DAVID W. LONG, Ph.D.Emeritus Professor of Comparative Philosophy

Author: Body Knowledge: A Path to Wholeness The Philosophy of Michael Polanyi Department of Philosophy

California State University, Sacramento226 Moon Circle

Folsom, CA 95630916 208-0584

pueohonu@comcast.netnamaste@csus.edu

csus.edu/indiv/l/longd

PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCHES: PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE STUDY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

ABSTRACT: This cross-disciplinary, cross-cultural paper explores and critiques scientific, philosophical, and psychological concepts of consciousness. It reflects the thinking of Hungarian scientist-philosopher, Michael Polanyi, the subject of my 2011 book. It also embodies some of the ideas I presented at the First International Conference for the Study of Consciousness Within Science in 1990, a gathering of physicists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers, all of whom were trying to come to grips with both the experience and the idea of consciousness in their work.

Concepts without percepts are empty;percepts without

concepts are blind.

---Immanuel Kant

The intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the rational mind is a faithful servant. We have created a society that honors the servant and has

forgotten the gift.

---Albert Einstein1

The power of science to grow by the originality of individual thought is thus established within a cosmic perspective of steadily emergent

meaning. Science, conceived as understanding nature, seamlessly joins with the humanities, bent on understanding man and human greatness.

---Michael Polanyi2

Discussions about consciousness are complicated by the fact that participants do not share a common underlying “ordinary” consciousness. Everyday experience is founded on what J. D. Teasdale calls implicational cognition, much of which is not verbally formulated.

An unacknowledged aspect of debate is individuals’ attempts to negotiate the expression of their unformulated experience. This is further complicated by the way in which a discourse, based on particular ontological assumptions, exercises an ideological control which limits what underlying aspects of experience can be formulated at all. Charles Tart’s concept of state-specific sciences provides a framework within which the role of unformulated experience can be acknowledged and taken into account. Unless this is done, debates will be vitiated by participants engaging in ideological struggles.

---Psychologist David Edwards3

. . . . .Creativity is dangerous. We cannot open ourselves to new insights without endangering the security of our prior assumptions. We

cannot propose new ideas without risking disapproval and rejection. Creative achievement is the boldest initiative of mind, an adventure that takes its hero simultaneously to the rim of knowledge and the limits of propriety. Its pleasure is not the comfort of the safe harbor, but the thrill of the reaching sail

---Robert Grudin, The Grace of Great Things: Creativity and

Innovation4

The study of consciousness and the means by which we study it have dominated my thinking and work for almost 50 years. My examination has encompassed Western and Eastern, theoretical, philosophical and clinical views of consciousness as well as the methods thinkers and practitioners use to discover, articulate, modify, and apply such views.

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What follows I need to say, and say in the way I do because healthy, critical dialogue, especially about the issues of consciousness, cannot avoid confronting the pre-scientific and philosophical premises which support empirical and theoretical inquiry. The subject of my book, Hungarian scientist-philosopher Michael Polanyi, devoted his life and work to unearthing and displaying the human and philosophical presuppositions of the natural and behavioral sciences.

This paper might also be seen as a meditation on some of Polanyi’s key statements in Personal Knowledge and in his Duke Lectures of 1964.

In the former he says,

We start from the fact that no material process governed by the laws of matter as known today can conceivably account for the

presence of consciousness in material bodies . . . . .To represent living men as insentient is empirically false, but to regard them as thoughtful automata is logical nonsense.5

I want to build on some of Polanyi’s revolutionary insights into embodied consciousness by offering a few remarks about my own phenomenological investigation of consciousness.

In addition to Polanyi, my work reflects the thinking of William James, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Eugene Gendlin, Eugene Kaelin, Medard Boss, R. G. H. Siu, H. H. Dalai Lama, Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Franklin Merrell-Wolff, Robert Irwin, Martin Heidegger, Oliver Sacks, David Kaonohiokala Bray, Idries Shah, and Indian, Buddhist, and Sufi sciences of man.

