shunning da - hss13

8/11/2019 Shunning DA - HSS13

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Opening Explanation



Basic OverviewShunning is a moral argument about the proper response to individuals and governments that violate the moral order. Thenegative argues that because a particular nation (in this case, Cuba — but the link will be expanded in later iterations toinclude Venezuela and Mexico) is a flagrant, willful, and persistent violator of human rights, the United States has a moralobligation to shun. Shunning is a refusal to engage — it expresses moral outrage, supports the moral order, and exerts

moral suasion. The goal is not to change th e targeted nation‘s behavior (although that would be nice); it i s to take a moralposition and avoid complicity with evil.



Why Learn Shunning?1. Argumentatively Useful — Like coercion disadvantages on domestic topics, shunning is a useful negative generic because it does not require link or impact uniqueness. Debaters that master the argument will always have a fallbackposition that is simple, straightforward, and winnable as a standalone option. All students need to be prepared toeffectively answer it.

2. Promotes Topic Knowledge — Students will be exposed to the human rights portion of the topic including the humanrights status of the topic countries, the effects of U.S. policies, and the ethical dimensions of the U.S.‘s foreign policytoward Latin America. These issues will come up in a variety of other contexts including affirmatives, advantages, andcritiques.

3. Develops Important Skills — Debating shunning requires students to grapple with important, recurring controversiesabout the role of ethics in government policy and the nature of moral responsibility. Learning to debate the relative meritsof consequentialism and deontology is useful in a wide variety of debates.



Negative



1NC



Shunning 1NC

Cuba is a flagrant, willful, and persistent violator of human rights — repressionis worsening.

Miami Herald 13 — Miami Herald, 2013 (― Human rights under abuse in Cuba ,‖ Editorial, April 22 nd , Available Online at http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/04/22/3358813/human-rights-under-abuse-in-cuba.html#storylink=cpy, Accessed 07-03-2013)

The State Department‘s latest report on human -rights practices effectivelyputs the lie to the idea that the piecemeal and illusory changes inCuba under Gen. Raúl Castro represent a genuine political opening towardgreater freedom .

If anything, things are getting worse . The report , which covers 2012, says theindependent Cuban Commission on Human Rights and Reconciliationcounted 6,602 short-term detentions during the year, compared with 4,123in 2011 . In March 2012, the same commission recorded a 30-year record high of

1,158 short-term detentions in a single month just before the visit of Pope Benedict XVI. Among the many abuses cited by the 2012 report are the prison sentences handed out to members of the Unión Patriotica de Cuba, the estimated3,000 citizens held under the charge of ― potential dangerousness ,‖state-orchestrated assaults against the Damas de Blanco (Ladies in White), thesuspicious death of dissident Oswaldo Payá and so on .

As in any dictatorship, telling the truth is a crime : Independent journalist Calixto Ramón Martínez Arias, the first to report on the cholera outbreakin Cuba, was jailed in September for the crime of desacato ( insulting speech ) andremained there until last week.

The regime is willing to undertake some meek economic reforms to keep people

employed. It has even dared to relax its travel requirements to allow more Cubans to leavethe country if they can get a passport.

Both of these are short-term survival measures , designed as escape valves for growing internal pressure . But when it comes to free speech ,political activity and freedom of association — the building blocksof a free society — the report is a depressing chronicle of human-rights abuses and a valuable reminder that repression is the Castroregime‘s only response to those who demand a genuinely free Cuba.Fundamental reform? Not a chance .

Reject engagement with human rights abusers — moral duty to shun.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B.in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. inEconomics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989(―On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions ,‖ Public Affairs Quarterly , Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19) A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethicsindicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest inexpressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict.But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? Theshunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights arethereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not



assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to imposesuch sanctions?

We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties . When Galtung

speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts ofrespecting people's rights . The argument goes like this: There is more involved in

respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. Forif there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moralcommunity, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie ) not only toavoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to supportthat moral order .

Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people'srights being respected . It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. Inthis moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order

to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights . Thusto the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in.

Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moralorder . When the violation of human rights is flagrant , willful , andpersistent , the offender is , as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order,publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, iftolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually underminealtogether the moral order . Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behaviorinto an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the wordmeans "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which areshameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blazeforth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do notconsider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moralorder. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands

that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly , willfully , andrepeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order ,

the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms thelegitimacy of that moral order . How does shunning do this?First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announcessupport for the moral order and backs up the announcement

with action . This action reinforces the commitment to the moralorder both of the shunner and of the other members of the community .(Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of1986.)

Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, evenif the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If theshunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community,shunning may well make clear to her that she is , in fact, removing herself fromthat community by the behavior in question . Thus shunning may achieve bymoral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force."



Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction , whoseappropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether hedeserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order , of "purifying the community"after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it. Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If theargument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the verynotion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikesat a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack onthe moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do notattack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violationof the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing.

We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity . Rather,

because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful , persistent , and flagrant immorality .

Any compromise sanctions evil — reject every instance regardless ofconsequences.Gordon and Gordon 95 — Haim Gordon, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Education at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, and Rivca Gordon, general director of the Foundation for Democratic Education in Israeland chairperson of the Gaza Team for Human Rights , 1995 (―Introduction,‖ Sartre and Evil: Guidelines for a Struggle ,Published by Greenwood Press, ISBN 031327861X, p. xvi-xviii)Put differently, this book is also about us, a man and a woman who, often with others, have for years been struggling forfreedom, for dialogue, for justice, for human rights in Israel and in the Middle East, and about what we have learned fromSartre that has helped us to conduct this daily struggle. Yet it should also be clear: We are not standard do-gooders.

When we use the word "struggle," we mean fighting , attacking ,pointing at evildoers, demanding that they be prosecuted . We meanaccepting the profound loneliness that often characterizes such struggles. We mean living with the stupid decisions andthe mistakes that we have often made, and, we hope, learning from them. We mean knowing that we too have done Evil.[end page xvi]Like Sartre we do not need to be identified with a party or an organization or a large group when we attack an evildoer,

although we are, at times, happy when such occurs. For instance, when human rights are blatantlyabused in the Gaza Strip, or when violence against women is ignored by the Israeli police,

we are unwilling to compromise such a destruction of human freedom with the goals of a party or an organization so that the organization orparty can attain its political ends from this Evil . Learning from Sartre, wecondemn the Evil and the oppression and exploitation as loudlyand clearly as possible . And like Sartre, our condemnations often fall on deaf ears. Again and again wehave failed, as this book will often indicate. The Israeli military administration in Gaza, the Israeli press, Israeli politicians,other intellectuals and academics, and even other human rights organizations have often made us feel frustrated,impotent, stuck, irrelevant. But we continue.It is in this kind of struggle, we believe, that one can learn much from Sartre's writings. Hence, in what follows, while weshall discuss in detail and in depth quite a few philosophical themes central to Sartre's writings, we shall always attempt to

suggest how these themes can help in the day-to-day struggle against Evil. To do so, we often add to our discussion ofSartre's insights on Evil an instance from our personal experiences or from events in the world that these insights havehelped to clarify. We firmly believe that Sartre would have preferred such a book to a strict scholarly study of his relationship to Evil. Herepeatedly pointed out that he was deeply concerned with the relevance of his writings to day-to-day praxis, to day-to-daystruggles, to the situation in which persons find themselves. He wanted his writings to make a concrete difference in the world, not only to be a topic of analysis and discussion among scholars and philosophers. We also believe that Sartre would have liked a book that at times reeks of the blood, sweat, and tears -- and yes, the rage,the passion, the debilitating loneliness, and the ongoing fight against impotence -- that characterize any worthy strugglefor freedom today.



