school children’s ability to distinguish hypothetical beliefs

8/12/2019 School Childrens Ability to Distinguish Hypothetical Beliefs

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Elementary School Childrens Ability to Distinguish Hypothetical BeliefsFrom Statements of Preference

Irene-Anna N. DiakidoyUniversity of Cyprus

Christos IoannidesUniversity of Pireaus

The authors examined students understanding of hypotheses as beliefs that can be empirically verified.

Thirty second graders and 30 sixth graders considered cases of disagreement about foods and colors that

reflected either alternative hypotheses or different preferences. Their task was to decide whether the

validity of each expressed belief could be determined and to justify their decision. Younger students

considered both hypotheses and preferences as empirically verifiable, whereas older students were better

able to recognize in some cases that preferences are legitimately variable. This lack of distinction may

reflect limited metaconceptual ability or a deterministic epistemological view, both of which might

interfere with the understanding of the hypothesis-testing process.

In the past 15 years, there has been a proliferation of research

exploring issues related to the acquisition of scientific knowledge

and skills (Ioannides & Vosniadou, 2002; Klaczynski, 2000;

Klahr, Fay, & Dunbar, 1993; Kuhn, Amsel, & OLoughlin, 1988;

Sodian, Zaitchik, & Carey, 1991) as well as to the teaching of

science in elementary and secondary schools (Guzzetti, Snyder,

Glass, & Gamas, 1993; Smith, Maclin, Grosslight, & Davis, 1997;

Toth, Klahr, & Chen, 2000). One line of this research has explic-

itly focused on the knowledge and skills that are taken to underlie

the understanding and the application of the scientific method (see,

e.g., Kuhn, Black, Keselman, & Kaplan, 2000). A central part of

this knowledge is the understanding of the hypothesis as a causal

or categorical statement that accounts for a particular state ofaffairs. The scientific method revolves around the formulation and

empirical testing of hypotheses, and conclusions regarding their

validity enrich, modify, or restructure scientific knowledge. The

present study focused on the understanding of hypotheses as

statements or assertions whose truth value can be determined, at

least to some extent, through empirical testing.

Studies by Kuhn and her colleagues (e.g., Kuhn et al., 1988;

Kuhn, Garcia-Mila, Zohar, & Andersen, 1995) have documented

preadolescent childrens weaknesses in scientific reasoning and,

specifically, in the ability to test causal hypotheses in a systematic

way. Kuhn has interpreted these findings as attributable to a lack

of differentiation between prior belief and the evidence that may

confirm or disconfirm it (Kuhn et al., 1988). On the other hand,

Sodian et al. (1991) have shown that first and second graders can

distinguish between conclusive and inconclusive tests of simple

hypotheses when these are presented to them. This finding led

Sodian et al. to the contrasting conclusion than even young chil-

dren can differentiate between a belief and the evidence that may

support or disconfirm it. The ability to differentiate between belief

and evidence is crucial to understanding the function and potential

outcomes of hypothesis testing in science domains. Equally cru-

cial, however, is the ability to understand what types of beliefs

would constitute a hypothesis and would, therefore, be subject to

empirical verification.

Hypotheses as a Subset of Belief Statements

To the extent that a hypothesis is promoted by one or more

individuals as a (potentially) true or valid account of a state of

affairs, it can be taken to represent a belief that, nevertheless, is

subject to disconfirmation on the basis of evidence. The opposite,

however, is not necessarily true. Only a subset of statements or

assertions from the universe of beliefs can be subject to discon-

firmation and therefore constitute legitimate hypotheses of the type

that would lend themselves to systematic scientific inquiry

(Dewey, 1906; Stace, 1945). This point is more clearly illustrated

by considering one such subset of beliefs that could be taken, more

appropriately, to represent preferences. The assertion Red is a

more beautiful color than blue represents an evaluative proposi-

tion (Dworkin, 1996) that can be classified as a personal prefer-

ence. It also represents a belief to the extent that it is held to be true

by at least one person (Southerland, Sinatra, & Matthews, 2001).

As it is formulated, however, its generalizability is indeterminate,

and therefore, it cannot be subjected to the empirical test. On the

other hand, the validity and generalizability of the related assertion

Most people think that red is a more beautiful color than blue

can be determined, and therefore, it can function as a legitimate

hypothesis. The outstanding difference between these statements

of beliefthe hypothesis and the preferenceis that one can be

subjected to the empirical test whereas the other cannot because it

Irene-Anna N. Diakidoy, Department of Education, University of

Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus; Christos Ioannides, Department of Education,

University of Piraeus, Piraeus, Greece.

The authors made equal contributions to this article so author names

appear in alphabetical order.

We thank D. Natsopoulos for reviewing an earlier draft of the manu-

script, A. Raftopoulos for his comments about the philosophical distinc-

tions between kinds of beliefs, A. Andreou for his help with data collection,

and the children who participated in the study.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Irene-

Anna N. Diakidoy, Department of Education, University of Cyprus, Kal-

lipoleos 75, P.O. Box 20537, CY-1678 Nicosia, Cyprus. E-mail:

[email protected]

Journal of Educational Psychology Copyright 2004 by the American Psychological Association2004, Vol. 96, No. 3, 536 544 0022-0663/04/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-0663.96.3.536

536


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concerns a matter of personal taste (Carpendale & Chandler,

1996).

