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Society for Asian & Comparative Philosophy
Australasian Society for Asian & Comparative Philosophy
2013 Joint Meeting in Singapore
Panel Paper abstracts (sorted by author last name) Akina, William Kelii Panel IB, 8 July 1015h-1215h
The Role of Mind in Alvin Plantingas Reformed Epistemology and Wang Yangmings Xinxue (School of Mind)
This paper identifies several philosophic moves executed by contemporary Reformed Epistemologist Alvin
Plantinga which parallel Wang Yangmings attempt to navigate the conflict between empirical and rational
knowledge in the development of virtue. Like Wang, Plantinga posits an extra-empirical theory of knowledge.
Both Wang and Plantinga see mind as essential to the cultivation of practical virtue. Wang Yangming is known
for rejecting the primacy of empiricism in the epistemology of Zhu Xi. Wangs departure from Zhu
foreshadows the response made by Plantinga to modernist empiricism. Wang concluded that self-cultivation
does not begin, as Zhu held, with gewu (the investigation of things), but with the extension of innate knowledge.
He asserted that those who desire to be practical sages in the world must first turn inward, not for a rectification
of the mind, but for rectification by the mind. Wang built upon Mencius idea that cultivation of virtue is
essential to attaining sagehood because the virtues are innate only in a duan (i.e., beginning or potential)
sense. Similarly, Plantinga does not regard empirical knowledge to be the source of moral knowledge or virtue,
but regards moral knowledge and practice to be informed by the cultivation of properly basic knowledge
found within the individual. Like Wang, Plantinga sees this episteme present in an incipient (i.e., duan-like)
form, requiring cultivation to become effectual in practice. Wang wrote, When the mind is free from the
obscuration of selfish desires, it is the embodiment of li, the Principle of Nature, which requires not an iota
added from the outside. (Instructions for Practical Living, 3). Similarly, Plantinga holds that it is proper
noetic (i.e., mental) functioning which enables the cultivation of knowledge and virtue beyond their basic
(i.e., duan-like) form.
Ashton, Geoff Panel VIB, 9 Jul 1600h-1800h
From Terror to Love of Fate in the Bhagavad Gt: Reading Kas Theophany and the Path of Devotion (Bhakti Yoga) through Nietzschean Amor Fati
If one of Kas basic concerns is to get Arjuna to act according to his katriya dharma, then what could be his rationale in revealing his divine form in Chapter 11particularly given that the events it discloses re-enact the
terror that stifled Arjunas will to act in the first place? Furthermore, what, if anything, does the path of devotion
(bhakti yoga) have to do with Arjunas recovery from this second crisis of will in the Gt? This paper argues
that Ka reveals the impending destruction of the world (through the theophany) in order to help Arjuna to
love a potentially repellent fate with Nietzschean-like, yes saying pathos. The paper begins by drawing
attention to the post-theophany chapters, which clarify the architecture of circumstance (prakti) la the theistic
metaphysics of the early Skhya doctrine. It then situates bhakti yoga in this philosophical context, arguing
that devotion to Ka helps Arjuna to re-embody not just his limited physical body, but his entire situation qua
empathic identification with the cosmic body of Ka. Finally, the paper links bhakti yoga, Skhya
metaphysics, and the theophany by way of Nietzsches formulation of amor fati. In brief, bhakti yoga is a kind
of amor fati that enables Arjuna to love the body of life as his own in full awareness that his love will not
modify his fate.
Berger, Doug Panel VIIB, 10 Jul 1015h-1215h
The Sense Organs and Awareness: Classical Indian and Chinese Perspectives
Even before the migration of Buddhism from South to East Asia, classical Indian schools of thought like
Samkhya and Nyaya and pre-Qin and Han Chinese traditions of Confucian, Mohist and Daoist thought shared,
remarkably, some general views about the bodily sense organs (Skt. indriya; Ch. tian guan). Both large
frameworks of reflection held that the human body possessed six organs of sense, five external and one internal,
that these organs were susceptible to their respective spheres of attention because of their elemental
correspondence with their specific objects, and that these organs affectively and cognitively responded to their
environments. Both traditions held furthermore that these sense organs in various circumstances could act
alternatively in internal conflict or harmony in the experience of any individual person. However, their most
conspicuous disagreements between these cultural traditions arose regarding the problems of (1) whether the
physical sense organs themselves were aware of their sensibilia or not, with Indian schools arguing in the
negative and Chinese schools in the affirmative; and (2) what specific capacities the major coordinator of the
sense organs' activities (atman in the Indian traditions and xin in the Chinese) needed to carry out its controlling
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functions over them. This paper will survey the views and general arguments of classical Indian and Chinese
schools in the hope of encouraging dialogue between scholars of these traditions on the character of bodily and
cognitive awareness.
Bilimoria Purushottama Panel ID, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h
Disenchantments of secularism: Taylors polysemy of Secularity and India
In his compellingly massive tome, The Secular Age (2007) Charles Taylor sets out three senses of secularism. I
am interested in his third sense, that Taylor christens as secularity: Secularity is a matter of the whole
understanding in which our moral, spiritual or religious experience and search takes place. Taylor is
comfortable in concluding that a society would be deemed secular qua secularity or not, in virtue of the
conditions of experience and search for the spiritual. And while in passing he mentions that the case of India is
correlated better (perhaps historically at least) with the latter sense, in the case of the West, the shift to public
secularity has been part of what helped to bring on a secular age in the third sense. (The distinctiveness of the
shift is not always clear in Taylors massive tome.) I wish to contest Taylors still profoundly and evidently
redemptive-eschatalogical Christian construction of the reformed secularity that he wishes to advocate, or
prescribe, and more importantly, the narrow representation of the supposed case of India, that he mentions en
passant. So I will problematize the senses in which India could be said to be secular or not secular, or the kind
of secularity that afflicts the Indian condition. The imposed discourse(s) of secularism in any and all of Taylors
valences only helped to, as it were, muddy the waters and has left behind in the postcolonial-scape a troubling
legacy from which the Indian society has barely recovered and with which the modern nation-state continues to
grapple. If not that, then it becomes entangled in ambivalent and hybrid imbroglios, such that we now have
adherents of God Rama protesting that India has embraced an ideology of pseudo-secularism to the detriment
of its national and cultural harmony and, indeed, erstwhile heterogeneity. The battleline is drawn not just
between secularism and spiritual transcendence, but it cuts in multiple vectors across religions (of which there
are more and claims more adherents than in all of the US, Europe and the rest of the Western world put
together). The situation and challenges from and for secularism facing the Indian (to be sure, post-Gandhian)
experiment are so fraught with dilemmas and discursive instabilities that it is worth examining this scenario if
only so that the West may heed to its own by-gone Orientalist errors and be cautious before hurriedly coveting
or expropriating religion within the nuances of secularity.
Bockover, Mary I. Panel IA, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h
Emotion, Ethics and Equality: Humanity as Moral Feeling In this presentation I will argue that the feeling relevant to understanding emotion is an irreducible unity of
affect and cognition. These "emotionally relevant feelings (ERFs) are cognitive but cannot be equated with
belief: ERFs entail belief but are not entailed by belief and so must be distinguished on conceptual grounds.
ERFs do not entail the experience of specific bodily sensations and so are not a combination of cognition and
affect either. Briefly, emotion has been misconceived in the West because reason and affect have historically
been treated as independent and often mutually exclusive faculties. My thesis that emotion has both cognitive
and affective aspects that cannot be separated except for the purpose of analysis accords more closely with the
ancient Chinese notion of xin or "heart-mind". I will tie my concept of emotion to a new way of thinking about (gender) ethics in light of the fact that
Confucianism puts such heavy emphasis on social roles without an explicit mechanism to critique them when
ren or human flourishing is at stake. I will show such critique is moral only when one feels truly that a wrong has been done that dehumanizes a person or group. Ren is an intensional affect that links us to the
humanity of others, but here must also be concerned with yi or the lack of parity or fairness that can accompany imbalances of power. The claim that a role ethic alone can account for the good life is just too
simple without explicitly showing how, on Confucian grounds, concerns for equality are linked to human
flourishing in general. Otherwise, the role ethic risks defaulting to a status quo that has unjustly benefited some
(e.g., males) at the expense of others (e.g., females).
Burik, Steven Panel IIA, 8 Jul 1345h-1545h
Polemos and Dao, Conflict and Harmony, Heidegger and Zhuangzi
Using Heideggers reinterpretation of Heraclitus polemos and Zhuangzis ideas of dao, struggle and sorting of
differences, I will argue for a reinterpretation of notions of conflict and harmony in the two thinkers.
