The Securitization of Democracy:Freedom House Ratings of Russia

With David Parker, King’s College, University of London

In European Security

This article explores the claims of Russian officials that U.S. assessments of economic and political developments in Russia, particularly those of Freedom House (FH), are excessively critical and often used to justify global dominance. To assess the validity of such claims three different influences are considered: culture, power and special interests. The article finds that all three, each with roots in the Cold War, play a role in shaping assessments of Russia and help to explain why FH analysis of Russia is more critical than the analysis of other organizations. The politics of special interests is found to be particularly influential and reflects the interests of U.S. national security policies and priorities. Such priorities are also linked to a politics of memory derived from the Cold War, which often influence perceptions of Russia as a threat rather than as a potential partner.

Keywords: democratization; democracy promotion; Freedom House; Russia; United States; Cold War

IntroductionThe reaction of Russian policy-makers to Western, and particularly U.S., ratings of

corruption, business environment, and political freedoms have ranged from scepticism to outright rejection. Many Russian officials view U.S. ratings of economic and political developments as a form of political pressure and a threat to their nation’s sovereignty. Russians often see such ratings as a sophisticated ideology and a set of conceptual tools that serve to justify a U.S.-dominated Western global hegemony or, at the very least, an example of blinkered double standards. Vladimir Putin suggested that American democracy promotion rhetoric resembled the way colonialists had talked a hundred years earlier about how the white man needed to civilize ‘primitive peoples’ (Myers and Kramer 2006). Partly in response to U.S. assessments of Russia and democracy within Russia and on its border, the Kremlin has taken a range of actions, including limiting U.S. funds for Russian NGOs, training youth activists to protect the system, launching PR campaigns to improve Russia’s international image, and presenting U.S. activities in Eurasia as destabilizing and anti-Russian.

Within the milieu of Western democracy promotion, the role and analysis of the Washington based Freedom House (FH), an independent organization widely known for its global ratings of freedom and democracy and for criticism of Russia, has been particularly criticised by Russian officials. This is especially so during periods of strained bi-lateral relations, such as during the second term of the George W. Bush administration. Sergei Markov, of the United Russia party, accused FH of being a Russophobic organization, suggesting that ‘you can listen to everything they say, except when it comes to Russia…there are many Russophobes there’ (cited Osipovich 2008). Human rights defenders, as well as the authorities, within Russia react critically to FH characterizations of their political system as ‘non-free’ and to assumptions that U.S. organizations can, and should, judge Russia. For instance, in 2007, responding to the

FH annual report in which Russia was rated as ‘not free’, Ella Pamfilova, Chair of the Presidential Commission on Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights, said that the report would serve to undermine human rights and suggested that there was a political motivation behind the ranking (2007 cited Burns 2007).

The puzzle is not why FH is critical of Russia’s political system – several other agencies are and there have been serious setbacks to Russian democratization in recent years – but why it has been much more critical than others. Throughout the first decade of this century FH was the only significant Western organization to assign Russia the rating of dictatorship (‘Not free’) and remains the most consistently harsh critic still, placing it in the group with countries like Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and China. Russia’s non-democratic and non-liberal trends are obvious and other Western organizations too rarely view Russia as fully democratic. Nevertheless, these organizations use less politically charged categories such as hybrid regime. We address the nature of Russia’s political system in the next section of the paper.

Does the Russian critique of FH thus have merits? While not seeking to undermine much of the good work done by FH or the important goals of supporting freedom and repressed peoples, we argue that FH and Russia present a special case and that the reasons for FH toughness have to do not only with non-democratic trends in Russian politics, but also with American politics, enhanced by institutionalized practices and assumptions based on historical experiences. Such practices and assumptions include the institutionalization of democracy promotion during the Cold War (in opposition to the Soviet Union) and the Cold War experiences of FH board members and staff which contributed to Russia often being seen more as a threat rather than a potential partner. During the Cold War, FH developed into an umbrella organization for promoting U.S. values and interests abroad (which for FH is often one and the same thing). The global index of freedom is only one area of the organization’s activities to promote its vision of democracy. Other activities include educating the public, lobbying the government and Congress, as well as assisting and funding opposition groups in Russia and other ‘authoritarian’ nations.

What is promoted by FH as an objective system of rating democracy reflects foreign policy priorities of certain groups within the American establishment. Among these groups, security elites with neoconservative convictions stand out. Their understanding of democracy has roots in the Cold War and may be summed up as the belief in promotion of American values for (primarily) enhancing the U.S. national security. Their vision of democracy corresponds with that of FH and other organizations in Washington that seek to promote toughness on Russia. As such, this article will contend that not only does FH contribute to U.S. foreign policy through its efforts to promote a tougher stance on Russia (which is the main focus of the article) but also serves to support and reinforce existing neoconservative positions. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to explore the connections, it is worth noting that, although independent, over half of FH funding comes from government and that government funding for FH has increased in recent years, with a 241% increase between 2001 and 2006 (a period where neoconservatives were particularly influential) (Giannone 2010, p.75). As such, while FH influences government there is also likely to be informal influence from the centre (particularly so considering the historical links between FH board members and government departments – see Table 4).1

While many academics, governments, journalists and NGOs accept FH assessments uncritically, there have been a limited number of scholars that have raised concerns regarding either FH’s methodological approach or its underlying assumptions and biases. Diego Giannone (2010), for example, analysed the cultural and economic dimensions of FH to suggest that it has an inherent neoconservative bias and that changes in the methodological criteria used to score countries are, at least partly, ideologically driven, such as an increased emphasis towards free private business and away from socioeconomic equality (see also: Banks 1986, Herman and Chomsky 1994, Lieven 2007, Javeline and Lindermann-Komarova 2010, Treisman 2011). This paper builds on this and other previous studies that highlight FH’s political motivations by identifying the mechanisms, historical experiences and ideological convictions that result in a particularly harsh, and potentially damaging, approach towards Russia. It contributes to the literature on the role of special interests and lobbying in policy (DeConder 1992, Mearsheimer, Walt 2007) by identifying how the assumptions of some groups, informed by both ideological convictions and historical experiences, influence their perception of other countries. The paper also reinforces the wisdom that assessment and promotion of democracy, while a positive contribution to efforts to supporting freedom when done effectively, is, nevertheless, in part a political process that reflects interests and cultural stereotypes of those offering such assessment.2

The paper first analyses FH ratings of Russia’s political system and its ratings by FH in comparison with other agencies. We then review several possible explanations of why some Western agencies tend to be more critical of Russia than others. Among these explanations, we find especially helpful an interest group perspective that incorporates insights from cultural/ideational and power-based explanations. We then apply this perspective to the case of FH by identifying the belief in promoting democracy for national security within the American political class, studying the Cold War’s roots of the securitization of democracy and the contemporary politics of special interests behind FH’s activities. The conclusion summarizes our findings and their implications for U.S. democracy promotion.

