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SPATIUM International Review UDC 725.42:334.73(497.1) 1948/1950 ;No. 25, September 2011, pp. 39-49 327(497.1:47) 1948/1950Review paperDOI:10.2298/SPAT1125039Z

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SOVIET IN CONTENT - PEOPLES IN FORM:THE BUILDING OF FARMING COOPERATIVE CENTRESAND THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV DISPUTE 1948-1950

Jelena ivanevi1, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Architecture, Belgrade, Serbia

It was not until 1948, when the Cominform conflict escalated, that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia began a thorough

implementation of the Soviet model in Yugoslav agriculture due to the Soviet criticism, the CPY made immediate legislative

changes and started a class struggle in Yugoslav villages. Simultaneously, and just a few months before the Fifth Congress,

Josip Broz Tito initiated a competition for building 4,000 Farming Cooperative Centres throughout Yugoslavia - they were built

in accordance with the social-realist national in form socialist in content slogan. Once the building started, in his

Congress speech, Radovan Zogovi, a leader of the Serbian Agitprop department, offered the first official proclamation of

Socialist Realism in the post-war period by a political authority. This article analyses the process of planning, designing and

building of the Farming Cooperative Centres; discusses their political, ideological and formal implications; and inquires into

the specific role of architecture, joined with the theory of Socialist Realism, in building Yugoslav socialism.

ey words: the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute; the Five-year plan; Farming Cooperative Centres; Socialist Realism; national in form.

THE POLITICS: THE SOVIET-

YUGOSLAV DISPUTE1

In March 1947, after an unsuccessful Belgrademeeting with Soviet representatives, EdvardKardelj left for Moscow to meet with Iosif Stalinpersonally. Forming joint stock companies wasa way of post-war bonding between Yugoslaviaand the USSR; however, as the bonds werestrengthening, the disagreements were rising.In the context of the emerging Eastern Bloc, theUSSR initiated a process of cultural andeconomic exchange with the countries ofpeoples democracies, adjusting theireconomies to its own five-year economicdevelopment plan. By the beginning of 1947,the Soviet share in their import-export structurehad increased, the trade agreements weresigned, new joint stock companies were beingcreated and the first economic plans werebeing prepared. The Yugoslav government wasa leader in this process. The One Year Plan wasalready declared in 1946. While the other1Bul. kralja Aleksandra 73/II, 11 000 Beograd, [email protected]

Eastern European countries were setting uptheir short-term plans, the proclamation of thefirst Yugoslav Five Year Plan was already inorder.2 In the course of the process, inFebruary 1947, the first Soviet-Yugoslav jointstock companies were created, concerning theriver float and civilian airlines (ed. Dedijer,1980, vol.1, pp.113-118). By March, theSoviets had resumed a monopoly over thefirms and were already looking to establishmore. This time, they were demanding thefounding of joint production companies in thefield of metallurgy and oil extraction, that is, inthe field of heavy industry, which was to be the

2 The other countries of peoples democracies did notproclaim their Five Year Plans until The Council for MutualEconomic Aid was found in January 1949 in Moscow. In1947, when the Five Year Plan was declared in Yugoslavia,a Three Year Plan was proclaimed in Hungary, Two YearPlans in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, and One YearPlan in Albania. After the founding of The Council to whichYugoslavia was not invited, Five Year Plans were declared inBulgaria and Czechoslovakia (1949-1953), Hungary andPoland (1950-1954), Romania and Eastern Germany(1951-1955), and were based on the same premises as theYugoslav (1947-1952) and the first Soviet Five Year Plan(1928-1933) (See Obradovi, 1995, pp.103-104).

base of The Plan. In Kardeljs later words, thispresented a problem for both political andeconomic reasons (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.1,p. 120).3By 1947, the CPY had already gainedfull political power in the country and the statehad a monopoly over all the major productioncompanies. However, the monopoly itself didnot enable the organizing and controlling of theentire process of economic accumulation andreproduction from one centre (Obradovi,1995, p.83). This was the task of The Plan, andin the words of Andrija Hebrang, thechairperson of the Economy Council at thetime: It is known that the one who holds theeconomy in hand, also holds the power(Obradovi, 1995, p.64). However, theenforcing of The Plan implied another level ofcentralisation. By demanding to establish jointcompanies in the industrial field specifically,the USSR was asking for direct involvement inleading the Yugoslav economic plan, that is, its3According to Dedijer, forming join companies in thefield of industry was one of the reasons of the Sovietconflict with China, and later with the other EasternEuropean countries as well (see ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, pp.117-118; and Feit, 1971, pp.154, 369-371).


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share in holding the power. The Soviet termswere unacceptable, yet, in an agriculturalcountry such as Yugoslavia, Soviet aid wasnecessary for the building of industry. The CPYwas obviously looking for some other form ofcooperation, and in that regard, Kardeljs Marchmeeting with Stalin was an unexpected success.Halfway through debating the joint companiesissue, Stalin suddenly stopped insisting on hisprevious requests. His new standpoint was:What would it be like not to form new jointcompanies at all, but for us to help you, to giveyou one aluminium factory, one metal factory,and to help you in drilling for and refining oil? Itis clear that joint-venture companies are not anadequate form of cooperation with an allied andfriendly country such as Yugoslavia. There wouldalways be disputes, in a way, the independenceof the country would suffer and friendly relationswould become corrupted. Those kinds of firmsare convenient for satellite countries (). Wewill give you all that on credit, help you with theworkforce, specialists, and some of it you willpay in money, or however you can () We stillhave to get something from you too. (ed.Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, pp.120-1)Both sides agreed that Soviet aid in buildingYugoslav industry was to be given in creditloans. In the following month, the Law of theFive Year Plan was declared and publiclycelebrated on 1 May 1947. Simultaneously,the Yugoslav government had declined theMarshall Plan, as did the other EasternEuropean countries. After that, the credit loanswith the USSR were signed and foreign tradewas predominantly directed toward the EasternBloc. The Cominform was created inSeptember 1947 in Poland, establishing itsfuture base in Belgrade, offering the firstofficial post-war political partnering betweencommunist parties, and proclaiming that theworld was divided in two opposing blocks: thedemocratic and the imperialistic (see ed.Dedijer, 1980, vol. 1, pp.161-165). By the endof the year, the mutual contracts of friendshipand cooperation were signed among theEastern Bloc countries, implying their militarycooperation in case of war. Yet at the sametime, it remained uncertain whether theYugoslav economy would develop in the waythe CPY had planned, because it becameunclear if the funds Stalin had promised weregoing to be invested.At the beginning of December 1947, theSecretary of the Yugoslav Foreign TradeMinistry Bogdan Crnobrnja left for Moscow torenew the trade agreements that were due toexpire by April 1948. He was left there waitingfor nearly two months (ed. Dedijer, 1980,