Heideggers Auseinandersetzung (con-frontation) and Zhuangzis famous sorting which evens things out, the
seminal second chapter of the book Zhuangzi, suggest that harmony lies not in overcoming differences, but
exactly in making difference and diversity central. I start with an exposition of how Heidegger understands
logos and polemos in radically different ways from their normal or traditional meanings, and how he attaches
great importance to both terms. I then proceed to analyse Zhuangzis understanding of the world in terms of the
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yin-yang dichotomous forces, and argue how a comparison of both thinkers can show us a new understanding of
ideas of difference, conflict and harmony. It will be shown how harmony in Daoism is not to be understood as a
dialectical resolution to conflict, but more as a situating within the different forces, and a certain form of
responding to conflict and diversity. Heideggers differential thought will be employed to show a similar
approach to difference, where in contradistinction to a Hegelian resolution or sublimation of the difference,
Heidegger shows how difference is not to be overcome, but to be acknowledged as fundamental to being. Such
responses carry a form of great responsibility, since they might be perceived as random and spontaneous. Yet I
will argue that they are anything but random, and that both Heidegger and Zhuangzi seek to engage diversity,
struggle and conflict in a most objective and disinterested manner. Such an engagement will then be shown to
have ethical implications beyond the philosophical worlds of Heidegger and Zhuangzi.
Chan, Benedict Panel IVD, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h
Do Economics Rights Really Conflict with Liberal Rights? An East and West Cultural Debate
There are different cultural debates between the East and the West; one of them focuses on the conflict between
economic rights and liberal democratic rights. Some regions in East Asia have strong economic growth in the
past decades, but these regions do not have enough political freedom and democracy. Some argue that this
shows that in East Asia, economic rights have a higher priority than liberal democratic rights, and liberal
democratic rights should be sacrificed for economic rights when necessary. In this essay, I am going to evaluate
such a debate in depth. I first discuss some information as the background of this debate, and then I focus on the
philosophical part of this debate and summarize the points into a philosophical argument, which concludes that
economic rights are more important than liberal democratic rights. I then develop my own argument against
such a conclusion. My argument is divided into two parts. First, I analyze the meaning of economic rights and
argue that economic subsistence rights are the core of economic rights. Second, by discussing the views from
different scholars, such as Michael Walzer, Joseph Raz, Amartya Sen, and Henry Shue, I argue that economic
subsistence rights and liberal democratic rights are inseparable and we should promote both of them together in
East Asian cultures. In other words, in East Asia, economic rights are not more important than liberal
democratic rights, and one should not sacrifice liberal democratic rights for economic rights in the East.
Chan Wing Ching Elton Panel VIIIB, 10 Jul 1345h-1545h
Discipline for harmony: the power of Confucian ritual propriety
The Record of Ritual says harmony and serenity, such are the use of ritual propriety.1 Faced with a world of
conflicts and chaos, Confucianism never lost confidence in reestablishing the general harmony of society.
Recurrent in Confucian texts are quixotic solutions such as having a sage-king to restore harmony by touching
the heart of the people, but beneath the rhetoric, Confucians have in fact invested their hope for harmony in
building a social order based on ritual propriety. Yet what features does ritual propriety possess that would
justify such confidence in its power? Contemporary studies have offered multifarious interpretations. Ritual
propriety has been seen as a kind of habituation, a social system, a form of moral guidance, a grammar for social
interactions, or an individuals awareness for navigating role-based human relationships. Notwithstanding their
merits, however, these accounts seem to have neglected one important feature of ritual propriety: it is not only a
moral framework, but also a political one. It seeks not simply to make possible for every individual the pursuit
of a good life, but more specifically to actively shape how such good life is to be led.
Chandler, Marthe Panel VID, 9 Jul 1600h-1800h
Whistling to summon spirits: Daoist attempts to whistle what cannot be said
The logician Frank Ramseys legendary response to Wittgensteins Tractatus was What you cannot say, you
cannot say. And you cant whistle it either. Ramseys remark has been taken to emphasize that there are
certain things philosophy cannot, and should not attempt to do.
Daoists are also concerned with what cannot be said. Zhuangzis chapter The sorting which evens things out
suggests a relationship between natural sounds and the sounds of flutes and whistles, contrasting these sounds
with human speech. Like music produced on instruments, the sound of wind, and the chirping of birds,
whistling does not carry the semantic meanings speaking does.
The third century CE text Poetic Essay on Whistling describes Daoist breathing exercises teaching students
how to whistle. The physical discipline involved allowed adepts to transcend the limits of their bodies, to
wander in the clouds and to summon natural spirits. For Daoists whistling may have been a way to enter a
mystical state, to transcend space and time (physical limitations) and contact a spiritual reality. Confucians, and
philosophers like Frank Ramsey, are dubious about the value of this sort of behavior, attempt.
Moreover even people trained in Daoist whistling may find it producing unexpected results. The poet-
philosopher Su Shi lived a good Confucian life, devoting himself to government service and literary
accomplishment. His efforts resulted in arrest, prison, poverty and exile. In Sus Second Red Cliff Ode he
described climbing a steep cliff, and whistling to summon a sympathetic and comforting response from the
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natural world. The Daoist immortal who appeared was hostile and mocked the poets efforts. Su had bumped up
against a limitation of philosophy: it cannot provide comfort and escape from the misery and disappointment of
the ordinary, human world.
Chang, Wonsuk Panel ID, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h
Social Vision and Experience in Choe Han-ki and Pragmatism: Achieving a Flourishing Community without
Disintegration
In this article, I would like to articulate some consistencies between the social visions of Confucianism and
pragmatism, both of which embrace a notion of experience as immanent, evolutionary process. To begin with, I
outline the social philosophy of Choe Han-ki, a 19th
century Confucian thinker in Korea, by clarifying some of
the vocabulary related to his social philosophy, such as self-regulative process , interactivity ,
achieved integration of society and governance of associated humanity . Through this clarification, I will argue that one can adequately interpret his social philosophy by concentrating on the ideas of relatedness
and process rather than of agencies like a discrete individual or organic society, in which the notion
of configurative energy plays a crucial role. Here the self can become mature by commitment to a
variety of changing configurations of relation . And through this one can contribute to the harmonious whole. To strengthen my argument, I turn to the rich connections between Choes thought and the tradition of
pragmatism as found in the works of John Dewey, George Herbert Mead and Jane Addams. These defy
transcendentalism and develop ideas of robust communities based on shared experience and associations.
During this comparison, I also examine the role of harmony and conflict in the formation of flourishing societies
in consideration of agonists and Marxist criticism. I will look at Choes understanding of scholarly debates,
remonstration, and social conflict in comparison with Dewey and Addams understanding of role of conflict in a
democratic society.
Chien Yi-Chun Panel IVD, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h
What Do We Owe to Migrant Domestic Workers?Rethinking Immigration Ethics in East Asia
In recent decades, migration patterns have increasingly become feminized. According to the UN 2006 report,
the number of female migrants across the world increased from 35 million to 95 million between 1965 and
2005. From these numbers, approximately 1.4 million women have migrated from Southeast Asia to the
industrialized countries of East Asia as domestic workers. However, this feminized shift of migration patterns in
East Asia have raised new questions that have not been adequately addressed. I will examine these issues
through a comparison across East Asian contexts, engaging both empirical and theoretical approaches. This
paper will focus on the policies of two major labour-importing countries in East Asia South Korea and
Taiwanwhich share similar cultural backgrounds, labour market structures and demographic pressures.
Nevertheless, variations exist between their labour and immigration policies. I will explore whether the differing
emphasis put on maintaining an ethnically and culturally communitarian notion of liberal democracy has
affected the policy-making in these countries. Additionally, I will investigate their differing historical, economic
and political paths to understand the underlying causes of these variations. From a theoretical perspective, my
research will explore how Asian schools of political theory, which emphasize communalism and social
emotions, interact with Western liberal notions of human rights and justice in shaping public debates about
migrant labour policies. I will also explore how the existence of migrant domestic workers reshapes the structure
of family and concept of care in these countries. Lastly, I will examine whether an Asian model of just treatment
for migrant domestic labourers is feasible or desirable as an alternative to Western models.