Merleau-Ponty’s groundbreaking analysis of consciousness as perceptual conscious, beginning with Phenomenology of Perception (1945) had a profound influence on me in the 1960s. It is an important part of the tacit background of this paper. Polanyi apparently knew little of the Frenchman’s work when writing Personal Knowledge. William Poteat at Duke, I am told, introduced Polanyi to the phenomenologist’s key ideas in the 1960s. Merleau-Ponty died in 1961 at the age of 53. Had he lived I am certain he and Polanyi would have had much fruitful dialogue.

I’ll come right to the point, as I did in the prologue of my book based on my 1967 dissertation, Body Knowledge: A Path to Wholeness The Philosophy of Michael Polanyi. I have serious doubts about whether there can be a scientific study of consciousness, given our conceptions of science and our confusion about what constitutes the proper objects and fields of

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investigation. I am equally skeptical about the possibility of meaningful psychological, neuroscientific, and philosophical modeling of experienced and experiencing consciousness.

I find myself agreeing with one of my most important mentors in matters scientific, psychological, and medical, Psychiatrist-Philosopher Medard Boss, whose words resonate so closely with Polanyi’s positions.

Psychology is the science of the ‘psyche’ or mind. Western psychology has borrowed its methodology and its thought-models from the natural sciences; but it overlooks the fact that the conceptual universe of these natural sciences was by no means designed for the investigation of human life. . . . . Western Psychology tells us absolutely nothing about the subjectivity of the subject, the personality of the person and the consciousness of the mind in a manner that would actually enable us to understand the connexion between these, the environment, and our real selves. . . . . Never. . . . . has there been a physical medicine, let alone a psychotherapy nor will such scientific disciplines ever be possible in the future, without a pre-given specific philosophical first premise concerning the nature of man, his world and the inherent relationship between man and his world.6

Boss’s insights arise from his intensive work as a Psychiatrist and Therapist, as well as his 28-year relationship with Martin Heidegger. Therapeutic considerations compelled him to put aside virtually all theory in order to focus on the experiential realities of consciousness.

I applaud Boss’s critique of the neuroscientific, brain-based research, and philosophical psychology that have dominated the topic for the last 50 years. A survey of technical and popular literature provides ample evidence of the continued reign of reductionism, scientism, and positivism.7

However, there are growing exceptions and exceptional thinkers, although they are still a minority. One the best examples is the Dalai Lama’s Mind and Life Institute that arose out of a number of Mind and Life Conferences featuring scientists, philosophers, and contemplatives that began in 1987.8

The philosophy and science of Embodiment as exemplified in the work of Biologist, Philosopher, Neuroscientist, and Buddhist Francisco Varela, Philosopher Evan Thompson, and Psychologist Eleanor Rosch is an exciting cross-fertilization of disciplines and ideas.9

As Polanyi argued throughout his writing, scientists, psychologists, and philosophers need to reveal and confront their underlying premises regarding

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man and his being. They need to acknowledge that investigation cannot occur in the absence of self-conscious, self-critically articulated views about the human beings.

There is another significant underlying premise that dominates the sciences and much of philosophy. Roger Bacon and Petrus Peregrinus (13th Century) called by some the fathers of empiricism, emphasized method over content. Today, the consensual definition of science encompasses both method and content. Given the materialist, reductionist orientation of most scientists, the positivist identification of science with method and the specific theoretical and empirical content excludes so much of what we humans do and believe. Polanyi’s remarks I quoted above reinforce this point.

Scientists and Philosophers need to engage in self-interrogation about what truly constitutes science, for example, a strong emphasis on methodology per se or an emphasis on methodology directed to particular bodies of scientific knowledge.

Bodies of knowledge constituting contemporary science are an extraordinary testament to the creative efforts of so many good and great scientists.

