seventh army in sicily 1

8/3/2019 Seventh Army in Sicily 1

1/27

...

,

THE SEVENTH ARMY IN SICILYREPRODUCED BYPUBLISHED SEPTEfolBER 1943 BY THE 62ND ENGINEER TOP COMPANYTHE STAff Of THE SEVENTH ARMY


2/27

r - - - - - I - - - - -c ONTEN S-------- , PAR! 0a. !b e PlaJa.

o. I.e8 tean..d.

II2d.b1t )Jo. I - PJannlwa InItruc10 . 1 - Fore. lla.El:hibit n - Far 3430utlJ.M pl.an to r JOSS, DIllE, eDT A... t .I:dd.bl 10 . In - t orpD1aat1011l,CODCCtr&Uon, .". . . .lD't or 12th A.S.C.lID1 til - t1.oDI:I:b1hU 10 . IV - Wi t.ena Ia f t1 'l"rOl'M OperaUoD P la # 2 ~ . lxb1b1t y .1 -I Ie Iqurw .. l 'ore

A. C r! L. PI'oYo.t II&nbal 0-1 I I . 1pa1c. I .D. 0 o. AdJutat o . . r a l G4a ~ t e r .&nt1&1roratt Q. Jw1I. AdYooateo. F1AaDB. ca l . . . .' tare IupectorI. In p...... Public Relat1aD8 1fNdqurter. t Spec1alI. 0rdDID Chlrpla1a

n.r or ottlcen.


3/27

I . CIIG.lJf.IZI.TIOIf1 . C0R91t.1on or !P Nvl- Wh11e J.nIT 18 a nebalou organisation, i t 1te l that as & dat p1aDe. wiDima Anr.r should conalat of t 1Dt&Dtry oorpe orthree din.eio Each co should r iDtorc d b.T corpe artUIer,. brigad '!'be it T to r three din- lona 1e that b.T inc th i t is poslll1 1 . to _inta1Jlth e preeam-e. VerT rare17 do .ittlatic:ma ar i a . where a tiro din- i on oorps can res t

ODe or it e diT1tllou.2. Troop L"MI- A. In. . t1ng up th e troop l i s t to r th e usau l t CotlVOT,

it t alft:1S be r bered that while and equipment to operate harbors,hes, grpes regutraticm, hospitals, or to restore and lI&1ntain . !r t i . Ida areneoees817', th81 ar e ntter17 n lue l . s s untU the righting intentlY, supported b.Tar t i l lery ' and t aDb, ba e MIltured a beaohhead.} . Fro ou r e:xperiellc, un i t . no t engaged in th e 1n1t t ight at the

beao ar e a1 'T" euper-optb18tio sa to how long it take!! to seeur. a beaohhead.lfon-kill "e held to an 1.rhduoabl . win1.. . in -.r17 eohe1ona.1. S taU S!ctiOYI- keh etarr .eetion ehoold be at tn l l etretlgth when th e1n1t1al d 18 re c If td an d plann1ng 1D1tiated. '!'he ft l tme or work 18 uaual17reater clm'1Dr th is pbue t it 18 uri.D@ t e operatiOJ3&1 stage. J.upenUDg th e8ta t t ~ t e l 1 prior to th e cupa1gn 18 t1atacto!'1'. ott'1oers tbraat intothe Id.ddle or th e planning with a saril1' 1lwlequat. backgro1md are placed a ta 41.a4ftDtage whioh ter1all1' 1e 8D8 the i r va lu .4. AdditIonal StaU Segtionl 10 'fLO allows sutfioient perecmne1 to r th e G-4Sect10ll il l a landb o p e ~ t i o n . tnnepor tat ion PCl'tian in G-4 u an additional. epec1a1 . tan . eet lon on the J.nir 18ftl. 18 an essential adjunct to th e ' \lCoessMt1 th e nppq ttmetiona ot a mdem o o ~ , t l .14 ~ or IUlJ)hiblou taakt o r e . It shoald ecata1.b tom to .,., o!" t ioen about t1Nl1t}' e lU ted 118D.'fhia 1 . pro1:BblT th e 1108 1JIportant io n in 0-4., . Q- 2 etiT1.t1Ht- J.l l per8GD8 te d with 1Dte1ligeo e acthi . t iee .boD.1dbe pl a er on. , 11', th e ta8k toroe 0 er , who would exarc18e thieuthoritT throogh h18 .....letaDt Chief at Statt, 0-2. I t 1AI orth1' at DOte that int B'OSII operation there aD;1 UDCorrelated G-2 aotlT1.tl.. wMoh resulted inno l 1 tU .CCIltUaioza.6. :- 1. n n 1 to pror lda to r th e terception ot 0 aa&p8

b e 1 ~ m nbord1Date unite ot th e an4 part icularq be th other trlCld11'Jo r 1IIdta 1D th e operation, eDUar to ' th , Bri t1eh -J " Serrloe, shoa1d be. l tabl .. a t UD1t.7 ~ a s t a t t otN.oer ro r a ir .hould be ueigned to the 0- ) Seotion ot a l l db1aione &Dd bi g er 1Drl.ta. H should be ho m tb e a ir torce, pret'erab1;r ot

t ie ld and thorough1;r trained in a1r-groImd eapport.~ ~ ~ ! t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I - fh e J.nir 1iai8 a , . t . . t be tur thc ' den1oped.eJ 18 1 ahoa1d be Ntah118bed in J.nIT hee.dquarten. Personneltulq selected eqa1pped and train I t 18 iJIpo t that tbe1 betaDetlO11l at th e ince\)tlan ot planning. J.deqaate io n tor lateralt be ked out.9. . t- I t 18 ed that th e G- ) Slct t "- 4 T Ib1.cml1' to r li.Ib1Dg th priorit1' or at units, and the. u- !"'&D8po1' .._ S e c t 1 ~ , a sepuate t8 S t1on, be responsible to r iasu1ng detaUed

ord , prori41ng th nec a:rr a4dit1onal , and ooordinating and rolWOT t.

10. s- Antr n ar sbore control organisation ehould bepert'eeted at the iDoeptlon t4 pl.nniDc. !hill group should be oompletel;r etatte4

with 1Dt'ormed repruGDtatiTQ or a ll etion sary th e operat ph u In IIBtJSJcrlf due to 1n1t1al s tarr sbort&gea and ro r other reuo it .. . no t t . . . lb1.to t neh an organ! t lon uatU sbortl, b e r o ~ D OaT.11. CorpI Ar tU1, a l - OOrp8 art1l.1.er1 br ipd . should ona18t ot nc1mexrt or l5S gcme, CCl' reg! nt ot 8 1neh howits .rs , and cme regiJlent ot 4. 5 h

guD8, aho one o ~ e n a t i o n 'battalIon. Al l cot1'8 artllleJ'1 0Q1d be prorlded nth-4 raotore now used b.T e Col .lA.12 . EprlDeer Upita:- In Nght.1ng in bad com:rt!'1' qaiDat an who ru tato demolitIons to r d ~ l s 1 ' , i t 18 cCClcebab1e that th e rat io ot Eag1D.eer n t.to IDtantr1 reg1JIenta should be tU"t7-t1tt1'. Certa1nl1' f I f t ' rT lJItentl'7 di io nactivel) ' enpged require. th e services or 0B e EngiDeer ~ ll addition to it adiT1.eicmal ~ e r e . Th . Corps Artill.er;r certa1Dl1' requ.ire8 an ~ t an d others _t be ntUIHd to II " that th supplies broQgJ:rt up b.T th eth e Corps an d Divisi ns .

I I . AIIlINISTRATIOH1 . Changes ! rHigher B e ~ S t - There is D8Y IIJOUgh preparat.1CID tDe .Changea iiiPlaDs th e speoifying 0 II1Dute datai ls should ~ o r e be inso ar u poasj,bl. b;y higher headquarters. Valuable t1ae dur1Ds the traiD.1n&period can thus be saved IDd loww UDits be g1nc1 ts bene t i t faJ' ustab:Q', ping, am training.2. Channels CommaDdt- Det1D1te chann 18 or CQIIItarxt shoaJ.d be se t 1JP t . -JIIlId1ately Jtsr th e c cept!Ou ot th e oper&t.'1C1D. The 0 1 at l>'C7nx', troa task toroe ccmaander to the highest authorit;r, should definite and cl1rectsubs1di.&1'1' or adjacent headquarters should be 1Dcl ed in t.b1a channel 3. J . s s i ~ ~ t Al l troops selected to r th e oper t.1 sbould beplaced cl1rec er tc; ; ; ; ; . . .nd ot the task tore. cQlll!'DJl1"der. 'fh1a ~ r x t 8hou1dbe a ll acing. Troops eboul..cl DOt UDder one ee-und to r t r , ancl undc'ano cOllllllaDcl to r attarlnhtratiTe purpos.s.4. ~ s Al l coabat unite should be bll"ouIht up to rio s ~ p1ul S to r II and orticer8 ot junior iX'-.1e, u d a ll pa r f rOND. TbUi.e ot r l t a l UIportanc it he a a l l cOJlbat units wo h .. boat t eaa , pl a , eto. ,ar e to go into action f 'u l l strength. It should be a nco sed ac t that cln tosickness md other reasons, a p p r o x : 1 A a ~ 10 to 1,% ot arsr c wi l l no t be an.Uable to the cOlllll&Dder OIl D-dq. 'l'beretore, m order to han cOllpleteq tra1ned t-..made up of M Il accustomed to ...orkiDi tog.ther, an onr-stNDgth ala" be prorlcled atthe earl1 s t possib1. JIOII8nt.S .Record ot Unite J0in1Di SI1b-Tuk J'orc.SI- 1. chec ays t be e

8 whIch'ii1l1 proiid. fo r an accurate record tb a te e on ...hi h l1D1taparts or l1D1ts jo m Sllb-task tore. . . 'fb1a i speciallJr nee ssary to r op.rati o phase.6. ~ AccCllllOdati t- , tbe r on l.ao1 o r . ,be adequa~ t acCOiKidi all pcaonmt cOlDCC"lled, and the c ~ C & t 1 O l l

S8 t be uple to h.m:U. he...,- t rar t ic that nol'll&l.:q a c ~ a n 1 N aphib1operat ions, both during th e planning &Del the operations p 7. Desi!tjtion or Ports aDd Units to ~ a t e l - In planning to r an .. .phibious opera1Ol1 it 18 essent! i1 tb&t & d iion ot ports, eabarkation poin

an d t inal etag1ng areas be 1nclvMd in th 1n1t1&l. d1recti..... Dnipat1.on uniteto cOlllpr1ae the tore. and prov1.alon to r the r ease or th s un!!i lI to th e task torceconcerned als t also be acCOlllPll.ahC 1I1 th th e tart or planning that prior1tiac-2


4/27

he United Rations' t rans i t ion troa th e -eM of th e beginning" to th e "beginning or the eM " i s spanned by th e history or th e United State3 Seventh Ant3".For though it had a new name - acquired a t se a as i t s embat ed convoys bored01lD upon th e Sic1l1an coast - the Seventh Antq was no t a new organisation. '!'beeo-ander, essen ial ly th e UJI8 ta t f , and JDaJl;1 at th e same troops bad oncebefore shared th e t i t l e "greatest aIlphibiO'l1s fa e in history." WesTask 1'0 e, they had ended th e beginninB 1d th th e as saul t a North Africa in ov..

ber, 1942. As th e Seventh A:rrq they began th e en d with th e attack on icil;y thatopened th e f i r s t breach in th e European fort ress .That cont.inuity of historT had a profound effect on the su cess or th e SicUia n .. sault for the s tar f U 11'811 &8 th e troops had th e benat i t or a:perlence.

LesSOM of the "Torch" operation 11'81'8 well learned; i ts mistakes e rec t i f ied,and th e resul t was an operat.lon as well planned and as 8lIIOOth1 eucuted as th euncertain fortunes of war permit.'lbe Torch operation was ha.:rd4 thre months pas t , i ts a s soM were s t i l l be 1JIg studied, when the decision to pu t tha t experience to a new t e s t was made.'!'he W.stern Task Force bad rea3sumed i t s ol d D&1IIB, the I Armored Corps. It lIaSbaaed t Casab ca , ch Morocco, in Jzuary , 1943, whe t that T ry plac ,though unlalO1lD to lIIIOSt of i t s members, i t s 1'u ur e was being decided.In th e suburb or Anfa, President Franklin D. Roosevelt am Pr1me l l in is terWinston Churcb1ll met to i sCU8S th e futur conduct of th e war. They and theirs ta t fs , loold.ng months ahead to th e successful concl113ion of the North African

caapaign, planned th e knoek-out or I taly' - to s t a r t with th e invuion or Sici lyin July.Less than three weeks afte the end of th e Ant'a Conference, th e complexuchinery o planning ha d been set in motion. on February 12, Planning Instruc

t iOD o. 1 was issued by orce 141, th e pJann1 ng h adcparters se t up in Algiersunder General S ir Harold Alexander.!h e "favorable Jul;y moon" was designated as the ta rge t date. The forceswere to be of suf t ic ie t s rength to guarantee success and 11"61"8 to consist of:

Combined A1ll ForcesCOllllllill1der in Chief' General EisenhonrForce 141 (Combined All.ied Ground Forces) General AlexanderForce S45 (One British Field Utq) General l4ontgomeryForce 343 (American '1'a8k Force) Lt . General PattonAmerican and Br iUs h )laval Fo ce s Admiral CunninghamAmerican and Br iU sh Ai r Forces Air Chief Marshal Ted er

Although th pl.am1ng ins truct io anticipated "\.hat I ArD:>red Corps' pJwmingr woW.d done i n i t i a l ly a t Casablanca, then probably at an, an interim 8to Rabat was already under way when th e 1netructions were issued. An adTance dtac t had l e t t on th e n in th of February an d choseD th e ChalIIber of ComDercebuUding in th e Moroecan capital for th e hea&luarterlS. On the 2Jrd the move wascOlllpleted.By th ie date , chiefs of th e prin ipa l s tar sections had been informed thatthe headquarter was entering a lanni.ng phase, and on the f i f th of lIare l e t -te r from ed Force Headquarters designated the units to be assigned to Foree343, fo r an aaphib10us operation to begin &IS 80 0 &II possible ta r th e eod. of

the Tunisian Campaign.

