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Communicating From Within theShadows: The Israel Security Agency andthe MediaClila Magen & Eytan GilboaPublished online: 12 May 2014.

To cite this article: Clila Magen & Eytan Gilboa (2014) Communicating From Within the Shadows: TheIsrael Security Agency and the Media, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence,27:3, 485-508, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2014.900293

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CLILA MAGEN and EYTAN GILBOA

Communicating From Within theShadows: The Israel Security Agencyand the Media

Dr. Clila Magen, a Lecturer in the School of Communication and a ResearchFellow at the Center for International Communication at Bar-Ilan University,was previously a spokesperson for the chair of the Committee on Defense andForeign Affairs of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament. A graduate of Bar-IlanUniversity in Political Studies and Communications, she received her M.A. inCommunications and Journalism Studies from the Hebrew University, andher doctorate in Communications from Bar-Ilan University. She has alsobeen a Visiting Scholar in the Department of Mass Communication,Advertising and Public Relations at Boston University. Dr. Magen’s book onthe Israeli intelligence services and the media 1948–2008 is forthcoming fromthe University of Haifa Press.

Dr. Eytan Gilboa is Director of the School of Communication, Director of theCenter for International Communication, and Senior Research Associate at theBegin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) at Bar-Ilan University,Ramat-Gan, Israel. He is also Visiting Professor of Public Diplomacy at theAnnenberg School for Communication and Journalism at the University ofSouthern California, Los Angeles. A graduate of the Hebrew University atJerusalem, he received his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees at Harvard University.Professor Gilboa has served as a consultant to the Israeli Prime Minister’sOffice and the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and as VisitingProfessor or Senior Fellow at several leading American and Europeanuniversities and research centers. A widely published author of books andarticles, he is a frequent news commentator on radio and television stationsworldwide.

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27: 485–508, 2014

Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 0885-0607 print=1521-0561 online

DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2014.900293

AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 27, NUMBER 3 485

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Communicating with the media is an ongoing complicated task intelligenceservices tackle from the day they are established. The relationship isinherently tense because one side wishes to reveal what the other wishes toconceal, highlighting the constant contradiction between two majorprinciples: the public’s right to know versus the government’s duty toprotect national security. Reconciling these two principles becomesexceedingly complex during crisis situations because both the media andthe public demand to know what is happening and why, whereasintelligence services can offer only limited and often incompleteinformation, a limitation imposed by the need to protect vital secrets.Moreover, the services frequently face a quandary: they are innatelysecretive and cannot advertise their accomplishments and successes, butthese are commonly exposed when they fail. This distorts the naturalbalance other organizations are generally able to maintain between failuresand achievements and any publicity about them.1

The relationship between intelligence services and the media can be viewedvia two different lenses: operational and reputational. The two are closelylinked but, for analytical purposes, differentiating between them is essential.The operational dimension refers to media relations employed by theservices to promote such professional activities as psychological warfare,disinformation leaks, and open source intelligence.2 It also includes thehighly controversial practice of recruiting and using journalists forintelligence information gathering.3 The focus here is on the reputationaldimension, exploring both historically and theoretically how intelligenceservices employ strategic communication to address public concerns.In so doing, several theoretical principles are taken from the field of public

relations (PR) and crisis communication, with the results applied to thehistorical experience of the internal Israeli Security Agency (ISA).4

The evidence shows how crises can affect the approaches of services to themedia, how inadequate responses can cause substantial damage, and howopen-minded security directors can successfully meet the challenges of theinformation age. The lessons revealed here may be relevant to internalintelligence agencies in other Western liberal democracies.

UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENCE–MEDIA RELATIONS

The increasing interest in the ways intelligence services address the public viathe media is not sufficiently reflected in research on the topic.5 Severalsignificant studies have contributed to the understanding of the intelligence-media relationship, but much is still uncovered. Several studies havefocused on media coverage of the intelligence community, providing theperspective of only one side of the relationship.6 Existing research isconfined mostly to one discipline and is therefore very limited.

486 CLILA MAGEN AND EYTAN GILBOA

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE

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A book edited by Robert Dover and Michael Goodman, SpinningIntelligence, focuses on the mutual exploitation of intelligence services andthe media for the i r own interes ts and object ives . 7 I t presentsvarious perspectives of the unique relations (e.g., balancing nationalsecurity and the public demand for transparency; the U.S. IntelligenceCommunity [IC] and the media following 11 September 2001 [9=11]; theBritish D-notice system, and others). Boston University’s Arthur S. Hulnickdeals with the media strategies of the American intelligence community,claiming that it could more generously open itself to the media and thepublic.8 He also makes concrete recommendations for improvement, suchas extending the scope of public appearances of Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) officials, and collaborating with producers of films and TV series.Loch K. Johnson of the University of Georgia discusses the dilemmas andethical issues related to the use of journalists for gathering intelligenceinformation.9

Several studies have focused on the gradual process of releasing classifiedinformation to the public as part of a more liberal approach of intelligenceservices towards information that is obsolete and doesn’t need to be keptsecret.10 Nicholas Wilkinson’s important essay on the history of the BritishD-notice system shows where freedom of the press and national securityfrequently collided.11 These studies have clearly expanded knowledge of themedia–intelligence relationship. Nevertheless, they are still very fragmentedand haven’t yet been accumulated into a coherent body of knowledge.Moreover, scholars have not only devoted very little attention to thestrategic communication methods used by the intelligence services, but theyhaven’t applied existing crisis communication and strategic communicationtheories and approaches to study them.Dirk C. Gibson’s studies are a rare exception. In his work, ‘‘The

Communication Dilemma of CIA,’’ Gibson used public relations methods toanalyze the objective difficulties the CIA encountered when it decided toopen itself to the media and the public.12 In a later study, he produced aquantitative analysis of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) PRefforts over 50 years, focusing on how its longtime Director J. Edgar Hooverapplied those methods to magazines, newspapers, books, and movies. Gibsondemonstrated how the FBI maintained a positive and firm reputation byaggressive PR led mainly by Hoover.13

Existing research lacks an in-depth interdisciplinary discussion or even adetailed description of the strategic communication intelligence servicesuse. This creates a major deficiency: issues that are mainly aboutcommunication and PR are analyzed without sufficient attention torelevant theories and models. This deficiency significantly narrows thescholars’ understanding of the relationship between the two sides.Intelligence services also fail to take full advantage of the theoretical and

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AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 27, NUMBER 3

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practical assets that a symbiotic research can provide. We here attempt to fillthis theoretical and methodological void.As limited as research is about the intelligence-media relationship in

Western liberal countries, research about their Israeli counterparts is evenrarer. Many studies have dealt with the relationship between the IsraelDefense Forces (IDF) and the media, or provide a general view on therelationship between the Israeli security forces and the local press.14 Otherstudies have focused on the media’s role in specific events such as the 1973Yom Kippur War, the 2007 Second Lebanon War, and the 2009 and 2012military operations in Gaza.15 Only a few studies have specifically examinedthe relations of the Israeli intelligence services with the media, and they tooanalyzed media coverage, rather than the media strategies and tactics theorganizations themselves employ.16 Shlomo Shpiro and Yaron Katz haveexamined communication strategies.17 However, these are rare exceptions.Shpiro distinguished between German and Israeli intelligence services

strategies. The German services have developed a relatively open approachto the media, primarily in order to regain the legitimacy lost among thedomestic population during the Nazi regime. The German model (labeled‘‘Defensive Openness’’) includes media monitoring, proportional responseto criticism, selectively sharing data, and rewarding journalists rather thanthreatening them. In contrast, the Israeli intelligence services haveconsistently enjoyed very high levels of public legitimacy and support fromthe general public. This has allowed them to adopt distant and even aloofrelations with the media. According to Shpiro, the Israeli model (labeled‘‘Controlled Exclusion’’) consisted of suppressing operational data,threatening or sanctioning uncooperative media outlets or journalists, andusing the media for deterrence and propaganda. Katz argued that theglobal media forced the Israeli intelligence services to change theirapproaches to classified information, censorship, and disclosing theidentities of the agency directors.

