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Special Report

Prepared by the ST, PT and OTRB ISACs

July 2, 2015

Improvised Explosive Device

(IED) Attacks

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Purpose

In light of recent incidents and thwarted plots involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

and repeated calls and guidance issued online from formalized terrorist organizations for future

attacks employing various weapons that include IEDs, the Surface Transportation (ST), Public

Transportation (PT), and Over the Road Bus (OTRB) ISACs are providing this Special Report

for your general security awareness.

The application of any standards or guidance discussed herein is strictly voluntary. The

practices implemented by rail, transit, and OTRB systems may be either more or less restrictive

than any recommended practices or guidance given in this document. In some cases, federal

and/or state regulations govern portions of public transit systems’ operations. In those cases,

government regulations should take precedence over the information or guidance provided

herein. Organizations should consult their own Agency’s/Organization’s policies and guidance

before taking any actions based on the information presented in these documents.

This document supplements guidance and analysis already provided in daily reports produced by

the ST, PT, & OTRB ISACs. Of note, the last page of this report lists references for additional

information on the subject of IEDs.

To contact an ST and PT ISAC analyst please call 866-784-7221, or email

st-isac@surfacetransportationisac.org.

To contact an OTRB ISAC analyst please call 877-847-5510, or email

mcanalyst@motorcoachisac.org

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IED Attacks Defined

The term IED first came into common usage during the 2003 Iraq War. The U.S. Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) currently defines an improvised explosive device (IED) attack as,

“the use of a “homemade” bomb and/or destructive device to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or

distract.” The devices themselves can take many forms, ranging from a small ‘pipe bomb’ to a

sophisticated and highly destructive device capable of causing serious injury or the loss of life.

IEDs are often concealed weapons employed by criminals, vandals, terrorists, suicide bombers,

and insurgents. IEDs can be delivered to the target in a vehicle or by a person and are often

placed along well-travelled routes, or at or near areas where large numbers of people are present,

including transportation systems.

Characteristics of an IED

An IED can be comprised of a variety of materials, but ultimately consist of several common

components, including: an initiator, a switch, a main charge, a power source, and a device

container. IEDs may be surrounded by, or packed, with additional materials or “enhancements”

such as screws/nails, glass, wire or other metal fragments designed to increase the amount of

casualty producing shrapnel propelled by the explosion. Enhancements may also include other

elements such as hazardous and toxic materials. An IED can be initiated by a variety of methods

depending on the intended target. Many commonly available materials, such as fertilizer,

gunpowder, fireworks, and hydrogen peroxide, can be used as explosive material as well.

However a device is designed, explosives must contain a fuel and an oxidizer, which provides

the oxygen needed to sustain the reaction. A common example is ammonium nitrate/fuel oil

(ANFO); a widely available industrial explosive mixture employing ammonium nitrate as the

oxidizer and fuel oil as the primary explosive fuel. The popularity of ANFO is largely

attributable to its low cost, ready availability, and high stability. In response to successful efforts

to stem the flow of ammonium nitrate fertilizers into war zones, insurgents in Afghanistan began

employing potassium chlorate, instead of ammonium nitrate in IEDs. The shift to potassium

chlorate, used legally in the manufacturing of matches and textiles, is particularly troubling,

because the material is ubiquitous, less expensive, nearly as powerful, and is easier to turn into

an explosive than ammonium nitrate fertilizers.

There are also growing concerns that extremists, insurgents, and terrorists could employ

undetectable liquid explosives, which can be transported in separate stable chemical forms and

then mixed together at the target site to create the explosive material. In 2006, those concerns

prompted the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to restrict the amount of liquids passengers

can carry on commercial aircraft. According to officials, new techniques, which can reportedly

include dipping cloth in liquid explosives, are believed to have been developed by the notorious

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alleged bomb maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, and his Yemen-based group, al Qaeda in the Arabian

Peninsula (AQAP). Al-Asiri’s insidious techniques also prompted concerns regarding suicide

bombers who could deliver an IED to a target inside a natural or surgically created body cavity.

Destructive Force and Impact

The destructive potential of an IED ultimately depends on the size, construction, and placement

of the device, and whether it incorporates high explosives or propellants. Estimates of the

potential damage radius of a particular device are generally based on the equivalent volume or

weight of explosive, as compared to TNT, as well as the type and configuration of the bomb.

Vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIED) are generally more destructive, because they can carry a greater

weight of explosive material than IEDs carried by a person.

An explosion in or near a building or public transportation venue can blow out windows,

collapse walls, and shut down building systems. Depending on the location and destructive force

of the device, exit routes may be disrupted or destroyed. Smoke, fire, dust, and the release of

hazardous materials incorporated within the structure of a building can also cause trauma and

complicate victim navigation away from the target area. Furthermore, an IED attack may cause

disruptions in municipal services such as electricity, water, communications, and transportation,

which may continue for days to weeks after the attack. Secondary hazards that result can

include: fire, toxic smoke, the disruption of electric power, ruptured natural gas lines and water

mains, and fallen debris and obstacles.

Explosions also create a high-pressure shock wave, or “blast overpressure” that sends debris

shrapnel flying and lifts people off the ground. The type of injuries and the number of people

impacted can vary greatly based on the physical environment and the size of the blast, the

amount of shielding between victims and the blast, the presence of fires, structural damage

resulting from the explosion, and whether the explosion occurs in a closed space or an open area.

Blast overpressure effects are amplified in confined spaces. This phenomenon is a major

contributing planning factor in terrorist attacks against buses, train coaches, and underground

transportation facilities. Some health effects may not be initially apparent, but can cause

symptoms and fatalities hours to months after the event. Long-term psychological effects are

also common following an IED attack. While most symptoms diminish over time, assistance and

guidance from mental health professionals may be required.

Common injuries cause by explosions include: blast overpressure damage to the brain, lungs,

ears, eyes, abdomen, soft tissue areas, and other pressure-sensitive internal organs; fragmentation

injuries caused by projectiles thrown by the blast’s shock wave; impact injuries caused when the

blast throws a victim into another object or person; crush injuries caused by collapsed or falling

objects; and thermal injuries caused by burns to the skin, mouth, sinuses, and lungs.

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Blast lung injury, a condition caused by the extreme pressure of an explosion, is the leading

cause of illness and death for the initial attack survivors after an explosion. The aggravation of

pre-existing conditions, such as asthma and congestive heart failure, is also possible.

Multiple Explosions and Secondary Devices

During an attack, secondary explosions and/or bombings at multiple locations can occur. The

explosion of a bomb can cause secondary explosions if gasoline, natural gas, or other flammable

material ignites. The need to respond to more than one site at once can complicate and slow

response efforts.

In addition, a known tactic assailants have employed frequently in the past is to stage an initial

attack to attract or funnel first responders and bystanders into an area before detonating a

secondary device, either at or near the likely gathering point or evacuation route to maximize law

enforcement and first responder casualties.

Representative Examples of IEDs

April 15, 2013 – Boston Marathon Bombing: At 2:49 pm, two homemade pressure cooker

bombs placed just over 200 yards apart detonated near the finish line; killing 3 individuals and

injuring more than 260 others. The IEDs were constructed using black powder from crushed

fireworks as the explosive fuel, and the devices included ball bearings, nails, and other bits of

metal as shrapnel housed in pressure cookers and concealed in backpacks. These IEDs included

improvised fuses made from Christmas lights and remote-control detonators fashioned from

model car parts. Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev were later found guilty of planting the

devices in the area near the race finish line where large crowds were likely to gather and news

media coverage of the event was the most extensive. Tamerlan was killed during the ensuing

manhunt and chase and Dzhokhar was captured and sentenced to death on May 15, 2015.

During questioning, Dzhokhar reportedly revealed they used guidance provided in Inspire

Magazine, an online English-language magazine published by AQAP in Yemen, to build the

devices.

July 7, 2005 - London Bombings: Fifty-two people were killed and hundreds more injured

in a series of coordinated attacks on the London transportation system on the morning of

July 7, 2005. The attacks were carried out by four suicide bombers. Following the attack,

authorities had difficulty identifying the explosive used in the IEDs, but authorities

reportedly found the acetone peroxide, triacetone triperoxide (TATP), in the London apartment

of the biochemist arrested in association with the bombings. “Shoe bomber” Richard Reid,

reportedly used TATP as a detonator in his thwarted December 22, 2001 airline plot on Flight 63

from Paris to Miami. This high explosive can be as, or even more powerful than, military

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analogs and is known as one of the most sensitive explosives, because it is extremely sensitive to

impact, temperature change and friction.

