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CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 7 5/5/2023 2:45 PM

Chapter 5

Comparing democratic values and judgments

The previous chapter compared trends in system support in Western Europe and the United

States. Despite widespread fears of a tidal wave of growing political disaffection, in fact the evidence

demonstrates that public support for the nation-state and its institutions ebbs and flows during recent

decades. Some enduring contrasts in cultural attitudes persist for many decades, such as those

distinguishing confidence in regime institutions in Norway and Italy, Britain and France, or the

Netherlands and Belgium, maintaining diversity among European nations.1 Even in the United States –

where the loudest alarm bells can be heard about a supposed rising tide of political cynicism and voter

anger – in fact American support for government has both risen and fallen over time, and contrasting

trends in public confidence are evident among the major branches of the federal government.

We do not have longitudinal survey evidence which can be used for consistent comparison of

changes in support for the political system during the last half century, and it is always possible that

public confidence may have fallen in many countries during the longer period. Systematic comparative

evidence is lacking but it is also possible that approval of elected officials may have eroded during this

era, as Dalton suggests happened in many established democracies.2 Nevertheless, even if so, post-

industrial societies in Western Europe and the United States are all stable states and wealthy

economies, where the culture of liberal democracy has deep-seated roots which has evolved over

centuries. Generalized trust in regime institutions provides a reservoir of support which is independent

of policy performance and thus any erosion of trust which has occurred may tie policy-makers hands. 3

Deeply-unpopular governments or leaders may fall. Widespread dissatisfaction can catalyze support for

constitutional reform movements and generate a public outcry for greater transparency, monitoring,

and accountability.4 At worst, enduring cynicism about government may potentially fuel contentious

politics and sporadic out-breaks of violent street protest. The existence of multiple indicators of political

disenchantment in particular countries should raise legitimate anxieties about the workings of

democratic governance in these societies. Governments, and multilateral institutions such as the

Council of Europe, have frequently expressed considerable concern about these issues. 5 But even in the

worst case scenario, long-standing democracies are highly unlikely to experience a major legitimacy

crisis, far less processes of regime change or even state collapse, due to any grassroots disaffection.

These states are highly resilient to challenge due to enduring cultural traditions, periodic opportunities

to rotate the major parties in government and opposition, and the weight of institutional inertia. The

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same is not necessarily true elsewhere. Lack of regime legitimacy could have far more serious

consequences in fragile states, in post-conflict societies, and in countries which have not yet

consolidated the transition from autocracy.

Narrowing the analytical focus, this chapter seeks to understand the size and distribution of the

democratic deficit in a wide range of countries worldwide.

and how these attitudes are shaped by historical experience of democratization. As discussed in

chapter 3, each country’s historical experience of democratization is measured by the cumulative record

of civil liberties and political rights for each nation during the third wave era, as estimated annually by

Freedom House from 1972-2006, taking account of both downturns and upticks over the years. The

resulting index is standardized to 100-points and categorized into societies with restricted, moderate

and extensive experience of democratization during the third wave era. The historic democracy index is

appropriate to explain contemporary cultural attitudes and values, since the duration of democratic

institutions is measured over more than three decades and thus prior to the period of fieldwork for the

fifth wave survey of the WVS, conducted in 2005-7. This helps to guard against analytical problems of

reciprocal causation in the complex relationship between culture and institutions. The index is also used

to sub-divide older and younger liberal democracies, to reflect their differing histories. Contemporary

regimes (in 2006, to match the midpoint of the fifth wave of the WVS) are classified by this study into

four categories: older liberal democracies, younger liberal democracies, electoral democracies, and

autocracies. It is not possible from cross-national comparisons to determine the direction of causality in

any correlations between contemporary regimes and patterns of political attitudes; public demands for

political reforms may lead towards stronger democratic states, on the other hand, better functioning

democracies may encourage public faith and confidence in this form of governance.

Endorsement of democratic values and the rejection of autocratic principles

Surveys have sought to tap public attitudes towards democratic and autocratic values and

principles in several ways.6 Perhaps the most common approach has relied upon questions which ask the

public to express their direct or overt preferences for democratic rule as a normative ideal, using the ‘d’

word but without providing a more specific context, concrete principles, or elaborating its meaning

further. For example, surveys have typically asked people whether they approve of democracy as the

‘best form of government’, whether democracy is ‘preferable to any other form of government’, whether

it is important ‘to live in a country that is government democratically’, or whether they approve of

having a democratic system ‘as a good or suitable way of governing their own country’. The direct or 2


overt approach allows survey respondents to reply using their own understanding of these terms, rather

than imposing a common meaning. Similar methods have often been used to gauge opinions towards

other complex normative concepts, such as notions of equality, freedom, or human rights. At the same

time, direct questions suffer from certain important limits which put their face validity into question. It is

therefore important to explore the underlying meaning, as well as the depth, of any overt support for

democracy.7

Research based on the Global-barometer and the World Values Surveys suggest that during the

1990s, when asked directly, many citizens around the globe expressed widespread aspirations for

democratic principles as the best system of government. 8 The ‘Asian values’ thesis propounded by Lee

Kuan Yew, former prime minister of Singapore, claimed that democracy was a Western cultural artifact. 9