AUDIENCES

Strategic communication and crisis communication theories and models canbe useful in analyzing relations between the ISA and the Israeli media.Strategic communication is ‘‘a purposeful use of communication by anorganization to fulfill its missions.’’18 Crisis communication is ‘‘a dialogbetween the organization and its public prior to, during, and after thenegative occurrence.’’19 In any strategic communication, the first essentialtask is to identify the relevant audiences. The intelligence community hasthree main stakeholders: policymakers, foreign intelligence services, and thegeneral public. The most acknowledged clients are policymakers,politicians, officials of various relevant government agencies, and members



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of parliament, particularly members of intelligence and security committeesto whom the services are accountable, such as the Senate and HousePermanent Select Committees on Intelligence in the United States, theIntelligence and Security Committee in the United Kingdom, and theSubcommittee for Intelligence and Secret Services in Israel. Policymakersconstruct their impressions of the services from routine and specialmeetings with intelligence senior officials, as well as from media reports.A solid positive reputation may influence governmental allocation of

resources. In the 1950s, CIA Director Allen W. Dulles occasionally askedhis deputies to supply lawmakers with ‘‘CIA success stories that might beused at the next budget hearing.’’20 In the 1980s, CIA Director William J.Casey opposed public debate over the inquiry the many Soviet spiesoperating in the U.S. during those years, but he was warned that if herefused to supply information he would be denied the budget request hesubmitted for approval.21 Unlike the media and the public, policymakersare exposed to successes of the services, and therefore gain a morebalanced view of the organizations. Nevertheless, they do not operate in avacuum and have to consider media reporting, commentary, and criticism.22

The second most prominent audience consists of the foreign intelligenceservices, allies and rivals alike. A vital interest of any intelligence agency isto establish mutual cooperation with allies, especially in sharing informationand resources.23 An intelligence service’s solid positive reputation mayencourage other services at home and abroad to cooperate with it. TheMossad’s ability to obtain an exclusive copy of Nikita S. Khrushchev’shistoric secret speech against Joseph Stalin at the Twentieth CommunistParty Congress in 1956, as well as the service’s other successful operations inthe 1960s, inspired the CIA to establish long-lasting relations with the Israeliintelligence community.24 In contrast, a colossal scandal or exposure ofsensitive relations between services may severely restrict their cooperation.25

Similarly, although intelligence services occasionally learn directly from theircounterparts about their successes, they still use media coverage as asignificant source of information.The third audience is the general public. Intelligence services operate in the

name of the millions of citizens they serve. Due to the secrecy of intelligenceoperations, the public is rarely exposed to what the services do in their name.Nevertheless, when intelligence services are involved in operationsdisapproved by public opinion, their exposure inevitably leads to massivedamage with ripple effects. Historically, in liberal democracies, the mediashape public opinion and public opinion influences policymaking. In theRonald Reagan–William Casey era the media and the public savaged theCIA for its entanglement in the Iran–Contra affair. The CIA’s image andstanding in American public opinion were severely damaged. The U.S.intelligence agencies also lost credibility following the intelligence failures



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around 9=11, and the manipulations leading to the 2003 U.S.–UK invasionof Iraq.26 Intelligence services with a bad reputation could easily losepotential high quality human resources, while a positive reputation couldreadily attract them.Although intelligence services operate in the shadows, far from the public

eye, they are well aware of the consequences a bad reputation may inflict onall their different audiences. Often, their relationship with the media isdetermined by a pragmatic choice of preferring a certain audience overanother. If revealing positive information to the general public may riskfruitful collaboration with allies, that step is likely to be rejected. Mediacoverage significantly influences all three audiences of intelligence services:policymakers, politicians, and officials; foreign intelligence services; and thegeneral public. Therefore, effective media relations, especially in crisissituations, are essential to preserve the ability of the intelligence services toachieve their goals.

CHALLENGES

Different eras have raised new and unfamiliar challenges to intelligenceservices, necessitating gradual or swift adaptation. In the post-Cold Warera, the CIA had to justify its very existence and to reinvent itself.27 Thepost-9=11 era demanded a familiarity and understanding of cultureand religion.28 Today, the information age is challenging intelligenceservices in all liberal democracies.29 Throughout their histories, intelligencecommunities were often obliged to juggle between the need to keep silentand the need to maintain a positive reputation or restore it followingnegative publicity. The natural tension between the media and intelligenceservices has become even more convoluted in the information age. Inthe past, intelligence services were not as deeply scrutinized or pressuredas they are today to establish the communication capabilities necessary todeal with the media. This now seems to be a major deficiency, one whichsometimes leads to devastating public affairs debacles. The newsocial climate stimulates heated debates within the services regardingthe best ways to deal with the media. Several events in the lastdecade, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have once againsurfaced the public dimension that is relatively neglected in IntelligenceStudies.30

We suggest three main factors for understanding the context in which theintelligence services address the media: external factors, internal factors, andcrisis type. External factors refer to the media environment, and are essentialwhen analyzing the context in which crises occur. Crises in a less-developedmedia environment differ significantly from those that occur in an advancedone.31 CIA Director John McCone (1961–1965) confronted different media



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challenges than did Director David Petraeus (2011–2012), who ultimatelyfaced an embarrassing crisis of his own. The information age has givennon-governmental organizations (NGOs), activists, and individualsplatforms from which they can present to wide global audiencescommentary that may cause the inte l l igence community greatembarrassment and complications.32 In underdeveloped technologicalenvironments, governments can control information much more effectivelythan those in advanced technological environments.33

Intelligence services have always made enormous efforts to keep vitalsecrets hidden from the public.34 But protecting secrets in the contemporaryglobal village has become an increasingly difficult task. As Ray Hiebert andSheila Gibbons suggested, ‘‘No one can be stopped from connectinganything to anybody.’’35 Recent examples include the release of videos andpictures of prisoner abuse in Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison,36 as well as themassive revelations by Wikileaks.37 Radical changes in the mediaenvironment have added new and unfamiliar challenges to the intelligencecommunity. Therefore, in a historical analysis defining whether the crisisoccurred prior to or after the emergence of the information age and thenew media sphere is imperative.The second dimension is the internal factor. Francis J. Marra emphasized

the importance of understanding the organization’s internal communicationculture in any evaluation of the strategic communication it employs.38 Otherstudies demonstrate the essence of coherent organizational behavior as afactor for crisis communication success.39 For many years the dominatingcommunication culture within the intelligence services was rigid andsuspicious of any relationship with the media or journalists, but theinformation age has inspired internal reviews and debates about the correctapproach to the media.40 Consequently, once-rare leaks from insideintelligence services have now become more common.41 The extendedinformal cooperation with the media adds a relatively new challenge to theservices, as unofficial sources from within the organization talk toreporters and supply credible information that sometimes contradicts thepolicy and actions of the director and his senior staff.42

