(ection 27: Passage of Bills; ItemVeto)

1.CIR vs CTA

FACTS: Section 42 of house bill 17839 which became RA 6110 imposed a caterer’s tax on

various operators of restaurants. President Marcos however, vetoed the portion of Section 42

which imposed a 20% caterer’s tax on restaurants operated by hotels, motels, and rest houses.

Private respondent, Manila Golf and Country club, claims that the assessment of petitioners to let

them pay the imposed taxes is without basis because of the veto done by the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto was valid?

RULING: Yes, the veto was valid. An item in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section

imposing a particular kind of tax, but rather to the subject of tax and the tax rate.

( par.2) Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990)

FACTS: On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill 19186, or the General

Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items

included in the proposed budget submitted by the President. Pursuant to the constitutional

provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to the President for

consideration and approval. On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and

declared the same to have become RA 6688. In the process, seven Special Provisions and

Section 55, a "General Provision”, were vetoed.

Senator Neptali Gonzales, together with 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality

of President Cory Aquino’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89,

and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90).

Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills

is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when

she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the

President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power

but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike

out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of

separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the

1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the

prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.

ISSUE: WON the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution/ WON

the President has the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.

HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that

should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate

provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the

exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming

arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and

Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are

“inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s

veto power.

PHILCONSA vs Enriquez 235 SCRA 506 (1994) GR 113105

A. FACTS:

RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled “An

Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1

to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes” was approved by the President and vetoed some of

the provisions.

Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation

for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of

the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court.

PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the

Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art

XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.

16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus

against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National

Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the

items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the

appropriation for debt services.

Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus

against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special

provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions

imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s,

DPWH, and Nat’l Highway Authority.

B. ISSUE:

Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid?

C. HELD:

1. Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres.

w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have

direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing

the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID.

2. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s – said provision allows for the use of income

& creation of revolving fund for SCU’s. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte

State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCU’s enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres.

merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.

3. Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for

maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the

Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to

the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO

VOID.

4. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. – AFP modernization, prior approval of

Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any

prov. blocking an admin.action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be

subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID.

5. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions – allows Chief of Staff to augment

pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may

exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed.VETO VALID.

6. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGU’s – use of special fund for the

compensation of the said CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an

amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act

cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.

BENGZON VS. DRILON G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133

BENGZON VS. DRILON

G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133

Gutierrez, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently

receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree

repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired

justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by

Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted

men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB

16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in

1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the

veto now challenged in this petition.

It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its

publication, thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was

superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto of

HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to

the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.

HELD:

The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its

funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to

constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated

to it in the appropriations law.

Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the

ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired

Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional

provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.

The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are

declared valid and subsisting.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) 

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.  Respondent

argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as

when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their

approval. 

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws

which are not as to their publication;

2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation. 

HELD: 

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the

requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.  This clause does not

mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other

date, without its previous publication. 

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking,

all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.  A

law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class

legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect

the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the

people only, and not to the public as a whole. 

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a

condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different

effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. 

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public

of the content of the law. 

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official

Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity.  The Supreme Court is not

called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. 

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. 

ART VI, SEC 28

CIR vs Lingayen

MAIN POINT: Charters and Special Laws granted and enacted by the Legislature are in the

nature private contracts.

Facts:

Pursuant to RA 3843 (Franchise Act), BIR assessed and demanded against respondent the

company deficiency franchise tax and surcharges it failed to pay. The respondent asked for

reinvestigation, however, it was denied.

Issue:

WON the court can inquire into the wisdom of the act

Held:

The Court does not have the authority to question the wisdom of the Act.

Tolentino Sec. of Finance

Petitioner alleged that RA 7716 (VAT law) was unconstitutional on the grounds that it did not

originate from the House of Representatives as required by Art VI, Sec 24. It is in fact a result of

the two consolidated bills

WON RA 7716 violated the Constitution

MAIN POINT

A bill is deemed to have originated from HR provided that it is filed prior to the filing of the Bill

in the Senate, even if in the end, the Senate approved its own revision.

HELD

No. It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate

exclusively in the HR. The court said that the exclusivity of the prerogative of the HR means

simply that the House alone can initiate the passage of a revenue bill. Such that, if the House

does not initiate one, no revenue law will be passed.

Garcia v. Executive Secretary

President issued an EO to have ad valorem tax on crude oil and other oil products. Tariff

Commission held public hearings on said EO and submitted a report to the president for

appropriate action.

Whether the president may issue an EO which is same as enacting a bill

in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

The enactment of appropriation of revenue and tariff bills is within the scope of legislative rather

than the executive department. However, it doe

not follow that executive order nos. 475 and 478 characterized as revenue measures are

prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.

Pursuant to Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution,

Congress, may by law, authorize the president to fix within specified limits tariff rates import

and export quotas and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development

program of the Government.

The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and

Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which the

President explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus is

CIR VS SANTOS

taxation policy of the government. Petitioners also impugn the decision by asserting that there was no showing that the tax laws on jewelry are confiscatory

Guild of Phil. Jewellers questions the constitutionality of certain provisions of the NIRC and Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. It is their contention that present Tariff and tax structure increases manufacturing costs and render local jewelry manufacturers uncompetitive against other countries. In support of their position, they submitted what they purported to be

an exhaustive study of the tax rates on jewelry prevailing in other Asian countries, in comparison to tax rates levied in the country. Judge Santos of RTC Pasig ruled that the laws in question are confiscatory and oppressive and declared them INOPERATIVE and WITHOUT FORCE AND EFFECT insofar as petitioners are concerned. Petitioner CIR assailed decision rendered by respondent judge contending that the latter has no authority to pass judgment upon the

ISSUE WON RTC has authority to pass judgment upon taxation policy of the government

HELD

SC held that it is within the power of the legislature whether to tax jewelry or not. With the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), coverage (subject) and situs (place

No. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary OF TAXATION

Southern Cross vs. Phil Cement

FACTS: Philcemcor filed with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) a petition seeking for

the imposition of safeguard measures on Gray Portland cement, in accordance with the SMA

(Safeguard Measure Act). After the DTI issued a provisional safeguard measure, the application

was referred to the Tariff Commission for a formal investigation, in order to determine whether

or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement. After public

hearings and conducting its own investigation, the Tariff Commission came out with a negative

finding. Notwithstanding such finding, the DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice

whether it could still impose a definitive safeguard measure. The Secretary of Justice opined that

the DTI could not do so under the SMA, and so the DTI Secretary then promulgated a Decision

wherein he expressed the DTI’s disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but

at the same time, ultimately denying Philcemcor’s application for safeguard measures on the

ground that the he was bound to do so in light of the Tariff Commission’s negative findings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power to tax can be delegated?