Confucian values, the thesis stressed, emphasize community rather than individualism, duties rather

than rights, and the importance of harmony, consensus, respect for authority, and an orderly society.10

Nevertheless despite these claims, surveys have reported that in fact orientations towards authority, as

well as support for democracy, are remarkably similar in East Asia and Anglo-American societies. 11

Indeed almost universal public approval for the abstract idea of democratic governance has been

expressed even in some of the most rigid East Asian autocracies, including Communist China and

Vietnam, where the public lacks any direct experience of living under this type of rule.12 In the Middle

East, as well, the region which lags furthest behind the rest of the world in democratic reforms, it might

be expected that support for democracy would be low. Yet the 2006 Arab Barometer survey reports that

eight or nine out of ten respondents in Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, and Kuwait believe that ‘democracy is

the best form of government’ and that ‘having a democratic system of government would be good for

our country’.13 As Diamond summarized the survey evidence worldwide: “Strikingly, the belief that

democracy is (in principle at least) the best system is overwhelming and universal. While there is a

slightly higher preference for the Western industrialized countries, in every region – even the former

Soviet Union and the Muslim Middle East – an average of at least 80 percent of people polled say that

democracy is best.”14

The World Values survey monitors direct or overt attitudes towards democratic rule using the

following question: “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think

about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good,

fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system .” By itself,

overt support for democratic values proved to be insignificantly related to either the historical

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experience of democratization or to contemporary types of regimes. Support for democracy as an ideal

form of governance proves over-whelming and almost universal today; almost nine out of ten

respondents worldwide who offered an opinion approved of democratic governance as a ‘very’ or ‘fairly’

good political system for their own country. Moreover positive attitudes were expressed among the

public living under every type of regime, including in autocracies, and also in every cultural region,

including in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Far from being a Western phenomenon, as earlier

research suggested, the WVS survey evidence indicates that approval of democratic governance is

widespread and universal, confirming the findings of previous studies based on the Global-barometers. 15

Democratic states have not produced ‘the end of history’ but it seems as though democratic values have

broad appeal, even in unlikely places.

The ubiquity of public approval of democracy around the world also raises certain important

questions, however, about the measurement and interpretation of these results. In particular Schedler

and Sarsfield argue that the validity of direct measures of abstract support for democracy can be

questioned due to the potential problems of interviewer effects generating ‘politically correct’

responses, as well as the vague, shifting and controversial meaning associated with ideas of

democracy.16 Instead, they argue, abstract measures need to be compared with attitudes towards more

specific, concrete, and detailed procedures, rights, and institutions associated with this form of

governance. Hence using a Mexican survey they examined public approval of freedom of speech,

freedom of assembly, political equality and tolerance of minority rights, without mentioning the term

‘democracy’ directly in these questions, to avoid cueing respondents. They report that Mexicans

expressing the strongest support for democracy also manifest illiberal convictions on at least some

specific political rights and civil liberties.

If we simply tap attitudes towards democracy, without considering alternatives, then we are

unable to analyze the relative importance of different forms of rule. For example, if people are asked by

pollsters whether they value health care and also whether they want lower taxes, then it is likely that

both statements will be widely endorsed. If people are asked whether they prefer more public spending

on health care or more tax cuts, then this presents respondents with more realistic and complex choices

where they are forced to prioritize options. Similarly support for democracy may be widely endorsed but

it remains unclear how important this is to Jordanians, the Chinese or Moroccans compared with, for

example, the desire to maintain social stability, the value of respecting traditional authorities, or the

risks of regime change. A more effective way to explore whether democratic attitudes are robust, and to

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measure more nuanced choices, is to use trade-off items where citizens are asked to express their

preference for different types of democratic and autocratic regimes. This strategy has been widely used

in countries which have experienced a recent water-shed transition, notably in post-communist Europe,

where surveys have commonly compared people’s evaluation of the current against the previous

regime.17 This is a useful approach in the context of revolutionary upheaval or a watershed

constitutional change involving a shark break from the past, exemplified by the end of apartheid in

South Africa, or the fall of the Berlin wall in Germany. It is less appropriate in many countries where

democratization has been an evolutionary process of a series of incremental reforms, or indeed with

many states such as Russia, Pakistan, and Nigeria which have veered back and forth over the years in

their human rights record. The process of democratization occurs gradually in many states, with an

extended series of steps, backwards and forwards, transforming each polity.

Given these considerations, the Global-Barometer surveys used a trade-off question to monitor

regime preferences, as follows: “Which of the following statements do you agree with most? Democracy

is preferable to any other kind of government. In certain situations, an authoritarian government can be

preferable to a democratic one. It doesn't matter to people like me whether we have a democratic

government or a non-democratic government.” The results confirm widespread popular support for

democratic rule in the abstract, with majority populations in 43 out of 49 societies preferring democracy

over any other kind of government. Most people also exercised a clear choice, with few responding that

it didn’t matter to them either way.

For comparability, to see whether the results remain robust and consistent with other

indicators, for a trade-off scale the World Values Survey asks about the desirability of democratic

governance, military rule, rule by bureaucratic elites, and also strong-man leadership unchecked by

parliament and elections. The standardized democratic attitudes index is constructed by recoding the

items to reflect the endorsement of democratic rule and the rejection of autocratic forms of

governance, and then combining these responses. Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of democratic

attitudes using this standardized index. The 100-point scale was also dichotomized for descriptive

purposes, so that responses of 70 and above were categorized as expressing strong democratic

attitudes.