March 11, 2004 - Madrid Train Attacks: Ten explosions rocked four commuter trains during

the morning rush hour in Madrid, Spain. The bombs were reportedly composed of bags stuffed

with the explosive, Goma-2 ECO and metal fragments. The terrorists reportedly used cell

phones with timers to initiate the explosive devices, killing 191 people, and injured more than

1,800.

July 27, 1996 - The Centennial Olympic Park Bombing: A “pipe bomb” concealed in a

backpack exploded in the Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, Georgia, during the Summer

Olympics in 1996. The bomb reportedly contained nails to increase its lethality. Two people

died and many more were injured. Eric Rudolph pleaded guilty to the attack in 2005.

April 19, 1995 - Oklahoma City Bombing: A truck, loaded with ammonium nitrate fertilizer

and nitromethane, detonated in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma

City, Oklahoma. Until 9/11, it was the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil, killing 169 people.

Timothy McVeigh was later convicted and executed for the crime; his accomplice, Terry

Nichols, is currently serving a life sentence in a maximum security federal prison in Colorado.

Prevention, Mitigation, & Response

According to DHS guidance, there are three broad concepts related to the prevention or reduction

of morbidity and mortality associated with an explosive event: prevention, mitigation, and

response.

Prevention

Detection of IEDs presents a challenge for security screeners, first-line employees dealing with

the public, first responders, and military personnel. Though bomb detection technologies

continue to be developed for use in high-risk areas and high profile events, training security

guards, airport staff, and other personnel to be alert for suspicious behaviors and indicators of a

potential IED is often the impactful and cost effective defense. Examples of potential indicators

include unattended bags or boxes left in unusual places, unusual acidic/petroleum smells, people

who are carrying a package or wearing a backpack with oily stains or leaking substances, visibly

exposed wires/batteries/electronic components, or persons exhibiting suspicious or overly

nervous behaviors, sweating profusely and/ or wearing unseasonably bulky or loose attire.

As with all terrorist threats, the importance of alert and trained employees and an aware public

that knows how to identify and report suspicious persons, behaviors, or incidents in a timely

manner cannot be overstated. Nevertheless, other potential IED countermeasures may include:

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Improved information sharing among organizations, suspicious activity reporting by both

the public and by employees;

Robust community outreach and awareness training programs;

Community oriented policing efforts;

Increased visible and non-visible patrolling by law enforcement;

Employment of K-9 bomb detection teams;

Real time CCTV cameras and/or suspicious behavior monitoring software programs;

Officer and first-line employee IED awareness and identification training programs; and

Various physical and technological security enhancements.

Preparation and coordination between first responders, including law enforcement, Fire,

Emergency Medical Services (EMS), and facility personnel, is critical. Employees should be

instructed to remain vigilant and report all odd or suspicious activity to security officers and law

enforcement personnel charged with protecting transportation assets. All businesses should

prepare, regularly exercise, and continually evolve all hazard emergency response and continuity

of operations (COOP) plans. Evacuation routes and safe areas should be established for

employees and patrons during emergencies. Managers should develop and regularly test crisis

communication protocols to alert employees to immediate threats and direct protective actions.

Regular exercises for all employees should be conducted to ensure familiarity with response

plans, ensure that emergency communications equipment is always operable, and that employees

are adequately trained in their use.

Public transportation security operations always involve a multi-faceted strategy of active and

passive measures synchronized and coordinated to provide the maximum threat mitigation within

the constraints of available resources. A solid strategy starts with a thorough assessment of all

threats followed by a risk assessment. Effective security measures do not have to be expensive

to be beneficial. In fact, some of the best security practices have evolved from creative problem-

solving and taking advantage of existing conditions, technologies or resources to augment the

more classical approaches like police patrols and CCTV surveillance systems.

