self-enhancement and learning from performance feedback - psychology

SELF-ENHANCEMENT AND LEARNING FROMPERFORMANCE FEEDBACK

ALEXANDER H. JORDANPINO G. AUDIA

Dartmouth College

The theory of performance feedback views decision makers as problem solvers seek-ing to improve performance. By specifying how and when decision makers mayinstead seek to enhance their self-image by assessing performance as satisfactory,the model presented in this article specifies boundaries on performance feedbacktheory’s critical prediction that low performance induces increased search, change,and risk taking, and it suggests one reason why decision makers sometimes fail tolearn from their mistakes.

Organizational theory traditionally has beendominated by a conception of decision makersas boundedly rational agents whose attempts tomaximize positive outcomes for their organiza-tions are constrained by limits to their cognitiveabilities (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; March & Si-mon, 1993/1958; Ocasio, 1997; Thompson, 1967).According to this view, a primary mechanism bywhich decision makers deal with their cognitivelimitations is learning from performance feed-back (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Greve, 1998;Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992; Mezias, Chen, &Murphy, 2002; Miller & Chen, 1994). Research onperformance feedback, growing out of Cyert andMarch’s (1963) behavioral theory of the firm,holds that decision makers set levels of per-formance they desire to achieve (i.e., aspira-tion levels) according to both their past perfor-mance and peers’ performance levels, and, inturn, if performance falls short according tothese preordained standards, decision makerswork to identify impediments to performanceand to improve it, whereas if performance ex-ceeds aspirations, decision makers become lesslikely to take actions oriented toward increasingperformance.

Summarizing advances made by this line ofresearch, Greve (2003: 53–59) identified three

predictions regarding the effects of performancerelative to the aspiration level. First, decisionmakers’ search behavior, oriented toward iden-tifying alternatives to the current set of activi-ties, is increased when performance is belowthe aspiration level and is decreased when per-formance is above the aspiration level.1 Second,decision makers’ inclination to implementchanges to activities is increased when perfor-mance is below the aspiration level and is de-creased when performance is above the aspira-tion level. Third, decision makers’ propensity tochoose from a pool of potential solutions thosethat entail greater risk is increased when per-formance is below the aspiration level and isdecreased when performance is above the aspi-ration level. Although contributors to this line ofinquiry have acknowledged occasional short-comings in decision makers’ responses to per-formance—such as resistance to changing strat-egies even when failure is quite severe (e.g.,Audia & Greve, 2006; Greve, 1998; March & Sha-pira, 1992; Ocasio, 1995; Staw, Sandelands, &Dutton, 1981)—the emphasis in this literaturehas remained on problem-solving responses to

This article has benefited greatly from comments by JackGoncalo, Dan Levinthal, Willie Ocasio, Zur Shapira, BarryStaw, Phil Tetlock, and participants at the 2010 OrganizationScience Winter Conference in Steamboat Springs, Colorado.We also thank the three AMR reviewers and former associ-ate editor Adelaide King for their constructive comments.Please address correspondence concerning this article toPino G. Audia.

1 Search behavior that occurs in response to performancebelow the aspiration level is known in the literature asproblemistic search (Cyert & March, 1963: 121). In contrast,slack search stems from extra time and resources that allowfor experimentation, and institutionalized search is con-ducted by units dedicated to search activities (Greve, 2003:54). Throughout the article, given our focus on behavioralresponses to performance, we use the term search to refer toproblemistic search.

� Academy of Management Review2012, Vol. 37, No. 2, 211–231.http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2010.0108

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perceived performance (see Figure 1 for a famil-iar flowchart representation of the theory).2

Comparatively little attention has been paidto the processes underlying decision makers’assessments of performance, even though it isthese subjective interpretations, rather than anyimpartial truth about performance, that largelydetermine whether decision makers initiatesearch, undertake changes, and choose risky so-lutions (Audia & Brion, 2007; Elsbach & Kramer,1996; Pfeffer, 1981; Staw, 1980; Sutton & Kramer,1990). For example, a decision maker may beperforming poorly according to informed outsideobservers, but if he or she assesses his or herown performance as satisfactory, then perfor-mance feedback theory’s critical prediction thatlow performance induces the decision maker tointensify problem-solving responses is lesslikely to hold.

In this article we offer a two-mode model ofhow decision makers assess performance andrespond to it. Focusing on the individual deci-

sion maker as our unit of analysis, we begin byreviewing the conventional model of perfor-mance assessment, rooted in a view of decisionmakers as problem solvers, and then contrast itwith a model that takes into account people’sneed to see themselves in a positive light—whatsocial psychologists have called the “self-enhancement motive” (Allport, 1937; Fiske, 2004;McDougall, 1933; Pyszczynski & Greenberg,1987). Next we describe and illustrate strategiesof self-enhancement in performance assessmentthat have received limited attention, and weproceed to identify conditions under which de-cision makers are more likely to switch from aproblem-solving mode to a self-enhancing modeof performance assessment, thereby becomingless likely to respond to low performance byincreasing search, enacting changes, and tak-ing risks. We conclude with a discussion ofwhat might be done to reduce unwanted self-enhancement in the assessment of performance.Consistent with much of the recent literature onthe effects of performance feedback on decisionmakers (e.g., Audia & Greve, 2006; Desai, 2008),throughout our analysis we refer to performancebelow the aspiration level as low performanceand performance above the aspiration level ashigh performance.

By incorporating insights from contemporaryresearch on self-enhancement, our work buildson recent efforts to advance performance feed-back theory (Argote & Greve, 2007; Gavetti,Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007; Greve, 2003) in twokey ways. First, we extend the component of the

2 The theory of performance feedback also assumes thatparticipants bring different interests to organizations andthat conflict is resolved through negotiation, resulting in theformation of a dominant coalition and the selection of orga-nizational goals (Cyert & March, 1963; Fligstein, 1990; Oca-sio, 1995). Here our focus is on the individual-level processesposited by the theory and discussed at length by Greve (2003:40–70), along with the influences of the organizational andinstitutional context on the individual decision maker. Wenote in the discussion that our arguments might have sig-nificant implications for political processes as well, but weleave the task of fully developing these implications to fu-ture research.

FIGURE 1The Conventional Model of Learning from Performance Feedbacka

a Adapted from Greve (2003: 60) and Scott and Davis (2007: 335).

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theory that concerns performance assessmentitself by identifying a broader range of cognitivestrategies through which performance is as-sessed. In particular, we highlight ways thatself-enhancing decision makers may retrospec-tively revise standards of performance evalua-tion to make them align more favorably withobserved performance, rather than staying con-sistent in their standards of evaluation, as sug-gested by the conventional model of perfor-mance assessment. Second, we extend thecomponent of the theory that concerns behav-ioral responses to performance by identifyingscope conditions regarding the theory’s criticalprediction that low performance induces deci-sion makers to increase search, change, and risktaking. Although a considerable body of empir-ical work at the organizational level (e.g., Bro-miley, 1991; Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan,2006; Lant et al., 1992; Miller & Chen, 1994) andindividual level (Audia & Goncalo, 2007; Audiaet al., 2000) supports this prediction, researchershave noted situations in which low performancedoes not have these predicted effects (e.g., Au-dia & Brion, 2007; Audia & Greve, 2006; Desai,2008; Greve, 1998; March & Shapira, 1992; Ocasio,1995), and we add to this work by identifyingseveral situational and dispositional featureslikely to lead decision makers to form self-enhancing assessments of low performancethat, in turn, reduce the extent of behavioralresponses to low performance. A deeper under-standing of subjective performance construalthus helps to shed light on deviations from thepredictions of performance feedback theory thatare not yet fully understood.