Crisis communication literature provides scholars with a wide range ofstudies regarding organizational responses to crisis situations. Severalstudies emphasize the centrality of the management approach to the media,mainly in fragile situations.43 The attitudes of directors toward the mediahave been a major factor in determining strategic and tactical responses tochallenges and crises.44 In the post-Watergate era, CIA Director WilliamColby took the Agency’s skeletons out of the closet.45 Director StansfieldTurner (1977–1981) established for the first time a public affairs office atthe CIA, while his successor, William J. Casey (1981–1987) reducedinteractions with the press to a minimum.46 An extremely negative



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approach toward the media by the Agency’s leadership may cause greatdamage to its reputation in time of crisis.47

Type of crisis is the third critical factor needed to fully understand thechallenges intelligence services face. Crisis communication studies discussthe need to accurately evaluate crises in order to properly address them.48

For obvious reasons, hearing about intelligence failures is much morecommon than successes. However, a typology of public intelligence crises isyet to be constructed. We suggest a new measure, based on salient elementsderived from various intelligence crises: level of operational failure, targets—legitimate (i.e., terrorist groups) or illegitimate (innocent bystanders,ordinary citizens); outcome—minor or devastating (such as level of deathand destruction); country—friendly or hostile; the extent to which themodus operandi is exposed, the scope of diplomatic and polit icalentanglement, legal issues (such as charges and trials), and the number andstatus of agents involved.Application of these criteria may yield various types of intelligence crises,

ranging on a spectrum from low to high severity. A low severity crisis ischaracterized by a minor operational failure, legitimate targets, acceptableoutcome, a friendly country with close relations between the respectiveintelligence services, no exposure of the modus operandi, minor diplomaticentangling, very few agents involved and already outside the country,minor charges, and quick low key trials. The opposite case is considered ahigh-severity crisis. A few additional factors may affect the crisis type, suchas the duration of the crisis: a difference exists between a crisis that endsafter a few days and one that lingers for weeks, months, or even years.49

Proximity is another factor: a series of crises occurring one after the otherin a relatively short period of time may intensify the challenges.

CRISIS COMMUNICATION

Many studies of crisis communication focus on the strategies and tactics thatorganizations employ when crises erupt. The literature suggests twocontradictory approaches. The ‘‘classical approach’’ refers to an open, fast,and sincere response: ‘‘Tell it all and tell it fast.’’ The ‘‘topical approach’’refers to the opposite policy of no response, denial, and shifting blame toother actors or factors.50 In a 24=7 media environment, the topicalapproach is becoming less effective because it swiftly stimulates rumorsand speculations that fill the vacuum created by the organization’s silence.Credibility is one of the central tenets of crisis communication.51 Thetopical approach could harm credibility, though for many years the mediaand the public tended to exempt intelligence services from the standards ofopenness and transparency demanded of every other government agency,and were willing to legitimize denials or refusals to reveal information.52



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Today, however, due to publicized manipulations and failures, the public isless tolerant toward secrecy, especially when the services abuse legitimatecodes of secrecy. To understand why intelligence services dislike theclassical approach requiring full transparency isn’t difficult. The media andthe public now demand some response, and therefore the need to createand demonstrate a better balance between secrecy and accountability isgreater.Intelligence services employ several tactics, somewhat modified by their

unique status and mode of operation. The ‘‘carrots and sticks’’ approachremains a dominant and popular tactic: cooperative and disciplinedreporters enjoy privileges such as one-on-one briefings, access to valuablematerials and exclusive sources, while critical reporters face difficulties,avoidance, obstacles, and sanctions. The ‘‘carrots and sticks’’ approach isemployed by all kinds of organizations, private-sector firms andgovernment agencies alike, but the intelligence services have an extraleverage: they can restrict the work of recalcitrant reporters by enforcingcensorship and classification.53

‘‘Spin doctoring’’ is a second popular tactic utilized by the intelligenceservices. It refers to forestalling negative publicity by diverting attention toother issues, manipulating information, and publicizing a favorableinterpretation of the words or actions of a company, a political party, or afamous person. Scholars and authors attribute the term to sportsterminology in which the ball is spun in order ‘‘to make it go in a certaindirection."54 Spin doctors have had a significant impact on government–media relations and communication strategies, including media–intelligencerelations.55 This tactic is especially appealing to secretive organizationswhich can decide more easily than other organizations what information torelease and when. Yet, if the media exposes the abuse of this tactic, as it hasin several recent cases, the services’ image and reputation are badlydamaged.56

The third common tactic is off-the-record briefings. Even when a serviceofficially restricts access to people and information, its director or anothersenior official may provide exclusive information to a selected group offavored journalists. A fourth common tactic is to draft former seniorintelligence officials to appear in the media and provide explanationswhich serving officials can’t. The services use this tactic especially whenforced to lower their profile. For example, in 1981, former DCI Colby wasasked to defend on public television President Reagan’s controversialappointment of William Casey as CIA Director.57 The holistic approach tocrisis management proposes that coping with challenges should be viewedas an ongoing integral part of running an organization. Therefore, periodsof calm can help to prepare for both crises and the promotion oforganizational interests.58



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Two critical issues challenge intelligence services: who should conductmedia relations, and how should they do so? Today’s complex mediaenvironment requires the building of highly professional internalcommunication capabilities and=or utilization of external PR agencies.59 Inthe intelligence arena, these issues are often, of necessity, extremelycomplex and sensitive. An official spokesperson cannot always fall back on‘‘no comment,’’ a response which in some cases is considered a form ofconfirmation that indirectly reveals information the intelligence serviceswish to conceal. Yet, if an organization fails to employ an officialspokesperson it may botch its media relations. Western intelligence serviceshave approached this dilemma in various ways. The CIA has appointed aspokesperson, while its British counterpart has not.60 The British SecretIntelligence Service (SIS) declares on its Website: ‘‘Because of the secretnature of our work, it’s been the policy of SIS and successive governmentsnot to comment on operations, staff, agents, or relations with foreignintelligence services. SIS does not have a Press Office.’’61

The second issue is how intelligence services should conduct mediarelations and PR. Intelligence services frequently face a paradox: theysuffer from a built-in disability because they can’t glorify achievements,brilliant and successful as they may be.62 Studies indicate that maintainingsolid and close relations between practitioners and reporters may lead tofavorable coverage of the organization.63 The long-term nurturing of closerelations with the media in routine periods, and maintaining a stablepositive reputation overall, may significantly aid organizations in dealingwith crisis situations.64 The more intelligence services cultivate mediarelations and build strategic communication capabilities during routineperiods, the more potentially effective are their crisis communication andresponses in extraordinary times.