Public involvement through security awareness campaigns, such as DHS’ “If You See

Something, Say Something” campaign, the London Metropolitan Police Service’s “It's probably

nothing, but...your call could save lives,” and the Philadelphia Regional Transit Partners “Look

Up, Speak Up” public awareness campaigns, which encourage the public to be vigilant, are

examples of creative risk mitigation efforts. These programs capitalized on the public’s personal

investment in safety and provide a reporting means to deliver anonymous and timely

observations of suspicious or illegal activity directly to law enforcement authorities. People

most familiar with a given environment are in the best position to determine whether or not

something is out of the ordinary. Managers should reinforce and use the “If You See Something,

Say Something,” campaign among employees and the travelling public to promote security

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awareness and timely reporting. They should instruct people to use common sense, and to trust

their instincts. If a suspicious package is located, they should keep their distance from the

suspicious package and call authorities immediately. When making a report, be ready to provide

their name, location, a description of what they think is suspicious, and the time they saw it. The

responding officer will assess the situation, ensure the area is evacuated and call for appropriate

personnel and equipment to investigate the scene.

A complimentary security approach, such as the Amtrak Police Department’s "Txt-a-Tip,"

recognizes the fact that most of their ridership carries cell phones. Amtrak provides a

smartphone application and/or assigns a simple text message code that riders can use to quickly

and unobtrusively report threatening items, events, or individuals. Viewing the public as

“security stakeholders” and energizing them to stay alert and report suspicious and illegal

activity is a proven low cost “security best-practice” that can benefit every public transportation

entity. This strategy essentially multiplies the “eyes and ears” of law enforcement to create a

network of observers who can help provide the actionable information that officers need to

optimize their policing resources.

Though time may vary considerably, most terrorists engage in a great deal of preparation before

an attack; regardless of the weapons or tactics employed. This discernable terrorist planning

cycle offers opportunities for alert citizens, security personnel, or law enforcement to identify a

potential attack before it occurs. The results from a Study in 2008 by Dr. Brent Smith, Ph.D., a

professor of sociology and criminal justice at the University of Arkansas, found that

“preparations generally began less than six months before the attack and ended with a flurry of

actions a day or so before.” According to Smith, though all terrorists engage in the terrorist

planning cycle to some degree, the pattern and extent varied by group type; “single-issue and

right-wing terrorists engaged in substantially less preparatory crime over a shorter period —

once again, most likely reflecting the use of "leaderless resistance" and lone-wolf strategies. The

planning cycle of international terrorists tended to be longer.”

ST and PT ISAC analysts developed the Attack, Protect, and

Respond and Recover cycle illustrated in Figure 1, as a means

of establishing a framework of understanding to counter the

terrorist’s attack cycle. This framework aligns protective and

response measures to counter the terrorist’s activities. The

concept of the Attack/Protect/Respond and Recover Cycle is to

first ‘Deter’ the adversary from considering your system as a

potential target. If this fails, the objective is to ‘Detect’ the

adversary’s presence as far out in time and space from critical

assets as possible, alert the transit or local police for assistance

and delay the adversary long enough for the law enforcement to

Figure 1: Attack/Protect/Respond & Recover Cycle

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respond and Deny the them success. If an attack or event is successful, organizations should be

prepared to ‘Respond’ and ‘Recover’ to normal operations.

The specific objectives of the Attack/Protect/Respond and Recover cycle are:

To cause an adversary to abandon consideration of your system as a potential target

during their reconnaissance stage by means of effective layers of people, process, and

technology countermeasures.

To prevent the adversary from conducting surveillance and intelligence collection during

their surveillance stage through Physical Security, Operations Security, and Information

Assurance programs and an active involvement of local law enforcement and the public

through awareness campaigns and Public Outreach Programs.

To discover an adversary’s planning of an event and/or the presence of a threat in a

timely manner to preclude any negative effects through active information collection and

sharing initiatives at the local, regional, state, and federal levels.

To deny an adversary success in any attack against a critical asset through an integrated

array of Physical Protective Systems, Defense in Depth measures, and a comprehensive

employee training and awareness program. To reduce the magnitude of an event by

executing efficient and coordinated emergency response and recovery activities through

well planned and exercised Emergency Preparedness and Continuity of Operations Plans

(COOP). Crisis Communications Plans and media relations are critical in this phase of

the cycle to keep the public informed, to maintain public confidence, and to counter the

adversary’s media exploitation of their attack. Security procedures and countermeasures

must be established to ensure public safety, protect first responders from secondary

attacks, and to preserve evidence.