However, disengaging scientific methodology from specific bodies of knowledge can lead to remarkably fruitful phenomenological research and findings. Polanyi’s groundbreaking conceptions of personal knowledge and the tacit dimension establish and exemplify the epistemological legitimacy of exploring human domains excluded by positivistic and scientistic thinkers.

For example, there is a distinction that many others and I consider crucial, i.e., the distinction between Inner Empiricism and Outer Empiricism. The explorations of German or French phenomenology represent a form of inner empiricism, especially where observers are able to substantially bracket ontological superimpositions and instead assert that consciousness is always consciousness of something, but it is not inherently directional.10

The focused, systematic, experimental inquiry found in classic Indian and Buddhist Yoga, for example, Patanjali’s Yoga-Sutra (somewhere between the fourth and second centuries, BCE) is a successful example of an enterprise embodying inner empiricism. In the 195 Aphorisms of this short work, Patanjali interrogates and dismantles consciousness, its structure, and its contents, providing the irreducible level of consciousness that Western philosophers, even Merleau-Ponty, have not been able to grasp.11

On the other hand, the methodology of outer empiricism, which dominates most scientific investigation, declares that consciousness, if it is

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recognized at all, is always an inherently directional consciousness of objects focused on a material world governed by the laws of matter.

However, almost any phenomena in our consciousness and in the world can be investigated and intersubjectively validated by the methods of science.

Highly trained scientists and phenomenological investigators can observe, interrogate, and cross-examine phenomena, as does Patanjali. Scientists and phenomenologists alike can agree or disagree with one another, can discuss and critique, can find consensus, and perhaps discover ways to introduce conceptual and theoretical symbolizations that refer to objects of consciousness whatever their ontological status. Charles Tart’s State-specific science is intended to reach that goal.12

Philosopher-Psychotherapist Eugene Gendlin offered a fresh and productive approach to this question 50 years ago in Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning. Felt meaning as contrasted with logical, intellectual meaning is at the heart of Gendlin’s pioneering analysis.13

Merleau-Ponty and others who follow in his footsteps have refined and expanded those initial investigations. And Boss’s work, which depends heavily on the phenomenologists, represents a radical but fruitful revisioning of the human sciences and their practical application to philosophy, therapy and education.

As it stands now, most research and modeling exclude felt experiencing or conceptualizations based upon first-person experience. Instead, external, third person observations and theoretical constructs are the currency of much research. As a result, the conclusions of scientific, psychological, and philosophical studies of consciousness are remote from the immediacy of human life and awareness, or what Husserl calls the Lebenswelt, the pre-reflexive, pre-scientific, pre-philosophical world of purposive human actions that should guide scientific and philosophical reflections. Educational Psychologist Cyril Burt once said: “Psychology first lost its soul, then lost its mind, until it was finally in danger of losing consciousness.”

Polanyi echoed this sentiment in pointing out that we have lost our lived-in bodies . . . . . by ignoring “. . . the exceptional position of our body in the universe.”14 In 1945 Merleau-Ponty aptly described the lived-in body as haunting rather occupying space.

I embrace and celebrate the achievements of science. The work done charting features of the human being in the world commands our respect. We possess a wealth of information about brains and behavior, perception, sensation, and learning. The study of man in the last few generations has produced a revolutionary revisioning of the earlier sciences of man.

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Regarding the achievements of so many fine scientists, it isn’t so much what they produce that troubles me. It is the meaning they impute to what they are doing, or saying they’re doing, which concerns me. Their narrow interpretations exclude most of what makes us human beings. Recall the positivist’s criterion of empirical verifiability—what cannot be observed and described empirically is meaningless.15

For instance, as Polanyi often points out, scientistic claims abound in the scientific world. But they’re not scientific claims. Rather they are philosophical and ideological declarations with no scientific warrant. Philosophically naïve scientists don’t often distinguish between statements that are warranted by science and those that are not.

