HISTORY

USSOCOM HISTORY20TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION

united statesspecialoperationscommand

From the CommanderFrom the CommanderOur Past is PrologueOur Past is Prologue

The year 2007 marks not only the 20th anniversary of theestablishment of the United States Special OperationsCommand (USSOCOM), but also a time of unprecedent-ed challenges and responsibility for America’s SpecialOperations Forces (SOF). The terrorist attacks of 11September 2001 have resulted in a sea change for theUnited States, and USSOCOM has been assigned a leadrole in the the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Since its creation in 1987, USSOCOM has supported con-ventional forces and conducted independent special oper-ations throughout the world, participating in all majorcombat operations. SOF has also carried out other mis-sions ranging from non-combat evacuations to bilateraltraining missions. In executing all of these assignments,USSOCOM personnel have demonstrated daring, skill,and versatility. SOF’s capabilities were broadly employedin Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQIFREEDOM.

President George W. Bush designated USSOCOM as the lead for planning, synchronizing, and, as direct-ed, executing global operations against terrorist networks. USSOCOM’s strategic approach is keyed bypositioning the limited numbers of high demand SOF at the “right place, at the right time, facing the rightadversary.” Defeating an adaptive enemy requires dedication to the fights in Afghanistan and Iraq, as wellas long-term vigilance in places such as the Philippines and Trans-Sahara Africa. USSOCOM alsoremains committed to force readiness and building SOF’s future. The formation of the Marine CorpsForces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) in 2006 has contributed unique capabilities to the U.S.SOF team. USSOCOM will continue to ensure the highest state of SOF readiness and make certain thatthe SOF Warrior remains the centerpiece of 21st century special operations.

The Congress mandated the creation of USSOCOM 20 years ago, and over this time, our SOF Warriorshave compiled a record of success and achievement. Today’s environment demands the skills of SOFmore than ever. Our core tasks and adaptive personnel are uniquely suited to engage the irregular andambiguous enemy facing our nation. Today’s SOF Warriors remain on point, armed with the exception-al support of the U.S. government and American people, facing all present and future challenges.

2

1968 - The future home of U.S. Strike Command (1969 - 1971), U.S. ReadinessCommand (1971 - 1987), and U.S. Special Operations Command (1987 - present).

Artist’s rendering of HQ USSOCOM 2006.

3

Founding and Evolution of USSOCOM 5Major Operations: 1987 to 2001 29

Operation EARNEST WILL 29Operation JUST CAUSE 32Operation DESERT SHIELD/ DESERT STORM 45El Salvador 54Somalia 55Haiti 60Balkans Operations 64

Bosnia-Herzegovina 64Kosovo 68

Peace Operations and Crisis Responses 70Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 76Humanitarian and Other Contingencies 81

GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 87Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 87Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 113Trans-Sahara Africa 128Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-Philippines 129

Glossary 133Index 137Acknowledgements 142

Table of Contents

4

General Lindsay accepting flag at USSOCOM activation ceremony, 1 June 1987. Note original USSOCOM flag.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld passes the USSOCOM flag to GeneralBrown at his and General Holland’s change of command ceremony

2 September 2003.

Founding USSOCOM“I think we have an abort situation,” Defense

Secretary Harold Brown informed PresidentJimmy Carter on 24 April 1980. Carter simplyresponded, “Let’s go with his [the ground com-mander’s] recommendation.” The mission to res-cue 53 American hostages had failed. At a deso-late site in Iran known as “Desert One,” tragedyoccurred minutes later when two aircraft collid-ed on the ground and eight men died. The failedmission struck a blow to American prestige andfurther eroded the public’s confidence in the U.S.government.

The event culminated a period of SpecialOperations Forces (SOF) decline in the 1970s.SOF capabilities had deteriorated throughoutthe post-Vietnam era, a time marked by consid-erable distrust between SOF and the conven-tional military and by significant funding cutsfor special operations. The Desert One disaster,however, led the Defense Department to appointan investigative panel, chaired by the formerChief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L.Holloway. The Holloway Commission’s findingscaused the Defense Department to create acounterterrorist joint task force and the SpecialOperations Advisory Panel.