Russia and FH Ratings

This section discusses Russia’s political system and FH ratings of it in comparison with three other rating agencies – the academic database Polity IV, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Index, and the Political Atlas (PA) compiled by Russian academics. While defining democracy in institutional terms and sharing such definitions with other agencies FH was, until 2011, the only one that rated Russia as an authoritarian system and remains the most consistently critical of Russia. We include ratings assigned to China, another non-democratic, strategically important state, by the four agencies to act as a control state. This provides additional nuance to our analysis by highlighting that FH does not score more harshly than the other agencies in a standard fashion but that Russia is a special case.

Russia’s Political System: A Hybrid RegimeRussia’s political system is not a genuine democracy or close to it. There are multiple

human rights problems in Russia and cause for serious concern about many aspects of domestic Russian politics. Politically motivated trials against opposition figures and organizations, such as

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Alexie Navalny and Sergei Udaltsov, highlight the centralization of power and oppression of opposition. Human rights abuses in Chechnya have been widely reported as has repression of the media and the assassinations of journalists, along with an increasing restriction on civil society. The strengthened penalties in June 2012 for participating in unsanctioned protests are troubling as is a new law, introduced in June 2013, which imposes penalties on the promotion of ‘non-traditional’ sexual relations among minors. Russia’s recent annexation of Crimea (February 2014) highlights stark and critical differences between Russia and Western states in relation to respect for international laws and norms in regards to electoral processes and legitimacy. There is, therefore, much to be criticized in Russia and it is appropriate that international actors should highlight and respond to such concerning issues.

The Kremlin and experts with ties to the Kremlin define the system as ‘managed democracy’ in response to Vladimir Putin’s prioritization of political stability and economic reforms in the first half of the 2000s. Although the head of state was opposed to ‘any kind of special Russian democracy’, he explained that ‘the principles of democracy should correspond with the current status of the development of Russia, with our history and our traditions.’3 By ‘current status,’ Putin meant the country’s need to recover from the negative legacy of the 1990s. He made his view clear that for democracy to progress the state had to provide the necessary conditions, including peace and order, and that the urge for freedom had to comply with the imperatives of political stability. Some scholars and journalists defined managed democracy as a semi-authoritarian regime tasked with conducting necessary structural reforms. Such reforms were presented as necessary but that would ultimately result in the establishment of conditions for free and fair competition, but the process of achieving such results must not be accompanied by disorder. As Graeme Robertson writes, such a hybrid regime deliberately seeks to ‘extract the benefits of competition while minimizing the likelihood of loss of control. Competition is less something that authoritarians have failed to eliminate, but rather something that they consciously allow and try to control.’4 Other scholars too (although by no means all) defined Russia’s system as a hybrid or semi-authoritarian regime although certain trends in recent years are of obvious concern.5

Managed democracy could not, and does not, function effectively because it rests predominantly on the popularity of a single leader, rather than effective institutions. There are multiple examples of the managed democracy working to undermine its own effectiveness. In March 2008, then-president Putin designated the liberally-minded Medvedev as his political successor, but in March 2012 – out of fear of internal instability – Putin returned to power. No viable institution of power succession was created, and the mechanism of selecting a preferred leader remains informal. Another example concerns the Kremlin’s attempt to develop institutions of civil society from above and limit external influences in Russian politics by establishing the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, initiating changes in the legislature on the framework of regulations for NGOs, and providing grants to Russian NGOs through a competitive process.6 However, in the process of encouraging the indigenous development of Russian civil society, the Kremlin empowered primitive anti-Western and anti-liberal feelings and undermined a number of legitimate foreign organizations working in the country. Similarly, while taking the power of mass media away from business interests, state-controlled media frequently silenced important events and opposition voices, while displaying a lack of intelligent coverage and analysis. The overall progress of Russia with democracy-building is therefore limited and, in some areas, progress appears to be reversing.

Nevertheless, there remains space for limited pluralism in Russia’s political system, especially when compared to the Soviet period. Alternative news coverage remains available, as the internet, newspapers, and some radio and television channels (specifically Ekho Moskvy and Ren TV) are free of state control. In response to political protests following the rigged elections to Duma on December 4, 2011, the Russian state allowed demonstrations in Moscow and other large cities, widened their coverage in state controlled media, and promised limited reforms to increase participation by opposition in national and local politics. During the Sochi Winter Olympic Games in 2014 Russian authorities permitted Gay Pride protests to take place (albeit 18 kilometres from the main games cluster). . Although undoubtedly influenced by concerns about Russia’s international image in the run up to the Winter Olympics, in December 2013, Putin nevertheless pardoned 20,000 prisoners, including members of the Pussy Riot and his critic, former tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Many of those charged for disturbances during protests in the early 2012, were either released or received sentences lighter than those expected. Although the Kremlin restricted the activities of opposition leaders, some of them run for office of mayors in major cities. Golos, an independent Russian election watchdog, described the September 2013 elections as freer (although not fairer) and political choice is increasing. The most prominent religious groups are able to operate relatively freely and progress has been made in regards to strengthening the rights of people with disabilities. The activities of opposition parties, alternative media, and the newly expanded Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights limit the ability of the regime to control opposition politics and indicate that the Russian state is, despite the very real concerns, not a dictatorship. There is a mix of democratic and autocratic elements. While the situation has worsened domestically recently during the 2000s Russia was certainly a hybrid regime.

FH Ratings

FH produces an average score of democracy based on eight criteria (Table 1). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7 for measuring freedom which forms the basis for its democracy assignments. 1 represents the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. Based on the average score, FH classifies political systems in five categories: consolidated democracies (1.00–2.99), semi-consolidated democracies (3.00–3.99), transitional governments or hybrid regimes (4.00–4.99), semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes (5.00–5.99), and consolidated authoritarian regimes (6.00–7.00). Countries receiving a rating between 5.5 and 7 are considered to be ‘Not Free’.

