inquiry, for a truce to the
polemic about ethical principles.
seems not unlikely toIffinally
result in a real revival of Ethics.
we
turn
to
a
region
which
the the
vestedturbid
interests
of
time-honoured
organisations,
complications of emotion, and a formalism that too often
mergesto
in hypocrisy,
must always render hard of accessconsider
a sincere
philosophy, and
the attitude oflife,
Pragmatism towards thefind
religious
side of
we
shall
once morein principle
that
it
has a most important bearing.antithesis
For
Pragmatism overcomes the oldItall'
of Faith and Reason.'
shows on the one hand that
Faith
'
must underlieWithout
Reasonis
'
and pervadethere'
it,
nay,
that at bottom rationality itself
the supremest postulate
of Faith.
Faith, therefore,'
can be no
Reason, and
initially the
demands of Faith
must be asenables
legitimate and essentially as reasonable as those of the'
ReasonFaith.'
'
they pervade.
On'
the other hand,
it
us to draw the line between a genuine and a spurious'
The
spurious
faith,'
which
too oftento,is
is
all
theologiansOstwaldlikely
take
courage;
to
aspire
merely the
is not a professional philosopher at all, but a chemist, and has very never heard of Pragmatism but he sets forth the pragmatist procedure of the sciences in a perfectly masterly way.
PREFACEsmoothing over of an unfaced scepticism, orpallid
xvat
best a
fungus that, lurking in the dark corners of the
mind, must shun the light of truth and warmth of action.In contrast withit
a genuine faithItis
is
an ingredient
in
the growth of knowledge. the knowledge thatfurther conquests.it
ever realising itself in
needs and seeks
to help
it
on to
It
aims at
its
natural completion intrue or verification,
what weandbelieve.
significantly call the
making
in default of this
must be suspected as mere make-
method in Science and more fundamental than their difference. Both rest on experience and aim at its interpretation both and both require their anticipaproceed by postulationso the identity of
And
Religion
is
far
:
;
tions to
be
verified.
The
difference lies only in the:
mode
and
extent of their verifications
the former must doubtless;
differ
according to the nature of the subject
the latter
has gone
much
further in the case of Science, perhaps
merely because there has been soin
much
less
persistencereligious
attempts at
the
systematic verification of
postulates.Ill
It
is
clear,
therefore,
that
Pragmatism
is
abletois
to
propound an extensive programme of problems worked out by its methods. But even Pragmatismthe final term of philosophic innovationgreater andlists:
benot
there
is
yet a
more sovereignit
principle
now
entering the
of which
can only claim to have been the foreThis principle also has long beenof men,
runner and vicegerent.
working
in
the
minds
dumb, unnamed andripe
unavowed.
But the time seemsto let itfire.
nowit
formally to
nameitsI
it,
and
loose in order that
maythe
receive
baptism ofpropose,
accordingly,
to
convert
to
use
ofj
philosophic terminology a word which has long been
xvi
HUMANISMin
/famedi
history
and
literature,
and
toI
denominate
Humanism
the attitude of thought which
know
to be
habitual in William
James and
in myself,
which seems to
be sporadic and inchoate indestined,I
many
others,
and which
is
believe, to
win the widest popularity.were
There
would indeed be no flavour of extravagance and paradoxaboutthis last suggestion,it
not that the professional
study of Philosophy has so largely fallen into the handsof recluses
who have
lost
all
interest
in
the
practical
concerns of humanity, and have rendered philosophy like
unto themselves, abstruse,
arid, abstract
and
abhorrent.
But
in
itself
there
is
no reason why
this
should be thelife
character of philosophy.to be every man's concern,
Theand
finalif
theory of
oughttobe.
we caninterest,
dispel the notion
that
the
tiresome technicalities
of philosophy leadit
nothing of the least practical
yet
may
There
is
ground, then, for the hope that the study of aleast as profitableletters.
humaner philosophy may prove at enjoyable as that of the humaner'
and
'
In'Years
all
butI
name Humanism has long beendescribed one oftoits
in existence.
ago
most precious
texts,
William James's Willpassions
Believe} as a " declaration of the
independence of the concrete whole of
man
with
all
his
and emotions unexpurgated, directed against the cramping rules and regulations by which the Brahminsof the academic caste are tempted to impede thefree
expansiondoctrineto
of
human
life,''
andbiped
as
"
a
mostto
salutary
preach
to
a
oppressed
by manyallay his
'-ologies,' like
modern man, and calculated
growing doubts whether he has a responsible personality and a soul and conscience of his own, and is not a merephantasmagoria of abstractions, atransient'
complex ofnot reallyp.
shadowy formulas that ScienceIts
calls
the laws of nature.' "
great lesson was,1
I
held, that "there areOctober 1897 (N.S. No. 24,
In reviewing
it
for
Mind in
548).
PREFACEanyeternal
xvii
and non-human truthsbeliefs
to prohibit us from,
adopting the
we need
to live by, nor
any
infallible'
a priori
tests of truth to screen us
from the consequences"
of our choice."
Similarly Professor James, in reviewing
Personal Idealism}
pointedis
out
that
a
re-anthropoits
morphised universesophy."
the general outcome of
philo-
Only
for re-anthropomorphised'
we should'
hence-
forth read re-kumanised.
Anthropomorphismit it is
is
a term ofprove
disparagementdifficult to alter.
whose dyslogistic usage2
may
Moreover,
clumsy, and can hardlyI
be extended so as to cover what
mean by Humanism.it
There
is
no need to disclaim the truth of whichbut
is
the
adumbration, and a non-anthropomorphic thoughtabsurdity;
is
sheer
still
what we need
is
something wider andwith the greatalii
more
vivid.I
Similarly
would not disclaim
affinitiesis
saying of Protagoras, thatthings.