vol.1, pp.188-9). On 20 January 1948, he wasfinally received, only to find that the contractpromised was merely verbal. Two weeks later,Kardelj left for Moscow again. This time, Stalinissued him with two ultimatums in two days: on10 February, the foundation of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation; and on 12 February, thesigning of a contract for obligatory consultationson foreign political issues (ed. Dedijer, 1980,vol.1, pp.168-75, 185-7). Stalin was dissati-sfied with Kardeljs indecisiveness. On 26February, the Soviet Ministry of Trade declaredthe trade agreements would be delayed untilDecember 1948. From that moment on, Sovieteconomic pressure was turning into a full-blown Yugoslav economic crisis. In March,Soviet military and civilian experts werewithdrawn from Yugoslavia and the facts of theYugoslav-Soviet conflict were exposedinternationally. By mid-1948 when the firstCominform Resolution was declared,Yugoslavia found itself in a situation of totalpolitical and economic isolation from theEastern and the Western Blocs simultaneously.The framework of the Soviet criticism was thatthe class struggle cannot be felt, as therewas a substantial growth of capitalistelements in Yugoslav villages (ed. Dedijer,1980, vol.1, pp.204-5). The CPY was also heldresponsible for a non-programmatic approachto Party leadership. Apparently, its lastcongress had been held in1928. By 1948, theCPY had already introduced a series ofeconomic and cultural measures in accordancewith Soviet practice, yet Yugoslav and Sovietsystems still differed a great deal. Along withthe state-owned (dravni) and the co-operative(zadruni), the 1946 FPRY Constitution stillallowed the private (privatni) economic sector.As for the cultural field, Socialist Realism wasencouraged by Yugoslav art critics; however,the standpoints of Yugoslav cultural fieldofficials, architects in particular, wereambiguous. In 1947, there were severalcompetitions for designing Yugoslav govern-ment buildings, but the formal characteristicsof submitted projects still fell into two distinctcategories: some resembled Modernism,others, Socialist Realism. In fact, both wereequally accepted and discussed by juries(Blagojevi, 2007, pp.56-188). However, in amatter of weeks after the Soviet criticism, anew Party line was established. In a plenarymeeting held on the 12thand 13thof April, theCPY abandoned the path of a peoplesdemocracy and posed the concepts of classstruggle and of the socialist character of theYugoslav revolution. The changes in thelegislative and the public economic field wereimmediate. On 28 April 1948, the Nationali-

zation Law was revised, abolishing allindustrial companies that were still privatelyowned. On 20 May, the Party decided not totake part in the second Cominform meetingscheduled for June, thereby avoiding a publicconfession of guilt and instead announced theholding of the Fifth Congress on 21 July. TheCPY also did not abandon the idea of the Plan,yet because of the economic sanctions, itsfurther implementation would have to be basedon domestic resources only, that is, on theprivate sector. As a complete liquidation ofcapitalist assets in the industrial productionfield had already been conducted (ed.Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, p.58), in accordance withthe Soviet criticism, the class struggle andinternal enemy issues related to the peasants.Simultaneously, the building of the Coope-rative Centres (Zadruni domovi) began, givingarchitecture a new, crucial role in buildingsocialism.THE PRACTICE: THE BUILDING OF

FARMING COOPERATIVE CENTRES

Josip Broz Tito gave the initiative for buildingCooperative Centres in December 1947(Bajalica, 1948; ed. Kruni, 1948). At the sametime, Crnobrnja had left for Moscow and Sovieteconomic pressure was starting to take place.This investment was not provided for thePlan presented detailed building funds and incertain domains even the exact number ofbuildings was specified. Yet the documentcontained no data about building the Centreseither by numbers or by the scope of theinvestment. The building started on April, andafter the Congress was announced in May, itcontinued in the form of a so-called pre-congress competition. To this day, let alone1948, this was one of the largest massbuilding actions in Yugoslavia: the task was tobuild 4,000 units.The social significance of the Centres wasconstantly stressed at the time and it wasclosely linked to their architectural programme.The buildings consisted of two integrated parts:the agricultural-administrative (Zadruga Farming Cooperative Office) and the cultural-educational section (Dom kulture CulturalCentre). The presumptions behind the givenpartition were the following. Firstly, by buildingsuch architectural works, the material base forfuture development of the farming cooperativesector and Yugoslav agriculture would becreated. New facilities would accommodate theexchange of industrial and agriculturalproducts and, therefore, provide the newesttechnical advancements for agriculturalproduction (Govor potpretsednika Saveznevlade Edvarda Kardelja, 1948). Secondly, the