TWO VIEWS OF PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

The Problem-Solving Decision Maker AsPerformance Assessor

According to classic organizational theory, de-cision makers are motivated to improve futureperformance by rooting out problems andsearching for solutions (Simon, 1997/1947). Topromote successful performance, the decisionmaker first decides on clear performance goals(e.g., sales goals) and sets moderately ambitiousaspiration levels based on historical perfor-mance levels and the performance of compara-ble others (Cyert & March, 1963). After some in-terval of time has passed, the decision maker

next observes performance outcomes, attendingfirst to the goals he or she previously deter-mined to be most important. The decision makeracknowledges a problem if performance is be-low the aspiration level. He or she then enacts asearch “directed toward finding a solution tothat problem” (Cyert & March, 1963: 121), in-creases his or her propensity to implementchanges to activities, and becomes more likelyto choose from a pool of potential solutionsthose that entail greater risk (Greve, 2003: 53–59).

Thus, the decision maker functions primarilyas a problem solver: performance feedbackhelps the decision maker to identify importantproblems, and these problems spur a search forsolutions, changes in activities, and greater risktolerance. This view of how decision makersassess performance and respond to it hinges onthe assumption that decision makers show tem-poral consistency in their standards for evaluat-ing performance.3

According to this view, decision makers’ goalsare set prospectively and remain fixed acrossthe performance assessment process, untilchanges in the environment or in strategic ori-entation motivate alterations to them. We arguein the following section that a more comprehen-sive model of how decision makers assess andrespond to performance must go beyond thisassumption and also take into account decisionmakers’ motivation to see themselves as good,competent actors who perform their jobs well.This motivation, as we will see, can lead deci-sion makers to retrospectively shift their stan-dards for performance evaluation in order toform a more favorable view of low performance.

The Self-Enhancing Decision Maker AsPerformance Assessor

The conventional model of performance as-sessment suggests that, to predict behavior, thedecision maker’s subjective assessment of per-formance must be understood, “not merely aspecification of the situation as it ‘really’ is”(March & Simon, 1993/1958: 172). According tothis view, decision makers’ cognitive limitationsare the chief subjective influence on perfor-

3 By standards of evaluation, we mean the performancegoals chosen to evaluate performance and the benchmarks,such as the aspiration levels, against which performance onthe chosen goals is assessed.

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mance assessment, but there is some insinua-tion that decision makers “also strive rationallyto advance their own personal goals, whichmay not be wholly concordant with organiza-tional goals” (Simon, 1997/1947: 88; see also Cy-ert & March, 1963: 121). These personal strivings,outside the assumed motive to improve perfor-mance, may critically affect the performance as-sessment process, yet they have received littleattention in the body of work inspired by Simon(1997/1947) and Cyert and March (1963; for anexception see Audia & Brion, 2007).

How might decision makers’ personal motivesaffect performance assessment? Whenever a de-cision maker feels responsible for performance,performance assessment becomes an evalua-tion of the self as much as an evaluation ofoutcomes. People have various motives whenevaluating themselves, including self-assess-ment (the desire to accurately assess the self;Trope, 1986), self-improvement (the desire toimprove oneself for the future; Sedikides & Hep-per, 2009), self-verification (the desire to confirmpreexisting self-evaluations; Swann, 1983), andself-enhancement (the desire to see oneself in apositive light; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987).Attending to the self-enhancement motive—thedesire to see oneself as a winner, no matterwhat one’s actual performance is—is especiallyimportant for advancing performance feedbacktheory, since this motive is likely to distort theperformance assessment process, unlike theself-assessment and self-improvement motives,which should instead motivate decision makersto assess performance as accurately as they can(congruent with the decision makers’s desire toidentify and solve problems), and the self-verification motive, which should distort perfor-mance assessment primarily when decisionmakers wish to verify an unrealistically posi-tive self-image (i.e., its distorting influence ismediated by self-enhancement).

Psychologists have long regarded the motiva-tion to see oneself positively as a fundamentaldrive that influences cognition on conscious andunconscious levels (Kruglanski, 1980; Kunda,1990). For example, people tend to process posi-tive information about the self more fluentlythan negative information and to take credit fortheir successes while attributing their failuresto outside influences (Sedikides & Strube, 1997).These processes distort people’s self-percep-tions in a positive direction, and the self-

enhancement motive can even lead people toretrospectively revise their understanding ofprior actions to make it seem to themselves asthough they acted more competently than mightactually be the case (Greenwald, 1980; Staw,1980). As we discuss below, these retrospectivecognitive processes have implications for theassessment of performance.

Although self-enhancement is viewed bysome as a general tendency (Taylor & Brown,1988), research suggests that this motive is ac-centuated by perceptions of threat to the self-image (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996;Gramzow, 2011). After all, when things are goingwell, one does not need to distort one’s cognitiveprocesses to form favorable evaluations of theself. It is after suffering a setback—somethingthat might lead to negative evaluations of theself, if perceived objectively—that a concernwith maintaining a positive self-image acti-vates the tendency to self-enhance. Thus, theliterature on self-enhancement suggests that, inthe context of performance assessment, the mostcrucial triggers of self-enhancement are lowperformance (i.e., performance below the aspi-ration level) and a perception of personal re-sponsibility for that performance (e.g., Audia &Brion, 2007). Performance outcomes that are, onthe surface, inconsistent with a positive view ofa decision maker’s job-related abilities pose athreat to the decision maker’s self-image; thisself-threat activates the self-enhancement mo-tive; and then, motivated by the desire to seehimself or herself in a positive light, the deci-sion maker engages in cognitive processes thatfacilitate a more favorable assessment of lowperformance than he or she would other-wise hold.

An initial implication of our analysis is thatwhen performance is below the aspiration level,the performance assessment process may be-come more complex than suggested by the prob-lem-solving mode assumed in performancefeedback theory. Decision makers in problem-solving mode define standards of performanceevaluation prospectively and, later on, assessactual performance by comparing it to their pre-defined standards (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve,2003). So if performance is below the aspirationlevel, decision makers in problem-solving modeconclude that a performance gap exists. In con-trast, decision makers in a self-enhancing modeof performance assessment may set perfor-


mance evaluation standards and later retro-spectively revise them so that the gap betweendesired performance and actual performance isminimized, reducing or even eliminating theperception of performance problems andthereby bolstering the self-image (cf. Staw,1980). Thus, whereas decision makers in prob-lem-solving mode stay consistent in their stan-dards of performance evaluation, self-enhanc-ing decision makers’ standards of evaluationmay be fluid and the priority assigned to vari-ous goals may be shifting, all in service of sup-porting the conclusion that performance is fa-vorable. We summarize the differences betweenperformance assessment in the problem-solvingmode assumed by the theory of performancefeedback and performance assessment in theself-enhancement mode in Table 1.

