siger brant on divine providence

International Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 51, No. 4, Issue 204 (December 2011)

Siger of Brabant on Divine Providence and the Indeterminacy of Chance

Andrew LaZella

ABStrACt: the compatibility of divine providence with the contingency of human free-dom is widely-debated within medieval thought. Following recent works on the Islamic philosopher Averroes, this essay expands the issue of causal indeterminism to include the less disputed question of contingency in the larger framework of chance. In tradition of Latin Averroism, Siger of Brabant provides a unique and heterodox perspective on the compat-ibility of chance with providence. Unlike his fellow scholastics who attempt to preserve contingency under the watchful gaze of divine providence, Siger rejects such moves as destructive of contingency. He instead argues for restrictions on the determination of such events by the arche of divine providence, thus leaving them anarchic with respect to its order but capable of introducing new beginnings in the otherwise closed universe of causes.

In meDIevAL tHoUgHt, questions of causal determinism and indeterminism primarily focus on the reconciliation of the contingency of human freedom against

various forms of necessity (e.g., physical, intellectual, divine). most notably, this question takes shape in terms of harmonizing the infallible order of divine providence with the free choice of the human will. In taking up the determinism-indeterminism question within the context of medieval thought and following recent works on the Islamic philosopher Averroes by Catarina Belo and ruth glasner, I would like to reframe this question to include the type of causal indeterminism and contingency in the realm of nature, oftentimes simply referred to as “chance.”1

Although chance phenomena gain a philosophical audience at least as early as Aristotle’s Physics and continue to hold sway throughout most medieval discussions of causation at least as late as Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations, the volatile causal gap opened by such indeterminism can be quickly reclaimed and absorbed as part of divine providence.2 In itself the rarity of the chance event need not thwart such order but instead could play a pre-ordained part, albeit of infrequent or singular occurrence. only when chance exceeds or even resists the divine order itself does it emerge as recalcitrant within the universe of causes. Despite the theologically heretical impli-cations of such a form of contingency, I will argue that in the writings of the much

1See Catarina Belo, Chance and Determinism in Avicenna and Averroes (Leiden: Brill, 2007); and ruth glasner, Averroes’ Physics: A Turning Point in Medieval Natural Philosophy (oxford UK: oxford Univ. Press, 2009).

2Aristotle, Physics, II. 4–6. All references to Aristotle will be from Aristotle, The Collected Works of Aristotle, 2 vols., ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton nJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), hereafter referring to the individual text, its book and section number/name and, in cases of direct citation, the corresponding Bekker lines (e.g., Metaphysics epsilon 2, 1026b4–5). For Suárez, see Francisco Suárez, Disputationes Metaphysicae I-II (Hildesheim: georg olms verlagsbuchhandlung, 1965), Disputation 19, Section 12.

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overlooked and more often maligned Latin follower of Averroes Siger of Brabant, a muted defense of such a position can be found. Unlike his Latin contemporaries, Siger’s Averroist-inspired thought is not so quick to resolve the excess of sublunary contingency to the causal order of the universe as a whole as directed and foreseen by divine providence.3

my concern in what follows will be centered on a claim regarding divine providence that Siger makes in his De Necessitate et contingentia causarum.4 ex-trapolating the roman idea of the paterfamilias to the cosmos as a whole, Siger states that if the causes preordained by a paterfamilias do not produce the desired results necessarily, then neither will his reason (ratio), his understanding (intellectus), or his providence (providentia) impose necessity upon such events. the same goes for the divine provider of the cosmic familias (i.e., the unified order of all existing things). In both cases, Siger argues, because the order and connection of causes does not impose necessity onto future events—but only on those that arise from a cause that cannot be impeded—neither does the account of such order impose necessity. this means that certain causes and their effects remain indeterminate with respect to the order of the whole. my question will be to what extent the totality of the causal order, directed by the first principle (arche) of that order, necessitates particular causes when referred to the whole.5 I will show how for Siger the claim “the causes preordained by an arche toward some end do not lead to that end necessarily” does not mean that the First allows for there to be contingency on the part of some causes in realizing its intended end, as might be claimed by Aquinas and others, a type of “necessity from the ordered whole” that Siger deems fallacious.6 Instead, his position entails

3“For Siger there is only physical contingency in the universe, in the sense that there are chance occur-rences because the causality of some agents can be thwarted. there is no true metaphysical contingency since god does not create freely.” Armand maurer, “Siger of Brabant’s De Necessitate et Contingentia Causarum and Ms Peterhouse 152,” Mediaeval Studies 14 (1952): 49 n9.

4“Quodsi dictus ordo et connexio futuris omnibus necessitatem non imponit, sed tantum quibusdam, quae fiunt ex causis non impedibilibus, nec etiam ratio dictae connexionis necessitatem imponet, quia si causae quas praeordinat paterfamilias in aliquem finem, necessario illum non inducunt, tunc nec ratio seu intellectus vel providentia patrisfamilias.” Siger De Brabant, De necessitate et contingentia causarum in La Doctrine de la providence dans les écrits de Siger de Brabant, ed. J.-J. Duin (Louvain: Publications Universitaires and Paris: Éditions Béatrice-nauwelaerts, coll. “Philosophes médiévaux, III,” 1954), p. 39, hereafter De Nec. followed by chapter and page number(s). Citations from In Meteororum and Metaphysics Cambrai will also be from this text, hereafter Meteor. and Meta. Cambrai followed by book, chapter, and page number(s). For the authenticity of latter, which I cite with caution, see maurer, “Ms Cambrai 486: Another redaction of the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant?” in Mediaeval Studies 11 (1949): 224–32, and “the State of Historical research in Siger of Brabant,” Speculum 31 (1956): 53.

5the four distinct “reports” of Siger’s Metaphysics are: the munich, vienna, Cambridge, and Paris reports. For the munich and vienna reports, see Siger De Brabant, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam. Édition revue de la reportation de Münich. Text inédit de la reportation de Vienne, ed. William Dunphy (Louvain-la-neuve: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, coll. “Philosophes médiévaux, XXIv,” 1981). For the Cam-bridge and Paris reports, see Siger De Brabant, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam. Text inédit de la reportation de Cambridge. Édition revue de la reportation de Paris, ed. Armand. maurer (Louvain-la-neuve: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, coll. “Philosophes médiévaux, XXv,” 1983), hereafter “mm,” “mv,” “mC,” and “mP” respectively. the book number will be given in roman numerals and the chapter number in arabic, followed by the page number(s) (e.g., mv v.5, p. 368 ).