Desert One did serve to strengthen theresolve of some within the Department ofDefense to reform SOF. Army Chief of StaffGeneral Edward C. “Shy” Meyer called for afurther restructuring of special operationscapabilities. Although unsuccessful at the jointlevel, Meyer nevertheless went on to consoli-date Army SOF units under the new 1st SpecialOperations Command in 1982, a significantstep to improve Army SOF.

By 1983, there was a small but growingsense in Congress of the need for militaryreforms. In June, the Senate Armed ServicesCommittee (SASC), under the chairmanship ofSenator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), began a two-year-long study of the Defense Departmentwhich included an examination of SOF. Twoevents in October 1983 further demonstratedthe need for change: the terrorist bombingattack in Lebanon and the invasion of Grenada.The loss of 237 Marines to terrorism, combined

with the command and control problems thatoccurred during the Grenada invasion, refocusedCongressional attention on the growing threat oflow-intensity conflict and on the issue of jointinteroperability.

With concern mounting on Capitol Hill, theDepartment of Defense created the Joint SpecialOperations Agency on 1 January 1984; thisagency, however, had neither operational norcommand authority over any SOF. The JointSpecial Operations Agency thus did little toimprove SOF readiness, capabilities, or poli-cies—hardly what Congress had in mind as asystemic fix for SOF’s problems. Within theDefense Department, there were a few staunchSOF supporters. Noel Koch, Principal DeputyAssistant Secretary of Defense for InternationalSecurity Affairs, and his deputy, Lynn Rylander,both advocated SOF reforms.

At the same time, a few visionaries onCapitol Hill were determined to overhaul SOF.They included Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) andWilliam Cohen (R-ME), both members of theArmed Services Committee, and RepresentativeDan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of theReadiness Subcommittee of the House ArmedServices Committee. Congressman Daniel hadbecome convinced that the U.S. military estab-lishment was not interested in special opera-tions, that the country’s capability in this areawas second rate, and that SOF operational com-mand and control was an endemic problem.Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly thatthe Department of Defense was not preparing

5

Founding and Evolution of USSOCOM

Wreckage at Desert One, Iran (April 1980) where eightAmericans died.

adequately for future threats. Senator Nunnexpressed a growing frustration with theServices’ practice of reallocating monies appro-priated for SOF modernization to non-SOF pro-grams. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S.needed a clearer organizational focus and chainof command for special operations to deal withlow-intensity conflicts.

In October 1985, the Senate Armed ServicesCommittee published the results of its two-yearreview of the U.S. military structure, entitled“Defense Organization: The Need For Change.”Mr. James R. Locher III, the principal author ofthis study, also examined past special opera-tions and speculated on the most likely futurethreats. This influential document led to theGoldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Actof 1986.

By spring 1986, SOF advocates had intro-duced reform bills in both houses of Congress.On 15 May, Senator Cohen introduced theSenate bill, co-sponsored by Senator Nunn andothers, which called for a joint military organiza-tion for SOF and the establishment of an officein the Defense Department to ensure adequatefunding and policy emphasis for low-intensityconflict and special operations. RepresentativeDaniel’s proposal went even further—he wanteda national special operations agency headed by acivilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs andreport directly to the Secretary of Defense; thiswould keep Joint Chiefs and the Services out ofthe SOF budget process.

Congress held hearings on the two bills inthe summer of 1986. Admiral William J. Crowe,Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led thePentagon’s opposition to the bills. He proposed,as an alternative, a new Special OperationsForces command led by a three-star general.This proposal was not well received on CapitolHill—Congress wanted a four-star general incharge to give SOF more clout. A number ofretired military officers and others testified infavor of the need for reform.

By most accounts, retired Army MajorGeneral Richard Scholtes gave the most com-pelling reasons for change. Scholtes, who com-manded the joint special operations task force inGrenada, explained how conventional force lead-ers misused SOF during the operation, notallowing them to use their unique capabilities,

6

Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA)

Senator William Cohen (R-ME)

Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA)

which resulted in high SOF casualties. After hisformal testimony, Scholtes met privately with asmall number of Senators to elaborate on theproblems that he had encountered in Grenada.