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cultural and ideological development of themasses would be improved. By building newtheatres and libraries, peasants would findknowledge, art, scientific and culturalentertainment, as well as necessary restingplaces (Brajovi, 1948, pp.28-29). The claimthat providing technical equipment wouldimprove agricultural development is indis-putable; however, in the present economicconditions, there was nearly nothing toexchange (see Pavlovi, 1997, pp.48-50).Thepurpose of the Plan itself was to improveindustrial development, that is, to producemore machines. Accomplishing this goal byforeign trade was not possible at this point.Therefore, what was really implied in the abovetheses was that the mere building of theCentres would increase the use of mechani-zation, improve agricultural production andinitiate cultural development. Clearly, this ishardly sustainable anywhere, not to mentionYugoslavia in 1948, and equalling architecturalworks to a material base was a rather literalinterpretation of Marxs thought, particularly intimes when there were no funds to cover theexpense of building that material base itself.As has been said, the federal government madethe decision about the number of buildingsafter considering the material and financialpossibilities (Bajalica, 1948, p.6). However,those central funds were unlikely to cover any ofthe necessary material requirements for thismass enterprise, the general recommendationwas to collect local resources first (Borba,March 29, 1948). The State provided certainamounts of steel, glass, cement, and timber, butthe rest of the construction material, namely,sand, stone, lime and bricks had to bemanufactured and sourced locally due to theshortage of gas near construction sites.Havingto build 4,000 units simultaneously in a matterof months also implied having a great numberof trained construction workers that post-warYugoslavia did not have. Considering the factthat they had to be found immediately, somewere trained on crash-courses and others hadto learn the trade while on-the-job. In manycases, there was no time to wait for federalfunds at all and the building started without anyexternal help. The work was expected to bedone exclusively by peasants anyway as themoving power of the masses and their initiativewas broadly counted upon.Cooperative Centres were designed accordingto a specific typology. The villages were firstdivided into eight categories by number ofinhabitants, and based on that, eight types ofprojects were made. Such partition wassupposed to bring new edifices into accordwith each villages economic strength. The

assumption was, in contrast to urban areas,rural settlements economic power could bedirectly linked to the number of inhabitants.That is, the more fertile the land, the morepeople would live there (Koji, 1973, p.134).However, in 1946, all agricultural fields largerthan 30 hectares (medium sized) had alreadybeen collectivized and joined to state-heldfarming cooperatives - the majority of villageswere small and, by the given criteria,undeveloped (Petranovi, 1980, p.512; Koji,1973, p.151). The mass building of the Centresand their eight group sub-division was meant tobe undertaken in those areas specifically. Forregions known to be fertile, such as the fields ofVojvodina, there were ninth and tenth so-calledSuper Types of Centres of a larger capacityand with specific programmes (ed. Kruni,1948). Consequently, the flaws of the giventypology were transferred to the Centresarchitectural programme and were mostnoticeable when relating to their cultural section.Depending on a villages size, the architectswere supposed to design eight types ofbuildings. The given programmatic elementswere the same for all types, differing only inthe number of rooms and capacity. Theadministrative part consisted of one to twostores and service warehouses, one to fouroffices and one warehouse for storingagricultural products. As for the culturalsection, the dominant programmatic elementwas a so-called multipurpose hall intended fortheatrical plays, films and larger gatherings.The first typological inadequacy could befound in the case of the halls. They weresupposed to have 200 seats for type I to 550seats for type VIII. Considering a fifty-seatdifference was too small for halls to beclassified into different typological categories,the attempts to do so were abortive. They weredesigned schematically, with the number ofseats only approximate to those required by theprogramme or not even drawn on theblueprints. The other cultural features were of asecondary character. For the first six types onlya reading room was required, and only for thelast two types a library, both 30m2. The lastfour types also had one or two rooms forcultural needs of 20m2. As for servicefacilities, all types had a projectionists cabinand a coatroom for the audience, named asmall coatroom for the first four types. Thecirculation areas were not defined and theprogramme contained no data about any otherspaces necessary, thus, in most projects, eventhe sanitary facilities were not drawn in, or theywere added to the buildings exterior later.According to the statements of the architects atthe time, the cultural section of the Centres

was supposed to be the focus of the culturalrevolution of our peasantry (Macura, 1948,p.28). Yet, the programme was given only ingeneral terms and, consequently, their projectswere of the same character. The task ofpreparing the whole enterprise in a matter ofmonths also left no time for gathering theelementary, economic or technical data. Thecadastral registers were not used in the designprocess (Pivac, 1951, p.111), and even if theyhad been, they would have been useless,again, due to the typology. Likewise, the final,detailed designs were never made. Theconstruction started by functionally unfinishedand technically unmarked first drafts on a1:200 scale, and although the members of theEngineers and Technicians Society ofYugoslavia (ETSY) had made the decision tomake detailed projects, along with the firstdrafts (Macura, 1948, p.27), the rush of apre-congress competition made those detailedprojects remain only a single proposal.In total, seventy-five projects of different typeswere accepted, forty-seven of which were formass construction, and the rest belonged tothe specific category.As has been said, thetradesmen and engineers had given their bestin building Cooperative Centres. Trade Unionmembers worked on construction sitesinstead of taking their vacations and thearchitects designed the projects for free, takingon the obligation of surveying the constructionprocess by working overtime (Kruni, 1949,p.99).However, the participation of experts wasnot decisive in any way, because once thebuilding started, the typology according towhich the projects were initially made, as wellas those projects themselves, was completelyneglected. Choosing if and where they weregoing to be built was neither a typology matternor the architects concern.The key role of preparing and organizing thebuilding process was given to Party Committeesof the Districts (Srez), who were the guardians ofParty politics and Plan implementation at theregional level. Along with CooperativeCommittees and the support of the PeoplesGovernment and Popular Front, the Districtrepresentatives organized the supply andproduction of construction material, and had thepower to decide in which villages and sites theconstruction would take place (Bajalica, 1948,pp.7-8). Those forty-seven designs thearchitects had made were mere catalogues forthem to choose from. As a result, the onlyconnection the Centres still had to the wordtypology, if any, was that some of them werechosen to be built more than once.