Manis
the
Measure of
Fairly interpreted, this
the truest and
most!
important thing that any thinker ever has propounded.It is
only in travesties such asto;
it
suited Plato's dialectic
purpose
circulatein reality
thatit
it
can
be said
to
tend
to
scepticism
urges Science to discover
how
Man mayhis
measure, and by what devices
measures with those of his fellow-men.
make concordant Humanismmore
therefore need not cast about for any sounder or
convenient starting-point.
Forgranted.
in
every philosophy
we must take some
things forit
Humanism,
like
Common
Sense, of which
may Man
fairly
claim to be the philosophic working out, takes
for
granted as he stands, and the world of man'sit
experience as
has come to seem to him.
This
is
thein
only natural starting-point, from whichevery direction,1
we can proceed
and to which we mustv.
return, enrichedButI
Mind forI tried to
2
January 1903 (N.S. No. 45, p. 94). do this in Riddles of the Sphinx, ch.
6-9.
now
think
the term needs radical re-wording.
xviii
HUMANISM
and with enhanced powers over our experience, from all the journeyings of Science. Of course this frank, thoughnot therefore'uncritical,'
acceptance of our immediate
experience and experienced self will seem a great deal to
be granted
'
by those addicted to abstruser methods. They have dreamt for ages of a priori philosophies without presuppositions or assumptions,' whereby Being might be conjured out of Nothing and the sage mightBut no obscurityin
penetrate the secret of creative power.
of verbiage has in the end succeeded
concealing the
utter failure of such preposterous attempts.
The a prioriin
philosophies have
all
been found out.all
And whatall
is
worse, have they not
been detected?
doing what they pretended to disclaimtake surreptitiously for granted
Do
they notnature
the
human
they pride themselves ontrying to solveIt is true that in
disavowing?with
Are they notfaculties?
human problemssuperhuman.
human
form they claim to transcend our nature,
or to raiseto exaltfor the
it
to the
But while they professit
human
nature, they are really mutilating!
all
kingdom of Abstraction's sake
their professed starting-points,
Purelife
For what are
Being, the Idea, the
Absolute, the Universal
I,
but pitiable abstractions from
experience, mutilated shreds of
humanis
nature,easily
whose
real
value for the understanding of
outweighed
by the
living experience of
an honest
man ?are
All these theories then
de facto start from the im-
mediateofit,
facts of
our experience.
Only theyit
ashamed
and assume without inquiry that
is
worthless as a
principle of explanation,
and that no thinker worthy ofThus, so far from assum-
the
name canless
tolerate the thought of expressly setting
out from anything so vulgar.ing
than the humanist, these speculations really mustgreatto
assume aaddition
deal
more.
They mustnature,their
assume,
in
ordinary
human
own
met-
PREFACEempiricalstarting-points
xixcorrectness
and
the
(always
more than dubious)'
of the deductions
whereby they have
de facto reached them.
Do you
propose then to accept as sacrosanct theconceptions of crudeall
gross unanalysed
Common?'
Sense,I
and to exempt them from
criticism
No,
only
propose to start with them, and to try and see whether
we could not get as far with them as far as we may want to get.
as withI
any
other, nay,
have
faith
that the
process of experience that has brought us to our present
stand-point has not been wholly error and delusion, and
may onright
the whole be trusted.
Andother,
I
am
quite sure that,it
or wrong,
we have noof
and that
is
e.g.
grotesque extravagance to imagine that we can put ourselves at
the
standpoint
the
Absolute.'
I
wouldof
protest, therefore, against every
form of a priori metaresults'
physical
criticism
'
that
condemns the'
our
experience up to date as an illusorytrial.
appearance
without
For
I
hold that the only valid criticism they canin,
receiveis
must comewhere and
and through,
their actual use.
It
just
fail
to
work
common-sense assumptions that we are theoretically justified, andin so far as
practically compelled, to
modify them.
But;
in
each such
case sufficient reasons must be
shown
it
is
not enough
merely to show that other assumptions can be made, and
couched
in
technical
language,
and that our data are
abstractly capable of different arrangements.I
There
are,
am
aware,
infinite
possibilities
of
conceptualis
re-
arrangement, but their discovery and construction
but
a sort of intellectual game, and has no real importance.In point of method, therefore,to vindicateitself,
Humanism
is
fully ableit
and so we can now define
as the
philosophic attitude which, without wasting thought upon
attempts to construct experience a priori,take
is
content to
human
experience as the clue to the world of
human
xx
HUMANISMManonhis
experience, content to takeas heis
own
merits, just
to start with, without insisting that he
must
first
be disembowelled of his interests and have his individuality
evaporated
and translated into technical jargon,
before he can be
deemed deserving of
scientific
notice.i.e.
To remember
that
Man
is
the measure
of all things,if
of his whole experience-world, and that
our standard;
measure be provedto
false all
our measurements are vitiatedis
remember
thathis
Man
the
maker of the sciences;
which subserve
human purposesits
to
remember
that an
ultimate philosophy which analyses us
awayits
is
thereby
merely exhibiting
failure
to achieve
purpose, that,
and more that might be stated to the sameroot ofIt
effect, is
the real
Humanism, whenceit,
all its
auxiliary doctrines spring.if
is
a natural consequence, for instance, that," real
the
facts
require
possibilities,
real
indeterminations,
real beginnings, real ends, real evil, real crises, catastrophes
and escapes, a
real
God and
a real moralthings,
life,
just
asin
commonhumanism
sense conceivesas conceptions'
these
may remainx
which philosophy gives up the'
attempt either to
overcome
or to reinterpret."