Both the House and Senate passed SOFreform bills, and these went to a conference com-mittee for reconciliation. Senate and House con-ferees forged a compromise. The bill called for aunified combatant command headed by a four-star general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretaryof Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict [ASD (SO/LIC)], a coordinat-ing board for low-intensity conflict within theNational Security Council, and a new MajorForce Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called“SOF checkbook”). The House had conceded onthe issue of a new civilian-led agency, but insist-ed on including MFP-11 to protect SOF funding.The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987Defense Authorization Act, amended theGoldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into lawin October 1986.

For the first time, Congress had mandatedthat the President create a unified combatantcommand. Congress clearly intended to forceDOD and the Administration to face up to therealities of past failures and emerging threats.DOD and the Administration were responsiblefor implementing the law, and Congress subse-quently had to pass two additional bills toensure proper implementation.

The legislation promised to improve SOF inseveral respects. Once implemented, MFP-11provided SOF with control over its ownresources, better enabling it to modernize theforce. Additionally, the law fostered interservicecooperation: a single commander for all SOFpromoted interoperability among the forcesassigned to the same command. The establish-ment of a four-star Commander in Chief and anAssistant Secretary of Defense for SpecialOperations and Low Intensity Conflict eventual-ly gave SOF a voice in the highest councils of theDefense Department.

Implementing the provisions and mandatesof the Nunn-Cohen Act, however, was neitherrapid nor smooth. One of the first issues to sur-face was appointing an ASD (SO/LIC), whoseprincipal duties included monitorship of specialoperations activities and low-intensity conflictactivities of the Department of Defense. The

Congress even increased the number of assistantsecretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but theDepartment of Defense still did not fill this newbillet. In December 1987, the Congress directedSecretary of the Army John O. Marsh to carryout the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until a suitablereplacement was approved by the Senate. Notuntil 18 months after the legislation passed didAmbassador Charles Whitehouse assume theduties of ASD (SO/LIC).

Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOMprovided its own measure of excitement. A quicksolution to manning and basing a brand newunified command was to abolish an existingcommand. U.S. Readiness Command (USRED-COM), with an often misunderstood mission, didnot appear to have a viable mission in the postGoldwater-Nichols era. And its Commander inChief, General James Lindsay, had had somespecial operations experience. On 23 January1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended tothe Secretary ofDefense thatUSREDCOM bedisestablished toprovide billets andfacilities forUSSOCOM.

P r e s i d e n tRonald Reaganapproved theestablishment ofthe new command on 13 April 1987. TheDepartment of Defense activated USSOCOM on16 April 1987 and nominated General Lindsay tobe the first Commander in Chief SpecialOperations Command (USCINCSOC). TheSenate accepted him without debate.

USSOCOM had its activation ceremony on1 June 1987. Guest speakers included WilliamH. Taft IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense, andAdmiral William J. Crowe, Jr., two men whohad opposed the Nunn-Cohen amendment.Admiral Crowe’s speech at the ceremonyadvised General Lindsay to integrate the newcommand into the mainstream military: “First,break down the wall that has more or less comebetween Special Operations Forces and theother parts of our military, the wall that somepeople will try to build higher. Second, educatethe rest of the military—spread a recognition

7

and understanding of what you do, why you doit, and how important it is that you do it. Last,integrate your efforts into the full spectrum ofour military capabilities.” Putting this adviceinto action, General Lindsay knew, would posesignificant challenges (a “sporty” course, hecalled it), considering the opposition theDefense Department had shown.

USSOCOM CommandersThere have been seven Commanders since

1987—Generals James J. Lindsay (16 April1987-27 June 1990), Carl W. Stiner (27 June1990-20 May 1993), Wayne A. Downing (20 May1993-29 February 1996), Henry H. Shelton (29February 1996-25 September 1997) Peter J.Schoomaker (5 November 1997-27 October2000), Charles R. Holland (27 October 2000-2 September 2003) and Bryan D. Brown (2September 2003 to the present). Each CINC-SOC faced unique challenges and opportunities,and each left his mark on the SOF community inthe course of responding to significant changeson the military landscape. One constantthroughout this period, however, has beenchange and new challenges for the U.S. military.The demise of the Soviet Union did not lessenthe range of threats to the United States. Theappearance of new aggressor states, heightenedregional instabilities, the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction and transnationalterrorism, all led to an increased use of SOF bythe conventional U.S. military, Ambassadors,and other government agencies. After the ter-

rorist attacks of 11 September 2001, GeneralsHolland and Brown confronted a new GlobalWar on Terrorism.