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Dragomir Simis ProjectIn the words of Jovan Kruni, the criteria forchoosing a project were the following: the needfor more buildings of a smaller capacity; theinexpensiveness (a smaller quantity of materialrequired); a good organization of the groundplan; and one important factor was alsoarchitectural treatment of the building, that is,its attractiveness (Kruni, 1949, p.107). Thefirst claim, however, only partially factual inSerbia, two thirds of villages were small, andtypes I, IV and VIII were built the most(Table 1). Apparently, large units were moreexpensive to build, but seemingly, they werequite attractive as well. The average number ofsites per project was thirty, however, not alldesigns were equally popular. An unknownarchitect, Dragomir Simi, was the absolutewinner of the Serbian pre-congresscompetition, although he later only received anhonorary mention. His design was chosen tobe built 132 times, while three other projectsnever saw the light of day; Rajko Tati, aneminent pre-war Serbian-national stylearchitect, designed one of them (Table 2).

Simis project belonged to the type IV ofCentres,and in it there were certain differencesto the given programme. The hall had 255 outof 350 seats required along with the readingroom; there was a library, which was not

required for this type.The architect apparentlyneglected the typology and found an averageprogrammatic solution that contained all thefeatures Cooperative Centres could have had.This was the first and the last programmerevision he made.If Simis design is compared to the otherprojects of the type IV, the application of thesecond and third (economic and functional)principle Kruni mentioned becomes clearer.In other designs, ground plans were moredeveloped; therefore, the circulation areasoccupied much space, but considering thenumber of seats required for type IV halls, this

was functionally justified (Figure 1). Yet inSimis project, the audience areas were keptto an absolute minimum, in fact, one couldalmost claim there were not any (Figure 2).Although a foyer for at least 200 people wasnecessary, it was not included in the design.The visitors were supposed to enter the hallthrough a porch and a vestibule of 12m2 alltogether. The stage area was under-developed,with no coatrooms, and in the case of atheatrical play, the actors would have to enterthe stage directly from outside. The situation inthe administrative part was similar. The userswere supposed to enter the office directly from

Table 1. The number of construction sites per typeType SitesI 916IV 636VIII 570III 212II 170V 118VII 81VI 31

Table 2. The number of construction sites per authorType Architect Sites

1 IV Dragomir Simi 1322 I Dimitrije Marinkovi 1203 V Sima Papkov 1184 VII Nikola Gavrilovi 815 VIII Miodrag Milievi 796 VIII Sima Papkov 797 III Nedeljko Pei 758 II Nikola Gavrilovi 509 IV Jovan Kruni 4410 I Dobrosav Pavlovi 4111 IV Petar Petruevi 3612 I Branislav Marinkovi 3513 II Nedeljko Pei 3514 I Ljudmila Krat 3315 VIII Nikola Lali 3216 III Aleksandar egvi 3117 VI Tehn. Sergije Vihrov 31

Figure 1. Radovan Tri, Kolkhoz Centre of the IV type, elevation, plan, 1948. Kruni, J. ed.) 1948) Zadruni domovi:zbirka projekata masovne izgradnje na teritoriji ue Srbije, Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine i Autonomne KosovskoMetohijske oblasti u 1948. godini. Beograd: Zadruna knjiga, p. 29.

Figure 2. Dragomir Simi, Kolkhoz Centre of the IV type, elevation, plan, first storey, 1948. Kruni, J. ed.) 1948)Zadruni domovi: zbirka projekata masovne izgradnje na teritoriji ue Srbije, Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine i AutonomneKosovsko Metohijske oblasti u 1948. godini. Beograd: Zadruna knjiga, p. 27.


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the porch and go through it to enter the otherone. However, given the programme did notdefine facilities and circulation areas, althoughthey are required for any architectural design,the architect did not feel any obligation toprovide them, and in that regard he made norevision of the programme whatsoever. Thus, ifthe intention behind the project had been toprovide adequate spaces for the administrativeand cultural needs of users, its plan wouldhave been graded as unsuccessful. Yet, if thegoal had been to build the largest number ofunits in the shortest period of time, with theminimum quantity of material available,comfortable audience spaces could have beensacrificed. Simi designed the mosteconomical and, therefore, the best plan bywhich the architectural programme was morethan fulfilled. It had literally all the program-matic elements of type IV with a libraryincluded; thus the requirements were compliedwith more than a 100%. The project wasperhaps atypical for a certain group of villages,but it was made typical by its success. It wasthe average, most acceptable solution at thetime, and in the circumstances, was of a new,high quality. As for the fourth aspect, thebuildings attractiveness, that was realizedtoo. The architect achieved a maximumrepresentational quality by the minimal use offormal elements and again, with minimalmaterial requirements. Its prominent side wasformed by a second storey balcony exit, placedabove the porch framed by arches (Figure 3a,b). At the time, the arched porch was found tobe consistent with Yugoslav vernaculararchitecture and the Socialist-Realist nationalin form concept (Figure 4a, b, c).

The PorchAccording to Kruni (1949, p.98), the buildingof the Centres was tightly connected to the tasksof the Plan. However, according to the Plan, theywere never provided for (Borba, May 1, 1947).Furthermore, the whole enterprise was poorlyprepared, and once the construction started, anuntrained workforce built the units. It was

physically impossible for the architects to visit,let alone inspect and survey the buildingprocess on each of the 4,000 sites, andalongside the given typology, almost everyproject had to be adjusted to terrainconfiguration, locally available material, techni-cal conditions or the opinions of those, whodecided on the spot (Pivac, 1951, p.111).Those additional adjustments surely used muchmore time and material, which could have beensaved if only a basic analysis had beenconducted previously. Apparently, the savingswere not a truly decisive factor in the process,and perhaps the appropriate words here wouldbe the rush to build, followed, paradoxically. bywastefulness. So if the primary assumptionbehind building those units was to adjust theirarchitectural programme to economicconditions of villages in order to initiate theadvancement of the Cooperative economy,enforce a cultural revolution, and fulfil the tasksof the Plan, it could be considered either asunsuccessful or as demagogic. From thestarting point of planning, through thedesigning, up to the construction phase, thedevelopment of the villages was never takeninto any serious consideration, and the wholeenterprise was of an unplanned character.Yet, if the architectural treatment ofCooperative Centres is considered, there is asegment that was typical for all the projects,although it was not required by the programme.Kruni (1949, p.99) mentioned that porcheswere first supposed to be built in wood in orderto mimic vernacular architecture, but due to theshortage of timber, this aspect was also givenup on. However, there was no giving up onbuilding porches, they were constructed inbrick and concrete that was insufficient forconstructing the buildings alone. Evidently, theuse of vernacular elements was silentlyunderstood among architects, as well as in thebuilding process, although all the economicand organizational conditions for buildingdetails like these were extremely unfavourable.Far more important functional aspects werewillingly neglected repeatedly, and the porcheswere not necessary either for constructionpurposes or by functional requirements, thislast is evident from Simis project. Buildingthese elements surely required more time,money and material, especially when anunqualified workforce was employed (Figure5). Seemingly, in the case of the porch, whoserole was exclusively representational and inaccordance with a national in form, socialistin content slogan, the economic aspect hadsuddenly lost key significance. The task was,apparently, to build the largest number ofunits, with the minimum of means available,