6“Potest intelligi per sermonem dicentem quod necesse est quod huiusmodi futura fiant, contingenter tamen, quod huiusmodi futura contingenter eveniant relatione ad quandam causam eorum impedibilem,

SIger oN DIVINe ProVIDeNCe AND The INDeTerMINACy of ChANCe 485

that contingency cannot be completely absorbed within the divine order because the First Cause does not create the universe and only leads everything beyond its first effect through a series of intermediaries, leaving certain sublunary events radically indeterminate or anarchic even with respect to the First arche.

1. tHe ACCoUntABILIty oF tHe CAUSAL orDer

In De Necessitate Siger defines divine providence as the practical reason of the order and connection of causes and dispositions.7 more than foreknowledge alone, which pertains to the divine intellect insofar as it grasps future things absolutely, providence also requires prudence and therefore the practical application of the divine intellect.8 As Siger elsewhere adds, such “practical application” includes reference to ordering things to a proper end (providentia est ratio ordinis aliquorum in finem debitum).9 Such an ordained end collects or gathers together an otherwise disparate multiplicity of “things” into an integrated unity or “order.” the importance of this claim for what follows stems from how certain orders (e.g., biological bodies, familias, nations, armies, universes) come to be unified in reference to a guiding principle, or arche, and directed by such a principle toward a common end. thus, the extent to which the universe comprises a providential order will be judged on the extent to which a single arche unites all things on account of a preordained end.

What is required for providence is not only causal execution (i.e., the ability to bring about an effect) but also foresight into the end to which the action is directed. Causal leadership, as Siger argues in his In Meteororum, must be accompanied by prescience of the end to which the action is directed. In the case of divine providence, if divine causality were to lead (ducat) something to an end and yet lack cognition of such an end, this providential order would constitute an imperfect regime. the same imperfection applies to foresight without execution.10 the components necessary for a providential order, therefore, are cognition of all the parts that are ordered, an end to which they are ordered, and finally their execution.11 If the arche of divine providence fails in any of these, it does not institute a perfect regime. In terms of such providential order, we must determine whether particular causes, when inte-grated into the totalized order and connection of the universe as a whole, take on a certain necessity. An answer requires a more detailed review of what Siger means by “necessary causation.”

In his Metaphysics Siger outlines the three ways by which a cause produces a future effect: (1) in a way that is simply necessary insofar as its nature is not impedible;

et quod tamen necesse sit quod fiant, relatione ad providentiam et totam causarum connnexionem. et hoc est dicere quod simpliciter necessario eveniant, licet respectu ad aliquid sint contingentia; sed, sicut prius visum est, omnia esse necessario futura etiam in respectu ad totam connexionem causarum, falsum est.” De Nec. Iv, pp. 39–40.

7“Providentia divina nihil aliud est quam ratio practica seu intellectus connexionis et ordinis causarum ad sua causata.” De Nec. III, pp. 38–39.

8De Nec. I, p. 18.9Meta. Cambrai I.23, p. 72.10Meteor. I.4, p. 113.11Ibid.

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(2) for the most part (ut pluribus) in that the cause can be impeded, but usually is not; and (3) per accidens, which occurs as an addition or addendum to the proper action of an agent.12 Siger defines necessity as “the impossibility of being otherwise.”13 the second way of causing, causation for the most part, however, can be impeded. Although such causes produce their effects frequently and most of the time, their natures do not enjoy the same immobility and impossibility to be otherwise as does necessity simpliciter. Finally, and most importantly for our purposes, there is causation per accidens, which includes a wide range of phenomena, all of which in one way or another seems to fall outside the scope of causation proper. What loosely binds together these latter causes is their seeming lack of determinate necessity, which may just turn out to be a limitation of our knowledge in reference to complicated causal matrices and the ultimate order of the universe as a whole. As we shall see, chance falls under this last region of effects. Siger’s concern, in both the Metaphysics and in De Necessitate, is to understand the extent of causal necessity in reference to future events, that is, the degree to which causation for the most part and causation per accidens open up the possibility of sublunary contingency or the “possibility to be otherwise,” and yet can remain a part of the providential order.

In both texts Siger distinguishes such necessity, which he defines as “impossible to be otherwise,” from causation for the most part and causation per accidens. As will be seen, uninterrupted causal necessity applies only to certain orders of causes, while other orders fall short from such necessity. the distinct orders in question, numbered as five in De Necessitate, concern the relation between causes and the things caused. each order becomes increasingly more complicated and less universal, for more causes are introduced and the concordance of various causes functions on multiple planes. thus, although causes for the most part and causes per accidens do not operate in the higher orders, they come to play a prominent role in the lower ones. the exact point at which Siger draws the line, that is, the point at which causal operations no longer neatly reduce back to a single point of origin or arche (i.e., governance by the First Cause), will be a matter of discussion below.

2. tHe FIve orDerS oF CAUSeS

the first order of causes described by Siger is the First Cause as the cause of the first intellect. It causes this effect per se, immediately, necessarily, and simultane-ously with itself. Siger explains that it causes per se because in order to cause per accidens something would have to concur with it in causing. As First, however, any concurring cause would bifurcate its causal primacy. Furthermore, it causes this

12“ . . . si attendamus ad causas effectuum futurorum, invenimus quaedam a causis suis procedure tripliciter. Quaedam enim procedunt a causa necessaria simpliciter, in cuius natura non est reperire impedimentum, ut viventem fore moriturum. Alia autem procedunt a causis ut in pluribus, quibus positis, non semper ponitur effectus, quia causae in natura sua natae sunt recipere impedimentum, sicut comestio veneni est causa mortis. Alia autem sunt quae nec procedunt ab hac causa nec ab illa, sed solum a causa per accidens, ut quod agens contrarium, potentius existens, faciat deficere agens ut in pluribus ab effectu intento. Hoc quidem facit non per se sed per accidens, inquantum accidit indispositionem materiae quam causat occurrere agenti ut in pluribus. Isto triplici modo quicumque effectus futuri a causa tali vel tali procedunt.” mC vI.9, pp. 322–323.