Chow Ken Q, Joel Panel VB, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h
The Irony of It All The Junzi as Ironic Philosopher
Richard Rorty and Confucius can be read as positing two opposed views of citizenship. On the one hand,
Rortys model of the ironic philosopher sees the citizen as someone who does not have a final vocabulary, a
citizen who is able to continually revise his/her own deepest ends and yet also have the convictions to defend
those views in a public democratic setting. Rortys understanding of citizenship is thus supposed to be based on
an anti-foundationalist understanding of politics. Comparing Rortys ironic philosopher to Confucius junzi in
the light of citizenship reveals an important limitation of Rortys work: the neglect of individuals as relational
and thus co-dependent in their moral and political development. I will argue that it is possible to give an ironic
reading of Confucius junzi, but that such an approach also highlights particular tensions between Confucian
thought and liberal democracy, particularly in the understanding of the Confucian emphasis on rituals (li) and
Rortys ironic stance towards citizenship. These comparisons also point to problems within Rortys over-
emphasis of a kind of irony that ends up inflating the significance of literature. It also challenges Rortys firm
distinction between the private and the public, where one cannot conduct ironic discourse in public that is,
impose ones private search for autonomy on strangers in the public sphere. These tensions however, can be
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accommodated in a broadened understanding of moral motivation and continual creative engagement within
these two traditions, along the vein of the ironic reading of the junzi argued for in this paper.
Chow Lee Tat Panel VC, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h
Musicality in Ritual: Lessons from Music in the Zhongyong.
The opening line of the Zhongyong smacks of theism on first impact, redolent with suggestions of a
transcendent super-force (tian ) who dictates (ming ) a predetermined order or essence (xing ), from
which an inevitable progression ensues (dao ) whereby ...we cannot quit even for an instant. Under such an
order, exemplary persons (junzi ) charge themselves with attempting to understand this divine knowledge,
and alongside their faithful flock, seek to perpetuate their revelations through education (jiao ). Does this
apparently theistic first impression then decisively fix the tone for everything else that follows in the Zhongyong,
leaving it as yet another iteration of the theistic narrative? I think not, for the subsequent passages in the
Zhongyong employs the curious analogy of music to illustrate these apparently 'theistic' concepts. Music, which
is ordinarily conceived of as a spontaneous, creative and fluid art, is used analogously in making sense of the
concepts sketched in the Zhongyong's opening passage, concepts which we have speculated as theistic, that is,
as a predetermined, dictated and static order of things; the contrast here is glaring. Our main concern in this
paper would be an attempt in making sense of that contrast between the analogies of music and the apparently
'theistic' concepts of tian (heaven), ming (decree, command), xing (natural tendencies) and
dao (the proper way), all of which have bearings on the conceptions of jiao (education) and junzi
(the exemplary person); at base, we would argue that these concepts are not theistic in light of the
explanatory role given to music and attempt to articulate the lessons one might draw from the Zhongyong's
rendition of music.
Chuang, Christina Panel IC, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h
Understanding a desireless action as a benevolent action
In the Bhagavad-Gita, Krishna advises Arjuna to act without desire. According to the final two verses of the
second chapter, the person who, having abandoned all desires, acts without desire, without a sense of mineness,
without a sense of self, that person attains peace. Scholars have questioned the doctrine of desireless action and
debated whether Krishnas advice is to be taken literally. In this paper I argue that even if we interpret the text
with the Humean principle that only desire motivates action, Krishnas advice is still coherent on the basis that
we understand a desireless action as an action "motivated" by benevolent desire. Here I am using the notion of
benevolence as constructed by Francis Hutcheson (rather than Hume). I offer two reasons for my claim. First,
Hutchesons benevolence has an empty character because benevolence is receptive to something and to respond
with a moral evaluation. Benevolent desire is a permissible desire since to act benevolently is to act
disinterestedly and thereby accepting purusha as ones true nature. Second, for Hutcheson, love is a motive
insofar as it necessarily includes a desire for the happiness of the agent that we approve. For Hume, on the other
hand, love cannot be a motive because it is simply reactive and does not include a desire. Since the ultimate
teaching of the Gita is not a technique, but the teaching that love is at the core of our being, it is referring to a
kind of moral love that necessarily includes benevolence.
Coyle, Daniel Panel IVB, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h
Conflict and Harmony in Chinese Strategic Philosophy: From Embodied Emotions to Global Efficacy
A central theme in early Chinese philosophy is buzheng (not contending). This strategy for harmonious
living--recommended by Daoists, Strategists, and Confucians--defers to the uniqueness of each situation as the
model of efficacy. Ames and Hall understand the buzheng formula as it occurs in Daodejing as something of an
injunction to cultivate a disposition that is advantageous to all, to organize the world using accommodation
rather than coercion. The best human beings perform synchronizing roles, which are both active,
participatory, and effective (see especially the Comment to Laozi 66). The Guiguzi (or Book of Master
Guigu) develops the formula in an explicit and controversial way. The text prescribes that one non-coercively
establishes a cultivated situation to regulate affairs. It claims that if one can fathom embodied emotions (qing
- actually, both human emotional-psychological affects and states, as well as world-psychological affects
and realities.) then one can achieve global efficacy. This paper will evaluate the Guiguzi's claim in light of
the Strategists critique of Confucianism in the Laozi and Sunzi texts, specifically, their arguments that
Confucian moral philosophy alone is inadequate to the task of resolving unavoidable conflicts.
Creller, Aaron Panel IB, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h
Harmonizing Knowledge: Using Resources from Classical Chinese Philosophy to Reintegrate Techne and
Episteme
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Virtue is so noble an end for Aristotle and Plato that the workings of a city should aim toward it in every way
the education of the children, the religious beliefs of the citizens, the punishment of the vicious, the status of
craftspeople and laborers, and so on. Despite their differences, the projects of Platos Republic and Laws and
Aristotles Politics are structured with some of the same assumptions about knowledge, assumptions that lead
them to similar political stances on labor. This paper begins by picking out some key features of the metaphysics
of Greek epistemology that lead to the devaluation of techne and craftwork and the ascent of episteme in the
politico-ethical life. Following the Platonic and Aristotelian accounts of labor, I complicate their concept of
craftwork as merely vulgar by referencing two philosophically exemplary craftsmen from classical Chinas
Zhuangzi. I close the paper by concluding that comparative epistemology needs to comprehensively harmonize
skillful approaches to knowledge with intellectual approaches to knowledge, especially given the relevance of
epistemology to daily life.
da Silva, Diogo Csar Porto Panel VC, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h
Living Seduction: Iki within Japanese Aesthetics and Thought
Focusing on Kuki Shz's The Structure of Iki chapters 1 and 2, our aim is to analyze his Hermeneutical
approach to the phenomenon of consciousness sprung in the Japanese sensibility called Iki and its intentional
structure. Iki as a meaning within a particular culture have three distinguishing marks: Seduction (), Pride (
) and Resignation (). Through this we expect to find a path to contextualize and elucidate, in a comparative perspective, the relation between Kuki and Heidegger's Hermeneutics. Although, this proximity
could raise critiques concerning the legitimacy of using an Occidental methodology to grasp a particular
phenomenon of Japanese culture and history, our claim is that the opposite is true; by employing Hermeneutics,
in a Heideggerian sense, Kuki was able to put light on constitutive aspects of Iki's meaning that keep Iki firmly
tied to Japanese aesthetics and thought. Those aspects, we believe, are to be found in Iki distinguishing marks,
namely, Pride () and Resignation (). Our presentation attempts to show how those marks appear in other Japanese historical developments, as for example the detachment from worldly affairs characterized by
Resignation that appears in the poetics of Genji Monogatari and as Pride has a fundamental role on the Theory
of Shame that explains Japanese character.
de Silva, Padmasiri Panel IA, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h
Embodied Cognition and Emotions:
A Buddhist Perspective on Body-Mind Emotional Reactivity.
Cognition is embodied when it is deeply dependent on the features of the physical body, and when a persons
body beyond the brain play a significant role from a causal or physically constitutive role in cognitive
processing. Traditional cognitive science has looked at cognition in a narrow sense in abstraction from the
bodily mechanisms of sensory processing and motor control. Since Varella, Thompson and Rosch published the
work, The Embodied Mind, there emerged a new dialogue between cognitive science and Buddhist
contemplative/meditative psychology. In a different kind of lineage in the Western philosophy of mind, Jesse
Prinz has also revived the Jamesinian thesis that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body and they
allow us to literally perceive danger (fear) and loss (grief).