Figure 4a. Village house, Pomoravlje, Serbia. Deroko, A.1968) Narodno neimarstvo I. Beograd: SANU

Figure 4b. The State Museum, Baku, Azerbaijan. Mac, I.L. 1946) Optenarodna demokratska naela sovjetskearhitekture, Tehnika, No. 4-5, p. 122

Figure 4c. Kolkhoz Centre, Novi Vrbas, Vojvodina. Kruni,J. ed.) 1948) Zadruni domovi: zbirka projekatamasovne izgradnje na teritoriji ue Srbije, AutonomnePokrajine Vojvodine i Autonomne Kosovsko Metohijskeoblasti u 1948. godini. Beograd: Zadruna knjiga, p. 77.

Figures 3a and 3b. Dragomir Simi, Kolkhoz Centre of theIV type, exterior view, Omanica, Trstenik District, 2007.Authors photographic archive


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but with specific formal characteristics, all bythe time the Congress began. Considering theCongress was a programmatic and referen-dum-like event, it can be assumed that Centreswere built for propaganda purposes. If so, theproblem is - what were the porches supposedto propagate in a specific, Yugoslav socio-political context?THE THEORY: NATIONAL IN FORM,

ORMACHTBILDUNG

Speaking of Cooperative Centres, Kruni (1949,p.99) claimed the architects were usingvernacular forms in order to achieve two goals:they tried to adjust to peoples [narodna]architecture by form and to local conditions bymaterial. Macura (1948, p.29) explained thetwo aspects more thoroughly. Firstly, theCentres were supposed to gain a suitablecharacter and appearance, since their numberimposed a danger of their resemblingstandardized, monotonous elements, andtherefore a danger for their architectural valueto be below the value which the significance andthe role of Cooperative economy presupposes.Secondly, the architects tried to adjust thebuildings in appearance as well as by material,to local, namely, geographic and climaticconditions, as well as certain specificities ofpeoples architecture of certain areas.Both architects separate the two aspects: formand peoples architecture on the one hand,and material and the local conditions on theother. The second attempt, adjusting to localconditions by material was inevitable, becausethe locally available materials had to be usedfor construction in any case. However,adjusting to aspects of local architecture was

not possible, again, due to the given typology.The criterion of the number of inhabitants saidnothing of a villages location or itsarchitecture; hence, the architects could nothave known where their projects were going tobe built. Therefore, adjusting to localarchitecture is one matter, but adjusting topeoples architecture by form in order toexpress a suitable character, is somethingelse. Quite another thing was to give thosebuildings a national form.According to Bratislav Stojanovi (1947-1948,p.14), national forms were coming from thepeople, therefore, they were the easiest way tobring architecture nearer to the masses and todevelop the peoples creative forcessimultaneously. As Ivan olovi (1993, p.83)noted, the political vocabulary in which the keyword is the people, combined with invokingfolklore, has a familiar intent in mind. In theeyes of the majority, folklore subjects andforms legitimize political and military actions.They suggest (connote) the idea that themessages and emotions transmitted by thatspeech are inevitably the echo of the voice, ofthe expression, of peoples will, moreover,that the sender of the political message is thepeople itself. Quite similarly, in 1948 BrankoMaksimovi (1948, p. 75) wrote:By creating works of architecture we will learnthat they belong to the people and that masses ofpeople rightfully expect of our new architecture tofully express their wishes and aspirations toward abetter and more joyful life, to sketch out our pathto socialism as clearly as possible.4The intent behind invoking folklore, however, isof a dualistic character. It is used not only tolegitimize political projects in the eyes of thepeople, but also to a foreign audience. Bystressing the differences between local traditionand a neighbours culture it claims politicalindependence; by looking for similarities, itclaims the right to a political conjunction intoone common state (olovi, 1993, pp.88-9).The Soviet case was, as ever, contradictory. Thedifferences of local traditions were not stressedbecause there was a claim for politicalseparation; on the contrary, they were supposedto create conditions for their merging into oneculture. As Greg Castillo noticed (1997, pp.91-6), this was not a mere political proclamation,but Stalins consciously constructed dialecticallogic. It was the expressing of non-Russian4Uiemo se da stvarajui arhitektonska dela mislimona to da ona pripadaju narodu i da narodne mase spravom oekuju da naa nova arhitektura to punijeizraava njihove elje i stremljenja ka boljem iradosnijem ivotu, da to jasnije ocrtava na put usocijalizam.