And
whether or not
Humanismall
will
have to recognise theradical'
ultimate reality of
the gloomier possibilities of James'ssafely be predicted that its'
enumeration,empiricism'
it
may
will grant to the possibilities of 'pluralism
a
more
careful
and unbiassed inquiry than monistic prea social beingnatural that
conceptions have as yet deigned to bestow upon them.
For seeing that man
is
it
is
Humanismuniverseit
should be sympathetic to the view that theultimately 'a joint-stockaffair.'
is
Andis
again,
will
receive with appropriate suspicion
all
attempts tothe formal
explain
away
the
humanfinal
personality which
and1
efficient
andto
causeix.).
ofI
all
explanation,
andfor
James,
Will
Believe
(p.
have substituted
humanism
empiricism.
PREFACEwill
xxiundistorted'
rather
welcome
it
in
its
unmutilated,
immediacy
as (though in an uncongenial tongue) theall
a
priori condition of
knowledge.''
And
so
it
will
approve
of that 'personal idealismspiritual values
which
strives to
redeem the
an
idealistic
absolutism has so treacher-
ously sold into the bondage of naturalism.
With
'
Common
Sense
'
it
will ever
keep
in
touch by
dint of refusing to value or validate the products of merely
speculative analyses, void of purpose
and of
use,
whichtheits
betoken merely a power to play with verbal
phrases.all
Thus Humanismdoctrines whichattitude.
will derive,
combine and include
may
be treated as anticipations of
For Pragmatism
itself is in
the
same case with PersonalItis
Idealism, Radical Empiricism and Pluralism.reality only the application of
in
Humanism to the theory of if human nature as a whole, be the clue to the theory of all experience, then human The purposiveness must irrigate the arid soil of logic.knowledge.If the entire
man,
facts of our thinking, freedsions,will
from
intellectualistic perver-
clearly
show
that
we
are
not
dealing withprocesses,
abstract concatenations
of purely intellectual
but with the rational aims of thinkers.as will be the value
Great therefore,
we must claim
for
Pragmatism as a
method, we must yet concede that
any method he has made, and thatinterpretit.
man is greater than our Humanism must
IVIt is
a well-known fact that things are not only
knownthe
by
their affinities but also
by
their opposites.for
And
fitness of the
term
Humanismbe
our philosophic purpose
could
hardlyits
better
displayed
than
by the ready
transfer of
old associations to a novel context.is
A
humanist philosopher
sure to be keenly interested
xxiiin
HUMANISMhuman thought andsentiment,facts for the
the rich variety of
and unwilling to ignore the actualbolstering
sake of
theory of what
up the narrow abstractions of some a prion 'all men must' think and feel under penalty
of scientific reprobation.
The humanist,
accordingly, will
tend to grow humane, and tolerant of the divergences of attitude which must inevitably spring from the divergentidiosyncrasies
of men.
Humanism,
therefore, will
still
remain opposed to Barbarism.itself in
But Barbarism may show
philosophy in a double guise, as barbarism of
temper and as barbarism ofdefects
which to
this
Both are human style. day remain too common amongdisplays itself in the inveteratein spite of
philosophers.
The former
tendency to sectarianism and intolerance,discredit
theit.
which the history of philosophy heaps uponto
For what could be more ludicrous thanpretence thatall
keep up the
and
must own the sway of some absolute unquestionable creed ? Does not every page ofan unique and personal achievementanother'ssoul
every philosophic history teem with illustrations that aphilosophic systemis
of which not even the servilest discipleship can transfusethefull
flavour
into
?
Why
should
we
therefore blind ourselves to the invincible individuality of
philosophy, and
behold realityit ?
deny each other the precious right to each at the peculiar angle whence he sees
others cannot and will not see as we we lose our temper and the faith that the heavenly harmony can only be achieved by a multitudinous symphony in which each of the myriad centres of experience sounds its own concordant note ? As for barbarism of style, that too is ever rampant,do, should
Why, when
even thoughattained
it no longer reaches the colossal heights by Kant and Hegel. If Humanism can restore
against such forces the lucid writing of the older Englishstyle, it will
make Philosophy once more
a subject gentle-
PREFACEmencan read with pleasure.
xxiii
And
it
can at least contend
that most of the technicalities which disfigure philosophic
writings
are
totally
unneeded, andis
that
the
stringing
together of abstractions
both barbarous and dangerous.it
Pedagogicallystudent,
it
is
barbarous, because
nauseates the
and because abstract ideas need to be illuminedillustrations to fix
by concreteallyit
them
in the
mind
:
logic-
is
dangerous, because
abstractions
mostly take
the form of worn-out metaphors which are like sunken
rocks in navigation, so that thereof error and
is
no more
fatal
cause
deception than the trust in abstract dictareal
which by themselves mean nothing, and whoselies in
meaning
the applications, which are not supplied.
In history, however, the great antithesis has been be-
tween Humanism and Scholasticism.easily
This also weits
mayFori
adopt, withoutis
detracting
from
force.
Scholasticism
one of the great
facts in
human
nature,
and a fundamental weakness of the learned world.as ever,it
Now,spirit
is
a spirit of sterilising pedantry that avoidslife
beauty, dreads clearness and deteststhat grovels infutile
and grace, a
muddy
technicality,
buries itself
in
theit-
burrowings of valueless researches, and conceals
self
from human insight by the dust-clouds of desiccatedit
rubbish which
raises.