In the first section of this book we deal with the problem of intuitively responding to Evil. Our experience hastaught us that too many people have learned to pass by or to ignore theEvil that confronts them here and now. They purposely refrain fromperceiving a specific and concrete instance of Evil. Hence they neverneed to fight it . Of course, they thus support the evildoer and the evilregime , but that only partially concerned us in this section. Different questions seemed more crucial: Whatcharacterizes [end page xvii] the consciousness and the freedom of a person who does respond intuitively to Evil, and whotries to fight it? What attitudes interfere with such an intuitive response? We sought significant answers to these questionsin Sartre's literature and drama.



2NC/1NR



Link—Cuba

Cuba is a flagrant, willful, and persistent human rights violator —arbitrarydetentions suppress free speech, political activity, and freedom of association.

Raul Castro's reforms are illusory: abuses are at record highs — that's MiamiHerald.

Prefer our evidence — it cites the latest report from the independent CubanCommission on Human Rights and Reconciliation.

Abuses are pervasive — Cuba represses all political dissent.HRW 13 — Human Rights Watch, 2013 (― Universal Periodic Review: HRW Submission on Cuba ,‖ 16th UniversalPeriodic Review, May, Available Online at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/18/universal-periodic-review-hrw-submission-cuba, Accessed 07-03-2013)

Cuba remains the only country in Latin America that represses virtuallyall forms of political dissent . In 2012 the government of Raúl Castro continuedto enforce political conformity using short-term detentions , beatings ,public acts of repudiation , travel restrictions , and forced exile .

During its first UPR review, Cuba rejected all recommendations addressing thearbitrary detentions of political prisoners , the lack of protectionof human rights defenders , and restrictions on freedom ofexpression . Since then, Human Rights Watch has continued documentingcases of serious abuses of these rights .The Cuban government released dozens of political prisoners in 2010 and 2011 on the condition that they accept exile in

exchange for their freedom. Yet while the overall number of political prisoners hasdeclined, the government has increasingly relied upon arbitrary arrests

and short-term detentions to restrict the basic rights of its critics,including the right to assemble and move about freely . Meanwhile, thegovernment continues to sentence dissidents to long-term prisonsentences in closed, summary trials, or hold them for extended periods

without charge .

Cuba’s rights abuses are flagrant, willful, and persistent:

A. Political imprisonment — it’s widespread and denies basic rights .HRW 13 — Human Rights Watch, 2013 (― Universal Periodic Review: HRW Submission on Cuba ,‖ 16th UniversalPeriodic Review, May, Available Online at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/18/universal-periodic-review-hrw-submission-cuba, Accessed 07-03-2013)

In line with the rejection by the Cuban government of the recommendation to ―halt the prosecution of citizens who areexercising the rights guaranteed under articles 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the UDHR,‖ Cubans who dare tocriticize the government risk criminal charges – which is in clearcontradiction with Cuba‘s international human rights obligations – and will not enjoy due process guarantees , such as the right to fairand public hearings by a competent, independent, and impartialtribunal . In practice, courts are ―subordinated‖ to the executive and legislative branches, thusdenying meaningful judicial protection . Political prisoners‘ are



routinely denied parole after completing the minimum required sentenceas punishment for refusing to participate in ideological activities such as―reeducation‖ classes .

Dozens of political prisoners remain in Cuban prisons , according to respectedhuman rights groups on the island. These groups estimate there are many morepolitical prisoners whose cases they cannot document because thegovernment does not allow independent national or internationalhuman rights groups to access its prisons .

B. Arbitrary Detention — it’s common and violates fundamental rights .HRW 13 — Human Rights Watch, 2013 (― Universal Periodic Review: HRW Submission on Cuba ,‖ 16th UniversalPeriodic Review, May, Available Online at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/18/universal-periodic-review-hrw-submission-cuba, Accessed 07-03-2013)

In addition to political convictions, the Cuban government has increasingly relied onarbitrary detention since the previous UPR in 2009 to harass and intimidate individuals who exercise their fundamental rights . The Cuban Commission forHuman Rights and National Reconciliation —an independent human rights group that the government views as illegal —received reports of 2,074 arbitrary detentions by security forces in 2010, 4,123 in 2011, and 5,105 from January toSeptember of 2012. The detentions are often used preemptively to preventindividuals from participating in meetings or events viewed as critical ofthe government, such as peaceful marches , meetings to discusspolitics , or human rights workshops . Many dissidents are subjectedto beatings and threats as they are detained, even though they make noattempts at resistance .Security officers virtually never present arrest orders to justify the detentions and threaten detainees with criminal

sentences if they continue to participate in ―counterrevolutionary‖ activities. Victims of such arrests areheld incommunicado for a period ranging from several hours to severaldays, often at police stations . In some cases, they are given an official warning, which prosecutors may

later use in criminal trials to show a pattern of delinquent behavior. Dissidents said these warnings are aimed atdiscouraging them from participating in future activities seen as critical of the government. Their families arenot notified that they have been detained, generating a sense of terror from not knowing where they are .

C. Free Expression — it’s non-existent and punished harshly .HRW 13 — Human Rights Watch, 2013 (― Universal Periodic Review: HRW Submission on Cuba ,‖ 16th UniversalPeriodic Review, May, Available Online at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/18/universal-periodic-review-hrw-submission-cuba, Accessed 07-03-2013)In line with its rejection of the recommendation to ―lift restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and association ,

including restrictions on the media that are not in ac cordance with ICCPR,‖ the government maintains amedia monopoly on the island, which ensures that freedom of expression is

virtually nonexistent . This clearly contradicts Cuba‘s internationalhuman rights obligations . The government controls all mediaoutlets in Cuba and access to outside information is highly restricted .Only a tiny fraction of Cubans have the chance to read independentlypublished articles and blogs because of the high cost of and limited accessto the internet . Although a small number of independent journalists and bloggers manage to write articles for foreign websites orindependent blogs, they must publish their work through back channels, such as illegal internet connections.



Independent journalists and bloggers are subjected to public smearcampaigns , short and long-term detention , and physical abuse bypolice and state security agents . Oftentimes their cameras, recorders, and other equipment areconfiscated by authorities. According to the independent group of journalists Hablemos Press, 19 journalists werearbitrarily detained in September 2012, including Calixto Ramón Martínez Arias. Martínez, who had previously reportedon issues critical of the government and was detained on September 16 while reporting a story. At the time of this writing,he remains in detention without charge.

The Cuban government uses selective allocations of press credentials and visas , which are required by foreign journalists to report from the island, to control coverage of theisland and punish media outlets seen as overly critical of the regime . Forexample, in anticipation of the March 2012 visit of Pope Benedict XVI to Cuba, the government denied visas to journalistsfrom El Pais and El Nuevo Herald, newspapers whose reporting it had previously critic ized for presenting a negativeimage of Cuba.