When I review the findings of the sciences and the proposals made by philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists I seldom have the sense that the pictures include me, or even the people who create the pictures and make the proposals. The domain of felt experiencing or felt meaning that constitutes so much of my personal and social life doesn’t appear to be mirrored in either descriptions of external observations of behavior, or in systems of interconnected theoretical constructs intended to explain behavior.

1500 years ago Augustine, in a perfect mirroring of Polanyi’s “knowing more than you can tell,” wrote, “If no one asks me what time is, I know perfectly well what it is; but as soon as someone asks me what it is, I have no idea.” I feel that way about virtually all conceptualizations relative to direct experiencing.

Wittgenstein’s often quoted remark strengthens the case for tacit knowing: “The aim of authentic philosophy is to mean the unspeakable by clearly displaying the speakable.”16

I can’t deny the immediacy of experiencing any more than Augustine and Descartes could deny their existence in the act of doubting it. Felt Experience is manifest. It exemplifies itself. It is the first-person point of view. Felt Experience, as the primary matrix of the Lebenswelt, is the source of science, philosophy, religion, and dreams. We never leave it; we always come back to it after conceptual and linguistic flights of imagination and theory. To be true to science and philosophy, I think scientists and philosophers have to acknowledge this immediacy and its significance for our work. Our lives are played out within its boundaries. Our work presupposes it. It is the medium within which we conjecture and operate, asserting or denying the truth of theories, models, and pictures.

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It is little noticed or acknowledged that the criteria of truth and evidence are themselves a function of conscious performances within the same medium. If we reduce our performances to brain states, or sensations, or behavior, then we undercut the meaning of truth and criteria of rationality.

If neuroscientists claim that they must reduce and explain all claims and statements in terms of brain states, then those scientists’ explanations are really nothing more than brain states. How can a brain state be true or false?

Polanyi argued consistently that theories must begin with personal and social immediacy. They must return to this base if they are to have relevance and meaning for any of us. Theories are empty exercises in the absence of the phenomena about which they are theories.

In the third Duke Lecture, Polanyi remarks, “The mathematical theory of a frog can explain the life of frogs only if frogs are non-theoretically known beforehand.”17

The Reductionists get mired in the dissected parts and never return to the whole. Needless to say, phenomena and theory work together to help us indwell (Dilthey’s Verstehen) and understand what there is in the world, how we know it, and how we fit into it.

When we forget to consider ourselves while counting objects in the world, we generate paradoxes we seem incapable of resolving.

The Indian story about forgetting to count yourself that I use in my book captures this so dramatically.18

Consider a few examples.No traditional or current theories that I am aware of appear sufficiently

rich in conceptual bridges to first-person experience to account forthemselves or for the theorizer’s actions in creating them.

David Hume’s remark in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion tellsthe tale: “What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain that wecall thought, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe.”

Scientific and philosophical investigators of consciousness interrogating the phenomenon and phenomena of consciousness have always struck me as peculiar when they fail to be aware of their own consciousness. By failing to acknowledge their own consciousness they can never achieve pictures that mirror what it is to be a conscious human being in the world. Polanyi makes this point frequently.

How are we to free consciousness research from the context of the consciousness in which we live and out of which our inquiries come? We can’t entirely objectify it, if at all. The definitions and concepts of consciousness that form the starting point of research are evaluated by standards that lie

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outside the scope and methods of research. The pre-scientific background of experimental inquiry will determine which definitions and concepts are appropriate. This depends on consensus about the phenomena upon which we are trying to reach a consensus, which depends on the context of immediate, felt experiencing. “What we are looking for is what is looking, “ said St. Francis.

As a working Physical Chemist from the 1920s on, Polanyi became concerned that science, philosophy, and society were in serious trouble. Science was separated from its philosophical premises and from its social milieu, as he has argued so forcefully. In the drive toward precise, comprehensive and fruitful explanations of phenomena, we drift away from problems and puzzles about human beings, which give rise to our empirical quest in the first place.