Unfortunately the
scholastic
temper
is
one which
their
mode
of
life
induces in proit
fessors as easily as indigestion,
and frequently
rendersis
them the worst enemies of
their subjects.it
This
de-
plorable but might be counteracted, were
not thought
essential to a reputation for scientific profundity at least
to seem scholastic.
Humanism
therefore has before
it
an
arduous fight with the Dragon of Scholasticism, which,asit
were, deters
men from approaching
the golden applesin
that cluster on the tree of knowledge
the garden of
the Hesperides.
And
lastly,
may we
not emphasise that the old associ-
xxivations of the
HUMANISMword would?
still
connect withshall
Humanismit
a
Renascence of Philosophy
And
we not accept?
this
reminiscence as an
omen
for the futurestill
For
is
clear,
assuredly, that Philosophy has
to be born again tostill
enter on her kingdom, and that her votaries must
be
born again to purge their systems of theinveterate
taint
of an
barbarism.
verge, perhaps,
upon the
fanciful
But some of these suggestions it suffices to have shown:
that
Humanism makesand that
a goodin
name
for the
viewsits
I
seek
to label thus,its
such extension of
meaning
old associations lose no force but rather gain a subtler
flavour.
Toit
claim that in
its
philosophic useis
Humanism maydeny thatvain,
retain its old associations
not, however, toIt
must enter
also into
new
relations.
would be
for instance, to
attempt concealment of the fact that toits
Naturalism and Absolutism Naturalismtracingis
antagonismuseful as a
is
intrinsic.
valid
enough and
method of
the
connexions that permeate reality from the:
lowest to the highest level
but when taken as the last
word of philosophy it subjects the human to the arbitrament of its inferior. Absolutism, on the other hand,cherishes ambitions to attain the
superhuman
;
but, rather
than admititself
its
failure,
it
deliberately prefers to delude
with shadows, and to reduce concrete reality to the
illusory
adumbration of a phantom Whole.that whereas Naturalismit is
The
difference
thus
is this,
worthy of respect
for the
honest work
does, and has a real use as a partial
methoduse,
in subordination to the whole,its
Absolutism has noillusion.
and
explanatory valuewithit
is
nothing butwill
As comparedmiddle path;
these,
Humanism
pursue
the
will
neither reject ideals because theyit
are not realised, nor yet despise the actual because
can
conceive ideals.
It willit
not think the worst of Nature,its
but neither will
trust
an Absolute beyond
ken.
PREFACEI
xxv
pagesof
am well aware that the ideas of which the preceding may have suggested the barest outline are capable endless working out and illustration. And though Imade noassertion that could notrealiseif assailed, I
believe myself to have
be fully vindicated
most keenly that
a complete statement of the Humanist position far transcends, not only
my own
powers, but those of any singleto
man.
But
I
hoped that those who were disposed
sym-
pathy and open-mindedness would pardon the defects andoverlook the gaps in this informal survey of a gloriousprospect, while to thosein
who
are too imperviously encased
habit or in sloth, or too deeply severed fromI
me byoffence,
an alien idiosyncrasy,bringconviction,little,
knew
that
I
could never hope to
however much, nor to avoidsay.sail
however
I
might try to
Andits
so
I
thought the
good ship Humanism might
on
adventurous quest
for the Islands of the Blest with the lighter freight of these
essays as safely and hopefully as with the heaviest cargo.F. C. S.
SCHILLER.
Oxford, August
1903.
CONTENTSESSAYI.
PAGE
The Ethical
Basis of Metaphysics
'
.
i
II.
'Useless' Knowledge
1844.
III.
Truth
.
IV. Lotze's
Monism
.
.
.
62
V.
Non- Euclidean Geometry and the Kantiana Priori. .
85"
VI.VII.
The Metaphysics of the Time-Process.Reality and 'Idealism'. .
95
.110128157 166
VIII.IX.
Darwinism and Design
The Place of
Pessimism in Philosophy
X.
Concerning Mephistopheles
XI.
On Preserving Appearancesand Substance.
.
183.
XII. Activity
204 228
XIII.
The Desire for Immortality
.
XIV. The Ethical Significance of Immortality
250
XV. Philosophy and the Scientific Investigationof a Future Life. .
266
THE ETHICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICSARGUMENTThe Place'
1
of Conduct in Philosophy (a) The absolutist reduction of Conduct to appearance ; (6) the pragmatist reaction which makes conduct primary and thought secondary. Is Pragmatism irrationalism ? No, but it explains it by exposing the inadequacy of intellectualism. Ways of reaching Pragmatism (i) by justification of 'faith' against 'reason,' (2) historical, (3) evolutionary. The definition of Pragmatism. Its relation to psychological teleology. The supremacy of ' Good over True and ' Real.' Kant's Copernican Revolution, and the complication of the question of reality with that of our knowledge. A further similar step necessitated by the purposvieness of actual knowing. The function of:
'
'
'
'
the will in cognition.