D. Human Rights Promoters — they’re banned and imprisoned .HRW 13 — Human Rights Watch, 2013 (― Universal Periodic Review: HRW Submission on Cuba ,‖ 16th UniversalPeriodic Review, May, Available Online at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/18/universal-periodic-review-hrw-submission-cuba, Accessed 07-03-2013)In line with its rejection of the recommendation to ―implement legal safeguards to ensure protection of human rights

defenders against abuse of provisions for criminal prosecution,‖ the Cuban government hascontinued to refuse to recognize human rights monitoring as a legitimateactivity and to deny legal status to local human rights groups . Meanwhile,

government authorities harass , assault and imprison human rightsdefenders who attempt to document abuses . In the weeks leading up to and during the Pope‘s visit to Cuba, authorities detained, beat, and threatened hundreds of dissidents. On March 14, 2012, security officersassaulted and arrested 13 people who had sought refuge in a Catholic church in Havana while demanding respect forhuman rights. Leticia Ramos —a member of Ladies in White — was arbitrarily detained three times in the weeks precedingthe Pope‘s visit and was beaten so severely by police that they bro ke one of her ribs, she said. She was warned not to try totravel to Havana for the Pope‘s visit.

E. Travel Restrictions — they’re repressive and destroy families .HRW 13 — Human Rights Watch, 2013 (― Universal Periodic Review: HRW Submission on Cuba ,‖ 16th Universal

Periodic Review, May, Available Online at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/18/universal-periodic-review-hrw-submission-cuba, Accessed 07-03-2013)

The Cuban government forbids the country's citizens from leaving orreturning to Cuba without first obtaining official permission, which is oftendenied to those it views as ―detractors.‖ For example, acclaimed blogger YoaniSánchez, who has been critical of the government, has been denied theright to leave the island at least 19 times since 2008, including in February 2012, after shehad been granted a visa to travel to Brazil for a documentary screening.

The Cuban government uses forced family separation to punishdefectors and silence critics . The government frequently bars citizensengaged in authorized travel from taking their children with them

overseas, essentially holding children hostage to guarantee theirparents' return .

The government restricts the movement of citizens within Cuba by

enforcing a 1997 law known as Decree 217 . Designed to limit migration to Havana, the decree requires Cubans to

obtain government permission before moving to the country's capital. It is often used to preventdissidents traveling to Havana to attend meetings and to harass dissidents from other parts of Cuba who live in the capital.



Human Rights Watch is the gold standard for human rights reporting —affindicts are political, not substantive.Levy 9 — Daniel Levy, Director of the Middle East Program at the New America Foundation, Director of theProspects for Peace Initiative at The Century Foundation, hold an M.A. from Cambridge University, 2009 (―The‗Swiftboating‘ of Human Rights Watch ,‖The Huffington Post , July 20 th , Available Online athttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-levy/the-swiftboating-of-human_b_241634.html, Accessed 07-03-2013)

Last week witnessed a concerted attack against the credibility of the NGO HumanRights Watch (HRW), seeking to link supposed fundraising activities in Saudi Arabia with that organization'scriticism ("bias", according to its detractors) of Israeli practices in the occupied territories, also claiming HRW is softpeddling on Saudi violations. It started in a Wall Street Journal piece, the Israeli prime minister's office and spokespeople

weighed in, and then AIPAC and the rightwing blogosphere got onboard. The attack on HRW has now beenratcheted up according to last week's Jerusalem Post.The former right-wing Israeli Government Minister, Natan Sharansky (also an ex-Prisoner of Zion, President George W.Bush's favorite author and occupation apologist) claims that HRW "has become a tool in the hands of dictatorial regimesto fight against democracies." Ron Dermer, director of policy planning in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office adds: "We aregoing to dedicate time and manpower to combating these groups; we are not going to be sitting ducks in a pond for thehuman rights groups to shoot at us with impunity".

The apparent trigger for this assault on a group that represents the global gold standard in human rights monitoring, analysis, and advocacy , was a visit by HRW's

Middle East-North Africa director, Sarah Leah Whitson, to the Saudi kingdom. I happened to find myself on a panel atThe Century Foundation discussing the Middle East with Whitson just days before this storm broke -- I went back and watched tapes of that panel discussion. To accuse Whitson of being soft on the Saudis or somehow singling out Israel forcriticism is quite astonishing as I'm sure you'll agree if you take ten minutes to listen to her presentation -- of that, more ina moment. According to reports Whitson was hosted one evening in Riyadh by prominent businessman and intellectual, Emad binJameel Al-Hejailan, for a private dinner which included business leaders, civil society leaders, and well-connected Saudis.It was not a fundraising event. HRW was certainly not fundraising from the Saudi government. Spencer Ackerman of The Washington Independent quotes Whitson--"We have never raised any money from the Saudi government or any otheragency in the world." That HRW does not take government money is something that is already well-known.

HRW does , of course, receive contributions from individuals and foundations --something that does not prevent them from producing releases andreports critical of the states from whence donors hail .Does HRW's fundraising from private sources in the U.S. prevent it being critical of American human rights violations

(and I obviously acknowledge the differences between the US and Saudi Arabia)? Apparently not. Yes, donors haveagendas, but as long as the organization adheres to standards of fact-checking and objectivity , its credibility is sustained .

Sadly, these attacks on HRW demonstrate no such objectivity orcredibility -- they come from a narrow and misguided right-wing Israel advocacy agenda. One group that has been plowing this terrain for some years is Gerald Steinberg's odiously named "NGO Monitor," in the attacks on HRW heis being joined by bigger guns. Steinberg accuses HRW of being "linked to the terrorist campaign" (of Hamas ...etc), and whines that "Human Rights Watch is an organization with a budget of $40 million a year; they are a superpower". PoorMr. Steinberg, his supporters in the anti-HRW campaign over at AIPAC only had an "$80 million purse" at their disposal.



They Say: “Weigh Consequences”

Utilitarianism is incoherent —infinite uncertainty makes calculationsinterminable.

Read 9 — Rupert Read, Reader in Philosophy at the University of East Anglia, 2009 (―The difference principle is notaction-guiding ,‖ Available Online athttp://www.rupertread.fastmail.co.uk/The%20difference%20principle%20is%20not%20action%20guiding.doc, Accessed04-15-2011)There is a flaw in Utilitarianism that is one step beyond the problem mentioned above. It is a deeper, more ‗constitutive‘

version of the ‗no stable rules‘ problem. It is one of the most widely -touted serious flaws in Utilitarianism (atleast, in Act Utilitarianism ) that it is ultimately not merely liable to defy our moral intuitions and produce social

uncertainty, but is not action-guiding at all . Any course of action can be justified , given uncertainties about others‘ reactions , other‘s expectations, and so forth,

with a good enough story to tell, and a long enough view of theconsequences. Utilitarianism , in other words, never rules out any choice since it makes permissibility always depend on consequences in a manner

that is in-terminable . When agents are act-

utilitarians, they need toundertake an endlessly iterable process of trying to determine howthey will react to one another‘s actions .

This is a particular, very damaging version of the ‗calculation problem‘ in

Utilitarianism. How can we really calculate utility, when it depends upon theconsequences of our actions, and these depend upon other people‘sreactions to those? Gigantic, impenetrable co-ordination problems result .

Utilitarianism is morally monstrous —kill to save is never justified.Kramer 11 — Nicholas Kramer, author of Taking Responsibility for Empire —a blog about American foreignpolicy, former associate investigator for an oversight & investigations committee in the United States Senate, 2011(―Murdering Some to Save Others ,‖ Antiwar.com , April 13 th , Available Online athttp://original.antiwar.com/nkramer/2011/04/12/murdering-some-to-save-others/, Accessed 04-15-2011)In my ongoing quest to understand how morality and justice apply in a complex society, I have recently been watching aseries of lectures on these topics available online from Harvard University‘s Michael Sandel. Professor Sandel begins theseries by posing two scenarios to his audience of Harvard undergraduates. In the fi rst, Sandel suggests that a surgeon hasa choice between saving five moderately injured patients at the cost of not saving one severely wounded patient, or savingthe one at the cost of the five. When asked which choice they would make, by a show of hands the students almostunanimously indicate their preference for saving the most people possible. In Sandel‘s second scenario, the choice is thesame, but the surgeon must actually kill the one patient in order to save the rest (in this case, to harvest the vital organsnecessary to keep the others alive). This time, not a single student supports the principle of saving the many at the cost ofthe one. Sandel then asks members of his audience to explain the apparent inconsistency in their collective logic; althoughthese future leaders of our political and economic systems seem to have a very difficult time articulating their rationales,the difference between the scenarios is obvious, and the implications should be heartening to us all.