peoples national identity that contrasted and,consequently, propagated Russias developmentand progress - its mission civilatric wassupposed to encourage them back to joinRussia. Stalins logic was later transferred to thetheory of Socialist Realism, and in the mid1930s, the architects were called to apply theidiom national in form, socialist in content.However, how this aphorism was to be translatedinto built form was by no means obvious, andthe main reason for the confusion lay in thetheoretical bases of Socialist Realism itself.As with all the other Soviet arts, thearchitecture of Socialist Realism was supposedto be concurrent with Gorkys definition givenfor literature, by which writers were expected tooffer the truthful, historically concreterepresentation of reality in its revolutionarydevelopment (quoted after Tertz, 1965,p.148). The Statute of The Union of SovietArchitects (1937) stated: Soviet architecturemust aspire to create the edifices that aretechnically perfect, economical and beautiful,that reflect the joy of socialist life and thegreatness of the ideas and goals of our epoch(quoted after Ostrogovi, 1947-1948, p.3). Inaddition, Andrei Zhdanov explained the way ofachieving these goals. The artists weresupposed to use various means in choosingthe best of what all the previous epochs haveever created (danov, 1934, p.181).According to the upper broad definitions, nostrict guidelines had been bestowed uponSoviet artists, yet, in the spirit of Stalinsdialectical logic, this did not imply they hadenjoyed absolute freedom. Clearly giveninstructions could have been easily followed,but the fact there were not any opened upbroad possibilities for finding artistsmistakes whenever there was a new Partyline to be implemented. Seemingly, that vastopenness gave rise for the absolute freedom ofthe Party on the one hand, and for totalrepression for the artists on the other.However, in literature and the fine arts it was atleast known that the motives of buildingsocialism were to be portrayed in realisticform. In architecture, it was by no means clearhow to reflect the joy of socialist life informal terms, nor was this ever cleared up inits theory. In fact, the theorists were primarilydedicated to erase any stable grounds forarchitectural production. Soviet architecturewas supposed to use its shapes, itscompositional means of expression, itspicturesque language (Ostrogovi, 1947-1948, p.4), but those compositional meanswere never actually defined. In the early 1930s,during the First Five Year Plan, there was a taskof finding the Soviet style; so Ivan Fomin

Figure 5. The porch, Veliki Dupci, Rasina District, 2007.Authors photographic archive.


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the Soviet Union. All the changes made inYugoslav law and economy were a declaration ofconsistency to Soviet principles; likewise, byusing vernacular elements in CooperativeCentres their Soviet character was intended. Onthe other hand, the constant invoking of thepeople and peoples forms speaks enoughabout to whom the internal aspect of propagandawas intended. However, propaganda purposesdo not explain the fact that there were 4,000Centres in the building process in 1948. It isquestionable whether the language ofarchitecture, namely, referencing Soviet orfolklore forms, could be reason enough for theParty to impose the difficult task of buildingthousands of buildings on itself, even in politicaland economic conditions already unfavourablefor its staying in power. It appears thepresumable role of the architecture of SocialistRealism does not end completely if taken solelyin the post-modern sense Mikhail Epstein(1998) wrote about, respectively.According to Arendt (1998, p. 369, 371), thereal goal of totalitarian propaganda is notpersuading, but organizing, the accumulation ofpower (Machtbildung). The masses are notconquered by a momentary success ofdemagogy, but by a visible reality and thepower of living organization. The ideologycannot be either transferred or taught, butonly exercised and practiced. As Kardeljargued at the Fifth Congress, the importantfeature of the Yugoslav public economyssocialist transformation was creating anorganizational form and a material technicalbase which would change the small-self soul ofa peasant day-to-day (V kongres KPJ i zadruneorganizacije, 1948). The significance of newfarming cooperative economies in achieving thatgoal was stressed by Aleksandar Rankovi,Interior Affairs Minister, who claimed theypresented a very convenient form throughwhich the Party () practically helps themasses () to mobilize against capitalistelements in the villages (ed. Dedijer, 1980,vol.1, p.383). After that, Dimitrije Bajalica(1948, p.8), the Secretary of the FarmingCooperative Economy Committee, said theCentres themselves were a material technicalbase for achieving socialism in the countryside,a base which with proper organizational-propaganda work () will help the masses topersuade themselves by their own experience ofthe need and the necessity of that road for abetter and happier life. That was also the long-term significance of those buildings: Merebuilding of Centres () creates new organizersand managers of public economy, raises thefaith in the power of association and enforcesthe consciousness of Cooperative members.

As it happens, these were not merely politicalproclamations. If it had been propaganda only,in all probability there would have been no needfor building 4,000 units in the given economicconditions. However, the lack of funds was notthe failing point of the whole process, but aprerequisite, its driving power, enforced by thetask of building thousands of unitssimultaneously. By not providing the materialand the funds required, the Party was mobilisingall the material and human resources available.The engineers were designing (although theirprojects were not followed); the tradesmen weresent to villages (although their help was of minorsignificance); but most importantly, the peasantswere gathering, producing material and buildingthe units. The action had mobilized all the levelsof society to mass labour, and they were doing itpro bono, out of their own resources - after all,they were said to be building for themselvesanyway. Contrary to other arts, the one featurearchitecture could provide in the whole processwas a living organization, with its key focusshifted from the buildings to the people, andthrough it, the Party was practicing the samedialectical Soviet model it was criticized for notbeing consistent with. On the one hand, thisshowed peoples support to the outside. AsBajalica (1948, p.8) stressed just before theCongress: Millions of work hours given [bymasses of people] in this pre-congresscompetition speak of () their love for theParty.Yet more importantly, the Soviet criticismleft the Party unsure of the peoples responses. Itwas in a position of preserving power and, asYugoslav representatives argued themselves,while the CPY was organizing, the people werepracticing and learning. Their involvement in theact of building gave the Centres a character noarchitect or form could ever manage to express -a didactic one. To paraphrase Slavoj ieks(1999, p.28) insight, the most elementarydefinition of ideology was given by Marx: theydid not knowit, they were doingit (Figure 6).