FH ratings of Russia ratings across time are summarized (Table 1). To assess the overtime evolution of the ratings, we use five data points, 1997, 2002, 2005, 2011 and 2013. In 1997 Russia was viewed as a semi-consolidated democracy. In 2002, the country’s rating indicated the beginning of its descent to the category of semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes (5.00), alongside countries such as Jordon, Togo and Ethiopia (Freedom House 2002). In 2005, Russia was moved further in the authoritarian direction (5.61), listing it next to states such as Afghanistan, Chad, Rwanda and Cambodia (Freedom House 2005), and in 2011 it was rated as a consolidated authoritarian regime (6.18). According to FH, the country became such regime in 2009 (6.11) (Freedom House 2011). The most recent ratings of Russia continue to classify the country as a consolidated authoritarian regime (Freedom House 2013).

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Table 1. FH Ratings of Russia, 1997-2011

1997 2002 2005 2011 2013

1. Electoral Process 3.50 4.50 6.00 6.75 6.75

2. Civil Society 3.75 4.00 4.75 5.50 5.50

3. Independent Media 3.75 5.50 6.00 6.25 6.25

4. Governance 4.00 5.25 n/a n/a n/a

5. National Democratic Governance n/a 5.75 6.50 6.50

6. Local Democratic Governance n/a 5.75 6.50 6.00

7. Judicial Framework and Independence 4.00* 4.75 5.25 5.75 6.00

8. Corruption n/a 6.00 5.75 6.50 6.50

Democracy Score n/a 5.00 5.61 6.18 6.21

*Until 2003, this category combined constitutional, legislative, and judicial framework. Sources: Freedom House, Nations In Transit: Russia. Reports from 2003- 2013. Available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2003/russia, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=678

The political context of U.S.-Russian bi-lateral relations during these years highlights the scope and limits of FH influence. For two of those years identified as highlighting Russia’s slide (2002 and 2011), U.S.-Russian relations were improving, with U.S. administrations praising Russia’s global role and democratic trajectory. For example, following Russia’s support for the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the 2002 National Security Strategy stated that Russia was, ‘in the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching for its democratic future’ (US National Security Strategy 2002, p. v). Similarly, in 2011 relations were experiencing an upswing following Obama’s ‘reset’ and the successful signing of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NST). In late 2010 Obama (2010) described the relationship in terms of ‘…key partners in global security’ and hailed the signing of NST as ‘testament to the truth that old adversaries can forge new partnerships’ (Obama and Medvedev 2010). This was a time when FH was active in denouncing the Kremlin and Obama’s administration for not doing enough to call

the Kremlin to account on its human rights violations. FH lobbied in support of the Magnitsky Act, which denies visas and and freezes assets of Russian ruling elites implicated in the case of the lawyer Sergei Magnitsky –who died in a Russian jail following his claim to have discovered mass fraud and subsequently being accused of tax evasion himself. FH President, David J. Kramer, published, on behalf of FH, ‘Contending with Putin’s Russia: Proposals for a New Approach’ (Kramer and Cork 2013) as well as other influential Op-Eds. Even when not enjoying a firm base of support within government (as seems to be the case currently with the more realist-leaning Obama administration), FH serves as a source for information about, and analysis of, Russia and contributed to public denouncements of Russia and failures on the U.S. part.

Comparative Perspective on FH Ratings

Other agencies rate Russia’s political system differently. Polity IV, affiliated with George Mason University, also adopts institutional criteria, such as political competition, and constraints on executive action by combining the Polity score. The score ranges from -10 (fully institutionalized autocracy) to +10 (fully institutionalized democracy) (Marshall and Cole 2009, p. 9). Polity IV identifies a middling category, anocracy, which combines a mix of democratic and autocratic traits and practices ranging from −5 to +5. Overall, the agency identified five groups: full democracy (10), democracy (6 to 9), open anocracy (1 to 5), closed anocracy (-5 to 0), autocracy (-10 to -6) (Ibid, p. 12). In the ‘Global Report 2009’ Russia is listed as an open anocracy in the group of countries including Zimbabwe, Kyrgyzstan, Ecuador, Venezuela, Thailand, and Singapore (Ibid, pp. 25-30). Countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were listed as autocracies (Ibid, pp. 26-27). In 2011 Polity IV again listed Russia as an open anocracy (Marshall and Cole 2011, p. 33).

The EIU measures five dimensions: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, political participation, and political culture by assigning scores from 10 to 0 (10 being the highest and 0 the lowest in democracy progress). The EIU preferred categories are full democracies (approximately 10 to 8), flawed democracies (8 to 6), hybrid regimes (6 to 4), and authoritarian regimes (4 to 0). Russia was classified as a hybrid regime with the overall score of 5.02 (rank 102) in 2007 and 4.26 (rank 107) in 2010. By comparison, states such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan were listed as authoritarian regimes (Kekic 2007, p.4, Democracy Index 2010, p. 5). In 2011 EIU ranked Russia as autocratic for the first time.

Finally, Political Atlas (PA) assessed, among other developments, the institutional basis of democracy. The used criteria included competition for the executive, parliamentary competition and electoral inclusiveness (Melville et al 2010, p. 114). On the scale of democratic progress from 0 to 10, with 10 being the highest and 0 the lowest, PA assigned Russia the score of 5.24 (rank 93). Russia was rated considerably higher than Afghanistan (4.21), Azerbaijan (3.46), Egypt (2.21), Kazakhstan (2.10), and China (0.69) (Ibid, pp. 143-145). By placing Russia in the upper-middle position, PA acknowledged that the country ‘has a long way to go to catch up with advanced European and/or European-type democracies’. Nevertheless, the group stressed that Russia is not an authoritarian country for it has already put in place ‘a set of institutions … essential for sustainable democratic governance’ (Ibid, pp. 229-230). Of course,

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an index put together by Russian academics has the potential to suffer from the same biases towards Russia that critics charge FH of displaying towards the United States. This article does not reject this concern but it is important to stress that PA is put together by those associated with the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and The Higher School of Economics which generally lean in the Kremlin-critical direction.

(Table 2) summarizes the ratings of Russia by the four agencies since 2005. Prior to this point only FH was regularly rating democracy levels. Only FH has consistently rated Russia as ruled by an authoritarian (non-free) regime. Others, while noting the country’s alarming trends, generally characterized its political system either as a mixed or hybrid regime. The ratings assigned to China highlight that FH ratings are not consistently more negative than the other agencies. All four indexes assign China their lowest category of rating yet it is only FH that groups Russia in the same category as China. Only FH releases democracy ratings annually so for some years it is impossible to do same year comparisons.