The understanding of this difference can be taken to reflect the

development of metacognitive competence (Kuhn et al., 1995) to

the extent that it implicates a reflection on the types of beliefs that

one may hold. As such, it presupposes the understanding of belief

as a mental state distinct from physical fact (Perner, 1991) but fallsshort of the sophisticated metastrategic competence that is in-

volved in the coordination of multiple sources of evidence with

theory and that preadolescents have been found to lack (Kuhn et

al., 1988). It is, however, intimately connected with the ability to

recognize and/or formulate researchable questions and therefore is

a prerequisite to understanding the function of the scientific

method and its successful application. The immersion of students

in the scientific process, as in the case of inquiry-based learning,

involves, among other things, their active participation in the

formulation and testing of hypotheses (Chinn & Malhotra, 2002;

McGinn & Roth, 1999). It would appear, then, that the understand-

ing of hypotheses as a distinct set of beliefs defined by their

potential to be empirically verified would justify, to the mind of

the student, the process of testing them in the context of scientific

inquiry. That same understanding can be expected to highlight the

tentative and evolving nature of scientific knowledge (Elby &

Hammer, 2001; Polanyi, 1950), promoting thereby the develop-

ment of more sophisticated epistemological views (Carey & Smith,

1993; Southerland et al., 2001).

The ability to differentiate hypotheses from other belief state-

ments, such as preferences, is also related to the ability to differ-

entiate hypotheses from evidence (Sodian et al., 1991) but only to

the extent that it involves theat least implicitrecognition that

the truth value of a belief is supportable by facts or reasons that are

distinct from the belief itself. The child, for example, who offers an

explicit reason for holding a belief of any kind that is not a simple

restatement of the belief itself demonstrates a basic understandingthat reasons represent distinct entities that are brought to bear on

beliefs. This understanding, however, does not necessarily imply

the ability to distinguish between different types of belief that, to

our mind, would also have implications concerning the ability to

distinguish between the various types of information or reasons

that can support them. Therefore, the highly constrained context of

the Sodian et al. (1991) study (i.e., children had to choose between

two tests that could yield either conclusive or inconclusive, but

otherwise appropriate, evidence concerning the validity of two

simple and mutually exclusive hypotheses) does not permit any

inferences concerning the extent to which children recognized the

presented contrasting beliefs as hypotheses.

Distinguishing Hypotheses From Other Belief Statements

Despite its importance with respect to the acquisition of scien-

tific knowledge and skills, the ability to distinguish between hy-

potheses and other types of beliefs has not been the subject of

intense investigation within the areas of cognitive-developmental

and educational psychology. However, one study by Carpendale

and Chandler (1996) has implications with respect to this issue.

Their study was designed to assess childrens ability to understand

and account for differences in interpretation and preference in

relation to their understanding of false belief. In addition to a

standard false belief task, they also presented 5- to 6-year-old and

7- to 8-year-old children with scenarios in which two puppets

disagreed on matters of taste (e.g., which soup was tastier and

which picture was nicer) or arrived at a different interpretation of

an ambiguous stimulus. The ambiguous stimulus tasks involved

lexical ambiguity (e.g., having to wait for a ring), referential

ambiguity (e.g., object hidden under two equally large blocks),

and figural ambiguity (e.g., duckrabbit and ratman drawings).

For each scenario, children were asked to indicate whether it wasall right for the puppets to disagree and to justify their answer.

Indications that the different interpretations or tastes were equally

acceptable were scored as correct responses. Carpendale and

Chandlers results showed that childrens scores on the matter-of-

taste tasks were significantly different from their scores on the

ambiguous stimuli tasks. Overall, all children were more likely to

indicate that differences in preference were more acceptable than

differences in interpretation. More importantly, however, there

was also a significant main effect of age, indicating that the older

children were more likely to correctly attribute differences in

preference to matters of personal taste and differences in interpre-

tation to the ambiguous nature of the stimuli.

Acknowledging variations in preference as more acceptable

than variations in interpretation reflects a basic recognition of

these statements of belief as different in some respects. In the

Carpendale and Chandler (1996) study, however, the conflicting

preferences and interpretations were equally acceptable. What

distinguished them was the source of their justification (i.e., person

based as opposed to stimulus based) and their potential to be

verified as true and generalizable. What Carpendale and Chandler

termed interpretations could essentially be conceptualized as cat-

egorical hypotheses concerning the nature or the meaning of an

ambiguous stimulus. Therefore, one could verify them the same

way one would test such a hypothesis: by collecting more infor-

mation about the stimulus in question and its relation to other

stimuli. In contrast, one would not be able to arrive at a similar

generalizable conclusion concerning variations in preference.Their validity must be taken at face value because the observed

variations derive from personal subjective experience and neither

need nor admit external justification.

