schuetz - type and eidos in husserl's late philosophy

7/23/2019 Schuetz - Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy

1/20

International Phenomenological Society

Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late PhilosophyAuthor(s): Alfred SchuetzSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Dec., 1959), pp. 147-165Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2104353.

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2/20

PHILOSOPHY

AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

ESEARCH

A Quarterlyournal

VOLUME

X,

No.

2

DECEMBER1959.

TYPE

AND

EIDOS IN HUSSERL'S

LATE PHILOSOPHY

In a brilliantpaperpresented o the

Colloquenternational

de pheno-

menologiea Royaumont1957 1 Professor

Eugen Fink deals

with what

he calls the operative

concepts in Husserl's phenomenology.

He dis-

tinguishes n the work of any major philosopherbetweenthematic and

operative notions.

Whereas the formeraim at the fixation

and preser-

vation of the fundamental

oncepts,the latter are used in a

vague manner

as tools

in

forming

the thematic notions;

they are modelsof thought or

intellectualschemata

which are not brought

to objectifying ixation, but

remain opaque

and thematically unclarified.

Accordingto Fink, the

notions of phenomenon,

of constitution, and

performances

(Leistungen), nd

even those of epoche and of transcendental

ogic

are used by Husserl

as operativeconcepts. They are not

thematically

clarified or remain at least operatively adumbrated, and are merely

headings for groups

of problemsopen

to and requiring urtheranalysis.

The present paper

makes the attempt to show that also

the

notion of

typicality, which, according o Husserl's

later philosophy,

characterizes

our

experiencing

of the life-world

n the natural attitude on both

the

predicativeand the

prepredicativeevel, and even the notion

of ideation,

(at

least in

the sense of eidetic generalization,

hat is, the grasping

of

the

ideal generaand

species of materialuniversals)are widely

used by

him as

mere

operative

schemataof a

highly

equivocal

characterand

are

in need

of furtherclarification.

To start with the typicality of our

experiences of

the life-world

so

central orHusserl's ate philosophy,

we find that three

groups

of problems

lead him to a closer investigation of

this feature: (1)

The

horizonal

characterof our experiences

n

the natural

attitude,

and

the

limiting

notion of world

as the foundationof

the qualitiesof preacquaintedness

and

familiarity

adherent to

them; (2)

the

problem

of

the

genealogy

of

logical forms,

including the

constitution of

universal

objectivities

as

originatingn prepredicative xperience;(3) the structureof our experi-

ences of the life-world

Lebenswelt),

heir

necessaryvagueness,

and their

determination

by

our interests. Although

it will

hardly

be

possible

to

handle

separately

each of

the

afore-mentionedproblems

n its

relation

to

typicality,

it

is

hoped

that our

analyses

of the various

approaches

(which

we

propose

o

perform

without

trying

to embark

upon

a

discussion

147

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3/20

148 PHILOSOPHY

AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

of

the historical development

of Husserl's pertinent

thought,

and

without

any reference o

his so far

unpublished

writings)

will showthe

reasons or

the equivocations

involved

in Husserl's pertinent views.

They are

hardly

compatible

with one anotherand

are of an

operative

nature.

We

will close

with a few questionsreferring o the relationshipbetweenthe typicality

of our experiences

n

everyday

life and the

possibility of the

so-called

free variations

performed

n

phantasywhich

are

supposed o lead

by

the processof ideation

to the intuition

of the

eidos.

I.

THE

PREACQUAINTEDNESS

OF

THE

WORLD AND

ITS OBJECTS;

INNER

AND

OUTER

HORIZON

We

start with

a

brief

analysis

of

our

experience

of everyday

life

as

described n Husserl'sErfahrungund Urteil.2As usual- and sometimes

to

the great disadvantage

of his general

theory

-

Husserl

takes

as the

paradigm

of our experiencing

the perceiving

of concrete

objects of

the

external

world

given

to our

actual or

potential

sensory

apperception.

To

the naive attitude

of

our everyday

life objects

are simply

pregiven

as

assumedly

being

and

being

in

such

and

such

a way.

They are pregiven

to

us

in

the unquestioned

(although

always

questionable)

assurance

of

an

uncontested

belief,

and thus not on

the ground

of a particular

act

of

positing,

and

still less on

the

ground

of an existential

judgment.