These variations in how decision makers as-sess low performance have important implica-tions for some of the key predictions made byperformance feedback theory. According to thetheory, perceptions of low performance signal todecision makers the existence of a problem; thedecision makers then seek to resolve the prob-lem by initiating a search for solutions, makingchanges, and taking risky actions (Greve, 2003).Acknowledging that decision makers facing lowperformance may adopt either a problem-solving mode or a self-enhancing mode of per-formance assessment suggests that variationsin the decision makers’ assessments of low per-formance may cause variations in their re-sponses to low performance, as seen by outsid-ers. Decision makers who form more favorableassessments of performance below the aspira-tion level—owing to their adoption of a self-enhancing mode of performance assessment,rather than a problem-solving mode—may dis-play weaker than expected responses in terms

of initiating search, making changes, and tak-ing risky actions.

The next step in our analysis is identifyingstrategies that decision makers use to form self-enhancing assessments of low performance andthe conditions that increase decision makers’propensity to engage in such self-enhancementin performance assessment. Our analysis drawson the existing social psychological literatureon self-enhancement but also adds to this liter-ature by proposing links between decision mak-ers’ propensity to self-enhance in performanceassessment and key features of the organiza-tional context in which decision makers operate.

INCONSISTENT STANDARDS OF EVALUATIONAND SELF-ENHANCING ASSESSMENTS OF

LOW PERFORMANCE

Self-enhancing assessments of low perfor-mance may take familiar forms, such as attend-ing selectively to positive indicators and ignor-ing negative indicators (cf. Baumeister & Cairns,1992; Sweeney & Gruber, 1984), or taking creditfor successes and finding external excuses forfailures (e.g., Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Bowman,1976; Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983). Here weconcentrate on three self-enhancing cognitivestrategies of performance assessment that havereceived limited attention in the performancefeedback literature. These three strategiesshare the common theme of illustrating howthe self-threat posed by performance belowthe aspiration level can prompt decision mak-ers to retrospectively reconsider the standardsof evaluation used to assess performance. Ob-served low performance can thus influence howdecision makers assess their performance.

TABLE 1Two Modes of Performance Assessment

Features of PerformanceAssessment Problem-Solving Mode Self-Enhancing Mode

Primary motivation Fix problems; improve performance See oneself in a positive light; assessperformance as satisfactory

Standards of evaluation Predetermined; temporally consistent Fluid; temporally inconsistentPriority of performance goals Fixed ShiftingPrimary temporal orientation Prospective; reasoning motivates

conclusionsRetrospective; conclusions motivate

reasoning


Revising the Priority of Performance Goals

One self-enhancing strategy of performanceassessment that illustrates temporal inconsis-tency in the standards of performance evalua-tion is revising the priority of performance goalsaccording to observed performance—that is,giving greater importance to those goals forwhich performance is favorable. People some-times show a tendency to regard those thingsthey are good at as more important than thosethey are bad at (Campbell, 1986; Dunning, Mey-erowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Greve & Wentura,2003; Lewicki, 1983, 1984; Tesser & Paulhus, 1983),and empirical evidence suggests that this is es-pecially the case when performance is low.

Elsbach and Kramer (1996) evaluated howmembers of the top twenty business schools re-acted to Business Week’s rankings, and theyfound that members of business schools receiv-ing lower than expected rankings deflected themeaning of those low rankings by givinggreater importance to favorable performance di-mensions (e.g., reputation in regional labor mar-ket) and discounting the importance of the per-formance dimensions used to form the rankings.Similarly, Audia and Brion (2007) found that bothparticipants in experimental studies and orga-nizational decision makers tended to regard asecondary performance goal as central to goalachievement only when it showed favorableperformance and a primary performance goalshowed unfavorable performance. Based on thiswork, we propose, for example, that when a hos-pital executive finds that the number of gall-bladder surgeries performed at his or her hospi-tal has increased but the outcome of suchsurgeries has declined, the executive may de-cide that, contrary to his or her previous priori-tizing of performance goals, the most importantgoals should be the number of patients servedand the length of waiting lists, rather than out-come quality. Retrospectively revising the prior-ity of performance goals thus allows decisionmakers to perceive low performance in a morepositive light.

Proposition 1: Compared to decisionmakers whose performance is abovethe aspiration level, decision makerswhose performance is below the aspi-ration level are more likely to revisethe priority of performance goals bygiving greater importance to those

that show favorable performance,which, in turn, makes performanceseem more favorable and conse-quently reduces the extent of search,change, and risk taking triggered bylow performance.

Increasing the Level of Abstraction ofPerformance Goals

A second strategy that illustrates the inconsis-tency of standards in how low performance isassessed consists of increasing the level of ab-straction of performance goals. Psychologistshave noted that every human action can beidentified at numerous levels of abstraction(Trope & Liberman, 2003; Vallacher & Wegner,1987). Lower levels of abstraction involve a con-crete description of the action on a physicallevel, whereas higher levels of abstraction in-volve a more general description of the action interms of the actor’s intentions. At a low level, forexample, a person might be said to be pressingkeys on a keyboard, whereas at a higher levelthe same behavior might be described as typingwords, writing an article, or, at a higher levelstill, working toward tenure or fulfilling careeraspirations. Taking advantage of the fluid qual-ity of action descriptions, self-enhancing deci-sion makers may restate their performancegoals at a different level of abstraction—especially when they are threatened by a con-clusion of failure if they stick to their previouslevel of description.

We propose that decision makers may be es-pecially likely to retrospectively increase thelevel of abstraction of their goals, since the moreabstract one’s performance goals, the more flex-ibility one has in defining exactly how, at alower level, goal fulfillment might be specifi-cally and concretely instantiated. After redefin-ing performance goals at a more abstract level,the self-enhancing decision maker may searchfor evidence that could be construed as positiveunder the new and more flexible description ofwhat constitutes success. For example, the prin-cipal of a high school, faced with a decliningproportion of students attending college aftergraduation, may revise his mission to be about“preparing students for success in life,” ratherthan “sending every student to college,” allow-ing him to search for other evidence of postgrad-uate success when assessing performance. Sim-


ilarly, a manager who is faced with decliningfinancial outcomes may revise her goal to beabout serving the general welfare of the firm’sstakeholders, rather than simply maximizingshareholder value, allowing her to search fornew evidence when assessing performance,such as improved work-life balance among em-ployees (Walsh & Seward, 1990: 432).

Proposition 2: Compared to decisionmakers whose performance is abovethe aspiration level, decision makerswhose performance is below the aspi-ration level are more likely to increasethe level of abstraction at which theirgoals are described, which, in turn,makes performance seem more favor-able and consequently reduces the ex-tent of search, change, and risk takingtriggered by low performance.

Invoking Counterfactual Outcomes AsComparison Standards

A third cognitive strategy that illustrates theinconsistency of the standards used in the as-sessment of low performance consists of invok-ing counterfactual outcomes as comparisonstandards. Decision makers may deviate fromthe comparison standards they previously setfor themselves based on past performance or theperformance of comparable others, especiallywhen performance is poor in relation to thosestandards. By shifting to counterfactual thinking(see Byrne, 2005; Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese,1997), decision makers can justify their perfor-mance by comparing it to what would have hap-pened had they employed different strategies.That is, a questionable outcome in the realworld can be made to seem less bad by compar-ing it to a catastrophic imagined outcome thatwould have occurred, according to the decisionmakers’ speculation, under alternative deci-sions. These “downward” counterfactuals gen-erally make people feel better about themselves(Roese, 1994; Sanna, Chang, & Meier, 2001;Sanna, Meier, & Turley-Ames, 1998; Sanna,Meier, & Wegner, 2001; White & Lehman, 2005)such that self-enhancing decision makers maybe more likely to focus on how things could havebeen worse than on how they could have beenbetter had they acted differently—even thoughthe latter “upward” counterfactuals are more

likely to lead to adaptive changes to behavior inthe future (cf. Epstude & Roese, 2008; Markman,Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993; Morris &Moore, 2000; Roese, 1994; Roese, Hur, & Penning-ton, 1999). For example, in a lab experiment col-lege students who contemplated a poor recenttest score felt better if they afterward wrote pri-vately about how things could have gone evenworse for them on the exam (Roese, 1994).