The fact that the older children were better able to distinguish

preferences from interpretations on the basis of differences in

sources of origin and justification (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996)

reflects the development of an understanding of a fundamental

way in which various beliefs may differ from each other. However,

it does not necessarily reflect a corresponding understanding that

what further distinguishes a particular set of beliefs is their poten-

tial for empirical validation. Therefore, the present study sought to

assess the extent to which elementary school children could dif-

ferentiate hypotheses from other beliefs as statements whose truth

value can be decided upon on the basis of empirical testing. The

sample included second graders, whose age range corresponded to

that of the older children in the Carpendale and Chandler (1996)

study, and sixth graders. The choice of the sample was motivated,

first, by the fact that it is in elementary school that children come

formally into contact with scientific knowledge and activities as

such and, second, by the possibility of a developmental progres-

sion toward a more mature understanding of what would constitute

a hypothesis and an empirical test in relation to that formal

exposure. We expected, then, that the sixth-grade students would

be better able to recognize that the validity of a hypothesis can be

determined whereas the validity of a preference must be taken at

face value.

537DIFFERENTIATING HYPOTHESES FROM PREFERENCES


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Our basic procedure was similar to the one used by Carpendale

and Chandler (1996) in the sense that we also presented partici-

pants with scenarios of disagreement about foods and colors that

reflected either a difference in preference or alternative hypotheses

of the type that could be the focus of scientific investigation.

However, instead of asking children to decide whether the dis-

agreement was acceptable, we asked them to decide whether onecould determine which side was right or wrong and to justify their

decision. We asked for a justification because a positive answer

with respect to whether the validity of a particular assertion could

be determined would not permit any inferences regarding chil-

drens understanding of what would constitute a hypothesis test.

For example, a child, or an adult for that matter, might indicate that

the validity of an assertion can be determined by asking an expert

or by reading. Although this would certainly influence ones

gravitation toward one side of an issue, it would not count as

legitimate empirical evidence on the basis of which hypotheses are

evaluated in science domains. Moreover, one could indicate that a

decision can be based on appearance and taste comparisons. In this

case, a belief is justified on the basis of subjective evaluation, and

although this is a way of assessing whether one shares a prefer-

ence, it would not count as a legitimate hypothesis test.

Research has shown that prior knowledge and personal beliefs

can influence reasoning (see, e.g., Stanovich & West, 1997), the

extent to which hypotheses are perceived as plausible (Klahr et al.,

1993), and the way evidence is interpreted and evaluated (see, e.g.,

Chinn & Brewer, 1993). Specifically, Klaczynski (2000) found

that although adolescents used higher order analytic reasoning to

evaluate evidence that was inconsistent with their beliefs, they

relied on simple heuristics to evaluate evidence that was consis-

tent. We reasoned, therefore, that favoring one alternative belief

might influence decisions concerning the extent to which its va-

lidity could be tested and, more importantly, proposals concerning

the way it could be tested. To control for possible prior beliefbiases in the present study, half of all the disagreements involved

one alternative hypothesis or preference that students had been

found to favor, whereas the other half involved neutral

alternatives.

To summarize, the primary goal of the present study was to

determine the extent to which elementary school children distin-

guished hypotheses from preferences as belief statements whose

truth value can be determined and to examine the kinds of tests that

they proposed. We hypothesized that older children would be more

likely than younger children (a) to indicate that only hypotheses, as

opposed to preferences, could be tested and (b) to propose empir-

ical tests, although not necessarily well designed or correct, as

opposed to subjective evaluations or references to authority. An

additional but secondary goal was to examine the extent to which

younger and older children were influenced by their prior belief

biases in their decisions and test proposals.

Method

Participants and Procedure

The participants in the study were 60 students who came from predom-

inantly middle-class backgrounds and whose native language was Greek.

All students were attending the same elementary school located in a large

metropolitan area in the island nation of Cyprus. Half of the students ( n

30) were attending Grade 2 (15 boys and 15 girls), and their ages ranged

from 7 years 6 months to 8 years 3 months (mean age 7 years 11

months). The rest of the students (n 30) were attending Grade 6 (17 boys

and 13 girls), and their ages ranged from 11 years 3 months to 12 years 4

months (mean age 11 years 7 months). All participants came from one

second-grade classroom and one sixth-grade classroom chosen randomly

from the three classrooms per grade level available at the school. Grade

point averages and individual subject test scores were not made available

as a matter of school policy. However, at the time of the study, the school

had an explicit mixed-ability grouping policy, and therefore, it is morelikely that a range of school achievement levels was represented in the

sample.

All students were interviewed individually twice by Christos Ioannides,

an experienced science educator, and his research assistant. Both inter-

views took place during the school day and were conducted in the students

and the researchers native language. At the beginning of the first inter-

view, each student was informed about the general purpose of the study and

the types of questions that he or she would be asked. The first interview

took place after the student had indicated his or her willingness to continue

and lasted approximately 5 min. Its purpose was to reveal students

personal preferences about foods and colors and their prior beliefs con-

cerning the properties of these. The second interview took place 3 days

later and lasted approximately 10 min. Its purpose was to reveal students

understanding of hypotheses as distinct from preferences. All responses

were tape-recorded and transcribed.

Materials

Preliminary questionnaire. The first interview was structured accord-

ing to a preliminary questionnaire that included 12 questions. Half of the

questions were designed to elicit students preferences about foods and

colors. Specifically, students were asked to name foods and colors they

liked best, those they disliked, and those they neither liked nor disliked.

The rest of the questions were designed to elicit students personal beliefs

about specific properties of foods and colors that could potentially function

as hypotheses. Specifically, students were asked to name foods they

believed had high nutritional value, foods they believed had low nutritional

value, and foods whose nutritional value they believed was average.