History demonstrates that it is often an “information tip” made or received by a vigilant

employee or passenger that saves lives by identifying a threat before, or as, it emerges. Potential

indicators of pre-operational surveillance or attack planning include:

Presence of trespassers or other suspicious individuals on transportation sector property

Persons lacking appropriate background or qualifications who attempt to gain

employment within a rail or mass transit system

Persons engaging in overtly suspicious actions to provoke and observe responses by

security personnel

Persons showing unusual interest in sensitive information about security measures, access

controls, personnel, entry points, and hours of operation

Persons attempting to discreetly use cameras or video recorders, or sketching or note-

taking, near mass transit sites or property

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Unwarranted observation of, or questions about facility equipment, security drills, or

procedures

Repeated visits by the same subjects to the same, or similar locations

Persons attempting to disguise or change appearance

Attention to, or avoidance of, surveillance cameras or other countermeasures

Presence of people wearing inappropriate attire for the weather

In addition to the indicators above, mass transit and rail security personnel should also remain on

the lookout for potential indicators that any type of attack may be imminent. These include:

Suspicious bags or containers left unattended at or near mass transit facilities, or on

buses, rail cars, in transit hub trash cans, or along their routes

Damaged mass transit property or infrastructure (gates, locks, fences, or CCTV cameras)

Persons whose behavior indicates an inordinate amount of stress, anxiety, or nervousness

such a profuse sweating or irritability, or any other behavior that might cause concern.

Mitigation and Response

Despite the best efforts to prevent an incident, an IED attack could still occur. Both businesses

and individuals should have a plan for major emergency situations, including an IED attack.

Preparation is critical. Every person should take these steps to prepare for a potential attack:

Learn the emergency procedures at your place of work, any other sites you visit regularly,

and any public transportation systems you use. Communication systems may be

inoperable in an emergency, and you should be familiar with what steps to take.

Know how to get out of the area. If you work far from home, plan backups to get home if

the usual modes of transit are not operating.

Know the routes to hospitals in your community.

Take a first aid and/or CPR course.

Make a family emergency plan. Remember that family members may be in separate

locations at the time of an attack. To prepare yourself and your family,

Designate an “out-of-area” contact, and make sure that everyone in your family

has that person’s phone number.

Have an emergency supply kit both at work and at home that includes water and non-

perishable food to last at least three days, battery-powered radio, first aid kit, flashlights,

and batteries.

Though avoiding or thwarting the detonation is the best way to avert IED-related injury,

suffering, and death, should an IED attack occur, the first priority is to evacuate the area and

lead/help other individuals to evacuate immediately; thereby reducing the potential risk posed by

a secondary device and/or secondary explosions and minimizing exposure to dust, smoke, and

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any hazardous/toxic substances that may have been released as a result of the IED blast. It also

allows emergency responders to focus their efforts on finding and assisting non-ambulatory

victims unable to extricate themselves from the scene.

If you are in a train, on the subway, or on a bus:

In general, it is best to remain inside the train car unless you are in immediate danger.

Use the communication system on the train car to receive instructions.

If you must leave the car, be aware of hazards on the tracks or in the tunnel and move

with caution to the nearest station or point where you can contact emergency personnel.

Open windows or doors if possible and if it is safe to do so, because it can reduce the

severity and number of injuries from a secondary explosion.

If you are in a building:

Get under a sturdy table or desk if objects are falling around you.

Exit as quickly as possible, without stopping to retrieve personal possessions or make

phone calls.

Assist other victims to leave the area if possible. Use stairs instead of elevators.

Be aware of weakened floors and stairways, and watch for falling debris as you exit the

building.

Once outside of a building:

Move away from windows, glass doors, or other potentially hazardous areas.

Continue to move away from the IED blast site and look for emergency officials who will

direct you to a safe location.

Be aware that secondary explosions may occur at or near the original IED site, especially

as rescue personnel arrive. Use caution to avoid debris that could be hot, sharp, or

cause puncture wounds

Limit your use of communication devices as systems often become overloaded.

If you become trapped:

Cover your nose and mouth with anything you have on hand to limit inhalation of dust or

other hazardous materials. Dense-weave cotton material can act as a good filter.

Avoid unnecessary movement so you do not kick up dust.

Signal your location to rescuers by using a flashlight or whistle, or by tapping on a pipe

or wall.

Shout only as a last resort, it can cause you to inhale dangerous amounts of dust and drain

your energy.

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If you are nearby, but not at the immediate site of an attack:

Assess the environment around you before taking any action.

