Self-Determination in the Modern World Order:

A Look at Kosovo

MAY 4, 2016Jeta Luboteni

Olson Scholars

Luboteni 1

Abstract

Across the international community, there is a widespread approval for the principle of

self-determination. However, this approval rarely extends to actual cases of territorial dispute.

This lack of recognition is puzzling. Though the concerns emphasized vary across schools, the

literature reviewed illustrates the concern for stability in the state system. There is not a

significant discussion of the divergence between the rhetoric of self-determination and its

actualization; this is the focus of my research. I conduct a discourse analysis on documents

produced by the international community that support the concept of self-determination. I will

also look at the rhetoric of the self-determination movements. More specifically, I will focus on

the case of Kosovo, as it is a rare case where sovereignty was granted, yet is still contested.

Temporally, my project is situated after the Cold War, as the literature notes a shift in context

here. A careful exploration of the discourse surrounding self-determination offers us some

insight into the puzzle of why some territories get to self-determine and others do not, through

historical and discourse analysis. My analysis aims at bringing a more nuanced understanding to

the issue. More importantly, it should help us understand why the international community

supports self-determination on paper but not in practice.

Luboteni 2

Self-Determination is emphasized in the rhetoric of international organizations (as

evident in the documents they ratify) as a right of states.1 However, when territories demand

independence using self-determination as a justification, it is usually denied. This has especially

been the case after decolonization and the Cold War. Only a few states have been recognized

past the end of that context, Montenegro (2007) and South Sudan (2011) being the most recent.2

There currently exist a number of partially-recognized territories awaiting United Nations

recognition, as well as various independence movements that have little to no recognition.3

Kosovo’s status as an independent country is still hotly debated.

What explains the lack of recognition independence being granted to self-determination

movements, despite the international support for the principle (See Chart #3)?4 The question

emerges from the international community supporting the concept of self-determination without

supporting it in the real world. This is important because bodies like the International

Community, 5 in various charters and statements, have agreed that such principles of freedom,

democracy, and self-determination are good things, and necessary for governments to provide.

However, within many contested regions, the international community recognizes territorial

integrity over self-determination. So there seems to be a significant conflict in the application of

self-determination to the real world.

1 President Wilson’s Message to Congress, January 8, 1918; Records of the United States Senate; Record Group 46; Records of the United States Senate; National Archives. And World History: The Modern Era, s.v. "Atlantic Charter (1941)," accessed December 13, 2015. http://worldhistory.abc-clio.com/.2 "Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-present." UN Member States. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml. 3 "Members, United Nation, Growth, History of Organization." UN News Center. Accessed December 15, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml.4 Tir, Jaroslav, Philip Schafer, Paul Diehl, and Gary Goertz. 2015. “Territorial Changes, 1816-2014 (v-5): Procedures and Data.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 16:89-97.5 By the term “International Community” I imply the United Nations, and world powers, especially the United States.

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This is a very important question for international studies research because it

encompasses much of the basic concepts, including IR theories, the state system, and

International Organizations. Another reason this is an important topic is because it illustrates

how the current state system is taken for granted. It is easy to forget that the Westphalian system

only very recently been spread around the world.6 Additionally, Self-Determination is taken for

granted. It is easy to think that everyone has it, since it seems to have such universal support. It is

also easy to think that people who want independence are just ruining the system, or threatening

the sovereignty of others. They are characterized in the discourse differently, but almost always

negatively, like rebels, separatists, even terrorists or criminals.

This is an especially important topic for International Studies students because it

illuminates a weakness in the mainstream outlook: the current state borders as unchanging and

morally legitimate, which is debatable in many cases. Many of these justifications are echoed in

the Literature. The main reasoning for restricting independence is the suggestion that if one

region is allowed independence, then all movements will demand the same. This is the idea of

the domino effect, very prevalent in both the literature and the opinions of International

Organizations. This restricts freedom for the sake of keeping a system intact. This is not to say

that there is no line to be drawn for some movements versus others, but that is not the focus of

this research. Instead, I am to critique the discourse surrounding self-determination in order to

illustrate how it can be unequivocally supported theoretically while being almost entirely

rejected in practice.

In order to better understand the situation of self-determination in the modern world

order, I conduct a discourse analysis of primary sources discussion self-determination. First, I

will be looking at international agreements. Then, in order to better understand the nuance of the

6 R. Falk, "Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia," Journal of Ethics 6, no. 4 (2002)

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issue, I will be looking at the case of Kosovo. This is an especially important case because many

consider it to be one of the rare instances of self-determination that was granted in recent times.