Similarly, students were asked to name colors they believed were highly

visible from a long distance away, colors they believed were not visible,

and colors whose visibility they believed was about average.

Main questionnaire. The second interview was structured according to

a main questionnaire that included eight disagreement scenarios or cases,

each followed by a question and a justification requirement (see Appen-

dix). Students were asked to consider each disagreement case, to evaluate

whether it would be possible to decide if one side or party was right, and

to justify their answer. Overall, half of all the cases concerned disagree-

ments about foods, whereas the rest concerned disagreements about colors.

Moreover, half of the cases referred to disagreements about matters of

preference (Cases 1, 2, 5, and 6; see Appendix), whereas the rest referred

to disagreements about beliefs that could function as hypotheses (Cases 3,

4, 7, and 8; see Appendix).

The main questionnaire was individualized according to each students

personal beliefs, as indicated by his or her responses to the preliminaryquestionnaire. Each student had to consider disagreements for which he or

she was found to share the preference or hypothetical belief expressed by

one party and disagreements for which the student had previously ex-

pressed no strong bias. As a result, the main questionnaire included two

biased preference cases (Cases 1 and 5; see Appendix), two neutral

preference cases (Cases 2 and 6; see Appendix), two biased belief cases

(Cases 3 and 7; see Appendix), and two neutral belief cases (Cases 4 and

8; see Appendix). The order of question presentation was counterbalanced

between students both with respect to conceptual category (foods and

colors) and with respect to within-category questions.

Students responses to the questions following each disagreement case

were scored as to their appropriateness depending on whether the case

reflected a disagreement in preference or hypothetical belief. For example,

indications that the nutritional value of foods and the visibility of colors

538 DIAKIDOY AND IOANNIDES


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could be determined would constitute appropriate responses. On the other

hand, indications that the tastiness of foods and the beauty of colors could

also be determined would constitute inappropriate responses. Appropriate

responses received a score of 1, and inappropriate responses received a

score of 0. Subsequently, Christos Ioannides and his research assistant,

independently of each other, classified responses and justifications into

categories designed to capture the full range of the responses obtained.

Interrater agreement was high (84%), and all differences were resolved byIrene-Anna N. Diakidoy.

Results

Differentiating Between Hypotheses and Preferences

Preliminary analysis indicated that scores received for all cases

within each conceptual category (food and color) were not signif-

icantly different from each other (M 2.53, SD 0.90, andM

2.70, SD 0.91, respectively), paired t(57) 1.31, p .19

(two-tailed), d 0.21. Therefore, students scores across cases

were summed to yield six combined scores: a total belief score, a

total preference score, a biased belief score, a biased preference

score, a neutral belief score, and a neutral preference score. How-ever, the small number of cases within each score category and the

near-ceiling performance on the belief cases resulted in marked

deviations from normality (see Table 1). Therefore, data were

analyzed with nonparametric procedures, and effect sizes were

estimated on the basis of proportion differences (Fleiss, 1994).

Overall, 35 students (59%) recognized correctly that the validity of

hypothetical beliefs can be determined, 2(4,N 60) 61.42,p

.00, whereas 18 students (31%) indicated incorrectly that the validity

of personal preferences can also be determined, 2(4, N 60)

14.31,p .01,D 0.28. Moreover, it can be seen from Table 2 that

correct and incorrect responses were equally frequent in the prefer-

ence categories. A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for matched pairs

showed that differences between beliefs and preferences, in terms of

correct responses, were significant, Z 3.60,p .00 (two-tailed),

with effect sizes ranging from D 0.20 to D 0.48. Although

response patterns in the biased belief and neutral belief categories

were significantly different from each other, Z 3.35, p .00

(two-tailed), with effect sizes ranging from D 0.14 toD 0.22,

this was not the case with the biased preference and neutral preference

categories,Z 1.36,p .17 (two-tailed).

A series of Mann-Whitney tests indicated that response patterns

in any of the categories were not significantly different as a

function of sex (p .05). On the other hand, differences as a

function of grade emerged as significant only with respect to the

preference categories (see Table 3). Second graders (37%) were

more likely than sixth graders (24%) to indicate incorrectly that the

truth value of preferences can also be determined,Z 2.41,p

.02 (two-tailed), D 0.13. Moreover, there were significant dif-

ferences in the sixth gradersresponse patterns in the biased belief

and neutral belief categories, Z 2.80, p .01 (two-tailed),

with effect sizes ranging from D 0.10 to D 0.26. In compar-

ison, response differences between biased belief and neutral beliefcategories were not as pronounced in the second graders group,

Z 1.96, p .05 (two-tailed). However, students at both grade

levels had similar response patterns in the biased preference and

neutral preference categories (p .05).