RULING: Yes, under conditions laid down in Section 28(2). [“The Congress may, by law,

authorize the President to fix within the specified limits, and subject to such limitations and

restrictions as it may impose, Tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,

and other duties or imposts within the framework of the National Development Program of the

Government.]

This delegation of the taxation power by the legislative to the executive is authorized by

the Constitution itself. At the same time, the Constitution also grants the delegating authority the

right to impose restrictions and limitations on the taxation power delegated to the President. The

restrictions and limitations imposed by the Congress take on the mantle of Constitutional

Command which the executive branch is obliged to observe.

Article VI Sec 28

Abra Valley College vs Aquin

Petitioner is an educational corporation, its building and lot was issued a "notice of seizure" and

a "notice of sale" for failure to pay taxes. Petitioner argues that they should be tax exempt since

it's for educational purpose despite the fact that the 2nd floor was being used as residential and

the ground floor was being leased to another corporation.

W/N petitioner should the tax exempt for being an education corporation

It is mentioned in the Constitution that when used for educational purposes, it should be

exempted from paying taxes. Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption to

facilities which are incidental for the accomplishment of its main purpose. however it cannot be

said that the lease of the ground floor to another corporation is to be incidental for the

accomplishment of the main purpose. therefore they should not be exempted from paying taxes.

Llandoc v. CIR, 14 SCRA 292

FACTS: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash

to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr.

Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was

spent for such purpose.

 

On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29,

1960. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the

Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the

Parish priest at the time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical

personality as the constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid.

HELD: Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section22(3) Article VI of the

Constitution contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as

Property taxes contra distinguished from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the

property used for religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a

property by way of gift inter vivos.

 

The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of

the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose.

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIV VS DAR

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA G.R. No. 124043, October 14, 1998

Facts: Private respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various

programs and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to

its religious, educational and charitable objectives. YMCA earned an income from leasing out a

portion of its premises to small shop owners and from parking fees collected from non-members.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment for deficiency income tax,

deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and professional fees and deficiency

withholding tax on wages. YMCA protested the assessment.

Issue: Whether or not the income of private respondent YMCA from rentals of small shops and

parking fees is exempt from taxation

Held: YMCA argues that Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution exempts charitable institutions

from the payment not only of property taxes but also of income tax from any source. The Court

is not persuaded. The debates, interpellations and expressions of opinion of the framers of the

Constitution reveal their intent. Justice Hilario Davide Jr., a former constitutional commissioner,

stressed during the Concom debate that what is exempted is not the institution itself; those

exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and

exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, an eminent

authority on the Constitution and also a member of the Concom, adhered to the same view that

the exemption created by said provision pertained only to property taxes. In his treatise on

taxation, Justice Jose Vitug concurs, stating that the tax exemption covers property taxes only.

Indeed, the income tax exemption claimed by YMCA finds no basis in Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the

Constitution.

YMCA also invokes Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution claiming that YMCA is a non-stock,

non-profit educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and

exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income. The

Court reiterates that YMCA is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income tax on

the rentals from its property. The bare allegation alone that it is a non-stock, non-profit

educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax.

Laws allowing tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris. Hence, for the YMCA to be

granted the exemption it claims under the aforecited provision, it must prove with substantial

evidence that: 1. it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and

2. the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly and exclusively for

educational purposes. However, the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by

YMCA to prove that it met the said requisites.

YMCA is not an educational institution within the purview of Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the

Constitution. The term “educational institution,” when used in laws granting tax exemptions,

refers to a school, seminary, college or educational establishment. Therefore, YMCA cannot be

deemed one of the educational institutions covered by the said constitutional provision.

Moreover, the Court notes that YMCA did not submit proof of the proportionate amount of the

subject income that was actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.

John Hay v. Lim

GR No. 119775

March 29, 2005

Facts: The John Hay Peoples’ Aternative Coalition et al filed a petition in the Supreme Court

regarding its previous decision in favor of respondents BCDA et al to invalidate Section 3 of

Proclamation No. 420, which granted tax exemptions to the John Hay Special Economic Zone.

The Section in question states that the John Hay SEZ shall enjoy duty-free privileges, and the

Proclamation was issued by then-President Ramos.

Issue: W/N the President, in giving tax-free incentives to the John Hay SEZ, violated Art VI Sec

28 Par 4 of the Constitution, which states that “no law granting any tax exemption shall be

passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of Congress.”

Held: Yes, Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 was in violation of Art Vi Sec 28 Par 4 of the

Constitution. While the President is allowed to impose tariff rates and import and export quotas,

among others, under Art VI Sec 28 Par 2 of the Constitution, Par 4 of the same Section expressly

states that only Congress can pass laws relating to tax exeptions.

grant of tax exemption rests upon the theory that it will benefit the body of people and not upon

the idea of lessening the burden of individual corporate owners.

Lung Center v. Quezon City, GR No. 144104, June 29, 2004

Planters Products Inc v. Fertiphil Corp, GR No. 166006, March 14, 2008

Section 29. Fiscal Powers of Congress; Limitations; Special Funds

Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 PHIL. 331, 1960-61

PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS

"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit, derived from such expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular enterprise."

FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public works

particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway. The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the government.

ISSUE: WON the incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of justifying an expenditure of the government?

HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.

The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.

Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221, 1991

Guingona vs. Carague

FACTS: The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967 which authorized the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the presidential decrees are violative of Section 29 (1) Article VI of the Constitution?

RULING: No. Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are

made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.

Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, 158 SCRA 626, 1988

Taxed were levied on sugar production for the purpose of creating the sugar stabilization fund

administered by PHILSUCOM. Proceeds from the fund were used to capitalize republic planters

bank. Sugar producers petitioned the court to compel republic planters bank and PHILSUCOM

to transfer the shares to the names of the producers who are allegely the true owners of the shares

Gaston vs Republic Planters Bank

W/N the funds referred in the case are regarded as public funds.

Yes, they are public funds. The funds collected here were in the nature of a tax with a special

regulatory purpose. Hence they may only be used for a public purpose. Therefore the shares

cannot be considered to be owned by private individuals

Section 30. Appelate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA, 237 SCRA 519, 1994

First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA, 237 SCRA 519, 1994

FACTS: The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended provided that appeals from

decisions of the Board of Investments (BOI) shall be the exclusive jurisdiction of the CA. Just a

few months after the 1987 Constitution took effect (July 17, 1987), the Omnibus Investments

Code of 1987 (EO 226) was promulgated which provided in Art 82 thereof that such appeals be

directly filed with the SC. The SC later promulgated, under its rule-making power, Circular No.

1-91 which confirmed that jurisdiction of the CA over appeals from the decisions of the BOI.

SC’s Second Division, relying on said Circular, accordingly sustained the appellate jurisdiction

of the CA in this present case. Petitioner now move to reconsider and question the Second

Division’s ruling which provided: 

“….although the right to appeal granted by Art 82 of EO 226 is a substantive right which cannot

be modified by a rule of procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what manner

the appeal can be brought are only matters of procedure which this Court has the power to

regulate.” 

They contend that Circular No. 191 (a rule of procedure) cannot be deemed to have superseded

Art 82 of EO 226 (a legislation). 

ISSUE: Was the Court correct in sustaining the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in decisions

from the Board of Investments? 

HELD: Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the 1987 Constitution took effect February 2, 1987.

Thus, Art 82 of EO 226, which provides for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is

invalid and therefore never became effective for the concurrence of the Court was no sought in

its enactment. Thus, the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended still stands. The

exclusive jurisdiction on appeals from decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA. 

Section 32. Initiative and Referendum

Garcia v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 279, 1994

Article VII: Executive Department

Section 1. Executive Power; Privileges; Immunities

Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 1989; MR, 178 SCRA, 1989

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989]

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the

respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres.

Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the

President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the

Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1

and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the

Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President

impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is

guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President

(Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the

Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would

normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's

country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to

travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a

state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct

rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within

the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of

movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country,

including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security,

public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter

one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the

limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the

liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well

considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of

International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in

determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to

national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by

the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after

the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the

Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Laurel v. Garcia 187 SCRA 797, 1990

Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356 SCRA 108, 2001

Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 186450, December 13, 2011

Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 191805, November 15, 2011

Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393, 1988

Soliven v. Makasiar

Section 1. Executive Power; Privileges; Immunities

Main Point: While the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting

suit. The privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and

may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's

behalf.

Facts: President Aquino sued Beltran for libel for having written that the President hid under the

bed during an attempted coup.

Issue: WON a President can sue, since she cannot be sued.

Ruling: Affirmative. Privilege of immunity from suit pertains to the President by virtue of the

office, and can be invoked only by the holder of the office, and not by any other person. An

accused in a criminal case cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense. Also, nothing can

stop the President from waiving said privilege.

Senate v. Ermita, G.R. 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS: The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail Project However, On September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464] and that "said officials have not secured the required consent from the President." Thus this petition to declare EO 464 as unconstitutional as petitioners contend that the President has exercised grave abuse of Executive privilege in issuing it.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is a valid exercise of Executive privileg?

RULING: The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege becaue A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description of the documents within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality. Without this specificity, it is impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very thing sought to be protected.

Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. 170516, July 16 2008

Petitioner seeks to have the full-text of the Japanese-Philippines Economic Partnership

Agreement(JPEPA). They emphasized that it is a matter of public concern and public interest.

Respondent invoke its executive privilege.

Akbayan vs Aquino

W/N the agreement can be covered by the executive privilege

To be covered by the right of information, the information must be a matter of public concern

and must not involve matters of national security. The petitioners demand of the full-text has

been declared moot and academic since it was already made accessible to the public. However

the petitioners failed to show "sufficient showing of need", therefore as for their demand of

having the full-text was denied and respondents claim of executive privilege was valid

Neri v. Senate, G.R. 180643, March 25, 2008; MR, Sept. 4, 2008

Neri v. Senate, G.R. 180643, March 25, 2008; MR, Sept. 4, 2008

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)

entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of

equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project for U.S. $

329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The project was to be financed by the People’s

Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the

September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and

power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared

in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hours and during which he admitted that

Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN

project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that

she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused

to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she

directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that

the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down

in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order

for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE:

Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive

privilege?

HELD:

The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464 (advised

executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and

jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to

legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive

privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry

relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of

military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the

commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine

of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater

confidentiality than the others.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the

ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and

correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and

policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair

our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put,

the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating

to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the

three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the

communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the

power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President

to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally

been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a

close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be

considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. Third, there is no

adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of

the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive

privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on

matters of public concern. We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not

appear before them at all. However, petitioner made himself available to them during the

September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he

expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the

exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article

III provides: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,

transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy

development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Prov. Of North Cotabato v. Government, G.R. No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008

Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506

Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652

Senate v. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006

SENATE vs ERMITA

MAIN POINT: The teaching on executive privilege may be culled from.

Facts:Various officials of Exec.Dep’t, and Military after being invited to appear as resource speakers on the issue of “Gloriagate”, wire-tapping, electoral fraud, and etc. were not able to make it due to prior commitments. Thereafter, the President issued EO 464, (Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution and for Other Purposes) and Ermita sent a letter to the Senate President informing him of the EO and that the resource persons from the executive departments would not be able to attend without the consent of the president.