Murdering some people to save others is fundamentally immoral . Whenthis principle is put before us in a hypothetical example such as Professor Sandel‘s, it is easy to understand, even

instinctual. I believe that, with the possible exceptions of serial killers, psychopaths,

narcissists, and other outliers, the vast majority of people left to their owndevices would not follow the cold calculations of utilitarianism tothe extreme of murdering another person even if that action would

benefit many others . I will leave it to the philosophers to determine why this is so, but most of us knowsuch murders to be wrong and would not participate in them.If that is the case, what then explains the recent line of ―moral‖ reasoni ng expressed by liberals and neoconservatives alikein favor of the ―humanitarian‖ bombing of Libya? There are only two explanations I can imagine: either theinterventionists are among the outliers mentioned above, or there is something about murder by the state that allowspeople to circumvent their own innate moral instincts. During a recent discussion I had with a favorite college professor,he wondered how different our moral view of war would be if we had not developed the technology and mindset that



allows for mass murder from afar. For instance, he asked rhetorically, ―Would we really have gone into Hiroshima with broadswords and hacked to death 100,000 people of all ages, sizes, and shapes? Yet we dropped a single bomb on them,and those who lose sl eep over that fact are considered so far out of the mainstream as to not be taken seriously.‖

The simple and uncomfortable truth is that murder is murder ,regardless of whether we do it with a 1,000-lb. explosive delivered viacruise missile or with a broadsword . As much as I would like to blame the pro-war liberals and

neoconservatives for the horrors they support, the reality is that it is the state that allows andperpetuates the limitless destruction brought about by war in our name.The appeal of this destruction is so powerful that even people (such as Nicholas

Kristof) who generally seem not to be mass murderers or overall ―bad‖ folkscan be seduced into blind support of absolutely immoral actions . If weaccept that otherwise ―good‖ people cannot be r elied upon to maintaintheir moral principles when it comes to the actions of the state, the only way we can hope to inoculate ourselves against the temptations of state violence for ―humanitarian‖ causes is to adopt a strictly non-interventionist foreign policy . I would not want to live in a society that condoned surgeonsactively murdering some patients in order to save others; likewise, I despise and regret my implicit support for a

government that murders Libyans to theoretically prevent the deaths of other Libyans. As heart-breaking asit is when people on the other side of the world kill each other, it isindeed better to save no one if that is the only way to avoidcommitting murder .

Numbers don’t matter— fallacy of aggregation.Taurek 77 — John M. Taurek, Professor of Philosophy, 1977 ( ―Should the Numbers Count?,‖ Philosophy and Public Affairs , Volume 6, Number 4, Summer, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR)

I cannot see how or why the mere addition of numbers should changeanything . It seems to me that those who , in situations of the kind in question, would have mecount the relative numbers of people involved as something in itself ofsignificance, would have me attach importance to human beings and whathappens to them in merely the way I would to objects which I

valued . If six objects are threatened by fire and I am in a position to retrieve the five in this room or the one in thatroom, but unable to get out all six, I would decide what to do in just the way I am told I should when it is human beings who are threatened. Each object will have a certain value in my eyes. If it happens that all six are of equal value, I willnaturally preserve the many rather than the one. Why? Because the five objects are together five times more valuable inmy eyes than the one. But when I am moved to rescue human beings from harm in situations of the kind described, Icannot bring myself to think of them in just this way. I empathize with them. My concern for what happens to them isgrounded chiefly in the realization that each of them is, as I would be in his place, terribly concerned about what happens

to him. It is not my way to think of them as each having a certain objective value, determined however it is we determine the objective value of things,and then to make some estimate of the combined value of the five as

against the one. If it were not for the fact that these objects were creaturesmuch like me, for whom what happens to them is of great importance, Idoubt that I would take much interest in their preservation. As merely intact objectsthey would mean very little to me, being, as such, nearly as common as toadstools. The loss of an arm of the Pieta meanssomething to me not because the Pieta will miss it. But the loss of an arm of a creature like me means something to meonly because I know he will miss it, just as I would miss mine. It is the loss to this person that I focus on. I lose nothing of value to me should he lose his arm. But if I have a concern for him, I shall wish he might be spared his loss. And so it is in

the original situation. I cannot but think of the situation in this way. For each of these six persons it isno doubt a terrible thing to die. Each faces the loss of something among the



things he values most. His loss means something to me only, or chiefly, because of what it means to him. It is the loss to the individual thatmatters to me, not the loss of the individual. But should any one of thesefive lose his life, his loss is no greater a loss to him because, as it happens,four others (or forty-nine others) lose theirs as well. And neither he nor anyoneelse loses anything of greater value to him than does David, shouldDavid lose his life. Five individuals each losing his life does not add upto anyone's experiencing a loss five times greater than the losssuffered by any one of the five . If I gave my drug to the five persons and let David die I cannotsee that I would thereby have preserved anyone from suffering a loss greater than that I let David suffer. And, similarly,

were I to give my drug to David and let the five die I cannot see that I would thereby have allowed anyone to suffer a loss greater than the loss Ispared David. Each person's potential loss has the same significance tome, only as a loss to that person alone . Because , by hypothesis, I have anequal concern for each person involved, I am moved to give each of theman equal chance to be spared his loss. My way of thinking about thesetrade-off situations consists, essentially, in seriously considering what will be lost or suffered by this one person if I do not prevent it, and incomparing the significance of that for him with what would be lost orsuffered by anyone else if I do not prevent it. This reflects a refusal to[accept] take seriously in these situations any notion of the sum of two persons'separate losses . To me this appears a quite natural extension of the way in which most would view analogoustrade-off situations involving differential losses to those involved, indeed even most of those who find my treatment of thecases thus far described paradoxical. Perhaps then, in one last effort to persuade them, it may be helpful to think about atrade-off situation of this kind. Suppose I am told that if you, a stranger to me, agree to submit to some pain of significantintensity I will be spared a lesser one. Special circumstances apart, I can see no reason whatever why you should be willingto make such a sacrifice. It would be cowardly of me to ask i t of you. Now add a second person, also a stranger to you. Again we are told that if you volunteer to undergo this same considerable pain each of us will be spared a lesser one. I feelit would be no less contemptible of me to ask you to make such a sacrifice in this situation. There is no reason you should be willing to undergo such a pain to spare me mine. There is no reason you should be willing to undergo such a pain tospare this other person his. And that is all there is to it. Now, adding still others to our number, not one of whom willsuffer as much as you are asked to bear, will not change things for me. It ought not to change things for any of us. If notone of us can give you a good reason why you should be willing to undergo a greater suffering so that he might be spared alesser one, then there is simply no good reason why you should be asked to suffer so that the group may be spared.Suffering is not additive in this way. The discomfort of each of a large number of individuals experiencing a minorheadache does not add up to anyone's experiencing a migraine. In such a trade-off situation as this we are to compare yourpain or your loss, not to our collective or total pain, whatever exactly that is supposed to be, but to what will be suffered orlost by any given single one of us. Perhaps it would not be unseemly for a stranger who will suffer some great agony orterrible loss unless you willingly submit to some relatively minor pain to ask you to consider this carefully, to ask you toempathize with him in what he will have to go through. But to my way of thinking it would be contemptible for any one ofus in this crowd to ask you to consider carefully, "not, of course, what I personally will have to suffer. None of us isthinking of himself here! But contemplate, if you will, what we the group, will suffer. Think of the awful sum of pain that isin the balance here! There are so very many more of us." At best such thinking seems confused. Typically, I think, it isoutrageous. Yet, just such thinking is engaged in by those who, in situations of the kind described earlier, would be movedto a course of action by a mere consideration of the relative numbers of people involved. If the numbers should not begiven any significance by those involved in these trade-off situations, why should they count for anyone? Suppose that Iam in a position either to spare you your pain or to spare this large number of individuals each his lesser pain, but unableto spare both you and them. Why should I attach any significance to their numbers if none of those involved should? Icannot understand how I am supposed to add up their separate pains and attach significance to that alleged sum in a waythat would be inappropriate were any of those involved to do it. If, by allowing you to suffer your pain, I do not see that Ican thereby spare a single person any greater pain or, in this case, even as much pain, I do not see why calling myattention to the numbers should move me to spare them instead of you, any more than focusing on the numbers shouldmove you to sacrifice for them collectively when you have no reason to sacrifice for them individually. It is not myintention to argue that in this situation I ought to spare you rather than them just because your pain is "greater" than would be the pain of any one of them. Rather, I want to make it clear that in reaching a decision in such a case it is naturalto focus on a comparison of the pain you will suffer, if I do not prevent it, with the pain that would be suffered by any givenindividual in this group, if I do not prevent it. I want to stress that it does not seem natural in such a case to attempt to addup their separate pains. I would like to combat the apparent tendency of some people to react to the thought of each of fifty