Justification Categories

Tables 4 and 5 show the types of justification given by students

for their positive and negative responses and their frequency in

each of the belief and preference cases. Overall, it can be seen that

the frequency of unjustified responses (9% on average) and simple

belief restatements (4% on average) was low across all cases of

disagreement. With respect to statements of preference (see Table

4), justifications on the basis of subjective evaluations that couldnot lead to generalizable conclusions were the most prevalent

(38% on average). A typical example of this justification type was

given by Constantinos (Grade 2), who indicated that yes, each

one should try the others favorite food, and then they will see who

is right [about which food tastes better].In fact, all students who

resorted to this type of justification stated that simply tasting the

foods or painting the colors would help them resolve the disagree-

Table 3

Score Frequencies in Biased and Neutral Categories Within Grade

Category

Score

2 N0 1 2

Grade 2Biased belief 2 5 22 24.07** 29Neutral belief 4 8 17 9.17* 29Biased preference 15 9 6 4.20 30Neutral preference 14 10 6 3.20 30

Grade 6Biased belief 0 4 26 16.13** 30Neutral belief 3 9 18 11.40** 30Biased preference 9 7 14 2.60 30Neutral preference 7 5 17 8.55* 29

Note. The degrees of freedom for all chi-square tests are 2.*p .05. **p .01.

Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations, and Normality Indices for

Combined Scores (N 60)

Combined scores M SD Kurtosis Skewness

Biased belief 1.78 0.49 4.40 2.23Neutral belief 1.48 0.70 0.30 0.98

Total belief 3.25 1.08 0.68 1.31Biased preference 0.93 0.86 1.65 0.13Neutral preference 1.03 0.87 1.69 0.07

Total preference 1.97 1.67 1.64 0.08

Note. Maximum possible biased and neutral scores 2. Maximumpossible total score 4.

Table 2

Score Frequencies in Biased and Neutral Categories

Category

Score

2 N0 1 2

Biased belief 2 9 48 62.47** 59Neutral belief 7 17 35 20.47** 59Biased preference 24 16 20 1.60 60Neutral preference 21 15 23 1.76 59

Note. The degrees of freedom for all chi-square tests are 2.**p .01.



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ment. On the other hand, negative answers justified on the basis of

individual differences, which would also be more appropriate for

statements of personal preference, were less frequent (28% on

average). For example, Aphrodite (Grade 6) decided that no, we

cannot [determine who is right], because it depends on what color

each one likes.Moreover, about 15% of all students justified their

negative answers by resorting to egalitarian responses. An example

of such a response was given by Christos (Grade 6), who said that

we cannot say [who is right], because both colors are nice.The

frequency of egalitarian responses was comparable across cases ofbiased preference and neutral preference. Finally, it is interesting

to note that a few students (5% on average) justified their positive

responses by proposing an objective evaluation of a different but

related belief statement. Phanis (Grade 6), for example, proposed

that the two parties should paint one sheet green and another

yellow and then have their classmates vote which one is more

beautiful.

With respect to statements of belief that could function as

hypotheses (see Table 5), justifications on the basis of objective

evaluations were the most frequent (38% on average), especially

for cases concerning the visibility of colors from a distance.

Typically, these justifications involved looking from a distance.

Maria (Grade 2), for example, indicated that, to determine which

color is more visible from a distance, they should paint both on

pieces of paper, then go far away and see which color can be seen

better. The objective evaluations proposed in the case of the

foods nutritional values were slightly more varied. For Cypriana

(Grade 2), the way to determine which food is more nutritious was

to have each party eat one kind of food and then see who gets

fatter. For Michael (Grade 6), on the other hand, the way to

determine which food is more nutritious was to have each party

eat one kind of food only. Then, after a while, see which person

has gained more weight. The person who has gained the most has

eaten the least nutritious food.A few students thought that health,

instead of growth, was the important indicator and, like Stephanos

(Grade 6), stated that each one should have a blood testmaybe

check for cholesterol? Finally, one student, Stelios (Grade 6),

proposed thatwe can analyze the hamburger and see how many

vitamins and other nutrition stuff it has. Then we can do the same

with corn flakes and compare them.Justifications on the basis of

objective evaluations, regardless of their completeness or scientific

adequacy, were considered to be the most appropriate for cases of

belief. However, several students (14% on average) also proposedsubjective evaluations similar to the ones proposed for cases of

preference.

Students also justified their positive responses with references to

properties of foods and colors or to objects having a particular

color (11% on average) and with references to authority, such as

parents, doctors, and favorite friends (8% on average). For exam-

ple, Marina (Grade 6) decided that one party was wrong because

potatoes do not have as many vitamins as beans. Antonis (Grade

6) determined that yellow must be more visible from a distance

because the sun is yellow and it is far away.Natasha (Grade 2),

on the other hand, suggested that they should ask their mothers,

and then they will see who is right. It must be noted that

references to properties, objects, and authorities were more fre-

quent in cases of disagreement about the nutritional value of foods

than in cases concerning the visibility of colors (see Table 5).

Finally, egalitarian responses were more frequent in cases of

neutral belief (15% on average) than in cases of biased belief (5%

on average).