' lbey 1 r 8 1 " e ~ Headquarters, I Armored Corps; Hea uar te r , VI J.nq rp J on eCombat Co1lD8JX1 of 2nd Ar1Iored Division; 3rd Infantry naiaD; 36th In ! tr yT sion; 45th Infantry Division from the United States and tbB l a t or 9th Infantr y Division.

(G llarch 11 , t e section opened the special pl8'ln1JJg room in tiM b a a ~ t ot th e headquarters builiHng in Rabat and began &IIseabl1 ng research uw1& l onSici ly . Tbi s c ti n was th e f i r s t to deta.U personnel on a f u l l time baais toth e HUSKY plan, realizing that it would have to la y intelligence groundwork or eother sections c ul d begin planning. One off icer , a draft.sman and a s t e n o g r ~ h e r became th e nucleus of a planning s tar f wbic , within a few 1IlOnths, was to total.hundreds of ~ r k e r s .

This group began 'WOrk on an "Outline of Intelligence Intoraation on Siclly",known to th e s tar f &II the "Black Book". Couposed principally of extracts fromsecret reports, th e Black Book SUDJIl,Qrized a l l information available a t that time.It covered ieneral topography, conmunicati n and transportation facUi t ies , beaches , defenses, IIilitary reso ce s and bat t le order, aI d financiaJ., polit ical ansocial factors.

To point up essential teatures of th e is land, an early G-2 project was th epreparation of special overlays fo r general display. Drawn in color on transluc nt acetate sheets, the o v e r l a ~ showed na tn , roads, ratlroads and disposition of eneuw troops. They were made to f i t over the standard 1:100,000 map or'the island, bu t a more 1Japressive 113e of them was on a specially- t backl ighted frame that made it possible to view a t nee any esired c mbination offeatures. Used by G-2 i t se l f fo r makiJ:lg est imates of enemy capabilities, theoverlays were also kept n pe ant display fo r th e us . of aIV IIlSDber of th eplamrl.ng s tar f .

Hardl.y less :1JIIportant, in th e early phase, was G-2's responsibili ty fo r scuring or th e headquarters an d i ts growing fUes of m1l1tary secreta. The pr in-ciple established was t t th e personnel informed of the plan shou1d be kept to aIIdn1mum md that those informed should be giVIn only such information &8 theirpl r t icular duties r uired. A class if icat ion system, CO'I'ering both officers andenlisted men, was se t up , and the Provost Ilarsha1 section provided special gu&l'lUfo r th e plamdng room to which o class if ied personnel were adm1t ted . The l i s t11&8 lengthened whenever necessary, bu t even a t ebarkat ion time, there were s t i l lsome m8llIbers of the headquarters who di d no t know where they were going.

The reversion of Weetern Task Force to a type corps had involved th e 10s8 ota substantial portion of i t s experienced personnel. The new ass1gn:Mnt 1Japosedon 0- 1 the task of bringing a ll sections up to th e strength required by rapidlygrowing duties. on ch 18, 0- 1 directed th e s tar f sections to subd t personnelrequirements, together with names of those spec1.all desired. On the 27th, th ef i r s t large request was subDitted: 14 officers by name from th e Firth ArJv, 13from Atlantic Base Section, 11 rr other unita; and 17 by qual.1t'ication fr


5/27

INITIAL PLABKeamrhUe in i t ia l plans fo r th e assault 1I81"e being dft'eloped. A p-eJiminaryd1scusa1 was held a t Force 1I.a1 headquarters on Karch 18 where Forces 141, 3lU,and .54511'8l'8 npresented. On week la ter the outline plan was issued. (See Plate1) I t called fo r a British aasault on Soutbeastern SicUy, ~ t 1 r e e n ~ u g u s t a andGw, on ~ D q , aDd two distinct American assaults: The DiS! Force Ord DiTisionReini'orced) was to attack the Se1acca-kzara area of Southwestern Sicily on D plustwo; md D plus ! ' i n , th e FISH Force (36th Division) was to land in th e Caat.el&rq; th e HOOK Force (45th DiviBion) in th Capaci area, and th e GROO Force(1 RCT o f 36th DiTis10n and 1 RCT of the 45th DiTision) in th e Trappeto area, a llin Horthnstem SicUy. 82M l lrborne DiTision, less parachute elements &asistingENSA, was to be prepared to assist the stern assault on cal l after D plus two.'l'bis en1:.ire plan was predicated upon th e North Mricm1 Campaign ending b1April 30. The sustained drive of th e British Eighth Arrrr:r across Libya, th e operations of th e American II Corps an d Br1t1sh Firs t Anty in Tunisia, were closelyfollowed b1 th e Force 343 p1a.mling ~ - no t only because th e outcome of thatcapaign would haTe a decisive effect on the i r own, but also because there wereUDY spec1!ic lessons to be learned.One o f th e IIIOst bIportant of these 'WaS the necessity fo r being able to pass1dne!1e1dB, planted profusely by retreating German units. The &lgiDeer Sec"t1on,early in th e planning period, undertook an Brlensive program of a1ne training aDdexper1JIIeDtiDg. During arch the 17th Armored EDg:!.neers were apen .mt ing in these of bangalore tol't'edoes to clear .a1nef'ielde and a t th e en d of th e .mth an

&Jgineer deta i l - .a also sent to the Eighth Artsv mn e lSchool a t Tripoli to studyBr1t i h _thods. A special COIlYO)" was sent to 'l\m1a1a to collect a.rman minesfo r ecq>er1ment and training. So 1JIportant was this type o f trainiDg coDB.ideredthat it 1I U proposed to n,- sufficient JII1nes to th e United States to enable th e45th Dirlsion to load th on i ts transports to r study during th e tr8Dl!l-At.llllticcrossing. 'l'bis plan was found 1JIIpractical.. Throughout th e planning period closel1.a1SOD 1r M DAintalned 'With th e Fif th Anqy II1De school and 'With II1ne iDstructianat th e Fifth A:nr Imaslon Tra1n1Dg Center. and during June officers of th e &:g1neer Section Tisite d a ll Arm;y &gineer Units to supen:iee mine, as 11 as caamOage, training.0THm SPECIAL mooP5

Other speciaJ. A%'my troops alao egaged in tr 1DiDg progrlll8 throughout th eSpr1J:Ig. Pending arr ival tree the United States of th e motorised che:1cal bat ta l icoa assigned to th e opSl"ation. tests or white phosphorus shells, colored ke~ e and name tbronrs wer. collducted bT units a1.ready in North Africa. Onord..s of the ~ d i n g General effor ts were . -de to obtain .. large a supply aspossible of lIP g o b greMdes. FollcndDg th e arriTal o f th e thr-ee chemical bat~ . . a I l B , dalOnstrations of th e 4. 2 inch chem1cal 1IOrt&r, t i r ing bleh uplos iveand te phosphorus, were held fo r th e Cb1e1' ot Stat f . To reduce th e weightcarr1 b7 as t 'troops, th e Chemical Section alao srranged to r a l l troops inth e assa t to be equipped 'With train1Dg gas maaka, in place ot th e bulky erncem&8b.

Basic f i r s t ai d tr a was checked in a l l units b1 th e lledica1 Section,lIbieh also made cClqllete studies or intelllgence _ter1al on Slc1.ly to prepareto r special medical problems l ike ly to be enoountered du ring the operation. Al lhospitals, as -.el l hotels and schools that II1ght serYe as emergency hospitals,1IWe l is ted, and iDformation on diseases peculiar to the island was studied.Jnv cal uni ts were requisitioned and assembled. fo r tra:1D1ng, plans fo rftaCUat of casualtle" dra1lI1 up .

The training of Signa troops presented a pr o _ dur1IIg the plmn1Dg phasebecause one Signal battalion and two d i n a i S1gDa1 ~ . bad hi d combat experience. The units 1Ih1c to o no pert in th e '1'uD1s1an CapaigD hadbeen operating th e COI!IIIDmicaUon ag8DCies a t various hea.dquarters aDd bad l l .t t leor no opportunity to carT7 on aD adequate S 1 traiDiDg prograa. Most of th ean i J ab1e SigD&l. traiDiDg schools ha d 1 e n g ~ courses ( to three -emtba),md it was f 1 t that there 1r U no t enoagh t:lJlle to send troops to these IICbools.

The tra1Ding of a ll radio operators in L1nk sign procedure, as ordered bTAFHQ, was begun 'With two one-day IJChools a t IIostaganem. Represctatives o f ma tot the Signal un itIS atteDded.

Training in the use a l d tAmance of th e British Speech plus S1JIp18lt aDdSpeech plus Duplex equ1 t 1Ia8 given a t the req-aeat of the SigDal Offic.. , IArmored Corps, to r JDelIIbc's of th e la t red S Battalion to lib th e eqo1pment was to be JDade avaUable.Tra1n1J:lg in th e lDstallation, operatiOD and u1DtArlaDce of S1eDal Corps 0&1"r ier equ1pment WlUI given at a BenD d q school cODducted bT the l ledi terraneuBase Section fo r a l.bI1.ted DlDIber of ~ In th e selection 0 Quartenlaster troops fu r th e operatlon, train1De of units

had to be takeD tor granted. 1boe. al.readT in th e theatAr . . . . . eDCaeed 1D th e s u etype of work apected of tbEID in e operation, bu t under d1!!..en t conditiCllllJ.Those enroute to th e theater arrived too late to enter into err COJII'ftbensifttra.1ning program.

ASSAULT UHITSThe 1IIOVe:me:nt, tr.a1n1ng, am stag1ng or _ j a r assault units ecbeduled tar tbeHUSKY Operation during the p1anD1:og pMae was centered about th e Fitth A.n1T IDvuio n Training Genter a t Port .lux Paules, J.lger1.a (Arsew Area). Th1a area was . -deavailable fo r the .pblbious tra1.niDg of the 1s t Infantry Division, 9t h Int'ant17Division, 3rd IDtad.l'1' Dirls1on, 2nd AruJred DiTislon, 1st ~ e e r hlblousBrigade, and la ter , the 45th Division. The 82Dd l l rbome DiTision did not .av.into th e Ann area, bu t .aved direct ly troll Casab to it s tra.1.D1Dg area nearOuJda au l f1Dl117 to the staging area near lar iouan, Tunisia.The 45th Division was CDat-1oad in the United States and reached. Oran 011June 22Dd. '1'h1s division coDducted it s rebear al in Anew gulf on June 24-25.and afte r five dqs I conditi tra1.DiDg a t the Fif th Imuion Tra1D1ngCenter reloaded to r th e ope-a on. Movement o f as t units attached to th evarious sub-task forces was ace U sh during the period May 1 to JUDe 22, 1943.'1'h1s . ,vement im'olved the u.se 0 ad , r aU, .ter, aDd airborne transportationfaci l i t ies trQIIl erne end of Ur1ca to th e other.The special tra1n1ng to r th e operation consisted of IIIIphlbious tu l l acaJ..erebearsals b1 th e separate b- k forces. ~ b l b 1 0 U 8 training bT units CQDSlate d ot load1ng units 111th a ll personnel and equiJaent into shipe and craf t (asplamed to r th e operation), am then approachini a selected beach 8Dd debarldDcunder ~ a t e d cl3lbat ccodit.i during ~ l i g h t am in darkness. Tbese cises were conducted a t leas t once b1 each unit 1Ib1l.e tra1niDg a t FAI'l'C, aad .arethaD coce b1 D>st units.

0-4


6/27

a r i ~ types of tra1n1ng fo r small un ! ts in special operations were conducte d in conjunction n th uphibious training. Other special training included th euae of liTe ammunition, simulating bat t le conditions to such an e:cten't as to givethe individual soldier th e max1 Jm lJll of preparat ion fo r bat t le , Beach defenseswere constructed to giTe the troops opportunity to by-pass such obstacles.