The Building of Socialist RealismA small number of Centres were finishedbefore the Congress. For example, in the Nisusdistrict thirty-eight were under construction,but by July 1948 only three of them wereroofed, and the walls were almost finished ontwo (Bajalica, 1948, p.7). Yet, the mere factconstruction had started was more than enoughfor the Party to make a number of consecutiveassumptions. The material base was set;therefore, the building of the new socialistsociety had already begun. In Bajalicas wordsbefore the Congress (1948, p. 8):By building the Cooperative Centres with theirlibraries and reading rooms, the conditions ofthe kolkhoz villages of the great country ofsocialism have are being created in ourcountryside too. The Centres are going tobecome lighthouses which will constantly lightup our villages with rays of socialism, and onthe base of science of Marxism-Leninism, andusing the 30-year- experience of the SovietUnion, in our conditions help create a new,socialist countryside.By the same principle, the Centres strongpointin practice, or rather, in reality, along with theirformal side, was used for declaring thatSocialist Realism is dominant in Yugoslavarchitecture. In his Congress speech, RadovanZogovi (1948, p.56), a leader of the Serbianagitprop department, condemned decadenceand formalism of Modern architecture andclaimed Socialist Realism is more appropriatefor building a new, socialist society. This wasthe first official proclamation of SocialistRealism in the post-war period by a politicalauthority. As Maksimovi (1947-1948, pp.15-16) wrote, the same happened in the USSR inthe 1930s, it was those gigantic tasks ofplanned building that posed new conditionsfor building architecture on solid, healthybases, and for rejecting tendencies whichwere rooted in capitalism, in the deteriorationof architecture, and turning it into a baretechnicism.The Partys proclamations were then followedby an institutional reply: the OctoberResolution of the Second Congress of ETSYstated that the architects accept the CentralCommittees directives and concluded:To discard notions of architecture broughtdown to a mere solving of the utilitarian,narrow-technical components as in capitalistcountries, and to demand the correct fulfilmentof functional component and artistic-ideological component of an architectural workat the same instance. ()To devote all the attention necessary to

Figure 6. Peasants on construction site, Novi Vrbas,Vojvodina, 1948. Uee sekcije arhitekata Beograda DIT-aNR Srbije u akciji izgradnje zadrunih domova 1949)Tehnika, No. 2-3, p. 97.


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acquainting, studying, evidencing, conservingand publicizing research results of thearchitectural heritage of our past.5 (Rezolucijasekcije arhitekata na II. Kongresu inenjera itehniara Jugoslavije, 1948)After that, while speaking of the Centres inApril 1949, Kruni (1949, p.99) made thefollowing rationalization:If someone would think that the projects ofour Cooperative Centres are notcontemporary, because they do not have anywindows and flat roofs, then we would respondthat the measure of contemporariness andquality of their form is not the use of elementsof Western-European grasping of things, butthe use of elements that are a real expressionof our possibilities and needs, which are intheir scope, and which are in the service of thebroadest strata of the working masses. Sucharchitecture is a document and an expressionof its time and, therefore, is qualityarchitecture. And not only that, the enormityand the broadest significance of this action,which cannot even be imagined in a bourgeoissociety should be emphasized as well, itsbreadth and general usefulness for peopleimplies the socialist content of ourarchitecture. From the standpoint of form, it isa contribution to the process of creating theexpression of Socialist Realism which hasbegun.6Before they were even built, the Centres wereproof that the reality was accurately shownby which, as Karel Teige (1977, pp.305-6)wrote in his definitions of Socialist Realism,they immediately drew a positive assessmentof the formal side, and showed evidence ofperfection in its realization. Moreover, thatsame formal side was proof that they areSocialist Realism, without mentioning, of5 Odbaciti shvatanja o arhitekturi koja se svode na pukoreavanje utilitarnih uskotehnikih komponenata, kako se topojavljuje u kapitalistikim zemljama, i traiti, da se u istias pravilno udovolji funkcionalnoj komponenti i umetnikoidejnoj komponenti arhitektonskog dela. (...) Posvetiti svupanju upoznavanju, izuavanju, snimanju, konzerviranju iobjavljivanju rezultata prouavanja naeg arhitektonskognaslea iz prolosti.6 Ako bi se nekome inilo da projekti naih zadrunihdomova nisu savremeni, jer nemaju prozora i ravnekrovove, onda bi tu odgovorili da merilo savremenosti ikvaliteta forme nisu upotreba elemenata zapadnoevropskogshvatanja, nego upotreba elemenata koji su realan izraznaih mogunosti i potreba i koji su u njihovoj razmeri, akoji su u slubi najirih slojeva radnih masa. Takvaarhitektura dokument je i izraz svoga vremena, a samim tim ikvalitetna arhitektura. Ne samo to, ovde treba istaiogromnost i najiri znaaj ove akcije, koji se ne moe nizamisliti u buroaskom drutvu, a ija irina i opte narodnakorist znai socijalistiku sadrinu nae arhitekture. Sagledita forme, ona je doprinos u zapoetom procesustvaranja izraza socijalistikog realizma.

course, the detail of national in form.Paradoxically, the architectural practice itselfprovided a material base for politicalpropaganda, but it managed to establish newtheoretical claims about and upon itself onlythrough it. In addition, the politics-practice-theory concept of building Socialist Realism inYugoslav architecture was just a starting pointfor the other arts. The pre-congress compe-tition was referring to photographers, artistsand art students as well, as they were all sentto construction sites throughout Yugoslavia.Consequently, there was a thematic change inYugoslav painting also, the motifs of PeoplesLiberation War were swiftly set aside by motifsof building the new socialist society (Figure7a, b, c, d). The most distinguished case ofthat process was the sudden star-status ofpreviously unknown painter Boa Ili (Merenik,2001, pp. 21-47). At the end of 1948, hisProbing the Terrain of New Belgrade was ahuge success, and is considered a canonicalexample of Socialist Realism in Yugoslav finearts to this day.The Year 949In Arendts words (1998, p.370), totalitarianleaders choose elements from reality to isolateand generalize them until they construct aworld that can be on equal terms with the realone. However, they constantly add the power oforganization to the weak and unreliable voice oftheir arguments, and the more their power isresisted by the outside, the stronger is theterror on the inside.In December 1948, the Soviets declared thetrade agreements were not going to berenewed at all and it became clear that politicaland economic relations with the USSR werenot going to be improved no matter what theCPY did (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.2, pp. 4-6, 20-21, 673). In 1949, for the first time after thewar, the media image relating to the USSRstarted to change. The number of favourablearticles was decreasing as border incidentswith the eastern neighbours were increasing;and along with their first culmination in March,the first critical articles were published(Dobrivojevi and Mileti, 2004). Yet, eventhough the popularising of the USSR wasstopped, the implementation of Soviet methodsdid not; in fact, it was enforced even more. InJanuary, after the Second Plenum of the CPY,the Yugoslav economy was reoriented again(ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.2, pp.13-16), butcontrary to the previous impulsive manner ofhandling things, the mobilization of theworkforce and the liquidation of kulaks as aclass acquired a planned approach. The

Figure 7a. The building of the New Belgrade, 1948.Dobrovi, N. 1948) Izgradnja Novog Beograda,Jugoslavija SSSR, No. 33, p. 8.