This paper has a specific focus on emotional reactivity in negative emotions (both of the body and mind) and I
re-visit Strawsons classic paper on Freedom and Resentment along with a critical appraisal of Owen
Flanagans response to Strawson and Buddhist thoughts on Destructive Emotions. I accept the importance of
Strawsons classic study but maintain that Strawson has conflated two significant dimensions of moral emotions
and that Owen Flanagans analytical response to Strawson on reactive attitudes is useful but we need a deeper
analysis of reactive attitudes in the light of the innovative integration of Buddhist contemplative practices to
new research in neurology the impact of a meditative life on the emotional brain. The paper will develop the
concept of non-reactivity with a special focus on internal affective and autonomic balance, as well as
interactive flexibility, and the role of the prefrontal cortex in this context. Case studies of the emotion of
Anger, drawn from my professional experience would be added.
Forte, Victor Panel VIB, 9 Jul 1600h-1800h
True or False Entrusting? A Response to Masao Abes Study of Falsity and Faith From the Standpoint of
Shinrans Shinjin
In Masao Abes essay, Evil, Sin, Falsity, and the Dynamics of Faith (2000) he examines how the awareness of
evil and sin turns human beings towards faith in order to transcend the limits of ego and self-centered will. But
for Abe, this overcoming of sin through faith in God is unsatisfactory, since such a faith results in a
fundamentally divided self, split between the sinful self, cut off from the ideal subjectivity of God, and the saved
self, which is unified with God. In this sense, faith inevitably fails in its initial project to transcend the self. The
person of faith must therefore live with an on-going conscious awareness of falsity. The inevitability of falsity in
faith leads to a deep sense of nihilism, when one is faced with the nothingness that results from the failure of
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faith to transcend the limits of the ego. Abe concludes that a true religion would have to be based in a faith
that can overcome this sense of nihilism, which has been brought about by a profound awareness of falsity.
In his essay Abe limits his discussion of falsity and faith to the faith directed towards a transcendent God, and
does not take up the question of the place of shinjin (true entrusting) in Shinrans Buddhism, or compare how
the faith-centered practices of Shin Buddhism might respond to the nihilism he claims to have discovered in his
study of the dynamics of faith. The purpose of my paper is to critically assess Shinrans understanding of true
entrusting from the standpoint of Abes notions of falsity and faith, and to determine to what extent the faith
prescribed by Shinran is able to overcome the nihilism of Abes true religion.
Gagnon, Jean-Paul Panel IID, 8 Jul 1345h -1545h Hainans Li Peoples: Roles of Women and Democracy
The Island of Hainan, just off the southern coast of mainland of China, is the territorial home of an 'ethnic
minority' that most contemporaries identify as the Li Peoples. This indigenous group, thought to have resided on
the island for circa 3000 years, is an important locus for the study of Asian democracy. Ethnographers argue that
the Li were (and to some extents still are) a matrilineal society where women enjoyed political power: as
representatives, administrative leaders, producers of economy, and shamans. The Li were initially hunter-
gatherers but later slash and burn agriculturalists. Families, or clans, governed resources collectively. Their
governance system was based on assemblies, dialogue, and peaceful conflict-resolution. It is a choice model to
look at and to revive for contemporary politics. The dominance of women in historic Li politics and society is a
refreshing change to what is often a male-centric and undemocratic historiography of Asia.
Gao, Yin Panel VIIB, 10 Jul 1015h-1215h
Conflict and Harmony in the Body: the Military Metaphors in Classic Chinese Medical Texts
Military metaphors are used very often in todays medical and public health discourse. We talk about pathogens
invading the body, deploying antibiotics or antiviral drugs to defend the body and fight diseases, or a war
against cancer. The military metaphors are also widely used in classic Chinese medical texts. A physician of
18th
century China argued that, using drugs is like deploying soldiers. Military texts are cited directly and
military strategies are used to defend treatment strategies in many classic Chinese medical texts. This paper
explores the similarities and differences in the usage of military metaphors between modern biomedical
literature and that of classic Chinese medical texts. I argue that the metaphors used in classic Chinese medical
text are less confrontational than that of biomedicine. The focus, in line with the thoughts of classic Chinese
military strategist schools such as Sunzi, is on resolving conflicts and restoring harmony in the body with
minimum effort and maximum benefit rather than eliminating the invading force as in Western medical and
public health discourse. I argue that such differences are derived from the fundamentally different perceptions
and conceptions of illness and health between biomedicine and traditional Chinese medicine.
Garrison, James Panel VB, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h
The Aesthetic Life of Power
The post-structuralist notion of [I] "subjectivation" advanced by Michel Foucault and Judith Butler describes the
formative imprisonment of normative subjects as being relational, discursive, bodily, and based in ritual and
being based around a drive for [II] autonomy. Classical Confucianism's notion of person-making is likewise
relational, discursive, bodily, and based in [III] ritual propriety (l ). Although lacking a substantive critique of
power relations, Confucianism accounts for the social self with a parallel vocabulary more keen on aesthetic
self-development.
Working today, L Zhu extends the classical Confucian view with his Marxian notion of [IV]
"subjectality," the sedimentation of ritual in society's collective unconsciousness, as does Richard Shusterman
with his approach to [V] "somaesthetics" and giving conscious, ritual attention to bodily life. Putting this all
together results in an intercultural account that gives novel resources the post-structuralist project. This approach
does not completely solve the problems of [I] subjectivation, but by providing a new sense of [II] autonomy
through conscious attention to how [III] ritual l, in the process of [IV] subjectality, sediments in collective
unconsciousness, [V] somaesthetic practices can ameliorate the dilemma bit by bit.
Higgins, Kathleen Panel IVA, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h Embodied Emotion and the Aesthetics of Loss and Mourning
To many theorists of emotion, who see emotion as provoking action tendencies, typically functional ones, grief
has seemed anomalous because it appears to prompt inaction or dysfunctional behavior. Robert C. Solomon
argues that grief is thoroughly functional, serving to continue love and exhibiting action tendencies in the
commemorations they motivate. Accepting these points, I argue manifestations of this impulse to commemorate
reveal an aesthetic side to grief. Grief characteristically raises aesthetic concerns and prompts aesthetic
expression. Grief is embodied in aesthetic forms that include both works that endure (commemorative artworks,
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graves, shrines, monuments, artworks that take grief and loss as subject matter, etc.) and performances, in which
the emotion is literally expressed through the survivors bodily actions. Among the latter, most notably, are
rituals associated with mourning, a phenomenon that is ubiquitous. Xunzi, in defense of ritual as a means of
expressing emotion, helps explain the aptness of aesthetic embodiments of grief: rituals of mourning provide
channels for expressing a highly upsetting emotion in a manner that is not socially disruptive. The Great
Preface also indicates that rituals embody the emotion. Aesthetic expressions of grief, I will contend, are in part
motivated by the desire to reanimate the dead person, a desire that can only be satisfied symbolically. Our being
restricted to symbolic gestures is one of the reasons that survivors feel that nothing they can do would be
adequate to honor the deceased loved one. The insufficiency of any particular symbolic form also provides an
impetus to further creative gestures of commemoration. Thus we overlook the close association between
aesthetics and loss because none of our aesthetic gestures are adequate embodiments, but this inadequacy is in
part responsible for further expressions of loss and grief that take aesthetic form.
Huang, Anita (Yahui) Panel ID, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h
Achieving Social Harmony with Pragma-linguistic Strategies
This paper examines ways of achieving social harmony in Chinese discourse from the point of view of
philosophy of language. It analyzes various speech acts realized by the use of buhaoyisi to feel
embarrassed/thanks/sorry, an expression that is commonly taken to save face among conversational participants
and promote social harmony. It shows that the meaning of buhaoyis ties to a wide range of speech acts and that
it is difficult to define its meaning based on its illocutionary force. Searle claims that in order to define the
linguistic meaning of a word it is not adequate to follow the classical linguistic analysis that says: the word W
is to perform speech act A (1969, p. 137). I show that an adequate account of buhaoyisi indeed cannot rest on
such a formula, nor can it rest on an account that simply emphasizes the primary use of such an expression.
Rather, one must take into consideration its multivalent nature in naturally occurring data, because buhaoyisi
can be used in a variety of syntactic environments without having the same meaning. By defining the meaning
of buhaoyisi and calculating its illocutionary force, the present study perfects previous analyses and makes
better predictions about how speakers achieve social harmony with pragmatic linguistic strategies using similar
expressions.
Johnson, David Panel IB, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h
Self-Determination of the Whole: Nishida and the Achievement of Perception
Nishida Kitar elucidates an ontology in which the individual is seen as an aspect of the world rather than as an
entity standing over against it. The relation between self and world, then, is one of ontological continuity, but
the form that this continuity takes is dynamic: one can cultivate or neglect this connection and achieve or fail to
achieve it in its most replete and harmonious forms. In this talk I show that these ideas can be productively
related to a central theme in phenomenology, found especially in the work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.