'
Reality
'
as the response to a will toaction.
know, andI)
quasi-personal ; (3) metaphysics quasi-ethical ; (4) Pragmatism as a tonic the venture of faith and freedom ; (5) the moral stimulus of Pragmatism.it:
therefore dependent in part cannot be indifferent to us ;
on our
Consequently
(
*
reality
(2) our relations to
has Philosophy to say of Conduct? Shall it high or low, exalt it on a pedestal for the adoration of the world or drag it in the mire to beplaceit1 This essay, originally an Ethical Society address, appeared in the July It is now reprinted with a 1903 number of the International Journal of Ethics. few additions, the chief of which is the long note on pp. n-12. Its title has of course been objected to as putting the cart before the horse. To which it is easy to reply that nowadays it is no longer impracticable to use a motor car for the removal of a dead horse. And the paradox implied in the title is, of course, intentional. It is a conscious inversion of the tedious and unprofitable disquisitions on the metaphysical basis of this, that, and the other, which an erroneous conception of philosophical method engenders. They are wrong in method, because we have not de facto a science of first principles of unquestionable truth from which we can start to derive the principles of the special sciences. The converse of this is the fact, viz. that our principles are postulated by the needs, and slowly first secreted by the labours, of the special sciences, or of such preliminary exercises of our intelligence as build up the common-sense view of life. And so what my title means is, not an attempt to rest the final synthesis upon a single science, but rather that among the contributions of the special'
What
'
'
'
and must have,
sciences to the final evaluation of experience that of the highest, decisive weight.
viz. ethics,
has,
B
2
HUMANISM
i
Shall it equate trampled on by all superior persons ? Philosophers it with the whole or value it as nought? have, of course, considered the matter, though not perhaps with as great success, or as carefully as they ought.
And
so the relations of the theory to the practice of life, of cognition to action, of the theoretical to the practical reason, form a difficult and complicated chapter in the that history one fact, however, stands out clearly, viz. that the claims on both sides are so large and so insistent that it is hardly possible tohistory of thought.1
From
compromise between them.ofhis
The philosopher
is
not on
the whole a lover of compromise, despite the solicitations
man
lower nature. He will not, like the ordinary of sense, subscribe to a plausible platitude like, e.g.
Matthew Arnold's famous dictum that Conduct is threeMatthew Arnold was not a philosopher, fourths of Life. and the very precision of his formula arouses scientific suspicions. But anyhow the philosopher's imperiouslogic does not deal in quarters
Ccesar aut nullus ;
naught.
it is prone to argue aut Conduct be not the whole life, it is Which therefore shall it be ? Shall Conduct be:
if
the substance of the All, or the vision of a
Now,
it
alternativeinevitable.'
dream ? would seem at first that latterly the second seems to have grown philosophically almost For, under the auspices of the Hegelizing
Philosophy has uplifted herself once more to contemplation of the Absolute, of the unique Whole in which all things are included and transcended. Now whether this conception has any value for metaphysics is a moot point, on which I have elsewhere expressed a decided opinion 2 but there can hardly be a pretence of denying that it is the death of morals. For the ideal of the Absolute Whole cannot be rendered compatible with the antithetical valuations which form the vital atmosphere of human agents. They are partial appreciations, which vanish from the standpoint of the Whole. Without the distinctions of Goodidealists,'
a metaphysical
;
1
Cp.
the
essay on
'
Useless
'
Knowledge2
Aristotle.
for its treatment by Riddles of the Sphinx, ch. a.
Plato
and
i
ETHICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICSEvil,
3
and
Right and Wrong, Pleasure and Pain, Self and
Then and Now, Progress and Decay, human life would be dissolved into the phantom flow of an unmeanothers,
ing mirage.must, like
Absolute all moral distinctions be swallowed up and disappear. The All is raised above all ethical valuation and moral criticism it is beyond Good and Evil it is timelessly perfect, and therefore incapable of improvement. It transcends all our antitheses, because it includes them. And so to the metaphysician it seems an easy task to compose the perfection of the whole out of the imperfections of its parts he has merely to declare that the point of view of human action, that of ethics, is not and cannot be final. It is an illusion which has grownin theall
But
others,
'
:
'
;
:
transparent to the sage.ethics wanes.
And
so,
in
proportion as his
insight into absolute reality grows clearer, his interest inIt must be confessed, moreover, that metaphysicians no longer shrink from this avowal. The typical leader of this philosophic fashion, Mr. F. H. Bradley, never attempts to conceal his contempt for ethical considerations,
nor omits a sneer at the pretensions of practice to
" Make the be heard in the High Court of Metaphysics. 1 " and then realise moral point of view absolute," he cries, your position. You have become not merely irrational, but you have also broken with every considerable
religion."
And"ButThataI
this is
how heI
dismisses the appeal to practice, 2
if so,
what,3
may
be asked,not
is
the result in practice?;
reply at onceprejudice
is
my
business
"
it is
merely
" hurtful
" if " irrelevant
appeals to practical
allowed to make themselves heard." Altogether I can conceive nothing more pulverising to ethical aspiration than chapter xxv. of Mr. Bradley'sresults are
Appearance and Reality.^1
3is
Appearance and Reality, pp. 500-501. But does not this "hurtful" reaffirm the
2 Ibid. p.
450.
ethical valuation
which Mr. Bradley
trying to exclude ? * If in any one's mind any lingering doubts have survived as to the purport of this philosophic teaching, he has only to turn to the ingenious but somewhat
4
HUMANISMAndthe worst ofit all
'
ethics follows logically
is that this whole treatment of and legitimately from the general method of philosophising which conducts to the meta-
physical assumption of the Absolute.
Fortunately, however, there appears to be a natural tendency when the consequences of a point of view have been stated without reserve, and become plain to the meanest intelligence, to turn round and try something fresh. By becoming openly immoralist, metaphysic has And so, created a demand for its moral reformation.quite recently, there has
become
noticeable a
movement
which repudiates the assumptions and reverses the conclusions of the metaphysical criticism of ethics which we have been considering. Instead of regarding contemplation of the Absolute asin a diametrically opposite direction,
the highest form oftrivial
human
activity,
it
sets
it
aside as
and unmeaning, and puts purposeful action above Instead of supposing that Action purposeless speculation. is one thing and Thought something alien and other, and that there is not, therefore, any reason to anticipate that the pure contemplations of the latter will in any way relate to or sanction the principles which guide the former, it treats Thought as a mode of conduct, as anintegral part of activeresults as irrelevant,itlife.