The greatest challenge facing GeneralLindsay was to make the command the drivingforce behind SOF revitalization that Congressmandated, without alienating conventional mili-tary leaders. This was no mean feat, given theopposition to the command’s mere existence inmany military circles. As the first CINCSOC, hedeveloped a hierarchy of priorities to get thecommand functioning: organize, staff, train, andequip the headquarters; establish the relation-ships necessary to discharge its roles and mis-sions; create Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11)to ensure SOF controlled its financial destiny;build command and control relationships withthe components, ASD (SO/LIC), and the TheaterSpecial Operations Commands (TSOCs); defineworldwide SOF requirements; and plot thefuture of the command.

General Lindsay also faced two major opera-tional tests—Operations EARNEST WILL/PRIME CHANCE I in the Persian Gulf, andOperations JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTYin Panama. The use of SOF by the theaterCINCs (known as the operational tempo, orOPTEMPO) increased significantly duringGeneral Lindsay’s tenure.

The complex, politically sensitive process ofestablishing a new unified command extendedinto General Stiner’s tenure as second CINC-SOC. General Stiner also pushed the commandto fulfill the provisions of the Nunn-Cohen

8

General Carl W. Stiner, USCINCSOC 1990-1993

General James J. Lindsay USCINCSOC1987-1990

Amendment. Perhaps most important, GeneralStiner oversaw the implementation of develop-ing and acquiring “special operations peculiar”equipment, material, supplies, and services.After DESERT STORM, General Stiner devotedmuch of his time to raising public awarenessabout SOF’s successes. Supporting the theaterCINCs and maintaining SOF combat readinesswere also top priorities. During his tenure, thecommand submitted fully-supported budgetsbased on SOF mission requirements. GeneralStiner also succeeded in convincing theSecretary of Defense to designate PsychologicalOperations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) asSOF. During Stiner’s tenure, USSOCOM sup-ported a number of operations worldwide, mostnotably DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM,PROVIDE COMFORT, PROVIDE RELIEF, andRESTORE HOPE. SOF OPTEMPO accordinglyrose 35 percent during this time.

On 20 May 1993, General Wayne A. Downingbecame the third CINCSOC. He brought uniquequalifications to the position, having previouslybeen a director of the USSOCOM WashingtonOffice and commander of both the Joint SpecialOperations Command and the United StatesArmy Special Operations Command. The mainchallenges of his tenure were to continue therevitalization of SOF and to prepare the SOFcommunity for the twenty-first century. Tothese ends, General Downing streamlined theacquisition of SOF-specific equipment, increasedthe command’s focus on its “customers,” andrealigned SOF budget requirements with thereduced Defense Department budgets.

He instituted changes in how resources wereallocated for the future that resulted in aStrategic Planning Process which promised toput the command’s budget to best use. Duringhis watch, the SOF OPTEMPO again increased.SOF participated in Operations UNOSOM II(Somalia), SUPPORT and UPHOLD DEMOC-RACY (Haiti), and JOINT ENDEAVOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina), as well as many smaller contin-gencies and deployments.

During his 21 months as CINCSOC, GeneralHenry H. Shelton successfully guided the com-mand through a time of extraordinary world-wide demand for SOF support, and a time of con-strained resources. From 1992-1997, the USSO-COM budget shrank by more than 6 percent inconstant 1997 dollars. At the same time, thenumber of SOF operations (OPTEMPO)increased by more than 51 percent and person-nel deployments (PERSTEMPO) increased 127percent. In 1996 alone, SOF deployed to a totalof 142 countries, and engaged in 120 counter-drug missions, 12 demining training missions,and 204 Joint Combined Exchange Training(JCET) exercises, among other activities.