In a real-world example of downward coun-terfactual generation, President Obama, ac-knowledging mediocre economic indicatorsone year after his economic recovery packagewent into effect, defended the stimulus mea-sures by claiming that “it is largely thanks to theRecovery Act that a second depression is nolonger a possibility” (Stolberg, 2010). Other ex-amples of this strategy in action can be found instatements from the American leaders of thewar in Iraq. In the summer of 2003, the pressbegan to run stories about the problem of terror-ists from other nations entering Iraq to targetU.S. troops. In response to this troubling indica-tor, President Bush suggested that Americantroops were “defeating the terrorists here in Iraqso that we don’t have to face them in our owncountry” (Bush, 2003). This reinterpretation of aprime facie negative situation contained an im-plied counterfactual: if there were no invasion ofand war in Iraq, there would be terrorist attackson American soil. By invoking a frightening al-ternative reality, the administration was able tosuggest that the war in Iraq was responsible forthe prevention of further attacks in the style ofSeptember 11—an unfalsifiable and rhetoricallyeffective claim. Conjuring counterfactual out-comes as comparison standards thus allows de-cision makers to perceive low performance in amore positive light.

Proposition 3: Compared to decisionmakers whose performance is abovethe aspiration level, decision makerswhose performance is below the aspi-ration level are more likely to com-pare their own performance to down-ward counterfactual outcomes, which,in turn, makes performance seem morefavorable and consequently reducesthe extent of search, change, and risktaking triggered by low performance.

Taken together, these three self-enhancingprocesses of performance assessment help to


explain why decision makers sometimes exhibitweaker problem-solving responses to low per-formance than would be expected given themagnitude of their performance deficits.

WHEN DECISION MAKERS SELF-ENHANCE INPERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

Our analysis thus far lays out the primaryconditions that can activate self-enhancement(i.e., low performance and personal responsibil-ity for the performance), key differences be-tween the self-enhancing mode of performanceassessment and the problem-solving mode ofperformance assessment, and important impli-cations of the self-enhancing assessment of per-formance for behavioral responses to low per-formance. However, rather than suggesting thatdecision makers threatened by low performancealways adopt a self-enhancing mode of perfor-mance assessment, the literature on self-enhancement offers insights into the specificconditions under which low-performing deci-sion makers can be expected to adopt a self-enhancing mode versus a problem-solvingmode. The next step in our analysis is to identifyfeatures of decision makers and their situationsthat influence the performance assessmentmode in which the decision makers operatewhen facing low performance and that thereforeinfluence the degree to which they form favor-able assessments of low performance and, con-sequently, the degree to which they respond tolow performance by initiating search, makingchanges, and taking risks.

Social psychological research suggests thatthe magnitude of self-threat posed by low per-formance—and thus the likelihood that a deci-sion maker will adopt a self-enhancing mode ofperformance assessment—is influenced bycharacteristics of both the decision maker andhis or her situation that affect the perception ofthreat (Campbell, Reeder, Sedikides, & Elliot,2000; John & Robins, 1994; Sedikides & Gregg,2008; Tetlock, Stitka, & Boettger, 1989). Drawingfrom and integrating the bodies of literature thatview self-threat as a chief activator of self-enhancing responses, we propose that the threatposed by low performance and the consequentlikelihood of assessing performance in a self-enhancing way are greater when decision mak-ers possess narcissistically high self-regard(low performance is more threatening the more

inflated one’s view of one’s job-related abilities),believe their ability is fixed (low performance ismore threatening when it signals a permanentrather than correctable deficit in ability), areaccountable for performance to audiences whocan influence their future (low performance ismore threatening when it signals a poor futurefor the self), and are accountable for perfor-mance outcomes rather than processes (low per-formance is more threatening when the focus issolely on ultimate outcomes).

Beyond factors that increase the threat lowperformance poses for decision makers’ self-image, self-enhancement in response to low per-formance is also facilitated by a second set ofconditions—those giving decision makers morelatitude to portray performance in a positivelight (Dunning et al., 1989; Kunda, 1990;Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). In a theoreticalsynthesis of the empirical literature on self-enhancement, Sedikides and Gregg noted that“positive self-evaluations reflect not only whatpeople want to believe, but also what they canbelieve” (2008: 108). Similarly, Kunda observedthat “when one wants to draw a particular con-clusion, one feels obligated to construct a justi-fication for that conclusion that would be plau-sible to a dispassionate observer” (1990: 493).These insights suggest that the propensity toform more favorable assessments of low perfor-mance may be strengthened or weakened byfactors that alter the extent to which decisionmakers can form plausible and defensible self-enhancing performance assessments. Specifi-cally, we propose that low performance is morelikely to be assessed in a self-enhancing waywhen decision makers’ jobs involve greater taskcomplexity and when decision makers possessgreater informational power. As we discuss be-low, greater task complexity and greater informa-tional power both allow for greater flexibility inredefining standards of evaluation according toone’s self-enhancing biases so that a reasonablecase can be built for a self-serving conclusion.

Conditions Increasing the Perceived Threat ofLow Performance

High level of narcissism. Low performance isespecially threatening to the self-image of indi-viduals who have high self-esteem, who expectsuccess, who are highly motivated to achieve,and to whom performance is personally impor-


tant (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). At the ex-treme of these variations in personality, narcis-sism involves a grandiose self-image (e.g.,exaggerated perceptions of one’s own abilities;Farwell & Wohlend-Lloyd, 1998; John & Robins,1994) and a need to have inflated self-views con-stantly reconfirmed (Bogart, Benotsch, & Pav-lovic, 2004; Campbell & Foster, 2007; Campbell,Goodie, & Foster, 2004). As might be expectedfrom these characteristics, experimental evi-dence suggests that highly narcissistic individ-uals show more dramatic self-enhancement ef-fects than less narcissistic individuals (John &Robins, 1994) and that their motivation to self-enhance persists more strongly across varyingconditions than that of less narcissistic people(Campbell et al., 2000). Decision makers in orga-nizations can sometimes manifest high levels ofnarcissism (e.g., Kets de Vries, 1994; Lubit, 2002),and highly narcissistic decision makers can beexpected to experience greater threat in the faceof performance problems. We therefore proposethat decision makers with higher levels of nar-cissism will show a greater propensity to formfavorable assessments of low performance thandecision makers with more ordinary levels ofself-regard.

Proposition 4: Greater narcissism in-creases the perceived threat of perfor-mance below the aspiration level,thereby increasing decision makers’propensity to assess low performancein a self-enhancing way.