However, the extent to which it is independent and/or self-determined is debated by various

actors. I will analyze documents from the websites of the government of Kosovo, the Self-

Determination Movement (Levizja Vetvendosje) in Kosovo, and the Serbian government. My

discourse analysis will not be as salient if I do not go into the historical context surrounding the

documents, so I will include this as well.

In the literature review, I compare scholarly findings as to why a territory is recognized,

or, rather, not recognized. The groups include the desire to preserve territorial integrity,

economic strength, or ethnic makeup. Another group emphasize the importance of context in

order to legitimize a movement. I take historical considerations into account in the literature

review as well. My methodological section will explain my reasoning for choosing a discourse

analysis. In the analysis I look a reconceptualization of a state, of independence, and of self-

determination, and then conclude with a deeper look at what independence and self-

determination actually mean, and if they are interchangeable.

Literature Review

There is a disagreement among scholars as to why there is not a consistent application of

self-determination to independence movements. Most observe that in the majority of cases, self-

determination is denied to the people asking for it.7 There are three groups of scholars who have

different claims for why this is. The first group argues that it is because of the interest of the

international actors to preserve the integrity of existing states. The second group thinks it is

7 Halperin, Morton, David Scheffer, and Patricia Small. Self-Determination in the New World Order. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013.) 123-160.

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because the international community frowns upon ethnic states, and sees them as a source of

violence. The final group emphasizes the concept of self-determination itself as problematic, and

that the International Community is reluctant to make changes under such nebulous definitions.

Protection of Existing States

The first school of thought emphasizes the role of the international community as a

protector of state territory, and includes thinkers such as Wolf & Rodt, Guibernau, and Falk. The

prevailing opinion in this school of thought is that since the United Nations and other such

institutions are made up of states, they will naturally protect their interests. These scholars argue

that the current system of state recognition privileges the interests of existing states over those of

possible states.8 The only time when self-determination was deemed acceptable was in the

decolonization context.9 This allowed states to let go of their colonies without opening the

floodgates for significant changes to the system.10 If the context was set that only colonies could

be recognized as states, then the non-colonial territories would have no grounds to demand

independence. The problem with Kosovo, as these authors discuss, is that it broke the rule of

territorial integrity of states.11 Many states do not want to recognize Kosovo, because it may

become a precedent for further state fragmentation.12 Because Kosovo does not have a pre-

existing and restrictive context, then any territory at any time can also claim self-determination

and demand recognition for its secession. This shows the reluctance of other states, as well as the

international community a whole, to allow change in the state-centric system. It also points to the

reasons that other self-determination movements have not been recognized. Guibernau in

particular characterizes the system “renewal of nations as a community of fate.”13 This means 8 Wolff, S. and A. P. Rodt. "Self-Determination after Kosovo." Europe - Asia Studies 65, no. 5 (2013): 805.9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid, 815.12 Ibid, 810-812.13 Guibernau, M. "Self-Determination in the Twenty-First Century." Ethnopolitics 14, no. 5 2015: 543.

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that the other states or International Organizations will not see the self-determination as

legitimate, because they see the system as legitimate.

There is a subset of sources in this category that emphasizes the leading actors in the

international community as the ones resisting change.14 However, it finds that the power to

decide on self-determination claims lies in the hands of those privileged by the world order,

which is either the United States, or the United Nations.15 Halperin, Shaffer and Small argue that

the United States should advocate for keeping borders the way they are.16 This is in order to

preserve its standing as a world power, since that power is built on the existing world order.17

This is an important contribution to my research because is emphasizes power in the current

world order.

Richard Falk discusses Europe’s privilege in having its state system exported to the rest

of the world.18 This also shows the power inherent in Europe: since the system was designed

based on its people and land, the different situations in other areas of the world have to adapt to

the European model. This also relates to ethnicity, because the idea European state/nation should

only be made up of one ethnicity.19 The self-determination movements illustrate the dissonance

experienced by a state when it does not fit into that ideal European model of a Nation. Falk sees

this as an anomaly that will contribute to the demise of the Westphalian system.20 Exporting a

system based on a European context to the rest of the world will eventually fail because the rest

14 Falk, R. "Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia." Journal of Ethics 6, no. 4 (2002): 350. And Halperin, Morton, David Scheffer, and Patricia Small. Self-Determination in the New World Order. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013.) 215 Falk, R. "Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia." Journal of Ethics 6, no. 4 (2002): 346. And Halperin, Morton, David Scheffer, and Patricia Small. Self-Determination in the New World Order. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013.) 8216 Halperin, Morton, David Scheffer, and Patricia Small. Self-Determination in the New World Order. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013.), 80.17 Ibid, 119.18 Falk, R. "Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia." Journal of Ethics 6, no. 4 (2002): 312.19 Ibid, 31320 Ibid, 326, 347, 349.

