sg security wg chair: darren highfill darren@utilisec

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SG Security Working Group Face-to-Face Meeting – July 2011 @ Vancouver, BC Usability Analysis Task Force Cybersec-Interop Task Force Embedded Systems Security Task Force SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec .com

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SG Security Working Group Face-to-Face Meeting – July 2011 @ Vancouver, BC  Usability Analysis Task Force  Cybersec-Interop Task Force  Embedded Systems Security Task Force. SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill [email protected]. Agenda. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

SG Security Working GroupFace-to-Face Meeting – July 2011 @ Vancouver, BC

Usability Analysis Task ForceCybersec-Interop Task ForceEmbedded Systems Security Task Force

SG Security WG Chair:Darren Highfill

[email protected]

Page 2: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

AgendaDay Timeslot Subject Group

Monday 1500-1700 SG Security Boot Camp SG Sec WG

Tuesday 0800-1000 Opening Plenary OpenSG 1030-1200 Agenda & Status Updates

Testing & Certification SupportASAP-SG Process Review & Update

SG Sec WG

1300-1500 SG Security / SG Network Joint Session

Wednesday 0800-1000 SG Security / OpenADR*Embedded Systems Security TF

Joint Session SG Sec WG

1030-1200 Embedded Systems Security TF (continued) SG Sec WG 1300-1500 Usability Analysis TF SG Sec WG 1530-1730 CyberSec-Interop / Lemnos

Topic: Vulnerability DisclosurePlanning & Prioritization

SG Sec WG

*SGSec-OpenADR joint session will be held in Pavillion Ballroom D

Page 3: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Status Updates• NIST CSWG & PAPs

– AMI Security Subgroup– PAP10, PAP18, others?

• NERC CIP SDT• IEC TC 57 WG 15• ICSJWG Solutions Technology Subgroup• NERC Cyber Attack Task Force• DOE-NIST-NERC collaboration: Risk Management Framework

Page 4: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Testing & Certification• How do we align SG Security work products to facilitate

testing & certification?• Structure and format of requirements

– [Subject] [verb] [object] [parameters/constraints]• What does conformance / certification with a users group

specification mean?– Where are we feeding this work?– What is the eventual target?

Page 5: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

• Project Description:– Utility-driven, public-private collaborative project to develop system-level

security requirements for smart grid technology

• Needs Addressed:– Utilities: specification in RFP

– Vendors: reference in build process

– Government: assurance of infrastructure security

– Commissions: protection of public interests

• Approach:– Architectural team produce drafts for review

– Usability Analysis TF assess effectiveness

– SG Security WG review, approve

• Deliverables:– Strategy & Guiding Principles white paper

– Security Profile Blueprint

– 6 Security Profiles

– Usability Analysis

ASAP-SG: Summary

Schedule: June 2009 – May 2011Budget: $3M/year

($1.5M Utilities + $1.5M DOE)

Performers: Utilities, EnerNex, Inguardians, SEI, ORNL

Partners: DOE, EPRIRelease Path: NIST, UCAIugContacts:

Bobby Brown [email protected] Highfill [email protected]

Page 6: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Slide 6 Bobby Brown

ASAP-SG Funding Distribution

Labor Security Engineers System Architects Penetration Testers (White Hat Hackers)

Travel – Face-to-face Meetings Meetings – Room, Audio/Visual, Webinar, Meals Supplies/Misc. – Printing, Tech Transfer Materials

Page 7: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Funding & Workflow• Feeding and accelerating smart grid Feeding and accelerating smart grid

standards developmentstandards development• Model of public-private partnershipModel of public-private partnership

Page 8: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Security Profile Impact• Early adoption: Early adoption: Utilities and commissions Utilities and commissions

referencing AMI SPreferencing AMI SP (CPUC, SCE, NV Energy…) (CPUC, SCE, NV Energy…)

• Process for developing a security profile has Process for developing a security profile has evolved substantially since initial AMI SP draftevolved substantially since initial AMI SP draft

• AMI Security Profile AMI Security Profile now under revisions now under revisions by CSWG AMI by CSWG AMI Security SubgroupSecurity Subgroup

Page 9: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Security Profile Impact• Use cases in 3PDA Use cases in 3PDA

form foundation of form foundation of ESPI workESPI work

• Common functional Common functional model facilitates model facilitates definitive mapping of definitive mapping of security requirementssecurity requirements

Page 10: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Security Requirements Relevant to SG

Page 11: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

ASAP-SG Security Profiles

• Security Profile status:

– Advanced Metering Infrastructure

– Third Party Data Access

– Distribution Management

– Wide Area Monitoring, Protection,& Control (Synchrophasors)

– Home Area Networks

– Substation Automation

PROPOSED

PROPOSED

COMPLETE

COMPLETE

COMPLETE NISTIR 7628 PublishedAugust 2010

COMPLETE

Page 12: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

1. Scopea) Nominate functionality (i.e., use case titles)b) Delineate real-world application/component coverage

2. Logical Architecturea) Nominate logical architectureb) Define roles by functionalityc) Refine use cases & logical architecture

3. Security Constraintsa) Define security & operational objectivesb) Perform failure analysis

4. Security Controlsa) Define controls (including recommended network segmentation)b) Map and tailor controls to roles

5. Validation

ASAP-SG Process: Basic Steps

Page 13: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Process Notes: Scope• Why is this important?