Under General Shelton, SOF’s largest opera-tional commitment was to Operation JOINTENDEAVOR/JOINT GUARD, the peacekeepingmission in Bosnia. In addition, special operatorsassisted in noncombatant evacuations from suchcrisis areas as Liberia (Operation ASSUREDRESPONSE), Sierra Leone (Operation NOBLEOBELISK), and Albania (Operation SILVERWAKE). As a way to improve the deploymentprocess, the command developed “force module

9

General Henry H. Shelton, USCINCSOC1996-1997

General Wayne A. Downing, USCINCSOC1993-1996

packages” that pre-configured what forces andoperating supplies would be needed for a varietyof missions, cutting back on preparation timewhile still offering the correct force mix.

Due to intense mission taskings, severalSOF personnel specialties were labeled “lowdensity/high demand assets.” Concerned aboutthe impact on its people, the command carefullyreviewed requests for these personnel andtracked their rate of deployment to prevent over-use.

On 5 November 1997, General Peter J.Schoomaker assumed command of USSOCOM,and like General Downing before, he brought awealth of experience in special operations. Inaddition to commanding SOF tactical units, heserved as commander of both the Joint SpecialOperations Command and United States ArmySpecial Operations Command. Like his prede-cessors, he faced unique challenges as the com-mand prepared for the twenty-first century.

General Schoomaker’s top priority was toprepare the SOF community for change—change in order to remain relevant to nationalsecurity requirements. To that end, he initiatedor accelerated numerous projects, to include theheadquarters reorganization; planning, pro-gramming and acquisition enhancements; andintegrating the components into one resourcingand acquisition team. During his tenure, SOFparticipated in the transition from JOINTGUARD to JOINT FORGE in Bosnia-Herzegovina, DESERT THUNDER in Kuwaitand Saudi Arabia (to thwart Saddam Hussein’sattempt to restrict UN inspectors’ freedom ofmovement), and numerous contingencies and

peacetime engagements. SOF also played cru-cial roles in ALLIED FORCE, the operation thatforced Serbian forces out of Kosovo, and JOINTGUARDIAN, which enforced the Kosovo peaceagreement.

General Charles R. Holland assumed com-mand of USSOCOM on 27 October 2000, havingserved as the vice commander of USAF inEurope. As Commander USSOCOM, he antici-pated “staying the course,” to implementchanges made by previous Commanders and tocontinue SOF’s key roles in operations aroundthe world. He emphasized that SOF had toaddress the seams and friction points with theservices that had caused operational difficulties.For example, he instructed AFSOC to continueworking with the Air Force to resolve differencesobserved in the Air War over Serbia. But, 9/11would result in a sea change for both USSOCOMand General Holland’s priorities.

“On September 11th, enemies of freedomcommitted an act of war against ourcountry. Americans have known wars—but for the past 136 years, they have beenwars on foreign soil, except for oneSunday in 1941. Americans have knownthe casualties of war—but not at the cen-ter of a great city on a peaceful morning.Americans have known surprise attacks—but never before on thousands of civilians.All of this was brought upon us in a sin-gle day—and night fell on a differentworld, a world where freedom itself isunder attack.”

President George W. Bush20 September 2001

10

General Peter J. SchoomakerUSCINCSOC 1997-2000

General Charles R. Holland, USCINCSOC2000-2003

Following the horrific terrorist attacks of9/11, President George W. Bush told the nationthat “every necessary weapon of war” would beused to disrupt and defeat the global terror net-work. He cautioned that this war would entaila lengthy campaign, unlike any previous war.Indeed, a sea change would occur because the9/11 terrorist attacks forced a re-evaluation ofU.S. national military strategy, with a focus oncombatting terrorism worldwide. This re-evalu-ation would lead to the greatest changes inUSSOCOM’s mission and force structure sinceits inception. On the battlefields and by othermeans around the world, SOF countered terror-ism and took on even greater relevance, becom-ing the cornerstone of the U.S. militaryresponse to terrorism.

Immediately after 9/11, General Holland andUSSOCOM provided SOF to the GeographicCombatant Commands (GCCs) in the fightagainst terrorism, especially SOCCENT andUSCENTCOM for Operation ENDURINGFREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan. Support toSOCPAC and USPACOM soon followed as SOFprovided assistance in the form of foreign inter-nal defense—training Filipino forces and provid-ing civil and medical assistance.

General Holland cited the SOF successes inOEF to illustrate the quality of SOF personnel.