Justification categories were not equally frequent across grade

levels. Unjustified responses and belief restatements were more

frequent in Grade 2 (19% on average) than in Grade 6 (6% on

average). With respect to preference cases (biased or neutral), the

younger students were more likely to justify their responses on the

basis of subjective evaluations (46% on average), whereas sixth

graders were more likely to suggest that disagreements were due to

individual differences (51% on average). Moreover, the second

most frequent justification type for the second graders was theegalitarian response (21% on average), whereas for the sixth

graders, it was the subjective evaluation (26% on average). Dif-

Table 5

Frequency of Justification Categories in Cases of Biased Belief

and Neutral Belief (N 60)

Justification category

Biased belief Neutral belief

Case 3 Case 7 Case 4 Case 8

Yes

No explanation 3 1 0 1No way to find out 4 1 1 3Belief restatement 3 4 2 3Reference to authority 10 0 9 0Reference to property

or object 14 2 5 4Subjective evaluation 9 8 11 6Objective evaluation of

related belief 0 0 1 0Objective evaluation 12 36 9 34

NoNo explanation 1 2 5 2Egalitarian responses 2 4 13 5Reference to individual

differences 1 2 2 2Dont know/no response 1 0 2 0

Table 4

Frequency of Justification Categories in Cases of Biased

Preference and Neutral Preference (N 60)

Justification category

Biased preference Neutral preference

Case 1 Case 5 Case 2 Case 6

YesNo explanation 1 1 0 1No way to find out 0 4 2 1Belief restatement 1 0 3 2Reference to authority 0 2 1 2Reference to property

or object 1 2 1 2Subjective evaluation 28 19 25 18Objective evaluation of

related belief 2 5 1 3Objective evaluation 0 0 0 0

NoNo explanation 3 0 2 2Egalitarian responses 8 10 8 9Reference to individual

differences 15 17 17 19Dont know/no response 1 0 0 1



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ferences between grade levels were not as clear with respect to the

belief cases. Although the older students were more likely to

propose objective evaluations (48% on average), they also resorted

to references to properties and authorities when considering the

nutritional value of foods (23% on average). In contrast, the

younger students proposed objective evaluations primarily when

considering the visibility of colors (47% on average). Otherwise,they were more likely to propose subjective evaluations (23% on

average). Finally, egalitarian responses were given by both the

second graders (17% on average) and the sixth graders (23% on

average) only to neutral belief cases.

Discussion

Distinguishing Hypotheses From Preferences

The first question that motivated this study was whether

younger and older elementary school children distinguish hypoth-

eses as beliefs whose validity can be tested from preferences that

are justifiably variable. The findings indicate that, whereas stu-

dents readily agreed that the validity of hypotheses can be deter-

mined, they had difficulty understanding that the same is not true

for statements of preference. As expected, however, older children

were more likely to consider preferences as legitimately variable

and to attribute them to individual differences. In contrast, younger

children were likely to think that disagreements about preference

could also be resolved in favor of one side, and they proposed

evaluations that by necessity involved subjective comparisons that

would not yield generalizable conclusions. These findings suggest

that younger children (7- to 8-year-olds) have difficulty differen-

tiating between hypotheses and preferences. Older children (11- to

12-year-olds), on the other hand, appear to be better able to

distinguish between hypotheses and preferences, but the relatively

small effect size indicates that they do not do so with accuracy.These findings appear to be in contrast to those of the Carpen-

dale and Chandler (1996) study, which showed that all 5- to

8-year-old children tended to consider differences in preference as

more acceptable than differences in the interpretation of ambigu-

ous stimuli. The fact, however, that a difference in preference is

considered acceptable does not necessarily imply an understanding

that it is not resolvable (see also Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Moses,

1990). The present findings lend validity to the above claim.

Although we did not ask children to decide whether it was okay for

two people to disagree (as in Carpendale & Chandler, 1996), we

can assume that they also considered disagreements acceptable,

even if only in the sense that they recognized that different people

can believe different things. However, the majority of the younger

children and some of the older ones believed also that disagree-

ments can be resolved regardless of whether they involve differ-

ences in preferences or hypotheses. Moreover, the way they pro-

posed this could be done was similar for both kinds of belief

statementsthat is, by directing attention outward, toward the

stimuli in question (comparing foods and colors), rather than

inward, as Flavell et al. (1990) had claimed to be the case with

preferences and as Carpendale and Chandler (1996) had found to

be the case with the older children in their sample. These findings

appear to suggest that the metaconceptual ability that would allow

a reflection on and a further differentiation between the kinds of

beliefs that one may have is either lacking or not consistently

manifested in the early elementary school years.

The tendency to consider preferences and hypotheses as simi-

larly testable can also be taken to reflect an epistemological

presupposition that all statements can be either right or wrong. To

the extent that beliefs and knowledge are justified similarly in the

minds of students (Southerland et al., 2001), such a presupposition

can be thought of as related to a starting, commonsense episte-

mology, according to which knowledge is certain and conflicts areattributable to incomplete or inaccurate information (Carey &

Smith, 1993; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). The possibilities of limited

metaconceptual ability and a deterministic epistemological presup-

position do not necessarily represent alternative interpretations of

the findings. In fact, we consider them related in the sense that lack

of reflection on ones own beliefs would help sustain a determin-

istic outlook and that, in turn, a firm conviction that all beliefs can

be right or wrong could inhibit such a reflection and, thereby,

metaconceptual awareness.

Older childrens increased ability to recognize that some belief

statements are not testable may reflect increased metaconceptual

understanding and a weakening deterministic epistemology, both

of these brought about by their greater familiarity with the kinds of

belief statements that drive scientific investigation. It must be

noted, however, that the way science is taught in the Cypriot

elementary school is more likely to reinforce, inadvertently, a less

sophisticated, deterministic epistemological view. Science educa-

tion content and outcomes are determined by a national curriculum

(Cypriot Ministry of Education and Culture, 1996). All teachers

are required to follow the instructional methods that are specified

in detail for each lesson unitincluding presentation content, time

frames, activities, teacher demonstrations, and questionsin the

science teachers manual (Kyprianou, Loizidou, Charalambous,

Matsikaris, & Yiannakis, 1997). According to the manual, lessons

start with definitions and examples of target concepts. Subse-

quently, students engage in classification and example-recognition

activities. In addition, they observe teacher demonstrations orconduct prespecified miniexperiments, both of which serve to

prove the validity of the previously offered accounts.