THE ISA AND THE MEDIA

Case Studies and Sources

A few ISA crises help demonstrate the preceding theoretical principles. Threecase studies, selected according to a historical axis of major events in the ISAchronicle, allow a comparative analysis over time and a tracing of changes inthe ISA’s relationship with the Israeli media. Moreover, a historical analysismight reveal whether the ISA has drawn the proper communication lessonsand effectively applied them. Studied are the 1961 case of a Soviet spy, Dr.Israel Beer, who was apprehended while serving in a high-level position atthe Prime Minister’s Office; the 1984 Bus Line 300 incident, and the ISA’s1995 failure to prevent the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.Naturally, scholars’ access to intelligence services records is extremely

limited. A main reason for the paucity of studies on the complex relationship



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between Western intelligence services and the media is access to intelligencedata. Nevertheless, a significant amount of material has become availableand open to scholars for research. We used numerous methods to investigateour selected cases, including a survey of memoirs written by former ISAofficials, books and articles; a content analysis of coverage of intelligence inthe mainstream Israeli press (2,000 items); and many in-depth interviewswith former ISA directors, senior journalists, and politicians. The interviewsyielded highly valuable information found in no other source. A discoursethat usually remains behind the scenes within the intelligence community wasbrought to fore. In case of contradictory information, cross-checking wasapplied and multiple sources were used to trace the actual events andprocesses.65

The Soviet Spy Affair (1961)

In 1961, Colonel Dr. Israel Beer, a well-known figure, was arrested in Israeland accused of espionage for the Soviet Union. It was a shocking revelationfor the young state, as Beer was a prominent figure, a senior officer, and aclose adviser to the nation’s first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion.Nevertheless, the communication challenge to ISA was minimal. TheIsraeli media environment was at the time relatively primitive andtechnologically underdeveloped, with only two radio stations, no TVbroadcasting, several party newspapers, and only three independentnewspapers. Alternative sources of information were not common, and thecompetition among fellow journalists was mild. Government control overinformation was a relatively simple task, and informal leaks from withinthe ISA were extremely rare. The ISA’s organizational communicationculture strictly prohibited any informal connections with the press.66

According to the intelligence crisis index earlier suggested herein, the Beercase was considered a low severity crisis. The ISA’s response was adequate. Itimmediately mobilized the press, which willingly and fully cooperated withboth ISA Director Amos Manor and Director of the Security ServicesIsser Harel. The media even agreed to postpone breaking the news ofBeer’s arrest because of the trial of Adolph Eichmann, a former Naziofficer captured by the Mossad and tried in Israel that same week. Harelfeared that the news about Beer would damage the centrality ofEichmann’s trial in media coverage and the eyes of the public.67 Thus, themedia agreed to postpone the headlines about Beer’s arrest because of PR,not for national security reasons. Director Manor had a relatively openapproach to the media, maintaining close relations with a few seniorjournalists whom he knew he could trust.68 His style was compatible withthe pragmatic approach of Harel, who constantly alternated betweenkeeping silent and utilizing the media to promote his causes and agenda.



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In the 1960s, ISA had no public affairs liaison, nor any other externalcommunications professional. It dealt with public issues on an ad-hocbasis, with no systematic development of communication capabilities.The ISA cautiously addressed the Beer crisis via the classic crisis

communication approach, that of maneuvering between what can andcan’t be said. In one media report, an extremely rare evidence of acomment on the arrest was attributed to either Manor or Harel. In thepiece, the source admitted that Beer’s infiltration was troubling and thatthe ISA would study the case and draw the proper lessons from it. Thisfinding is alone quite surprising because the state was then still very youngand formal responses from the agency were extremely rare. This proved tobe one of very few direct responses delivered from the ISA headquartersuntil the late 1990s. During the crisis, the ISA updated the media andprovided information about the events, though its approach wasincomplete and favorable to the agency. Manor and Harel met editors andsenior journalists and briefed them in detail about the spy’s arrest and theaccusations against him.69

In so doing the ISA used several communication tactics and handedjournalists more carrots than sticks. It utilized the tactic of semi-formalleaks by suggesting that it had frequently warned Prime MinisterBen-Gurion about Beer and his connections with the Soviets, andrecommending that any sensitive information be kept away from him.These leaks were obviously designed to clear the ISA of any blame for thedebacle, and to shift the responsibility to others. An attempt was alsomade to spin the crisis by glorifying the ISA’s brilliant success in capturingthe spy. Shifting the media’s agenda from a debate over the spy’ssuccessful penetration of the government’s sensitive zones to the ISA’ssuccess in capturing him is a common practice among intelligence services.70

Harel and Manor addressed the various intelligence audiences in differentchannels, including the media. Besides the sending of general messages to thepublic, the ISA needed to convince policymakers that it was putting greatefforts into exposing and capturing any Soviet spies who managed topenetrate Israel from among immigrating Russians. This message wasdelivered in face-to-face meetings with policymakers, officials, and parliamentmembers, and also in interviews with selected reporters. The ISA alsoemphasized this message in seeking to deter the Soviets. These measuresprovided a sufficient communication response to the publicized crisis andsuited the circumstances. During calm periods prior to the Beer crisis, DirectorManor had developed a seemingly friendly relationship with the press andmaintained the organization’s famed image. Thus, the organization’sreputation was barely damaged, and restoring its luster following the crisis wasa relatively simple task. After a very short period of time negative mediareports about the ISA declined and positive reports increased.



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In the 1960s, the ISA did not need a sophisticated strategic communicationcapability, as well illustrated by the Beer case. All three main factors—internal, external, and type of crisis—were not seriously challenging theorganization. The ISA, enjoying considerable public support and acooperative and patriotic press, managed the crisis well. A simple andeffective use of ‘‘carrots and sticks’’ was sufficient. Nevertheless, Manorand Harel used a mixture of a censorship and information control,accompanied by PR strategies and tactics, in order to gain maximalinfluence on public opinion via media coverage. These actions undoubtedlyhelped the ISA deal with the highly publicized crisis. Keeping thetraditional code of secrecy, while cultivating friendly connections with thepress, helped the organization maintain and restore its image after the crisis.