For example,he recog-nized thecrucial rolethe SOF hadin the over-throw of theTaliban gov-ernment bya f f i r m i n gthat “ourpeople makea difference.”He alsonoted thatthe GCCshad request-ed more SOFbecause oftheir profes-s i o n a l i s mand special-

ized skills, and he concluded, “When we make apromise, we deliver.” With SOF in high demand,Holland directed USSOCOM to secure approvalfor transferring some missions (like training theGeorgian armed forces) to conventional forces.

USSOCOM reoriented its priorities andefforts to focus on the GWOT. The commandcreated a joint interagency collaboration centerand a counterterrorism planning group, as wellas supported the counterterrorism missions andactivities of the other unified commands.

In 2003, General Holland also provided SOFfor Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), thelargest SOF deployment since the Vietnam War.During his three years as CDR USSOCOM,General Holland presided over SOF taking on amuch larger role in U.S. defense planning, oper-ations, and foreign internal defense than it hadin 2000. The JSOTF-P (OEF-P) countered the alQaeda-affiliated Abu Sayyaf Group by trainingwith the Armed Forces of the Philippines. SOFdirected the successful overthrow of the Talibangovernment in Afghanistan, and SOF played aprominent role in OIF. Thus,USSOCOM duringGeneral Holland’s tenure made significant con-tributions to the GWOT, and set the stage forsignificant new authorities that would giveUSSOCOM the lead for planning in the war onterrorism.

11

MH-53 flying near the World Trade Center site on 11 September 2001.

After having served as Deputy Commanderfor a year, General Brown assumed command ofUSSOCOM on 2 September 2003. During histenure, USSOCOM continued to focus its priori-ties and resources on prosecuting the GWOT,and the command secured approval of newauthorities and missions that would fundamen-tally alter how it addressed worldwide terror-ism. General Brown pushed the command toshed missions that conventional forces couldexecute and concentrate on having SOF focusmore on their unique skill sets. Thus, not onlywould Brown push for new authorities for thecommand, he also insisted that budget and pro-curement programs and new capabilities andcapacities be aligned with the command’s priori-ties for the GWOT.

Evolution of the CommandMission and Organization

USSOCOM’s mission, as delineated in the1987 Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) Manual 71-87,was to prepare SOF to carry out assigned mis-sions and, if directed by the President or theSecretary of Defense, to plan for and conductspecial operations. Mission responsibilites were:

The responsibilites of managing MFP-11 anddeveloping and acquiring special operations-peculiar items made USSOCOM unique amongthe unified commands. These responsibilities—dubbed “service-like”—had heretofore been per-formed exclusively by the Services. Congresshad given the command extraordinary authorityover SOF force structure, equipping, andresourcing.

General Lindsay organized the commandalong the lines of a typical unified command “Jdirectorate” structure, with two modifications:he assigned MFP-11 and acquisition responsibil-ities to the J-8 (Resources) directorate, and cre-ated a new J-9 directorate, responsible forPSYOP and CA support, on 15 June 1988.

The command’s mission statement evolvedwith the changing geopolitical environment.With the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise ofregional instability, SOF’s capabilities were inever greater demand. To reflect this increasedoperational tempo, which called for a large SOFinvolvement in peacekeeping and humanitarianoperations, General Downing modified the com-mand’s mission statement in 1993. The revisedwording read:

“Prepare SOF to successfully conductworldwide special operations, civilaffairs, and psychological operations inpeace and war in support of the regionalcombatant commanders, AmericanAmbassadors and their country teams,and other government agencies.”

USSOCOM also added counterproliferationand information operations/command and con-trol warfare to its list of principal missions,and expanded the counterterrorism mission toinclude defensive measures (antiterrorism).

General Shelton continued to refine the com-mand’s mission statement, goals, and vision inorder to serve SOF’s customers more effectively.In December 1996, he approved a slightlyrevised mission statement:

“Provide Special Operations Forcesto the National Command Authorities,

• Develop SOF doctrine, tactics,techniques and procedures. • Conduct specialized courses ofinstruction for all SOF. • Train assigned forces and ensureinteroperability of equipment andforces.• Monitor the preparedness of SOFassigned to other unified commands. • Monitor the promotions, assign-ments, retention, training, andprofessional development of all SOFpersonnel. • Consolidate and submit programand budget proposals for Major ForceProgram 11 (MFP-11). • Develop and acquire special opera-tions-peculiar equipment, material,supplies, and services.