But

our

experience

of these given

objects shows

two

characteristics:

n

the

first

place,

all

objects

of our

experiencehave

from

the outset the

character

of

typical familiarity;

n the second

place,

the process

of our

apperceiving

these

objectsby

originary

ntuition is

always

permeatedby

anticipations

of not

actually

apperceived

but cointended

eatures.Both

characteristics

are

closely

connectedwith each

other

and with the

typicality

of

our

experiences,

and this in the following

way:

According to

Husserl,

the world and

the

individualobjects

in

it are

always experiencedby us as having been reorganized by previous

experiencing

acts

of the most various

kinds.In any

experience,

even

that

of an

objectivity

apperceived

or

the first

time, a preknowledge

f

as

yet

unapperceived

roperties

of

the objectis involved,

a preknowledge

which

might

be undeterminedor incompletely

determined as

to its

content,

but which will never

be

entirely empty.

In

other words,

any

experience

carries

along

an experiential

horizonwhich

refers

to the possibility

(in

subjective

erms: to

the faculty)

not

merely

to

explicate

step by

step

the

objectivity

as

it

is given

in actual apperception,

but also

to obtain by

additional experiencing acts ever new additional determinations of the

same

objectivity.

This*

nfinite

open

horizon

of the

actual experience

functions

in its indeterminateness

from the

outset

as the scope of

antici-

pated

possibilities

of

further

determination;yet

in

spite of

their

un-

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4/20

TYPE AND

EIDOS

IN HUSSERL's

LATE

PHILOSOPHY 149

determined

generality

these anticipations are,

according

to

Husserl,

nevertheless

typically

determined by their typical

prefamiliarity,

as

typically

belonging, hat

is, to the totalhorizonof

the same and

dentifiable

objectivity,

the actually apperceived

properties

of which showthe same

general ype.

Thus,

it is the horizonalanticipations

which

predelineate he typical

preacquaintednessnd

familiarity

of the objectivitygiven to

our apper-

ception.

First of all the object is

within that

universal horizon of all

horizons

o which we refer in the

natural attitude

by the term world.

The world

is the total

horizon of all possible experiences.

Any object is

an

object

within he world

which, n the natural

attitude, does

not become

thematic tself, but is

just taken forgranted.For

example,any

single

real

object of

the

outer world

is apperceived

as a.valid existent

within the

generalhorizonof the world, and this means, amongother things,that it

is apperceived

as an

identical and as always

the same

identifiable

element of the world, and having

as such its

position within universal

space

and universal time.

But

the world as

the

unquestioned

horizonal

background

of all possible

experiencesof existents

within

it

has merely

in

general

he

subjective

characterof familiarity

without being

known

n

its individual particularities.

Each

individual existent which

is apper-

ceived as

such has,

in addition, its particular

horizonalstructure

within

which

all

further distinctionsof

acquaintedness

and unacquaintedness

originate.

The

object

is given to

the

apperceiving

consciousnessnot

merelyas

an

objectivity

as such,

but as an existentof a particular

ype:

as

a

thing of

the outer world,as a plant,

an animal,

a humanbeing,a

human

product,

and so on.

Even more: it is apperceived

as pertaining

o further

and

further differentiated

genera with their

subordinated

species

provided

hat we arepermittedto

use analogically

hese technical

terms

for

the

prepredicative

and

preconceptual

orms

of

simple

apperceptual

experiencesnow

under

scrutiny.

Accordingly,

o Husserl

structurization

by preacquaintednessnd unacquaintednesss a fundamental eature of

our

consciousness

f

the

world.

This

structurization

s

permeated

by

the

relative

distinction between

undetermined generality

and determined

specificity.

If

we

call the

open

frame of

further

determinability

of

the

apperceivedobject

the inner

horizon

f this

object,

then we

may say

that

the

further determination

occurs by explicating

the

preindicated

hori-

zonal

implicata and,

correlatively,

the adherent

open possibilities

of

anticipated

activities of

the mode

I can

(I

can examine

the

object

more

closely;

I can make its unseen

back

side visibleby turning

t

around

or

by

locomotionsof my body, etc.). The innerhorizoncan thus be characterized

as the

empty

frame of the undetermineddeterminability,

ndicating

and

prescribing

both the particular

style

of

any

further

explication

and

a

particular

ypicality

of the

anticipatedexplicate

so to

be

obtained.