Most strikingly, it is apparent that democratic attitudes significantly strengthen with historical

experience of living under this form of governance (R=.58 p>.000). Seven out of ten respondents living in

countries with the longest experience of this form of governance expressed strong approval of

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democratic attitudes, compared with roughly four of ten respondents in states with restricted

experience. As illustrated in Figure 5.6, democratic attitudes are most widely expressed in countries

such as Germany and New Zealand, with the most autocratic states such as Iran and Russia clustered in

the bottom left corner of the graph. Nevertheless again there are a few outliers, notably Iraq (and, to a

lesser extent, Ethiopia), where moderate approval of democratic attitudes is evident, and a democratic

culture appears to be flourishing strongly in Ghana. Contemporary levels of democracy are also

significantly related to democratic attitudes, although the relationship is slightly weaker than the

historical comparisons (see Table 5.1). Therefore the trade-off question employed in the World Values

Survey, where respondents are offered a choice between democracy and autocracy, did produce a less

overwhelming consensus that simply asking about direct or overt approval of democracy. Nevertheless

the result confirm the widespread appeal of democracy, as well as the public’s rejection of autocratic

forms of government, with democratic attitudes strengthening in societies with the longest experience

of this form of governance

[Figure 5.1 about here]

The expression of democratic attitudes and the rejection of autocratic alternatives by itself is

still essentially ‘costless’, and hence it remains difficult to estimate the weight which should be given to

these responses. Thus although general approval of democratic governance appears remarkably

widespread in countries such as Ghana, Mali and Burkina Faso, it is unclear from this evidence whether

democracy is regarded as vital and urgent to people’s lives, or whether it is seen as generally desirable

but as less important than more immediate priorities facing poorer societies, such as strengthening

economic development, living standards, or security. In addition to attitudes towards democratic and

autocratic types of regimes, therefore, we must therefore also compare how far people value

democracy. The concept of ‘values’ refers to personal or societal goals which are regarded as desirable,

for example the importance of freedom and autonomy , of security and avoiding risk, of respecting

traditional sources of authority, or of material gains in living standards. Values can apply to the

individual, or to broader units such as the family and household, social group, the community and

society, the nation-state, or even the world. Values can be understood as the normative benchmarks

which can be used to evaluate actions, policies and events, for instance, where there is a trade-off,

whether it is regarded as more important for governments to pursue economic growth or

environmental protection, and whether societies should seek to reward entrepreneurial success or to

share public goods more equitably among all members. By contrast, ‘attitudes’ refer to approval or

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disapproval of more specific statements; hence people can agree that a high priority should be placed

on democracy, as the most desirable goal or value, but there is still room for legitimate debate about

which institutional arrangements are most likely to maximize opportunities for political participation and

competition, and hence differing attitudes towards alternative types of electoral system or the

appropriate division of powers between the executive and legislature.


The value of democracy is gauged from the World Values Survey 2005 by the question: “How

important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means

it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?” This

item is arguably superior to asking simply about approval of democratic attitudes, as it seeks to gauge

the depth or strength of support. ‘Strong’ support for democratic values is indicated by those giving a

score of 7.0 and above. Overall, two thirds of the public in the countries under comparison reported that

democracy was very important. Strikingly, again, the saliency of democracy deepens significantly with

historical experience of this form of rule. On average three-quarters of the citizens living in states with

the most extensive history of democracy thought that it was very important to live in a democracy,

compared with almost six out of ten citizens living in states with limited experience of this form of rule.

Figure 5.2 also confirms that a culture where the general public regards living in a democracy as

important deepens with greater experience of living in a democracy. This view proved especially popular

among Scandinavian citizens, although again there was considerable variation among long-standing

democracies, and strong preferences for democracy were also expressed among some transitional

states, such as Ghana, Turkey and Argentina, as well as by Ethiopia, Rwanda and Jordan. By contrast, as

predicted by the second proposition under analysis, the contemporary level of democracy in any state

was not significantly related to the endorsement of democratic values (see Table 5.1).

Evaluations of democratic performance

But how do people evaluate the democratic performance of their own government? As

discussed earlier, measures gauging satisfaction with the performance of democracy are common in the

EuroBarometer surveys (see chapter 4), as well as the International Social Survey Program, and the

Global-Barometers. The standard question used in these studies asks: “On the whole, are you very

satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in your

country?” The results have been widely analyzed in the research literature, especially studies analyzing

whether satisfaction with democracy can be attributed to the impact of institutional design, good 7


governance, policy performance, and regime histories.18 Nevertheless the precise meaning of the

standard measure of democratic satisfaction remains ambiguous and open to interpretation. This

question may indeed reflect public assessments of democratic practices and performance (‘the way

democracy works in your country’). Responses to the standard question, however, may also be seen as

endorsing normative approval about the general legitimacy of democratic principles (‘are you satisfied

with democracy’). 19 In addition, usually responses to this question are treated as unambiguous and

straightforward, on the assumption that citizens are capable of making informed and rational

assessments about the democratic performance of governance in their own country. Even if evaluations

do not meet these standards, for example if the public remains highly critical in states such as Sweden

and Norway which are regularly ranked by experts as some of the most democratic in the world, public

perceptions are still an important indicator of the state of political culture. Democracy is a complex and

abstract concept, open to several interpretations; the next chapter explores how citizens understand the

meaning of this idea, particularly in closed autocracies lacking democratic traditions, to establish

whether public judgments are based on informed knowledge.

