Sea Mine Warfare: Sea Mine Warfare: An Assessment Update An Assessment Update

23-26 July 2001

RDML M. A. Sharp, Program RDML M. A. Sharp, Program Executive OfficerExecutive Officer

July 2001 2

PMS490PMS490

PMS210PMS210PMSNSWPMSNSW

PMSMDSPMSMDS

PMSEODPMSEOD

CLOSED LOOP DEGAUSSINGA-COIL

DATA BUS

POW ER FEEDER TO D/G

COIL

CL DG PROCESSOR

MODIFIED D/G COIL POW ER SUPPL IES

HIGH-SPEED DATA BUS

SHIP-BASED MAGNETIC SENSORS

MULTIPL EXER

L -COIL

M-COIL

DET

SABRE

RMS

MCM 1 Class

MHC 51 Class

CLOSED LOOP DEGAUSSING

ZODIAC F-470

PEO-MUW

VSW MCM

REMOTE ORDNANCE NEUTRALIZATION SYSTEM

REMOTE ORDNANCE NEUTRALIZATION SYSTEM

ASSAULT BREACHING

MCS 12MARINE MAMMAL SYSTEM IC

WS

NA VY

ALMDS

AN/AQS-14 AN/ALQ-141

AN/AQS-20

PMS411

PMS403SQQ-34(V)CV-TSC

EMATT/MK 30 Targets

DD-21

AN/SQQ-89(V)

AN/SQQ-89(V)

LMRS

Program Executive Office Program Executive Office Mine and Undersea WarfareMine and Undersea Warfare

July 2001 3

PEO Top FourPEO Top Four

• Create a Navy Plan for Battle Space

Dominance Under-the-Sea

• Determine the Way Ahead for Naval Mining

• Conduct End-to-End Assessment of

Organic Mine Counter Measures Capability

• Dedicated MIW Forces Roadmap to the

Navy after Next

July 2001

SHALLOW MEDIUM DEEP

Current Mining Capability

No Requirement

MK 56

MK 56

MK 65/63/62 QUICKSTRIKE

MK 67 SLMM

QS & SLMM

QS & SLMM

150 fsw 600 fsw

MK 60 CAPTOR

July 2001 5

Current Status of USN MinesCurrent Status of USN Mines• Quickstrike Mk 62/63/65

– Support for older Mods fully funded– Mod 3 procurement initiated this fiscal year– Air platform integration and algorithm development above core

• Submarine Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM) Mk 67– Demil/Disposal directed by PR99– Retention directed by POM02 SPP– Limited support until maintenance is reestablished in FY04– Out of Service by 2010

• Mine Mk 56– Demil/Disposal directed by PR99– Retention of contingency quantity directed by POM02 SPP– Minimal support for safety issues only– Out of Service by 2010

• Encapsulated Torpedo (CAPTOR) Mk 60– Demil/Disposal directed by PR99– Out of service by end of this fiscal year– Some components retained for possible future mines developments

July 2001

SHALLOW MEDIUM DEEP

Mining Capability Beyond 2010

No Requirement

No Capability

MK 65/63/62 QuickStrike

150 fsw 600 fsw

July 2001 7

Year 2010 ProblemYear 2010 Problem• Limited Inventory-Shallow or Medium

(Bottom) Water Only• No Medium (Moored) or Deep Capability• No Covert Mining Capability• Infrastructure Atrophy

– Reduced budget – No New development Planned or

Programmed– U. S. Navy Core Competency Threatened

with Extinction

July 2001 8

0

30000

1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

CAPTORMk 56SLMMQS

US Naval Mines InventoryUS Naval Mines Inventory

July 2001

Mining Infrastructure S&T Mining Infrastructure S&T and Development Work Forceand Development Work Force

0

50

100

150

200

250

86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02

Fiscal Year

Wor

k Y

ears

Core Infrastructure = 36 WY

Core Infrastructure

S&T = 15 WY

Dev = 21 WY

Total = 36 WY

Desert Storm

July 2001 10

Mine Node

Mine Node

U.S. Mining Vision - U.S. Mining Vision - IntegratedIntegrated Littoral Battlespace Dominance Littoral Battlespace Dominance

July 2001 11

‘‘Top 4’ – Organic MCMTop 4’ – Organic MCM

• Will Organic MCM Systems satisfy the operational mine warfare requirements?