That



5/20

150

PHILOSOPHY

ND

PHENOMENOLOGICAL

ESEARCH

is why Husserlcomes

to the conclusion

hat all particular

apperceptions

are

fulfillmentsof

that which

has

been meantin advance.

Now it has to

be

emphasized

hat the horizon

is continually

n flux.

With

any

new

intuitive

apperception

ew determinations

r rectifications

of previousdeterminationsmodify the possibleanticipationsand there-

with the

horizon.

No apperceptions merely

nstantaneous

and transient;

any apperception

becomes

a

part

of habitualknowledge

as a permanent

result.

Sometimes

Husserl speaks of the

sedimentations

f preceding

experiences.

To be

sure, these

habitualpossessions

are latent,

but this

involves

that they may be wakened

or

called forth. This

occurs by

way

of

a

passive synthesis

of congruence

Deckungssynthese),

ased on

similarity

r

dissimilarity, synthesis

or

whichHusserluses

the traditional

term of association, hastening

to warn

us that its meaningas

used by

himis a differentone. To Husserl association esignatesa general orm

of

immanent

genesis

inherent to consciousness.

t

means exclusively

the

purelyimmanent

relation of

somethingrecalls something

else,

some-

thing

refers to somethingelse. Thus

a

pair

is

constituted,one member

of which wakens

the other. Similar experiences

are called forth by

similar

ones

and

contrast

with

the

dissimilar.

It

seems

that

Husserl

changed

he terminology

ater on3 and handled

the problemof association

as

a

special

case of pairing or appresentation.

Thus the apperception

of

an objectivity

in its horizon

calls forth the

recollection

of other objectivities

similar

to or even

like the

former,

and

constitutestherewith

a typicality

on the groundof which

by apperceptive

transference

(ApperzeptiveUebertragung)

lso other objectivities

of a

similar kind

are

apperceived

rom

the outset as

objectivities

of the

same

type,

that is, of a pregiven

more or less

specific familiarity.

It can be

easily seen

that with any step

of originary

apperceiving

and explicating

not merely

the objectivity

under scrutiny

becomes

further determined,

but that concomitantly

a modificationof

the horizon of

all

possible

experiencesas a wholeoccurs.New typical determinations nd familiari-

ties

are

constituted

and

predelineate

he direction of apperceptive

ex-

pectationswhich attach

themselves o

the

givenness

of newly

encountered

objectivities.

The extension of

the

typicality

thus constituted

might

widely

vary dependingupon

the manner

in which the

objectivity

is

anticipatorily

ppresented.

Thisextension

-

alwaysaccording

o Husserl

discloses

tself merely

in the fulfillments

of the

anticipations,

and can be

conceptualized by

particular

intentional

acts

in

hindsight only.

We

shall return

very

soon to

the

problem

of

conceptualization,

es-

pecially in its relationship to typicality. At this juncture an example

of

the

typicality

of the

natural

experiential

apperception

given by

Husserl

in

another

context4

might

be a

welcome

llustration

of the preceding.

He

points

out

that in the natural

attitude

things

in the factual world

are from



6/20

TYPE AND

EIDOS

IN

HUSSERL'S

LATE

PHILOSOPHY

151

the

outset

experienced

as

types,

namely,

as

trees,

animals,

snakes,

birds,

and in

particular, as

fir,

maple,

dog,

adder,

swallow,

sparrow,

etc.

That

which

is

apperceived

as

a

type

recalls

similar

things

in

the

past

and

is to

that extent

familiar.

Moreover

what

is

typically

apperceived

carries

along

a

horizon of

possible

further

experiences in the form of a predeline-

ation

of a

typicality of still

unexperienced

but

expected

characteristics

of

the

object.

If

we

see a

dog

we

anticipate

immediately his

future

be-

havior, his

typical

way

of

eating,

playing,

running,

jumping,

etc.

Actually,

we

do not

see

his

teeth, but

even if

we

have

never

seen

this

particular

dog,

we

know in

advance

what

his teeth

will

look

like

-

not in

their

individual

determination, ut in

a

typical

way,

since

we

have

longago and

frequently

experienced

hat

suchlike

animals

( dogs )

have

something

ike

teeth

of

this and

that

typical

kind.

But why are certaincharacteristicsof the object pairedwith charac-

teristicsof

other

objectsas

typically

similar,

while

others,

-

at

least

for

the

time

being

-

are

disregarded?