Although the manual advises teachers to start each lesson by

asking students what they know about the target concepts or the

general topic, it offers no similarly explicit guidelines on how to

respond to studentsideas or, in fact, whether to respond at all (see,

e.g., Kyprianou et al., 1997). In this case, it is up to the individual

teacher to decide whether to have students pursue their ideas

further or to proceed with the lesson. The second option is more

viable given the large amount of content that must be covered

within specific lesson periods, as well as within the course of the

school year (Cypriot Ministry of Education and Culture, 1996). As

a result, the sixth graders in our sample had limited experience, if

any, in formulating and investigating hypotheses in science (see,

e.g., Chinn & Malhotra, 2002). Therefore, their increased ability to

differentiate between kinds of belief, when compared with that of

the younger students, may also simply reflect their greater expe-

rience with unresolved preference disputes in the context of ev-

eryday life.

Although there was a tendency to regard hypotheses and pref-

erences as similarly testable, prior belief bias was found to exert an

influence on responses to hypothetical beliefs only. In general,

students confidence that a disagreement could be resolved was

greater when it involved a hypothetical belief that was favored as

opposed to a neutral belief. A corresponding tendency was not

evident in students responses concerning preferences. Moreover,



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the influence of prior belief bias was greater in the older age group

than in the younger age group. Although, one could speculate that

such differential influences might reflect conceptual differentiation

to some degree, we consider such a speculation as unwarranted

given the modest effect sizes and the limited scope of the study

with respect to this factor.

Proposing Tests for Hypotheses

The second question that the study sought to address concerned

the extent to which students were able to propose objective,

empirical tests for determining the validity of hypotheses. The

findings indicate that although the older children were clearly

better able to think of empirical tests, the younger children were

also able to propose objective evaluations in some cases. More-

over, all children were better able to think of empirical tests when

considering the visibility of colors from a distance than when

considering the nutritional value of different kinds of food. Be-

cause of the current emphasis on health and nutrition, all students

in the Cypriot elementary school have been advised at least once

about the importance of a healthy diet. That, in turn, may explain

the overall higher frequency of references to properties of food,

such as vitamin and sugar content, and to authorities, such as

doctors and dieticians, when considering the nutritional value of

foods. In contrast, students everyday life provided many oppor-

tunities for discovering and evaluating what things can be seen and

from how far away (e.g., letters on the blackboard). Therefore,

conceptual and task familiarity may have been responsible for all

students increased ability to think of a test to resolve disagree-

ments about the visibility of colors.

In agreement with previous research (e.g., Sodian et al., 1991;

Wimmer & Perner, 1983), our findings also indicate that young

elementary school children demonstrate an understanding that a

belief is justifiable on reasons or facts that are distinct from thebelief itself. Few children, even in the younger age group, failed to

justify their responses, and even fewer restated a belief as evidence

for its validity. Moreover, we would argue that failure to justify a

belief does not necessarily reflect lack of understanding of what an

external justification is and of its necessity. Evidence for this is

provided by the few children in our sample who explicitly attrib-

uted their inability to justify to the fact that they did not know of

or they could not think of a way to evaluate who was right or

wrong. Therefore, young childrens notable reliance on external

justifications and evaluations (subjective or objective) necessarily

implies that they also possess the basic ingredients of the strategic

competence that, according to Kuhn (1997), is needed to under-

stand the inferential relationship between evidence and belief.

The objective evaluations that our sample proposed did not

necessarily represent well-designed hypothesis tests, and in the

case of nutritional values, they were often scientifically inaccurate.

They were, however, genuine attempts to set up test conditions that

could yield potentially useful evidence. On the other hand, sub-

jective evaluations can also be taken to represent attempts at

testing and, as expected, were more prevalent with personal pref-

erence conflicts. It is also notable that the few students who

proposed objective evaluations to resolve them did so by interpret-

ing the initial statements as hypothetical generalizations about

peoples preferences. This dominant tendency to propose some

kind of test suggests that elementary school students have a basic

understanding of experimentation (Sodian et al., 1991) even if they

have not yet mastered the intricacies of the skill. We would further

expect the acquisition and the successful application of this skill to

go hand in hand with, if not to depend on, the ability to distinguish

the kinds of belief statements that can be the focus of experimental

investigation.

Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research

One could argue that our basic task requirement may have

biased the students to answer in the affirmative and to do their best

to propose some kind of test. Children may have responded dif-

ferently in the cases of preference if we had asked them whether it

could be determined if someone was right, instead of who was

right. However, we consider this possibility less likely given the

almost equal frequency of correct and incorrect responses in all

cases of preference. On the other hand, it must be noted that our

task was relatively limited when it came to revealing the full extent

of students ability to think of empirical tests. It is possible that

students who proposed objective tests would have been able to

revise and develop their proposals further if they had been asked to

elaborate them. Similarly, students who proposed subjective tests

might have been able to recognize their proposalslack of potential

to conclusively resolve a disagreement if they had been confronted

with the issue. Future research could modify and extend the basic

task to require children to consider the possible and expected

results of their test proposals and the extent to which these would

allow them to resolve a disagreement conclusively.