Avoid being lured closer to see what is happening because the risks from

secondary attacks or hazardous materials could be extremely high.

Listen for, and follow, instructions from local authorities and building personnel. If no

information is immediately available from local officials, stay away from windows and

doors and move to an inner area of a building until directed differently by authorities.

Caring for the injured

First aid that bystanders or transportation personnel could provide during an IED attack

may save lives. Transportation organizations should consider providing regular first aid

training to front line personnel.

The most likely lifesaving first aid necessary is pre-hospital external hemorrhage control

to control bleeding. To control bleeding, apply direct pressure to the bleeding site. If

pressure is ineffective, according to the latest advice provided to first responders by DHS,

“the use of tourniquets is proven to save lives from treatable exsanguination injuries.”

Transportation organizations should consider including some form of pre-hospital

external hemorrhage control training as part of the first aid training provided to

personnel.

Nearby hospitals may be overwhelmed with victims presenting severe or even life

threatening injuries. The “walking wounded,” or victims who are not severely injured,

but nevertheless require some form of medical attention, should be instructed to go to

hospitals located furthest from the bombing site.

The Hartford Consensus is a collaborative group of public safety organizations that

include fire, law enforcement, pre-hospital care, trauma care, and the military, assembled

in Hartford, Connecticut, in 2013 to develop a consensus regarding strategies to increase

survivability in mass-casualty events. The group concluded that “no one should die from

uncontrolled bleeding” and developed the acronym THREAT to address these type of

situations:

o Threat suppression,

o Hemorrhage control,

o Rapid Extrication to safety,

o Assessment by medical providers, and

o Transport to definitive care

Though evacuation is critical in limiting the effects of secondary attacks or explosions,

the Hartford Consensus concluded that uninjured or minimally injured victims can act as

rescuers. This guidance is particularly applicable if doing so improves overall

survivability by expediting evacuation from the scene of an incident.

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Upcoming Training/Awareness Opportunities

Office for Bombing Prevention Training Courses:

Bomb-making Materials Awareness Program (BMAP) Training

BMAP is an outreach initiative, developed in partnership with the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), to increase public and private sector awareness of homemade explosives

(HME) by promoting private sector point-of-sale awareness and suspicious activity reporting to

prevent misuse of explosive precursor chemicals, explosive powders, and components commonly

used in IEDs. BMAP training is designed for first responders responsible for outreach to build

knowledge of IED threats, HMEs, and bomb-making materials. The course also provides

guidance and materials to help participants conduct outreach to industries and businesses within

their jurisdiction in order to strengthen prevention opportunities by building a network of vigilant

and informed private sector partners who serve as the Nation’s counter-IED “eyes-and-ears”.

The eight-hour course designed for first responders can accommodate 25 participants.

Thursday, July 9: Akron, Ohio Patrick Shaw, Patrick.shaw@hq.dhs.gov

Tuesday, July 28: Mesquite, Texas Harvey Perriott, Harvey.perriott@hq.dhs.gov

Wednesday, July 29: Mesquite, Texas Harvey Perriott, Harvey.perriott@hq.dhs.gov

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Additional Resources

- Afghan Bomb Makers Shifting To New Explosives For IEDs

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/06/25/ammonium-nitrate-potassium-chlorate-

ieds-afghanistan/2442191/

- Al Qaeda Threat: Officials Fear 'Ingenious' Liquid Explosive

http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-threat-officials-fear-ingenious-liquid-

explosive/story?id=19871892

- The Counter Improvised Explosive Devices Centre of Excellence (C-IED COE)

http://www.coec-ied.es/

- Countering Improvised Explosive Devices

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_72809.htm

- Counter-IED Report - MILENG COE

http://milengcoe.org/Links/Documents/20140114_NU_C-

IED%20Report_RC%20Project%20article.pdf

- Counter-IED Strategic Plan

http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/20120116_JIEDDO_C-

IEDStrategicPlan.pdf

- Explosives

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/explosives.htm

- First Responder Guide for Improving Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device and/or

Active Shooter Incidents http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/First%20Responder%20Guidance%20June%

202015%20FINAL%202.pdf

- Hazard Classification Code

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/explosives-class.htm

- Liquid Explosives

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/explosives-liquid.htm

- Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP)

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/tatp.htm

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Examples of Improvised Explosive Devices

(IEDs)

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