individuals suffering a pain of some given intensity in the same way as they might to the thought of some individualsuffering a pain many or fifty times more intense. I cannot but think that some such tendency is at work in the minds ofthose who attribute significance to the numbers in these trade-off situations. In the original situation we were to imagine

that I must choose between sparing David the loss 'of his life and sparing five others the loss of their lives. Inmaking my decision I am not to compare his loss , on the one hand, tothe collective or total loss to these five , on the other, whatever exactly

that is supposed to be. Rather, I should compare what David stands tosuffer or lose, if I do not prevent it, to what will be suffered or lost by anyother person, if I do not prevent that. Calling my attention to the numbersshould not move me to spare them instead of him , any more than focusing onthe numbers should move him to sacrifice his life for the group when he has no reason to sacrifice for any individual in the

group. The numbers , in themselves, simply do not count for me. I think they should notcount for any of us.

Isaac wrong —overreaches on “realism.”Steger 2 — Manfred B. Steger, Associate Professor of Politics & Government at Illinois State University, holds aPh.D. in Political Science from Rutgers University, 2002 (―Ends, Means, and the Politics of Dissent: Reply to Jeffrey C.Isaac,‖ Dissent , Volume 49, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCOhost, p. 74-75)

Idealizing ―Realist Politics‖

A nother reason for the systemic distortion and marginalization of the campus left‘s

pacifism is the widespread idealization of so-called ―realist politics.‖ Throughout his

article, Isaac adopts the questionable metaphysical assumptions thatunderlie the realist paradigm : ―In the best of all imaginable worlds, it might be possible to defeat al -Qaeda without using force and without dealing with corrupt regimes and political forces like the Northern Alliance. But[end page 74] in this world it is not possible. And this, alas, is the only world that exists.‖ Note how Isaac claims for

himself the same omniscient vantage point that he so dislikes in the campus left. This arrogant spirit ofontological absolutism pervades his essay . Here is another ex ample: ―To accomplish anything inthe politi cal world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about.‖ Of course, having defined wh atcounts as the ―political world,‖ Isaac employs the term ―necessary‖ to imply war -like activities. In short, the only way to

fight terrorism is to declare a large-scale war on it, thus fighting violence with greater violence. Anybodychallenging Isaac ‘s conclusions or his underlying realist metaphysics isnaïve , unpragmatic , vague , irrational , an accomplice of terrorism, and —this is my

favorite charge —out of touch with the ―preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans.‖

Isaac‘s cheap rhetorical appeal to ―common sense,‖ is , indeed, anembarrassing move for an intellectual descendent of the gadfly Socrates who contributesregularly to a progressive magazine titled Dissent.



They Say: “States Not Moral Actors”

States are moral actors at least in this context —duty to shun.Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B.in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. inEconomics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989(―On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions ,‖ Public Affairs Quarterly , Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 20)In this section I address a number of objections, beginning with the claim that the argument only applies to individualsand not to states.1. Many maintain that there are no moral rights or duties among nations. Others hold that nations have a right to self-determination which obligates other nations not to interfere in their internal affairs. On what grounds can we say thatnations as well as individuals can be obligated to shun and be liable to be shunned?

As I see it, nations are agents in the sense that they do things that affectpeople's interests —"do things" in the sense in which people do things and not in the sense in which the wind does things —for they have both thepower to affect people's interests and the ability to decide

whether or not to do so . But being an agent in this sense is a sufficient

condition for having moral responsibility . And the argument for theduty to shun is perfectly general, applying to all morally responsibleagents . Institutions such as the state can act in ways which directlyattack and undermine the moral order , and individuals andinstitutions can sanction such offenders as a witness to the moral order. Asmoral agents states are also obligated to support the moral order andhence to shun when the situation demands . (For more detailed analysis of thearguments that morality applies to nations see Cohen (1985) and Beitz (1979).)

State moral agency needed to address global challenges.Erskine 1 — Toni Erskine, Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, Honorary Professor of

Global Ethics at RMIT University, holds a Ph.D. from Cambridge University, 2001 (―Assigning Responsibilities toInstitutional Moral Agents: The Case of States and Quasi- States,‖ Ethics & International Affairs , Volume 15, Issue 2, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Wiley, p. 83)

First, if only individuals, and never institutions, are seen to be moralagents, the possibility of assigning responsibility for some actions is lost .The U nited States can respond to acute environmental crises by upholding the

conditions of the Kyoto convention — whether or not it chooses to do so — while the individual citizencannot . The same citizen might have a duty to live in a way that isenvironmentally responsible, but she has neither the scope nor thepower to coordinate and enforce systemic changes in how goods areproduced, consumed, and disposed of . As O‘Neill maintains, ― If ethical reasoning isaccessible only to individuals , its meagre help with globalproblems should not surprise us .‖46

Nations are obligated to shun —prima facie duty.Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B.in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. inEconomics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989(―On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions ,‖ Public Affairs Quarterly , Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 21)



A frequent objection to "human rights" policies may also be raised to shunning: By what right does one nation impose its values on another? The argument may proceed by noting that shunning represents the reaction of a community to those who reject its standards in particularly serious ways. But, it will continue, surely there is no such moral community amongnations, since there is no world-wide agreement on basic moral standards.Jose Zalaquett addresses these questions in his lecture on "Human Rights and Moral Dimensions of International

Conduct." His thesis is that there is a world-wide consensus on basic humanrights, as is evidenced by the fact that the world's nations have signed theUnited Nations Charter (Zalaquett, 1983). Thus besides general arguments for moralobligations among nations, the explicit recognition of certain duties bythe nations of the world supports the claim that there is a world moralorder which ought to be protected .