Using an alternative phrasing, the 5th wave WVS asks the following question: “And how

democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means

that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would

you choose?” The way that this question emphasizes evaluations of how democratically each country is

being governed makes it highly suitable to test public evaluations of the perceived democratic

performance of regimes in each country.20 The use of the 10-point scale also provides respondents with

a more subtle range of choices than the standard 4-point scale. Moreover evaluations of democratic

performance using this question are strongly correlated at national-level with another WVS survey item

asking respondents to evaluate respect for human rights in their own country (R=0.78 p>.000) and

confidence in government (R=.51 p>.000). By contrast, public evaluations of the democratic

performance of their own government were not significantly related to general approval of democratic

or autocratic forms of rule. This pattern gives us more confidence that the democratic evaluation

measure taps into how people regard the workings of their own political system more generally, rather

than tapping support for democratic values. The 10-point democratic performance scale was

dichotomized for descriptive comparisons, so that responses of 7.0 and above were categorized as

expressing strong satisfaction with the performance of democracy.


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Using this measure, the comparison of almost fifty nations demonstrates that overall about one

third of the public expressed strong satisfaction with the performance of democracy in their own

country. Figure 5.3 shows that the public strongly approved of how democratically their country was

being governed in many of the older democracies with the longest history of this form of governance,

although again the comparisons highlighted the considerable range of replies, with Scandinavian

citizens, in particular, usually proved exceptionally positive about the democratic performance of their

states, in contrast to Italians, the Dutch and the Americans. Yet the link between the length of

democratic experience and satisfaction with democratic performance was not wholly clear cut, as highly

favorable evaluations are also expressed in the third-wave democracies of Ghana, South Africa, and

Uruguay. Ghana, in particular, proved exceptionally positive in how they judged their government. A

half-century ago, Ghana was the first African state to achieve independence following colonial rule. In

April 1992 a constitution allowing for a multi-party system was approved in a referendum, ushering in a

sustained period of democracy. Since then, the two largest political Ghanaian parties have regularly

rotated in presidential office and the country has been regarded as one of the most successful

democracies on the continent.21 By contrast, citizens in the countries with minimal experience of

democracy usually expressed the most critical towards the performance of democracy in their own

country. Hence, in line with the evaluative reports of independent observers and expert judgments, in

2005 Ethiopians, Russians, and Iranians all rated their own governments extremely poorly by this

standard. It is also notable that Chinese evaluations proved similar to those made in India, although the

latter has been democratic (with one period of suspension) since independence in 1947, an puzzle to

which we shall return in the next chapter.

Therefore despite the important variations, in general democratic satisfaction usually deepened

significantly with each country’s historical experience with this form of governance (R=.37 p>.009).

Hence 40% of citizens living in states with extensive experience of democracy expressed strong

satisfaction with the performance of their own democracy, compared with just 14% of the public

expressing similar levels of satisfaction in the countries with restricted experience. Unlike the pattern

observed for institutional confidence, therefore, a reservoir of support for the performance of

democracy does seem to gradually accumulate and deepen with greater familiarity with this form of

governance, lending support to the first proposition. The cumulative experience of living in a state with

widespread political rights and civil liberties, and the values and norms gradually acquired through this

process, therefore do seem to generate positive satisfaction among citizens with how democracy works.

Attitudes were also linked with the contemporary level of democracy in each country, although the 9


correlation proved weaker, as predicted, and not statistically significant at the conventional level

(R=.257 p>.075).

Estimating the size of the democratic deficit

Combining these indicators allows us to examine the distribution and size of any democratic

deficit in different countries. Citizen’s evaluations of the performance of democracy in their own country

are measured by the question: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again

using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is

“completely democratic,” what position would you choose? Democratic values are gauged by the

statement “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale

where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you

choose?” Using these scales, the democratic deficit in any society is estimated as the mean democratic

values minus the mean evaluations of democratic performance. The gap thus represents the difference

between the importance which citizens attach to living in a democracy and their judgments of the

democratic performance of the own government. The deficit is minimized where democratic

expectations reflect judgments about perceived performance. The distribution of the indicators of the

democratic deficit, and levels of democratic knowledge, can be compared by historical regime, across

global regions, and among nations, as well as analyzed by individual-level social characteristics such as

age, sex and education.