Arguably, the beliefs that our sample had to consider repre-

sented simple categorical statements. They were not beliefs about

complex causal relationships of the type investigated by Kuhn

(e.g., Kuhn et al., 2000). Therefore, one could suppose that chil-

drens extensive experience with classifying the world might have

better prepared them to deal with the contrasting beliefs that our

tasks involved. It is possible that if we had asked them to considerdisagreements about factors influencing the nutritional value of

foods or the visibility of colors, they might have resorted more

often to belief restatements. To our knowledge, there is no research

that has directly examined the extent to which young children s

ability to differentiate hypotheses and to coordinate them with

evidence varies as a function of the type of hypotheses. The

contrasting findings of previous research (e.g., Kuhn et al., 1995;

Sodian et al., 1991) suggest that this factor may also play a role.

Therefore, further research in this direction may help to better

describe and explain younger childrens ability to engage in sci-

entific reasoning.

Future research could also be designed to provide a more

in-depth look at the influence of prior belief bias and conceptual

familiarity on the ability to distinguish hypotheses from other

beliefs and on the types of tests proposed. Although prior belief

bias was included as a factor and was found to selectively influ-

ence decisions concerning hypotheses only, the limited number of

disagreement cases involving biased and neutral hypothetical be-

liefs and preferences does not permit any definite conclusions to be

drawn at this point. In contrast, there was no systematic effort to

control for conceptual or task familiarity in this study. Neverthe-

less, there were clear task differences with respect to the ability to

think of objective hypothesis tests and that appeared to be due to

conceptual familiarity differences. Therefore, a more thorough

examination of this factor and its possible interaction with belief

bias would provide a test of this possibility and would contribute



8/9

to arguments concerning the influence of prior knowledge in

relation to domain-general heuristics in the development of scien-

tific reasoning skills (see, e.g., Klahr et al., 1993).

Conclusions and Implications

The findings of the present study indicate that the related no-

tions of belief justification and evaluation may be acquired earlier

than, albeit to a limited degree, and more or less independently of

the ability to distinguish between different kinds of beliefs. Nev-

ertheless, elementary school childrens limited ability to distin-

guish hypotheses from unverifiable belief statements is likely to

interfere with their understanding of what a conclusive hypothesis

test is all about and with their ability to formulate researchable

questions in a scientific inquiry context. However, studentsinitial

understandings of belief and belief justification can provide a

fertile ground for subsequent conceptual differentiation, refine-

ment, and extension. Early and extensive practice in formulating

and evaluating their own beliefs should facilitate childrens ability

to distinguish those that can be empirically and conclusively

verified from those that cannot. This, in turn, should promote thedevelopment of the metacognitive and metastrategic competencies

that Kuhn (1997) has claimed to be necessary for scientific rea-

soning and increase the epistemological authenticity of scientific

inquiry in educational settings (Chinn & Mahlotra, 2002; Smith,

Maclin, Houghton, & Hennessey, 2000).

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(Appendix follows)



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Appendix

Main Questionnaire

Case 1

George and Michael disagree about which food tastes better. George

says that X (students favorite food) tastes better than Y (the student

dislikes it). Michael says that Y tastes better than X.

Question 1: Can we determine who is right and who is wrong?

If yes, how?

If no, why not?

Case 2

Peter and Paul disagree about which food tastes better. Peter says that X

tastes better than Y. Paul says that Y tastes better than X (student is

indifferent to both foods).


If yes, how?

If no, why not?

Case 3

Helen and Angela disagree about which food is more nutritious. Helen

says that X (student considers it very nutritious) is more nutritious than Y

(a food the student considers to be less nutritious). Angela says that Y is

more nutritious than X.


If yes, how?

If no, why not?

Case 4

Mary and Silvia disagree about which food is more nutritious. Mary says

that X is more nutritious than Y. Silvia says that Y is more nutritious than

X (student believes that both foods are equally nutritious).


If yes, how?

If no, why not?

Case 5

Lucia and Georgia disagree about which color is more beautiful. Lucia

says that X (students favorite color) is more beautiful than Y (student does

not like it). Georgia says that Y is more beautiful than X.


If yes, how?

If no, why not?

Case 6

Kostas and Lazaros disagree about which color is more beautiful. Kostas

says that X is more beautiful than Y. Lazaros says that Y is more beautiful

than X (student is indifferent to both colors).


If yes, how?

If no, why not?

Case 7

Marina and Sofia disagree about which color can be seen from a longer

distance. Marina says that X (the student considers it most visible) can beseen from a longer distance than Y (student considers it less visible from

a distance). Sofia says that Y can be seen from a longer distance than X.


If yes, how?

If no, why not?

Case 8

Paul and Nikolas disagree about which color can be seen from a longer

distance. Paul says that X can be seen from a longer distance than Y.

Nikolas says that Y can be seen from a longer distance than X (student

believes that both colors are equally visible).


If yes, how?If no, why not?

Received February 3, 2003

Revision received January 29, 2004

Accepted February 10, 2004


school children’s ability to distinguish hypothetical beliefs

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