Instead of regarding practical
Practical Value an essential And so far from admitting determinant of theoretic truth. the claim to independence of an irresponsible intelligence, it regards knowledge as derivative from conduct and as
makes
involving distinctively moral qualities and responsibilities in
a perfectly definite and traceable way.
In short, instead
of being reduced to the nothingness of an illusion, Conduct is reinstated as the all-controlling influence in every
department of life. Now, I cannot but believe that all effective ethical effort ultimately needs a definite basis of assumptions concerning the nature of life as a whole, and it is becauseflippant
and prolix exposition of the same doctrine in Mr. A. E. Taylor's Problem of Conduct. To Mr. Taylor the real problem of Conduct would appear to be why any one should continue to hanker after so manifest an absurdity as a
rule of conduct.
i
ETHICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICSam
5
I
willI
convinced that this new method of philosophising supply such a basis in an almost perfect way, that venture to avow myself its earnest advocate. If I
am
asked for
its
name,
I
can only say that
it
has been
called
Pragmatism by the chief author of its importance, Professor William James, whose recent book, The Varieties
of Religious Experience, soof philosophicliterature
many
others besides the readers
have been enjoying. But the name in this case does even less than usual to explain the meaning, and as the nature of Pragmatism has been greatly misunderstood, and even writers of intelligence and repute have conspicuously failed to grasp it, I musttry to putit
in a clearer light.I shall
a few be reached, before explaining how it should, in my opinion, be defined. For a considerable prejudice against it has arisen in some minds by reason of the method by which Professor James has approached it. Professor James first unequivocally advanced the pragmatist doctrine in connection with what he calls the Will to believe.' : Now this Will to believe was put forward as an intellectual right (in certain cases) to decide between alternative views, each of which seemed to make a legitimate appeal to our nature, by other than purely intellectual considerations, viz. their emotional interest
And
perhapsin
best begin
by mentioning
of the
ways
which Pragmatism
may
'
and
practical
value.
Although Professor James
laid
down
a
number
of conditions limiting the applicability of
which was the willingness and to abide by the results of to take the risks involved subsequent experience, it was not perhaps altogether astonishing that his doctrine should be decried as rankhis Will-to-believe, the chief of
irrationalism.
Irrationalism seemed a familiar and convenient labelfor the1
new
doctrine.
For irrationalism
is
a permanent
had, however, laid the foundation of his doctrine as long ago as 1879 Mind. And, though the name is new, in some form or other the Indeed, it recognition of the thing runs through the whole history of thought. would be strange if it had been otherwise, seeing that, as we contend, the actual procedure of the human mind has always been (unconsciously) pragmatist.
He
m
an
article in
6or
HUMANISM
i
continually recrudescent phenomenon of the moral consciousness, the persistent vogue of which it has always
been hard to explain.at the present
It is ably and brilliantly exemplified day by Mr. Balfour's Foundations of Belief, and, in an extreme and less defensible form, by Mr. Benjamin Kidd. And if, instead of denouncing it, we try
to
understand
it,
we
shall
not find thatit
it
is
entirely
absurd.
At bottom indeed
indicates
little
more than a
defect in the current rationalism, and a protest against the rationalistic blindness towards the non- intellectualfactors in the foundation of beliefs.
Sense such has always shown a certain sympathy what is called the pure protests against the pretensions of It intellect to dictate to man's whole complex nature.withall
And Common
has always
felt
that there are
'
reasons of the heart of
which the head knows surpasses mere understanding, and that these possess a higher rationality which a narrow intellectualism has failed to comprehend. Now if one had to choose between Irrationalism and Intellectualism, there would be no doubt that the former would have to be preferred. It is a less violent departure from our actual behaviour, a less grotesque caricature of Like Common Sense, therefore, our actual procedure. Pragmatism sympathises with Irrationalism in its blind revolt against the trammels of a pedantic Intellectualism. But Pragmatism does more it not only sympathises, it;
nothing,' postulates of a faith that
explains.
It
vindicates the rationality of Irrationalism,;
without becoming itself irrational it restrains the extravagance of Intellectualism, without losing faith in the intellect. And it achieves this by instituting a fundamental analysis of the common root both of the reason and of the emotional revulsion against its pride. By showingthe 'pure' reason to be a pure figment, and a psychologicalimpossibility,to
and the real structure of the actual reason be essentially pragmatical, and permeated through and through with acts of faith, desires to know and wills toto
believe,
possible,
disbelieve and to make believe, it renders nay unavoidable, a reconciliation between a
i
ETHICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICSis
7
reason which
humanised and a
faith which is rationalised in
the very process which shows their antithesis to be an error.
That, however, Pragmatismintervening in
should
have
begun
by-
the ancient controversy between Reason
and Faith was something of an accident. In itself it might equally well have been arrived at by way of a moral revolt from the unfruitful logic-chopping and aimless quibbling which is often held to be the sum total ofphilosophy.