[Figure 5.4 and Table 5.2 about here]

Figure 5.4 and Table 5.2 compare indicators of democratic knowledge, values and evaluations

by the historical experience of democracy during the third wave era. As the chart illustrates, as observed

earlier, democratic values prove relatively high across all types of societies; on average, the mean

importance of living in a democracy is rated 8.54 on the 10 point scale. Those societies with the most

extensive experience of liberal democracy states give democratic values a slightly higher priority (8.90)

than those with minimal experience of this form of governance (8.36). By contrast, in general the public

expresses less satisfaction with the performance of democracy; the mean score for satisfaction is 6.43

out of 10 across all societies. Subjective satisfaction is lowest in long-standing autocracies, as might be

expected based on any assessment using ‘expert’ indicators from Freedom House or Polity IV. Overall,

based on the difference between these indicators, the democratic deficit therefore proves largest in

autocracies (-2.78), mainly due to dissatisfaction with the performance of their governments. The deficit

is smaller in countries with moderate experience of democracy (-1.90), as well as in long-established 10


democracies (-2.07), driven by higher expectations about democratic values. At the same time,

knowledge of the principles and procedures of liberal democracy is most widespread in long-established

democratic states, with far less awareness evident in the historical autocracies, which lack experience of

this form of governance.

[Table 5.2 about here]

Comparison of these indicators across global regions, presented in Table 5.2, demonstrates that

the largest democratic deficit is evident among the eight post-communist states in Central and Eastern

Europe, especially in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Russia, where the public expresses

widespread adherence to democratic values and yet also minimal satisfaction with how democratic

governance is actually performing in their own countries. The deficit is also substantial in the five

countries under comparison in the Middle East. By contrast, widespread satisfaction with the

democratic performance of their own government means that the smallest democratic deficit exists in

the Scandinavian nations under comparison. Relatively modest deficits are also registered among states

in Asia-Pacific and South America. The challenges facing democracy in Latin America have been widely

discussed, especially turmoil among states in the Andean region (Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia and

Colombia), as well as the presidential coup in Honduras and popular pressures ousting elected

presidents earlier in Ecuador, Argentina and Peru.22 But in fact the overall gap between democratic

expectations and performance in the seven Latin America nations contained in the 2005 WVS survey is

relatively modest compared with other world regions.

[Table 5.3 about here]

National contrasts

Table 5.3 also allows us to scrutinize how the deficit varies across societies among each type of

historical regime, identifying some outliers which deserve further scrutiny. The largest gap is in Ethiopia,

where the public expresses strong aspirations for democracy, and yet where many Ethiopians feel that

their government is failing to deliver in this regard. The country is one of the least developed economies

in Africa, with average per capita incomes of $900 (2008). Widespread poverty and hardship are

reinforced by periodic droughts and famines. Almost two-thirds of its people are illiterate. Ethiopians

have also endured persistent civil conflict and a border war with Eritrea. In late-1970s, a self-proclaimed

Marxist junta led by Mengistu Haile Mariam tortured and murdered hundreds of thousands in brutal

repressions. The overthrow of the junta in 1991 saw political and economic conditions stabilize and the

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1994 constitution provided for a federal republic with ethnically-based regions. The government is run

by Meles Zenawi's Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, elected through a series of

bitterly-fought and violent multi-party contests. In the wake of the 2005 elections, senior opposition

leaders and journalists were imprisoned and charged with treason, triggering further dissent. In this

context, most Ethiopians widely endorse democracy, although they remain deeply unsatisfied with the

way that the Meles regime operates.

The size of the democratic deficit is also particularly pronounced in Ukraine, a country which has

experienced considerable political turbulence and unrest following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine achieved independence in 1991. Nevertheless democracy has remained elusive and the legacy

of state control, economic recession, and endemic corruption has also stalled efforts at market reforms.

In the closing months of 2004, the Orange Revolution, a peaceful mass protest, forced the authorities to

overturn a rigged presidential election and to allow a new internationally-monitored vote that swept

into power a reformist slate under Viktor Yushchenko. Subsequent internal squabbles in the government

allowed his rival Viktor Yanukovych to stage a comeback in parliamentary elections and to become

prime minister in August of 2006. An early legislative election, brought on by a political crisis in the

spring of 2007, saw Yuliya Tymoshenko, as head of an Orange coalition, installed as a new prime

minister in December 2007. The political clashes, street protests, and regime instability experienced

during these years seem to have generated widespread disappointment among Ukrainians with the

democratic performance of the government, although citizens continue to widely endorse democratic

ideals. Among the post-communist states, Russia, Moldova, and Armenia all share a similarly-sized

democratic deficit.

In marked contrasts, the public in China expressed strong approval of the democratic

performance of their own government, and a relatively modest democratic deficit, a pattern also

recorded in other surveys.23 This puzzle requires further exploration. Since 1949 the People’s Republic of

China has been ruled by the Communist Party (CPC) which governs without challenge from nation-wide

popular elections or the checks provided by an independent judiciary. Some liberalization of the press

has occurred in recent years, and competitive village and town elections are held. Nevertheless

observers document frequent cases of human rights violations; for instance, Human Rights Watch

reports that China has frequently silenced opponents and critics of the Communist party leadership,

prevented protest demonstrations, and banned opposition parties.24 Some national minorities (non-

Han) communities also face serious restrictions and repression in mainland China. Nevertheless as seen

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in the previous chapter, Chinese awareness of the principles of liberal democracy proved relatively poor,

with many expressing an instrumental notion of this form of governance. The exceptionally strong

economic performance of China, becoming the leading manufacturing economy in the world, is one

factor which may be driving positive general assessments of their government. This hypothesis is

explored more fully in Chapter 9, where performance explanations are scrutinized in greater depth.