Table 2. Western Ratings of Russia’s Political System: A Summary

FH Polity IV EIU PARussia China Russia China Russia China Russia China

2005 Not Free Not Free

2006 Not Free Not Free

2007 Not Free Not Free Hybrid Regime(Rank 102)

Authoritarian Regime(Rank 138)

2008 Not Free Not Free Hybrid Regime(Rank 107)

Authoritarian Regime(Rank 136)

2009 Not Free Not Free Open-Anocrancy

Institutionalized autocratic regime

2010 Not Free Not Free Hybrid Regime(Rank 107)

Authoritarian Regime(Rank 136)

Rank: 93(Score:5.24 out of 10)

Rank 178(Score: 0.69 out of 10)

2011 Not Free Not Free Open-Anocrancy

Institutionalized autocratic regime

Authoritarian regime (rank 117)

Authoritarian regime (rank 141)

2012 Not Free Not Free Authoritarian regime (rank 120)

Authoritarian regime (rank 142)

Sources: Freedom House, Freedom in the World. Reports from 2005-2013, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2005; Marshall and Cole. Global Report Series: Conflict, Governance and State Fragility. Reports 2009 and 2011, http://www.systemicpeace.org/peace.htm; Melville et al, A Political Atlas; and Democracy index. EIU. Reports from 2007-2013.

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Explaining FH Ratings of Russia: Special Interests and the Securitization of Democracy

Special Interests and FH This section reviews several possible explanations of Western ratings of Russia as not

meeting the standards of democracy. For the purpose of concentrating on the Western side, we do not discuss the question of Russia’s own political development, some of the issues of which were highlighted earlier, by taking it for granted that such developments are an important factor in how it is perceived by outsiders. We assume that all social science ratings and explanations leave considerable room for subjective interpretation. In addition to studying methodologies, scholars will therefore do well to try to understand some open and hidden assumptions made by ranking agencies. We pay special attention to political factors affecting the ratings of Russia and other countries.

Cultural explanations suggest that the roots of the ratings of the world’s political systems may lie in national perception. Nations perceive each other based on their historical experience, rather than objective assessment. As humans jointly meet and overcome challenges, they assume a common identity, sense of origins, accomplishments, and losses. As a result they develop what scholars define as an ethnocentric perception of the world, in which values of the self tend to be viewed as superior to those of the other(s). Externally, ethnocentrism may manifest itself in various forms of ethnic prejudices and hidden or openly expressed phobias. (See Wiarda 1981, Druckman 1994 and Dovidio and Gaertner 2010). When a human group grows in size and develops successfully, it has a tendency to assume that others will follow its lead. In this case, the self tends to suppress its phobias of the other by denying the other its cultural difference. This sense of superiority, which in relation to America is often expressed in terms of American exceptionalism, can be reinforced in particular cases based on specific historical interactions with other states. In relation to Russia, the Cold War overlapped with, and reinforced, aspects of American exceptionalism to shape U.S. perceptions that were uniquely underpinned by a sense of relative superiority, as well as mistrust of Russia. As Wendt (1995, p.77) has noted, ‘history matters’ and, in relation to U.S. perceptions of Russia, the Cold War (and memory of the Cold War) is crucial to understanding the ways in which Russia is understood and expectations of Russia.

In addition, some power explanations emphasize the overwhelming power that the West has in the international system, and point to multiple dimensions of American power including material capabilities and aspects of soft power (See Nye 2004, Ikenberry 2006, Brooks and Wohlforth 2008) and implying that Russia and other states would have to comply with U.S. leadership in the world. Ranking Russia as not meeting certain institutional standards can therefore be understood as a form of pressuring the Kremlin. Again, this strand was reinforced by the Cold War. The common understanding of American victory, buttressed by the expansion of American power and influence during the Cold War and Russia’s relative decline at its conclusion, gave U.S. policy-makers both the material ability and ideological motivation and justification to pursue the expansion of U.S. power.

Power and culture perspectives have limitations in understanding contemporary policy. In at least some of their versions, they have a tendency to view work of national power and culture as being a constant rather than an ever-evolving product of interacting ideas and practices. The two perspectives may shed some light on why Western ranking agencies tend to present Russia and other countries as not meeting their democracy standards, yet these will not fully explain the variation in rating Russia by FH, EIU, and Polity. For that we need a more nuanced perspective sensitive to diversity of Western countries and various communities inside those countries.

Local political and cultural communities usually have diverse international preferences. Scholars have identified several influential schools in American international thinking (see Mead 2002). To capture diverse attitudes held by officials and members of political class, an explanation of Western ratings of Russia must incorporate domestic politics of the West’s policy formation. One aspect of it includes special interests, lobbies, and ethnic groups that have traditionally played an important role in the nation’s policy formation, (see Goldberg 1990, DeConde 1992, Smith 2000, Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2004, Mearsheimer, Walt 2007 and Tivnan 2011) and it would be equally significant to investigate the structure and potential of an anti-Russian lobby (Tsygankov 2009).

Anti-Russian groups in America emerged in the early 20th century and consolidated during the Cold War. In the United States, the lobby (henceforth the Lobby) represented a loose coalition of several influential groups, but the most important group included advocates of American hegemony, who fought the Cold War not to contain the U.S.S.R., but to undermine it by all means available. As will be outlined in the next section, at least some were fully aware that their real target was Russia, not the communist regime. An important part of this group also formed the core of the Committee of Present Danger and ‘Team B’ that had produced a highly inflated assessment of the Soviet threat in the mid-1970s. The second group included organizations that had been created after World War II with an agenda of protecting freedom and human rights in the world. Over time the initial agenda of such agencies as FH and Human Right Watch partly transformed into a tool for fighting the Soviets. The third group consisted of Eastern European nationalists or those who fled from the Soviet system and the Warsaw Pact and now dreamed of defeating the Soviet Union as the ultimate way to gain independence for their people.

The Lobby views Russia and its foreign policy as threatening Western interests. FH’s ratings reflected the perception of Russia as increasingly deviating from Western expectations by a broad group of members of the American political class. Importantly, the ratings helped to legitimize such perceptions and were part of multiple FH activities to pressure Russia to comply with Lobby expectations. FH influenced the media and policy circles with the image of Russia as led by an increasingly dangerous regime, as well as maintain contacts and train Russian domestic opposition to the Kremlin. These organizations’ played a role in shaping the official state perception. As FH announced in January 2003, its assessments of political rights and civil liberties is used by the White House in determining decisions on foreign aid (Freedom House 2003). Through its activities, such as testifying before Congress and briefing high level administration and State Department officials, FH has succeeded in persuading some leading members of the American political class to advocate the Russia-threat approach. Indeed, George W. Bush (2006) referred to FH as ‘making a significant contribution to the security of our

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country’ whilst Senator John McCain (R – Az) (2013) described FH as ‘one of the most important organisations in the world’. FH recently contributed to debates regarding Congressional efforts to re-write foreign assistance legislation.