And as we increasingly turn to technical science and philosophy to resolve our conceptual and life problems, we begin to break contact with the life and metaphysical domains that make our lives and ideas meaningful.

To truly understand ourselves as human beings we need to turn to Polanyi and thinkers like him, such as Merleau-Ponty, Gendlin, Boss, the Dalai Lama, and Robert Irwin.19

But we also need to become familiar with and incorporate insights and observations from the vast literatures and traditions of Asia and the Middle East. A synthesis and blending of contributions from the many traditions around the world and in human history, might enable us to evolve conceptual and experiential accounts of the seamlessly embodied human being acting in the world. Jesuit Paleontologist-Philosopher Pierre Teilhard de Chardin gave voice to my ideal of what and who we are in the world: “We are not human beings having a spiritual experience but spiritual beings have a human one.”

FOOTNOTES

1. This is from The Expandable Quotable Einstein, collected and edited by Alice Calaprice. Her collections provide us with a

comprehensive, inclusive picture of Einstein.

2. Preface to Personal Knowledge, p.xi. This preface should be read and reread to truly understand the origins, originality, and depth

of Polanyi’s work.

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3. “Unconscious Influences on Discourse about consciousness: Ideology, state-specific science, and unformulated experience,” Indo-

Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Vol. 5, Edition 1, April 2005, p. 1. Edwards discusses a number of important ideas, including the work of Psychologist Charles Tart whom I cite in Footnote 11. Edward’s work encompasses science and spirituality. He cites Medard Boss’s work in the article. J. D. Teasdale, now retired, was a highly respected researcher and clinical psychologist at the Medical Research Council and Brain Scientists unit at Cambridge. The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenlogy’s main page contains a seven-point list of key principles of phenomenology formulated by Lester Embree, one of the truly great phenomenologists of our era (his CV runs 64 pages). www.ipjp.org/index.php/aboutphenom.

4. Robert Grudin, The Grace of Great Things: Creativity and Innovation, p. 9. Grudin, a retired professor of Comparative literature has written one of the most extraordinary books on creativity that I have encountered in over 50 years of reading the literature from many fields about creativity. In his notes to Chapter 1 he mentions two famous books that are his favorites, Bernard Lonergan’s Insight, and Michael Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge. Grudin quotes a profound statement by Polanyi on p. 44, “Having made a discovery, I shall never see the world again as before. My eyes have become different; I have made myself into a person seeing and thinking differently. I have crossed a gap, the heuristic gap which lies between problem and discovery.”

The great modern classic treatment of creativity is to found in The Creative Self by the late Cornel Lengyel, an extraordinary writer and poet with whom I had the great good fortune of friendship for many years. The book, published in 1971, is long out of print. It can be found many libraries, along with Cornel’s other works.

5. Personal Knowledge, p. 339.

6. A Psychiatrist Discovers India, pp. 9 & 88. Boss visited India and Indonesia in 1956 and 1958 and published this book in 1958.

The first chapter, “The Necessity of the Journey to India,” encapsulates one of the most telling and comprehensive critiques of the dominating

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and damaging role of materialist science in the West. The book encompasses a number of themes in the long history of science, medicine, psychology, and spirituality in India, particularly in the Ayurvedic system of traditional medicine that goes back to the Vedas of the mid-second millennium BCE. Boss was able to spend considerable private time with some of India’s most venerable sages whose private lives and teachings are little known both inside and outside India. He provides verbatim accounts of his conversations with these sages. These sages possessed deep and comprehensive knowledge of Western science and philosophy. This short book was always a core text in my Indian Philosophy Courses.