• Led by overarching IPT

• Composed of three separate but related IPTs

– Analysis

– Research

– System Engineering

• IPTs composed of N7/N8/PEO MUW, SURFLANT, CMWC, CSS representatives

• Provided interim report mid June, final report NLT 30 September

July 2001 12

ObjectivesObjectives• Determine the technical capabilities of

complete suite of organic systems (seven) and C4I in a coordinated (net-centric) warfighting role– Requirements– CONOPS– Technical Performance

• Describe capabilities and shortfalls– Identify “holes,” issues, and recommendations

• Formulate alternatives to shortfalls• Recommend solutions

July 2001 13

E2E E2E Assessment Assessment

TeamTeamCINCLANTFLT CMWC N752

PMA-299 N763 N77

N78 N74 2nd FLT

Executive BoardExecutive BoardCo-chairs

CAPT Lambert (PMS 403)

CAPT Jimenez (PMS 210)

Analysis Research Systems Engineering

Core Team CellsCore Team Cells

Review Panel

CAPT Briggs (PMS 490)

K. Haas (PMS 210)

T. Stefanick (PMS 210)

July 2001 14

Assessment ProcessAssessment ProcessIntegrate Concept of

Operations and Employment

AMCM LMRS RMS

Integrate Concept of Operations and Employment

AMCM LMRS RMS

System Technical Parameters

Probability of detection

Probability of neutralization

Endurance

False alarm rate

Other …

System Technical Parameters

Probability of detection

Probability of neutralization

Endurance

False alarm rate

Other …

Assessment Methodology

Measures of effectiveness

Modeling

Fleet expertise

Review Panel

Assessment Methodology

Measures of effectiveness

Modeling

Fleet expertise

Review PanelCommunications / Data flowCommunications / Data flow

Baseline Scenario Development

Threats TACSITs

Environmen Asset Availability

Baseline Scenario Development

Threats TACSITs

Environmen Asset Availability

Identify Capabilities

and Shortfalls

Identify Capabilities

and Shortfalls

Prioritize and Rank RecommendationsPrioritize and Rank Recommendations

MIW Operational

Requirements

MIW Operational

Requirements

July 2001 15

‘‘Top 4’ - Dedicated MIW Forces Top 4’ - Dedicated MIW Forces Roadmap to the Navy after NextRoadmap to the Navy after Next

•MCM’s/MHC’s/New Payloads;

–Plan for improvement not clear or funded.

•MCS Replacement

–Valid need for dedicated ship?

–Expected life of Inchon

–Realistic plan for way ahead

>Convert existing ship?

>New Construction of a unique ship?

>Build an additional ship of an existing class?

•MH-53 vs. MH-60

July 2001 16

‘Top 4’ - Improving USW Battle Space Dominance

•Advancing USW as a concept that includes ASW and MUW

•Shallow water operations means we no longer have the luxury to keep ASW and MUW separate.

•Assured access requires an Undersea Warfare Approach.

July 2001 17

July 2001 18

‘Top 4’ - Improving USW Battle Space Dominance

•USW ESG refocused

•Cross platform, leveraged efforts approach

•Eliminate program redundancies/stovepipes•Capability and mission based•Marries ASW and MUW to assure access

•Modified SUBTECH process

•IPTs to explore future technologies which could contribute to mission accomplishment•Outcomes to affect FY02/03 execution and POM 04planning

July 2001 19

Questions?Questions?

July 2001 20

Differences from Force 21Differences from Force 21

• Scope of Force 21 included dedicated MCM, End to End (E2E) analysis addresses only organic

• E2E is a technical assessment addressing interoperability of the suite of systems vs. a strictly operational analysis

• End to End study addresses C4I to a much greater degree than Force 21

• Level of analysis of individual system timelines more detailed in End to End study

• End to End study uses most recent system performance estimates, rather than notional estimates or ORD thresholds

July 2001 21

12 MHC-51 Class ships•2 Overseas Homeported

14 MCM-1 Class ships• 4 Overseas Homeported

Dedicated Forces

1 MCS-12 Class ship

2 AMCM Sqdns (20 A/C total)• 4 FWD Deployed• 72 Hr Deployment Contingency

• 15 EOD MCM dets• 2 EOD Marine

Mammal dets• 1 Very Shallow

Water (VSW) det• 72 Hr Deployment

Contingency

An Integrated Force of Ships, Helicopters and Divers