FH and the Belief in Democracy for Security’s Sake

FH ratings of Russia reflect an influential belief within the American political class, underpinned by the arguments of Democratic Peace Theory (Doyle 1986, Russett 1993 and Brown et al. [eds.] 1996) that democracies do not go to war with each and that global democracy promotion is necessary for enhancing the U.S. national security (democracy promotion is a less high profile foreign policy objective of the realist-influenced Obama administration than it was during the George W. Bush administration). American security is understood as the key foreign policy priority and is viewed in expansionist, rather than defensive terms. This position, known as neo-conservative, assumes that the United States is the institutional model for others to follow and has a tendency to assess others through the U.S. lens. Such understandings, both of U.S. leadership and of security through democracy, were reinforced by triumphalist interpretations of the end of the Cold War (Schrecker 2004). When objectives of expansionist security and local democracy clash however, the belief-holders prioritize the former over the latter. As such, some of the promotion of democracy stems from a genuine conviction that spreading democracy promotes peace while at other times the language of democracy can arguably be understood to be have been used to bring legitimacy to other agendas. As Noah Feldman, the Coalition’s Provisional Authority law advisor, reportedly commented in relation to calls for earlier elections in Iraq, ‘If you move too fast, the wrong people could get elected’ (quoted in Weisman 2003). The roots of such securitization of democracy are also in the Cold War era. Many of those who fought to the Cold War did so without questioning their underlying views about freedom and by assuming that a pro-Western democracy would emerge as soon as the U.S.S.R. was defeated.

With respect to Russia, the powerful centre of the former-Soviet Union and its de-facto successor state (Russia inheriting the Soviet Union’s UN Security Council seat being one example) the assumption of these groups is that development of democratic institutions should not hinder the United States ability to obtain a greater access to Russia’s nuclear technologies, energy reserves, and important geostrategic location. Following the end of the Cold War liberals were hopeful that the ideological ‘victory’ of democracy would make Russia a willing and compliant (if junior) partner whilst neo-conservatives and more hard-line realists assumed that as a weak and defeated state Russia would have little option but to oblige the United States. Democracy should not be accompanied by state consolidation and efforts to balance against the United States. Keeping Russia in a state of military and economic dependence is viewed as essential, by neoconservatives, for preserving American security and promoting its values. As the two founders of the PNAC, William Kristol and Robert Kagan, asserted when referring to the large military forces of Russia and China, ‘American statesmen today ought to recognize that their charge is not to await the arrival of the next great threat, but rather to shape the international environment to prevent such a threat from arising in the first place’ (Kristol and Kagan 2000, p.12). Russia is to follow the U.S. interpretation of world affairs and develop a political and economic system sufficiently open to American influences. By registering a consistent decline in Russia’s freedoms over the last twenty years, FH ratings provided ammunition for those exerting pressure on the country not acting in compliance with American expectations. Democracy and human rights in the latter case are, at least partly, rhetorical tools.

The belief in democracy for security’s sake primarily is held by a considerable part of those with experience in national security affairs. It should be distinguished from other American beliefs about democracy and security. There are those who are not directly associated with American security establishment and believe in promotion of democracy abroad as a goal in itself, rather than a tool for enhancing security. In practical terms, however, they often endorse militaristic foreign policy agenda as a necessity for democracy promotion. For example, the so-called Liberal Hawks at times sided with Neoconservatives on Russia and even published in conservative outlets (see McFaul 2003, McFaul and Goldgeier 2005). Liberal hawks also signed open letters against the Kremlin that were organized by conservatives. For instance, in 2004 Madeleine K. Albright, Joseph R. Biden, Ivo Daalder, Larry Diamond, Richard C. Holbrooke, Michael McFaul, Sarah E. Mendelson, and Stephen Sestanovich signed the Open Letter to the Heads of State and Government of the European Union and NATO (2004) that was organized by the PNAC and that was also signed by prominent advocates of American military hegemony Max Boot, Bruce Jackson, Robert Kagan, William Kristol, John McCain, Joshua Muravchik, and James Woolsey. Liberal views on Russia’s role in Chechnya and the coloured revolutions, while rightly highlighting illegitimate Russian actions, simultaneously failed to fully recognise or acknowledge Russian security interests and concerns and contributed, to a limited degree, to the revolutions, working through organizations such as FH and the Soros Foundation (Beissinger 2006).

In addition to Liberal Hawks there are Realist and Libertarian groups. Like Neocons, Realists are often associated with national security institutions yet they don’t share the belief in promoting democracy for security reasons and instead advocate more traditional tools of diplomacy, intelligence, and military build-up. Within the intelligence community and the larger security establishment there are many who separate issues of security and regional stability from those of democracy. Finally, there are Libertarians, who prioritize preservation of democracy at home. (Table 3) summarizes beliefs held by the American political class about foreign policy priorities.

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Table 3. American Beliefs about Foreign Policy Priorities: Security vs. Democracy

Democracy

Preservation Promotion

Security

Main priority 1) Realists 2) Neoconservatives

Priority among others 3) Libertarians 4) Liberal hawks

1) Realists: security by traditional means2) Neoconservatives: security by promotion of democracy 3) Libertarians: preservation of democracy at home 4) Liberal hawks: promotion of democracy abroad

For the purpose of this essay, we concentrate on members of the political elite with national security experience (primarily found in cell 2 in Table 3). National security elites are defined as those associated with the ideology and institutions established to protect the nation from foreign pressures and threats such as Department of Defense, CIA, and National Security Council.7 Those with national security ties and Cold War experience are well-represented among FH associates (Table 4), although, of course, not all share neoconservative convictions. The next two sections trace the historical root of the belief in democracy promotion for security’s sake and its post-Soviet development as reflected in various activities of FH. We argue that security elites with neoconservative views and Cold War experiences were highly influential in FH activities.