13mC vI.9, p. 319.


effect immediately because it is its first effect, and thus nothing else could stand as an intermediary. It causes necessarily insofar as nothing can impede its causal activity nor do any intermediaries through which it causes fail to produce their effects, given the lack of such intermediaries in the first order. Additionally, the first intellect is caused simultaneously since succession requires an ordering of motion that produces priority and posteriority of duration. Without an order of motion between the First Cause and the first effect, their relation is simultaneous and one of logical, not temporal, priority. What also must be noted is that only one effect follows immediately from the First.14

the second order of causes is the First Cause as the cause of the separate intel-ligences, the spheres, and their motions. the realm of such intelligences and their corresponding spheres are eternal and immobile. Like with the first order, the First Cause causes such effects per se and necessarily. However, Siger takes note of an important difference, namely, that the First is not their immediate cause since only a single effect follows from it.15 Here already we witness a complication in the causal chain following from the First Cause. Although the First is the per se and necessary cause of such superlunary effects, it causes only through the mediation of its one immediate effect, namely, the first intelligence. thus, although uninterrupted in its causal influence, it nevertheless causes according to an order of causing distinct from the first order.

the third order of causes concerns the relation of the First Cause to the position of the celestial bodies. once again, the First Cause causes such stellar positions per se and necessarily, but as was the case with the previous order, only mediately. Unlike the second order, we witness an additional complexity with the third order, namely, time. Insofar as celestial bodies have motion, their altering positions can be measured successively (i.e., one after another) and thus give rise to time. Although the First causes such temporalized movement through intermediary movers, and thus not immediately, the action of the First is not impeded because its intermediaries are not able to be impeded. this means that the position and movements of the celestial bodies as uninterruptible results as a matter of necessity with nothing happening fortuitously or per accidens. only upon reaching the fourth and fifth orders, which concern hylomorphic sublunary beings, do we encounter causal impediments and accidental being. What characterizes such orders is the hylic materiality of such beings, a materiality that in its openness to contrariety (e.g., form and privation, the elemental contraries, etc.) and thereby to generation and corruption, puts into effect the full force of possibility.

the fourth order concerns causation of the sublunary realm by celestial causes. Such celestial causes cause things down below in different ways (diversis modis): sometimes per se, necessary, immediate, and simultaneous; sometime per se and necessary, but not simultaneous but instead through a mediating motion; sometimes

14For the argument that only one effect can proceed from the First Cause, see mC v.11, pp. 207–208.15“Sed in hoc deficit iste ordo a priori, quod Causa Prima non est causa praedictorum nisi secundum

quendam ordinem, et non omnium illorum immediata, cum ab uno simplici non procedat nisi unum im-mediate et non multa nisi quodam ordine; secundum autem quem ordinem procedant praedicta, nihil ad rationem.” De Nec. I, p. 21.

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the celestial constellation causes only for the most part but is able to be impeded through the “indisposition of matter” (cum nata sint impediri signa caelestia per materiae indispositionem); and sometimes they cause per accidens. Siger defines “per accidens,” which will be treated in greater detail below, as resulting from some disposition of matter or a contrary agent in the sublunary realm. either factor can be reduced to a celestial cause, although their concurrence—the mark of accidentality—does not have such a cause. In order not to leave such concurrence unaccountable, Siger attempts to trace back concurrence to an even higher cause, a unifying cause of concurrence. thus, instead of two things arbitrarily running together, and their mutual occurrence being merely a matter of happenstance or chance, Siger maintains that something outside of either of them brings them together within a higher order.16

the extent to which such unity of order resolves being per accidens and con-tingency back into divine order, and thereby providence, will be a matter of much concern for Siger. the importance of this move cannot be underestimated. Insofar as being per accidens can be reduced to a causal order, to that extent can the First Cause serve as governor of the entire cosmos. otherwise, to repeat the claim from In Meteororum above, a regime in which the governor either fails to cognize or to execute his end remains an imperfect regime.17 If sublunary accidentality escapes either the cognitive grasp or the executive power of the First Cause, then the cosmic regime as a whole exceeds the scope and the order of providence. Without preor-dained causes that extend to all regions of the imperium, divine providence would be forced to compete with, or at least make room for, chance occurrences anarchic with respect to its order. this is why Siger understands the urgency of being per ac-cidens’ reducibility to causal order and here gestures to such. As this issue requires greater attention, I will return to it below after reviewing the fifth order of causes.

the fifth order of causes concerns exclusively sublunary causes and includes per se necessary causes, per se causes for the most part, and causes per accidens. In terms of per se causes, most often they cause for the most part, and not by neces-sity simpliciter because such causes are subject to change.18 In addition, because all hylomorphic beings are open to multiple influences, often additional factors accompany a cause or its effect outside its intended scope and thus such “tag-alongs” (sumbebika) are “accidental” with respect to per se causes.19 Accidentality in the sublunary realm, whether on account of two concurrent causes, contrary impedi-ments, or some disposition or indisposition of matter, seems to have a sufficient causal ground in the celestial and divine realms.20 However, the extent of such causal powers in the sublunary realm and the degree to which divine providence reigns over causal contingency must be treated presently.

16De Nec. I, p. 23.17Meteo. I.4, p. 113.18one obvious exception of necessity simpliciter for hylomorphic beings, often mentioned by Siger, is

death. Because animate beings are composed from contraries, they necessarily will undergo corruption. How and when, however, remains a matter of contingency.

19mC vI.5, p. 309 and mv vI.4, p. 367.20“Accidentia tamen hic inferius, sive sint duae causae concurrentes vel contrarium agens impediens vel

materiae dispositio aliqua, inveniuntur ordinata et habere causam per se suae coniunctionis in altioribus causis.” De Nec. I, pp. 23–24.


3. SUBLUnAry ImPeDImentS AnD BeIng Per ACCIDeNS

In both the Metaphysics and De Necessitate, Siger treats the ways in which the production of an effect by means of a cause for the most part differs from an effect of a necessary cause.21 By referring some future effect to a cause for the most part, either according to itself or according to the absence of impediments, he argues, such a cause does not become necessary but instead retains the character (ratio) of contingency.22 As he further explains, the very “being impedible” of a cause for the most part does not require some actual impediment. the mistake in such thinking, as reflected in Aristotle’s reprobation of the megarians, is to think of potency from the side of its enactment. As Aristotle argues in Metaphysics Θ3, any un-enacted potency, such as the power to move, would cease to exist in the absence of a mover. Without a mover, an unmoved potency would become immovable, just as an unimpeded cause would become necessary.23 Such thinking, according to both Aristotle and Siger, is false. As a type of potency, impedibility, even when not enacted, remains with the cause for the most part. As characterized by their openness to possibility, causes for the most part cannot exclude in advance the possibility of being impeded. even post de facto, when such a cause is actually not-impeded, it continues to retain this mode of being unlike that of simple necessity.

Furthermore, when a cause for the most part fails to produce its usual effect or brings along something more in addition to its determinate effect, there results the third way of causing, namely, by causation per accidens.24 Because the cause for the most part lacks the immunity to possibility assigned only to a necessary cause, when an actual impediment does occur, the cause for the most part fails in bringing about its effect.25 Due to the openness of hylomorphic beings to contrariety, indisposition of matter may result from the influence of a contrary agent. For example, fire for the

21See, for example, mC vI.9, pp. 322–323 and De Nec. II.22“His suppositis, dico ad quaestionem quod, referendo aliquem effectum futurum ad causam ut in pluribus,

sive secundum se et absolute acceptum, sive sub privatione impedimenti acceptum, non est necessarium fore effectum eius. ostensum enim est quod necessarium esse est immobile esse et impossibile aliter se habere.” mC vI.9, p. 320.