– First point of entry for new audiences– Will likely dictate whether the document gets broad

review and engagement• What does it do?

– End users must be able to figure out if this document applies to them or not

– Need an easy and clear “yes” or “no” answer– Should not have to understand the rest of the

document• What is the approach?

– Define functionality covered in real-world terms– Provide examples using real-world terminology

Page 14: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Process Notes: Logical Architecture• Why is this important?

– Lack of coverage for functionality is the root of security vulnerabilities

– Lack of coverage is rarely intentional• Ambiguity in terminology• Changes in functionality over time

• What does it do?– Provides abstract (vendor-neutral) representation of

the system to bind controls– Removes ambiguity about functionality covered

• What is the approach?– Define roles in terms of functionality– Describe relationships between the roles– Define the functionality in terms of use cases

• Use a normalized format that facilitates verification of coverage

Page 15: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Process Notes: Security Constraints• Why is this important?

– Security ultimately has a cost– How do we know we are investing in the right place?

• What does it do?– Provides justification for selection of controls– Provides traceability for when (not if) system

functionality changes– Provides a means to quantifiably claim coverage

• What is the approach?– Define objectives for system operation

• What the system should do• What the system should NOT do

– Define failures the system should prevent• Bind to functionality (avoidance is one means of mitigating risk)• Look at both common and functionality-specific failures

Page 16: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Process Notes: Security Controls• Why is this important?

– Actions and requirements must be precisely defined• What does it do?

– Provides actionable guidance for the end user– Establishes a context to link high-level objectives to low-

level security mechanisms• What is the approach?

– Generate controls• Brainstorm controls from failures• Normalize controls into approachable and useful organization for the

end user

– Map to logical architecture• System (i.e., network segmentation)• Roles

– Adapt controls to specific context for each role• (e.g., consider resource constraints, access requirements,

maintenance…)

Page 17: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Document EssentialsScope• Functionality Covered• Applications, Interfaces, & Sub-Components• Explicit Examples

Logical Architecture• Communications Architecture• Roles• Use Cases• Mapping to Concrete Applications

Security Considerations• Contextual & Operational Assumptions• Security Principles• Failure Analysis

Security Controls• Network Segmentation• Control Definitions• Mapping of Controls to Roles & Segments

Page 18: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Scope

Page 19: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Roles and FunctionalityApplication of Logical Architecture:Post-Event Analysis

Page 20: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

WAMPAC Logical ArchitectureCommunicationsArchitecture Use Cases

Use Case 2 – Alignment Processes PMU Data

PM

UP

haso

r Gat

eway

Dat

a S

tore

Alig

nmen

t

YesYes

No4: Archive incoming data? Use Case 3

3: Alignment validates incoming

data packet

6: Data old (max lag time exceeded)?

7: Alignment discards data

2: Alignment monitors clock

5: Alignment sends data frames to

Data Store End

8: Alignment buffers data until all data received or max lag time

reached

Use Case 5

1B: Phasor Gateway forwards

PMU data to Alignment

Start

Start 1A: PMU sends data to Alignment

Page 21: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Recommended Network Segmentation

Page 22: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Role Assignment to Segments

Page 23: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Mapping Controls to Roles

Page 24: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Control Definition

Page 25: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Security Profile Development Process

Page 26: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Mapping Use Cases• Link structure varies

depending upon level of granularity in text vs. implementation

• Traceability provided regardless

• Analysis for coverage should be performed after catalog of profiles is more complete

{

Page 27: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Mapping Roles to Actors

Page 28: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Security Principles NISTIR Use Case Objectives

Page 29: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

NISTIR Controls as Inspiration & to Ensure Coverage

• Start with relevant NISTIR control to address identified failure scenario

• Re-write control specifically for implementation

• Ensure control is testable

• Use NISTIR to ensure coverage

Page 30: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Comparison & Validation

MapValidate

Actors

Interface CategoriesControls

Roles

Failure Analysis

Controls

Page 31: SG Security WG Chair: Darren Highfill darren@utilisec

Other Benefits

• NIST-IR 7628 and Security Profiles Traceability

• Coverage and Gap Analysis• Addresses some GAO Cybersecurity Challenges Report

concerns– Comprehensive Security– SynchroPhasor Security– Metrics for Evaluating Security Posture