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of the world is not like Europe. So perhaps the disconnect we see in the application of self-

determination relates to European fears of its own system falling into endless fragmentation as

people rush to emulate an unattainable standard. The uptick in self-determination movements in

Europe itself should serve as a red flag on this Nationalist state system.

This is a rather large school of thought that encompasses a lot of the literature and

positions on the topic. It could even be called the structural group because it relies so much on

the existing world order, and the desire to keep the structure of states as it is. This school of

thought has very important implications for my research because it is a part of the dominant

discourse, or at least aligns itself with it. The positions of the scholars here (aside from the

subgroup that critiques the world order) is that the system is not meant to allow for much border

change. But what about all the discourse these actors produce in support of self-determination?

Are sovereignty and stability more important? This school of thought clearly illuminates my

puzzle: if the International Community is by and large not willing to allow for border changes,

then why does it unequivocally support self-determination?

Avoidance of Ethnic States

Thought not referenced often as its own school of thought, ethnicity is seen as negative in

state building. Most self-determination movements fall along ethnic lines. One scholar that deals

heavily with ethnicity, though not in the context of self-determination, is Vamik Volkan. In his

book, Bloodlines, he uses the term “ethno-nationalism” to describe states that are both political

and ethnic entities.21 He sees it as causing significant problems in the world, including ethnic

warfare. Mark Mazower similarly understands ethnicity as negative. However, he emphasizes the

state ultimate source of violence.22 Like Falk, he sees the current state system as Eurocentric,

21 Volkan, Vamik D. Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1998.), 23.22 Mazower, Mark. "Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century." American Historical Review 107, no. 4

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with European Nationalism encouraging violence and exclusion.23 In order to prevent violence,

and encourage stability, self-determination is denied, despite the fact the European states were

built on this mode. This is a significant finding as to the reluctance of border change seen in the

modern international system.

These findings see ethnicity as problematic to the current state system. They both make

excellent points as to why ethnic states are difficult to justify: namely that they contribute to war

and conflict. However, this brings up an important question: why is Europe so against the

establishment of states based on ethnicity when it itself pioneered the concept of Nationalism,

and built its states upon it? In a different vein, Huzka suggests that the way states frame their

calls for independence results in how they are perceived.24 She looks into a few different cases,

namely in the former Yugoslavia, and concludes that Slovenia had such an easy time seceding

because it stated its desire for secession in economic terms.25 However, when Croatia framed its

desire to leave on ethnic terms, a war ensued.26 This has important implications for my project as

it points to the importance of independence discourse.

“Self-Determination” Itself

There is a group of scholars that claim that the reason for the puzzling application of self-

determination is that its definition is fluid.27 In other words, the way self-determination is

understood is subject to the context surrounding it. The sources in this group show that the end of

the decolonization context has made it harder to apply self-determination to the real world.

(2002): 1159.23 Ibid, 1178.24 Beáta Huszka, Secessionist Movements and Ethnic ConflictDebate-Framing and Rhetoric in Independence Campaigns, Routledge studies in nationalism and ethnicity (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge,, 2013).25 Ibid.26 Ibid.27 Roepstorff, K. The Politics of Self-Determination: Beyond the Decolonisation Process. (New York: Routledge, 2012.) And Buchanan, Allen. "Toward a Theory of Secession." Ethics 101, no. 2 (1991): 322-42.

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Meaning, that with the end of decolonization, there were no more “good reasons” for a state to

be independent. Both Buchanan and Roepestroff argue for a reworked theory.28 The reluctance of

the United Nations to recognize secessionist demands may be just that: it does not have working

definition of it. It may be unwilling to create a precedent that will unravel the system. This

echoes school of thought number one. However, if the current definition is still used, there will

be limits to the border changes that can infringe on the rights of the oppressed

people.29Alternatively, there will also be no limits to the calls for border change.30 This illustrates

the dilemma of the international community in applying self-determination in the modern world

order.

As we can see from the above schools of thought, the context surrounding a self-

determination movement is paramount to its conception. As I am looking at Kosovo, I will show

that the contexts can be complicated. Looking into the conceptions of the idea of self-

determination and the discourse surrounding it after the Cold War (when there was a specific

context) will help to further illuminate the puzzle. What I have reviewed here has made clear the

importance of context: both in terms of chronology and discourse. Even though only the last

school of thought dealt specifically with context, the others also showed that the current context

is one of stability. This means that states should remain as they are. This adds salience to the

example of Kosovo, because of its rarity.31 I will use this literature to better inform my puzzle as

to why some states get independence, and others do not.