23“Item, aliquid quod non movetur quia non est praesens movens, non ideo immobile est; quoniam si solum mobile esset quando esset praesens movens, cum tunc actu moveatur, tunc solum mobile esset cum actu moveretur; et ita non esset ponere aliquam potentiam nisi actui coniunctam, sicut megarici posuerunt quos reprobat Aristoteles in IX° huius. ex quo arguo sic. effectus non provenit necessario ex causa sua nisi cum causa immobilis est ad effectum. Sed causa ut in pluribus, accepta ut sub defectu impedimenti, quamvis non impediatur, non tamen est immobilis illo motu. Quod enim aliquid non moveatur propter absentiam moventis, hoc non dat ei rationem immobilis. Quod igitur evenit a causa ut in pluribus, accepta ut sub defectu impedimenti, non provenit ab ea necessario.” mC vI.9, pp. 320–321.

24See, for example, mC vI.9.25“ostensum enim est accidens esse defectum agentis ut in pluribus. Deficit autem agens ut in pluribus

ab effectu propter indispositionem materiae; quae quidem indispositio causatur ab agente contrario, et haec quidem indispositio considerata secundum se vadit in causam per se, scilicet in agens contrarium. Sed accidebat illi causae quod indispositio materiae occurret agenti ut in pluribus, cuius defectus est ens per accidens. ergo causae entis per accidens accidit secundum esse causam ipsius: agens enim contrarium per se causat indispositionem materiae. Quae autem accidunt huic indispositioni non causat nisi secundum accidens tantum. Accidens autem huic indispositioni defectus agentis ut in pluribus, qui quidem est ens per accidens. et ita, ut prius, ens per accidens non habet causam nisi solum per accidens.” mC vI.6, pp. 310–311.

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most part burns when put in contact with a flammable patient such as wood. Wood, however, can become indisposed to fire’s ignition on account of a retarding agent (e.g., water or talc). It should be noted that the indisposition, considered in itself, resolves (vadit) into a per se cause; that is, a cause can be found for the indisposition (e.g., water in the case of damp wood). the accidental being (ens per accidens) of the effect, however, is a slightly different matter: that the indisposed matter happens upon a cause for the most part, whereupon the latter is weakened (defectus est) and must abandon its usual post, this, according to Siger, remains a region of accidental being with an accidental cause (ens per accidens non habet causam nisi solum per accidens), which requires greater attention.26

First, it should be noted that ens per accidens is not synonymous with the be-ing an accident has. Instead, as one of the fourfold ways of Aristotle’s manifold of being, being per accidens, according to Siger, is not so much a being (ens) as the quasi-unity of multiple things running together, which might better be called an “incident.”27 As Aristotle states in epsilon 2 concerning being per accidens, “no science—practical, productive, or theoretical—troubles itself about it.”28 When it does come under consideration, Aristotle states, being per accidens is neither neces-sary nor for the most part (Δ.30). the frequent examples cited in regard to this fold of being are the gravedigger who discovers a treasure, the carpenter who happens to be a musician, the culinary concoction with a healing power, the creditor who encounters her debtor at the market, the wintry weather of the dog-days, and so forth.29 In generation of Animals, Aristotle adds the irregular generation of animals due to the distance between the celestial bodies and the sublunary world. matter, he argues, hinders accuracy insofar as it cannot easily be brought under rule.30 He maintains that because most things that occur in the sublunary realm are for the most part, and not of necessity, such incidentality accompanies the being of such impedible causes. the intellect, Siger argues, in desiring knowledge, realizes that such contingencies cannot be known and turns away from them toward future things

26“non enim per se nata erat in hunc effectum, sed extra naturam suam est. Unde antequam sibi concurrat, accidit ei quod faciat ipsum deficere: hoc enim est praeter ordinem eius per se et essentialem. et sic apparet quod ens per accidens non habet causam per se, scilicet propinquam.” mv vI.5, pp. 368–369.

27Jean-Luc marion prefers to translate being “per accidens” as “incidental being.” See Jean-Luc marion, Being given: Towards a Phenomenology of givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2002), p. 155. As marion states in n49: “As a general rule, I understand (and translate) sumbebekos as incident. I use accident only when I stick to the narrow and metaphysical concept within the limits that Aristotle often sought to restrict it. the translation by incident corresponds to that of the german Zufälligkeit, zufällig, ‘what falls and arrives upon.’” Ibid., p. 355.

28Aristotle, Metaphysics epsilon 2, 1026b4–5.29“Dico ad hoc quod accidens non est ut in pluribus nec sicut semper. Cuius ratio est quia accidens est

defectus entis ut in pluribus et oppositum eius universaliter, ut postea patebit. Quod autem est defectus et oppositum entis ut in pluribus non potest esse nisi raro et in paucioribus, ut ex se manifestum est.” mC vI.3, p. 306. Also: “Falsum est igitur quod ens per accidens sit ens semper vel ut in pluribus, et non ens raro. Frigus enim esse sub cane, hoc est per accidens ens; et hoc est raro per hoc quod contingit aliquando impediri agens quod est causa caloris. Unde calorem esse sub cane, hoc est ut in pluribus, non tamen sem-per, quia contingit hoc impediri et esse aliquando, licit raro, frigus sub cane. est ergo ens raro, sive ens per accidens.” mv vI.2, p. 364.

30Aristotle, on the generation of Animals, Iv.10, 778a5–9.


with necessary causes or causes for the most part.31 Such turning away results from their lack of intelligible determination with regard to being per accidens, which pushes contingency to the brink of “non-being.”32

Due to the openness to possibility (i.e., contingency) of causes for the most part, excessive causation (i.e., more than the intended scope) or even outright defection always remains possible. As Siger notes, such openness of the frequent invites the rare occurrence that is being per accidens, whose advent might also be defined as “chance,” which along with its counterpart fortune Siger names according to the gallic tongue “de aventure,” thereby signifying their incalculable arrival.33 As we shall see, such events flash into being without a determinate causal account of their generation and emerge as new archai or beginnings in the otherwise closed causal order. But if the chance event arrives adveniens extra, as a sort of parasitic tag-along of real and determinate causal processes, then to what extent can it be seen as part of the providential order of the universe?

4. UnItIng CAUSeS AnD tHe ProvIDentIAL rAnge

In response to this issue, in De Necessitate Siger addresses three doubts that occur with respect to his treatment of the question of necessity. the first is whether the claim “although the First Cause cannot be impeded with respect to any future ef-fect, such effect proceeds by intermediary causes that can be impeded” does not in fact impede the operations of the First, for the product of an artisan who produces through faulty tools is itself faulty. the second doubt is whether a cause for the most part that actually produces its effect causes by necessity. the third doubt concerns whether incidentality has a necessary concomitance (concomitantia necessaria) whereby the concurrence of impediments (concursus impedimentorum) comes to be by necessity. As Siger asks, if those events that have an account of incidentality according to themselves and in relation to their particular cause can be reduced into a higher ordering cause, why will there not be a necessary concomitance for such things? His answer to these questions, both in De Necessitate but also in the Metaphysics, will help us to further frame his account of divine providence.