Issue: WON EO 464 is valid? What types of information are covered by executive privilege?

Held:Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch, whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it mus be respected.

The types of information include those which are of a nature that disclosure would subvert military or diplomatic objectives, or information about the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law, or information about internal deliberations comprising the process by which government decisions are reached.EO 464, sec 2 enumerated the following as privileged:

1. Conversations and correspondence between the President and the Public official covered by this EO;

2. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should be divulged;

3. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements;

4. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings;5. Matters affecting national security and public order.

Neri v. Senate, GR No. 180643, March 25, 2008, September 4, 2008

Section 2. Qualifications

Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004

Section 3. Vice President

Section 4. Election and Canvass

Macalintal v. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003

Macalintal v. COMELEC

Section 4. Election and Canvass

Main Point: The proclamation of presidential and vice-presidential winners is a function of

Congress and not of the Comelec.

FACTS:

Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that

certain provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are

unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioner’s right to file the instant petition, stating in

essence that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental

significance to the Filipino people, considering that public funds are to be used and appropriated

for the implementation of said law.

The petitioner argues that Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim

the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the President

and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the

Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as

winners only by Congress.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.

RULING:

YES. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally

belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for

President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its

duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority

to proclaim the winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.

Lopez v. Senate and House, GR No. 163556, June 8, 2004

Pimentel v. Joint Canvassing Committee, June 22, 2004

The final adjournment of the Congress' session does not affect its non-legislative functions. In

fact it is stated in the Constitution, under Article VII Section 4, that both Houses of Congress

convened by express directive to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the President and Vice-

President and cannot adjourn until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated task

W/N petitions is with merit.

Petitioner Senator Pimentel Jr. seeks to a writ of prohibition directing respondent to cease and

desist from conducting further proceedings. He argues that the term of the Congress got expired

on its last session and therefore passed out of legal existence and should terminate all pending

proceedings.

Macalintal v. PET, GR No. 191618, November 23, 2010

Macalintal v. PET, GR No. 191618, November 23, 2010

FACTS: Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal filed a petition that questions the constitution of the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4,

Article VII of the Constitution: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of

all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President,

and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of

the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the

President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution. Section 1 of Republic

Act No. 1793, which provides that: "There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral

Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and

qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the Philippines."

ISSUE: Whether or not PET is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely

conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result

of the enactment may be likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of

such ordinary courts of first instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate courts,

and those of courts of domestic relations. The explicit reference of the Members of the

Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas

categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987

Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power granted to the

Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary

implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII

of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the

means necessary to carry it into effect. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the

Supreme Court, since it is the same Court although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are

more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions.

Hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of

the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the

imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court. We have previously

declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated.

Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution

independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.

Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Arroyo, PET Case No. 002, March 29, 2005

Legarda v. De Castro, PET Case No. 003, March 31, 2005

LOREN B. LEGARDA v. NOLI L. DE CASTRO

P.E.T. Case No. 003, 18 January 2008, Presidential Electoral Tribunal, (Quisumbing, J. )

MAIN POINT

We are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and

discharging her duties as such, which fact we can take judicial notice of, has effectively

abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination to protect and pursue

the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.

ACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioner Loren B. Legarda filed before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal a petition to annul

the proclamation of Respodent Noli L. De Castro as the Vice-President of the Philippines. The

protest filed by Legarda consisted of two aspects. The First Aspect covers the alleged erroneous,

manipulated and/or falsified results of the election. While the Second pertains to the revision of

the ballots of the precincts specified in the protest. The Second Aspect was earlier dismissed by

the Supreme Court for the failure of Legarda to pay the required deposit for the expenses.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner clearly and convincingly proved the presence of manipulation or

falsification of election results

HELD:

Petition DISMISSED.

We are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and discharging

her duties as such, which fact we can take judicial notice of, has effectively abandoned or

withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interest

involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. The most relevant precedent on

this issue is Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, a decision rendered by this Tribunal, which held that:

The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three

of which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May

1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago’s term if she would

succeed in proving in the instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In

assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this

protest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her “determination to protect

and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.”

Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. Moreover, the

dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty

as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all-[too] crucial political

stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.

It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election

protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest

implications thereof, on the following grounds:

(1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance;

(2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof;

(3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules;

(4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing

of the protest; and

(5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly

legible.

Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in

a suppletory character, may likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer. After

which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds. In sum, if

an election protest may be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly

stronger reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant.

In the case at bar, protestant’s tenure in the Senate coincides with the term of the Vice-

Presidency 2004-2010, that is the subject of her protest.

On the matter of the alleged spurious ER copies, we agree with the protestee that the protestant

had not adequately and convincingly rebutted the presumption that as public documents, the

Congress-retrieved ER copies, used for the proclamation of the protestee by the NBC, are

authentic and duly executed in the regular course of official business. The evidence adduced by

protestee to show that the supposed security features and markings in the Congress-retrieved ERs

and the COMELEC/NAMFREL’s copies are different, did not categorically establish that the

Congress-retrieved ERs are fake and spurious. To overcome the presumption of regularity, there

must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Absent such

convincing evidence, the presumption must be upheld. In fact, the records show that even the

witnesses presented by the protestant testified that they were able to discern security features and

markings in the Congress-retrieved ERs. The records also show that witnesses were not made to

examine all Congress-retrieved ERs in making observations relative to security features and

markings, but only a sample set thereof was utilized, resulting in grave insufficiency in the

evidence presented by protestant.

Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, PET Case No. 001, February 13, 1996

Section 5. Oath

Section 6. Official Residence; Salary

Section 7. Vacancy at the Beginning of the Term of the Presidency

Section 8. Vacancy During the Term of the Presidency

Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356 SCRA 108, 2001

ESTRADA vs DESIERTO

Nature: Petition to question the legitimacy of the assumption as President of the Republic of the Philippines by Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

Facts: Erap was elected as President of RP with GMA as his VP. Because of the jueteng scandal, an impeachment proceeding was started against Erap which was cut short as prosecutors walked out and joined the rallying people in the streets of Manila. Amidst the pressure, Erap proposed snap elections, which he is not to run as a candidate but to quell the “wave” against him. Negotiations were made between Erap’s camp and GMA’s, and at 12nn of 20 January 2001, GMA took her oath which was acknowledged by both Houses of Congress as well as the international community. Erap, on the other hand, left Malacanang.