Like Nishida, these thinkers propose an ontology of the intertwining of self and world. This provides the ground
for one of the most important and distinctive claims in this tradition, namely, that self and world mutually
determine one another. I attend in particular to the way in which the side of the self contributes to determining
the world and its objects. One sees this in the way in which our practices, language, and history, in the case of
Heidegger, or the structure, capacities, and skills sedimented in our body, in that of Merleau-Ponty, help to
constitute the perceived world.
Nishidas work on the structure and possibilities of the self in its relation to the world will allow us to show in
addition that who we are and become also determines in addition how things appear in our perceptual
experience. Who we are and become is, as Nishida shows, something that is open to a certain kind of shaping.
The significance of this claim will be seen in our capacity to cultivate our powers of perception; by bringing the
self and world closer together and so into a kind of harmony, our perceptions are able to be faithful to what is
there to be perceived.
Kim, David H. Panel IIB, 8 Jul 1345h-1545h
Confucian Shame: Harmony, Hierarchy, and Hegemony
This paper takes up the conference theme of conflict and harmony through an examination of the ethical and
political practice of shame generally and Confucian shame particularly: the ethical formation/revision of shame,
shames ramification in and through rites and relations, and the political complexities of resistance against
certain types of shame. The paper begins with a philosophically-comparative account of shame as a
heteronomous, subject-forming, and ethics-enabling emotion and then explores the ethical and political problem
of hegemonic heteronomy. I describe both parts of the paper below. In the account of shame, I depart from
much of the literature on shame and focus on the basic filiality of the emotion. Specifically, I tell a Y-shaped
story: Shame as filial conciliation, propitiation, or appeasement, which then gets recruited to the aim of (1)
ethical integrity through partially autonomist modification of the emotion (which is the focus of John Rawls,
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John Kekes, Bryan Van Norden, Kwong-Loi Shun, and others), and of (2) hegemonic appeasement through
insistently heteronomist entrapment by a normative regime (which is the focus of Sandra Bartky, John Deigh,
and many feminist thinkers). In the second part of the paper, I discuss how the foregoing account of shame
indicates not simply that shame plays a vital role in ritual/li (and of course righteousness/yi) but that it has a
ritual/li-like configuration in virtue of its propitiation structure. It has a heteronomy richer than the sort
described by Bernard Williams. However, this exposes Confucian shame to two aspects of what we might call,
hegemonic heteronomy. One of the ethical and political dangers of shame is that it can produce hegemony in the
guise of harmony, as when ones shame-configured subject-formation naturalizes womens second-class
status or regimes of racial hierarchy. Another ethical and political danger of shame so conceived is that it can
support hegemony in spite of intra-psychic disharmony. If time permits, I explore whether Confucian accounts
of ethical parenting and filial remonstrance are sufficient for addressing the problem of hegemonic heteronomy.
Kim, Doil Panel VIB, 9 Jul 1600h-1800h
Qian () and modesty Qian Xun () in modern Chinese and its equivalent in Korean are usually translated as modesty or humility
in English, with the people highly praising a person with the virtue. In this paper, I will examine its original
form in early Chinese thought, qian (). I will juxtapose it with modesty in the contemporary Western context,
with the comparison aimed ultimately at the articulation of the characteristic of qian. The recent discussion of
modesty in the Western context is concerned primarily with how the everyday experience in which a modest
person seems to devaluate her accomplishment or herself can be explained. This kind of inaccuracy in
assessment has perplexed many Anglo-American philosophers, for it runs counter to the traditional
understanding of the virtuous who has accurate knowledge. Different accounts have been suggested to explain
how modesty can still be a virtue, even though it appears to involve a kind of ignorance. Similarly, qian in early
Chinese thought, especially, in the Xunzi (), the Laozi (), and the Zhouyi (), involves devaluation
of ones own accomplishment or oneself. For this reason, I will utilize the sophisticated discussion of modesty
as an analytic tool to understand qian. However, this approach is not taken simplistically to analyze qian
through modesty; rather, it is intended to draw attention to the characteristic of qian that cannot be captured by
the Western discussion. This exercise of comparative philosophy will have a philosophical pay-off, in that my
account of qian will show how the seemingly similar ethical experience is justified in a distinctive way in early
Chinese thought. To anticipate, qian, unlike modesty, will be understood as a unique way to respect for other
people in social interactions.
Kim, Myeong-Seok Panel IIIA, 8 Jul 1600h-1730h
Emotion and Judgment: Two Roots of Moral Motivation in Mengzi
As David Nivison has aptly pointed out, Mengzi was not merely concerned about making people behave in a
certain way, but making them grow into the kind of people who will always do certain actions with the right
feelings and dispositions. Then, when people say that they are short of moral strength required for doing moral
actions, Mengzi might interpret them to be saying that they do not feel, say, enough compassion for the starving
people on the street to share food with them, do not find it especially humiliating when they are offered ten-
thousand bushels of grain in a manner compromising their moral dignity, and so forth. This sounds a very
plausible view of Mengzis conception of moral motivation, but actually this view gets problematic when it is
combined with Nivisons specific thesis that moral emotions constitute the only source of moral motivation.
According to Nivison, Mengzi postulates only one source of moral motivation (heart as the locus of moral
emotions or feelings), whereas Mengzis rival thinkers additionally postulate maxims or doctrines. However,
I argue that Mengzi also postulates two sources of moral motivation, and this interpretation of mine enables us
to solve Nivisons immediate action problem. That is, according to Nivisons view of one-source morality,
one cannot perform moral actions until one has fully cultivated ones ethical sprouts, but this seems to
introduce a serious moral dilemma for Mengzi because Mengzi acknowledges that there are some moral
obligations that should be fulfilled immediately. In this paper, I try to solve this problem by arguing that what
really motivates oneself in Mengzi is not an emotion but an ethical reason that may or may not be embodied in
an emotion, and this in turn reveals Mengzis idea that full moral action is possible even before one fully
cultivates ones ethical emotions.
Konovait, Liuda Panel VIIIB, 10 Jul 1345h-1545h
Harmonious Inconsistency
Role conflict is a significant research topic for the role theorists. Ralph Linton maintains that individuals (and
societies) are capable of ambivalent attitudes, and this capacity for inconsistency makes it possible for human
beings to achieve integrated personalities and at the same time survive in an unstable and constantly changing
environment (Study of Man, 1936). On the other hand, contradictory demands, which rise due to the
inconsistency within and among the roles, may cause intra- and inter-role conflicts. This paper examines views
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on inconsistency and role conflicts as presented in Confucian role ethics - an ethical framework proposed by
Henry Rosemont, Jr. and Roger T. Ames. According to this approach, persons are defined by their relationships
with their fellow human beings within a set of roles that they live (not play) at all times. Since people are
conceived of as essentially constituted by these roles, a question arises whether contradictions and conflicts are
an indispensable part of human nature or whether apparent inconsistency could be interpreted in an alternative
way.
Kumar, Shashiprabha Panel IVC, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h
Vedic View of Cosmic Harmony
The present paper intends to explore and expound the Vedic idea of inherent synergy between the gross
(embodied) and the subtle (disembodied) levels of existence. Veda is the most ancient available literary
document of mankind and it proclaims that life is a divine opportunity. It exhorts all human beings as the sons of
immortality and enunciates that the human body is a micro model of the macrocosm: yath pinde tath
brahmnde. Moreover, seeds of conflict or amity are actually rooted in the mind and if the mind is attuned in
such a manner that there is no intra-personal disturbance, then inter-personal disputes will automatically be
dissolved. Consequently, a complementarity between opposites such as evil and good, ignoble and noble,
darkness and light, untruth and truth, mortality and immortality will also be accomplished. Accordingly, if we
aspire to achieve global peace, then first we have to be at peace within ourselves. Vedic view propounds a
complete communion between man and Nature; the external as well as the internal space have to work in unison
because all forms of existence are intertwined in an integral bond. Even the eternal conflict between male and
female is not actual in Vedic view, since both of these are stated to be twin aspects of the same reality. Mankind
today is passing through a critical phase when all aspects of the universe seem to be in conflicting mode and the
quest for harmony is far greater than ever. It is in this background that the profound Vedic vision can offer fresh
insights for future possibilities.