In response to the first doubt, Siger argues that the First Cause’s non-impedibility requires not that it necessitates any effect that arises, but only that it be a cause to which no impediment outside its own order can happen (non potest accidere im-pedimentum extra eius ordinem). What this means, he argues, is that although the emergence of the future event happens according to the order of the First Cause, it alone does not fall under this order; so too does its opposite. the future event (e.g., tomorrow’s sea battle) would happen of necessity only if the other part of this con-tradictory pair of future contingents (i.e., no sea battle tomorrow) could not possibly

31“et ideo intellectus scire desiderans, cum videt quod non potest talia comprehendere, ad essentialia et futura, quae causas habent ex quibus necessario vel ut in pluribus futura sunt, ex illis causis praesentibus desiderantibus futura ad esse, totaliter se convertit” mP vI.7, p. 451.

32Siger argues that that which happens rarely approaches non-being. See mC vI.2, p. 305.33See In Physicam II.9, 164 from Siger De Brabant, Écrits de Logique, de Morale et de Physique, ed.

Bernardo Bazán (Louvain: Louvain Publications Universitaires, 1974). See also n43 below.

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fall under its order.34 Instead, both contrary possibilies fall under the order of the First Cause—neither one side nor the other has been excluded in advance by the necessity of the First Cause. thus, the occurrence of either possibility requires other causes outside the order of the First—some of which are impedible. even when the contingent event unfolds, it retains its mode of being impedible, even though at this moment it cannot be otherwise.

In response to the second doubt, Siger begins with a reference to Aristotle’s claim in De Caelo that the person who is sitting, while she is sitting, has the power to stand. She does not have the power, however, to stand while sitting. In reference to Peri hermenias, Siger follows Aristotle in disambiguating the necessity that “what is, when it is, must be” from the stronger claim that “what is must be.” the slippage between the former and latter does not take into account that a non-impeded cause for the most part does not take on the ratio of necessity. even though there is a certain necessity to the unimpeded cause for the most part, namely, that it is no longer in potency to being impeded and thus can no longer be otherwise, such is not a matter of necessity simpliciter. Siger emphasizes the importance of this distinction against the error of some who would mistake the two. one pernicious outcome would be to render deliberation futile. the ingesting of a drug will cause death if not impeded by medicine. Such a universal law (i.e., toxin A will cause death), however, fails to capture the particularity of a certain situation in that the necessity of imminent death can be delayed by a remedy administered either by deliberation or accidentally. thus, it does not cause death in this instance because of concurring factors.

the resolution of the third doubt concerns the lack of necessary concomitance between concurring events, even when resolved to a per se and unifying cause. Such examples include the mutual blooming of flowers in a field or the meeting of the creditor and debtor in the market.35 Siger argues that even though two concur-ring events may happen together as the result of a uniting cause, it is possible for them to arise separately.36 Although crop failure may cause both the creditor and debtor to go to the market, one can easily image advening events that prohibit their concurrence or distinct reasons for each of them to go. thus, it is not necessary or even regular that “when the creditor goes, the debtor goes,” although, on occasion, they may concur in their going as a result of a uniting cause. the causal influence of the First only universally and remotely determines the causal realm in which such occurrences can emerge. From this, Siger concludes that because an incident does not have a proximate uniting cause unless as a cause per accidens, a remote cause (e.g., god) does nothing more to introduce necessity into the event.37

And yet, if the total order of causes and the unity of divine providence do not necessitate contingent events in reference to the whole, does not providential

34De Nec. III, pp. 31–32.35In mC v.45–46, Siger explains the difference between these two type of events: the mutual blooming

has an extrinsic and proximate uniting cause (i.e., the sun), which explains its regularity, whereas the meeting of the creditor and debtor or the gravedigger’s uncovering of a treasure has no such proximate cause. the only uniting cause would be the First Cause, but It is a remote and not a proximate cause.

36mv v.15, p. 355.37See mC v.45–46, pp. 294–99.


governance fail to “bring order” to contingency? one may sense slippage between “to necessitate” and “to bring order,” but such a slight of hand, Siger argues, is often at work in arguments for divine providence. If these arguments were to hold merely that it is necessary that certain things come to be contingently, then there would be no problem. Instead, he argues, such arguments also introduce necessity and infallibility with respect to the emergence of such events insofar as they have been foreseen by divine providence and form integral parts of the order as a whole. the problem—as one finds with Aquinas—is that what is fortuitous with respect to particular causes becomes necessitated with respect to the whole (i.e., universal causes).38 Divine foresight requires god to immediately concur with each effect without which the effect would lack being. Siger’s stance against Aquinas’s account of contingency is that according to such a model, although each contingent effect has proximate causes determining it as this rather than that, divine providence im-mediately and infallibly necessitates the advent of such a contingent effect through its establishment and conservation of the whole order and connection of causes.39 thus, like Aquinas’s servants who meet each other by chance on the road to the market, yet have been sent purposely by their master to a single location, so too the contingency of the universe becomes necessitated with reference to the total order and connection of causes preordained by the archic provider as directed toward a common end.40

Siger rejects this view, which would make contingent events necessary insofar as executively ordered as integral parts of a whole dispensed toward a universal end.41 Although he also argues that in reference to the First Cause (i.e., remote cause), nothing is able to be by chance, Siger resists, however, what he sees to be such a clean reduction of chance to the totalizing order of the First.42 Instead, citing epsi-lon 2–3 of the Metaphysics in regard to the arche and aition of conditional causal chains, he argues that matter as the cause of the incidental provides an additional complicating element for the universe of causes insofar as it causes variation from the usual.43 matter invites what Aristotle in epsilon 3 calls “ungenerated archai of chance,” or fortuitous events that flash per accidens into being without coming-to-be through a determinate process of being and themselves introduce new beginnings to the causal order.

38De Nec. Iv. For Aquinas’s position, see, e.g., Sancti thomae Aquinatis, opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 4–5: Pars prima Summae theologiae (rome: ex typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1888–1889), q. 22, a. 2, ad 1, hereafter ST followed by part, question, and article number and part of article designation (i.e., obj. = objection; resp. = response; and ad. = reply to objection).