Issue: WON Estrada resigned as President

Held:Yes, impliedly. On reading Executive Secretary Angara’s diary published in the Phil. Daily Inquirer, the Court held that petitioner impliedly resigned because 1) he did not want to be a candidate in the proposed snap election 2) he did not object to Sen. Pimentel’s “dignified exit” proposal and 3) on Erap saying that he only had 5 days to a week to stay in the Palace. Also, from what the court eventually calls his “resignation letter”, Erap 1) acknowledged GMA’s oath-taking as President 2) he did not mention any intent on re-assuming his position as President and, 3) his gratitude on the letter is on a past opportunity he served as a President.

Lozano, et al v. Macapagal-Arroyo, February 6, 2001

Section 9. Vacancy in the Vice Presidency

Section 10. Vacancies in Both the Presidency and the Vice Presidency

Section 11. Incapacity of the President

Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356, SCRA 108, 2001

Section 12. Serious Illness of the President

Section 13. Prohibitions

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, 1991

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

Section 13. Prohibitions

Main Point: While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other

office and employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by

the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants

may do so only when EXPRESSLY authorized by the Constitution itself.

FACTS:

Petitioners seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by

President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987 which according to them allows members of the

Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or

positions in addition to their primary positions. The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s

constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those

provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding

any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1.

The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of

Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council

by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

Issue:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

Decision:

No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.

In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is

unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries

or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions

in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple

offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of

the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987

Constitution itself.

The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal interpretation

to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8

Art. VIII.

Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354, 1989

Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS: Petitioner, Quintin S. Doromal, former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a Motion to Quash the information against him for his violation of RA 3019 where respondents contend that he willfully and unlawfully have direct or indirect financial interest in the Doromal International Trading Corporation, an entity which transacted or entered into a business transaction or contract with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower and Youth Council., since according to him, he has not signed any document related to it.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners Motion to Quash is with merit?

RULING: There is no merit in petitioner's insistence that the information should be quashed because the Special Prosecutor admitted in the Sandiganbayan that he does not possess any document signed and/or submitted to the DECS by the petitioner after he became a PCGG Commissioner. That admission allegedly belies the averment in the information that the petitioner "participated' in the business of the DITC in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by law from having any interest. (Sec. 3-h, RA No. 3019).The petitioner "can rightfully be charged ...with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any business." The constitutional ban is similar to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law (PD No. 807, Sec. 36, subpar. 24) that "Pursuit of private business ... without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and Regulations" shall be a ground for disciplinary action against any officer or employee in the civil service.

Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568, 1993

Flores vs. Drilon

Main Point: The appointing authority that the congress gives to the President is an exclusive

prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed by the Congress.

Facts:

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases

Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon

of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay

Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this case. Paragraph (d) provides that the

President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a

compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget,

who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive

officer of the Subic Authority. Provided, however, that for the first year of its operations from

the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman

and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority. One of the contentions of the petitioners is that

it violates Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . .

appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for

by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through

the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor (provision on the first

year of operations) to the subject posts.

ISSUE:

WON the provision in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violatesl Sec. 16, Art. VII of the

Constitution.

RULING:

Yes. The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by

providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall

assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives

to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of

whom to appoint by limiting his choice.

Bitonio v. COA, G.R. no. 147392, March 12, 2004

Bitonio v. COA, G.R. no. 147392, March 12, 2004

FACTS: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the

Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. As representative of the

Secretary of Labor to the PEZA Board, he was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he

attended during the years 1995 to 1997. After a post audit of the PEZA’s disbursement

transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to Mr. Bitonio pursuant to the

Supreme Court ruling declaring unconstitutional the holding of other offices by the cabinet

members, their deputies and assistants in addition to their primary office and the receipt of

compensation therefore, and, to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997,

implementing Senate Committee Reports No. 509.

In his motion for reconsideration to the COA, he contended that the Supreme Court modified its

earlier ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case, which limits the prohibition to Cabinet

Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their Assistants. Officials given the rank equivalent to a

Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other appointive officials below the rank of

Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition.

He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA 7916), enacted four years after the Civil Liberties

Union case became final, authorized the payment of per diems; in expressly authorizing per

diems, Congress should be conclusively presumed to have been aware of the parameters of the

constitutional prohibition as interpreted in the Civil Liberties Union case.

ISSUE: WON COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his

attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors’ meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.

HELD: Yes. The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to receive per diem for his board meetings

sitting as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the Board of Directors of the PEZA.

The petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as

representative of the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from

receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise

applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor.

Moreover, it is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the

Constitution. No law can render it nugatory because the Constitution is more superior to a

statute. The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason

why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748 to cure such defect. The option of designating

representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the

payment of per diems to the members of the Board of Directors was also deleted, considering

that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution.

Public Interest Group v. Elma, GR No. 138965, June 30, 2006

Section 14. Appointments of Acting President

Section 15. Prohibited Appointments

In Re Appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta, AM No. 98-5-01-SC, Nov. 9, 1998

In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998

Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued

vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII

Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban

De la Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136, Feb. 28, 2001

De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, GR No. 191002, April 20, 2010

and May 1, 2010

DE CASTRO vs JBC

MAIN POINT: This case was filed with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election.

Facts:JBC commenced the proceeding for the selection of the nominees to be included in a shortlist to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to

submit the list to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next president makes the situation ripe for judicial determination.

Issue: WON Sec 15 of ART 7 applies to appointments to the judiciary.

Held:No. Prohibition under Section 15 of ART 7 does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the SC or to other appointments to the Judiciary. As can be seen, Article 7 is devoted to the Executive Department, and among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. One of the reasons underlying the adoption of the provision was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive.