Orcritical
again,
it
might be reached, most
instructively,
by a
consideration ofLotze,1
many
historic views, notably those
and of the unsolved problems which they leave on our hands. Or, once more, by observing the actual procedure of the various sciences and their motives for establishing and maintaining the truth ofof''
Kant and
their various propositions,
we may comewhatin
to realise that
what worksaccept as'
in
practice
is
actual
knowing we
true.'
is
But to me personally the straightest road to Pragmatism one which the extremest prejudice can scarce suspect Instead of truckling to the encroachments of theology. of saying like Professor James, so all-important is it to'
secure the right action that (in cases of real intellectualit is lawful for us to adopt the belief most congenial with our spiritual needs and to try whether our
alternatives)
faith will not
make
it
come
true,' I
should rather say 'the
traditional notion
of beliefs determined by pure reason
For how can there be such is wholly incredible. How, that is, can we so a thing as " pure " reason ? separate our intellectual function from the whole complex of our activities, that it can operate in real independence I cannot but conceive the of practical considerations ? reason as being, like the rest of our equipment, a weaponalone.in
a means of achieving must follow that the practical use, which has developed it, must have stamped itself upon its inmostthe struggle for existence andIt
adaptation.
done
Or, as Professor James suggested, and as Prof. A. W. Moore has actuallyin the case of Locke (see his Functional versus the Representational Theory of Knowledge), by a critical examination of the English philosophers.1
8structure, even ifit
HUMANISM
i
has not moulded it out of pre-rational instincts. In short, a reason which has not practical value for the purposes of life is a monstrosity, a morbid aberration or failure of adaptation,
which natural selection mustI
sooner or later wipe away.'It is in
some such way
that
should prefer to pave theit
way for an appreciation Hence I may now venturerecognition
of what we mean by Pragmatism.to define
as the thorough
that the purposive character of mental life generally must influence and pervade also our most re-
motely cognitivetheory oflife
activities.it is
1
In other words,
a conscious application to the of the psychological facts of cognition as
In the light they appear to a teleological Voluntarism. of such a teleological psychology the problems of logic and metaphysics must appear in a new light, and decisive weight must be given to the conceptions of Purpose
and End.
Or
again,
it
is
a systematic protest against
the practice of ignoring in our theories of
Thought and
our actual thinking, and the relation of all our actual realities to the ends of our practical life. It is an assertion of the sway of human valuations over every region of our experience, and a denial that such valuation can validly be eliminated from theReality the purposiveness ofall
contemplation of any reality
we know.teleological valuationis
And inasmuch
as such
also
the special sphere of ethical inquiry, Pragmatism
may
be
1 This is wider, and I think more fundamental, than any of the definitions in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy (ii. pp. 321-322), for the reason that the logical development of pragmatist method in my essay on Axioms as Postulates came out (in Personal Idealism) too recently to be available for the purposes of the Dictionary. I think, however, that intrinsically also neither Peirce's, nor James's, nor Baldwin's accounts are quite adequate. In Peirce's sense, that a conception is to be tested by its practical effects, the principle is so obvious as to be comparatively unimportant, and, perhaps, as he says, is somewhat a matter of youthful buoyancy. James's definition, that the whole meaning of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, does not emphasise the essential priority of action to thought, and does not explicitly correlate it with his own will to believe.' Baldwin tries to confine it to the genetic sphere and to deny that it yields a philosophy of reality. But his own subsequent account (s.v. Truth) of the psychology of the truth-valuation seems inconsistent with this and far more satisfactory. He fails, moreover, to explain how he can get at reality withoat knowing it, and how our estimations of what truth is can disregard and become nd ependent of our modes of establishing it.' ''
i
ETHICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICSAta blowit
9
said to assign metaphysical validity to the typical
method
of ethics.of
awards to the ethical conception
Good supreme authority over the logical conception of True and the metaphysical conception of Real. The Good becomes a determinant both of the True and of the Real. For from the pursuit of the latter we may nevereliminate the reference to the former. Our apprehension of the Real, our comprehension of the True, is alwayseffected by beings who are aiming at the attainment of some Good, and it seems a palpable absurdity to deny that this fact makes a stupendous difference. I should confidently claim, therefore, that by Pragmatism a further step has been taken in the analysis of our experience which amounts to an important advance in
that self-knowledge on which our knowledge of the world depends. Indeed, this advance seems to me to be of a
magnitude comparablethat which gave to
with,
and no
less
momentous
than,
the epistemological question priority
over theIt is
ontological.
generally recognised as the capital achievement of modern philosophy to have perceived that a solution
What is Reality? is not has been decided how Reality can come within our ken. Before there can be a real for us at all, the Real must be knowable, and the notion of an unof the ontological questionpossible untilit
knowable
reality
is
useless,
because
it
abolishes
itself.
The
true formulation therefore of the ultimate question of
metaphysics must become What can I know as real? thus the effect of what Kant called the Copernican revolution in philosophy is that ontology, the theory of Reality, comes to be conditioned by epistemology, the theory of our knowledge. But this truth is incomplete until we realise all that is involved in the knowledge being ours and recognise the Our knowing is not the real nature of our knowing.
And
mechanical operation of a passionless which
'
pure
'
intellect,
And
Grinds out Good and grinds out 111, has no purpose, heart, or will.
io
HUMANISM;
i
Pure intellection is not a fact in nature it is a logical which will not really answer even for the purposes of technical logic. In reality our knowing is driven and guided at every step by our subjective interests and These preferences, our desires, our needs and our ends.fiction
form the motive powers also of our intellectual life. Now what is the bearing of this fact on the traditional dogma of an absolute truth and ultimate reality existing It would for themselves apart from human agency? utterly debar us from the cognition of Reality as it is in if such a thing there itself and apart from our interests' '
were.
impose the conditions under which Only such aspects of alone Reality can be revealed. Reality can be revealed as are not merely knowable but as are objects of an actual desire, and consequent attempt, to know. All other realities or aspects of Reality, which there is no attempt to know, necessarily remain unknown, and for us unreal, because there is no one to look for them. Reality, therefore, and the knowledge thereof, essentially presuppose a definitely directed effort to know. And, like other efforts, this effort is purposive
For our
interests
;
it is
necessarily inspired
by the conception of some good
which it aims. Neither the question of Fact, therefore, nor the question of Knowledge can be raised without raising also the question of Value. Our Facts when analysed turn out to be Values,' and the conception of 'Value' therefore becomes more ultimate than that ofat'' ' '
Fact.'