The Bus Line 300 Incident (1984)

A very different case occurred in the 1980s, when the ISA experienced one ofits most severe scandals. In 1984, following a rescue operation of a hijackedIsraeli bus (Line No. 300), two of the Palestinians terrorists who carried outthe attack were killed after having been captured by the Israeli securityforces. This was revealed by the media through photos taken by journalistsduring the event, and from conflicting media reports about the terrorists’physical condition. In this case, the media played a major role in thedevelopment of the crisis. In fact, their presence and photos created thecrisis.71

In this incident, both the external and internal factors differed from thoseof the 1960s. The media were not as mobilized or as technologically limited asthey had been, and journalists were much more critical of the securityservices. The media were no longer a ‘‘lapdog press.’’ Following thosechanges in the social climate, the ISA’s traditional organizationalcommunication culture had also changed. Informal leaks, though still nota common phenomenon, did occasionally occur. Two years after theincident, three ISA senior employees, including the Deputy Director,informed the nation’s Attorney General that ISA Director AvrahamShalom and other senior officials in the organization had deliberatelymisled the national committee established to investigate the Line 300incident, feeding it with disinformation. The shocking revelation about thecover-up turned the crisis into one that lingered for several years.72

For many years, the ISA was exempted from public accountability andscrutiny, but the Line 300 fiasco dramatically changed the situation. TheISA’s wrongdoings were intensively covered by the Israeli press, theorganization was caught unprepared, and the cover-up revelations severelydamaged its reputation. Public trust in the ISA declined dramatically, andthe media demanded more transparency from all those involved. The ISA



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became highly challenged by external and internal factors, as well as by theintensifying severity of the crisis. The ISA’s response was problematic,causing great damage to its public image. Director Shalom, who despisedthe media, was extremely suspicious of their intensions. During the firstphase of the crisis, he refused to cooperate with the media or explain themotives behind his actions, even on background. Because the ISA had noofficial media liaison or media consultant before or during the crisis, theorganization chose to use the ineffective topical PR approach.The ISA used denial, spin, lies, and shifting the blame to other parties

involved. It employed sticks rather than carrots to restrain recalcitrantreporters. The service applied harsh censorship, and even used an extrememeasure of shutting down for four days the daily newspaper Hadashot(news), which published the original photos and a report exposing thesecret inquiry into the bus incident.73 As the crisis evolved, the ISAattempted to address the media, but at this point the effort was too littleand too late. The ISA lost all its credibility and the media were reluctantto listen to any additional explanations. Prior to the crisis, the ISA hadfailed to cultivate good relations with the media, and therefore couldn’tfind sympathetic journalists. Shalom’s successors soon defined imagerestoration and rebuilding the public’s trust in the organization as two oftheir main goals.74

Director Shalom had chosen a strategy of denial and silence, attempting atall costs to refrain from airing the ISA’s dirty laundry in public.Consequently, the damage to the organization’s trust and image, bothinternally and externally, was devastating and took many years to rebuild.Years after the incident, Shalom admitted that the ISA’s strategiccommunication regarding the Line 300 incident was harmful to theorganization’s reputation among all its various audiences.75 Moreover,evidence indicates that Shalom approved the killing of the seized terroristsdespite information he had that journalists, prior to his instructions, hadtaken pictures of the terrorists alive. From his perspective, neither themedia nor the public had anything to do with the ISA’s operations oractions. He didn’t think the general public was an audience that deservedattention.The Line 300 incident significantly changed the ISA’s approach to the

Israeli media. Yaakov Perry, appointed ISA Director in 1988, applied acautiously open approach to the media. His era is considered the mostinfluential in opening the ISA to the media and public opinion. Perryhighly valued the media and its influence on not only public opinion andpolicymakers, but even on the ISA’s employees. He understood that themost effective way to address the ISA’s various audiences was via themedia. He frequently briefed journalists and met with them for off-the-record conversations. For many years, prior to Perry’s tenure, the ISA had



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not been publicly credited for its successful operations. Media reports usedonly the vague term ‘‘security forces.’’ Perry changed this practice andthereby significantly improved the ISA’s image and reputation.76 The Line300 incident represented a serious lingering challenge to the ISA. But nowthe service was learning from its mistakes, began to draw the properlessons, and gradually adopted more effective communication strategies.

The Assassination of Prime Minister Rabin (1995)

The third case study deals with the ISA’s colossal failure to prevent theassassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. Yet, the crisis revealedsignificant progress in the ISA’s relations with the public via the media. Theexternal and internal contexts completely altered the circumstances of thecrisis. The event happened in the 1990s, at the emergence of the informationage. The Internet had already become a central source of information,making government attempts to control information much more difficult,and much easier for the media to locate alternate internal ‘‘voices.’’ TheIsraeli media thus moved to a more aggressive investigative mode,particularly given the severity of the event—the political murder of anincumbent prime minister. Moreover, the crisis lingered, as negativeinformation continued to surface months after the assassination, mainlyduring the official investigation of the murder.ISA Director Carmi Gilon was fully aware of his agency’s crisis

communication history. He recognized the damage caused by the service’slies and spins during the Line 300 incident, and drew lessons from pastexperiences with the media.77 From his perspective, the public was acentral audience, not a negligible one. Public opinion mattered. Gilon’sapproach represented a major transformation in the ISA’s basicphilosophy towards the outside world, with conscious efforts to providethe media with considerable information. He gave interviews and suppliedcredible and trustworthy details about the murder. He also instructed hissenior associates to allow access to reporters and to respond to theirinquiries throughout the crisis.78

Although the Rabin assassination inflicted considerable damage on theISA’s image, the personal approach employed by both Gilon and hissuccessors helped to significantly reduce the damage, and even open theway for a restoration of the ISA’s reputation. But one particular issueexposed by the media caused the crisis to linger, thereby complicating analready complex situation. Amnon Abramovitz, a senior commentator atTV Channel Two with excellent sources in the intelligence community,revealed that Avishai Raviv, a well-known right-wing extremist, was also adisguised ISA informant. This revelation was astounding, given Raviv’sprovocative nature and his efforts to inspire right-wingers to adopt



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extreme views and actions. His problematic behavior and his concealed ISAservice generated a heated public debate over the organization’s operationalmethods.Director Gilon was seriously challenged. Politicians and commentators

even argued that Raviv’s extreme preaching may have contributed to theclimate of hatred which led to Rabin’s assassination. The admission thatRaviv was employed by the ISA could have significantly harmedthe service’s ability to recruit agents and sources in the future. Theorganization was thus trapped between its unique character and theincreasing public scrutiny of its methods. At first, the ISA avoided directlyadmitting its ties to Raviv, but as the crisis developed, it informallyadmitted to loose relations with him.Following the Rabin assassination, Gilon resigned and was replaced by an

outsider, Major Gen. Ami Ayalon, a former commander of the Israeli Navy.Ayalon was the first ISA director whose full identity was divulged to thegeneral public. This too resulted from Israel’s changing social atmosphere.79

Ayalon realized that the ISA could no longer ignore developments in themedia and the public sphere and operate in an isolated bubble. Heunderstood that supportive public opinion is essential to the ISA’sperformance, and regaining the public trust became one of his key tasks.Ayalon approved the releasing of information on the connections betweenRaviv and the ISA. He weighed the damage to intelligence assets likely tobe caused by more transparency against the damage to the public trustlikely to be caused by silence and concealment, ultimately deciding to admitthe relations as a way of restoring the ISA image.80

Director Avi Dichter, who replaced Ayalon, went one step further andformalized the ISA’s relationship with the media. He too believed that theISA must adapt to the new media environment: to the Internet, to newsnetworks, to a critical society, and to public scrutiny. During Dichter’sterm, journalists were given access to ISA officials and facilities. One-on-one briefings with the director or other relevant figures became common.Since the mid-1990s, the ISA has been issuing formal press releases andholding semi-formal briefings and press conferences.In 2000, for the first time in its history, the ISA appointed an unofficial

spokesperson titled ‘‘Head of Media Branch.’’ As part of its newcommunication approach, the ISA stopped concealing its relationship withthe media and was no longer apologetic about it. A detailed Website wasalso launched. Originally created mainly to recruit high quality manpower,the ISA has also used the site to cultivate a favorable image during routineperiods. The Website reports monthly on unclassified operations, postsdata and trends on terrorism, and offers a glance at the agency’s history.81

Dichter’s successors, Yuval Diskin and Yoram Cohen, continued thisapproach to strategic communication.