So, as moral agents, agents who can be responsible for violating people'srights, nations as well as individuals (and presumably other institutions, such as corporations —

although we have not examined these cases separately) have a prima facie duty to shun undercertain circumstances and ought to be shunned under certaincircumstances .



They Say: “Shunning Hurts Human Rights”

“Solvency” isn’t necessary — voting neg bears witness.Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B.in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. inEconomics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989(―On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions ,‖ Public Affairs Quarterly , Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 20-21)But perhaps Thompson's pragmatic argument against interfering in the affairs of other states rules out national shunning:

Respect for domestic jurisdiction causes diplomatists to question a crusading approach to human rights.Routine interference in the essential conduct of the affairs of one government (that is, in its definition of itsrights and duties) by another is a recipe for disaster in political relationships. Furthermore, history offers littlesupport for the assumption that moral intervention can even make the situation worse. Given the realities ofnational sovereignty, methods such as quiet diplomacy, the private offering of incentives and rewards, andsustained individual contacts are more likely to yield results. Workability is a companion principle to respect fordomestic jurisdiction. Together they provide the diplomatists' main guidelines for action in human rights as inother spheres of foreign policy. (Thompson, 1980, pp. 91-92)

As a general caution against our desire to "do something" when we do not like the policies of another country, Thompson's

pragmatic approach is sound. But shunning represents a special situation in which,persuasion and direct pressure having been tried and having failed, theobjective is not to change behavior but to witness against it ."Workability" has been tried and has [end page 20] failed; the flagrant,persistent, and willful violation of human rights continues and must beconfronted publicly .



They Say: “U.S. Hypocritical ”

Hypocrisy doesn’t eliminate the duty to shun.Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B.in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. inEconomics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989(―On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions ,‖ Public Affairs Quarterly , Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 22)

3. A third objection is that shunning is hypocritical . How, for example, can the United States ingood conscience shun South Africa, given (a) its own injustices at home and (b) its failure to apply the same principles tothe Soviet Union?(a) "Let him who is without guilt throw the first stone." This biblical injunction will make anyone pause before judging

publicly her neighbor's morality. Yet must we not do this on occasion? Must we not, having admittedour own failings and shortcomings, having done our best to put our ownhouse in order, and having thereby affirmed our own commitment to themoral order, on occasion publicly disassociate ourselves from those whose behavior indicates the refusal to do just that? We may be wrong; others

may see us as a hypocrites. But in the end we must follow ourconsciences in this as in other matters .



They Say: “No Brightline”

It’s a judgment call —hard-and-fast rules unnecessary.Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B.in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. inEconomics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989(―On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions ,‖ Public Affairs Quarterly , Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 22)(b) The objection can also be that shunning must be hypocritical because nations cannot consistently shun all humanrights violators. Is there not hypocrisy in applying different standards to the Soviet Union, which is large and powerful,and to South Africa, which is relatively small and weak? Certainly many conservatives are offended by an eagerness ofliberals to condemn South Africa which is not matched by an equal eagerness to condemn the Soviet Union —although the

Soviet Union seems equally guilty of willful, persistent, and flagrant violations of the moral order. There is nohypocrisy or inconsistency , however, if there are situations in which a primafacie duty to shun is overridden by some other duty .

It is possible , of course, to advocate shunning South Africa but to deny even aprima facie duty to shun the Soviet Union. One could argue that thepurported grounds for shunning the Soviet Union (treatment of dissidents or the war in

Afghanistan) do not constitute flagrant, persistent, and willful violationsof the moral order. This kind of disagreement about shunning isunavoidable . For there will always be a strong element of judgment in decisions about shunning, even among people who agree on their basicmoral principles . The reason is that notions like "flagrancy" inescapably involve

judgments of degree and judgments of motives which do not admit ofprecise measurement .



Affirmative



2AC



violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised partiesmay seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it ishard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscienceof their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence andinjustice , moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often aform of complicity in injustice . [end page 35] This is why, f rom the standpoint of politics —asopposed to religion —pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in

principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is asmuch about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it isthe effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that ismost significant . Just as the alignment with ―good‖ may engenderimpotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil . This is

the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one‘s goals besincere or idealistic; it is equally important , always , to ask about theeffects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects inpragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutisminhibits this judgment . It alienates those who are not true believers. Itpromotes arrogance . And it undermines political effectiveness .

No link —plan is negative state action. No forced choice —remove restrictionsand shun.

Dirty hands inevitable —embargo harms innocents.Hernandez-Truyol 9 — Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Professor of Law at the University ofFlorida, 2009 (―Embargo or Blockade? The Legal and Moral Dimensions of the U.S. Economic Sanctions on Cuba,‖ Intercultural Human Rights Law Review (4 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 53), Available Online to SubscribingInstitutions via Lexis-Nexis)IV. A Critique - The Effects of the Embargo from a Social Justice Perspective n110

It is common knowledge that trade sanctions hurt workers andindustries , not the officials who authored the policies that are the targetof the sanctions. The countries most likely to face sanctions are those run by undemocratic governments least likely to let the pain of their populationsway them. These observations hold true in the case of the U.S. embargo onCuba .

While in nearly fifty years of the embargo the purported goal of achieving democracy in Cuba has not been met, theembargo has had deleterious effects on Cuba and the Cuban people . First, alook at some factual data in light of trade relation confirms the reality and extent of the harms suffered. In 1958, theUnited States accounted for 67% of Cuba's exports and 70% of its imports, n111 placing it [*76] seventh on both exportand import markets of the United States. n112 In 1999, by contrast, official U.S. exports to Cuba totaled a paltry $ 4.7million, which was comprised mainly of donations of medical aid, pharmaceuticals, and other forms of charitable aid. n113

In the year 2000, Cuba ranked 184th of 189 importers of U.S. agricultural products. n114 The relaxation of sanctionsagainst food and medicines beginning in 2000 found Cuba rising to 138th in 2001 and to 26th in 2004 for U.S. exportmarkets. n115 By 2006, Cuba's ranking had fallen slightly to become the 33rd largest market for U.S. agricultural exports(exports totaling $ 328 million). n116 The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates an ongoing annual loss to allU.S. exporters of approximately $ 1.2 billion for their inability to trade with Cuba. n117The Cuban government estimates that the total direct economic impact caused by the embargo is $ 86 billion, whichincludes loss of export earnings, additional costs for import, and a suppression of the growth of the Cuban economy. n118However, various economic researchers and the U.S. State Department discount the effect of the embargo and suggest thatthe Cuban problem is one of lack of hard foreign currency which renders Cuba unable to purchase goods it needs in theopen market. n119[*77] That there has been an economic impact of the embargo is evident to anyone who visits Cuba. For example, there isa minuscule number of modern automobiles on the roads of Cuba. Most are American vehicles from the late 1950s--prior



to the embargo (and the revolution). To be sure, because the law prohibits ships from entering U.S. ports for six monthsafter making deliveries to Cuba, the policy effectively denies Cuba access to the U.S. automobile market. n120

However, the impacts of economic sanctions are greater than lack of access togoods . In the case of Cuba, some argue that the U.S. embargo has had a deleteriousimpact on nutrition and health with a lack of availability of medicineand equipment , as well as decreased water quality . n121 Indeed, the American Association for World Health (AAWH), in a 1997 report, concluded that

the U.S. embargo of Cuba has dramatically harmed the health andnutrition of large numbers of ordinary Cuban citizens . . . . [I]tis our expert medical opinion that the U.S. embargo has caused asignificant rise in suffering —and even deaths —in Cuba . . . . Ahumanitarian catastrophe has been averted only because the Cuban government has maintained a high level of budgetary support for a health care system designed to deliver primary and preventive health care to all of itscitizens. n122

Thus, AAWH concludes that the embargo, limiting availability of food,medicine, and medical supplies, has a deleterious effect on [*78] Cubansociety . Significantly, religious leaders, including the late Pope John Paul II, opposed the embargo and called for itsend. n123 The gravamen of the objection is the humanitarian and economic hardships that the embargo causes.