Belief that ability is fixed. In much the sameway that decision makers’ views on the level oftheir ability (i.e., their narcissism) may affectwhether they form self-enhancing assessmentsof low performance, so their views on the mal-leability of their ability may also modulate thedegree to which they assess low performance ina self-enhancing way. A large body of socialpsychological research indicates that some peo-ple believe ability is unchangeable, whereasothers believe ability can be increased throughsustained effort, and that these different beliefscan have wide-reaching effects on cognitionand behavior (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett,1988) and organizational performance (Wood &Bandura, 1989). Within organizations, decisionmakers vary in the extent to which they assumethat talent is innate or a quantity that can beexpanded, and human resource and corporate

training practices, for example, may reflectthese beliefs (e.g., Heslin, VandeWalle, &Latham, 2005). Dweck (2006) suggested that En-ron’s Ken Lay exemplified an executive adher-ing to a fixed view of ability, whereas Xerox’sAnne Mulcahy exemplified an executive em-bracing a malleable view of ability, constantlyemphasizing the capacity for growth of talentsand capabilities at all levels. Note that narcis-sism and beliefs about the modifiability of abil-ity are conceptually orthogonal: a decisionmaker with a low or high overall view of his orher ability may view that ability as fixed or asmodifiable.

For a decision maker who believes that abilityis fixed, low performance may indicate a perma-nent deficit in job-related ability, with no obvi-ous avenue of remediation except defensiveself-enhancement. For a decision maker who be-lieves ability can be grown, however, low per-formance may indicate only a current deficitthat can be corrected by hard work and newstrategies in the future—a far less threateningprospect and therefore one that is less likely tolead to self-enhancement. Consistent with thisidea, when people with a “growth” view of abil-ity received negative performance feedback inone study, they responded by searching for newstrategies to do better in the future (by examin-ing the strategies of others who performed bet-ter), whereas people with a “fixed” view of abil-ity responded to the same feedback bydefensively boosting their self-image (by exam-ining the strategies of others who performedworse; Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). Moreover,some evidence suggests that people with agrowth mindset learn more in response to theirfailures, and consequently perform better in thefuture on the same tasks, than do people with afixed-ability mindset (Mangels, Butterfield,Lamb, Good, & Dweck, 2006).

Drawing from this literature, we suggest thatthe magnitude of threat to the decision maker’sself-image posed by low performance will begreater for decision makers who believe thatability is fixed than for decision makers whobelieve that ability is malleable. As a result,decision makers who believe that ability is fixedas opposed to malleable will be more inclined toassess low performance in a self-enhancingway, perceiving it to be more favorable than itreally is.


Proposition 5: A greater belief thatability is permanently fixed increasesthe perceived threat of performancebelow the aspiration level, thereby in-creasing decision makers’ propensityto assess low performance in a self-enhancing way.

Accountability to audiences who can influ-ence one’s future. While narcissism and the be-lief that ability is fixed are individual charac-teristics likely to influence the magnitude of theperceived threat that low performance poses toa decision maker’s self-image, accountability—having to explain, defend, or justify oneself toan audience—is “a ubiquitous feature of every-day life that links individuals to institutions”(Tetlock, 2002: 455) and that may also modulatethe degree of self-threat felt by low-performingdecision makers. Although some audiences candirectly influence decision makers’ behaviorsthrough the kinds of incentive systems they de-vise (e.g., equity compensation), our focus in-stead is on the impact that audiences have ondecision makers’ cognitive processes throughthe generation of more broadly defined evalua-tive pressures. Taking this social psychologicalperspective, we draw from Lerner and Tetlock,who defined accountability as “the implicit orexplicit expectation that one may be called on tojustify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to oth-ers” (1999: 255). Here the assumption is that de-cision makers who do not provide satisfactoryjustifications will suffer negative consequences,ranging from disdainful looks to the loss of val-ued outcomes.

The effects of accountability on individualcognition are complex and varied (see Lerner &Tetlock, 1999), and we propose that accountabil-ity’s influence on self-enhancement in perfor-mance assessment depends on at least two crit-ical factors that determine the degree to whichthe audience is perceived as a threat. First, theeffect of accountability may depend on the ex-tent to which the audience can influence thedecision maker’s future through its evaluations.Some audiences can inflict negative conse-quences on decision makers who fail to justifytheir actions by withholding rewards or admin-istering punishments, and thus exercising whatFrench and Raven (1960) called “reward power”and “coercive power.” These potential negativeconsequences pose a threat to decision makers

that is likely to elicit a defensive cognitive re-sponse in which decision makers self-enhance(Lambert, Cronen, Chasteen, & Lickel, 1996;Peecher & Kleinmuntz, 1991; Tetlock et al., 1989)and escalate their commitment to prior actions(Conlon & Wolf, 1980; Fox & Staw, 1979). Forinstance, in a study of pilots’ verbal accounts ofnear accidents they were involved in, the pilotsflying for commercial airlines—those who wereaccountable to audiences who could influencetheir professional fates, that is—interpreted theincidents in more self-serving, defensive termsand were less likely to draw lessons for improv-ing future performance than were pilots flyingtheir own planes (Morris & Moore, 2000). Ac-countability to an audience whose evaluationwill not affect a decision maker’s future, how-ever, may not increase self-threat and may evensometimes encourage thoughtful reflection onone’s potential performance weaknesses(Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 2002).Drawing from this literature, we propose thataccountability to audiences who can influence adecision maker’s future increases the threatposed by low performance and consequently in-creases decision makers’ propensity to form rosyassessments of low performance.

Proposition 6: Greater accountabilityto audiences who can influence de-cision makers’ futures increases theperceived threat of performance be-low the aspiration level, thereby in-creasing decision makers’ propensityto assess low performance in a self-enhancing way.

Accountability to audiences who are focusedon outcomes. Second, accountability research-ers have averred that in order to understand theeffects of accountability systems, it is importantto distinguish between accountability for out-comes and accountability for processes (Lerner& Tetlock, 1999; Simonson & Staw, 1992). Withinorganizations, both types of accountability arecommonly instantiated. For example, executiveswho answer to corporate boards that are fo-cused solely on results exemplify decision mak-ers who are held accountable for outcomesrather than processes. Executives who answer tocorporate boards that are involved in formulat-ing strategy, however, may find themselves ac-countable primarily for decision processesrather than outcomes per se. Although greater


audience expertise might be expected to elevatethe probability of process accountability (an in-expert corporate board, after all, could notknowledgeably critique decision processes), ex-pert audiences sometimes also elect to use out-come accountability. We therefore focus here onthe outcome/process distinction itself, ratherthan audience characteristics that might influ-ence the type of accountability utilized.

When decision makers are held accountablefor ultimate performance outcomes alone andmust justify those outcomes retrospectively, theymay feel an increased need to self-enhance andsee performance outcomes in a positive light.When outcomes are all that matters, there is noway to bolster one’s self-image against thethreat of low performance other than to recastthe performance in a more positive light; a de-cision maker cannot seek solace in the knowl-edge that prior decisions leading to that perfor-mance were sensible at the time they weremade. Conversely, with process accountability,it is possible to see oneself as performing com-petently—that is, making good decisions, giventhe information available at the time of the de-cisions—even if ultimate performance outcomesare acknowledged as subpar (Salancik, 1977).Indeed, when decision makers are asked to ex-plain or justify their decision processes to audi-ences, this type of accountability may actuallypromote more comprehensive, careful consider-ation of all available information and evidence,rather than pushing decision makers towardnarrow, self-justifying, and self-enhancing cog-nition, as outcome accountability often does(Johns, 1999; Scholten, Van Knippenberg, Nijstad,& De Dreu, 2007; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). Draw-ing from this literature, we propose that whenperformance is low, outcome accountabilityposes a greater level of threat to decision mak-ers’ self-image than process accountability. As aresult, an audience’s focus on outcomes as op-posed to processes is likely to elevate decisionmakers’ tendency to form favorable assess-ments of low performance.