28 Buchanan, Allen. "Toward a Theory of Secession." Ethics 101, no. 2 (1991): 322 Roepstorff, K. The Politics of Self-Determination: Beyond the Decolonisation Process. (New York: Routledge, 2012.) 3.29 Ibid, 2.30 Ibid, 4.31 Kosovo, because of its status as a province (and not republic) in Yugoslavia, is not granted the same rights as Montenegro.

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Methodology

This research focuses on the treatment of self-determination after the Cold War. This is

because there was a change in the context: with the Decolonization and Cold War state breakups

ending, there is not a set justification for independence. Instead of looking at multiple current

self-determination movements, I will be conducting a discourse analysis on Kosovo. This is to

better understand the nuance of a case that is arguably one of the only ones granted self-

determination in the last twenty years. Its contested nature also should illuminate the way

different actors understand self-determination. There is no intention to universalize, however, the

international community treats self-determination as universal, so I investigate why it is then not

applied universally.

The actors producing the discourse are at various levels. At the international level, they

include international officials, policymakers, and organizations as a whole. On the state level

they are heads of state, from both the territories attempting to secede, and the one(s) from which

it would secede, as well as other interested leaders. Since I am looking specifically at Kosovo,

the actors are: the UN and EU, the government of Kosovo, the Self-Determination Party

(Vetvedosje) and the Serbian Government. I will analyze the connections these actors have to

international principles, and how they reference each other.

I will be studying documents and official texts from the UN, EU and other such

International organizations that discuss self-determination.32 This includes the United Nations

Charter, Un Resolutions and Fourteen Points.33 This is in order to get an understanding of the

institutional aspects of self-determination, and to situate the concept historically. These sources

constitute the dominant discourse. 32 President Wilson’s Message to Congress, January 8, 1918; Records of the United States Senate; Record Group 46; Records of the United States Senate; National Archives.33 President Wilson’s Message to Congress, January 8, 1918; Records of the United States Senate; Record Group 46; Records of the United States Senate; National Archives.

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Then, I move into the conducting an analysis of the discourse surrounding Kosovo’s

independence. I look at its Declaration of Independence, as well as the statements of major world

powers and international organizations regarding the case. I also move into examining

“Vetvendosje,” the self-determination party of Kosovo, which contends that Kosovo is not nearly

self-determined. I look at the websites of both in order to understand what messages they want

the world to see. The Vetvendosje is the competing discourse, as it throws a wrench in the idea

that as long as a country is independent it is self-determined.

In keeping with the methods of interpretive research, I must keep in mind my own

location and identity. I was born and grew up in the United States, the same country that has

significant power to support or reject self-determination movements in the world, as well as

having significant sway in the International Organizations of which it is a member. As a student I

must note that academia often supports the decisions of the International Community to limit the

application of self-determination. It tends to dismiss its universal application as “impossible.”34 I

am working under such a context, due to my geographical and institutional location.35 Finally,

this research is also implicated in West-Centrism, because the models of the modern state

originated there.

In terms of cultural competence, I have a limited understanding where the international

officials are coming from when they reject self-determination. I do, on the other hand, have

significant cultural competence in understanding where people are coming from when they

demand self-determination. Since my family is from Kosovo, I grew up around the idea that

Kosovo had a right to be independent. I also sympathize with the self-determination movement,

as it is using the concepts of the international community to argue against its “interference” in

34 Guibernau, M. "Self-Determination in the Twenty-First Century." Ethnopolitics 14, no. 5 2015: 545.35 Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine, and Dvora Yanow. Interpretive research design: Concepts and processes. (Routledge, 2013.) 100-104.

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Kosovo. To an outsider their position may seem ridiculous, but I see where they are coming

from. More specifically, it may seem greedy that since Kosovo has been allowed to exist as

independent, that this movement wants further liberation. However, the focus of my project is

movements using the language of the dominant international community to contest their own

subordinate status.

One of the biggest areas to focus on is the search for data. Interpretive research cannot

sample randomly.36 I as the researcher, am implicated in the ways I search for the data.37 In this

case I have a significant role to play because of my heritage. For this reason I will consult the

website of the government of Serbia to analyze their opinion on Kosovo, and how they justify it.

If I look across “multiple meanings,” I am more likely to create trustworthy research.38 Kosovo

lends itself to many meanings, so casting a broad net helps illuminate them.

Instead of looking for the factors that allow a territory to be recognized a state, I will look

for the ambiguities regarding the application of self-determination. Looking at the way that

diverse actors understand self-determination can illustrate intertextuality. More specifically, I

will see if terms are understood similarly across the actors, and how concepts are presented. I

analyze the ways that meaning is ascribed to self-determination.