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MEETING DYNAMIC AND RELENTLESS CHALLENGES

Intelligence services can gradually adapt to the challenges of the informationage. Until the late 1980s, Israel’s ISA ignored the media and the public.Gradually, the public dimension received more and more attention. TheLine 300 incident represented a major turning point in the organization’sstrategic communication approach. Beginning in the early 1990s, the ISAinvested a great deal of effort into developing a communication responsethat was proportional to the challenges presented by critical events. Thiswas manifested through media briefings, appointing a semi-formalspokesperson, issuing press releases, and creating a Website.Using a proportional communication response to changing challenges

may be crucial to achieving the goals of intelligence services, whetherdirectly or indirectly. The different case studies presented here show thatin an earlier era of patriotic press, undeveloped technologies, and anextremely secretive communication culture, a minimal communicationresponse was sufficient to handle crises, particularly those of low severity.But, in a later time of a critical investigative media and a highly developedtechnological environment, a minor communication response to a severecrisis has proven to be insufficient and may even increase the damage theservice tries to cope with.Crisis communication strategies and tactics do not eliminate the reputation

damages that crises cause. Nevertheless, they can minimize the damage ormoderate the potential of ripple effects appearing in the aftermath of crisis.The ISA has changed immensely over the years, particularly but notmerely, due to changes in the media environment. In many ways, the ISAbegan to gradually adapt to new challenges in Director Perry’s tenure andcontinuing slowly and cautiously since then. Today, the challengesconfronted by intelligence services are relentlessly continuous and dynamic.The rapid development of sophisticated information technology isoverwhelming, and promises to produce new factors and challenges. Inlight of the evolution of the ISA’s strategic communication capabilitiessince the mid-1980s, the assumption that the service will continue to studychallenges and adopt effective ways to deal with them is logical.Although intelligence services must adapt to the new media environment,

recognizing and distinguishing them from other organizations, companies,and governmental agencies is necessary. This distinction has not changedwith the evolution of the information age. By definition, secrecy remainsan essential tool for intelligence services. Therefore, they cannot alwaysconform to the code of transparency in the fields of public relations andcrisis communication. The dilemma is never simple, and usually requires adelicate balancing between guarding the most vital state secrets andaddressing the public. A more holistic approach that considers both the



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public demand for more transparency and the service’s basic need to keepsilent could ultimately yield a pragmatic relationship between intelligencecommunities and the media in Western liberal societies.Strategic communication theory, models, and literature are extremely

relevant to research on this issue. Dirk Gibson took a step in this directionin his studies.82 We take an additional stride by presenting an innovativetheoretical framework for analysis that encourages scholars to investigatethe subject through a multidisciplinary approach.

REFERENCES1Although obvious differences exist between the two professions, they share somepersonal traits and interests. Both journalists and intelligence officers gather andinterpret information; they stimulate sources to cooperate and promise to protectthem at all cost.

2Emily O. Goldman, ‘‘Introduction: Security in the Information Technology Age,’’in Emily O. Goldman, ed., National Security in the Information Age (London:Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 1–10. See also Miroslav Nincic, ‘‘Information Warfareand Democratic Accountability,’’ in ibid., pp. 140–160.

3This issue was debated in the era of the Church Committee in the 1970s. SeeStansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1995), pp. 101–102, and Bob Woodward, Veil: The SecretWars of the CIA 1981–1987 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), p. 6.

4The Israeli internal intelligence service is also known as the Shin-Bet, Shabak, orthe GSS (General Security Service).

5Glenn Hastedt, ‘‘Public Intelligence: Leaks as Policy Instruments, the Case of theIraq War,’’ Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2005, pp. 419–439.See also Steve Hewitt and Scott Lucas, ‘‘All The Secrets That are Fit to Print? TheMedia and US Intelligence Services Before and After 9=11,’’ in Robert Dover andMichael S. Goodman, eds., Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs theMedia, Why the Media Needs Intelligence (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 2009), pp. 105–116.

6Ted Gup, ‘‘Covering the CIA in Times of Crisis: Obstacles and Strategies,’’Harvard International Journal of Press=Politics, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2004, pp. 28–39.See also Claudia Hillebrand, ‘‘The Role of News Media in IntelligenceOversight,’’ Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2012, pp. 689–706; Kathryn Olmsted, ‘‘An American Conspiracy: The Post-Watergate Pressand the CIA,’’ Journalism History, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1993, pp. 51–58.

7Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman, ‘‘Intelligence in the Information Age,’’in Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman, eds., Spinning Intelligence: WhyIntelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media Needs Intelligence, pp. 1–11.

8Arthur S. Hulnick, ‘‘Openness: Being Public About Secret Intelligence,’’International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 12, No. 4,Winter 1999–2000, pp. 463–483.



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9Loch K. Johnson, ‘‘The CIA and the Media,’’ Intelligence and National Security,Vol. 1, No. 2, 1986, pp. 143–169.

10Gill Bennett, ‘‘Declassification and Release Policies of the UK’s IntelligenceAgencies,’’ Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2002), pp. 21–32.See also John Hollister Hedley, ‘‘The CIA’s New Openness,’’ InternationalJournal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer1994, pp. 129–141; Richard C. Thurlow, ‘‘The Charm Offensive: The ‘ComingOut’ of MI5,’’ Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2000,pp. 183–190.

11Nicholas J. Wilkinson, Secrecy and the Media: The Official History of the UnitedKingdom’s D-Notice System (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2009).

12Dirk C. Gibson, ‘‘Secrecy: The Communication Dilemma of the CIA,’’ PublicRelations Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1987, pp. 27–38.

13Dirk C. Gibson, ‘‘A Quantitative Description of FBI Public Relations,’’ PublicRelations Review, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1997, pp. 11–30.

14Gideon Doron, ‘‘Three ‘Travelling’ Models of Politics and the Mass Media in theContext of Israeli National Security,’’ in Udi Lebel, ed., Communicating Security:Civil-Military Relations in Israel (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 147–164. Seealso Yaron Katz, ‘‘Global Media Influence on the Operational Code of Israel’sIntelligence Services,’’ International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence,Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 316–334; Yehiel Limor and Hillel Nossek,‘‘The Military and the Media in the Twenty-First Century: Towards a NewModel of Relations,’’ in Udi Lebel, ed., Communicating Security. Civil-MilitaryRelations in Israel, pp. 120–146.

15Eviatar Ben Zedef, ‘‘Did the Israeli Media Provide Sufficient Warning before theYom Kippur War?,’’ Patuah, Vol. 3, 1996, p. 48 (Hebrew).