Our
valuations thus pervade our whole experience,'
consent to recognise.
whatever knowledge we is no knowing without valuing, if knowledge is a form of Value, or, in other words, a factor in a Good, Lotze's anticipation 1 has been fully realised, and the foundations of metaphysics have actually been found to lie in ethics.
and
affect
whatever
fact,'
'
'
If,
then, there
In
this
becomes what ?
What'
way'
theis
ultimate
question
for
philosophy
Real
Reality for one aiming at knowing means, real for what purpose ? to what1
Metaphysics (Eng. Tr.
),
ii.
p. 319.
i
ETHICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICS
n
end?
in what use ? And the answer always comes in terms of the will to know which puts the question. This at once yields a simple and beautiful explanation of the different accounts of Reality which are given in the
various sciences and philosophies.
The purpose
of the
questions being different, so
is
their purport,
and so must
be the answers. For the direction of our effort, itself determined by our desires and will to know, enters as a necessary and ineradicable factor into whatever revelation of Reality we can attain. The response to our questions is always affected by their character, and that is in our power. For the initiative throughout is ours. It is for usto consult the oracle of Nature or to refrain to formulate our;
it is
for us
demands and
to put our questions.
If
Nature will not respond, and we must try again. But we can never be entitled to assume either that our action makes no difference or that nature contains no answer to a question we have never thought
we
question
amiss,
to put.1
1
That the Real has a determinate nature which the knowing reveals but does so that our knowing makes no difference to it, is one of those sheer assumptions which are incapable, not only of proof, but even of rational defence. It is a survival of a crude realism which can be defended only, in a fragmatist manner, on the score of its practical convenience, as an avowed fiction. On this ground and as a mode of speech we can, of course, have no quarrel with it. But as an ultimate analysis of the fact of knowing it is an utterly gratuitousnotaffect,
interpretation.in the act of'
The
plain fact'
is
that
we come
into contact with reality only
knowing or experiencing it. As unknowable, therefore, the Real The situation therefore in no wise is nil, as unknown, it is only potentially real. the assumption that what the Real is in the act of knowing, it is also sanctions One might as well argue that because an orator is outside that relation. eloquent in the presence of an audience, he is no less voluble in addressing himself. The simple fact is that we know the Real as it is when we know it ; we know nothing whatever about what it is apart from that process. It is
And I can see meaningless therefore to inquire into its nature as it is in itself. no reason why the view that reality exhibits a rigid nature unaffected by our treatment should be deemed theoretically more justifiable than its converse, a travesty of Pragmatism which that it is utterly plastic to our every demand The actual situation is of course has attained some popularity with its critics. a case of interaction, a process of cognition in which the subject and the 'object' determine each the other, and both 'we' and 'reality' are involved, There is no warrant therefore for the assumption and, we might add, evolved. that either of the poles between which the current passes could be suppressed What we ought to say is that when the mind knows without detriment. reality both are affected, just as we say that when a stone falls to the ground both it and the earth are attracted. are driven, then, to the conviction that the determinate nature of reality It is merely does not subsist outside or beyond the process of knowing it. a lesson of experience that we have enshrined in the belief that it does so subsist.
'
'
'
We
'
'
'
'
'
12It is
HUMANISM
i
no exaggeration therefore to contend, with Plato, that in a way the Good, meaning thereby the conception of a final systematisation of our purposes, is the supreme controlling power in our whole experience, and that in abstraction from it neither the True nor the Real can exist. For whatever forms of the latter we may have
some purposive activity, some conception of a good to be attained, was involved as a condition of the discovery. If there had been no activity on our part, or if that activity had been directed to ends other than itdiscovered,
was, there could not have been discovery, or that discovery. must discard, therefore, the notion that in the
We
constitution of the world
we count
for
nothing, thatis
itis,
matters not what
wedo.
do, because RealityIt is true
what
it
whateveractionis
we mayessential
on the contrary that our
and indispensable, that to some extent the world (our world) is of our making, and that without To what extent and us nothing is made that is made. in what directions the world is plastic and to be mouldedThings behave in similar ways in their reaction to modes of treatment, the From this we have chosen to differences between which seem to us important. infer that things have a rigid and unalterable nature. It might however have been better to infer that therefore the differences must seem unimportant to the things.
The truth is that the nature of things is not determinate but determinable, like that of our fellow-men. Previous to trial it is indeterminate, not merely for ourignorance, but really and from every point of view, within limits which it is our business to discover. It grows determinate by our experiments, like human character. all know that in our social relations we frequently put questions which are potent in determining their own answers, and without the putting would leave their subjects undetermined. 'Will you love me, hate me, trust me, help me?' are conspicuous examples, and we should consider it absurd to argue that because a man had begun social intercourse with another by knocking him down, the hatred he had thus provoked must have been a pre-existent reality which the blow had merely elicited. All that the result entitles us to assume is a capacity for social feeling variously responsive to various modes of stimulation. Why, then, should we not transfer this conception of a determinable indetermination to nature at large, why should we antedate the results of our manipulation and regard as unalterable facts the reactions which our ignorance and blundering provoke ? To the objection that even in our social dealings not all the responses are indeterminate, the reply is that it is easy to regard them as having been determined by earlier experiments. In this way, then, the notion of a fact-in-itself might become as much of a philosophic anachronism as that of