Proposition 7: Greater accountabilityto audiences who are focused on ulti-mate performance outcomes increasesthe perceived threat of performancebelow the aspiration level, thereby in-creasing decision makers’ propensity

to assess low performance in a self-enhancing way.

Conditions Increasing the Latitude to PortrayPerformance Positively

High task complexity. Decision makers’ jobsvary tremendously in what has been called“task complexity” (e.g., Campbell, 1988; Wood,1986). A key distinguishing feature of highlycomplex tasks, according to the various defini-tions of the construct that have been offered, isthat they involve a large number of subtasks orcomponent acts composing the complete task,as well as a large number of information cues,sources, or dimensions that inform the comple-tion of each subtask (Campbell, 1988: 43; Wood,1986: 66–68). Some tasks are low in complexity—for example, personnel scheduling at a smallfirm may involve only a handful of subtasks,each requiring attention to a very limited num-ber of information cues. Other tasks, however,such as forecasting the firm’s future perfor-mance, can involve innumerable subtasks, withmultitudinous sources of information informingevery subtask.

With low-complexity tasks, on the one hand,performance is relatively straightforward to de-fine. On the other hand, with greater task com-plexity comes greater flexibility in defining (andredefining) performance. As March and Simonnoted, “An individual can attend to only a lim-ited number of things at a time” (1993/1958: 151),and therefore the definition of a complex situa-tion “is simplified by omitting some criteria andpaying particular attention to others” (1993/1958:152). Consistent with March and Simon’s intu-ition, Dunning et al. (1989: 1082) found experi-mentally that the greater the number of criteriathat were given to define a particular trait (i.e.,the more complex the trait’s definition), the morepeople self-enhanced when assessing them-selves on the trait, because people used “self-serving trait definitions when providing self-evaluations,” emphasizing those criteria onwhich they were strongest.

Drawing on these insights, we suggest thatwhen task performance itself is a “complex sit-uation,” decision makers’ latitude to portray per-formance in a positive light is greater, and thisis likely to impact their propensity to form self-enhancing assessments of low performance. Go-ing back to our examples of tasks low and high


in complexity, when a severely inaccurate busi-ness forecast for the current year threatens amanager’s positive self-image, he or she canrevise the interpretation of performance on thatspecific task by emphasizing subtasks on whichperformance was stronger (e.g., predictedchanges in the macroenvironment, predictedchanges in market share) and omitting subtaskson which performance was weaker. When per-formance on a low-complexity task, such as em-ployee scheduling, is low (e.g., there is insuffi-cient coverage for absences), however, therewill be fewer options to portray performance ina positive light. Thus, while low performancemotivates self-enhancement by threatening adecision maker’s self-image, task complexity in-fluences the extent to which decision makerscan portray low performance in a positive light.

Proposition 8: Greater task complexityincreases the latitude to portray per-formance below the aspiration levelin a positive light, thereby increas-ing decision makers’ propensity toassess low performance in a self-enhancing way.

Possession of informational power. When wediscussed the effect of decision makers’ ac-countability to audiences who can influencetheir future, we noted that the reward and coer-cive power that some audiences are able to ex-ercise can pose a threat to decision makers thatincreases the probability of self-enhancing as-sessments of low performance. Decision makers,too, possess varying levels of power, and ourtheoretical analysis implies that the level of in-formational power possessed by decision mak-ers may affect the likelihood of self-enhancingassessments of low performance by alteringtheir latitude to portray low performance posi-tively. Organizational theorists have long seendifferential access to information as an impor-tant source of differences in power (e.g., Me-chanic, 1962; Pettigrew, 1972; see also Raven,1965), and, more recently, social network theo-rists have suggested that decision makers whooccupy more central positions are perceived asmore influential in part because of their greateraccess to information (e.g., Brass, 1984; Friedkin,1993; Krackhardt, 1990). Underlying this work isthe view that information that is in demand andnot easily available confers to those who have

access to it the ability to produce outcomesaligned with their perceived interests.

Explicating the link between information andpower, Pfeffer (1981, 1997) suggested that deci-sion makers with greater access to informationcan selectively report performance-relevant in-formation that is more favorable to them andmore acceptable to interested audiences. Draw-ing on Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) classic analy-sis of educational organizations, Pfeffer (1981)gave the example of decision makers responsi-ble for public schools whose pupils were under-performing on standardized reading and math-ematics tests. These decision makers’ privilegedaccess to performance-relevant information al-lowed them to form favorable perceptions of lowperformance by directing attention to dimen-sions of performance that were more positive,such as the proportion of their teachers whopossessed advanced degrees and the moneyspent on each student. Similarly, Pfeffer notedthat hospital administrators may deemphasizemeasures such as risk-adjusted mortality andmorbidity that reveal low performance and mayexaggerate the importance of indicators thatpoint to favorable outcomes, such as staffingratios and the proportion of board-certifiedphysicians.

Drawing on this literature, we propose thatgreater informational power increases decisionmakers’ propensity to self-enhance in responseto low performance. Decision makers withgreater informational power are more likely toform self-enhancing assessments of perfor-mance because privileged access to informationaffords them greater latitude to portray perfor-mance positively.

Proposition 9: Greater informationalpower increases the latitude to por-tray performance below the aspirationlevel in a positive light, thereby in-creasing decision makers’ propensityto assess low performance in a self-enhancing way.

It is helpful to take a step back and reflect onthe relationships among the variables we havespecified as influences on decision makers’ pro-pensity to assess performance in a self-enhanc-ing way. In our model performance below theaspiration level (for which the decision maker isresponsible) is the condition that triggers thedecision maker’s propensity to adopt a self-


enhancing mode of performance assessment.Our model also specifies that a decision maker’slikelihood of adopting the self-enhancementmode in response to low performance is influ-enced by factors that affect the self-threat posedby low performance and factors that affect thedecision maker’s latitude to portray perfor-mance positively. We conceive of high narcis-sism, belief that ability is fixed, accountabilityto audiences who can influence one’s future,and accountability to audiences focused on ul-timate outcomes as having additive effects onself-threat; similarly, we conceive of informa-tional power and task complexity as having ad-ditive effects on latitude to portray performancepositively.

However, the two higher-level constructs ofself-threat posed by low performance and lati-tude to portray performance positively are likelyto interact in their effects on self-enhancing as-sessments of performance. Other theories of or-ganizational behavior suggest that the motiva-tion to act and the capacity to act are bothnecessary for spurring behavior (e.g., Chen, Su,& Tsai, 2007; Vroom, 1964), and, analogously, themotivation to self-enhance and the latitude toportray performance positively are both neces-sary for prompting self-enhancing assessmentsof low performance. Motivation to self-enhancecan be rendered impotent if there is low or nolatitude to portray performance positively; like-wise, latitude to portray performance positivelycan have little effect if the motivation to self-enhance is weak or even absent. Conversely,the highest levels of self-enhancement can oc-cur only when both the motivation to self-enhance and the latitude to portray performancepositively are high.