Section 16. Power to Appoint; Commission on Appointments

Government v. Springer 50 PHILS 259, 1927

Bermudez v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 131429, August 4, 1999

Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568, 1993

Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 1260, 1989

Bautista vs. Salonga

FACTS: On 27 Aug 1987, Cory designated Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of CHR. In December of the same year, Cory made the designation of Bautista permanent.  However, Commission on Appointments averred that Bautista cannot take her seat w/o their confirmation. Cory, through the Exec Sec, filed with the CoA communications about Bautista’s appointment on 14 Jan 1989. Bautista refused to be placed under the CoA’s review hence she filed a petition before the SC. On the other hand, Mallillin invoked EO 163-A stating that since CoA refused Bautista’s appointment, Bautista should be removed. EO 163-A provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to CoA’s confirmation?

HELD: Since the position of Chairman of the CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the CoA it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the CoA. To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself.

Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549, 1987

Petitioner filed a motion to prohibit respondent from performing his duties as the commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that respondent's appointment was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments

W/N the appointment is considered to be valid.

Yes, it is valid based on Article VII Section 16 of the Constitution, which states that appointments made by the President that requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments are those belonging to the first group such as the Ambassador. The commissioner of the Bureau of Customs however does not belong to the first group, therefore it does not anymore need the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments to be valid.

Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259, 1989

Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259, 1989

FACTS: The petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the

President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the

Constitution. Due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on

Appointments, who insisted that the respondent Commission must first confirm sectoral

representatives before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the

In view of this development, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted on April 25,

1988, a letter dated April 11, 1988 of the President addressed to the Commission on

Appointments submitting for confirmation the appointments of the four sectoral representatives.

Meanwhile, petitioner in a letter dated April 22, 1988 addressed to Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr.

appealed to the House of Representatives alleging, among others, that since “no attempt was

made to subject the sectoral representatives already sitting to the confirmation process, there is

no necessity for such confirmation, and subjection thereto of the present batch would certainly be

discriminatory”.

ISSUE: WON the Constitution require the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House

of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments?

HELD: No. The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Since

the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by

appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it

is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the “other

officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,” referred to in the

first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the

Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).

Petitioner’s appointment was furthermore made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2

which gives the President ”the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,

whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval

by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” The

records show that petitioner’s appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in

recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of

Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her. Implicit in the invocation of paragraph

2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment of petitioner is, the recognition by the

President as appointing authority, that petitioner’s appointment requires confirmation by the

Commission on Appointments. As a matter of fact, the President had expressly submitted

petitioner’s appointment for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Considering that

Congress had adjourned without respondent Commission on Appointments having acted on

petitioner’s appointment, said appointment/nomination had become moot and academic pursuant

to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent Commission and “unless resubmitted shall not again be

considered by the Commission.”

Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254, 1992

Manalo v. Sistoza, GR No. 107369, August 11, 1999

Manalo vs Sistoza

On November 5, 2010

312 scra 239

Appointments

Petitioner, Jesulito Sistoza question the constitutionality and legality of the appointments issued by former Pres. Corazon Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the PNP who were promoted to the rank of Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. The said police officers tool their Oath of Offices and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. The petitioner brought before this petition for prohibition, as a tax payer suit to the SC to assail the legality of subject appointment and disbursement thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of the senior officers of the PNP is valid even without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

HELD: The SC held that the appointments are valid. The court has the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit alienated by the fundamental law. When it does the courts will not hesitate to strike down such unconstitutionality.

Matibag v. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002

Rufino v. Endriga, 496 SCRA 13

RUFINO vs ENDRIGA

MAIN POINT: When the authority is given to the head of collegial bodies, it is to the chairman that the authority is given and not to the body. He can appoint only officers “lower in rank”, and not officers equal in rank to him.

Facts:Petitioners contended that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees and that Section 6b of PD 15 (Created Cultural Center of the Philippines) authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional.

Issue: WON Sec 6b of PD 15 is unconstitutional

Held:

Yes. Section 6b of PD 15 is inconsistent with Sec 16 of Art VII. Sec 6b of PD 15 empowered the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Sec 16 of Art VII of the 1987 Constitution allowed heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or board to appoint only “officers lower in rank” than such heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. Thus, in so far as it authorized the trustees of the CCP board to elect their co-trustees, Sec 6b of PD 15 was unconstitutional because it violated Sec 16 of Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, GR No. 164978, October 13, 2005

Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR No. 196271, October 18, 2011

Section 17. Power of Control

Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano 21 SCRA 395, 1967

Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Jose Paño, et. al.

Main Point: The power of control has been given to the President over all executive officers.

Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his

department secretaries. At the case at bar, as the Executive Secretary acts by authority of the

President, his decision is that of the President’s.

FACTS:

In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land

situated in Davao. On 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion of the above

public land to the plaintiff. On 1954, the same was officially released from the forest zone as

pasture land and declared agricultural land. On 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants

applied for the purchase of 90 hectares of the released area. Plaintiff in turn filed its own sales

application covering the entire released area. The Director of Lands, following an investigation

of the conflict, rendered a decision on 1956 giving due course to the application of plaintiff

corporation. When the case was elevated to the President of the Philippines, Executive Secretary

Juan Pajo, by authority of the president, declared that it would be for public interest that

appellants, who are mostly landless farmers, be allocated that portion on which the petitioner

have made improvements.

ISSUES:

May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the

Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources?

HELD:

YES. The President’s duty to execute the law and control of all executive departments are of

constitutional origin. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority

to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. It may also

be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President’s power of control

over the executive departments. He may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the

Constitution does not command that he perform in person. As the Executive Secretary acts by

authority of the President, his decision is that of the President’s. Such decision is to be given full

faith and credit by our courts, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive.

Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr 197 SCRA 771

Roque v. Director of Lands, L-25373, July 1, 1976

Petitioner questions the decision of the Assistant Executive Secretary of the President for sustaining the decision of the Director of Lands and overruling the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources. He Claims that the Assistant Executive Secretary of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion

W/N there is grave abuse of discretion

No, it is stated in the Constitution that the President shall have control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. The assistant executive secretary was merely acting on behalf of the president, therefore it is understood that whatever decision the assistant executive secretary gives comes from the President himself.