Figure 7b. Frano Bae, Skice sa Omladinske prugeSketches of the Youth Railroad), 1947. Likovni umjetniciiz NRH na omladinskoj pruzi 1947-1948) Arhitektura,No. 4-6, p. 53.

Figure 7c. Ismet Mujezinovi, Mjealica The CementMixer), 1948. Jugoslavija SSSR 1948), No. 30, secondunnumbered page.

Figure 7d. Boa Ili, Sondiranje terena na NovomBeogradu Probing the Terrain of New Belgrade), 1948.


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number of Farming Cooperatives started to riseright after Kardelj (1948, p.7) quoted Stalinssuccesses achieved should not make us dizzynor put us to sleep at the Fifth Congress;however, after the Plenum their numberincreased by 600% in 1949 (Table 3, Graph 1).

With a reality base now set and left behind, nomaterial sources left and no obligation torespond to anyone, mobilization per se was thegoal. In 1949, the system was organizing theonly thing it had left - the people.THE U-TURN: TAKING ON A NEWFORM OF SOCIALISM

By November 1949, Stalin was still persistingin his accusations; only this time, he wasaiming at the intensifying negotiations betweenthe CPY and the West (ed. Dedijer, 1980,vol.2, pp.535-9). In December, the first tradeand loan agreements were signed with GreatBritain and the USA, and simultaneously,Kardelj (Govor druga Edvarda Kardelja nasveanom zasedanju slovenske Akademijeznanosti i umjetnosti, 1949) declared fromnow on () science is free. From then on,there was an economic and culturalreorganization perhaps even more revolutionarythan the one in 1945. In June 1950, the Partydecentralized itself, and in July, it proclaimedthe first self-management act. This led to a u-turn in all public fields. The First Conference ofArchitects and Urban Planners of the FPRY washeld in November. The architects confessedtheir errors from the previous period, stating,

among other things, that the Centres were anexpensive and luxurious way of building, notsuitable for the given land and climaticconditions or their functional requirements. Asfor Socialist Realism, it was not mentionedeven once, its abandonment was silentlyunderstood behind Krunics words (1950, p.170, 175) such as that our architecturalexpression is specific in form, and we thinkthat it is unworthy, illogical and utterly absurdto literally copy ready-made architecturalexpressions or urban planning formulas.Socialist Realism became a pejorative term inthe subsequent years marked by residentialarchitecture and Modernism, while previouslyunfinished government buildings were beingdressed in the new, Western fashion (Kuli,2007). The systematic dismantling washappening once again, and as all recentresults were being erased, a new form ofsocialism was adopted. Those legacies werefollowed until Titos death in 1980 when thewhole process started again, only in a post-modern epoch that transmitted a newlanguage for expressing national tendencies(Lujak, 2010; ivanevi, 2008). However,those were only formal adjustments; the urbanplanning methods were still exactly the same(Baji Brkovi, 2002), and the politicalcircumstances have remained an importantfactor in architectural practice to this day(oki and Nikezi, 2007). It is reasonable toask if it were the events of 1948 that posed amaterial base for the socialist-realist approachof always finding out different forms, while anunderlying method of doing so remainedessentially soviet.As for the Centres, after 1950 they were not builtanymore - many were left unfinished or theirsocialist content was changed (Ili, 1969;Nikoli and Ivanievi, 1970). Some were usedas cinemas and village schools; numerousothers became warehouses, or they were simplyleft abandoned, becoming monuments of thetime when, politically, they had served theirpurpose, and when their socialist role, oncepromised, was never fulfilled.CONCLUSION

Contrary to the common interpretations bywhich the events of 1948 were the startingpoint of the so-called de-Stalinisation of theCPY and therefore the decentralisation ofYugoslav economy and culture (see Lasi,1970, p. 269), it is more likely the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute initiated a shift towardenforcing the Soviet model even morethoroughly. Moreover, it appears it were theSoviet methods that helped construct a newthesis, of the third way of Yugoslav

socialism. The role of architecture in theprocess was crucial. Architectural practice wasthe material basis for building socialism, notnecessarily for the development of theYugoslav economy, but for mobilising thepeople for fulfilling the Partys politicalinterests and the constructing of its ideologicaldiscourse. In that regard, the buildingsthemselves were functional in many aspectsexcept one - the usefullness for the peoplethey were said to be built for. Thetransformation of Yugoslav architecture towardsModernism after 1950 was again made inaccordance with the change in the Partypolitics, which still left it in the realm of thetheory of Socialist Realism. It was still thereflectionof the ever developing, and therefore,ever changing socialist society. Because ofthat, the question remains: was the third wayof Yugoslav architecture, namely SocialistModernism or Socialist Aestheticism, simply apart of the official political construction that hidthe fact it was still Soviet in content andmodernist only in form?Acknowledgements

I whish to thank the two anonymous reviewers fortheir comments and suggestions on earlier draftsof this article, particularly the reviewer who madethe effort to help me in the final editing. I amindebted to Ryan Allain for his generous supportand help on proofreading this paper.References

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0

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Received October 2010; accepted in revised formJuly 2011

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