12

regional Combatant Commanders, andAmerican Ambassadors and theircountry teams for successful conduct ofworldwide special operations, civilaffairs, and psychological operationsduring peace and war.”

After General Shelton became theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1October 1997, the new CINCSOC, GeneralSchoomaker, elected to retain this missionstatement. He did, however, articulate a newvision for USSOCOM:

“Be the most capable and relevantSpecial Operations Forces in existence—living personal and professional stan-dards of excellence to which all othersaspire.”

Integrity was his watchword and the command’sas well.

Though the command’s mission statementremained constant, the same could not be saidfor how General Schoomaker viewed the head-quarters’ organization. His predecessor had ini-tiated a review of the organization in hopes ofaligning similar functions, streamlining proce-dures, and redirecting human resources. As aformer component commander, GeneralSchoomaker perceived that the headquarters did

not adequately focus on the command’s criticalfunctions, which he defined as resourcing SOF.He, therefore, boldly scrapped the traditional J-staff alignment and incorporated like or comple-mentary functions into five “centers of excel-lence.” A general officer, flag officer, or seniorexecutive service civilian led each center. Thereorganization enabled CINCSOC to concen-trate on strategic and operational priorities.

The Operations, Plans, and Policy Center(SOOP) combined functions from the J-3 and J-5directorates. Merging combat simulations andrequirements (J-7) with programming andcomptroller functions (J-8) resulted in theCenter for Force Structure, Requirements,Resources, and Strategic Assessments (SORR).The Intelligence and Information OperationsCenter (SOIO) included command, control, com-munications, computers and information sys-tems (J-6); the intelligence directorate (J-2); andinformation operations (J-3). The AcquisitionCenter (AC) and logistics directorate (J-4)formed the Center of Acquisition and Logistics(SOAL). Finally, the Command Support Center(SOCS) included the personnel directorate (J-1)and the special staff offices. This headquartersreorganization promised to strengthen theresourcing functions of USSOCOM—and, ulti-mately, support to SOF, the theater CINCs, andAmerican ambassadors.

In September 1999, General Schoomakerdirected the headquarters to continue its trans-

13New Headquarters USSOCOM Organization, 4 January 1998.

formation by further integrating staff functions.The Centers reevaluated how their existing pro-cedures supported the command’s core Title 10responsibilities of equipping, training, and sus-taining SOF. The review led the headquartersto transfer its Materiel Requirements Divisionfrom SORR to SOOP, aligning it with the valida-tion function. SORR established an experimen-tation and a joint processes divisions. TheExperimentation Division coordinated the test-ing of new warfighting concepts within USSO-COM and inserted SOF scenarios into JointForces Command exercises. The ProcessesDivision served as the clearinghouse for USSO-COM submissions on issues discussed withinjoint staff forums, such as the QuadrennialDefense Review and the Joint ResourcesOversight Council. SOIO began consolidatingits functions in 1998 and continued restructur-ing in 2000 and 2001, all the while retaining itscore missions of Intelligence, InformationOperations, and C4I. In 1998, it merged thecommunications and computer support staffsfrom the former J-2, J-3, and J-6 directorates toform a single C4I infrastructure support team.Also in 1998, SOAL became the sole programmanager for C4I system acquisitions, with SOIOproviding technical support. By January 2001,the center had completed its evolution from a J-staff structure, with a Chief Information Officer(CIO) coordinating information technology and aSenior Intelligence Officer (SIO) managing thecommand’s intelligence and information securityprograms. USSOCOM led DOD in developingtests and exercises to ensure no Y2K problemsinterfered with SOF weapons systems.

Streamlining operations allowed the head-quarters to transfer 27 of its personnel billets tothe theater SOCs and provided a core staff foranother new initiative, the Joint SpecialOperations University (JSOU). JSOU’s missionwas to educate future leaders in the art of jointspecial operations. In establishing JSOU,General Schoomaker noted that the schoolwould leverage and enhance existing joint andService professional military education (PME)programs. Accordingly, JSOU assumed opera-tional control of the U.S. Air Force SpecialOperations School and Naval PostgraduateSchool resident special operations curricula, and

also provided educational material to SOF facul-ty members at PME institutions.