This approach is not without its limitations. First of all, I am taking a roundabout

approach to my research question. It would be straightforward to do a small-n case study on the

factors that influence the recognition or granting of independence. But the literature review,

particularly the last school of thought, showed that there is more at play than a simple

presence/absence of factors needed for independence. So in looking at the nuance of Kosovo, I

hope to show the intersubjective meanings associated with self-determination. Generalization is 36 Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine, and Dvora Yanow. Interpretive research design: Concepts and processes. (Routledge, 2013.) 110-111.37 Ibid. 111.38 Ibid. 111.

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another thing I give up in doing a discourse analysis. However, I think it is better to focus on the

unique nature of both the current world order, and the case of Kosovo.

Analysis

In order to better understand why there is a very limited application of self-determination

to state borders after the cold war, I conduct a discourse analysis on self-determination in

Kosovo. First I look at the various international documents that guarantee self-determination to

people. Next, I analyze how that rhetoric is mirrored in Kosovo’s self-determination movement,

Vetvendosje. Finally, I grapple with the diverging rhetoric surrounding Kosovo as a “law-

breaker,” “special case,” “full country,” or “protectorate.” The differing conceptions of the same

territory should highlight the nuance of self-determination, as well as the severe difficulty of

putting it into practice.

The right of nations to self-determine was first present in discourse in Woodrow Wilson’s

Fourteen Points.39 This document is seen as the founding of the principle of self-determination,

especially for Europe. However, after closer analysis, certain nuances are made clear. First of all,

he does not use the word self-determination.40 Instead, he says that colonial claims should be

adjusted upon the “strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of

sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable

government whose title is to be determined.”41 This uses similar language to self-determination,

but its contents are not the same. And even if it was, it is discussing decolonization, and this

paper has already established that there is a significantly more straightforward application of

self-determination in that context. 39 President Wilson’s Message to Congress, January 8, 1918; Records of the United States Senate; Record Group 46; Records of the United States Senate; National Archives. And World History: The Modern Era, s.v.40 Ibid, Point 5, 10, 1141 Ibid, Point 5

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He argues for the territorial integrity of Russia, Belgium, France, Italy, Austria-Hungary,

Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Turkey and Poland, as they had been violated during the war.42

Again, this is rooted in a specific context, but furthermore argues for territorial integrity. His

final point seems to argue for the preservation of existing territorial integrity.43 This is

noteworthy because the concepts of territorial integrity and self-determination are often in

opposition, as seen in the review of the literature.44 It is therefore quite puzzling that it is seen as

the foundational document guaranteeing the principle. It is argued that the United Nations is

meant to support the territorial integrity of nations is one of the main reasons that it then denies

self-determination. So this document is exemplifying the tensions present across the principle.

Perhaps the way the United Nations understands self-determination is that it has already been

applied: in other words, the landscape we see is one that reflects self-determination in the eyes of

the United Nations.

The Atlantic Charter is less nuanced on the issue of people to choose their own

government.45 On point two it says territorial changes must be in “accord with the freely

expressed wishes of the people concerned.” On point three it says “they respect the right of all

peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.” This clearly supports self-

determination, where people can choose their government. It also echoes point number fourteen

of the fourteen points in asserting the freedom to choose one’s government, but not necessarily

their territory. So the question still remains of why the international community does not allow

the self-determination of nations and/or states.

42 Ibid, Points 6-1343 Ibid, Point 1444 K. Roepstorff, The Politics of Self-Determination: Beyond the Decolonisation Process (New York: 2012).45 "Atlantic Charter (1941)," accessed December 13, 2015. http://worldhistory.abc-clio.com/.

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Thought their strength is debatable, both these documents are pointing to the broad

international approval for the concept of self-determination. Though these documents are

important for the concept of self-determination, they are not ratified by the UN. However, their

global acceptance is not necessary for the principle to still be valid: it is in the charter of the

United Nations.46 It says “self-determination of peoples” is a purpose of the UN. Later, the

charter asserts that application of the principle promotes economic and social cooperation.

Furthermore, the addition of “peoples” after self-determination strengthens the cases being made

by movements. Again, however, there is a twist. Like the Fourteen Points, the UN Charter also

emphasizes territorial integrity.47 This shows that it does not see the two principles as exclusive.

The literature makes it clear that the current dominant discourse, coming from the international

community, sees self-determination as a threat to stability, among other things. Perhaps the way

that these international actors understand the two to be compatible. In other words, they want to

preserve all the historical self-determination that has happened in refusing infringements on

existing territorial integrity. This is a broader background to my discourse analysis, as I have

discussed international and historical documents.