Table 4. Partial List of Prominent FH Officials, 1991-2011: National Security Ties and Cold War Experience

FH Position National Security Ties Cold War Administrations

Kenneth Adelman

Dennis C. Blair

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Paula J. Dobriansky

Steve Forbes

Samuel Huntington

Max Kampelman

Jean Kirkpatrick

David J. Kramer

Joshua Muravchik

Mark Palmer

Donald Rumsfield

William H. Taft IV

Paul Wolfowitz

James Woolsey

Board Member

Board Member

Board Member

Board Member

Board Member

Board Member

Board Chairman

Board Member

Executive Director, President

Board Member

Board Member

Board Member

Board Chairman

Board Member

President

Defense Policy Board, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, CPD, PNAC

U.S. Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Intelligence

National Security Advisor

National Security Council, the U.S. Information Agency, PNAC

The Board of International Broadcasting, CPD, PNAC

National Security Council

Chief arms control negotiator, CPD, PNAC

U.S. Ambassador to the UN, CPD

State Department, PNAC

CPD

State Department, CPD

Secretary of Defense, PNAC

Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Representative to NATO

Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, State Department, Defense Department, PNAC

Defense Department, CIA Director, CPD, PNAC

Reagan

Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, G.W.H. Bush

Carter

Reagan, G.W.H. Bush

Reagan

Carter

Reagan

Reagan

G.W.H. Bush

-

Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, G.W.H. Bush

Nixon, Ford

Reagan, G.W.H. Bush

Ford, Reagan

Carter, Reagan, G.W.H. Bush

PNAC (Project for New American Century); CPD (Committee for the Present Danger)Sources: http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/Freedom_House

15

FH and the Politics of MemoryMany FH associates hold hawkish views on Russia and these views are partly rooted in

the Cold War era. The politics of memory associated with competition and proxy wars with the Soviet enemy, along with entrenched practices and assumptions, continued to shape attitudes toward post-Soviet Russia, particularly after the misplaced optimism of the early 1990s.8 It is worth emphasizing that while most observers understood the Cold War as a stand-off between the United States and Soviet Union, there were groups within the U.S. foreign policy community that considered themselves not just to be confronting communism but a particularly dangerous version based on the nature of Russia. Kennan’s Long Telegram in February 1946 accepted that ‘peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible’ but suggested that this was unlikely based, in part, on the view that the Soviet brand of socialism and the instinctive Russian sense of insecurity meant that the Soviet Union would seek power expansion (Kennan 1946). Similarly, NSC 20/4 (U.S. Department of State 1948), which outlined U.S. objectives in relation to the threat from the Soviet Union, had a strong focus on Russia specifically, with one of the primary goals being to, ‘bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia’. Russia thus came to be seen by some, particularly neoconservatives, as the real enemy.

During the Cold War, several hawkish groups in the United States described the country as being in mortal danger from the Soviet Union, and established organizations to promote the idea of a military victory against the U.S.S.R. In 1950, they founded the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) that subsequently resulted in NSC-68 that promoted an extensive military build-up designed to roll back communist influence and attain U.S. military supremacy in the world. The hawks opposed arms control and advocated the development of a first-strike capability that could pre-emptively destroy the entire Soviet nuclear arsenal (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.225). In the post-Vietnam era they worked to reverse America’s new anti-interventionist sentiments and to subvert détente (Mann 2004, chap 4). In 1976, they formed the core of Team B to offer evaluation of Soviet capabilities and intentions and to insist on another rise in military expenditures. Under President Reagan, they promoted the Missile Defense System. Finally, they worked to block the arms control agreement with Mikhail Gorbachev, rejecting the possibility of negotiating with the Soviets, advocating instead peace through strength.

In this context organizations, originally established to promote human rights globally, partly transformed into tools for fighting the Soviet Union. FH’s slogan, ‘United States: country of freedom,’ removed all doubts about the nation’s justified missionary objective and to liberate America in choosing its means for undermining the ‘evil empire.’ FH consistently abstained from criticizing the United States, choosing to instead direct attention outside. As room for dialogue shrank, the hawks emerged as especially visible in influencing foreign policy and subjecting democracy and human rights agendas to that of defeating the Soviet Union.

Fear of Soviet aggression became critical in preserving the cohesiveness and development of hawkish groups. Their influence is hard to exaggerate. In the estimation of an independent think tank, 33 members of the CPD received appointments in Reagan’s first administration.9 The success of these groups in shaping American foreign policy could only be explained by the Cold War polarization. In the late-1980s and early 1990s, the former anti-Soviet hawks were some of the most prominent voices helping to interpret the end of the Cold War as a victory of the Western freedom narrative, although this narrative was pervasive across other

groups also. Celebrating the Soviet Union’s ‘grand failure’ (Brzezinski, 2004) the American discourse assumed there would be little resistance to freedom’s worldwide progression and that Russia would be either compliant or, if not, too weak to resist U.S. leadership. Neoconservative thinker Francis Fukuyama (1989, p.4) championed ‘the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.’ The soon to become FH President Adrian Karatnycky co-published a book celebrating the nationalist challenge to the Soviet system (Diuk & Karatnycky, 1990).

The securitization of democracy did not end with the Soviet breakup. Post-Soviet Russia did not develop as the neoconservatives expected. Although Russia was initially weak it soon staked an independent position. While the Russian government unquestionably instigated policies and programmes that Western nations were right to challenge, much of the Russian push-back was understandable, based on contrasting perceptions and interests, and other states shared some of the Russian concerns. Russia opposed the eastern expansion of NATO, the bombing of Yugoslavia, and the invasion of Iraq. Finally, the Russian state consolidated its control over the political system and asserted itself in the energy sector by imposing a stricter control on Western companies. In this context Western ratings of Russia’s political system begun to fall, and its leadership was soon accused of authoritarianism and imperialist intentions in Eurasia. In its press release explaining the organization’s decision to downgrade Russia to ‘Not Free’, FH noted that the country’s ‘retreat from freedom marks a low point not registered since 1989’ and warned of ‘a dangerous and disturbing drift toward authoritarianism in Russia’ (Freedom House 2004).

Anti-Russian groups mobilized to respond to not only Russia’s domestic regressions but also the Kremlin’s growing independence and assertiveness and engaged in activities that seasoned observers described ‘as a concerted effort to alienate Russia from the West’ (Hart 2007) by displaying an attitude that was ‘more anti-Russian than was our policy toward Soviet communist Russia’ (Cohen, 2006). The view of the Putin-led Russia as a defeated yet defensive and non-repentant nation was gaining momentum. Indeed, Putin himself has consistently acted as a lightning rod for residual Cold War sentiment, with constant references to his KGB past from policy-makers and analysts alike, with much of his hard-line rhetoric slotting comfortably into pre-arranged intellectual structures. John McCain (2007 cited Calmes 2007) declared that when, ‘I looked into Mr Putin’s eyes I saw three things – a K and a G and a B’. FH Vice-President for Research Arch Puddington (2006) suggested that, ‘Putin has drawn extensively, and shrewdly, from the old Soviet system to build what is increasingly looking like a new model of authoritarian rule’ and argued that ‘Putin's Russia most closely resembles the Soviet Union of Leonid Brezhnev’.