16Merav Alloush-Levron, ‘‘Secret Press—From Secrecy and Sympathy toTransparency and Criticism: The Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks(The Mossad) as Reflected in the Print Press in Israel, 1960–1997,’’ Master’sthesis, Bar Ilan University, 2000 (Hebrew); Ayelet Sultz-Landau, ‘‘The Mediaand Covert Organizations in a Democratic Society—the Reciprocal RelationsBetween the Media and the ‘Mossad’ in Israel,’’ Master’s thesis, Tel AvivUniversity, 1999 (Hebrew).

17Shlomo Shpiro, ‘‘The Media Strategies of Intelligence Services,’’ InternationalJournal of Intelligence, and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 14, No. 4, Winter 2001–2002, pp. 485–502; Yaron Katz, ‘‘Global Media Influence on the OperationalCode of Israel’s Intelligence Services,’’ pp. 316–334.

18Kirk Hallahan et al. ‘‘Defining Strategic Communication,’’ International Journalof Strategic Communication, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2007, pp. 3–35.

19Kathleen Fearn-Banks, Crisis Communication: A Casebook Approach (Mahwah,NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2009), p. 9.

20Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday,2007), p. 103.

21Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981–1987, p. 487.



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22Piers Robinson, ‘‘Theorizing the Influence of Media on World Politics Models ofMedia Influence on Foreign Policy,’’ European Journal of Communication, Vol.16, No. 4, 2001, pp. 523–544.

23Stephane Lefebvre, ‘‘The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International IntelligenceCooperation,’’ International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 16,No. 4,Winter 2003–2004, pp. 527–542; Derek S. Reveron, ‘‘Old Allies, New Friends:Intelligence-Sharing in theWar on Terror,’’Orbis, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2006, pp. 453–468.

24Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’sIntelligence Services (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), pp. 168–170.

25Richard J. Aldrich, ‘‘Regulation by Revelation? Intelligence, the Media andTransparency,’’ in Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman, eds., SpinningIntelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media NeedsIntelligence, pp. 13–35; Shabtai Shavit (former Mossad director), interview withthe author, November 2007; Zvi Zamir (former Mossad director), interviewwith the author, October 2007.

26Michael Fitzgerald and Richard Ned Lebow, ‘‘Iraq: The Mother of AllIntelligence Failures,’’ Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 21, No. 5, 2006,pp. 884–909; Robert Jervis, ‘‘Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: TheCase of Iraq,’’ Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2006, pp. 3–52.

27Abraham H. Miller and Nicholas Damask, ‘‘Thinking about Intelligence after theFall of Communism,’’ International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence,Vol. 6, No. 3, Fall 1993, pp. 257–269.

28Javier Jorda, Manuel R. Torres, and Nicola Horsburgh, ‘‘The IntelligenceServices’ Struggle Against al-Qaeda Propaganda,’’ International Journal ofIntelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 31–49.

29Miroslav Nincic, ‘‘Information Warfare and Democratic Accountability.’’

30George Tenet, with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA(New York: HarperCollins, 2007), p. 465.

31Shelley Wigley and Maria Fontenot, ‘‘The Giffords Shootings in Tucson:Exploring Cit izen-generated versus News Media Content in Cris isManagement,’’ Public Relations Review, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2011, pp. 337–344. Seealso Dwayne Winseck, ‘‘Information Operations ‘Blowback’: Communication,Propaganda and Surveillance in the Global War on Terrorism,’’ TheInternational Communication Gazette, Vol. 70, No. 6, 2008, pp. 419–441.

32Alistair Alexander, ‘‘Disruptive Technology: Iraq and the Internet,’’ in DavidMiller, ed., Tell Me Lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack onIraq (London: Pluto Press, 2004), pp. 277–285; Larry Gross and SashaCostanza-Chock, ‘‘The West and the Rest: A Drama in Two Acts and anEpilogue,’’ in Peter van der Veer and Shoma Munshi, eds., Media, War andTerrorism: Responses from the Middle East and Asia (London: Routledge,2004), pp. 22–45; Zvi Reich, ‘‘How Citizens Create News Stories,’’ JournalismStudies, Vol. 9, No. 5, 2008, pp. 739–758; Philip M. Taylor, ‘‘Journalism UnderFire: The Reporting of War and International Crises,’’ in Simon Cottle, ed.,News, Public Relations and Power (London: Sage, 2003), pp. 63–79.



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33Richard C. Thurlow, ‘‘The Charm Offensive: The ‘Coming Out’ of MI5,’’Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2000, pp. 183–190.

34Michael Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age (Great Britain:MPG Books, 2001), p. 190.

35Ray E. Hiebert and Sheila J. Gibbons, Exploring Mass Media for a ChangingWorld (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000), p. 51.

36Kari Anden-Papadopoulos, ‘‘The Abu Ghraib Torture Photographs: NewsFrames, Visual Culture, and the Power of Images,’’ Journalism, Vol. 9, No. 1,2008, pp. 5–30; W. Lance Bennett, Regina G. Lawrence, and StevenLivingston, ‘‘None Dare Call It Torture: Indexing and the Limits of PressIndependence in the Abu Ghraib Scandal,’’ Journal of Communication, Vol. 56,No. 3, 2006, pp. 467–485.

37Eric Schmitt, ‘‘U.S. Tells WikiLeaks to Return Afghan War Logs,’’ The NewYork Times, 6 August 2010, p. A6; Sabrina Tavernise and Andrew W. Lehren,‘‘A Grim Portrait of Civilian Deaths in Iraq,’’ The New York Times, 22October 2010, accessed 20 February 2013, at http://www.nytimes.com

38Francis J. Marra, ‘‘Crisis Communication Plans: Poor Predictors of ExcellentCrisis Public Relations,’’ Public Relations Review, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1999,pp. 461–474.

39Kurt Wise, ‘‘The Oxford Incident: Organizational Culture’s Role in an AnthraxCrisis,’’ Public Relations Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2003, pp. 461–472.

40Arthur S. Hulnick, ‘‘Openness: Being Public About Secret Intelligence,’’pp. 463–483. See also Nicholas J. Wilkinson, ‘‘Balancing National Security andthe Media: The D-Notice Committee,’’ in Robert Dover and Michael S.Goodman, eds., Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Whythe Media Needs Intelligence, pp. 133–147.

41Morgan O’Rourke, ‘‘Infamous Intelligence Leaks: Time Line,’’ RiskManagement, Vol. 57, pp. 18–19.

42Chapman Pincher, ‘‘Reflections on a Lifetime of Reporting on IntelligenceAffairs,’’ in Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman, eds., Spinning Intelligence:Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media Needs Intelligence, pp. 149–163.

43James F. Fox, ‘‘Communicating on Public Issues: The CEO’s Changing Role,’’Public Relations Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1983, pp. 11–23; Linjuan R. Men,‘‘CEO Credibility, Perceived Organizational Reputation, and EmployeeEngagement,’’ Public Relations Review, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2012, pp. 171–173; JudyV. Turk, Yan Jin, Sean Stewart, Jeesun Kim, and J. R. Hipple, ‘‘Examiningthe Interplay of an Organization’s Prior Reputation, CEO’s Visibility, andImmediate Response to a Crisis,’’ Public Relations Review, Vol. 38, No. 4,2012, pp. 574–583.