Units which di d no t engage in unit ~ h 1 b i o u s tra1ning a t th e FAITC sentselected cadres to schools in water-proofing of vehicles fo r driving in water,t ransport loading, and unloading of ships and craft . These cadres lRlre then re -turned to their uni ts to ins truct th e remallrlng personnel.Special courses in driving and maintenance Dukws (21 to n Amphibious t rucks)were conducted by the 1s t Fc1g1neer Special Brigade a t Port Aux Poules in order tot ram drivers fo r th e large numbers of Duk1rs received jus t pr ior to the op8l'ation.It was iJIIpossll>le to conduct rehearsals n th a ll uni ts participating, bu trehearsals follawed. th e same scheme of maneuver as planned fo r th e actual operat ion and were on a scale as near fu l l Rtrength as possible. I t gave a l l sub-taskforces th e benef i t of a dry-run.Following th e rehearsals, sub-task forces were assembled in staging areas

tor f ina l loading or units to ship in the assault IIIOV'ement. Loca.tion of stagingareas was determined by location of sub-task forces a t th e end of rehearsals,available bivouac areas, dock space fo r loading ships, protection of ships andcraf t f r en8ll\V' se a and a i r , th e necessity fo r maintaining the maximum secrecy,and th e type of ships or craft in which units were to be l i f ted.In late April, Headquarter13 I Armored Corps IIIOved from Rabat, lIorocco, tothe same s tretch of Algerian coast where ma.JV of it s major uni ts were trainingand rehearsing for the HUSKY operation. The forward echelon was otficial1.y es tablished in the College COlIII1Unal in lIostaganem on th e 26th. Three days later ,the classified HUSKY planning group, which s t i l l comprised only a small portionof th e s taff , arrived in Yostaganem by a special, fas t , heavily-guarded convoy.It s mil s and o v e r l ~ s , and it s f i les of plannine instructions and intelligencematerial, were deposited in th e secret jo int map room 'Which had been repared in

advance.Soon, however, th e volume of p work had grown to such an extent that

i t overfiowed the confines of the jo int map room. More and lIIOre personnel of thes tarf sections were class if ied, more and more offices in th e school building n reroped off , placed under special guard and given over exclusively to plaming work.While th e HUSKY plan was being worked. ou t in lIostaganem, th e headquartersrear echelon was 0PEll"& ti,ng a t Oran. Routine administrative and personnel matterswere handled there, as well as detai ls of the HUSKY supply plan that required coordination n th 50S NATOUSA.Coumunication and l ia ison between s tarfs working on th e HUSKY plan were inlves major operations. The J4J s taff was spl i t into two lf1de1 separatedechelons. Some troops under control of Force 34J were on the eas t coast of th enited States, others were scattered. frol!1 Casablanca to Bizerte, a distance ofaver 1,000 miles. Headquarters a t Oran, liostaganem, Algiers, La. }(arsa, lIal. ta ,even Cairo had to be t ied together into tast-working channels. A co tantstream of intelligence material, directives, requisitions, inquiries and miscellaneous correspondence nowed back am for th across half ' a continent and on toLondon an d ashington.Prepar1Dg, sending and receiving and sa!egu.arding an nse volume of high-1 classified matter taxed to the utmost th e faci l i t ies and personnel of th e

Adjutant General. and Signal Sections. Hundreds of papers were registered daiJ.y.S}:e cia l courier routes were established, direct teletype l ines installed be eenmajor headquarters, radio n e and their accolllpal'l31.ne code rooms p1&.ced in cons tant operation, and telephone circuits opened and kept open.fu t there i s no adequate substitute for direct cont.act and throughout th epl.ann1ng period general and special s taff officers attended canterenees and vis-

i ted back am for th to discuss th e manll'old problems presented by th e plan.On A p r ' ~ 23 , there was a meeting a t Headquarters Foree 343, Rabat, presidedover by th e Conmanding General and attended by senior cOllllWlders and seniors tarf officers of I Armored Corps, and representative of Force W. At thismeeting General Patton gave an introduction and the general plan fo r th e HUSKYOperation.The n day Force 1.4l decided, in response to a request from Force 343, tosubstitute the 1s t Infantry Division tor th e proposed 36th Intmtry DiTision itth e Tunisian Campaign e nded in time to make th e change possible. Just a IIIOntblater , attar th e Tunisian Campaign clo.ed, th e I I Corps 'Was substituted to r thVI Corps.

CliAWE IN PLAN. On May 3, the plan of attack of Force 343 was changed trom the western endof the island to th e beaches between Pozsalo and Licata in the southeast . Theoutline plan of the new JOSS-DDIE-CENT assaul t _s published on th e 18th ot l l q .The general mission was to assaul t th e southeaatern port ion or Sicl ly in conjunc

t ion with the 12th British A:rtq an i capture i t as a base for further operat ions.(See Plate 2) .The specific mssion of th e new assault plan callErl to r landing and operat1.ngwest of th e l ine VIZZINI - RlGUS! - POZALLO, a l l exclusive; to seize and hold theair f ields jus t north of Com1so am a t Ponte Olivo and th e a ir l&nding f ields a tBiscari and northwest of Licata; to seize and operate the small por t a t Licata;

and to prepare fo r further operations under the directions of the Deputy Commanderin-ebier , ll . l1ed Force.The scheme ot l!lBDeuver was to make a simultaneous assault. in the Licata Gela - Sampieri area in order to capture th e air f ields and t 1'..... Lica.ta bydark on D plus 2; to extend th e beachhead to th e generaJ. l ine (YELLOW), P.AIJlA. DrIlONTECHIARO - CAMPOBELLO - I4A.ZZARINO - CllTIDlRONE - mwoaCHE:IE, and to the eastto contact the British in the vicinitY" of RAGUSAJ to include (BLUE) th e highground in th e vicini ty ot PIAZZA. AMERINA. - AIDONE to prevent hostile interferencetrom th e Northwest.The CENT - DIllE Aaeault was to be under th e 1JlImediate cOlllllaIld of Lieutenant

General O. N. BRADLEY, I I Corps. The participating troops were to be th e l s tDirt. ion (-1 RCT), llSth DiTision, 2 Ranger Battalions, 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, Paratroops (82nd Airborne Dins ion) , and supporting troops.This Aaaaul t Group bad three :1DIediate missions: (1) Under cover of darien ssto D Day to land in the Gala - Sampieri ar a and to capture and 88cure th e a i r -f ield a t Ponte Olivo b;y dalight on D plus one; th e airfield north ot Comso b;ydaylight of D plus two, and tb a ir landing field north ot Biscari by dark ot Dplua two. (2 ) To extend th e beachhead to YELLOW and gain oontact With theBritis h in th e vicini ty ot Ragusa to makB contact n th the 3rd Infantry Division onth e l e f t .The JOSS usau l t , c ed by or General L. K. muSCOTT, was to cauprisethe 3rd Infantry Division, Combat C'UIIIlIWO.LIU A of ths Second Armored DiTislon, one

0-6


7/27

Ranger Battalion and lJUpporting t roops, an d 1 IU to land in the L i ta area. I t1IIU to capture an d ae c e th e port and a i rf ie ld by' dark ot 0 Day, extend th e beachhead to YEIU:IW', protect th e l e t t tlank of the operation against interference tramth e northwest, and on i t s right tlank, to II&ka contact with II Corps.

'n1e Force .34J Reserve n a to consis t or three principal elements: The lootfore. , under Vajor General HUGH G!FFEY, made up or el8l18Dts of the Second ArmoredDiT1810n (less Combat CommaD1 A) , ona ReT of th e l s t Intantr;y D1:vieion, and supporting troOP8, ft B to sail with th e uSa l l t and be prepared to 1alId in supportot an;y ot the assaults; th e 82nd Airborne Division 1e8s paratroop e1eMnts was to be prepared to support the assault on ca l l atter H-Hour on D-Day; 1 RCT and Divieion ar t1l lery ot th e 9th Intantr;y Division was to be alerted to moYe trom Disert.on cal l of th e C_ _ rxUng General, Force 343, after D - O ~ .

The WOLF Force coq>Clsed ot one Parachute RCT reintorced, trom 82nd AirborneDivision was to ass i s t ODIE Force in landing and capture ot a i rf ie ld in vicini tyof Ponte Olivo night ot 0 II1nu8 1, D - D ~ (prior to seaborne sault) and be attachedto II Corps upon contact on land.In th e C&8e or some s tatf eections, th e change in plan bad 11t t l e erfect andthe7 continued mrk:lng along the "... l ines as bet'ore. In th e C&8e or others, bow"mo, many weeks or work had to be done OYer frOID th e beg1nn:1ng.Again IIlch ot th e i n i t i a l burden fe U on G-2, whose intelligence _ te r i a l hadto be amended and supplemented to coyer th e new area. A new intelligence plan andnew G-2 estimates e writ ten during subsequent dq ' s . Hew cwer lqs , s1.ldlar tothose coye:r1ng the western half of the island, 'Dre prepared f i re t to r the southeast, and then fo r th e no as t portions or th e island. Frequent cOD!erenceswere held with th e &1gineer Section to rearr&llge priorit ies on I lI lp publication.Arrangements were also ude to transfer to Force 343 the beach . cde ls fo r th eOela Licata sectors. '1'hese re.l1et llOdels, produced by' .Anv Ecs1neers . bondbeaches, to.ns d terrain teatures in cae t data1l; a -x l e l of it e 0lIl1 landingarea 11&8 delivered to each nb- task force 1Dvolved. In addition, a 1:100,000 terraiD B:ldel of t en t i re 1slaIxi was JD&de during the planning phaH, and oarriedwitb th e G-2 coabat intelligence section throughout the operation.As additional intel l lgtmee intonaat1on became &Vanab1e, a stMd1' etreaa ofbattle order, te r ra in and Il1scellaneous 1nt01'll8t1on smated frOID G-2 to th e otherl t a t f sections and th e nb task forces. On Kq 10 the f i r s t of eeries or general int'ormation bulletine was published, the series continuing unt i l th e end ofth e operation.Photographic intell1gence bec:aae th e principal source ot detailed intonaation

during th e plann1.ng period. Starting with one or f icer in reh, th e photointerpretation section apanded s teadily untU bT D-Dq it comprised 3$ OfficersIDd 70 Fnlisted Ken. Prior to D-Day I sorti.. t'lcnID by' th e Horth Urican PhotoReconna1ssance nng, yielded 19$,000 prints and 1,400 us .mled . ewc s .Ini 'omation gleaned by interpreters - .s dis88lll1D8ted in spec1al over-printed

collatiCll1 JIIllPS aDd a ser ies of written interpretation reporte.To teke :ru.u ad'Y8Dtage of thi s important activity aDd itl!l imDediate e t tec t

em operations duriDg a cr i t ical period. the re e re arreDged plans fo r both visualai r observation (Plate 3) aDd photographic reccmnais88Dce f'raD D to n,lS (plate 4) .'lhese were te be used 10 case ot eIIlI!I1"gency in the event ot waat1stactory coamunlcaticms. bearing in mind tha t radio si lence 1I8S to be e1'tective unt i l orderedlUted on th e morning ot D Day.

During th e operation proper. there -. s ceneid ra 18 satisfaotion in knowingtha t these two 1JD.portant activi t ies being prOYided tor . " e n thougb it 1lB8salble to ga in oontaot through direct chaJmels. -UTeDgemeDt wae made 111 thth e tactical reconna1ssance uni t . 1Ihich _ s pertorm1Dg th e visual observation.that laold.Dg suitable ccmmmicat1ons. steps would tUeD through a ir cClllll8Ddchannels to r th e honor1l3g of requestl!l against targets so d1scloaed. and arrangements were also made in ad"ance tClr th 6 report1Jlg ot an y results o f photographicrecCllDDaissance fa r 1JIIDediate action trClll Atrica. WIlere both ot these unita had tobe located 1n1tially. BCIIlbardment missions were executed without f\.u"ther orderstrCll1 th is headquarters as a resul t ot th e cClllb1ned ac t ivi t i es . aIY'I. th e aY Y interpreters m o had joined. th e Interpreters Group tr8Il.8lll1tted over :redio broadcastchannels. such 1ntomation as it was del!llll8d essential e i ther to r th e 1aDding oraga ina t targets tOUDd SUbsequently based on both of these services.

'lbe sectian principally affected by th e change in plan -. s 0-4.. Which bad tore"fmll,p itl!l plan of supply. As OrigjMUy outl.1ned. the Yoree 343 operatian wouldha"e lDcluded ear ly capture ot th e port of Palermo. and 11.. portl!l in th e _stof th e island. Bu t th e new area di d no t boast a s1Dgle 1m;portBnt port an d planstherefore had to prortde tClr S\lllPly ~ th e beaches fo r a period ot thirty days.if neoesS81'7. bei'ore a po r t could be ~ t u r e d .

force -. s to be 1n1t ial ly equipped. and su,pplied UDtil D plus 14. trCIIlNorth .African SOM'Ces. On D plus 14. th e t1rs t conTOY' loaded in th e llDi te d s tateaw.s to put in a t Sici11aD. por ts .

'lhe basie supply plan -. s to provide th e soldier with th e essentials to r cemba t an d no t overload h1m or th e beaches with UDD.eC sS1U7 supplies.'!be general plan fo r 8X8CutiC'l1 of th e supply mission . . ha t su task forcecazmanders _ re to be r8sponsl bl e fo r the i r own su,pply f'r ships and other landin g craft OYer th e beaches or through aDY sub-ports. to 1JJclude th e operation o fa ll bee.chh880s tmUl that duty - .s takeD over by Force 343.When iIle supply activit ies wr e to be taken OT ltr by Force 343. the CCIIIIIlmder.