Despite considerable Russia cooperation following 9/11, talk of a new Cold War, with Russia as the main contributing factor, was increasingly popular as the decade progressed (Bugajski 2004, MacKinnon 2007, Weiss 2007 and Lucas 2008), and found support from some within the White House. Cheney (2006) initiated accusations of Russia as reviving its authoritarian system and using its energy as a weapon of intimidation. An experienced Cold warrior, he was comfortable thinking about Russia as a potential threat and advocating what in practice would have amounted to a strategy of isolating Russia. After the Kremlin’s attempts to influence the results of Ukrainian elections, the idea of confronting Russia by championing

17

democratic values in the region became popular with both neoconservative and neoliberal thinkers and materialized in various publications and policy actions. By relegating Russia’s ratings from ‘partially free’ to ‘not free’, FH was both reflecting and further encouraging the emerging consensus in the neoconservative circles.

FH and the Politics of Special Interests

In addition to the politics of memory, FH ratings and activities can be understood in terms of the politics of special interests. Formed on the basis of the discussed Cold War identity, neoconservative groups shared the assumption of security by promotion of democracy. Following the Cold War’s end their immediate preoccupation became with maximization of available political and economic resources. As a result of their activities, the Cold War identity survived, albeit in a modified form. With disappearance of the Soviet enemy, Russia emerged as a perceived potential enemy, rather than a partner. A leaked draft document ‘Defense Planning Guidance’ in 1992, overseen by Cheney and co-authored by Wolfowitz, outlined the desire to prevent the emergence of a rival superpower and detailed the ambition to ‘increase US influence around the world, to further an atmosphere conducive to democratic progress, and to protect free commerce and ensure US access to world markets, associated critical resources, the oceans, and space’ (U.S. Defense Department 1992).

Specific political and economic interests of the identified neoconservative groups might have included securing state defence contracts, obtaining privileged terms for American energy companies in Russia, and expanding geographic control over strategically important territories in Eurasia. In all these cases, a Russia that is centralized, independent, yet not anti-Western presented American neoconservatives with a problem.

In attempting to exert pressures on Russia, FH and other organizations of similar convictions, initiated a campaigns through media, lobbying, and public testimonies. Their presented image of Russia was of an alien and hostile regime that had to be confronted, rather than engaged. FH’s decision to place Russia as ‘Not Free’ at the bottom of its list, next to the Philippines, Rwanda, and Tajikistan and below Egypt, Ethiopia, and Libya provided the sought expert justification and rationale for isolating Russia (Freedom House 2007). In addition to presenting an ideological justification for pressuring Russia, a number of these organizations provided funds to train opposition groups in Russia and other former Soviet nations (Herd 2005, MacKinnon 2007).

There are many examples of FH and neoconservatives exploiting events to present Russia as deserving it’s descent to a non-free country by the year 2005. Soon after Khodorkovsky was arrested and charged with fraud and tax evasion members of the neoconservative establishment reacted. Rather than also commenting on Khodorkovsky and other oligarchs’ highly questionable business practices,10 they presented the case primarily as a freedom fighter against an oppressive state. Senators including Joseph I. Lieberman (D-Conn.), Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), and Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), were soon calling the administration to get tough with Russia. To pressurise the government, hearings on Russian democracy took place featuring Yukos representatives, and Senator Lugar complained about the lack of financial support for human rights and democratic groups in the former Soviet Union

(2005 cited Baker 2005). Formidable support for Khodorkovsky also came from the media and think tanks, including the ones he had financially supported. Beneficiaries included the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ($500,000 pledge) and Library of Congress ($1 million donation) (O’Brien 2003 and Tsygankov 2009, chap. 7). FH summarized the consensus in its press-release on May 31, 2005 by concluding that ‘Mr. Khodorkovsky and his close associates were singled out by the Russian authorities as soon as they expressed concern with an increasingly authoritarian government … those who dare to challenge Russia's increasingly anti-democratic authorities are the ones targeted for prosecution’ (Freedom House 2005).

The electoral revolution in Ukraine was another case of FH extending its open support to those Ukrainians who challenged the incumbent regime and supported the West-favoured candidate, Victor Yushchenko. FH and other groups exploited the revolution to validate the old fears of Russia as an autocratic power. Former FH Board Member Brzezinski (2004) warned about the danger of Soviet restoration, calling Putin a new Mussolini with nostalgia for reviving an empire. Adrian Karatnycky (2006 cited Steele 2006) of FH spoke of a favourable ‘seismic shift westwards in the geo-politics of the region.’ The media became flooded with charges of Russia’s new imperialism and former FH Board Member Anne Applebaum (2004) suggested that a ‘new iron curtain’ was descending across Europe and dividing the continent because of Russia’s behaviour.

The Kremlin’s reaction to the Orange revolution in Ukraine displayed vulnerability to Western democratization pressures. President Putin (2005) warned against attempts to destabilize the political system by ‘any unlawful methods of struggle’. This is the context in which theorists sympathetic to the Kremlin’s agenda have developed the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’, insisting on the need for Russia to protect its path of development and natural resources (Tretyakov 2005). The less than fully free and fair conduct of Russia’s elections too demonstrated the ample fear of outside interference, as did the willingness of politicians to resort to an anti-Western rhetoric (Buckley 2007).

Russia’s reaction was partly influenced by the perception that Western organisations like FH favoured a particular side during elections. Certainly these groups trained and financed of revolutionary opposition groups using some Western NGOs inside Ukraine and Russia. The goal of these organizations, including Soros and FH, was to teach opposition groups ‘how to identify the key weaknesses in society and what people’s most pressing problems were’ (Herd 2005). Pro-Western opponents of incumbent regimes in Russia, Ukraine, and other countries of the former Soviet region were frequently invited to the United States to participate in conferences, Congressional testimonies, and other events organized by various democracy promotion groups. Neoconservatives in the political establishment sought to take advantage of this. Vice President Cheney reportedly established ties with the harshest critics of Putin, such as Vladimir Ryzhkov (Belton 2007), just as he had established contacts with Mikheil Saakashvili and Victor Yushchenko before they were elected presidents of their respective countries.