Proposition 10: The effect that condi-tions increasing the perceived threatof low performance have on the pro-pensity to form self-enhancing assess-ments of low performance is greaterwhen the latitude to portray perfor-mance positively is high rather thanlow. Likewise, the effect that conditionsincreasing the latitude to portray per-formance positively have on the pro-pensity to form self-enhancing assess-ments of low performance is greaterwhen the perceived threat of low per-formance is high rather than low.

Figure 2 provides a visual summary of howour model expands the familiar model of learn-ing from performance feedback shown in Fig-ure 1. In the familiar flowchart, the decisionmaker responds to performance below the aspi-ration level by increasing search, makingchanges, and taking risky actions. Figure 2 sug-gests that the degree to which the decisionmaker responds to low performance by increas-ing search, making changes, and taking riskyactions depends on whether he or she assesseslow performance adopting the self-enhancingmode or the problem-solving mode of perfor-mance assessment. The conditions specified inPropositions 4 through 10 combine to influencewhether the decision maker will opt for the prob-lem-solving mode or the self-enhancing mode.The self-enhancing mode involves retrospec-tively revising standards of evaluation, as spec-ified in Propositions 1 through 3, so that lowperformance is perceived to be more favorablethan it really is. Consequently, opting for theself-enhancement mode leads to lesser search,change, and risk taking than when low-perform-ing decision makers opt for the problem-solving mode.

PRIVATE COGNITIONS VERSUSPUBLIC PERCEPTIONS

Because the theory of performance feedbackand the literature on self-enhancement viewthe problem-solving mode and the self-enhancement mode, respectively, as guided byintrapersonal motives, we conceptualize perfor-mance assessment as a private cognitive pro-cess focused on decision makers’ own percep-tions of performance, independent from theirpublic statements about performance. The in-trapersonal orientation of the theory of perfor-mance feedback is evident in the assumptionthat decision makers are motivated to solveproblems not to shape others’ impressions ofthem but, rather, to satisfy their own personaldesire to improve performance. Likewise, theself-enhancement motive is defined in the liter-ature on self-enhancement as the personal de-sire to see oneself in a positive light, and insocial psychological research people rate them-selves as above average on many dimensions,even when these self-ratings are made entirelyprivately (e.g., Dunning et al., 1989; Kruger &Dunning, 1999). Similarly, in one study, even in


the absence of any obligation to justify theiractions and performance assessment to an au-dience, decision makers confronted with lowperformance retrospectively redefined the prior-ity of performance goals in order to form a morefavorable assessment of overall performance(Audia & Brion, 2007). Moreover, research hasshown that accountability to audiences causesshifts in private thoughts, not merely in publicstatements (e.g., Morris & Moore, 2000; see alsoTetlock, 1992).

Although performance feedback theory andself-enhancement theory focus on intrapersonalmotives, it would be limiting to think that deci-sion makers entirely ignore the repercussions oftheir actions on others’ perceptions of them. De-cision makers in problem-solving or self-enhancing modes may sometimes contemplatehow others may respond to their action or inac-tion, and private and public considerations mayinfluence each other. However, like other con-tributors to the theory of performance feedback

FIGURE 2A Two-Mode Model of Learning from Performance Feedback


(e.g., Greve, 1998; March & Shapira, 1992), we areconcerned chiefly with what decision makers doin response to performance and with the privatecognitions that guide their behaviors. In order toillustrate some of the cognitive strategies thatmay be utilized in self-enhancing performanceassessment (e.g., conjuring downward counter-factuals), we have drawn on publicly observablestatements on performance from decision mak-ers, but we intend these examples to be purelyillustrative rather than evidential. Self-enhanc-ing cognition in performance assessment can,like any other private thought, be made exter-nally observable when a decision maker articu-lates the cognition in speech or in writing, butthis type of external articulation is not requiredin our model of how self-enhancement influ-ences the assessment of performance andthereby affects problem-solving behavioral re-sponses to performance.

REDUCING SELF-ENHANCEMENT

By making low performance seem more favor-able than it actually is, self-enhancing perfor-mance assessment may prevent decision mak-ers from tackling problems, may increase theircommitment to losing courses of action (cf. Staw,1976), and may promote long-run failure. We pro-pose here organizational features that may pre-vent or at least reduce self-enhancing cognitionamong decision makers facing low perfor-mance. We target our interventions at the twokey facilitators of self-enhancement reviewed inthis article: (1) the decision maker’s latitude toportray low performance in a positive light and(2) the threat to the decision maker’s self-image.

Organizations can limit decision makers’ lat-itude to portray low performance positively byimplementing appropriate formal control sys-tems—the rules, standard procedures, and in-centive structures that help to shape organiza-tion members’ behaviors (Langfield-Smith, 1997;Walsh & Seward, 1990). Because powerful deci-sion makers engaged in highly complex tasksoften have significant latitude to retrospectivelyrevise standards of evaluation to fit observedperformance, it may be especially important torequire top managers to prospectively commit tospecific, well-defined standards of evaluationso that they cannot later use slippery perfor-mance-redefining strategies (cf. Staw, 1980). In-deed, an experimental investigation found that

asking decision makers to set an unambiguousaspiration level in advance—that is, a strict cri-terion for the level of performance that would beconsidered a failure and would lead to a changein strategy—reduced subsequent escalations ofcommitment to a losing investment, presumablyby reducing self-enhancing reinterpretations ofperformance (Simonson & Staw, 1992). Similarly,studies have shown that decision makers whoare working toward highly specific, well-defined goals rate their own performance moremodestly than when they are working towardless well-defined goals, even when receivingthe same level of performance feedback (Kernan& Lord, 1989; Mento, Locke, & Klein, 1992; Moss-holder, 1980). Formal systems that incentivizethe regular and prospective setting of tightlycircumscribed standards of evaluation are thusone means by which organizations might rein indecision makers’ self-enhancing tendencies.

Of course, managers’ tasks can sometimes beso complex and novel that it may not be possibleto demand well-defined, formal, prospectiveperformance goals in every domain and at alltimes. Fortunately, informal control systems—including the organization’s culture, or itsshared values and norms (Chatman & Cha,2003)—can exert their effects on organizationmembers continuously and can be tailored toreduce the self-threat that low performanceposes for decision makers and, thus, can atten-uate self-enhancement.