The next part of my analysis entails looking at the case of Kosovo, to gain a window into

the issue of self-determination. Kosovo gained attention during breakup of Yugoslavia, and the

wars that occurred (1992-1999). There was a high incidence of ethnic cleansing, as well as

genocide (particularly in Bosnia). Kosovo had the status of province of Serbia in Yugoslavia, as

opposed to republic. This made it less straightforward for it to be independent after the war. The

United States and NATO intervened to stop the ethnic cleansing in 1999. Many scholars cite

Kosovo as one of the few instances of self-determination being granted in the modern context.

46 United Nations Charter, Article 1.47 Ibid, Article 2.

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The mainstream does not consider it to be an outcome of neither decolonization nor the Cold

War, since it was a province of Yugoslavia, without the right of self-determination. However,

there are alternative discourses that do not see it that way. They conceptualize self-determination

differently and argue that Kosovo deserves to have it. However, even the alternative discourses

disagree on whether Kosovo does has it or not.

In this context came UN resolution 1244, which was made after the intervention. The

function of this resolution was to end hostilities. It makes no reference to the term self-

determination, instead specifically advocates for “autonomous self-government.”48 This is

significant because this can be, and is, interpreted by other actors as the United Nations deciding

against an independent Kosovo. Autonomy heavily implies that Kosovo still belongs to Serbia,

but due to its ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences, should be able to have significant

authority over its own laws. In the meantime, the UN suggests an “interim administration” meant

to “maintain civic law and order.”49 This interim administration continues to this day, although

with much less control over Kosovo. This again shows the attempt of the United Nations to have

both freedom and order, when the literature suggests that the two are often in conflict. In other

words, it both wants Kosovo to be free from Serbian oppression (but not necessarily

independent) while simultaneously being supervised by the United Nations. It holds a similar

position, though it exercises less power in Kosovo, it does not recognize its independence.50

This prescriptions of Resolution 1244 lead to the UN administration of Kosovo, which

continues to this day, despite Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence.51 As the website

states, the mission has shifted to emphasize “Subsequently, following the declaration of 48 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) [on the deployment of international civil and security presences in Kosovo], 10 June 1999, S/RES/1244 (1999), Annex 11. 49 Ibid. Annex 1050 UN. "United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)." UN News Center. Accessed April 19, 2016. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/.51 Ibid.

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independence by the Kosovo authorities and the entry into force of a new constitution on 15 June

2008, the tasks of the Mission have significantly been modified to focus primarily on the

promotion of security, stability and respect for human rights in Kosovo.”52 It is noteworthy that

they say Kosovo “authorities,” not government. This shows that they have no interest in

recognizing the government of Kosovo. However, they do seem to recognize the constitution.

Furthermore, the concepts seem to contrast each other. If a country is independent, why would an

international actor have to stay to ensure “security, stability and respect for human rights?” As I

will outline later, Vetvendosje emphasizes that the concepts are mutually exclusive. Kosovo’s

“independence” is not fully recognized, and lacks representation in many international

organizations, namely the United Nations. It could be said that the international presence is

impeding this independence. However, other countries have similar administrations and are UN

Members, they just have human rights or security issues. This is where Vetvendosje would make

a distinction between independence and self-determination.

An international document directly addressing whether Kosovo’s independence was legal

is the International Court of Justice Opinion on Kosovo.53 However, it actually never takes a

stance on whether Kosovo’s independence is justified, just that: “By ten votes to four, Is of the

opinion that the declaration of independence of Kosovo adopted on 17 February 2008 did not

violate international law.”54 However, it does not say whether the independence should be

granted, nor does it consider Kosovo to be a precedent. This goes against much of the literature

that was up in arms about Kosovo’s independence: it is much more nuanced than previously

conceptualized.

52 Ibid.53 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), General List No. 141, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 22 July 2010.54 Ibid, p. 15.

Luboteni 18

To further understand the situation, I looked at Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence

(coming from the Parliament), and searched for references to international documents used to

justify Kosovo’s independence.55 Similarly to the ICJ opinion, the Declaration States is that it

does not intend Kosovo to be a precedent for other people seeking self-determination. This,

again, runs highly contrary to the fears present in the literature reviewed. However, just because

it does not claim to be a precedent, does not mean it cannot be taken as one. The uncertain

context surrounding Kosovo both makes it harder to grant independence and to limit precedents.

The declaration seems to further attempt to avoid precedents by citing the violence of the

Yugoslav breakup.