Karyn Lai Panel IIB, 8 Jul 1345h-1545h
Reliability in Confucius Analects
This paper discusses the notion of reliability in the Analects. It focuses centrally, though not exclusively, on the
term xin (), commonly translated as sincerity or trustworthiness. According to a common translation of the term, to describe a person as xin is to say that she keeps her word or puts words to action (this draws on its
Chinese character). Yet, by focusing only on matching deed with word, this translation fails to capture an aspect
of xin, which is that a person is reliable. This latter aspect of xin implies a level of consistency in a persons
actions across a range of situations. The focus of this paper is especially on the nature of such reliability,
understanding it in light of its place in the life of the Confucian exemplary person (junzi ). It explores some epistemological and pedagogical aspects of reliability, including the cultivation of the person in order to
successfully manifest her commitments in different scenarios. To put this in a different way, these investigations
focus on the concrete moments when a persons commitments are realised in her actions. The paper suggests
that the term xin has a greater role in the Analectsand, indeed, in the life of the exemplary personthan is
commonly held.
Lee, Chan Panel VID, 9 Jul 1600h-1800h
Language and Ethical Conflicts Between Knowledge and Action
The conflict between what I morally know and what I ought to do is a perennial problem in philosophy. Moral
weakness of will is one of the most compelling explanations in understanding the problem. To reinforce the will,
most thinkers commonly emphasize the cultivation of moral virtues. Interestingly, Zhu Xi offers genuine
knowledge to solve this problem. He explains the conflict between knowledge and action as arising from moral
ignorance. If so, his solution should be justified by elucidating that attainment of genuine knowledge can lead to
strengthen moral motivation to do right things. In order to explain that genuine knowledge has a performative
faculty, Zhu emphasizes its two key aspects: embodiment of emotions and identification of experiences. To
Zhu, these two imply a process of objectifying what I know. In order to do so, these justify themselves via a tool
of language, which can make the world orderly. In this vein, Zhu claims that language should accord with the
reality of the world. By working on his ideas of the relationship between language and the world, this paper will
show that Zhus way of unifying language with the world is one of the effective ways to enhance moral
judgment. Moreover, his way will prove that moral values or virtues are not merely delimited to a subjective
matter of taste, but predicated upon a precise understanding of the world.
Lee, Kyoo Panel IA, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h
Weiwuyoushen (as I have a body), Our Bellies Need Harmonious Addressing:
A Lesson from Daodejing on the Interconnectedness of Physical Needs and the Social Body
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Weiwuyoushen (, As I have a body, 13 of Daodejing): This truism that points, un-trivially, to the stomach (12) to be fed rather than the eye to be feasted, illustrates the metabolic materialism of Daoist
political philosophy and social ethics, of this belly philosophy that affirms life-forces of all living beings.
Laozi, the alleged author, too, sees that blah-blah-blah is tasteless (35), i.e., that a talk is empty. This
straightforward attention to the inner workings and outer manifestations of the psychosomatic body epitomizes
the embodied spirit of Daoist strands of thinking, an anti-idealist streak. To be natural is to have a body; to live
is to be embodiedenergized. This paper interpretatively reconstructs a tapestry of such passages on the vibrant
ontology and material phenomenology of the body in Daodejing, while weaving into it some of the concepts
from the phenomenological tradition of the West, ranging from the work of St. Augustine to Jacques Derrida,
including that of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas, all of whom understood something about, say,
a soup for the hungry soul, something we all need and need to feed one another. If ruling a big country by
Dao is like cooking a small fish (60) with Wuwei virtuosity, reading Dao properly would entail saving ten
thousand (wanwu) tiny eggs in and from that small fish. By engaging Daodejing this way in colorful and
extensive detail, we will not only rediscover in it some kernels of nomadic, fugitive wisdom on ways of life or
life as a series of way-making, but more specifically, as I will show, renew our organic, holistic appreciation of
this timeless text as strong embodiments of phenomenological imaginationethico-political, feminist,
pragmatic and aesthetic.
Lee, Sang Im Panel IVC, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h
On the Uncertainty in I-Ching
It is said that I-Ching must have been originated from "the consciousness of suffering" in daily life. And such
worries are usually caused from the conflicts occurring in real life, that is, conflicts from the relations between
the nature and human beings, the individual and society, and self and others. To resolve these conflicts, a
prognosis is needed which makes it possible to know about the present, reflect on the past, and predict the future.
However, in the process of the prognosis, one of the major obstacles among them seems to be the uncertainty.
What will be the ability to predict the result from the uncertainty optimally? That is, what will be the most
objective standard to predict the future? As Aristotle claims that it is 'the practical wisdom,' in I-Ching it is
regarded as the ability to grasp the divinatory signs. It can be said that the divinatory signs can be the medium to
overcome the uncertainty. Then again, to cope with the uncertainty, it is necessary to catch the divinatory signs,
and the ability to understand those signs can be accomplished through the cultivation of virtues.
Li, Jifen Panel IC, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h
Xin in the Xunzi: the Origin of Goodness In this essay I argue that Xin is the origin of goodness in the Xunzi. First, I will examine various accounts of
desires or sentiments, xing and xin, and then I will clarify why I argue that xin is the best choice to explain
the origin of goodness in the Xunzi. Second, I will discuss xing. I argue that there are mainly two senses of xing
in the Xunzi. One is involved with sensuous reactions(benxing ), which are connected with five organs. And
the other is involved with emotional reactions(qingxing ), such as likes, dislikes, pleasure, anger, grief, joy,
which are connected with xin. Based on this, I suggest that Xunzis claim that xing is evil, should be best
expressed as qingxing is evil. Third, I conduct textual analysis to show that, for Xunzi, the origin of goodness
lies with xin, which has the function of zhi . Xin for Xunzi basically has two statues, which are connected with
the two senses of xing. Both qingxing and desires are from xin, and it is xin that motivates the transformation of
xing.
Li Lan-fen Panel VD, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h
Criticism and Reconstruction on Justice Criteria System
Measuring the significance of a justice criteria system is an extraordinarily complex issue. No such system can
avoid the criticism and reconstruction of its significance, as changed and unbalanced development in social
structure always exceed the significance system corresponding to the social structure. Considering the transition
of Chinese contemporary justice criteria system, which change from authority justice to efficiency justice to
harmonious justice, this paper aims to construct a justice criteria system with multidimensional values including
the personal dignity, social vitality, and happiness, to embody harmony justice and provide a legitimacy basis for
contemporary transformation and development in China.
Liu Liangjian Panel IVB, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h
Kang Youweis Doctrine of datong (Great Harmony) and the Overcoming of World Political Conflicts: New
Philosophical Dreams
Kang Youwei develops a theory of world political order in his Book of Great Harmony in an age of conflicts
among nation-states. He advocates a world state with great harmony to go beyond the separation and conflicts
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among nation-states. Zhao Tingyang echoes Kang Youwei to some degree in his project of tianxia system. A
dialogue among Kang Youwei, Zhao Tingyang, Kant, Habermas and Thomas Pogge leads us to have a new
understanding of the significance of a world state, which is a discarded choice in Kant. Similar to Kang
Youwei, Kants doctrine of perpetual peace starts from the sufferings because of the international lawless
condition. Kant supposes two different solutions: the positive idea of a world republic and its negative surrogate
of a federation of nation-states. A world republic is discarded by Kant because it is impractical although it is
right in theory. Kant seems to be too optimistic about his federation of free states. Without hard binding force, a
nation-state, even if a free nation-state, is innately and essentially ready for war. We could reasonably believe
that a world republic will not inevitably bring about the most horrible despotism and it is worthy of our
pursuit. The contemporary world is in a transitional period from nation-states to a world state. We wonder
whether the term glocality, which suggests glocal perspective, institution and principle in a glocal age, could
be a constructive concept in imagining a possible desirable world order in such a transitional period.
Loy, Hui-chieh Panel VA, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h
On the Mohists Divine Command Doctrine of Morality
The Mohists of ancient China are well known for their doctrine that Heavens intent (tian zhi) is the standard for
moralityjust as the setsquare is, to the carpenter, the standard for the right angle. This notion has strongly
suggested to some that the Mohists might have subscribed to what would be called a Divine Command Theory
of Morality, i.e., the doctrine that what is morally right is determined by the will of a deity. Other scholars of the
text, focusing on the many clear instances in which the Mohists argued for their proposed course of conduct or
policy on the basis that it brings about the impartial benefit of the world, see them first and foremost as
consequentialists. More than thirty years after the seminar paper by Ahern Dennis igniting the modern
discussion (Is Mo Tzu a Utilitarian? published in 1976), the precise nature of the Mohist appeal to Heavens
intent, and the exact relationship between that and their appeal to beneficial consequences to ground their
proposed dao continues to invite controversy. My aim in this paper is to provide an overview and evaluation of
the recent debate, and propose an interpretation of the role that Heavens intent (and related phenomena) plays
within the Mohist ethical and political program.