Among third wave democracies, some of the post-Communist states see a relatively large

democratic deficit, including in Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania. By contrast, a relatively small deficit is

evident in Ghana, Mali and India. Lastly within the group of established democracies, Italians display a

substantial democratic deficit, reflecting an enduring lack of satisfaction with how their government

works, a persistent pattern noted earlier when comparing the Euro-barometer surveys.

Conclusions

Socialization theorists have long predicted that citizens living within democratic states, who

have multiple opportunities to observe and to become engaged in public affairs, will gradually develop

norms and values which deepen their commitment to democratic values. Long-term processes of value

change are predicted to leave an enduring imprint upon democratic attitudes and values, and in cases

where states have experienced a major regime transition, cultural attitudes are expected to lag behind

contemporary conditions.

The results of the analysis generally provide important evidence largely supporting these claims.

Democratic cultures are indeed significantly stronger in societies which have had the longest historical

experience of this form of governance. In particular, compared with those living under autocracy,

citizens living in long-standing democracies display significantly stronger commitment to democratic

attitudes and a rejection of autocratic forms of governance, endorse the importance of democratic

values, and evaluate the democratic performance of their own governments more positively.

The overall pattern documented in this chapter therefore suggests that democratic cultures and

patterns of system support usually evolve over many years, or even decades, as the result of enduring

and long-lasting experiences, rather than responding immediately and rationally to short-term processes

of regime change. Ever since Almond and Verba, cultural theorists have long suggested that the gradual

diffusion of democratic attitudes, norms, and values serves to consolidate and underpin democratic

regimes. The evidence confirms the role of long-term historical experiences in cultural change. To

understand why historical patterns are stronger predictors of democratic cultures than contemporary

13


conditions, we also need to look at political knowledge. When people express widespread support for

democracy, and when they evaluate the performance of democracy in their own countries, it remains

unclear what this implies, especially in states with little, or even no, historical experience of this form of

governance.

Conclusions and discussion

Therefore the growing tensions between public support for democratic values and evaluations

of how democratically governments work in practice have been observed in the literature, nevertheless

many questions remain. These components are most commonly analyzed separately, rather than being

integrated.25 Moreover systematic research has not established the social background and political

characteristics of critical citizens, and the distribution of these groups across different types of societies,

cultural regions, and regimes. We also need to describe trends over time within the same set of

countries, to establish whether and where there has been any significant growth in the proportion of

critical democrats. Lastly, the behavioral consequences of this phenomenon need to be established to

understand the impact upon civic engagement, governance, and regime stability. The next section of the

book turns to understanding how we can best explain the phenomenon of critical citizens in any society,

before considering why this matters.

To understand these issues further, the next chapter turns to examining the cognitive basis of

judgments and thus whether critical citizens are capable of making informed judgments about the

performance of democracy.

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Figure 5.1: Experience of democracy deepens democratic orientations

Importance of democracy Democratic attitudes Satisfaction with democracy0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

58

44

14

72

42

37

7571

40 RestrictedModerateExtensive

Note: The historical experience of democratization for each society is measured by the cumulative Freedom House index for political rights and civil liberties 1972-2006, standardized to a 100-point scale and categorized into societies with restricted, moderate, and extensive experience during the third wave era. For details about each of the 100-point scales measuring the indicators of system support, see Figures 5.2 to 5.8. ANOVA was used to test the significance of the difference between the type of historical experience of democratization and the indicators of system support. The mean difference between types of regimes (Eta) proved to be statistically significant at the .01 level for all indicators. N.78,416

Source: World Values Survey 2005

15


Figure 5.2: Democratic experience strengthens evaluations of democratic performance

Note: V163. “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?” For comparison, these items were standardized to 100-points. The table describes the proportion expressing very positive evaluations (scoring 70 and above on the 100-point scale) by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.

Source: World Values Survey, 2005

16


Figure 5.3: Democratic experience strengthens democratic attitudes

Note: Attitudes towards democracy and autocracy were monitored using the following four combined items: V148-V151: “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system; Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections; Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country; Having the army rule.” For comparison, all indicators have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the proportion expressing very strong approval of democratic values and rejection of autocracy (scoring 70 and above on the 100-point scale) by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.

Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

17


Figure 5.4: Democratic experience strengthens democratic values

Note: “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?” For comparison, all indicators have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the proportion saying that democracy was very important (scoring 70 and above on the 100-point scale) by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.

Source: World Values Survey, 2005

18


Figure 5.5: The democratic deficit by historical experience of democracy

Restricted Moderate Extensive5

6

7

8

9

10

8.4 8.3

8.9

5.5

6.56.7

Democratic values Democratic performance

Democratic values: V162.”How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed

democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely

important” what position would you choose?”

Democratic performance: V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again


“completely democratic,” what position would you choose?”

Democratic deficit: Mean difference between columns (i) and (ii)


19


Figure 5.6: The democratic deficit by nation

Democratic values: V162.”How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?”

Democratic performance: V163. “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?” For comparison, these items have been standardized to 100-points. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.