There are many spelling and grammar mistakes in the English version of the document.

This shows that the Parliament translated it itself in order to have the document be understood by

the rest of the world, as soon as possible. This points to what is most important about this

Declaration: it is clearly catering its message to an International Organization/European Union

audience. It uses all the language and terms that are meant to first and foremost please the

international organizations, or more specifically “the Western gaze.” In using terms like

“diversity,” and “multi-ethnic,” it is clearly mirroring the vision the West has for Kosovo. This

relates clearly to the Second School of thought (avoidance of ethnic states). The government

knows that Europe (ironically) has no patience for ethnically divisive rhetoric, so Kosovo makes

no claims of Albanian supremacy. It mentions Albania/Albanian(s) zero times. Furthermore, the

declaration even says that Kosovo hopes to join the “European Family,” clearly showing that not

only does Kosovo want independence, but also acceptance by and membership in the European

Union.

55 Kosovo Declaration of Independence, 17 February 2008.

Luboteni 19

One of the most striking features of the Declaration is the mention of the Ahtisaari Plan,

eight times. This plan is also known as the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status

Settlement, and establishes parallel institutions for the Serbians in Kosovo. Marty Ahtisaari was

a special envoy to the United Nations. So his plan originates in the international organizations

from which the government of Kosovo is trying to gain recognition. The government seems to

have evaluated that its best chance for recognition comes if it declares what it thinks “the West”

wants to hear. So with the publication of this Declaration, the authors clearly hold Kosovo to be

independent. They are determining their own government, and deciding to be separate from

Serbia. At the same time, though, they clearly show that they understand that they need the

support of the international community. This looks like an ideal case of self-determination: one

of the few in recent years. Yet Vetvendosje has a bit of a different perspective.

Vetvendosje operates online heavily. For this reason, I analyzed the documents available

on their website discussing their position of Kosovo’s lack of self-determination. Their website

includes documents in English and Albanian, however, there are more documents in the

Albanian version, and they are more detailed. One of their most powerful documents is a

systematic “Deconstruction of the Declaration of Independence,” available in both Albanian and

English, as a testament to their disdain for the content of Kosovo’s declaration of

independence.56 In it, Vetvendosje rallies against the many mentions of the Ahtisaari plan, as

well as the avoidance of setting a precedent. They would have liked to set a precedent in order to

support “oppressed people elsewhere in the world” and that the avoidance is “the result of a

typically colonial mindset on behalf of the international bureaucrats that have dictated this

declaration.” They perceive these to be a foreign imposition into the founding document of

56 “Deconstruction of the Declaration of Independence.” Levizja Vetvendosje. Accessed April 19, 2016. http://www.vetevendosje.org/en/.

Luboteni 20

Kosovo, and another affront to its self-determination.57 More importantly, however, is that they

are placing themselves among colonized people. This could partially explain why they see

themselves as still lacking self-determination: they are still colonized, even if it is in terms of

mindset (but they argue that it is literal as well).

In an interview with Vice News, the founder of the movement, Albin Kurti, says, flat out:

“we got independence without self-determination.”58 This means that even if Kosovo is fully

recognized, there have been affronts to its right to determine its own government. This

complicates things. At the same time, it can be risky to take this Vetvendosje discourse as

representative of the general dynamics. However, I am simply illustrating how a local actor

complicates the ideas presented about self-determination, especially, but not limited to, the

literature. In the interview, he discusses the Constitution of Kosovo, another founding document

that Vetvendosje sees as a vessel of foreign oppression. He cites a broad history of oppression

that the Albanians of Kosovo have faced at the hands of various foreigners, and argues that this

continues to this day, partially explaining where the colonial framework comes from. Much of

the other articles on the website echo those general sentiments.

The other aspect that I looked at was the use of international principles to justify their

claims. This was confirmed, and even referenced itself. To clarify: in the movement’s manifesto:

“Levizja Vetvendosje is committed to re-organizing the international presence in Kosova,59 in

accordance with world-wide and well-known principles. . .”60 They then argue the presence is

tantamount to colonization, and reference another of their documents in saying that the

57 Ibid. 58 Nosan, Brad. "Kosovo's Vetevendosje Movement Doesn't Like Foreign Intervention | VICE | United States." VICE. August 15, 2012. Accessed April 19, 2016. http://www.vice.com/read/kosovos-vetevendosje-movement-doesnt-like-foreign-intervention.59 This is the Albanian spelling of Kosovo. When the former spelling is used in English, it is seen as a political statement about who owns the land. Kosovo is the Serbian way of saying it. 60 “Movement’s Manifesto.” Levizja Vetvendosje. Accessed April 19, 2016. http://www.vetevendosje.org/en/.