Majithia, Roopen Panel IIC, 8 Jul 1345h-1545h
Emotions and Action in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Bhagavad Gt
The paper proposes to develop and then explore the implications of the view in the Ethics that the wise person's
virtuous action requires the various desires (emotional, appetitive and rational) speak with one voice, whereas
the Gt suggests that the detached dharmic action of the sage is free of desire. Issues discussed may include:
the nature and extent of moral intentionality (i.e. whether it has only rational dimensions), the implications for
agency and the role of the body in moral action, and the place of love and compassion in right action.
Man, Eva Kit Wah Panel IVA, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h Beyond Ontology? A Review of Robert Solomons Ideation of Emotion and Mencius Notion of Embodied
Emotion
Robert Solomon regards emotion as a form of cognition and a matter of ideation. He opens the question of
whether different cultures with different ideas might have different conception and emotions. He sees the values
of cross-cultural research on emotion as it clearly lies on the side of ideas and different ways of conceiving
and evaluating the world. He has polemicized that claims of ontology of ideation may lead to a philosophical
black hole, and that he prefers phenomenology for its better attention to details and its insights and
understanding. While cross-cultural studies are revealing to his interests in the role of ideas in emotion, it will be
revealing also to those who investigate the moral ontology of the Confucian philosophy and its regulatory ideals
and practices regarding embodied emotion. This paper will use Mencius theory of the body as a cross-cultural
study example to review the relation and tension between the ontological and phenomenological elements which
are put forward in Solomons discussion. The paper demonstrates how Mencius theory of the body, its
suggestion on moral and physical regulation of embodied emotion and cultural examples in the Book of Rites
provide insights to the answers of Solomons invitational questions: Do ideas share some of the properties of
feelings and those being concerned with the body? How are both ideas and feelings tied to behavior, and the
social world and relationships? and Are emotions essential to ethics? and finally, Are emotions belong to a
culture?
Mason, Joshua Panel IIID, 8 Jul 1600h-1730h
Between Chaos and Vagueness: The extremes that threaten a harmonious society
A general definition of harmony is an orderly unity of distinct parts. Given this understanding, there are two
extremes that can inhibit or damage harmony: differences in the parts can be so extreme that they cannot be
unified, or the imposition of thoroughgoing unity can overwhelm the distinctiveness of the different pieces. A.N.
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Whitehead gives us a useful vocabulary for understanding these two ways of preventing a rich harmony from
forming. He says that when the bonds that unite differences are not strong enough or when the differences are
too great to be unified then the result is chaos. When unity swamps distinctions or demands a sacrifice of
differences then the result is vagueness. In its pursuit of a harmonious society, China has been deeply concerned
about chaos in the state. Because disintegration into separate parts, divisions, and conflicts are seen as disasters,
the government has emphasized national unity, social conformity, and political stability. With the pressure to
avoid chaos, a compensatory overemphasis on stability and conformity leads to an imbalance between
difference and unity which undercuts the potential for harmony. For example, in practicing censorship,
suppressing petitioners, and pushing cultural hegemony into the edges of the Chinese nation, China pursues a
harmony that is too heavily weighted towards unity and stability. The risk of such policies is a vagueness that
inhibits genuine social harmony. In the end I suggest that only policies which pursue justice for every
constituent part can maintain the delicate tension of chaos and vagueness, difference and unity, which
characterizes lively, vibrant harmonies.
Mattice, Sarah Panel IIIB, 8 Jul 1600h-1730h
Interrogating Comparative Philosophy: The Prevalence of the Combat Metaphor
In the article No (More) Philosophy Without Cross-Cultural Philosophy Karsten Struhl argues very
successfully that cross-cultural or comparative philosophy is a necessary component of philosophy, broadly
construed. If a key part of philosophical activity is the identification, articulation, and examination of
assumptions, then Struhl concludes we need the ability to engage distinct traditions in order to raise internal
philosophical assumptions to the level of inquiry. However, we can find in Struhls article evidence of one of
the assumptions that dialogue between philosophical traditions has the power to make visiblethe prevalence
of combat metaphors in and for philosophical inquiry. Struhl encourages comparative philosophers to go on the
offense, and repeatedly suggests that a key component of philosophical activity is interrogation. While these
are commonplace English terms to use in this context, they also point to a way of conceiving of philosophy that
has its roots in the combative society of ancient Greece, and that is not a mainstream part of philosophical
discourse in other traditions such as classical China. If we are to engage in the contemporary project of
responsible comparative philosophy, as Struhl suggests, then we need a special sensitivity to the power of the
conceptual metaphors we employ. In this presentation I explore the significance of conceptual metaphors for
philosophy in both ancient Greece and classical China, and articulate some ways that the differences between
those two traditions on the issue of metaphor might suggest changes to contemporary philosophical
methodology.
McGinty, Daniel Panel VIIIA, 10 Jul 1345h-1505h
A phenomenological approach to the cultivation of personal and public identity in early Confucianism
Confucian philosophy emphasizes the social qualities of the self, insofar as a persons identity is primarily
constituted by their relationships to others. Additionally, ones selfhood is formed over time and through gradual
self-cultivation via harmonious participation in social roles a conception with few similarities to most
traditional notions of the self in Western philosophy. However, the phenomenology of Husserl offers an in-
depth understanding of the transcendental ego that is inherently public a self that cannot be separated from the
social sphere and strongly relies upon social interactions for its ongoing development. Utilizing a comparative
phenomenological approach to personal identity in Confucianism can potentially provide new insight into its
cultivation through efficacious engagement in social relationships. Additionally, such an approach can analyse
the development of ones public identity as constituted by the ongoing acquisition of new manifolds of
presentation of the self manifolds that possess an intrinsically social character. This results in an understanding
of the junzi as a master of the actualization of an ever-expanding manifold of social roles as a person whose
core identity is continually enriched by the practice of xiao (among their family) and ren (within a community
or state). As a consequence, the junzi develops a multi-dimensional character with many facets that publicly and
appropriately manifest according to each situation. The junzi can thus be considered a larger-than-life
character due to the richness and complexity of their personal identity. This richness of character could perhaps
be considered a factor in the attractiveness of the junzi and the propensity of others to emulate them.
MI Chienkuo Panel VD, 9 Jul 1345h - 1545h
The Virtue Turn in Chinese Philosophy
The concept of virtue is a traditional and significant idea, it is also a modern and innovative conception. Both in
the traditional western culture (Aristotle, for example) and eastern culture (Confucius, for example), the concept
of "virtue" has been playing an important role not only being a constitutional element for human beings to
achieve the practical wisdom, but also an essential guideline for the agents to realize their well-beings
(eudaimonia for Aristotle and sagehood for Confucius). We have also currently witnessed that the idea of
"virtue" finds its new life and works its way back to the contemporary development of ethical and
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epistemological theories. Both moral virtues and intellectual virtues return to the central stage of the fields and
inspire philosophers in ethics and epistemology in discovering new strategies of solving the old problems. The
virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity and the virtue-based approach toward a normative ethics are
both the driving force for effecting and promoting this new value-driven approach. What is more important is to
expect "the virtue turn" also occurring in the Chinese Philosophy. Michael Slote, Stephen Angle, Bryan Van
Norden, and Jiyuan Yu have done some pioneer works in connecting virtue ethics with the Chinese Philosophy.
Ernest Sosa and I (Chienkuo Mi) have also been working on the subject connecting virtue epistemology and the
Chinese Philosophy. This project will emphasize the influence of "the virtue turn", and integrate issues and
problems involved in Ethics, Epistemology, and the Chinese Philosophy. This project will result in a more
globalized, cross-fields, and cross-cultural developments in East and West.
Moad, Edward Panel IIB, 8 Jul 1345h-1545h
Epistemic Hierarchy, Segregation, and Transformative Interaction in Classical Islamic Thought
This paper will explore some philosophical mechanisms of conflict management in the classical Islamic
tradition. The mechanism in question emerged on the basis of a common hierarchical view of epistemic
faculties corresponding to an ontological hierarchy on the one hand, and a social hierarchy on the other. One
method of managing ideological conflict was to diagnose the problem as an inappropriate discursive relation
between non-correspondent levels of these hierarchies, and to prescribe a strict segregation between these levels,
keeping everything and everyone in its place. Ibn Rushd is a proponent of this strict class system, and violation
of this policy is one of the main charges he brings against Al-Ghazali in his Decisive Treatise. But we find that
Ghazali takes a path of carefully managed transformative interaction, with the aim of lifting people to what he
sees as higher levels on the epistemic hierarchy. This strategy helps explain the apparent contradictions of
which Ibn Rushd accused him. But Ibn Rushds own mentor, Ibn Tufayl is no less guilty, as we will see, on the
same charge. Lastly, we will look at a move by Muhyedin Ibn al-Arabi to induce transformative interaction by
means of a complete inversion of the epistemic hierarchy.