1s t Engineer sPecial Brigade. would 88S\11118 ccmae.nd ot th e beach groups and of a llnon-divisicmal an d non-eorps UD1ts attached thereto and such necessary serriceun i t8 as ~ be attached by th e CaJJDBndblg General. an d also be responsible to rthe executian of a l l supply plans wi thin 'the theater of operations I11118D8t1ng franForce 343. including the operation of any seized ports.Force 343 . . o be respcm.sible fo r th e coord1Dation with Headquarters sosHATOUSA in iIle aaS&llbllng ot supplies a t ft1'ious parts of eIll arkatian and the i rtransportatiOll. to th e theater of operatiClD8. an d that supplle8 would be 0 tained

trCIIl 50S N A T O ~ and torw.rded em an au1lclDaUc basis err on special uest by 'l'eskForce an d SUb-Task Force CCIIIIIlUIders.ibe administrative ch8DD8l fo r S\QlPly w.s to be trClll th e SU 'Iask oree CJDaDdere and ArrI13 troops direct to Force 343. '1be I I Corps 'as to have no edminh_

t ra t ive fUnctions other than those pertaining to i ts Corps trooPS. e t ing e DOy .In i t i a l maintenance . . o be over th e beaches tm t l l such t1me as a jo rport coul4 be captured. Plans w re accordingly made to r continued beach maintenance to r a period ot a t l e u t thi r ty days . In ~ event that each maintenanceshould prove 1Dadequate. arrangeamts made to r a t i a l us e of th e Port orSyracuse afte r 0 plus 14.. J. force ot 2..500 service troops loaded on ODe troop-

a-8


8/27

By th e end of D f 1 th e Seventh ....rnt , { h ~ extended i t beac'lhea1g inland on bothit s r igh t and l e f t f lanks, and ha J withstood JetanaineJ c.:>unterattacks a t it s ceJ,lt.er.The eneMy a ir at tacks tha t had begun on D day were maintained, with repeated raiciaon be3ches and t ransport areas, by both high altitude an d dive bombers. Early inth e morning, th e cOlMl8.nd ship U.S.S. ilonrovia suffered a near miss at 50 tee t . Thea ir attacks continued throughout th e day unt i l 2400B.Our losses to r th e da y stood at 117 ki l led , IB94 missing an d 466 wounded. A tota l

of 4390 prisoners were taken. B,y 1400B about 400 prisoners had been gathered on th eGela beach awaiting evacuation by S8 8 to Africa.Among documents found in an enemy headquarters captured in Gela 1'Ias an I ta l ianmap giving th e locat ion of minefielda along th south coast and th e coastal roads.Atter t ranslat ion, copies were sent to the Divisions.

o pI s 2, 12 JulyThe second l i f t ot th e 82nd Airborne DivUion was due to land in Sicily fromNorth Africa the night ot th e 11th-12th. But fo r th e second tae an unfortunateincident of wa r interfered with th e execution of th e aii'bome mission. The t ransportplanes arrived over th e beachhead area simultaneously with a f leet of enemy boaben.In th e two hours tha t followed many paratroopers miased the i r mark.n th e ground, th e e n again launched counterattacks against the II Corps,throwing both infantry an d tanks into bat t le south o f NiscemL Th at tsck 1'&8 re pulsed b1 th e First Division supported on i ts right by elements of th e 2nd A. D. and

by 1400B th e enemy had been forced to abandon hi s l as t attempt to prevent ou r establishment ot a secure beachhead. During th e lIlOming th e Ponte Oliva airfield. ha dbeen captured.D I- 2, 12 July

On th e extreme r igh t of the Seventh Army sector, elements of th e 45th Division n Ragusa, contacted elements of th e Bri t ish Eighth ATm1 under General Montgomery.Howev r , th e Seventh I.r' tq beachhead wae s t i l l divi ed into two dist inct 38C-tors. 3d Divieion advanced rapidly' against scat tered n e infantry and tankunits , pushing i t s l ine to Canicat t i and improving posi t ions a t Pa d i Montechiaro and Riesi ; bu t on i t s r igh t , patrols contact en8ll\7' e1ements south ofRiesi between th e 3d and l s t Divisions. Exoept to r th is gap, th e Seventh Arm:1foothold on Sicl lT extended from eight miles deep at Gela to 15 miles on each

flank by' th e en d or D .; 2.The Engineers had rel!lOVed obstructione from th e runways of the landing f ie ldwest of Gela, and, act ing q u i c ~ to cu t mine fuses, had saved th e runways of PonteOlivo 011 destruct ion. Straggler control an d t raf f ic direct ion were organized inGela aM th e seeuritT of e n e ~ ammunition dumps and abandoned enemy headquarters

1ftI.8 assured. The advance Army collllllaDd post' moved ashore from th e Monrovia in midafternoon, established one echelon in a school building in Gala and another in agrove north or th e town. In short , th e cr i t i 1 phase of th e &8l5&ult bad beenpassed, and th e Seventh Army was a s h o ~ e to s tay.

EnelllY a ir act ion had been reduced considerably duri th e day, but some bOl!lb-in g and straf ing continued. One IST was bombed, burned and sunk.Against th e loss of 29 ki l led , 106 missing, 13 reported captured, and 183Wounded, we had taken 4,206 prisoners during e day. The unsuccessful enem;ycounter at tacks againJIt th e 1 s t Division during th e 11 aDd 12th hs.d cost him 4Mark VI, 29 Mark m and IV, and 10 I ta l ian tanks.

D I J, lJ JulyField Order no . 1 had ordered es.ch sub-t'lsk force to erlend it s beachhead toth e l ine "Yellow" illUl'lediately af"ter s e c l l r i n ~ \.i.t:I ini t i a l belichh s. When th eenemy hE.d been driven back to this line, hi:: 1anI< range ar t i l le ry would be unableto rea h th e airfields pt Ponte Olivo, Comiso, an B i s c ~ i , and these f ields, to/lethe r with th e port and arrf i e ld a t Licata , 1'10uld be usable by th Seventh Arrrry.On th e 3th, a Sa-enth Arrrry i rect ive made OMe revislone in the order. The

3d Division, which had alread reached "Yellow" was directed to continue reconnaissance to Agrigento, and hold Canieat t i Bnd th road junction two miles east ofRies!. 2d Armored Divisiol'\ ( lese Combat Command A) , together with th e at and 4t hRanger Battal ions, were detached from II Corps and assigned to Arrrry reserve. IICorpe was then to continue on it s o r i ~ i r ~ l ssion of securing th e " Y e l l ~ l ine.82d Airborne D:lvis:l.on, in Army reserve, was to contin e r e o r ~ a n i z a t i o n . The 18thReT was released to th e s t ivision.The major enemy effor t at th is time seemed to be east and west of a ge era!l ine Caltagirone - Gela. Elements of th e Hermann Goering Division, estilllllted asan armored "giment , were in action in th is area. Al l Seventh ArrtJy forcee advancedand further deepened th e beachhead.II Corps advanced to lrlgh ground 5 le s north or ChiaralllOnte Gulfi, 5 milesnorthwest of Com1so airport and 4 miles north or Biseari on it s right (45th Division) !"lank; and to th e high grOWld J miles north of Niscemi and Ponte Olivo inth e 1s t Division sector. 3d Division continued it s aggressive reconnaissance to -

ward Agrigento and the north. 2d Armored Division, with the la t an d 4t h RangerBattal ions, advanced to Mt. Nicola, 8 miles northwest of Gela, and continued to -rd Butera .

Now f irmly established on th e island, Seventh Arrq . . . . preparing to pu t captured airfielde an d cOlllllWrl.cations in ear ly operation. The airfield at PonteOlivo, a glider s t r ip northwest of Gela, and a landing st r ip 2 miles eaet of thetown, were reedy to receive planes. newly constructed 1anding s t r ip was al so ready a t Licata , and 3 P-3S's came in to th e field on the 13th.On 13 July, 2033 prisoners were taken, and by' th is time th e lIIOUDting totalof captured and deserting enemy troops, principal ly I ta l ian , had presented adif f icu l t problem. Divisions were burdened with hundreds of prisoners, and Corpsand lacked sufficient t ransportat ion to provide substant ial re l ief . Addit ional prisoner of war guards were requested to take OYer th e processing or captured enelll1 personnel.The civil ian medical problem ha d also becolll8 acute , due to an apparent lackof adequs.te l oca l fac i l i t i es . Prevented from shouldering th e tu n civ i l i an medica l burden by th e l imitat ion of i ts own supplies, th e Arrsry had to l imi t civilianhos i ta1izat ion to rendering f i r s t ai d to cases in dalli;",r death.American oasualtiee for the daT totalled 58 ki l l ed , 36 missing, 4 reportedcapt ed , and 157 wounded.Tactical a ir reconnaiBaance kept clost! watch on anemy lIIOVements, and f re-quently it s reports le d d i r e c t ~ to bomhlrdment missions. Bombers also served asa sour e of valuable information, reporting t h e ~ - observations through th e XI I Ai rSupport CommBnd on re turning from missions.Late in th e evening of the 13th, a ba t Ie group of the Hermann GoeringDivision was reporte near H-4540, about 5 miles e! lS of Niscemi. An Americanofficer who ha d been captured by th e Germans and then escs.ped confirmed previoUB

b-6


9/27

estima es that t r . ~ r ~ th o islenj , th "~ he ~ t Panz8r Divis ons. c I nt ero r+ed to be in 5 i ly .D .;. 4, lh Ju l

~ th e lLt:. it as r p a r ~ . n t tha t th e fn ls t ra t ion of er.emy cot.:.nteraUacks onth e ~ sector on I.e l l t" an i l 2 t " ~ " had 1 d a ecision to i t t : isW, fi nt.i eo dela;;in act ions an.1 lI'.OLkiIlg la c counterat tacks. Ai r rt-Connai ssance revealeda general enemy movement to cl.Td the ' :atania pla in, and ther ....er e also s1 119 ofener.JY w it aw northrard a l rn: hir.h.,:ay 12l: beyond Cal 11' I e .

Orders from r ~ g h e r h e a d q u a r t ~ r s ( t h ~ ~ t Arnry Group) now swune th e e for tof th e '"eventh A 1Y tow? d thp. nCoL"U west. A n ~ bound . betw en th e Sever.th ar n~ i g h t h ' A r m i e s extended f r o ~ Vizzini c n the roa to Caltagirone, Piazza merinaand th e ro a junct.ion te n miles 30U t-t we '"; t. r &mao

II Corps continued 1ts rapid push northward on i t s extreme r i eht an re chedth e line Yellow near Vizzini. In thtl cente the ll:'ft of th e L5tb Divisi.on sec ...to r , st i f fer opposition wa met, bu t units a d v 3 n ~ e d to th e high ground i t i l e ssoutheast of C tagi n!, and also ca p scar i laD ln g f i Id .

On tt:e II orps l e f t , th e 1s t Division ok Nisce and ~ z z a r i n o and heldp 5itio05 c n oiling th e ad j t ion three miles s theas 0 al. tagi nee Asmall pocket of res i s ce bene th e 1st and h5ht J"vision was s t i l l beingm ped up , but contact been est.a li s h re - as weil as between th e 1s tan Jrd J iv is io on th e l e f t a II 0 S an etlreen th e 45th Division and th eBr"tish on i t s righ - th u as iog a continu0us Allied beachhead across southeastern Sicily wi th th flanks anchored on th e sea. 3 J i v i ~ J i o n maintained i tsp sitions, with act ive rec ro ais:'ian no r an west; Co ba t Cor.n.an B of th e2nd Armor d Division and th e ls t a 4th Ranger Battal io s operated on th e IICorps front, th e former help1.nE: 0 clean 0 t t e eneo,:r pockets ne j iscemi, an dlat ter capturing Butera, with th ai f effect v_ Nava t)l1ro:-1ment.

The capture of scar i a i rf i e ld reported repairable Wi thin fiv to eighthours, had marked completion of th e in i t ia l . missions as iened Seventh Army.The 4t h Tabor of noums, from th e nGoums ocains" of thf! Freud', . l e rk . r i -can ~ ed a t Licata OT. th e 1 4 t h . d ." re at tached to the- .... Division.Corresponding" strength to an iniantry bat .tal ion, th e 4t e . a 0 fought withth e Jrd Division d in g it s a v ~ on Sciacca, an i l a te r ....as a t ' ~ h c 1 to IICorps for operat ions in th e r l l ' . countlj ' of nortt.f-ast rn Sic i ly . It gaVEr agood acco t of it e lf hrouE;h ut tt-e caopaign.

2 estimat t t by J f 4, 13,000 prisoners of war had been cart. red, t h enemy had suffered 1,400 casu t i es , dead an wounded, had 10 t 85 aircrc.ft ca t red, 67 guns arger than 75mm captured an d destroyed, sixteen ar k II I auctIV t sk and 7 !.lark VI ks were taken as ~ l as mne other tanks whos c lass i -f icat i n was no t rerorted.

Al l prisoners ex e t l t a l j cedical of.icerw and chaplains, and Ital iansoldl rs of S id ia n b l r t er e being evacua.ted to 1 th Africa r api y asRed Cross h o s p " ~ a l l a te r open o P r i ~ ~ n e r or Waras p"ss i Ie , cared fo r b Ital ian ?ersonne1.of t e I t a l i an prisoners e x p r e ~ w. they" accused 0 sa r i f ic ing I t a . l i a n ~ toone occa io n t. E: Gen::ans had ." ithrlroads as t he r lIIent, trapping the I" ie d th e rear .

h

Fi:"st of the cbnees to e affected..... he creat ion of a Provisio orps,cot:iprised. f th e 3r d "DiVision, reinforced by th e 3r d ltaru;er Bat ta l aD, Fifth f I . I ' l I l l O J ~ E d Field Art i l le ry Group and other sup"orting troops, and th e 82nd irborne "vis"on.This l a t t e r division had completed reorganization and was reinforce by th e 39tlRC7 of th 9Lh ' i v i s ion, 34th Field Artil le Battalion of the 9 h ivision, th e83rd Chemical ~ e a ~ J n s t ta l ion and ther troops.