Specifically, a growth-oriented organizationalculture that emphasizes the malleability of abil-ities may guard against defensive self-enhance-ment by reducing the threat of low performanceassociated with a fixed-ability mindset. In re-cent studies, asking participants to imaginethemselves within an organization that en-dorsed either a fixed or a growth view of abilityled the participants to behave as if they them-selves subscribed to the respective view (Mur-phy & Dweck, 2010). Organizational cultures thatpromote a static view of ability—for example,firms that heavily emphasize standardized testscores when hiring entry-level analysts—maytherefore incline decision makers embeddedwithin them to respond to performance difficul-ties with self-enhancement, whereas culturespromoting a growth-oriented mindset may havethe opposite effect (Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008).To develop a growth-oriented culture, organiza-tions might consider such measures as training


recruiters to seek prospective organizationmembers who believe in and value intellectualgrowth (Chatman & Cha, 2003) and having man-agers highlight their own mistakes as an inevi-table and integral part of their growth and im-provement (Murphy & Dweck, 2010; Pfeffer &Fong, 2005). The morbidity and mortality confer-ences that occur regularly at most large medicalcenters exemplify a threat-reducing, growth-oriented cultural practice; here, physiciansgather and discuss their errors in a nonpunitiveenvironment, with the goal of determining howsimilar problems can be prevented in the future.Analogous mechanisms in other organizationscould serve a similar function, encouraging amindset that views low performance as a spur toreflection, hard work, and improvement, ratherthan an indictment of one’s fixed abilities thatmust be defended against at all costs.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORYAND RESEARCH

Whereas in the theory of performance feedbackthe problem-solving decision maker is assumedto reason solely prospectively and to apply thesame standards of evaluation consistentlyacross the stages of assessment—potentially re-vealing unflattering discrepancies when perfor-mance is observed—we have suggested thatwhen prompted by certain situational and dis-positional features, the decision maker mayswitch to a self-enhancing mode in which he orshe revises prior cognitions and commitmentsaccording to present results and thus shows atype of “retrospective rationality” (Staw, 1980).Rather than being concerned with consistencyin the evaluative standards applied in the as-sessment process, the decision maker in a self-enhancing mode is chiefly concerned withmaintaining consistency in the conclusion thatthe assessment should lead to—that is, the con-clusion that performance is satisfactory. Cyertand March anticipated this type of strategywhen noting, in passing, that decision makersmay sometimes address performance problems“by revising the goals to levels that make anavailable alternative acceptable” (1963: 121), butthis strategy has received almost no attention inthe literature on performance feedback sincetheir prescient observation (for an exception seeAudia & Brion, 2007).

An important implication of recognizing thatdecision makers may sometimes switch from aproblem-solving mode to a self-enhancing modeis that standards of performance evaluation areno longer strictly exogenously defined, as is of-ten assumed in research on performance feed-back. When performance falls below the aspira-tion level and self-enhancement is activated,decision makers may seek to redefine perfor-mance. Far from being a straightforward linearsequence, performance assessment is dynamicand iterative in the model we have proposed.Revising goals to form favorable assessments oflow performance may influence the goals thatare then set prospectively for future perfor-mance, illustrating the potentially far-reachingimplications of self-enhancement in perfor-mance assessment. We view this process of per-formance definition and redefinition as an im-portant area of investigation for future work,and our propositions on features of the individ-ual and of the situation that magnify self-enhancement (Propositions 4 through 10) caneasily be combined with our propositions onhow self-enhancement occurs (Propositions 1through 3) to yield testable predictions. Manip-ulations or measurements of the dispositionaland situational variables that promote self-enhancement in response to low performanceshould have an effect on or a relationship withthe self-enhancing strategies of performance as-sessment that we describe. For example, highlynarcissistic decision makers should be morelikely to respond to low performance by retro-spectively increasing the level of abstraction ofperformance goals than less narcissistic deci-sion makers.

Ironically, the cognitive fluidity demonstratedby the self-enhancing decision maker’s abilityto twist ambiguity to fit adaptive notions of suc-cess may actually lead to behavioral rigidity,since search, change, and risk-taking actionsare less likely when a decision maker does notperceive performance as poor. Other research-ers have pointed to factors that reduce decisionmakers’ responsiveness to low performance,and it is useful to note how our analysis differsfrom theirs. Whereas we focus on psychologicalprocesses as a source of decreased responsive-ness to low performance, Greve (1998), in hisanalysis of product introductions, attributes de-creased sensitivity to low performance to bu-reaucratic constraints that limit decision mak-


ers’ discretion. March and Shapira (1992) focuson psychological processes as we do, but theysee decreased responsiveness as arising notfrom rosy interpretations of low performancebut, rather, from decisions makers’ interpreta-tions of low performance as a vital threat. Theswitch of the focus of attention from the aspira-tion to the survival point is their key mediatingmechanism. Their analysis is intended to applyespecially to cases of extremely low perfor-mance, when the distance between actual per-formance and aspiration levels is greater thanthe distance between actual performance andthe point at which a vital threat is likely to occur(i.e., the survival point). Our predictions, in con-trast, apply to a broader range of negative per-formance outcomes.

Before concluding, we wish to note two limi-tations in the scope of the current analysis thatpoint to future directions for research. First, wehave focused on the self-enhancement motive inthis article because, compared to other motivessuch as self-assessment and self-improvement,it is more likely to distort the performance as-sessment process, but we certainly do not meanto imply that it is the only self-evaluative motiveworthy of additional attention. On the contrary,we hope that this effort will encourage furtheranalyses of how related motives may also im-pact performance assessment. Complex behav-ior can never be reduced to a single explana-tion, and we believe that drawing on otherestablished constructs in social psychology willyield similarly productive opportunities for the-oretical development.

Second, although we have examined the in-fluence of institutional and organizational fea-tures (e.g., accountability to audiences) on howdecision makers assess and respond to perfor-mance, our unit of analysis has been the indi-vidual decision maker, and the implications ofthe self-enhancement literature for organiza-tional processes of learning from performancefeedback are beyond the scope of this article.Although researchers interested in the study ofperformance feedback have often used individ-ual-level theories to successfully explain orga-nizational-level outcomes influenced by power-ful actors, such as top executives of firms (e.g.,Audia et al., 2000; Greve, 1998), additional workis needed to fully integrate insights from theself-enhancement literature into the theory ofperformance feedback. For example, changes in

dominant coalitions (Cyert & March, 1963) aretypically seen as reflections of changes in theinstitutional environment (e.g., Fligstein, 1990)and the failure to achieve satisfactory perfor-mance levels (e.g., Ocasio, 1994). An interestingquestion, thus, is whether and under what con-ditions self-enhancement in the assessment ofperformance might delay the redefinition ofdominant coalitions.

Our goals in this article have been to illus-trate strategies of self-enhancement in perfor-mance assessment and to identify the condi-tions under which such self-enhancement ismost likely to occur so that organizations andtheir decision makers can better recognize sys-temic and individual barriers to accurate perfor-mance assessment and adaptive response tolow performance. We hope that this work illus-trates the value of integrating contemporarypsychological insights into classic organiza-tional theory (cf. Gavetti et al., 2007) and that itwill inspire researchers interested in individualperformance and learning to undertake empiri-cal studies, in the lab and in the field, to bothconstrain and expand on the ideas proposedherein. In addition, by highlighting the subjec-tivity of performance assessment, we hope toinspire organizations to develop interventionsthat guard against problematic self-enhance-ment, thereby enhancing learning.

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Alexander H. Jordan ([email protected]) is a postdoctoral researchfellow and visiting assistant professor at the Tuck School of Business, DartmouthCollege. He received his Ph.D. in psychology from Stanford University. His researchconcerns moral psychology, social and emotional influences on behavior, and sourcesof error in judgments of self and others.

Pino G. Audia ([email protected]) is an associate professor of businessadministration at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College, where he is alsofaculty director of the Center for Leadership. He received his Ph.D. in organizationalbehavior from the University of Maryland, College Park. His current research interestsinclude performance feedback effects on change and the allocation of attention toperformance metrics.


self-enhancement and learning from performance feedback - psychology

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