7. My reading includes technical and popular science, literature of all types, philosophy, religion, spirituality, psychology, engineering, medicine, neuroscience, politics, education, just to name a

few of the areas I explore. I recommend the Science Daily Newsletter and a number of other aggregators to get a

comprehensive picture of research in every field showing the good of science as well as the dominance of reductionism. A fascinating exemplification of this is in a feature Business Business Week, published in August 30, 1999: 21 Ideas for the 21stCentury.

8. I cite many examples in the prologue of Body Knowledge: A Path to Wholeness The Philosophy of Michael Polanyi. But

I want to add an article from the February 2012 issue of the Technology Review. In particular, The Mystery Behind

Anesthesia by Courtney Humphries that features the experience and reflections of Anesthesiologist Emery Brown at the Massachusetts General Hospital. He finds he must confront his patient’s consciousness and their reports directly in assessing degrees of awareness while under anesthesia. Also, in a recent article in The Chronicle of Higher Education: The Chronicle Review, What Buddhist Monks Taught Me About Teaching Science, science teacher Arri Eisen details his work with H. H. Dalai Lama who has been fascinated by science and neuroscience for many years. Eisen is a professor of pedagogy and a biology and faculty member in the Graduate Institute of Liberal Arts and Center for Ethics at Emory University. He participates in Emory

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University’s Emory-Tibet Science Initiative—between the Library of Tibetan Works and the Archives and Emory University.

Physician, researcher, philosophy, poet, novelist Raymond Tallis published a magnificent book last year: Aping Mankind:

Neuromania, Darwinitis, and Misrepresentation of Humanity that takes on reductionism, scientism, and materialism. Among other things, he’s debunking the idea that neuroscience can explain everything that makes us human. He has published extensively in these topic areas for many years. He also cites the pioneering work of Mary Midgeley, who has written extensively on related topics. Her Animals and Why They Matter is a stunning work. She focuses in her many writings on what philosophers can learn from nature, particularly from animals. Tallis says of her “Her incomparably lucid thought about our conception of animals and about science and scientism has established

her as one of a handful of leading philosophers in the English-speaking world.”

Three other sources need to be cited. The Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona, which hosts the Towards a

Science of Consciousness conferences. The Journal of Consciousness Studies, which includes a diversity of points of view. The Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness. The latter two contain the work of researchers who are committed to a neuroscientific reductionism as well as those whose work encompasses a much vaster arena of consciousness and methods for exploring embodied consciousness.

9. Embodied Mind, co-authored by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, Thompson’s Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of the Mind, and Rosch’s numerous writings.

Varela became a Tibetan Buddhist in the 1970s, studying with some of the great Rinpoches (incarnate lamas—the word means precious jewel). Rosch has written extensively on the implications of Buddhism and Contemplative features of Western religion for modern Psychology as well as on the Dalai Lama and compassion.

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10. Husserl’s expression of intentionality distinguishes acts of thought (noesis) and intentional objects of thought (noema). Merleau-

Ponty thought this was not the root level of consciousness. Instead, he argued that all consciousness is perceptual consciousness. This implied that all conceptualizations should be reconsidered

relative to the primacy of perception. Polanyi’s analysis is quite compatible with this.

11. I strongly recommend Georg Feuerstein’s The Yoga-Sutra of Patanjali: A New Translation and Commentary (1979).

Feuerstein provides the original aphorisms in Romanized Sanskrit, followed by a word-by-word analysis of the key terms in the aphorism. This is followed by an analysis of the meaning of the aphorism and the history of its terms.

For good Buddhist sources, I heartily recommend Dwight Goddard’s Buddhist Bible, with selections from Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese,

Tibetan, and modern sources.

12. Many years ago, Psychologist Charles Tart and others proposed State Specific Science in order to deal with non-ordinary states of consciousness and their contents. He published The End

of Materialism in 2009. See the article in the Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology by David Edwards from which I quoted at the beginning of this paper. It lays out Tart’s position as well as the proposals of many other investigators. Tart originally published his views on State Specific Science in Science in 1972 (not well received). An amplified version appears in the Journal of the Brazilian Association for the Advancement of Science, March and June, 1998,

“Investigating Altered States of Consciousness on Their Own Terms: A Proposal for the Creation of State-Specific Sciences.”

13. Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, p. 286-88. Gendlin cites many passages from Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of

Perception, p. 210.

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14. Duke Lecture #3, Commitment to Science, p. 20.

15. Einstein’s quotation in the book I cited in Footnote #1 is right on target. He says “I am not a positivist. Positivism states that what cannot be observed does not exist. This conception is

scientifically indefensible, for it is impossible to make valid affirmations of what people ‘can’ or ‘cannot’ observe. One would have to say ‘only what we observe exists,’ which is obviously false.”

16. This is Jacob Needleman’s paraphrase of 411.5 in the Tractatus.

17. Op. cit, p. 3.

18 . It seems there were ten merchants on their way in order to conduct transactions in another city. They had come to the

banks of a broad river. The rains had caused it to rise so much that it had swept away the bridge. Nevertheless, their business was urgent. And so the merchants decided to swim across the river. When they reached the other bank, one of them began to count the group. He wanted to make sure that no had drowned during the crossing. To his horror, however, he always ended up with nine instead of ten, no matter how often he repeated the count. The others too began to count. But no one got a higher figure than nine. A hermit, coming along, delivered them from distress and

doubt. He laughed merrily, counted the merchants and found that all ten were there. Only then did they notice that each of them,

when making his count, had forgotten to include himself.

19. Artist, philosopher, architect Robert Irwin has been one of the most influential figures for me in recent decades. Phenomenologist-

writer Lawrence Weschler brings Irwin to us in Seeing Is Forgetting the Name of the Thing One Sees and Robert Irwin Getty Garden (Garden photography by Becky Cohen). There is no experience quite like walking through Irwin’s garden at the Getty Museum in Los Angeles through the seasons. It discloses Irwin’s life and work and provides a unique set of felt experiences. Irwin and many of his artistic, scientific, and philosophical colleagues are deeply embedded in phenomenology.

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Bibliography

Books

Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth, and Logic, V. Gollancz, Ltd., 1946.__________, Logical Positivism, Free Press, 1959.

Bacon, Francis, The Complete Essays of Francis Bacon: Including the New Atlantis and the Novum Organum, Washington Square Press, 1963.

Boss, Medard, A Psychiatrist Discovers India, Oswald Wolff, London, 1965.__________,Psychoanalysis and DaseinAnalysis, Dacapo Press, 1983.

Bray, David Kaonohiokala, The Kahuna Religion of Hawaii, Borderland Sciences, 1990.

Calaprice, Alice, The Expandable Quotable Einstein, Princeton University Press and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2000.

Dennett, Daniel, Consciousness Explained, Little, Brown, and Co., 1991.

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Feuerstein, Georg, The Yoga Sutra of Patanjali: A New Translation and Commentary, Wm. Dawson & Sons, Ltd, Cannon House, Folkestone, Kent, England, 1979.

Gendlin, Eugene, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning: A Philosophical and Psychological Approach to the Subjective, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.

Ghilard, Agostino, The Life and Times of St. Francis, Curtis Publishing, 1967.

Goddard, Dwight, The Buddhist Bible, Beacon Press, 1970.

Gray, John, Strawdogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002.

Grudin, Robert, The Grace of Great Things: Creativity and Innovation, Ticknor & Fields, Houghton Mifflin, 1990.

Houshmand, Zara, Robert Livingston & Alan Wallace, Consciousness at the Crossroads: Conversations with the Dalai Lama on Brain Science and Buddhism, Snow Lion Publications, 1999.

Gurdjieff, George, Meetings With Remarkable Men, Penguin, 1973.

Hearnshaw, L., Cyril Burt: Psychologist, Cornel University Press, 1979.

Hume, David, Principle Writings on Religion: Including Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and the Natural History of Religion, Oxford, 1998.