Ang-Angco v. Castillo 9 SCRA 619, 1963

NAMARCO v. Arca 29 SCRA 648, 1969

Drilon v. Lim 235 SCRA 135, 1994

Drilon vs   Lim

9 May

GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994

FACTS:Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. The court cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter,” while the second is “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law.”

ISSUES:The issues in this case are

(1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional; and

(2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than supervision, over the local government

HELD:

The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional but affirmed the said lower court’s finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own

judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully examined every exhibit and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process.

Jason v. Torres 290 SCRA 279, 1998

Dadole v. COA, GR No. 125350, Dec. 3, 2002

DADOLE vs COA

MAIN POINT: The power of the president over local governments is only one general supervision.

Facts: The Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners, in excess of the amount authorized by Local Budget Circular No. 55 of DBM which provided that, “xxx additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates not exceeding P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities be granted xxx “. Petitioner judges argue that Local Budget Circular No. 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue by dictating a uniform amount that an LGU can disburse as additional allowances to judges stationed therein. They maintained that said circular is not supported by any law and therefore went beyond the supervisory powers of the President.

Issue: WON LBC 55 of the DBM is void for it goes beyond supervisory powers of the President? Does LBC 55 goes beyond the law it seeks to implement?

Held:The Court declared LBC 55 to be null and void.

Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to LGUs, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President.

LBC no 55 goes beyond the law it seeks to implement. Section 458 of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional allowances to judges “when the finances of the city government allow.” The said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory nature of LBC 55 had no legal basis.

DENR v. DENR Employees, GR No. 149724, Aug. 19, 2003

Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710

Tondo Medical Center Employees v. CA, GR No. 167324, July 17, 2007

Tondo Medical Center Employees v. CA

Main Point:

The express grant of the power of control to the President justifies an executive action to carry

out the reorganization of an executive office under a broad authority of law.

Facts:

DOH launched Health Sector Reform Agenda to reform the local health system. Executive Order

102 was the order to redirect the functions and operations of the Department of health which

provided for the changes in the roles functions and organizational processes of the DOH. Under

the assailed order, DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to

being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of being the

devolution of basic services to local government units. Petitioners alleged that this EO is in

excess of the Presidential Authority.

Issue:

WON EO no. 102 violates Section 17, Article 7 of the Constitution.

Ruling:

No. The argument that the EO 102 is in excess of the presidential authority due is without basis.

The constitution clearly states that the president shall have control of all executive departments,

bureaus and offices. Furthermore, DOH is among the cabinet level departments enumerated

under the Book IV of the Administrative code mainly tasked with the functional distribution of

the work of the president.

Malaria Employees v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007

Orosa v. Roa, GR No. 14047, July 14, 2006

Phillips Seafood v. BOI, GR No. 175787, February 4, 2009

Biraogo v. Truth Commission, GR No. 192935, December 7, 2010

Section 18. President’s Powers as Commander in Chief

Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448

Aberca v. Ver, 160 SCRA 590

IBP v. Zamora, GR 141284, August 15, 2000

Lacson v. Perez, GR 147780-81, 147799 and 1477810, May 10, 2001

Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 159085, February 3, 2004

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396, May 2006

Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

Main Point:

The President may call the Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or

rebellion.

Facts:

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA

People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state

of national emergency. In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,

respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy

among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some members

of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered

the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and

present danger. Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24,

2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the office of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was

perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25,

2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the

security guard of the building – were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a

composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the

warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed

Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

Issue:

Whether the issuance of PP 1017 is Constitutional.

Ruling:

PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or

suppress Lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the

Constitution.

However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power to

issue decrees to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless

violence as decrees promulgated by the President; and to impose standards on media or any form

of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under

section 17, article XII of the constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot

take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.

David v. Ermita, GR No. 171409, May 3, 2006

Gudani v. Senga, GR No. 170165, April 15, 2006

Ampatuan v. Puno, 651 SCRA 228

Section 19. Executive Clemency

Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 PHIL 34

Llamas v. Orbos 202 SCRA 844, 1991

People v. Salle 250 SCRA 581, 1995

Drilon v. CA, 202 SCRA 378, 1991

Torres v. Gonzales 152 SCRA 272, 1987

Monsanto v. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190, 1989

Sabello v. Department of Education, GR No. 87687, December 26, 1989

People v. Salle, Jr GR No. 103567, December 4, 1995

Garcia v. COA, 226 SCRA 356, 1993

Echegaray v. Sec. of Justice, GR No. 132601, Jan 19, 1999

Section 20. Foreign Loans

Spouses Constantino v. Cuisia, GR 106064, October 13, 2005

Section 21. Foreign Relations: Senate Concurrence in International Agreements

USAFFE Veterans Association v. Treasurer, 105 PHIL 1030, 1959

World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242

Bayan v. Executive Secretary Zamora, 343 SCRA 449, 2000

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, 2005

Lim v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002

Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, GR No. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000

Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 162230, April 28, 2010

Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244

Article VIII: Judicial Department

Section 1. Judicial Power

Santiago v. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188 (2970)

Noblejas v. Teehankee, 23 SCRA 405

Manila Electric Company v. Pasay Transportation Company, 57 PHIL 600

Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio, 33 SCRA 494

In Re Laureta, 148 SCRA 382

Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989); MR, 178 SCRA 760 (1989)

US v. Nixon, 418 US 683 (1974)

Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452 (2001); MR, 356 SCRA 108 (2001)

ESTRADA vs DESIERTO

Nature: Petition to question the legitimacy of the assumption as President of the Republic of the Philippines by Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

Facts: Erap was elected as President of RP with GMA as his VP. Because of the jueteng scandal, an impeachment proceeding was started against Erap which was cut short as prosecutors walked out and joined the rallying people in the streets of Manila. Amidst the pressure, Erap proposed snap elections, which he is not to run as a candidate but to quell the “wave” against him. Negotiations were made between Erap’s camp and GMA’s, and at 12nn of 20 January 2001, GMA took her oath which was acknowledged by both Houses of Congress as well as the international community. Erap, on the other hand, left Malacanang.