20


Table 5.1: The democratic deficit by historical experience

KNOWLEDGE VALUES EVALUATIONS DEFICIT

Historical experience of

democracy

Enlightened

awareness of

democracy

(i)

Importance of

democracy

(ii)

Satisfaction

with

democratic

performance

(iii)

Summary

(ii-iii)

Extensive experience 2.68 8.90 6.83 -2.07

Moderate experience 1.64 8.41 6.51 -1.90

Restricted experience 1.09 8.36 5.58 -2.78

Total 1.81 8.54 6.43 -2.11

Notes:

Democratic values: V162.”How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed

democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely

important” what position would you choose?” The above table shows the mean score on the 10-pt scale.

See chapter 5 for details.

Democratic performance: V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again


“completely democratic,” what position would you choose?” The above table shows the mean score on

the 10-pt scale. See chapter 5 for details.

Democratic Knowledge: This is estimated by the mean score on the procedural understanding of liberal

democracy scale minus the mean scores on the instrumental and authoritarian understanding scales.

See chapter 6 for details.

Critical Citizens: This index is calculated by the gap between (ii) democratic values and (iii) evaluations.

Source: World Values Survey 2005 N. 69,306

21


Table 5.2: The democratic deficit by world region

KNOWLEDGE VALUES EVALUATIONS CRITICAL

CITIZENS

#

Global region Enlightened

awareness of

democracy

(i)

Importance of

democracy

(ii)

Satisfaction

with

democratic

performance

(iii)

Summary

deficit

(ii-iii)

Scandinavia 3.64 9.19 7.68 -1.53 3

Asia-Pacific 1.37 8.43 6.90 -1.55 11

South America 2.35 8.34 6.57 -1.78 7

Africa 1.31 8.65 6.71 -1.91 7

North America 2.26 8.81 6.62 -2.20 3

Western Europe 2.71 8.87 6.64 -2.25 9

Middle East 0.72 8.59 5.79 -2.77 5

Central & Eastern Europe 1.93 7.99 5.06 -2.96 8

Total 1.79 8.54 6.44 -2.10 53

Notes: For details, see Table 7.1


22


Table 5.3: The democratic deficit by country

Restrictedexperience of democracy

Values

(i)

Performance

(ii)

Deficit(i-ii)

Moderate experience of democracy

Values(i)

Performance

(ii)

Deficit(i-ii)

Extensive experience of democracy

Values(i)

Performance

(ii)

Deficit(i-ii)

Ethiopia 9.2 4.2 4.9 Bulgaria 8.0 4.3 3.7 Italy 8.9 5.9 3.1Ukraine 8.0 4.2 3.8 Andorra 8.9 5.4 3.6 Cyprus 9.1 6.5 2.6Russia 7.5 4.4 3.1 Poland 8.7 5.7 3.0 Trinidad & Tobago 8.7 6.1 2.6Moldova 7.9 5.1 2.9 Romania 8.6 5.8 2.8 US 8.8 6.3 2.5Armenia 8.4 5.6 2.8 Burkina Faso 8.0 5.7 2.3 Netherlands 8.7 6.5 2.3Serbia 7.5 5.2 2.4 Argentina 9.1 7.0 2.1 Great Britain 8.6 6.4 2.2China 8.5 6.7 1.8 S. Korea 8.6 6.4 2.1 Sweden 9.5 7.5 2.1Viet Nam 9.2 8.0 1.2 Slovenia 7.9 5.8 2.1 W. Germany 9.2 7.2 2.0

Mexico 8.7 6.6 2.1 Australia 9.1 7.1 1.9

Zambia 8.8 6.7 2.1 Canada 9.0 7.1 1.9Brazil 8.2 6.2 2.1 France 8.5 6.6 1.9Taiwan 8.9 6.9 2.0 Japan 8.5 6.9 1.7Indonesia 8.5 6.5 2.0 Finland 8.7 7.4 1.3Colombia 7.9 6.3 1.6Chile 8.2 7.0 1.3Uruguay 8.9 7.7 1.2Malaysia 7.9 7.0 0.9Ghana 9.2 8.5 0.7India 7.1 6.5 0.7Mali 7.7 7.0 0.7

Total 8.4 5.5 2.9 8.3 6.5 1.9 8.9 6.7 2.2

Democratic values: V162.”How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?”Democratic performance: V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?”Democratic deficit: Mean difference between columns (i) and (ii)Source: World Values Survey 2005

23


24

1 Similar conclusions are reached by Berhard Wessels.2009. ‘Trust in political institutions.’ In The Legitimacy

of the European Union after Enlargement. Ed Jacques Thomassen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2 Russell J. Dalton. 2004. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in

Advanced Industrial Democracies. New York: Oxford University Press.

3 Marc J. Hetherington. 2005. Why Trust Matters. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

4 Bruce Cain, Russell J. Dalton and Susan Scarrow. Eds. Democracy Transformed? The Expansion of Political

Access in Advanced Industrialized Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

5 See, for example, Council of Europe. Forum for the Future of Democracy.

http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/democracy/Default_en.asp

6 William Mishler and Richard Rose. 1995. ‘Trajectories of fear and hope: support for democracy in Post-

Communist Europe.’ Comparative Political Studies 28:553-81; Richard Rose and William Mishler. 1996.