44Dirk C. Gibson, ‘‘A Quantitative Description of FBI Public Relations,’’pp. 11–30.

45John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simonand Schuster, 1986), p. 204.

46Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), pp. 269–299.



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47Miles Hudson and John Stanier, War and the Media: A Random Searchlight(New York: New York University Press, 1998), p. 307.

48John J. Burnett, ‘‘A Strategic Approach to Managing Crises,’’ Public RelationsReview, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1999, pp. 475–488; Seung H. Cho and Karla K. Gower,‘‘Framing Effect on the Public’s Response to Crisis: Human Interest Frameand Crisis Type Influencing Responsibility and Blame,’’ Public RelationsReview, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2006, pp. 420–422. See also Timothy W. Coombs,‘‘Deep and Surface Threats: Conceptual and Practical Implications for ‘Crisis’vs. ‘Problem,’’’ Public Relations Review, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2002, pp. 339–345;Jeesun Kim, Hyo J. Kim, and Glen T. Cameron, ‘‘Making Nice May notMatter: The Interplay of Crisis Type, Response Type and Crisis Issue onPerceived Organizational Responsibility,’’ Public Relations Review, Vol. 35, No.1, 2009, pp. 86–88; Friederike Schultz, Sonja Utz, and Sandra Glocka, ‘‘CrisisCommunication Online: How Medium, Crisis Type and Emotions affectedPublic Reactions in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster,’’ Public RelationsReview, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2012, pp. 86–88.

49David S. DeVries and Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, ‘‘Defining the Characteristics of aLingering Crisis: Lessons from the National Zoo,’’ Public Relations Review,Vol. 32, No. 2, 2006, pp. 160–167.

50Laura M. Arpan and Donnalyn Pompper, ‘‘Stormy Weather: Testing‘Stealing Thunder’ as a Crisis Communication Strategy to ImproveCommunication Flow Between Organizations and Journalists,’’ PublicRelations Review Vol. 29, No. 3, 2003, pp. 291–308. See also William L.Benoit, ‘‘Image Repair Discourse and Crisis Communication,’’ Public RelationsReview, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1997, pp. 177–186; Steven Mufson and DavidHilzenrath, ‘‘In its Report on the Gulf Oil Spill, BP Spreads the Blame,’’ TheWashington Post, 8 September 2010, at http://www.washingtonpost.com,accessed 20 February 2013.

51Ian I. Mitroff and Gus Anagnos, Managing Crises Before They Happen(New York: Amacom=American Management Association, 2001), p. 17.

52David E. Morrison and Howard Tumber, Journalists at War: The Dynamics ofNews Reporting during the Falklands Conflict (London: Sage, 1988), p. 119.

53Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in theTwentieth Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 140.

54Randy Sumpter and James W. Tankard, Jr., ‘‘The Spin Doctor: An AlternativeModel of PublicRelations,’’Public RelationsReview,Vol. 20, No. 1, 1994, pp. 19–27.

55Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman, ‘‘Intelligence in the Information Age,’’pp. 1–11.

56Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 410–412.

57Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981–1987, p. 164.

58Matthew W. Seeger, Timothy L. Sellnow, and Robert R. Ulmer, ‘‘PublicRelations and Crisis Communication: Organizing and Chaos,’’ in Robert L.Heath, ed., Handbook of Public Relations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001),155–165.



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59Kathleen Fearn-Banks, ‘‘Crisis Communication: A Review of Some BestPractices,’’ in Robert L. Heath, ed., Handbook of Public Relations, pp. 479–500.

60Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA, pp. 269–299.

61www.sis.gov

62George Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm, p. 44.

63Denise E. Delorme and Fred Fedler, ‘‘Journalists’ Hostility Toward PublicRelations: An Historical Analysis,’’ Public Relations Review, Vol. 29, No. 2,2003, pp. 99–124; James E. Grunig, et al., ‘‘Models of Public Relations in anInternational Setting,’’ Journal of Public Relations in an International SettingVol. 7, No. 3, 1995, pp. 163–186; Yungwook Kim and Jiyang Bae, ‘‘KoreanPractitioners and Journalists: Relational Influences in News Selection,’’ PublicRelations Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2006, pp. 241–245 ; Peter Neijens and EdithSmit, ‘‘Dutch Public Relations Practitioners and Journalists: Antagonists NoMore,’’ Public Relations Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2006, pp. 232–240.

64Shelley Wigley and Michael Pfau, ‘‘Communicating before a Crisis: AnExploration of Bolstering, CSR, and Inoculation Practices,’’ in W. TimothyCoombs and Sherry J. Holladay, eds., The Handbook of Crisis Communication(Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 568–590.

65Thomas R. Lindlof and Bryan C. Taylor, Qualitative Communication ResearchMethods, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011), pp. 274–278; LynRichards, Handling Qualitative Data: A Practical Guide, 2nd ed. (London:Sage, 2009), p. 148.

66Rafi Eitan, (former Mossad employee), interview with the author, January 2008;Naphtali Lavie, interview with the author, November 2007.

67Avner Bar-On, The Untold Stories: The Diary of the Chief Censor (Jerusalem:Edanim, 1981), p. 147 (Hebrew); Yossi Melman and Eitan Haber, The Spies:Israel’s Counterespionage Wars (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 2002), p. 129 (Hebrew).

68Dina Goren (former journalist and communication researcher), interview with theauthor, November 2007; David Giladi (former senior journalist), interview withthe author, November 2007.

69Avner Bar-On, The Untold Stories: The Diary of the Chief Censor, p. 147.

70The FBI used a similar tactic following the arrest of Aldrich Ames. The Bureauglorified the capturing of the spy. The Ames case revealed the tension betweenthe CIA and the FBI, each fighting for greater favorable reputation.

71Alex Libak, ‘‘I Should Have Noticed Something Was Odd,’’ Ha’aretz, 20 April1984, p. 3 (Hebrew).

72Mordechai Kremnitzer, ‘‘National Security and the Rule of Law: A Critique ofthe Landau Commission’s Report,’’ in Avner Yaniv, ed., National Security andDemocracy in Israel (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp. 153–172.

73Yechiel Gutman, Shake in the ISA (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1995), p. 60(Hebrew).

74Avi Dichter (former ISA director), interview with the author, April 2008; YisraelHasson (former ISA deputy director), interview with the author, March 2008.



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75Avraham Shalom (former ISA director), interview with the author, March 2008.

76Yaakov Perry (former ISA director), interview with the author, February 2008.

77Carmi Gillon, ISA Ben Hakraim (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2000), p. 423(Hebrew). Carmi Gillon (former ISA director), interview with the author,March 2008.

78Alon Ben-David (senior defense correspondent), interview with the author,May 2008; Amir Oren (senior defense correspondent), interview with theauthor, May 2008.

79Yaron Katz, ‘‘Global Media Influence on the Operational Code of Israel’sIntelligence Services,’’ pp. 316–334.

80Ami Ayalon, (former ISA director), interview with the author, March 2008.

81www.shabak.gov.il

82Dirk C. Gibson, ‘‘The Communication Dilemma of CIA’’ and ‘‘A QuantitativeDescription of FBI Public Relations.’’



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