That makes shunning immoral —uses people as means to an end .Gordon 99 — Joy Gordon, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Fairfield University, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophyfrom Yale University and a J.D. from Boston University , 1999 (― A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics ofEconomic Sanctions ,‖ Ethics & International Affairs , Volume 13, Issue 1, March, Available Online to SubscribingInstitutions via Wiley Online Library, p. 138-139)To the extent that commentators have pondered the question of why sanctions are still used —and why they are justified —they have generated two main responses: expression and punishment. Galtung and Lundborg, in documenting the failureof sanctions to achieve compliance with the stated political objectives, argue that sanctions should not be seen as"instrumental."41 Sanctions are not really designed to achieve compliance, they assert, but rather are "expressive." Agovernment may consider sanctions useful if they serve to "declare its position to internal and external publics or help winsupport at home or abroad."42 It is common enough to hear sanctions discussed in these terms —"It's important that wesend a message that this type of conduct is unacceptable to the international community."43 If we view sanctions in thislight, then they are no longer a failure. For example, after Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, President Carter imposed agrain embargo on the USSR, which President Reagan lifted in 1981. The Soviets did not withdraw from Afghanistan until

1988.44 If we look at sanctions from an instrumental point of view, they were clearly a failure. But sanctions could also "beinterpreted as having been motivated in part by a desire to signal resolve and leadership to the domestic public during anelection year," Nossal observes, suggesting that as an act of expression, the sanctions were in fact successful.45

However, "sending a message," while ordinarily a legitimate undertaking for astate, becomes ethically problematic if the means of communicationconsist of depriving vulnerable sectors of a foreign population of basicnecessities . While sanctions against aggression might be justified onutilitarian grounds, sanctions as a means of sending a message cannotclaim the same moral legitimacy . And while deontological ethics might not be able to raise aparticular objection to sanctions that prevent aggression —since in either case, some innocent population will suffer —the

same cannot be said of sanctions as expression. Where "sending [end page 138] a message" or"signaling resolve" or " expressing outrage" is the purpose of sanctions, thesanctions patently entail the use of human beings as simply ameans to an end ; human suffering becomes merely a device ofcommunication . Thus the purpose is unacceptable on deontologicalas well as utilitarian grounds .



No morality d-rule —nations aren’t moral actors. Rational self-interest bestmetric for action.Kennan 86 — George F. Kennan, Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University,served as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1952) and Yugoslavia (1961-1963) , 1985 (―Morality and Foreign Policy,‖ Foreign Affairs , Winter 1985/1986, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 216)

Second, let us recognize that the functions, commitments and moral obligations ofgovernments are not the same as those [end page 205] of the individual.Government is an agent, not a principal . Its primary obligation is tothe interests of the national society it represents, not to the moralimpulses that individual elements of that society may experience. No more than the attorney vis-a-vis the client,nor the doctor vis-a-vis the patient, can government attempt to insert i tself into the consciences of those whose interests itrepresents.

Let me explain. The interests of the national society for which government has toconcern itself are basically those of its military security, the integrity of its politicallife and the well-being of its people. These needs have no moral quality .They arise from the very existence of the national state in question andfrom the status of national sovereignty it enjoys. They are theunavoidable necessities of a national existence and therefore notsubject to classification as either "good" or "bad." They may bequestioned from a detached philosophic point of view. But the governmentof the sovereign state cannot make such judgments . When it acceptsthe responsibilities of governing, implicit in that acceptance is theassumption that it is right that the state should be sovereign, that theintegrity of its political life should be assured, that its people should enjoythe blessings of military security, material prosperity and a reasonableopportunity for , as the Declaration of Independence puts it, the pursuit of happiness. Forthese assumptions the government needs no moral justification , nor

need it accept any moral reproach for acting on the basis of them .



1AR



Extend: “Cuba’s Record Not Flagrant”

Double-standard for Cuba — media bias.Lamrani 10 — Salim Lamrani, Lecturer at the Paris Sorbonne-Paris IV and Paris-Est Marne-la-ValléeUniversities, specialist in Cuba-US relations , 2010 (―Cuba and the rhetoric of human rights (1 of 2) ,‖ ZNet , July 7 th , Available Online at http://www.zcommunications.org/cuba-and-the-rhetoric-of-human-rights-1-of-2-by-salim-lamrani, Accessed 07-03-2013)

In the West, the name Cuba is inevitably associated with the issue ofhuman rights. European and U.S. media stigmatize the largest island in theCaribbean repeatedly on this matter. No other country in the Americas isso singled out as is the homeland of José Martí, which is subject to media coveragedisproportionate to its size . In fact, events that would go unnoticed elsewherein Latin America or the world are spread immediately by the internationalpress when it comes to Cuba .

Their authors ignore economic and social rights.

Leech 13 — Garry Leech, independent journalist, Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Cape BretonUniversity, 2013 (―The Bias of Human Rights Watch,‖ Counterpunch , March 14 th , Available Online athttp://www.counterpunch.org/2013/03/14/the-bias-of-human-rights-watch/, Accessed 07-02-2013)

Nowhere in its Cuba reports does Human Rights Watch acknowledge thecountry‘s huge achievements in guaranteeing economic and social rights. In spite of being subjected to an inhumane decades-long economic blockade by the U.S. government, Cuba has succeeded in providing freehealthcare and education to all of its citizens as well as ensuringthat everyone‘s basic housing and food needs are met. But as with its analysis

of Venezuela, the provision of these economic and social rights to all Cubans isignored by Human Rights Watch .

This proves bias and destroys credibility — particularly dismiss evidence fromHuman Rights Watch.Leech 13 — Garry Leech, independent journalist, Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Cape BretonUniversity, 2013 (―The Bias of Human Rights Watch,‖ Counterpunch , March 14 th , Available Online athttp://www.counterpunch.org/2013/03/14/the-bias-of-human-rights-watch/, Accessed 07-02-2013)

In conclusion, the repeated failure of Human Rights Watch to prioritizeeconomic , social and cultural rights on par with civil and politicalrights, along with its refusal to contextualize human rights within thegrossly unequal and imperialist power structures that dominateglobal politics, has reduced the organization to little more than an

advocate of capitalist values . Human Rights Watch refuses torecognize the ways in which a human rights paradigm rooted in capitalist values (i.e. only civil and political rights) may not be suited to countries searching fora socialist alternative in their struggle to liberate themselves from centuriesof imperialism . After all, countries such as Venezuela and Cuba are forced to exist ina global context in which the most powerful nation on earth is using all ofits resources to undermine them , not in the name of democracy or



human rights, but because they dare to challenge the hegemony of the U nited

States by promoting alternative models .



Extend: “Embargo Hurts Human Rights”

Human Rights Watch concludes aff — the embargo hurts human rights in Cuba.HRW 13 — Human Rights Watch, 2013 (― Universal Periodic Review: HRW Submission on Cuba ,‖ 16th UniversalPeriodic Review, May, Available Online at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/18/universal-periodic-review-hrw-submission-cuba, Accessed 07-03-2013)The United States Embargo

The U nited States' economic embargo on Cuba , in place for more than half a century,

continues to impose indiscriminate hardship on the Cuban people andhas done nothing to improve human rights in Cuba .