William

James

and

Bergson

have

developedheir

theory

of the

selectivityof

consciousness

n

order

o

answer

this

question, which

is

directly related

to the

constitution of

typicality.

Husserl, too,

acknowledges hat the

explicating

activity by

which

the

object

is

apperceived s

a

unity of

characteristics

s

not

evenly

distributed

over

all the

particularitieswhich

detach

themselves,

but

that

our glance is directed toward specifically impressive properties of the object

by which the

object

of

this

particular

typicality

or

this

individual

object

dis-

tinguishes itself

from

objects of

equal or

similar

typicality. 5

What

is,

however,

the

factor that

makes certain

traits of

the

object

specifically

impressive ?

According

to

Husserl,

it

is our

interest.

He

distinguishes wo

kinds of

interest:

First,

the

object, which

is

passively

pregiven

o

us,

affects

our

receptivity and

wakens n

us the

more

or less

intense

tendency

to

follow

the

stimulus

emanating

from

and

imposed

upon us by the object, andto advertto it. Thatis why Husserl nterprets

receptivity

as the

lowest

form

of

ego-activity.The

adversion

evokes

an

interest

in

the

object

surpassing

hose

of

its

features which

are

merely

pregiven in

the

mode

of

actuality, and

striving to ever new

apprehension.

(This first

notion

of

interest

recalls

Leibniz's

definition of

consciousness

as the

tendency to

proceed to

ever new

experiences.)

The

second and

broader

notion of

interest does

not

originate

in

the

simple

adversion

toward the

object,

but in

making

it

thematic.

Theme

(in

the

precise

sense)

and

object do not

always

coincide,

as for

example

in a

situation in which

I am occupied with a scientific work as my theme, but am interrupted

by

a

noise

in

the

street.

Even

then I

have

not

dropped

my

theme

to

which

I

return

after

the

interruption

has

passed. Acts

of

interest

in

this broader

sense

surpass,

hen,

the

mere

being

adverted

to the

object,

say

by

per-



7/20

1-52 PHILOSOPHY

AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

RESEARCH

ceiving

it

or even searchingly

examining t: they involve taking part

in this activity ( Dabei-sein ),

an inter-esse in the literal sense of this

word.6

Husserl,

in

the texts published

so far, does

not continue this analysis

beyond these fugitive remarks.But it is quite clear that it is the interest,

or, perhapsbetter,

the

system

of

interestswhich codetermines

ypicality.

So

far

we

have

spoken

merely

of the inner

horizon

of the

object

and

its

explication.But any object adverted to stands out from

a background,

a

field, which is not adverted

to, but is just there.

We may say that

the

object has

an

open,

endless horizon of coexistingobjects, hence a

horizonof a second evel

which is related to the horizonof the first one.

We

call

this

horizon

he

outer

horizon

f

coexistingobjects

to which

I

may

at

any time turn as to

objects being either different from or typically

similarto the object I am actually adverted to. In a certain sense the mean-

ing

of

the latter is codetermined

by its outer horizonas

the totality of my

potentialexperiences f coexistentobjects,andtheirrelations

o the actually

apperceived one. But this

is not all: the meaning of the object

which is

in

immediacy given to

our actual intuition refers also

to its

-

mostly

hidden

-

relations to objects

which were given to

us once

in the

past,

and

might now be represented

n

terms of recollections

of

various

kinds,

and

even to objectivitiesof our free phantasying, provided

that a re-

lationship of similaritybetweenthem and the actually

given object pre-

vails at all. The unity betweenthe related elements

might be experienced

merely passively as pregiven n the unity of our consciousness.

But

-

in

contradistinction o the

process of explicatingthe implicata hidden

in

the

inner horizon all these

relations

can be made thematic.

The

activity

by

which

this is done

is called by

Husserl

relating contemplation

(beziehendes etrachten).However,it has to be emphasized

hat a

mere

addition of further objects to the actually given object

is as such

not a

relating contemplation. The

latter requires a specific interest

in the broader

sense which makes the object taken as the point of departure the main

theme.If, for example,

my fountainpen is the

maintheme,then

the table

upon which t lies is not the main theme,

but

a theme

merely

with

respect

to the fountain pen. Which

object,

in

such

a

case,

becomes

the main

theme depends again upon the directionof the

then

prevailing nterest,

and

the

relating contemplation

may

reveal

different determinations

of

either of the related

objects

such

as: A>

B,

B

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