‘Testing the Churchill hypothesis: popular support for democracy and its alternatives.’ Journal of Public

Policy 16:29-58; Richard Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer. 1998. Democracy and Its

Alternatives in Post-Communist Europe: Testing the Churchill Hypothesis. Cambridge: Polity Press; Roderic

Camp. ed. 2001. Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press;

Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes. 2001. ‘Support for democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental.’

British Journal of Political Science 31(3); Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi. 2004. Public

Opinion, Democracy, and Market Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Russell J. Dalton and Doh Chull

Shin, eds., 2006. Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the Pacific Rim Oxford: Oxford University Press;

Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. 2008. How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins

Press; Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin. Eds. 2008. How East Asians

View Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press.

7 Andreas Schedler and Rudolpho Sarsfield. 2007. ‘Democrats with adjectives: Linking direct and indirect

measures of democratic support.’ European Journal of Political Research 46 (5): 637-659.

8 Ronald Inglehart. 2003. ‘How solid is mass support for democracy: and how do we measure it?’ PS:

Political Science and Politics 36:51-57; Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 2008. How People View

Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

9 Donald Emmerson. 1995. ‘Singapore and the 'Asian Values' Debate.’ Journal of Democracy 6, 4: 95-105.

10 Z. Wang. 2005. ‘Before the emergence of critical citizens: Economic development and political trust in

China.’ International Review of Sociology 15(1): 155-71.

11 Russell Dalton and Doh Chull Shin, eds. 2006. Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the Pacific

Rim Oxford: Oxford University Press; Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin.

Eds. 2008. How East Asians View Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press.

http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/democracy/Default_en.asp

12 Larry Diamond. 2008. ‘Introduction’. In How People View Democracy. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner

(eds). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. P.xi.

13 Mark Tessler and E. Gao. 2005. ‘Gauging Arab support for democracy’. Journal of Democracy. 16(3): 83-

97; Mark Tessler. 2002. ‘Do Islamic orientations influence attitudes toward democracy in the Arab world?

Evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria’. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 43(3-

5): 229-249; Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler. 2008. ‘The Arab Aspiration for Democracy.’ Table 1. In Larry

Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University

Press.

14 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 2008. ‘Introduction’. In How People View Democracy.

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

15 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 2008. In How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns

Hopkins University Press.

16 Andreas Schedler and Rudolpho Sarsfield. 2007. ‘Democrats with adjectives: Linking direct and indirect

measures of democratic support.’ European Journal of Political Research 46 (5): 637-659.

17 William Mishler and Richard Rose. 1995. ‘Trajectories of Fear and Hope: Support for Democracy in Post-

Communist Europe.’ Comparative Political Studies 28:553-81; William Mishler and Richard Rose. 2002.

‘Learning and re-learning regime support: The dynamics of post-communist regimes.’ European Journal of

Political Research 41: 5. Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer. 1998. Democracy and Its

Alternatives in Post-Communist Europe: Testing the Churchill Hypothesis. Cambridge: Polity Press.

18 Christopher J. Anderson, and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. ‘Political institutions and satisfaction with

Democracy.’ American Political Science Review 91(1):66-81; Neil Nevitte and Mebs Kanji. 2002. ‘Authority

orientations and political support: A cross-national analysis of satisfaction with governments and

democracy.’ Comparative Sociology 1(3-4):387-412; Christopher J. Anderson, Andre Blais, Shaun Bowler,

Todd Donovan and Ola Listhaug. 2005. Losers’ Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy. New York:

Oxford University Press; Alexander F. Wagner, Friedrich Schneider, and Martin Halla. 2009. ‘The quality of

institutions and satisfaction with democracy in Western Europe: A panel analysis.’ European Journal of

Political Economy 25 (1): 30-41; Kees Aarts and Jacques Thomassen. 2008. ‘Satisfaction with democracy:

Do institutions matter?’ Electoral Studies 27(1): 5-18.

19 For a debate concerning the meaning, see D. Canache, J.J. Mondak and Mitch A. Seligson. 2001. ‘Meaning

and measurement in cross-national research on satisfaction with democracy.’ Public Opinion Quarterly 65:

506–528; Jonas Linde and Joakim Ekman. 2003. ‘Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used

indicator in comparative politics.’ European Journal of Political Research 42(3): 391 – 408.

20 Jonas Linde and Joakim Ekman. 2003. ‘Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator

in comparative politics.’ European Journal of Political Research 42(3): 391 – 408.

21 Naoimi Chazan. 1988. “Democracy and democratic rule in Ghana.” In Democracy in Developing Countries:

Africa, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner; Joseph Aye.

2000. Deepening Democracy in Ghana. Freedom Publications.

22 Roderic Camp. ed. 2001. Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh

Press; Marta Lagos. 2003. ‘Support for and satisfaction with democracy.’ International Journal of Public

Opinion Research 15 (4): 471-487.

23 Tianjian Shi. ‘China: Democratic values supporting an authoritarian system.’ In Yun-han Chu, Larry

Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin. Eds. 2008. How East Asians View Democracy. New York:

Columbia University Press.

24 For details, see Human Rights Watch. 2009. World report. http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79333

25 See, however, Richard I. Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2001. ‘Democracy and Its discontents in

post-wall Germany.’ International Political Science Review 22(4): 363-378.

http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79333

sites.hks. web viewsame is not necessarily true elsewhere. lack of regime legitimacy could have far...

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