Accor i ~ l y dur th e next two days II Corps pivoted on the Provisional Corpsto s in g th e entire Seventh Army 1"I"0nt to th e north And northwest in pr"pa.ra 10n fo rhe r ve t th e north 0 8 ~ t . The 45th Division, n t e r i rh t f lank, slsted tr.e a t Caned Division ofth r i t i sh XXX Corps in the oapture of 1Tj zzini, occupi. th e rel'"8inde of t hillound south of the Vizzini - a l t a . one o a , and hus co plated hA in ! ia ie -ston or IT Corps in th s sector. The Is Division COD in u it s adva , vinnorth of IAazzarino toward arafran a nd t}.e Jr d i n s i on , no,," . of rovisionalCorps, sent strong patrols into Favara snc. .'afnllllUto and reconnaissance patrols r urto five miles n rt h of Canicatti dRies t . 82nd Ai bo e D i v i s i ~ n continu r e a ~ -

sembling in prepara ion fo r ts visional orps ro e, an tend or D visiowhich rE'gained Combat Comman A m e 3r d Dl v sion, asse blE'd he Campobelloarea under Army e ~ n t r o l . The ini t ial objeet iv of th e co bined Seventh AMerican and ~ i g h t h B i t i sharJlli s (Firteenth Army Or ) as stated th e i rec t i was th 1 e Cat.anlPalma Di Montechiaro.An tti ct.iv i8suec on th e 15th erlended th e l e f t ar y 0 I Corpeto Palermo and th e r ight boundary to e north coapt.II Corps mission 1f88 to caoture Caltanilllletta an lIec e th e highn.y north1"I"om Caltanissetta, anc. to be nrepared fo r further act ion by dark Uly 19 .Provisional Corps' Jr d Division ' lmS to secure th e h i . lmay frot'l Canicatti Sa n Cataldo and e pr e ared for further act ion by July 1. The 82nd Airborne Division 1'I'aS to a83E1Dble Palma JIontechiaro r e l i ~ elements 0, t 3rd Divisionat tha t locat ion by dark July 17 in preparat ion fo r a westward a vance.As f i na l preparat ions SM d up for the next phase of he c aign, th e err;Jcore thus fa r stood as follows:A to tu of l S ~ 5 0 0 prisoners been t ake , t no r akdown available as :>th e proportion of Lie to Ital ians. The en 1 st an estimated 9CX' deand wounded, 112 a i rc ra f t had been captured 0 5 on th e ground. 80 ,la rger than 75 , 24 k il l and k IV tanks, an d 7 Mark VI tan ' had been cap-t ' lred.Total strength t e Seventh Army then stood at 203,204.In eparat ion fo r continuing 0 e at ons, s ~ a t Gela,remappi of units began an th e i n i t i a l ....at e wit an as -t:1.r.lated capacity 0 25, g lons day.

8


10/27

by .ea . wU h a landing a t Bro10. Proteated b7 a ir caver a.'ld supported b7~ 1 . r e t r a Task Faroe 88, th e 2nd Battalion. 30th Infantry, reinforcedre d ar t i l lery and tanka laDded suocesst'ully two m,les e at of Cape Orlandopt'llred a position astride th e highway and railroad Idles west of Brolo.

'l'his forc Ya B c r-attacked during th day bu t held i t s position. The 7thReT push along the coast road, crossing t.he Zappula 4iver while th e 15th RCT ad vanced northward an d captured Nasa.o enemy attempt to evacuate south along th e Naso - andazzo road had been made.He continu rear guard action along Highway 120 to andazzo, using mines an , j de molition. Alt.hough indicated earlier, no strong defensive posit;ion nort es t of Randazzo had been located by ou r troops moving in from the northwest. Other thanisolated pockets of resistance in th e vicin i ty of .laso, which were nearly surrounded,an d th e enemy continued rear guard. act ion along th e entire front of the .;,eventh J\nQy.

The 60th Infantry of the 9th Llivision was c o n t i n ~ i t s march eastward acrossextremely rough terrain toward Floresta. In most places the regiment had to buildi t s own roads. 1'h 39th RCT passed through th e 47th RCT and established contact withthe 78th io n ot th e Etighth Arm;y which was moving on l4aletto. The 39th continuedto attack eastward toward Randa'ZoZo against strong enemy resistance. By th e end of th e day, th e II Corps uni ts were closing in on Randazzo.

D .;. 33, 12 AugustEn evacuation across the llessina Strai ts was underway on a large scale. Eastbound enemy t raf t ic was ful ly loaded and westbound vessels we-a empty. Air photographswhich covered the llessina Stra i t s on August 11 showed 33 water craft , including 10ibel fe rr ies .Fnem;y forces were w1.'thdraw1ng eas t of Pat t i (C-84), breaking contact during th enight of August 11-12. The defense of iiandazzo consisted mainly of mined roads de fended by art i l l e ry, mortar, and long range small arms t i re . Generally, th e enemycontinued delaying action in th e north in he eventh Anrry zone. In the center, th eenemy evacu.ated nores ta (C-83) and was withdrawing east of th e Naso - Handazzo road.

Berore th e British Eighth Army, th e enem;rl" retrograde IDOV t re ched Riposto(D-Ol) without indications o f an organized de1'ense. In tile 9t h Division sone t e60th RCT ca:.;>tured nores ta, te n lId.les north ot Randazao, cutting the Cape Orlando Randauo road.The 3rd Division's 7t h RCT advanced aJ.ong th e c o ~ t road and ~ t u r e d Cape Orlanio.Both th e 7t h RCT an d th e 15th RCT made contact with the special 1s.nding force es t

at Brolo (C-7$). The 30th RCT passed through the 7th Infantry, and aided b7DaTal gunfire JIIOYed rap1d1y along th e coast road to capture Brolo. E1 nt e ot thisr gimsnt also entered F1carra (f ive miles south ot Brolo).

kiU11lrh1le th e British nI l Corps 78th Division pushed north 01' l&a.letto to highground south ot RantUzso to effect a pincer movement on th e c i ty with th e 9t h D ivision attacking traJA the north and west .At the close ot ~ th e 9t h Division 1JllS in an aha...'ltageous po3ition north ani

nst ot Randazzo to wage an i l l - ou t attack on th e c i ty. The]rd Division advancing along Highway ll3.o I 34. 13 August

ce AO N en withdrawals were characterized by heavy d l i t10ns and lIlinetield.! to b1pede th e Advance ot th e Sev nt h Arm;,. In the norther sector ther W&8

a general eneIllY' withdrawal and app;lrent (l.l.sorganization. Li t t le contact was dewest or Pat t i (C'J5).In th e vicinity ot Randazzo, th e e wi t dr und r coyer of darkn ,upported by occasional ar t i l lery and r tar t i r e . A large concentration of otortransport .walI observed in th e vicinity of llesaina (D35), and three small freigbteraand 30 8lIIa1.l. boat were s n at Porto D Ol1vieri , (C94).'By nighttal l the 9th Division had captured R a n d a s ~ , th e l as t strong en y

po3ition on th e southern axis. The 39th RCT captur d th e city against etu'.Jbornreaietance, whUe th e 60th RCT continued the attac eastward trom. !Plor st a (C33).The 47th RCT passed through th e 3 ~ t h RCT on the eastern outsld.rts or Randazzo.In th e .3rd Division zone, th e 30th ReT continued i ts adYllOce to the east withintwo mlee o f Patt i , whUe the 15th RCT and .3rd Ranger Battalion cleared pockets otreaiatance southwest ot Patti , The advance past Cape Calaya, four ai les northwest

ot Patti , was impeded by a large crater blown in th e road a t th e eastern end ot th eCalaY& tunnel whertl th e road had been carvoo from solid rock 8Ountailaide. LC1".were used to ter ry infantry and art i l l e ry past this b10ci


11/27

I . CEGAl'ITZATIOlf1. C . - While an J:nt1T 18 nebalcnw organization, i t 18

t .U t t as a datu. plane a Antr 8hou l d constat 0 two intantr7 corpe atthree diT1.eio ch . Each c o should be re1Df'orced by a corps artUlery brigade.'!'be it}' to r thne dir ldona 11!1 tha t by -1Dc th e it 18 pollsibl. to ain ta1 l lth e PNeeure Verr rare17 do .1tuaticma ar:1JI. where 0 din . ion oorpll can 8'tODe or 1 dlrle1oDa.

2. TrooP J4atp, - A. In p th e troop l i s t to r th e atllt corrf'07,i t aast a l be I' bered tha t while and equipment to operate barbors,hes, grayes reg1.ltratian, hospital s, or to restore and lIi!linta1D a1rti .Ida areDe0e88&r;y, thsy ar e ut terq T&1.ueI.u lIDtU th e t ighting intantl'7, supported b7artil lel '1' and tanks, baa C&!ltured a beaohhead.

} . 7l'o ou r uperience mdt . no t engaged in the 1Jrl.tial t ight at thebellOlM.. are aln78 8ttper-opt1Jd.etio to how long it takes to secur. a beaohhead.lon- t i l l t be held to an 1rreduoable lliDiJua in early ech.lons.1. Stttt S!ot;ioy.- Each etatt etlcm should be at ~ strength when th e1n1t1al d ... 1a c_ind an d plarmi ng 1D1tiatec!. '!'be YO ot work 1.1 uual.l7I'Mter chIr1J:l t h i l pbu_ thc.n i t 1.8 during th e operatiODa1 stage. A'QgMDt th eatatt ~ t e l y pr ior to the 19D ii i t1at.aetor;y. Otfioera tbraet intothe II1.ddle of th e plaJDIing with a ar1l7 1Dadequat. background ar e placed a ta cl1.a&4'fantage which ter1al l7 1 . 8IUI the i r valua.'- .&ddlt1op&l. Statt Seqtion. 0 'fLO a l lon euttioient personnel fo r th e G-4Sect 1D a 1aDdiD opeNtlon. tn:osportatlon ~ 1 C I D il l G-4 as an aMitional

. apee1a1 . ta r t .8Gtion on th e AnrT leftl. 18 an . s en t i a l adjunct to th e sllCee Mt1 or th e nppq ttmctlOD1l of a lIOdern corps, t i . l d U'IV', or uphi b i ou t u k to re . . I t IIhoald conta1.n tl-oa te l to tw l offioen aDd about tf t lJt7 enlU MD.1'h1JI i. pr o b17 oat bIpol"ta!1t 1011 in G-4.,. r l t 1- A ll pe ClD8 0 te d with intell1geDce ac t i r l t i es .boo1dhe plued UD4 on e , 817, th e tu k toroe 0 er , who eDJ'Cue this .uthor1t7 thr0t3gh hi e Aulstan t Chief at s tan ' , G-2. I t 1.8 wortb:r at DOte that int HDSII operation t re .uIT lIDCorre!ate4 G-2 act ir iU88 wMoh rea ted 1D

DO l1t.tl cad'aai 6. t- A Hl " r i to prcrt1.4e to r th e 1I1terception ot 0 8lI&ge8bet.. .m ftborIUAate tm1ta ot th e aDd ~ l c u l a r : Q ' ether t1'ia:ldl,..t ion, .1AUar to th e Bl"itl8h e3" Serr lc . , should he

peI"-.D1I l1t un1 7. ' k ' - star t otticer tor a ir .hould be assigned to the n-J Section of a l l d1rt810 bi g er units . Re should be f'l"OII th e a ir foroe, pr.terab1.7 orfield and tborough17 trained in a1r-grouDd support.

~ ~ { d I ~ m . J ~ ! H I l ! - s - !h e UwI 11..18 am.. t be fbrther d.....loped.PIU"& t i ahoa1d be ..tabl1.ahed i ll A nq headquarters. PersonneltuJ.ly elected equipped and traiDed. I t 18 UportaDt that the7 bet'tmctlon t th e lDceptiCID ot planning. Adequate 10 D to r l a te ra lt be eel out.

ed that th e G-3 Secti rMPCID8iblecml7 t ll8h1Dg t prior itT of JaOV t or units, and tha:t G-4 T'!'aD8porSecticm en" a .eparet. nents SeotiOl1, be Neponsible fo r isllU1Dl d taUed, th e nee al'7 aMlt iona l 1l8tJl8, an d coordinating and control.,... .10. 1 - AD Anq near .hare control organi..t lon .hou14 beperfected at th e tDoeption or pJannlDc. 'fh1e group .bould be comp1ete17 statte4

with 1D!'onted repreeentati of a l l action ear,y to t aperat e.In wBUSII- 4ue to 1Jrl.t1al statt shortage *lid tor other l'eUcme it . . . . no t t. . lb1eto ar ct 8QCh an organizati 1IIItU s r t l7 ore D Dq.U. Corpl A r t U I , a . - o o ~ U l e r 7 br i hoa1d ona1et ot nc l

lIleJrt, or 1 5 glma, GIl. reg1JIent or 8 inch ht.JW1tl.ra, and one reg1Bent ot 4. 5 hg u M , aleo one o ~ e n a t i o battalion. Al l orpe artl l le17 oW.d be prodded with11-4 traaton now used by ca JJ..

12 . Engineer Ugiy: - In l 'ighting in bad cmmtr;y ap iDat an who t rutato demolitions tor dela7, i t is oGlloeiv.bi. that th e rat io ot Eoginelll' ~ 1 I t 8 to Intantl'1 regiJlenta should be t1.tt7-t1t't,... CertaiDl7 flYf/r7 Intantr;y dl...uionactive17 ncaged requ.1.N. the . e r r loq ot one Eng1Deer reg1MDt in ad tion to i1;8dirlslonal Eagheera. 'the Corpa ArtU1erJr certaiDl7 requ1ree a . ~ t and others t be utUisEd to se e that th suppli bro1lght up by th e reaeth e Corps and Dlv1.sions.