39See n. 6 above.40See ST I, q. 14, a. 13, resp. and ad 3.41De Nec. Iv, pp. 39f.42mm v Commentum, p. 262.43See Aristotle, Metaphysics epsilon 2 1027a11–15 and 3 1027b14–15. For an extended discussion of

the issue of being per accidens in Aristotle’s thought, especially Metaphysics epsilon 2 and 3, and how chance events “flash into being” (i.e., emerge without a determinate course of coming-to-be), see Dorothy Frede, “Accidental Causes in Aristotle,” Synthese 92 (1992): 39–62; Jaakko Hintikka, Time and Necessity (oxford UK: oxford Univ. Press, 1973); richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle’s Theory (Ithaca ny: Cornell Univ. Press, 1980); Arthur madigan, “‘metaphysics’ e 3: A modest Proposal,” Phronesis 29 (1984): 123–36.

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5. mAtter AnD SUBLUnAry ContIngenCy

In the Metaphysics Siger affirms that matter is the cause of the incidental.44 Here he repeats his definition of the incidental as a failure of an agent for the most part in producing its usual result. this happens because “matter does not perfectly obey the power of the agent.”45 It instead returns disobedience to the agent’s power (virtus). Such “hyle,” Siger argues, invoking matter’s ancestral name and disambiguating it from celestial ether, accounts for something’s being disposed or indisposed to the influence of an agent acting upon it. Because something might become indisposed on account of its matter, an agent for the most part fails to bring about its usual ef-fect. As discussed above in terms of the orders of causes, such failure only occurs in the sublunary realm of hylomorphic beings wherein agents must act in matter (non autem contingit agens tale deficere nisi agendo in materiam, quae est hyle). only where something can be otherwise, that is where it can suffer (passibilis) the influence of another according to a variety of dispositions only there can it be contingent.46

matter is thus responsible for the possibility of being per accidens and contingency without which everything would happen by necessity. this is what distinguishes celestial rarity from sublunary being per accidens. the former happens rarely, but has a determinate and unimpedible cause in the past, which gives rise to a scientia by which it can be foreknown (e.g., through astronomical calculation). the latter, Siger argues, has no scientia because even an unimpeded cause for the most part lacks a ratio of necessity on account of matter.47 He thus defines being per accidens not only as rarity, but rarity on account of defection from a normal and planned course of action. But does this mean that matter has a power of its own to suddenly defect and go rogue?48

44“Ad aliud dicendum quod, quamvis indispositio materiae, secundum se considerata, vadat in aliquam causam per se ut in agens contrarium, accidit tamen illi causae quod indisposition materiae concurrat agenti ut in pluribus, cuius defectus est ens per accidens.” mC vI.6, p. 312. Siger draws a distinction between there being a per se cause for matter’s indisposition (i.e., the influence of a contrary agent) and the per accidens event of something indisposed running into an agent for the most part, which would usually cause a certain and determinate effect in the patient (i.e., burning). medicine usually causes health in the body; in cases of extreme intoxication or other bodily indispositions, however, the very same medical remedy can be rendered poisonous. Intervening circumstances (i.e., intoxication), which themselves have a per se cause—namely, the individual’s previous affairs of drinking an excess of alcohol—interfere thereby bringing about a defect in the medicine’s usual healing power and rendering an unusual outcome of poisoning. the outcome itself results per accidens.

45“nam accidens est ex defectu agentis ut in pluribus; non autem deficit agens ut in pluribus ab effectu nisi quia materia non obedit perfecte virtuti agentis. materia igitur est causa accidentis, causa autem, inquam, contingens, quoniam accidit ipsam esse causam eius per hoc quod accidit sibi indispositio, ex qua redditur inobediens virtuti agenti. Item, cum non contingat ens per accidens nisi ex defectu agentis ut in pluribus, non autem contingit agens tale deficere nisi agendo in materiam, quae est hyle: ipsam enim contingit solum esse dispositam et indispositam.” mC vI.7, p. 312.

46De Nec. I, p. 24.47“est igitur ens per accidens non solum quod raro contingit, sed quod raro contingit propter defectum

agentis ut in pluribus. nisi enim agens tale deficeret, omnes effectus ex causis suis de necessitate evenirent et nihil esset per accidens.” mC vI.5, p. 309. See also mC vI.4, p. 449.

48Cf. Belo, Chance and Determinism, pp. 55–56 and 88.


the category of material defection is somewhat misleading because even the determinacy of so-called regular events takes place in unique manners due to incident-ridden material from which such per se chains are established. Universal laws “here below” are always gleaned from individual cases. thus, it is not the case that matter introduces a subterranean stratum of powers apart from the economy of formal agents, as if to suddenly “swerve” without obeying the influence of any formal power.49 Instead, remaining open simply brings with it the possibility for unintended overlap. But if all events can be traced to the unity, albeit remote, of a First Cause, then to what extent can anything be called “contingent”?

As Siger argues in the Metaphysics, nothing flees (effugit) from the causality of the First Cause. Whatever proceeds from it falls under Its order and providence.50 Insofar as the desired end of the First is the completion of being, however, and It must execute this end in a material world outside its own making through the medium of celestial motion, certain variations take place falling outside the scope of this intended end. necessity reaches the sublunary order only at the level of the species, which alone are eternally generated through ceaseless motion of the celestial bodies. the irregular variations of matter expose regularized processes of change to incidental complicating factors outside and in addition to their normal motions.51 Because matter is not created by the First according to its specifications, and instead it must make do with such eternally existing “stuff” by completing it insofar as possible, any resultant incidental tag-alongs fall outside the scope of its intended action. And remember, if the paterfamilias does not induce these additional ends necessarily, then neither will his providence necessitate their advent and determine their indefinite openness to incidental overlap.

the overlap, which Siger calls “concurrence,” of multiple causal chains remains without a per se and determinate proximate cause. Although it may be the case that both the creditor and debtor go to the market because the same brigand robbed each of them, we can imagine separate reasons for their going. the concurrence of two causal lines around a single proximate cause (e.g., the common brigand or crop failure) can only happen per accidens because it is not always or usually the case that such a cause unites both and because separate proximate causes can lead to the same concurrence. Instead, most concurrences are united only around a remote per se cause, but not a proximate one.52 Siger concludes that the contingency of being

49De Nec. Iv ad 2, pp. 37–38. For further discussion of Siger’s account of matter, in particular the re-lationship between prime matter and potency, see Andrew LaZella, “on the non-Identity between Prime matter and Potency in Siger of Brabant’s metaphysics,” Tópicos 39 (2010): 9–44.

50mC v.46.51“Propter quod in II° De generatione dicit Aristoteles quod, existentibus istis inferioribus corruptibilibus

secundum numerum, propter longe distare a Primo, ideo reliquo modo complevit esse Deus, scilicet, per generationem.” mC III.16, p. 115. Aristotle agrees that god must complete sublunary being through perpetual generation and makes the following claim concerning the irregularity of such completion: “nevertheless it often happens that things pass-away in too short a time, because of their mutual commingling. For their matter is irregular, i.e., it is not everywhere the same; hence the processes by which they come-to-be must be irregular too, i.e., some too quick and others too slow.” Aristotle, on generation and Corruption II.10, 336b19–22. For a discussion of the use of preexisting materials according to Aristotle, see D. m. Balme, “greek Science and mechanism: I. Aristotle on nature and Chance,” The Classical Quarterly 33 (1939): 135.