Nakamura Tomoe Panel IIIC, 8 Jul 1600h-1730h
Nishi Amanes reconciliation of epistemological differences between Western Europe and Japan
This paper deals with an eclectic philosophy pursued by a Japanese philosopher, Nishi Amane. Nishi was a
philosopher of what came to be called the Tokyo school and an educator in the late 19th
century, who created a
number of translations of European philosophical terminologies currently in use both in Japan and China. His
philosophy can be seen as the reconciliation of European philosophy and traditional Japanese thought. He drew
on a diverse number of philosophical ideas. These included enlightenment, utilitarianism, positivism, and
empiricism from European philosophy as well as Japanese traditional thought, in particular, Confucianism.
The special focus of the presentation lies in addressing how Nishi attempted to reconcile the epistemological
differences between Western Europe and Japan. The mainstream of Western European epistemology is more or
less based on the dichotomy between noesis (intellectual perception) and aisthesis (sensory perception) and
philosophical predilection for the former. This dichotomy reflects the attention of European philosophy to the
distinction between human beings and the rest of natural world. Japanese traditional understanding of thought
did not have such a radical dichotomy and this was reflected in its conception of human beings. A main task of
this paper is to clarify how Nishi confronted the differences of epistemological concepts between the forms of
philosophy on which he drew and how he attempted to reconcile them. This is first done by articulating Nishis
creation of translations with its philosophical roots. Furthermore, it will also be argued that his reconciliation
was not only pursed theoretically but also practically. By this means I will attempt to explore a way to create an
intercultural perspective and utilise it in a practical sphere.
Nirban, Geetesh Panel VB, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h
A Case of Gender Conflict: Radical Amb in Mahbhrata
The paper proposes to discuss the issue of gender based conflicts and the strong character of Amb (as depicted
in Mahbhrata) who becomes a forcible casualty due to the irrationality and insensitivity inherent in the
societal norms, concretised by the masculine fraternity. The matter is a cause of concern in the 21st century (in
light of Nirbhaya, the brave-heart who became a victim of brutal inhumanity in New Delhi in Dec 2012). Unlike
her two sisters Amb and Amblik who relent to the norms of the society and appear as conformists, Amb
adopts a radical approach and denounces the sanctioned ways of patriarchy which eulogize womans identity in
form of mother, daughter and wife while according intolerant treatment to her existence. Forcefully abducted for
marriage and further assailed by an extraordinary mental anguish with no support, she is not discouraged or
demotivated. The paper will highlight Ambs emergence as an epitome of strength for women of all ages
through her ways of deriving self-empowerment and resolving the gender conflict by her determined response,
taking karma as her dharma and intelligently calculating the end of her tormenter (Bhma) not as a pleasurable activity (preyas) but as a morally desirable end (reyas). Amb carries in her character the vision and mission of
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an ethically enlightened woman of the epic who sets an example for the modern day women to rise above the
state of self-pity and hold on to action-oriented philosophy fearlessly so that cases of gender conflict can have
viable solutions giving rightful space to reason over emotion.
Oberg, Andrew Panel VIC, 9 Jul 1600h-1800h
This has nothing to do with George
Security cameras have now become a ubiquitous part of everyday life in most major cities in developed
countries, yet each new camera installed seems to come with its own cries of foul play by defenders of privacy
rights. Our long history with these cameras and CCTV networks generally does not seem to have alleviated our
concerns with being watched, and as we feel ourselves losing privacy in other areas especially the internet
the worry generated by security cameras has remained. In this case, however, our feelings of disquiet are
unnecessary, inspired as they are by an erroneous view of the self. The present paper argues that the atomistic
view of an autonomous self that has become commonplace is not only detrimental but unfactual. Our approach
to public services like television or healthcare is considered in the context of governmental obligation and
coercion, highlighting the inaccuracies of our view of the self and its borders as currently defined. In contrast to
this a more holistic view is offered, one that includes in the self all of those with whom our lives are entangled,
taking examples from charitable giving and other social behavior. Seen from this vantage point, more objective
analyses of the costs and benefits of a system like a CCTV security network or other programs meant for the
public good are possible, showing that in the end the issue is not about privacy but rather the relationship
between one and ones fellows.
Ozbey, Sonya Panel IIA, 8 Jul 1345h-1545h
Human Adaptability and Formation, and Dissolution of Human Alliances in Spinoza, and the Zhungz
In relation to the critical stance taken against Enlightenment humanism and theories of human exceptionalism,
many contemporary scholars within the Continental European tradition have turned to philosophies of certain
heterodox historical figures with monistic and immanentist ontologies (which are characterized by the absence
of transcendent principles generating and ordering the world). Turning to these previously under-studied texts,
among which, Spinoza has perhaps received the most scholarly attention in the last 50 years, seems to be
motivated by a desire to develop an ontological vocabulary where differences are articulated on a flexible and
continuous trajectory without final closures which is exactly what immanentist philosophies seem to promise,
as the absence of a transcendent horizon is expected to translate into the absence of ontologically prior measures
of difference which set up clearly delineated boundaries between beings (e.g. the way humans are thought to be
created in the image of God, which separates them from the rest of the creation in the Judeo-Christian tradition).
However, despite the ontologically flexible framework that they provide, the texts themselves sometimes present
us with remarks hinting a human-nonhuman distinction formulated in terms of sharp, and sometimes
unbridgeable, discontinuities. In this paper, I will attempt to make a comparative examination of two different
immanentist systems, Spinozas and Zhungzs, with the hope to not only further understand the way this
distinction features in their philosophies, but also examine the very grammar of the different types of reasoning
which picks out humans as exceptionalwhich helps bring out certain historically and personally contingent
factors that give rise to presence and absence of certain threads of thinking, and thus complicates certain
sweeping generalizations we make about immanentist philosophies.
Park, So-Jeong Panel VC, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h
Ritual and Music Revisited: Debates and Compromise in Confucian Discourse on Music
Until Ritual and Music ( lyu) became the concept which represents Confucian thought, there had been
the process of extensive debate and persistent compromise over a long period of time. We need to pay attention
to diverse opinions residing in Confucian ritual and music discourse and have a close look at conflicts and
differences among Confucian thinkers. If we do not do so, we will miss many disputed points that the Confucian
thinkers developed, such as the tension between institutional art and autonomous development of art,
discrepancy between musical practice and theory surfaced with the emergence of new music, and so on. The
bigger problem is that our ignorance of diverse views may lead us to misidentify Confucian discourse as an
authoritarianism which subordinates music to ritual or as an anachronism and restrain music from its natural
transformation for the adherence to traditional value. This paper argues that much wider range of views on
music than that of typically understood flourished and contended in Confucian ritual and music discourse.
Confucius was not one who attempted to demote music under ritual but rather the one who first found the own
value of music from the previous ceremonial form of musical performance and its inseparable relationship to
ritual as mutual reinforcement and complement. The paper also explores different opinions concerning ritual and
music from Zigong and Zixia through Mencius and Xunzi to various inclinations appearing in the Book of
Music. If my arguments are successful we will be able to answer the following question with less monolithic but
more comprehensive concern: Is the value of music merely instrumental in Confucian discourse?
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Park, Yeoun Gyu Panel VIIIB, 10 Jul 1345h-1545h
The Relational Self as Distancing and Defamiliarizing to the Others
In the classic tradition of Confucianism the relational self as being against the individual self is to conceive an
individual relationally and situationally, namely, to do him as the totality of roles and as the co-author of his
action. The concept of the relational self has surely received the philosophical merits to solve the difficult
problem of what the subject is, and to extend the domain of the ethical activities of the individual without much
conflict. Some recent articles of Xinyan Jiang and David Wong about the relational self well illustrated these
points through their practical and contextual argumentation. Although I generally agree with them, I here
propose a new way to understand the relational self, using two concepts, 'distancing' and 'defamiliarizing' that I
extracted from the Confucian and neo-Confucian tradition of jing (; mindfulness or reverence). I regard the 'distancing' and 'defa