I I . AIIlINISTRATIOH1 . Changes bLHisher Headquarters.- There,is De Y h pnparaUClIl u.e.Changes 1npIiii8 iiiiI tb i speo1lYiiii O1l1i.mlte cata1l.a abou1d tben tore be &Y01dedinsot u possible b7 h1ghar beadquarters. Val bl e t1ae dur1Dc t.be trai.D1neperiod can thus be saved la d l o n r units be gi.... it e benefit to r u s a b q , !Q111P-ping, arxi tra1n1Dg.2. Channels at Commanda- De!iDi1ie ohannet. ot ewwran d shoald be se t up 1 .JI8d1at.el After th e CODCtlptlOn or the oper t..1.oD. The c at c-.rendtu k toroe coDDBnder to tb e highest author1t7, sbonld he de.tiDite and direct.IJI1bsidiary or adjacent headquarters abould be 1Dcl eel 111 tb1a channal.3. A . s ~ or 1'roop a- All troops selected tor the oper t1 beplaced ec or th e ocmund or th e tu k toree cOlllll8Dder. Tb18 shouldbe all-..braoing. Troops aholIld DOt be UDder one to r tra1n1.nl, and lIDderano o01lllllllDd t Ildm1n1s t r a t i " purposes4. Jfi. ~ a U l coabat unite ahould b . brought up to 'I/o StnzJath, p1 ulS% t o r s ~ a r x i o1'ticV' ot junior Fade, aod a ll pe r fro. TbU

i. ot r l ta ! 1.IIportenc. it he small combat units Rc b u boat t u u , platocD, eto . ,ar e to go into action h11 strength. I t should be a recolDised tact that dile tosickness 4IId other reasons, approxiaately 10 to lS% ot urr c wi l l no t beable to th e commander OIl J)...,dq. Tbe:retore, in order to haft cc.plet..eq tr eel teuaII&de up at MIl &eOl1.l l tomed. to wOrkiJli together, an onr-st:r.ngtll IDl8t be prorl.ded atthe earliest possible t .S .Record ot Units J01n.1Di Snb-'faak l'ore a- A cbec fIPJ IIlSt be u tab l isbed which W111 prartae tor an accurate recora tbe te a ClI1l1'bi unitsparts ot unite join sub-task t o r e . i, spec1.allJ' nec.ssary to r ti l 01*'&t loaal phMe6. COlllOdati 1 - , 1Ibetber ClI1 land or , _ l i tbe ~ t &ccc.:id& il l pereo CClDCerned, Cld the c ~ c a t i . a D

S8 m.st be ap1e to handle 1;he rar t ic that norul.J a c o ~ ' t n 1 . . b10uaoperationa, both dur1.Da th e planning aDd th e operations p 7. DeIl1SItion ot Porte aDd Units to p a r t 1 ~ a t e l - In plann1Dg to r an . . . .phibious operaon 1 t is ssentI&t tJi&t the d e s ~ n of ports, t1cD po1nfinal staging areas be included in th e iDit1al dir cU Du!cn&ti uniteto comprise th e tore. aDd provision tor th e relus. of these UD1!iS to ta.ak torceconcerned Wl1st also be &ccc.pllibed 1I1th start. of plam"'ng 110 that priorl t i e

c-2


12/27

U . .lIR - aV I - GROUND1. lo tp t Pl.aPP'MI- .. . Ia operatiolUl ot an uphiblow _tuN, it u .bIIol u t ~ . . . .1&1 that a ll . enic rureeente4, I . e . , GJ'OUDd, 1.1r, ~ .boal4be ea together or adjaeent to Ne b otis duriDc tb eart pl.am i atac.. Fa11are to 40 80 r en l a il l oontu.lon, 1Mtt1a1-.101., aDd d ~ naft! aDd a ir ioipat1nC .wi t ph D in j1IDDt 0 with therroaD4 tClll'C'. InBUS!Y" u in "TCIlCIJII th e aDd 11."7 8tattII re 817 .eparte a c!lIrbc th e ori t loa l period ot planning. In botb opera 10 M t I'Malted inIIIMdl md the lOll. or ftluable t iM . The plan to r _ ed

. , . . . . t lca - t be deftloped 1D close cooperation br a ll lc1pating . ! b 1 8ha t , D a , ai d a ir toree etatt. u - a 1 a t ~ aD! c0Dt1mlou17...u.: other ' .o that a l l th e detaiU or tra1orl.ng, reheu'Mla, . , . . .MDtto tqiDc areu, loading o t CClIl"f'01'8 aDd b t ion be et teot inl ; r ooordinated.I t 18 ential that the a ir I Ierri e nprMatea on tbe aU pl a nn1 .lr tatt. 1leprMeatat1. . . . or a ir tacrti u U" no t Rttic1at l7 t ..U1er withHJ'rl.o. 1IIlita to 1D4icate with th e required a:aotn. . a oe oem,..... NCiIU1lre..m. tar .h1ppiDg 8]l&M.

2.. L""qn : - Cona l.1a18on _t be a1Jrta1n with a l l npp:q . , eo1Net .. Ift1bordiDate hMdquarkre, a i r , , aDd Da"7, th e p l ' . ' 1 l Ia.n4 operational . ta I - or an ' b i ~ operatl

3. S,lectiop at Qb jm iyM l - 'lbe eral to .ttack" " tb e C ~ I t bIooMa the dut,. or the Pore, C er , in OOIIIlj.1lCt1aD witJa the 1a"7 tb th . l1r Poree, to 4etendDe preoi8 1ooal1ts..th e 1uId1.Dp wUl be .t ted . T b e : t or th e 1IaY)' il l thia u 4e\ I J ~ . .t1on fit" tU which, f ro . na'ft1 .taDt!point, na1l.abl.. 'fbi in -teJ'en of 'toM .l i r 1AI and to nat :t t1b oernr 0&Il .. . prorl4ed.!1 M aDd wi l l be .ftl! 11 th e YT, Ar..,., .1 I" , wii r r tQeGtb . a "" , . . a tb18 4ecuioD ~ 1 a t e l 7 after the alii!type of 1!f't 18 etermned. ' fbt realClD that the l i f ' t E S t be 4eten!.Md n r . t 18that CID th e l i f ' t deptDd8 th . amant at t af t l labl" ...... OD tb ..,.t ofaa11ul. epead8 th e IImIlber or landings whiob a t ~ e a .

4. IItrt. PmFPe1 . - n . Ka"f7 ua U r Po tbroagb their alllior offiMZ'll-.t . tate ir to r equ1 t . S e tbue t8 wU11 I n , . r , ~ : b q elf t , th e QroaDd J'0l'0' c . ., th e Ira."., an4 t Air_ttbrub the .tt.. aDd.. th . Pl"Miden07 t a . ott ie the ..or u . C -Gbiat 0 oan .u e ti.Dal dea18ion. Bot .a t tb18 t iDaldee1al_ . t a te tb I' or .- t and . -nmt or i t ~ e o 1 f 7 1D ~ f 6 1 til.,. w11l e a r r 1 . . l t t e r i8iOlUl haft , DQ t1rl.Dr aMPt u t lon .hou1d in aD1' reduoe li n of stl8 or obs.IIpemt.. of l ,* ,1ng.,. _pal RecosnUion bT th e . l1r tp ! Grognd:- r 1JI TeJ'7 1IIportaDt , _ re~ ..,etion he g ina both sromd t.roop8 aDd a1J' troops il l recognising -.cb other.I t 18 btl1.end that th e . . ot tr 1 ,. plaDn ahot dOWD br groaDd 111 UI1ope t 18 COD814 bl:7 1.. . than Dllllber ot t ri Teb1ol.. deet!"CJ18d b:ra i r . fb.1JI tu t 18 t an ~ ap1.Det cloti r - eapport ch u ot

Rt t lo1a t to ftl'Tant t t i aboY . - t ioned , it 18 NI!1"8t:ta1:althat nc b oaaaalti coeur, aDd thoroQlh tra1n1Dg would o e r t a ~ DUllber.6. SwpriI ' P w p t : - H 8UZ"PrU OaD 1 ,obaJla or l8Dding s c st'\lll l l ! ' ! tt,. Ori.nc to th e D018e or t shipe in the tranaport area, I t U b18hl,. _1'0 lU that nrpr1ae later B

II1Du 1 boar w1ll en be secured. !'bU being so it U YI'f7 ct. .i rabl , that tb ea ir u.ult tbe aelected btacbee B a1Du8 30 II1.mltu aDd II1Du l' m-tea.It .ut be d e t 1 n 1 t ~ arraDged t i t fo r r e u ot tb .. t8 other hea1:r 18 to .ttack W o re a1IaI8 l ~ th e a . t tao -.t dDpaell! wi h.

W , :n 9nm1'- J'rGII th e 8'taDdpoint ot tM grotmd troops, t r i ta !betore planning narta detini t . t be .eoured l'rOlS tbe . . " . u to th eIIIIIIher a4 type or ships &ft11abl.., and th e deptb of 1 penUs bt. il l th e--u.. . oratt

2. Joint ORtrat1M1- lo int UODII nmeqUl l t to t .. .quire well qual.1fied li&Um off ic.. work1ng fUll the0- 3 Section of intr. Direct ~ C & t 1 0 l U l wi n a ~ or tb1a o ma n ntal. I f .wl aupport duri.tIg pbuee ot the act10n nboequent to th e 1D1t1al1andiDI - .at be oareta1.l7 coordinated. ' fbt pr..-ture witJmoawl of lia1aclllpenannel - .be auab coordination cU.tftcult.3. Co "" Sh!pal- A. .1 00IIb1Ded .lno", . . . , . , P c ,h1p 18DeCe U7 Dot cml7 to r tb e !'ut. Poroe C ~ ba t to r ~ u t . 1'01"0I C . . - M e n -. d .. ta r down .. th e ~ t a l C t.. ~ . . . . 'fbi l a i t yot the 1utallat10D8 d1Jdn1ehea with be a i.. ot he aD1t inYOlTed.la. C .h ips ahould be spec oClllWt:ructed and DOt 0Y1Hd a tth e la8t ..et. aboald il l oue be naft l t ighting ab1pl .1nM 1Jm:al...........1Jl t !N t1cbt reeulta il l j -U.t 41erupt a l l radio 0 tlon O O & l : L D e J ~ . a. au1table ort1c. _t be prorlded to r eacb of t !h eCos.uId.1.Dg General, Chiat 0 Stat f , 0-3, 0-2, aDd Ai r Support.4. 1 a o I 1 . ~ ahip eboal4 han tbree , cod' I OIl! to r th e1rIIt', OM to r th ' lfa;r, ODI to r th e .l1r Poroe co4 Mat tOD8 . Eacb or tb.. .oo4e r0C*8 .wit be 1arI' eaagh to pera1t ot ettic1ent operation ot !r l t i8h~ O a D Cod. 'f. . . !b e _ a g e HD .bould be oOJmm1ent to the cod.r o o . , aDd or eut'tic18Dt .1.. to aooOllodat the three ag e insta l la t1ou,DaIIIl7, .l rJq, Ra'91', and Ai r Corpe. All three eerrioes, bDw8Y!l', -..:r WI o :radio operation roOll. .lUo a !r1t18h Code R JmSt be proridll! WheNftr a je1Btoperation 18 p ea . w, had n o b a code roo OIl th e .,aroria.S. 7'be ' fuk Foroe C ~ e r ' . beadquart8l'8 ship ehould. be a c e ~ bT

2Jl alternate coaand hi p BUttlclent redio t to Oft ! ' th echam1.l1 if ' the p r 1 n o 1 ~ heedquartere ship i s oat. Where s ible 1 Bhipe should n a l t . p a r t 1 c u l a r ~ wb un1t in qaaBtiCill eqaale or eat0Ied8 e1se ot d1 dOD.4. rm1n'M at 1!av lmgppN :- a phu l . c tb e 11...,.an t.n.1n1nc cODWaina to baDdle boat . to t ind th e _nAP h a .l1ao mretra.iniDC 18 1Jl the arr lf t l a t and th e . udpa la t 0 .,...e1e 1Jl th etranaport


13/27

6. SpttdboIttI- 'fbcoe be-and biB 18 Tita l- - . t 1apeedboeta ~ 1 e 1 1 ' to r Ant which s d 11 oloe. to the c lhip.ar e rabl ooeu1 th e 0 or .-peedboatll to take aageewoald h e tate _ t ten . , up c!Utano at t1 t t to t1' lI11es, . tar t ottio in . 1IPMd'boat clel1nr tmd Neei. . . ta r ruter than tb qaD be coded, MIlt, aDd decoded. th e quuotere ~ b o a t a eaald 111 be . f t1la t i l l 0 io n 18 ared.

1 . CCEtro td ShippW Ott Sbol'l'- BRter shaald be proride4 toooatral et ah1rlP1nI ot t Sappl1.. earrled em 'the ah ipe . neede6 by 'the UD1ti luhore, aDd the po1D to 1Ih1oh the1 ar e el1Tered sh be determned b7 'tho..r th e npp lu . iI lteded. Otherwise, 1Jl p q t 't.10D8, nppl l willot'teD be ludec! c! t point whe . th81 ar e requie. ' - U aoem .. th e en sbore bat ter i . . ar e pu toa t o t BOtion, th e t raupor ta ahould oloe OIl beach. '!'here two re&80D11

tar tb1B troll Anv nampo1Jlt. Pin t , i t s r e a t ~ tacili tates th e speed ot 1111-loadiDg 117 a th e tunl-ercnmd. Second, th e ai r Goyer, which 1a pro t t1.ncbeach, 18 alBo . f t1 lable to protect th e shipe. 'lhia 1 . not true it the shipe q1Dc borisaD.9. 1- OOIIbat 1 111 ar e wsed aDd loadiDg to r the auau l t11 be , I t 18 .- t 4 .. ble that tb81 ban BUtt10ient 1.aDcl1Jlg cratt0UTied 1Jl r i t . 11ft a c o ~ I . . t e ....u1 t UDit without ha'rlng to oall em othera tPtl to 8UPPQ na1 l oraft.