Luboteni 21

international actors in the country show “non-recognition and disdain for the country’s

sovereignty.” This is a powerful dissent from the conception of Kosovo as independent and self-

determined. This shows that they see the concepts as related, but not interchangeable. They argue

here, in other words, that Kosovo is not even being recognized as independent, and is therefore

having its self-determination infringed upon. And even if it was recognized, the international

interference and presence violates Kosovo’s self-determination.

One of the other alternative discourses emanates from the Serbian Government. They

argue that the land of Kosovo61 belongs to them. The homepage of the government contains an

image of a Serbian flag, under it stating “Kosovo is Serbia.”62 Then, under Facts about Serbia >

Basic Facts > Provinces, it cites “Kosovo and Metohija.”63 It says: “The former state union of

Serbia-Montenegro, today the Republic of Serbia, was an internationally recognised state and as

such, it was a member of the UN and other international organisations . . . those principles and

norms which affirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member states.” This, rather

uncannily, cites international norms and agreements that apply to the situation. It is very

straightforward: Serbia sees its right to territorial integrity being violated.

This has significant implications for all the parties involved: because if Kosovo can cite

self-determination, Serbia can cite territorial integrity. If Vetvendosje can cite freedom, the

International Community can cite stability. This is summarized in Chart #1. Kosovo is a very

unique case, and it is not the aim of this study to generalize. Each case of a group of people

seeking self-determination deserves its own focus, because the context around each case varies

greatly. However, some observations can be made, at the least about Kosovo. And the main

61 They refer to it strictly as Kosovo-Metohija, which means Kosovo-Church Grounds in Serbian. 62 "Serbian Government." Serbian Government. Accessed May 04, 2016. http://www.srbija.gov.rs/?change_lang=en. 63 "Kosovo Metohija." The Government of Serbia. Accessed May 04, 2016. http://www.srbija.gov.rs/pages/article.php?id=20619.

Luboteni 22

observations are that every group pulls out of international law what is most convenient to them.

It is hard, if not impossible, to say who is “right,” because the interpretation of international law

depends on the context, as summarized in Chart #2. As we have seen, the literature couples

independence and self-determination. But the discourse analyzed here shows more nuance to

that.

Conclusion

The implications of this study are modest. They simply help clarify the situation in a

particular chronological and geographic context. Some things that come out from this study are

the importance of keeping the foreign/Western gaze in mind. It was clear that the discourses

emanating from Kosovo were constructed to be more acceptable to the international actors. In

the case of the government, this was done through compromises and the elimination of

precedents. In Vetvendosje’s case, it was done by using international principles of rights and

freedoms, but the extent to which this gains the approval of the foreigners in debatable. This

continued into the idea that things are not as they appear: just because the United Nations is built

upon self-determination, doesn’t mean that it is actually guaranteed. Nor does this mean that the

way in which a given actor understands self-determination is the way the United Nations

intended/intends to apply it.

A critique of their discourse would be this: there are tens of other self-determination

movements happening around the world, it seems unlikely that Kosovo will get the level self-

determination that Vetvendosje is seeking. However, this is not to say that Vetvendosje does not

have a point. They are applying the international concepts based on their contextual perceptions

and interests. But this critique simply questions the reality of their ambitions: I am not making a

value judgement, rather an observation about the trajectory of self-determination in this world

Luboteni 23

order. The potential for change is doubtful: both in Kosovo, and in the grand scale of the

application of the principle.

One of the most important findings of this paper is the importance of context. The

literature showed the desire of the international community to avoid violence in the fallout from

border change. The only way this can be prevented is if self-determination is limited to a certain

context. The international principles are not invalidated. They are simply not applied when the

world order (global context) is not befitting. So Kosovo can be seen as not only a special case in

that its declaration was at least partially recognized, but that it still is grappling with whether

independence means self-determination in the modern world order.

Chart #1

International Community

Security Concern

Needs to be Supervised

Kosovo Government

“Sovereign State”

Fully Independent

Self-Determination

Party

“Self-Determination

of Peoples”Still

Oppressed

Serbia’s Government

“Territorial Integrity” Stolen Land

Luboteni 24

Chart #2

Chart #3

International Law

Context

Competing

Interests

Luboteni 25

19451948

19511954

19571960

19631966

19691972

19751978

19811984

19871990

19931996

19992002

20052008

20112014

02468

1012141618

16

4

17

6

13

232365

84

7

0

15

107

9

45457

32

96

35

117

14443

51

30

3001

3

17

65211

33410121010

200

20010

Newly Independent Countries 1945-2015

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