Conclusion and Implications for U.S. Democracy Promotion

19

The paper has sought to explain reasons for Western ratings of Russia beyond Russian domestic politics and the politics of special interests and memory behind FH ratings of Russia specifically. Russia’s rejection of these ratings is partly conceptual and has roots in the nation’s historical emphasis on strong governance and state centralization. Scholars noted that FH operates on some questionable assumptions about democracy and media freedom. For instance, FH tends to equate weakness of the executive branch with democracy and a large quantity of media sources with their freedom or independence.11

The FH reasons for assessing Russia as ‘not-free’ are in part shaped by foreign policy preferences of the U.S. security elites and are also linked to the politics of memory of the Cold War which perceive Russia as a potential threat rather than partner and influence very specific expectations for Russia and of what democracy should look like. These elites tend to view democracy promotion through the lens of national security. They assess political changes in Russia in terms of bringing the country to agreement with the United States’ international policies. The main assumption here is that a Russia that follows the U.S. institutional model will be more likely to comply with the United States’ strategic priorities. Promotion of power objectives must go hand in hand with promotion of values especially when the U.S. power objectives are strongly challenged. In the latter case, democracy promotion becomes not just a foreign policy objective, but also a tool for exerting international pressures. The Cold War origins of FH and shared historical experiences between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War make FH analysis of Russia a special case. Future research into how generalizable the analytical approach used here could be to wider Russia-West relations would enhance our understanding of the motivations and mechanisms behind ratings of democracy.

The argument has implications not only for our understanding of the role of special interests in policy and politics, but for our understanding of democracy as well. Depending on social and political conditions, different nations adopt institutions that balance their demands for human rights, economic prosperity, and security from outside threats. A universal aspiration, democracy has stronger historical roots in some parts of the world and cannot be easily exported to other parts in a uniform manner. Although it is beyond the scope of the article to examine in detail the impact of U.S. democracy promotion efforts in Russia it is important to note that these efforts have, to a limited degree, potentially contributed to negative trends in Russian democratization and for wider U.S.-Russian relations. Indeed, Cohen (2013) suggested that he could not ‘think of a single U.S. intervention that significantly abetted Russia’s democratization, only ones that made no real difference or hindered it’. While there are a myriad of factors influencing Russia’s domestic politics, U.S. democracy promotion within Russia and on its borders have contributed to negative trends in two ways. Firstly, it may have contributed to genuine fears about perceived interference and undermining of sovereignty which contributed to the further centralization of power in Russia. Secondly, it may have provided Putin and other officials with a pretext for seeking to quell dissent at home, which they might have instigated anyway. For these reasons U.S. democracy contributed to tensions with Russia during periods where cooperation was important. FH has contributed to this through its influential reports, lobbying of government overseas programmes and, providing justification for existing anti-Russia agendas. A number of Western thinkers (Goldsmith 2008, Kupchan 2012 and Brooks 2012) have recognized the limits of democracy promotion and called for re-assessment of the policy or a humbler approach to its delivery. While Russia is by no means an ‘absolutely equal great democratic state’ with the United States, as it has asserted, assessments of its political

system that are excessively critical and simplify the serious challenges of transition contribute to Russian perceptions of democracy promotion as instrumentalised to exert U.S. influence (Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of The Russian Federation 2002).

The Russian government took a range of actions, either in direct response or opportunistically based on the pretext US interventions and actions provided, that were counter-productive to democracy and bi-lateral relations, such as introducing the Nashi youth movement and electoral legislation reforms designed to weaken the opposition. Putin signed a law allowing the suspension of NGOs if they engage in ‘political’ activities and received funding from U.S. organizations. U.S. democracy promotion also contributed to a renewed ideological competition, expressed through the concept of sovereign democracy. In February 2014, the Russian government intervened in Ukraine and annexed Crimea on the perception of illegal seizure of power in Kiev which Russian-makers believe, or at least publicly suggest, was supported by the United States and the European Union. The response of Russian policy-makers symbolised the ways in which U.S. criticism, seen within Russia to be excessively focused on the Russian side, undermined relations or fuelled the scope for anti-U.S. actions and rhetoric. It also highlighted the lack of leverage the United States currently has in relations with Russia based, in part, on a failure to focus consistently on areas of mutual interest. As such, the tightening of the Russian regime was in part a reaction to the U.S. democracy promotion strategy, of which FH was a key component.

Are there ways to improve credibility of Western ratings of democracy? Our analysis suggests that for a ranking agency to be perceived as relatively neutral, it is important that its experts have less direct connections with their country’s foreign policy infrastructure and strategic priorities. For a democracy critique to be taken seriously overseas, it must be freer from national security biases and de-linked from national security establishments. Indeed, the application of democratic peace theory must become more self-critical and sensitive to local and cultural realities if democracy promotion efforts are to be effective

Notes

21

1 For a useful consideration of this issue more generally see Scoble, Harry M. and Laurie S. Wiseberg, (1981).2 There are also broad national assumptions underlying our political concepts. As Ido Oren (2003) showed, the institutional definition of democracy, from which Western agencies proceed, was formulated in a particular social and historical context and was a response to the perceived threat from ‘totalitarian’ regimes in the 1950s when the state role in politics was increasingly viewed as intrusive and potentially dangerous. Such definition bears a strong imprint of the Western culture. For example, Western rating agencies such as FH, Polity IV, and EIU all place the U.S. in the group of ‘free’ nations or ‘full democracy’, whereas Russian agency Political Atlas assigned the U.S. an imperfect rating of 7.30 (Melville et al, A Political Atlas, 142).3 A joint press conference with President George W. Bush in Slovakia, 2005. 4 Graeme Robertson, The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 217.5 Henry Hale, ‘Eurasian Politics as Hybrid Regimes: the Case of Putin’s Russia,’ Journal of Eurasian Studies 1, 1, 2010; Richard Sakwa, The Crisis of Russia’s Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2011); Daniel Treisman, The Return: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011); Nikolai Petrov, Masha Lopman, Henry Hale, ‘Three Dilemmas of Hybrid Regime Governance: Russia from Putin to Putin,’ Post-Soviet Affairs 1, 26, 2013.6 Alfred B. Evans Jr., ‘Civil Society and Protest,’ in: Return to Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 107.7 For similar definitions, see Nelson-Pallmeyer 1992 and Hogan 1998.8 The need for ontological security during periods when Russia is not conforming to U.S. expectations can also contribute to a reliance on historical ways of understanding and framing Russian actions. See: Mitzen 2006.9 ‘Committee on the Present Danger,’ Right Web Profiles (Silver City, NM, January 6, 1989) < http://www.rightweb.irc-online.org/articles/display/Committee_on_the_Present_Danger>10 On Russian oligarchs’ special privileges, rigged privatization and oil wealth, see Freeland 2000; Khlebnikov 2001; Hoffman 2002.11 For critical assessments of FH methodology and assumptions, see: Giannone 2010, Büthe 2012, Dutta 2012, and Becker, Schneider, and Vlad 2012.

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