The plan is most moral — the embargo decimates public health. Wilkinson 9 — Stephen Wilkinson, Chairman of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba —an initiative by a team of UK academics, specialists and consultants, holds a Ph.D. in Cuban Literature, 2009 (―Cruel Cuban embargomust end,‖ Comment is Free —a Guardian blog, October 28 th , Available Online athttp://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/oct/28/cuba-embargo-un-united-nations, Accessed 05-20-2013)

Prior to the vote, the secretary-general prepared a public report that explains

what UN members and UN organisations say about the embargo. Thedocument could not be more dismissive of a policy that is near-universally viewed as a hypocritical failure .The US's closest allies oppose the policy, including the UK, Australia, France, Germany, Colombia, Japan, Mexico andBrazil. The embargo is especially unpopular in the western hemisphere, where Washington stands alone as the onlygovernment without diplomatic relations with Havana, and where organisation after organisation – the Rio Group, theIbero-American Summit, the heads of state of Latin America and the Caribbean, and Caricom – have called for its repeal.

The report also highlights the moral case by detailing the cost to the Cubanpeople – the very people it is supposed to help. A meaner, moreinhumane policy is hard to imagine . For example, the report shows how theembargo stops Cuba from obtaining diagnostic equipment andreplacement parts for equipment used in the detection of breast, colon, andprostate cancer . It stops Cuba from obtaining materials that are neededfor paediatric cardiac surgery and the diagnosis of paediatricillnesses . It prevents Cuba from purchasing antiretroviral drugs for thetreatment of HIV-Aids . It stops Cuba from obtaining materials used forthe diagnosis of Downs' Syndrome and drugs that alleviate the sideeffects of chemotherapy .I have seen the cancer wards in a Havana hospital where children with leukaemia were vomiting 16 hours per day for lack

of these drugs. It is hard to imagine how the suffering of children can possiblyhelp make Cuba democratic or endear the US to their parents .Obama's election victory was welcomed by the Cuban people, who overwhelmingly expressed the hope that he would liftthe embargo. He has said he wants a "new beginning" in relations with the island, but recently his administration decided

to continue enforcing it. To his credit, Obama has taken a few small steps to change policy .He did repeal the Bush administration rules on travel and remittances that divided Cuban families, and he has openeddirect negotiations with the Cuban government on topics such as migration and resuming a direct mail service.

However, so much more could be done. Not just because the whole world says so, but because it is morally the right thing to do .

Refusing to defend the consequences of shunning is irresponsible.Kennan 86 — George F. Kennan, Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University,served as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1952) and Yugoslavia (1961-1963) , 1985 (―Morality and Foreign Policy,‖ Foreign Affairs , Winter 1985/1986, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 210)



Furthermore, while we are quick to allege that this or that practice in a foreigncountry is bad and deserves correction, seldom if ever do we seem tooccupy ourselves seriously or realistically with the conceivablealternatives . It seems seldom to occur to us that even if a given situation is bad, thealternatives to it might be worse —even though history provides plenty ofexamples of just this phenomenon. In the eyes of many Americans it is enough forus to indicate the changes that ought, as we see it, to be made. We assume ,

of course, that the consequences will be benign and happy ones. But this isnot always assured . It is, in any case, not we who are going to have tolive with those consequences: it is the offending government and itspeople . We are demanding , in effect, a species of veto power over those oftheir practices that we dislike, while denying responsibility for whatever may flow from the acceptance of our demands .

Shunning doesn’t preclude all engagement — plan justified.Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B.in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. inEconomics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989(―On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions ,‖ Public Affairs Quarterly , Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 21-22)2. We should also consider the objection that shunning violates the obligation to "keep talking" to a "wayward" brother orsister, the obligation not to "write them off." The kind of "moral banning" that shunning involves in fact may underminethe moral order by isolating more and more individuals from the moral community. Turning against to Galtung, we findthe objective of changing behavior contrasted with that of punishing for the sake of punishing:

… it makes good sense to ask a politician engaged in sanction policies, "If you cannot have both, which outcome would you prefer, punishment without compliance or compliance without punishment?" If he insists thatpunishment is a sufficient condition for compliance, then he is naive; if he insists that punishment is a necessarycondition for compliance, then he is probably in addition highly punishment-oriented in the sense thatpunishment has become an automatic and probably also cherished goal in itself. This punishment-orientedattitude is probably fairly widespread, particularly as applied to the international system, and serves to maintainnegative sanctions. If compliance is not obtained, there is at least the gratification from knowing (or believing)that the sinner gets his due, that the criminal has been punished. (Galtung, 1983, p. 20.)

Two points are relevant to meeting this objection. First, one does not shun as a first resort. Thereare many steps of personal and public persuasion and pressure that should be taken before one decides on shunning . Are not human [end page 21] rights betterpromoted through "quiet diplomacy"? (See Zalaquett, 1983, pp. 79-80.) Recall the criteria of persistency, willfulness, and

flagrancy which must be met before one shuns. Thus shunning is not something that will drivepeople or nations from the moral community, but rather a recognition ofthe fact that they have removed themselves from the moral community .

Second, shunning is not a complete rupture of relationships, a completerefusal to have to do with. Even while imposing sanctions as a public witness against the immoral behavior, one can continue talksdesigned to bring the shunee back to the moral community . Recall the

Mennonite norm "that such shunning and reproof may not be conducive to his ruin, but serviceable to his amendment."



Extend: “No Morality D -Rule”

Policies are justified only if they promote the national interest — moralconsiderations are irrelevant.

Kennan 86 — George F. Kennan, Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University,served as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1952) and Yugoslavia (1961-1963) , 1985 (―Morality and Foreign Policy,‖ Foreign Affairs , Winter 1985/1986, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 209-210)

The situations that arouse our discontent are ones existing , as a rule, far fromour own shores. Few of us can profess to be perfect judges of their rightsand their wrongs. These are, for the governments in question, matters ofinternal affairs . It is customary for governments to resentinterference by outside powers in affairs of this nature , and if our diplomatic

history is any indication, we ourselves are not above resenting and resisting it when we find ourselves its object .

Interventions of this nature can be formally defensible only if the practices

against which they are directed are seriously injurious to our interests ,rather than just our sensibilities . There will, of course, be those readers who will argue that theencouragement and promotion of democracy elsewhere is always in the interests of the security, political integrity andprosperity of the United States. If this can be demonstrated in a given instance, well and good. But it is not invariably thecase. Democracy is a loose term. Many varieties of folly and injustice contrive to masquerade under this designation. Themere fact that a country acquires the trappings of self-government does not automatically mean that the in terests of theUnited States are thereby furthered. There are forms of plebiscitary "democracy" that may well prove less favorable to American interests than a wise and benevolent authoritarianism. There can be tyrannies of a majority as well as tyranniesof a minority, with the one hardly less odious than the other. Hitler came to power (albeit under highly unusualcircumstances) with an electoral mandate, and there is scarcely a dictatorship of this age that would not claim thelegitimacy of mass support.There are parts of the world where the main requirement [end page 209] of American security is not an unnaturalimitation of the American model but sheer stability, and this last is not always assured by a government of what appears to

be popular acclaim. In approaching this question, Americans must overcome their tendencytoward generalization and learn to examine each case on its ownmerits . The best measure of these merits is not the attractiveness of certain general semantic symbols

but the effect of the given situation on the tangible and demonstrableinterests of the U nited S tates.

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