UDfire wpport to 'be lUMd8I1tire toro.. I t i. th emlti:Jre .. ftW>l....... should DOt be 1IH4 8OaDB! 'aga.tut 1Ddt- ch ar e tir1Jlg, or ap1M ta:ppo!"t 18 or baleuurabl . ftl_, aDdto r puttiDg i t on ar e e r : d ~ ettic1ent.

u. W1e l c - The ~ t a 1 eurler equipped witll _ter aal:w..lDOil.. a l ' ! ta r.. to 8JI7 other o t _ t e r . . . . .tion t rw the beachee.12 . 1 - ta . .t be _de with " 'V tar a deti-JIlte ib f i iV ttlf' tM teadiDg &be! eaard1Dc or pl'i.8OIlera or - .r . ItI'QIlfttlJw eazmot be dou 'bT the ....,., additloual IP Batta1icme ..t be prori.4ed

&"'4, to pu such aen 1Jl the ....u lt CODWT rectuoe. tb e ....u l t pe n Poo4' D r : l ~ ! I 8 n at war whil. OlD boud ahipe ahoald prorlc!ed b7 e I aV.

JUl. J.I11. - s. U r nppor t 41nd.. i tself iDto t .. pbas. . . The

ti.rBt . . 18 th e or oontrol or a tu . a ir a c t i n t i.. iD th e a i r . Th1a18 . a t\mot1clll et th e air . be na t . . 11 boIIbiDg or IJ'OUDdtoreee. f t1a b u heeD in th e pu t ..tUtaotor1l1 ' UCOIIIPliabe4 'bT th e I!'OtDd8ta t 111I ta rp t . OIl wIlieb aD . ttaot would taoUltate the tathe pocad .. ~ et th e _ .., IIDcI 'bT the M t a b l l ~ t of a 'ftIa l1De Bboa1c! G"2" CID the a14. or beiDg too ta r iD trcmt of oa r OIIIDt raope, Dc! it Uaa14 .. )dobc! oat oonsultatioD with .i r ott1081'l1 eo ' tMtit wU1 be M1_ t e d _ ten'a1n t_ tur . " U 1 ' dlacernibl. tJooII th e a1r. TecJra . l.iDe .........1JlatM 18 quite daDgerou people pus1Jl& O'f'erth e gJ"GaIII1 raJ. IIlaIdre4 .u. . aD hour ha... dift'icnalt;r 1Jl P1ctiDl out 10al 1aDd lI. n.-11T,.. to what 1a .. e1Me a i r nppor t f t H,._ to a 1Jl COIlJ-eticm with cl.oee al l t tack pu tP""IB!. Bownr, a tU denn t e a ir 1IIdts can prorided to traiD withIJ'OUDd UIlI to _ a 'PI"i8U7.uBi tb e dut1' ot .ttao1r1nc 1dd.ob

a d T e r s ~ art t1.JlC the progress 0 th e t!'OGj)B at he tib7 th e grcnmd, it 18 -01'1 to cO'lDlt OIl ft1r7 great ettlOt. th e ,the IJ'O'UDd 'troope han t a e n q to upeet . , re .. .18tan .baf ttor. or . t tack thaD 18 a l poel1b1. 'l'b81.ut be taught that i t requires quitewb1.le to .aunt . ttack witb th e .ppropriate bowbB, et c A. !'be teDd8llC1" to credit a ir . t t acb OIl road8 aDd rallft1W wioapaoit;r ot deBtl'071Dl nob artari 18 alao filWi 1D the t iN t plaoe th echue.. or lettinc direct h it with . bon em wlnerabl. plaoe a l ' ! . ..11 ,erta1.l lq no better thaD th e cbaDoea at gett1llg po1Jlt hit with lClllC aJ"tille! 'T, bu t toM. 1a DDt th e Pr ia r1 detlOt. W. a l l mOlt' t h a t . d..,l1t1.oD to bee t teo tb . mat be defended or we i t will be :read1l1' reBOftd. 'lh18 tact 111 ecna1lLYtrue n . tbe r th e de.oUtion i. oaued b7 able p1.aDt.c! 1Jl th e J'OUDl! b7 dropped the air .

2. RIOP1U. S'."I- s . point wh10h should 'be settled t the COII_1OeMD t or the p1ann'DI 1.8 whet .. or t.ir wpport will ~ rapp11e4 duringiDe and lIUblIequent to the mg, he nature ot .apport il l _o h oue. U olM.a ir npport 1a be nppl1ed, aD . f for t _t be . -de to utUiH cUrectiOD&1!h1a eli et 011&1 note , p1"Od1Ioed either 'by s or greMI!.. , 1Jl t101"11 a d OCOU Neop i t i l ight -Ja. P I' W l OAD Dq, IIe!'O to 2400 , JUl . ,b' ieadq troops; note . . . . .... the at l111e 1a aDcC"ta1D, or itb ' i d11 ' . i r t t acb oar own t throaIb errar, , . 1 1 . n ob is pat oat 'by tWle t poenad... Whee th e traDt li n 18.arbc! by '18 note , an;Jtb1Dc be7'QDd i t 111 th e dirlOticm or th e e q . . , . be .t ", . 0108 suppoI"t. a1rpU , OIl th e other , s a . partiaa1arl1' obIloziou en.. 1Iurta1 t iOl l -1a 'be7mI4th e pon r th e t , e .g . , .! 'eYers slope position, and 111 art1l1er7

, it wU1 be oat l eel 1Jl .-.o1te. sero 2400 D , red now1ll. iD!icate 11' J blue noke . . . . " etc.a. I t 18 te l t that oould oar a1.rp1.aDu Ui_.... od or Bhow1JIc J ' 8 C I l O I I l 1 t ~ l c D ot oolor .. that been a.1D& t.r itroops OIl that 4q , it woald reduce ace14eatal t1r1Dr a t thea.

II . DCtICAL1. gma".,.h- !'be p ro r . 1ng ~ r a t l o D amst be s e DO t.th e Poree . . wbo18 ba t alao to r the Sub-!uk Pore 1D order bUN a O C X l ~ i l " . ted et tor t , th e DeManders ot th e Sub-'!'uk Fore.. ahoald 'be . . plan and objeo:tiT811 th e land1Dg should up to t J . t i ll =-table ~ o ot - . r , iD which th81 will t1 M t 1.... th e efforte to r t ~ t ot the '2. 1 - !b e Farce C .. l i t t l e poe8ibl . n th e artlli ..,. l ine baa _ reaohed br th e !ID1)oo1!).u

PoreM. haTing dODe, he orden to r th e pooaping or thto r th e turther 0 t iaaa wbioh Pl'Ment thnaelTM BowYer \h e JliV'Biot th e Parae C ~ e r on ah during ear11' ud Ie ' ar l t i pbuth e rattail H Tfll7

12 berT et tor t IIhou1d be ad e B8YW lIsue o r d e ~ belew tb e Bat1CIIl or e ~ The bi g an t ioer 18. the poea t . . ti be . . . o _,_'0 to b1'-PUs hi s 01"8 b1' te l l ing th e t e and - ot t 1Ib1ohar. . ruot1 "J_


14/27

IM)St cl"1t icalbe ot 0 pI 1 , a dUJ'ing t tin ga M and ~ d b q in 1n t tr7, aDd he.. ad ti M h18 is aDd up I' I t 18 retore.ent1&l t it th e --tc '7 at the a ir pend.ta, b an IrU1 lsI. a1z"cl"att alot tto be UM4 qa1JI8t bolRUa t D . A .olution 18 to ba tbue a1rcnt t .ait on onr-be&d tor t 1d.mltes 1:4 f!IY8!'7 baaJo. !b. , . CaD haft a seooJ:ldar7 bombalIIsion to 1Ib1oh the7 0C l PJ"OOMd and l!r'op their boll a t the close ot thei!' tII1Dr:lte wait. !bey should be . . -ph ed 1:4 t 1 n 7 IdJmt b,r another e1aUar groa.pwith a e1Jd1ar e arget. !bee. a i rplanu ..t be in ndio e loationwith the a1 r support urdt em the ground. s,. no h a ..thod &DT oOUDterattaok 0&Ilbe _ trol l th e d r .

16. tb t Iptaptrx BK!-' 1p elM! Cqgptn.- III 4"1) pne \n t ioae .. .,,-,acrttft en , p a r t 1 . c n J l a r ~ 1 t 18 prorlded with t anb , i t baa be e t0aD4 a ped1at to Uap-h'og battallou. n . 1eadUr battalion a4ftDON aDd ooaap1es oroap a u.ttAld objeoU" on a ccnaDd1ng Bite. 1'he second battal101l )la through the first ttall. which s . - c t 1 A ' - ~ bIIc1na to orp.n1.se a de l in ~ 1 tion. 1Ihe:D t Dew 1eadiDg battalion ba a reaohed a eu i M . lUlted object1"tartbe!' to th e t:ront., i t . wUl IIlal.t and th e th1rd or r . . r battalion will pau t.broach1t . The.eooD1 t taUan thea bec1ne to orguise. ID thi8 ...,. th e dugv or aooaaterattaok 1a _ter1al .q ~ .iDee, it the 4ep1.oJwd l Nd u e a..t on t .Oft r - I 'UD, th e --:r apiMt. a part1allT podt.1 , u4 it t.h1a is

throaltl be t1Dall7 I'tr1kN a prwpe.re4 poII1tion.

- a. A ll hoa1d haf t a creater &ppreo1ation the nnr.u a 1'lIqlIMt. or -PIS dUl'1ng t.he operation pro b q ,1"8 te dt,1&l is were pMlrOU, g1T1ag th e 1JIpr'e Bion that ape .... af t i l be apeded u d_i red.]I. nere 1a a delmi te need tO I ' a ~ b U . _p 4epot c au;r Gr eilli larCll'pnisat,ion. ODe ot th e t r l tlmctiODB at th e eg1nee1' duriDI t.he operatiODth e I I U P P ~ or -PII . '!'be TOIllM, be_. of the 1IJ1UP8C'tecU7 larg Ill:IIIberc trated 1Jl a na l l area, hu been tNMDdou. ID iu taMa441t.1oDal pencmnel wu NqU1J'ec! to ..e1at th na l1 _ p depot detaohJlente in th e.orting, aD4 i.e at .-pe. In addition, with a ra id q IIiOrl.nI torce,-. p .upplr t be IIObU. so that pe ar e steadily ....ailabl. when and whereeal1e4 tor. ed 1'/0 1a attaahe4 u InclOllU1"e 14.

19 . 41 r Photo! - a. Baae4 particularl ,. upon th e 1ngenn1ty ot th e 8n811V'1pbotograpbs or fu areu - .a t be taken tor P1J1"P08e ot eompe.riaan over alo r . n that RT can de l. .ea which ar t . ed1a caaoatlage4aDd b181ld into SI41'OUDd1Jlp be tetected. .l et ot aer1a1 pbotoe CO'fWl"iDg th e D1vidon reoutea at adftnoe ahouldbe turn1abe4 - .ch Din- im aDd Corpll !'.ng1neel' 1 ahead ot the front 1 crti fiCllWD ahould 1n8pecrted b;r photo 1Dterpreter to lI1neti IODeucl.. aDd bJpu1. reporta t be gotten into the banda 0 th e DlrlCOZ'JM b;r cub plane couri , da..U,. 1%1 t1.IIIe to be of -ralue.

20. Secpr1tx - Rt co p it i oD . - Co u nt c .Sp 8 and perol_ ar e ot great -ral1a8t be kept UDder Anv' cont:rol .M - .a t be pnbUshed b7 Anv hesdquarterllat l e u t in a4ftD 1'heee.bould then d18.nd.nated b7 lowe!' echelcmen th d e c n u t1 internle so that th e cOlIJlUI\Y reo.ine them approxI..at.e:q 24-hcn:In 1%1 adftDCe. Great oare IIJIIt be taken that 1nI;r aDd Corpe troope l'eoeiTa theatbroach p:roper ebam:1e1e.

21 . MebibiOM 4ttaokl.- When a pe.rallel t1aDk oo.aDded b,r the aT'! ai . te ,i 18 T8'r'f to .e u p bioaa attaolal rear ot tb e en..'. pos1t.1oD.1'hNe uphi'b1ou at. IIhou14 be 1D a s t r ag th a t leas t equ1ft1ent to a re1Dt01'0e4ooabat t.., beoe, . . no a torae 0&11 1&Dd turther 1D or the en8IIIl1 aDd e&D 1te.elt-suta1D1JI t .. pe1"1od of 4qB. RaT'! p a t i N .uppol"t 18 Tital .

1 . 0eD8Y CoaYentiou:- P1eld Kmual. 27-llO, "Bales of Led Wazot... " 18DOt f1c1a\l1i claar 1ii that 1 t 1acka 1DtG'pretation and toOr7 data ofth e lme!'al tal'lUl ot t.M Hape am GeDeYa e - - t i o n e , par q lI1th re t. . . .to the d1at1nction betneo pr i n t . am public plblic proper'tJ' cd it a u. by' _ad1ng torce. '1'bere also m 1Dsutticieaq ot .. .tezo1.U dea1.1Dc n th priaof ft!' t...,. be 1 . ~ q utU1.sed

EXHIBIT I E&Sm!'/ TASK II - !II


15/27

HE DQUARTE S FORCE 141PLA NING INSTRUCTIO NO.