Humphrey, Nicholas, Soul Dust: The Magic of Consciousness, Princeton University Press, 2011.

Husserl, Edmund, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenlogy: An Introduction to Phenomenologica, Northwestern University Press, 1970.__________, Ideas: General Introduction to Phenomenology, Macmillan, 1958.

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James, William, The Principles of Psychology, Harvard University Press, 1981.

Kaelin, Eugene, Heidegger’s Being and Time: A Reading for the Reader,Florida State University Press, 1988.

Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965.

Krishnamurti, J., Freedom from the Known: A synthesis of what Krishnamurti has to say about the Human Predicament and the eternal problems of living, edited by Mary Lutyens, Harper and Row, 1969.

Long, David W., Body Knowledge: A Pathway of Wholeness The Philosophy of Michael Polanyi, Xlibris, 2011.

Lyotard, Jean-Francois, Confessions of Augustine, Stanford University Press, 2000.

Menen, Aubrey, The Mystics, Dial Press, 1974.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Phenomenlogy of Perception, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962.

Needleman, Jacob, The Heart of Philosophy, Knopf, 1982.

Nye, Mary Jo, Michael Polanyi and His Generation: Origins of the Social Construction of Science, University of Chicago Press, 2011.

Polanyi, Michael, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, Harper & Row, 1958.__________, Tacit Dimension, Doubleday & Co. , Inc., 1966.

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Sacks, Oliver, The Mind’s Eye, Vintage, Random House, 2010.

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Siu, R. G. H., The Tao of Science: An Essay on Western Knowledge and Eastern Wisdom, MIT Press, 1957.

Tallis, Raymond, Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis, and Misrepresentation of Humanity, Acumen, Durham, 2011

Varela, Francisco et al, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, MIT Press, 1991.

Varela, Francisco, Editor & Narrator, Sleeping, Dreaming, and Dying: An Exploration of Consciousness with the Dalai Lama, Wisdom Publications, 1997.

Weschler, Lawrence, Seeing is Forgetting the Name of the Thing One Sees: A Life of Contemporary Artist Robert Irwin, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1982.__________, Robert Irwin Getty Garden, J. Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles, 2002.

Wolff, Franklin Merrell, Experience and Philosophy: A Personal Record of Transformation and a Discussion of Transcendental Consciousness, State University of New York Press, 1994.__________, Transformations in Consciousness: The Metaphysics and Epistemology, State University of New York, Press, 1995.

Articles, Lectures, and Websites

Edward, David. “Unconscious Influences on Discourse about Consciousness: Ideology, State-specific science, and unformulated experience,” Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenlogy, Vol. 5, Edition 1, April, 2005.

Arri Eisen,“What Buddhist Monks Taught Me About Teaching Science,” The Chronicle of Higher Education: The Chronicle Review, November 13, 2011.

Humphries, Courtney, “The Mystery Behind Anesthesia,” Technology Review, February, 2012.

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Polanyi, Michael, Unpublished Duke University Lectures, 1964. The five lectures are available through the Polanyi Society’s Tradition and Discovery Journal. http://www.missouriwestern.edu/orgs/polanyi/

Tart, Charles, , “Investigating Altered States of Consciousness on their own terms: A Proposal for the creation of State-Specific Sciences,” Journal of the Brazilian Association for the Advancement of Science, March and June, 1998.

“21 Ideas for the 21st Century,” Business Week, August 30, 1999.

The MindLife Institute, coming out of the Dalai Lama’s work. http://www.mindandlife.org/ “Building a scientific understanding of the mind to reduce suffering and promote well-being.”

Science Daily News, http://www.sciencedaily.com/ A comprehensive aggregator with special sections on the Latest Science, Mind and Brain, Health and Medicine, Space and Time, Biology, Earth and Climate.

Wilber, Ken et al, Integral Institute, http://www.integralinstitute.org/

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