52De Nec. III ad 3, pp. 35–36.

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per accidens cannot be foreclosed, neither by the total connection of everything present and not by reference to the First Cause, because of the “indeterminacy of circumstances” surrounding the emergence of an event. Indeterminate are those circumstances, Siger maintains, accounting for the helping or hindering of the ad-vent of per accidens being (infinita autem sunt quae possunt iuvare vel obesse ad eventum entis per accidens).53

Indeterminacy means that from the unintended concurrence of two or more causal lines, there emerges a new beginning exceeding the telic directedness of the various lines. In epsilon 3, which Siger continually references in defense of contingency, Aristotle calls these “ungenerated starting points (archai) of chance,” without which everything would happen by necessity.54 on such authority, Siger argues that this is why, even when unimpeded, a cause for the most part nevertheless causes according to a ratio of contingency. Although the First necessarily realizes its end, its provi-dential unity does not fully integrate the entire range of incidental unities, which flash into being without a determinate cause of generation and corruption. given the ungenerated manner by which such per accidens unities flash into being, whether they remain momentarily and without further effect or persist long enough to leave their own causal traces, their lack of a determinate arche leaves them anarchic with respect to divine providence.

6. tHe ANArChe oF CHAnCe

As Siger states in De Necessitate, approving of Aristotle’s claim in epsilon, being per accidens has no cause or arche of its generation.55 two causal lines happen to run together without a proximate uniting cause of their own. Some musicians are pale because musicians are humans, and humans qua embodied, have skin pigmen-tation. thus musicians and humans are made of the same stuff, which just might happen to lack pigmentation. through their concurrence, however, they emerge as quasi-beings and quasi-unities without a uniting cause of their own. It would be a mistake to think that by calling being per accidens not a true being or a true unity, but as if a being or a unity in name only, Siger means it has no real effect. much to the contrary, he has troubled himself with this fold of being for two deeply intertwined reasons: first, without such cases of defection from the usual, metaphysics would

53“Supposito tamen quod effectus contingents, referendo ad totam habitudinem praesentium, necessario eveniunt, adhuc non sequitur quod entis per accidens possit esse scientia. Infinitas enim eorum quae cir-cumstant aliquod scibile maxime impedit scientiam. Infinita autem sunt quae possunt iuvare vel obesse ad eventum entis per accidens.” mC vI.8, p. 315. Also: “tamen, supponendo nunc quod sic, scilicet quod in tota habitudine praesentium determinetur ad esse, adhuc dico quod ens per accidens non potest sciri quando erit, vel quando non erit. et ratio huius est, quia infinitas impedit certitudinem, impedit intellectum; propter quod dicit Aristoteles II° Physicorum quod, quia fortuna et casus infinitae sunt, homini videntur esse immanifestae.”

mv vI.6, p. 372.54Aristotle, Metaphysics epsilon 3 1027b13–14. I have rendered the translation into the more manageable

phrase “ungenerated starting points of chance.”55“et quia accidens non habet causam unientem proximam nisi per accidens, remota autem, quae Deus est,

non inducit necessitatem in concomitantia accidentium, ideo bene dixit ArIStoteLeS, quod accidens non est vere ens sed quasi solo nomine, nec vere unum, et quod causa generationis ipsius nulla.” De Nec. III, p. 36.


have no ground to distinguish causes from the most part from necessary causes. By definition, the former require possible defection.

Second, oftentimes such incalculable occurrences—always without a per se proximate cause—enter the causal universe and themselves produce real effects. often, as when attributes coincide in one subject, being per accidens is merely nugatory, such as paleness and musicality coming together in the same person; sometimes, however, it has a lasting causal resonance, such as when the gravedig-ger finds a treasure or the thirsty person meets ruffians at the well and as a result is killed. In the latter cases, being per accidens becomes an “ungenerated arche of chance,” because as a type of tag-along effect following from, yet incidental to, a per se cause, it has real effects in the universe of causes.56 What chance events share with their less significant counterparts (i.e., coincidental attributes), however, is a lack of per se, determinate, and proximate cause.57 there is a cause of paleness and there is a cause of musicality, but not a cause of their unity. So too there is a cause of this person being at the well (i.e., thirst) and a cause of the ruffians being in her yard (i.e., it provides a shortcut to the pub), but there is no cause of their encounter.

one might argue that although it is rare that quenching thirst leads to meeting violent ruffians, if one knew in advance the “total condition and harmony of causes” surrounding this particular situation, one would foresee that no intervening factors, such as a last minute phone-call, would prevent this meeting. But such a counter-argument misses Siger’s point: such chance occurrences remain ungenerated and indeterminate because not even the total condition and harmony of causes, united around the arche of divine providence, account for the excess of such effects. even if we were to imagine a perspective whereby we could foresee two causal lines coming

56“ . . . unde casus et fortuna sunt causae per accidens alicuius, quae quidem sunt causae per se alterius quod aliquid facit ad effectum accidentalem” mm v Commentum, p. 261.

57“Unde differt aliqua duo comparare ad invicem sicut accidentia, et comparare effectum casualem ad causam per accidens, sicut album esse musicum accidentaliter et invenire thesaurum ex fossione. effectus igitur qui concurrit suae causae est a casu.” mm v Commentum, pp. 261–262. “Differt autem causa per accidens et ens per accidens. ens enim per accidens in solo concursu attenditur: ut album est musicum per accidens, quia nullus ordo causalitatis est unius super alterum. Sed ubi est causa per accidens, ibi oportet esse consursum et etiam ordinem, ita quod pro quanto est ibi ordo, pro tanto ibi causa. oportet enim univer-saliter causam quae fortuna dicitur aliquid facere ad hoc quod effectus sit. Unde, cum est ibi privatio ordinis necessarii, pro tanto dicitur per accidens. Unde differt aliqua duo comparari ad invicem sicut accidentia, et aliqua duo comparari ad invicem ut effectum per accidens a causa et causam. non tamen semper dicendus est effectus casualis, procedens ex aliqua causa raro: hoc enim non habet veritatem cum fuerit causa remota per multa media, cuiusmodi est Causa prima. Si enim comparemus lecturam huiusmodi in hoc loco ad Causam primam, cum prius esset causa sicut nunc est causa, iste effectus raro est ab hac sua causa, tamen non dicitur casualis respectu huius suae causae, quia nihil accidit Primae Causae; sed effectus raro eveniens a causa proxima dicitur casualis.” mP v.4, p. 435. What Siger means by “being per accidens and a cause per accidens differ” is that being per accidens in the narrow sense of incidental coincidence of attributes (e.g., paleness and musical in the same person) does not refer to a cause, whereas the incidental event of chance follows per accidens from a per se cause of something else, and thus references its cause (e.g., finding a treasure and digging). For a further discussion of the difference between incidental coincidence of attributes and incidental events, see Frede, “Accidental Causes,” pp. 56–58. Siger also claims that in reference to the First Cause nothing can be by chance because just as there formerly was a cause, so too there is now a cause insofar as it remains unchanging and unceasing in its causal influence. thus, the coming-to-be of a chance event cannot be explained in reference to the unchanging action of the First.