~ _ 2 _

11

Be : - ten to r ti.cm15 being o. n1z.ed et. .ower-.!J' hiet . URnta and:.rt.e-rs by coar1er, or U,!lMdquertel'!l Porce 141,A.P.O. 512.

ad,lres'l 15 ' f ' l l f!I"l l ~ . L w !So and al l cab "" .nd llIBssageet-15 Headquartera a be eo ad1res ed.The plan calla 1'or!. lIa1D " .5. &NaUlt flooD NOlITiI J.1RICJ. - ea1.ern Task Force.\!. 1Ia1n Br t i l h aaaault t'ro ~ t - Eas.m ':'aak Foree

!le C o n b ~ Chieta ofand General Pattan as

r e s p e e " t ~ '9"811'.1 end loca 1 ns at ~ l ' ! e r e s p e c t ~ T 8 C _in be" he =erat. are '

ct P.poM1 e!. Cor.I1n ?orce 141 I' of W1UC _ 1:l&t!.on at de- be .t u.-=.. retallecl plan:dag r l l1 be located.

o.taUad llh=1ng POC'oIS of p!.ann1ng Willba in 'UmI AP!lICIn1t1&l.1;r .t CJ.S1II'p r o b a b ~ "",,1nj; ~ CP.,C.

_ern TaskI'aroe C er S1' _ or 1anrrl.nf w:l11be in IfIlE Dn=A probab1;r .t CAIRO.

.. In1t1atl r EDl-1'1" aet." toOpera 1oD. . lenciee_ .lY!I1 tor t .......!.b1e r o IJ'P.IC.l.1: he operation '.S. hiets at s tat! tortorees 11.5 1.C-in- to Al'!l 1 lustre .t!l1.agre n.

(S A '10. S. ' ~ . ' - " ' " " " 7 ~ ~ s. r-S,

r . g a d : 1 ~ Gen"rfll,.9GS) I'la.n!t, 1Iq. Forc8 141.D1a1ribution' (El

A. 1!l!l!1.It ""7 be Il8SUIlIlIC! thAt ~ b Adal.ralty 1 1 l I ~ t!te C O t " ' I l J r i e r - i n ~ " 1 e 1 ' of theP'1e8ta rl1 e Anl1&b!e the n cess ~ n ! " C ~ 3 tlin'1'i in CCS 16 "tdated 21st JlUluarv 1 9 4 ~ Annex A Lt sut't'10 ent tt .... +.0 ClllIT7 out tile1'1!Ill1 reh_Is and to With the o ; > e ~ . t 1 0 D ordera ot the r.....1C il'T'.

Air torcea or '.he tollorl.."lg order .r e ""l'tlCt to be . ""1labla in the'-ter in suffic1ent t "" tor t ' lb 0 t'l!!:.1tWI ....lIr.L.

S.E.i'. 2J, uadrona 6 Crou Total 912 . l t rcrat t1"7 (Dar) J:lquedroDa ) Groupe 294 Atraratt'rEF ( bt) ) Squadroaa 54.L1rcr&l'ttdpbt Bo 6 I Group 165 A1rcrat't.IIod:l.ua Bo"lbera 6 'JId...""" 5 Gr

"")75 .lirora1't

IIea"7 B n 2 Squadrcll>ll 7 Groupe 281. .l1rcr&l'tGR 8A1rcr&l'tTB 4 .. I GlOIIp lJ7 AtrarattPi!J Squadrans 1 Sq'--' 48 Atrerat't.Trans;>a:-t 3 Squot\r


16/27

5. Tuks wil l be OUTied 0IJt .. foll.oors: _ (2) Ur :13. Task I"orce e-m. r . ..uJ. be in _In ontro1 at thei r f W ! 'r 'ateation tJOII _U s 1Dtert......,.,..troll the tl_ the troop" c_:1Jl& i ere 1 .* UIIdal" thei r e-nd :u:ept @ Ili or the poaDd troop, 1 D c l u < I ~that the 1la'l&1 C- . r rlll be in _ iye COIItrol dnr1Dg the period .t l'WC0DIIIlie_ and pbato _1011oI .(.) ~ a and lIItt the fare are f1r1ll,. ...tebl18hed aahar W P1'oteatlO1l. t and __ ,. at a1I1>ol'M lIl11te.(i) Tho U8 & t bet SDW:OSA and 1l:U.lLLO. ""'I'P""'"ted by such The fo r 8lI al.lct.ted ere in tho Order at Bottle, 1IIdch 2. J!Il!! AIptult..pe.nlcllute trocpe ... eon be Utt.ed in OIIe third at tho 10 to Tule I"aroe -m8l"l!l aeparately. s. O-..r, .jar . I . . . . .uable treDeport .iraratt. ~ Troops: DiYio15. lco= liN! Plan, it' l>O1 a1.reed,. fonoarded, d be fo..-rded C C _ . 2nd . . . ,red D1YioiOll(11) Copture at the part or SIRAClJSI. and the e1r1'leld at PACHDIO. with tho leu t _ a i b l a delo;y. 1 !lAIlpr Bat tol lonlng pe (S . Trwp Lio1; to 1 - . 4 . ~ (111) Eotabliob l taott ' COl the Secerol iDe SIII.&CU9ol - P.lLlZZOLO _ Jl. ltIo.lon'RACIlS.\hieh ploee oU t be 1nolWll.... to I"aroe 545 and (1) 1hIder coyv of _. em tho mndJls or I) Dq to lend 1Jl.hera toaah rlll be gained nt h Force 3'-3. the mULl ..... ( ' Il l to 74 h. an.1lallle)(S) ,. ,. RIC!WlD9 , capture and aecure the part and th e e1r1'i at l"IB1lU by(1,,) !'lie rapid capture or the par te of ,rollSrA and 0Ar.IJIU and ,. ,. RIClI.lRDSOlI, OIl I) Do;r.th e C!JIIlDII group or ai rfie lds. illadl..... (2) I!:rtll>d tho boachbKd to m.uJI . protect1ns 18ft f1aJlk ofC.G the operatlon oga1nst 1Dtert . . . . . . . . . rro. WorUlwwt.(3) oontaot nt h n Corp

(b) ~ i. .1oten&Dce: o..r tho boacboe an

I. IIISSICN at &lIT or the pl.aDMd -..Ite.7. PIIrtIImo operatiClllll rlll be d-1CDed to aoteblloh Fore. lJ,1 .. rO dS.B. __ at 10 rro. LIC!TA, wi th . rlew to f illal 2. 82d tJ,rbo;pl DiYioi!!l (lm PN"tnrgp e lwg t e ) Il . ~ : oper o t i .- t a r the reductloa or the 1olend. S. 0 be pNpored to ho -.alt OIl oal l at'tc' B-Boar OIl To us au l t the soat.beaotern pc:rtlO11 of 1DlRD'IID 11> junction D D..,.with the 12th British J.rrq capture it u hue for f'1Irthelol!. 0Ir1Js to lacIr of parte to r ttmlUlce I"orce 343. it operet10....be lIIlC fo r I"oroe 5 to ..o1ot F 3'-3 11> ita e, 3. 9I!l DIV1SIOI. To be alerted to __ ... oal l or the C-.!loIthe O - m . r o coacenwd Jol4tly decide allocatlon port capaci ty. Gecerol 3'-3 at'tc' D I l q .2. ~ !aDd1Jl& and operat:1Jl& of ~ liDe VIZZIlII - IWlIlS.\ _POZ.UI.O. al l ~ 1 U 8 1 Y 9. n. - . . . l Took I"arc. e -nde ro ere c:huged with "' " eecart and s S.ise and hold the a.1rt'ia1da Just north of Q1IE!JiII!% and at ROll&lend of I" 545 and 1"0..... 343, and fo r the oubeeoj""nt.upport. Th. SPtllf and tho ai r 1eDl:UJg ri at P andn_ orIaf t1 - . . d o r a are &leo ~ 1 b l e ta r _bel...... dl i . . . . . I"IB If . G}. S e l . and operata the 11 port .t FIIlULl.10. The prUary role or the Ulled U r 1"0"". 14 aU phuee wil l be Jl. or t'urtbor operatlODll UDder tho d1reotion of the eouty 1. J!gzt the -1 1 7 ai r f and to proyids an - 7 fa r abipp1ns - . . d a " " 1 I > ~ b 1 o f . I"orce. S. Prorldo 8lIcort fo r ......ut and rn l l" " " , -......ra thI"",gbmttheir pa . - p to and rro. IDUlIFIIID.nd beaebee ap1nst ai r attaalc otqeo of tbe o ~ tho (2) To 1Dclude (BLllB) high sround 11> Y1c1D1ty or UZZA. _ .!. To proYide i for the uaeul t end fnl l_ inlhdted area at JAJld t iona wil l pend.t opera t ion of CIIl. ai r oontrc l ir _ acroea the Bl1TlRlWlZU..llDOIII! to ostU. ter t ' the "oal,-. 'rh1o wil l he ......,1oed by '.o.e. Force S45 u soon ... unita are ~ To OOC'lIP'l repair , proteot and operate oapturod airf1elda ..a to oper. te t'rOII SICILI. llur1Il& oteee ' .O.C. I"aroe 3'-3 will n. PLUl quickl,. u poe,iblate the d1roction or '.O.C. 01"00 545. .t. To prepared to aupport tur ther eat 100 at tho eroand troopoThe aOODDd 1 to conJr Force 343 so . - wi l l be operated a. 1. cm - OI!! Auaultl CIIl ca l l the eaptaNd a.1rf1.lcIa.'001I .. lend f ha.. . .- targed tbe trcmt 811t"fic1ently to al.1Dw th e at'fect- S. 0_..,. jo r Cenerat O. IlRAJlIn, n Corpe. 4. To oarry 0IJt furth.. ~ r w c _ ' _ ~ and pboto1... opera-u... of ocmtnle. th10 oteee 10 reached. J. C. I" W .II. Troope: lot DiYiotoa (-1 _1011II u dl1WCted by the Took I"arcee-.. .DDerata indepomdeatlT subjeot to co-crd1Dot10l> by ' . 0 .0 . , " ...T.A.I". 45th DiY1oion .t. To att&cll _ t roop . , . , . . . . OI l. The U r Plan glY.. he detail of . . , . 1e>nrn1ng c !laDger t tallo,," :. To be preso:red to _ ertlU. . . , . beJ'-1 tho or thora r the 'IIbnl. ! i l ied U r 1"........ era lc1pstiDll 11> 1IISIl'. 9lot BecOGb&1eWCO S n ert1l1ery or the sroand troops.P... . po ( 82d ' C. To 1nOtIro t th e 1D1tlal ahborne -" i . - .am.. teo Teak F co C ere . . . . - 1 b l o fa r p1.alm1ng th e a.. .l I l t . 1u Sappart1ng Troops ( Troop Liot to be 10. .-1 aeparateI,. th i rd . ot th e a1rJ:rsn; aft1lebl and oarric1eatconjJlDctloa with the .. 1&1 ook I"orce C-mar and th e J.t'r1can Jl. _ i o n e : Il1dero to .... or to oarry tho glidar IlCT at tho 824 ' i rbonl i lTactlcal Air I"orce e - n d a r , and fo r p1.amW:g and out tJ:trf 1I'lIb8ecl.- (1) lJndor of darImeoa or 0 De) ' to and 11> 1'!Dl2lll _ D1Yioion.operoU by th e . . . . . . . . _ thei r c-..d lIh.1cll _y be. rwq 0 _b l e s.llFI!RI oree ( to iDel". i.. .Y&1labl. eapt....8 JI. To t.raz.part. pt'oteot and ho a.1rbornothea to ~ l e t e thei r 111..1.... ADd 88C:lre: J.. To prortde .lIB oorTioe.The ai rfie ld at Ptllf b7 de;7l1gbt on oil. J. Prvteet!oa or eb1l>p1ns ott' r 14 porte.lJndar s - a t u.r.otloa or the Deputy e-nd.....i n ~ b 1 a f , b Tho e1r1'ie1d north or by day lit .ull..t Pare TuII: I" e - u l e r a a.re ~ 1 I l l e to r ~ i n s !'lie ai r fi . ld IIOl'th PAR!:IIF.m by d.ort of 2.of' thei r and. in U lan . 14 con,ltmction with the J(a (2) the to and 11> cout.ac with th eC-..." concerDlld. f ~ c r l tho l.1neII OIl wb1ch ~ b 1 b 1 o u 1 1 troJnir Ilrit10h 11> the 1D1b of QtIlr.lIlEZ.Ibou1d be oarried out. (3 Oontact with )r d DiYio t. ~ th e beaches and t!lroallbule I"orco . . . . . . -poaeib l . to r ...,....t d1roct1oa .I. Transport: Ship t shere and to atra1n1Dc at a1lt:arDe dlYiolan allDtted to tm - . throuch the DiYioional :. SC - . .dm- Copt- of al l a1rborne tra 1 .- t wi l l be (1 l ;ny. Il,. n&Y&1 lno on cal l th e Sub u k I" ethe C _ '" '1 "1 1 e- r e t , I"lt'th Uw;r. C-..!er ' lI .

d- 2


17/27

(I J Corp., 45 D1..-)Cbasa (a t )(

seventh army in sicily 1

Documents