Issue: WON Estrada resigned as President

Held:Yes, impliedly. On reading Executive Secretary Angara’s diary published in the Phil. Daily Inquirer, the Court held that petitioner impliedly resigned because 1) he did not want to be a candidate in the proposed snap election 2) he did not object to Sen. Pimentel’s “dignified exit” proposal and 3) on Erap saying that he only had 5 days to a week to stay in the Palace. Also, from what the court eventually calls his “resignation letter”, Erap 1) acknowledged GMA’s oath-taking as President 2) he did not mention any intent on re-assuming his position as President and, 3) his gratitude on the letter is on a past opportunity he served as a President.

Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997)

Infotech Foundation v. COMELEC, GR No. 159139, January 13, 2004

Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, GR No. 166886, July 30, 2008

Villarosa v. HRET, GR No. 144129, September 14, 2000

Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 162230, April 28, 2010

Garcia v. Board of Investments, GR No. 92024, November 9, 1990

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, GR No. 132601, January 19, 1999

Torrecampo v. MWSS, 649 SCRA 482

Liban v. Gordon, 639 SCRA 709

Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244

Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476

Hacienda Luisita v. PARC, GR No. 171101, November 22, 2011

Sana v. CESB, GR No. 192926, November 15, 2011

Gamboa v. Teves, 652 SCRA 690

Section 2. Role of Congress

Mantruste Systems v. CA, 179 SCRA 136 (1989)

Malaga v. Penachos, 213 SCRA 516 (1992)

Lupangco v. CA, 160 SCRA 848 (1988)

Section 3. Fiscal Autonomy

Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 SCRA 429 (1950)

Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992)

Section 4. Composition; En Banc and Division Cases

Fortich v. Corona, 312 SCRA 751 (1999)

People v. Dy, GR 115236-37, Jan. 16, 2003

People v. Ebio, GR 147750, Sept. 29, 2004

Firestone Ceramics v. CA, GR No. 127245, June 28, 2000

Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court

Tano v. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997)

Judicial Review

Lina v. Purisma, 82 SCRA 344 (1978)

Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 PHIL 139 (1936)

Macasiano v. NHA, 224 SCRA 236 (1993)

Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 678 (1972)

PACU v. Secretary of Education, 97 PHIL 806 (1955)

Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975)

Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 (1993)

Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993)

Kilosbayan v. Morato, 246 SCRA (1995)

Anti Graft League of the Philippines, 260 SCRA 250 (1996)

Telecom v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998)

Bayan v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000

Automotive Industry Workers v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005

White Light Corp v. City of Manila, GR No. 122846, January 20, 2009

Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR No. 140835, August 14, 2000

Sandoval v. PAGCOR, GR No. 138982, November 29, 2000

Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744 (1998)

IBP v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 (2000)

Francisco v. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 44

De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (1971)

David v. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 162

People v. Mateo, 433 SCRA 540

Mariano Jr. v. COMELEC, GR No. 118577, March 7, 1995

Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392

Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, GR No. 102782, December 11, 1991

Administration of Justice; Rule-Making

PNB v. Asuncion, 60 SCRA 321

Santero v. CFI Cavite, 153 SCRA 728

Damasco v. Lagui, 166 SCRA 214

People v. Lacson, 400 SCRA 262

St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494

People v. Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172 (1970)

In Re Cunanan, 94 PHIL 534 (1953-1954)

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, January 19, 1999

Bustos v. Lucero, 81 PHIL 648 (1948)

In Re Admission to the Bar: Argosino – Bar Matter 712, 246 SCRA 14 (1995)

Fabian v. Desierto, GR 129742, September 16, 1998

In Re: De Vera (2003)

Baguio Markets Vendor v. Judge, GR No. 165922, February 26, 2010

Republic v. Gingoyon, GR No. 166429, February 1, 2006

Maniago v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 104392, February 20, 1996.

Javellana v. DILG, GR No. 102549, August 10, 1992

Bar Matter No. 1222, February 4, 2004

Garrido v. Garrido, AC No. 6593, February 4, 2010

In re Letter of the UP Law Faculty, 644 SCRA 543

Section 6. Supervision of Courts

Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 (1993)

Caoibes v. Ombudsman, GR 132177, July 19, 2001

Escalona v. Padillo, AM P-10-2785, September 21, 2010

Section 7. Qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court; Lower Courts

In re JBC v. Judge Quitain, JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007

Kilosbayan v. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007

Topacio v. Ong, GR No. 179895, December 15, 2008

Section 8. Judicial and Bar Council; Membership

Section 9. Appointments of Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of Lower Courts

Section 10. Fixed Salary

Nitafan v. CIR, 152 SCRA 284 (1987)

Section 11. Security of Tenure; Power to Discipline

Vargas v. Rilloraza, 80 PHIL 297 (1948)

De La Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982)

People v. Gacott, 246 SCRA 52 (1995)

Section 12. Prohibition to Be Designated to Any Agency Performing Quasi-Judicial or

Administrative Functions

In re Judge Manzano, 166 SCRA 246

Section 13. Conclusions of the Supreme Court – How Reached?

Consing v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 78272, August 29, 1989

Section 14. Contents of Decision; Petition for Review; Motion for Reconsideration

People v. Escober, 157 SCRA 541 (1988)

Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966)

People v. Bravo, 227 SCRA 285 (1993)

Hernandez v. CA, 208 SCRA 429 (1993)

Nicos v. CA, 206 SCRA 127 (1992)

Borromeo v. CA, 186 SCRA 1 (1990)

Francisco v. Pernskul, 173 SCRA 324 (1989)

Velarde v. Social Justice Society, GR 159357, April 28, 2004

Section 15. Period for Making Decisions

Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan – AM No. 00-8-05-SC, Nov. 28,

2001

Edano v. Asdala, AM No. RTJ-06-2007, December 6, 2010

Sesbreno v. CA, GR No. 161390, April 16, 2008

Section 16. Submission of Annual Report