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together, this foreseen unity does not amount to a necessarily determined effect. the unity of such chance event remains per accidens and incalculable because there can be no real causal account of its coming to be. remaining indeterminate, even the paterfamilias’ account, understanding, or providence of the event does not necessitate it. In terms of “simple incidents” (accidentia simpliciter), or those events that flash into being without a determinate cause, certainly their remote cause is a condition sine qua non. If it were removed, they too would disappear. And yet, its mere pres-ence is insufficient to necessitate that they come to be.58 As aforementioned, Siger follows Aristotle in holding the opinion that some effects are simply contingent, and not merely contingent through a comparison to their particular causes.59

In response to those Peripatetics, whom Siger addresses in the Metaphysics, or to “the certain Parisian professors” addressed in De Necessitate, either wishing to argue that contingent effects as related to their particular causes are contingent but as related to the total harmony and condition (in totam harmoniam et habitudinem) of everything present happen by necessity, Siger rejects such a view that would abolish the “simple contingency” of certain effects.60 referring again to epsilon 3, in De Necessitate Siger states that future contingents are necessary only if they arise—not only from a remote cause that cannot be impeded (i.e., the First Cause) but also from proximate causes that cannot be impeded.61 But chance occurrences, whose only unity is per accidens, cannot have a proximate per se cause.62 otherwise, their unity would not be coincidental, nor even for the most part, but always (semper).63

not even with respect to divine providence, Siger argues against such Parisians and Peripatetics, do such future contingents necessarily emerge (nec etiam necesse est evenire futura contingentia respectu providentiae divinae).64 the First can be the per se remote cause of such events, but not their proximate cause otherwise their unity could never be impeded: musicality would always accompany paleness. this is because, as Siger argues in the Metaphysics, the First is not capable of multiple and diverse effects but is unchanging in its causal influence.65 thus, if sometimes musicians are pale, but other times they are not, or if sometimes gravediggers find treasures, this diversity of association between musicality and skin-color cannot be on account of the First, at least not proximately. If one were to hold otherwise,

58mC v.46, p. 296.59mC vI.8, p. 314.60“multi enim Peripateticorum volunt quod effectus contingentes, relati ad causas suas particulares se-

cundum se acceptas, contingentes sunt; relati tamen in totam harmoniam et habitudinem praesentium omnes de necessitate eveniunt. Aristoteles autem videtur fuisse contrariae opinionis, scilicet quod aliqui effectus simpliciter contingentes sint et non per comparationes suas ad causas particulares, ut posterius apparebit.” mC vI.8, p. 314. See also De Nec. II. p. 26.

61De Nec. III.62mv vI.2, p. 364.63mC v.46, p. 296.64“Causa etiam Prima, etsi sit causa non impedibilis, causat tamen per medium causae impedibilis, ut

dictum est; nec etiam necesse est evenire futura contingentia respectu providentiae divinae, quia visum est ex ordine et connexione causarum et habitudine praesentium non necesse evenire multa quae fient; quare nec ex ratione et intellectu huius ordinis et connexionis causarum ad causata. Providentia autem divina nihil aliud est quam ratio dicti ordinis et dictae connexionis practica.” De Nec. III, pp. 29–30.

65mC v.11, pp. 207–208.


namely, that everything will arise necessarily in reference to the First Cause and the total connection and relation of causes, this would expel (exigeretur) all being per accidens.

Where traditional advocates of contingency err, Siger argues, is in introducing the First Cause as an immediate cause of concurrence. the aforementioned Parisians and Peripatetics most often abolish the contingency of such sublunary events by resolving them to a proximate per se cause, such as to a First cause that cannot be impeded because it must immediately concur with every secondary cause.66 If the First were to concur immediately with each subsequent secondary cause, as most orthodox doctrines of divine concurrence hold, it would be an unimpedible per se proximate cause and the unity of all subsequent effects would be necessary. the attempt to save contingency through providential foreknowledge, whose non-interfering gaze supposedly provides an infallible unity to the universe of causes without predeter-mining them, does not suffice according to Siger.67 the utter simplicity of the First’s causal activity requires that there is no foreknowledge distinct from execution. Lest the unvarying output of this single causal arche necessitate that gravediggers always find treasures, which experience tells us they do not, then another origin must be found for this variation. In such a unique case as this, the origin lies between the folds of “normal” causal chains, itself emerging as an ungenerated arche of chance. this new beginning within the universe of causes falls outside the intended scope and preordained end of the First Cause, as a fold of being following from, yet quite literally complicating, the order of divine providence. It is not necessarily opposed to its unity, but an incidental tag-along flashing into being without a determinate cause or arche and incalculable with respect to the otherwise balanced economy of totalizing conditions and causes.

7. ConCLUSIon

the consequences of Siger’s account should not be understated. Because the First arche does not create the sublunary realm, but must act through intermediaries ultimately reaching ungenerated matter, it can only lead (duceret) the contingency of sublunary affairs to a certain extent. Unlike traditional theodicies, in which the providential arche exerts a more immediate and varied presence (i.e., by presciently allowing each event as part of its totalized order), according to Siger, providence does not immediately and directly concur with each new effect, but instead offers only a mediated response filtered through intermediary channels of intelligences and movers ultimately residing in a material world outside its own making. Against his fellow scholastics who introduce divine providence as a watchful, but non-interfering gaze, Siger maintains that such arguments require divine concurrence for each new effect, thus resolving them to a per se proximate cause, which cancels their contingency. thus, in both the Metaphysics and De Necessitate, he continually argues that because the total order and connection of causes does not necessitate

66See above n38.67See, for example, S. thomae Aquinatis, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis exposition. 2nd

ed., ed. m. r. Cathala and r. m. Spiazzi (taurini-romae: marietti, 1971), vI.3.

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the emergence of all future events, the sublunary realm can be led only to the end of eternal generation and corruption but no further. the providence of the cosmic paterfamilias remains open to complications by chance events, events incalculable and an-archic with respect to its order.

siger brant on divine providence

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