During General Holland’s tenure the missionstatement changed to:

Holland wanted the command to fix manpowerand equipment deficiencies, and add to the forcestructure. For example, OEF highlighted theneed for more PSYOP and CA forces in theactive component.

The 9/11 attacks and the GWOT wouldresult in the most far-reaching changes inUSSOCOM’s mission and organization. Toeffectively prosecute DOD’s efforts against ter-rorism, Secretary of Defense Donald H.Rumsfeld wanted a single headquarters—USSOCOM—to have primary military responsi-bility for the Global War on Terrorism. In July2002, Secretary Rumsfeld directed USSOCOMto develop a plan to find and deal with the inter-national threat of terrorist organizations. Forthe next three years, during the tenures ofGeneral Holland and his successor, GeneralBryan D. “Doug” Brown, USSOCOM would workto win support for its efforts to be the lead uni-fied command for planning and synchronizingthe GWOT. This would not be an easy or quickprocess.

Some in the Office of the Secretary ofDefense felt that the command had not beenfully used in the GWOT and that it should haveassumed the leading role among the GCCs.General Holland had not been given any newauthorities, however, and the combatant com-manders were reluctant to relinquish some oftheir prerogatives to USSOCOM. OSD commis-sioned a study by the Institute of DefenseAnalysis (IDA) to evaluate USSOCOM’s strate-gy for the GWOT. After receiving SOF briefings,IDA reported to Secretary Rumsfeld inDecember 2002 that the command had a viable

“Provide special operations forces to theSecretary of Defense, regionalCombatant Commanders, and

American Ambassadors and their coun-try teams for successful conduct ofworldwide special operations, civil

affairs, and psychological operationsduring both peace and war.”

14

strategy, and the Secretary then authorized a$7.1 billion plus-up for MFP-11 for the FYDP 04-09.

Defeating the terrorist networks requiredthe United States to meet two fundamental chal-lenges that had not been addressed before 9/11.First, to close the seams between U.S. govern-ment organizations that the 9/11 terrorists hadexploited, and second, to build a global countert-errorist network to counter the evolving terroristthreat and networks. These challenges wereaddressed in the National Military Strategy,various operational plans, and a host of otherdocuments, as well as through reform of theUnified Command Plan (UCP), which assignedresponsibilities to USSOCOM and the otherUnified Commands.

The DOD divided the world into geographiccombatant commands, where each geographiccommander had responsibility and authority formilitary activities in his area of responsibility(AOR). Under the UCP in effect in September2001, USSOCOM organized, trained, andequipped SOF, and the geographic commandersemployed SOF in their respective areas. In2001, no single GCC had the lead for counteringterrorism, and the 9/11 terrorists had cut acrossthe GCC boundaries by recruiting, planning,and training in the U.S. European Command(EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENT-COM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)areas of responsibility.

When, in July 2002, Secretary Rumsfeldtasked USSOCOM to develop a plan to deal withterrorist organizations, DOD first had to resolvea number of issues about what USSOCOM’sGWOT authorities would be, and what its rela-tions would be with the other unified commands.How and where was USSOCOM to discharge itsnew GWOT responsibilities with each GCCalready conducting counterterrorism operationsin its area of responsibility? How would USSO-COM impact the combatant commanders’ opera-tions and their theater security cooperation pro-grams? How would USSOCOM’s operationalrole increase, if at all?

Over the decades, the GCCs had developedregional expertise and had formed long-termcontacts with host nation militaries, all of whichwould be invaluable in combating terrorism.Rather than trying to recreate the GCCs’ area

expertise, USSOCOM explored a number of con-cepts that would allow the command to act asthe lead in countering terrorists around theglobe while capitalizing on the GCCs’ capa-bilites. One option would be for USSOCOM totake command of the Theater SpecialOperations Commands (TSOCs). This wouldtransfer regional expertise to USSOCOM, butlosing the TSOCs would also hamper the GCCs’efforts to accomplish their regional missions,which also supported the GWOT.

The GCCs also had demonstrated expertisein planning and executing operations. ShouldUSSOCOM deploy a headquarters element for-ward to command and control specific counterterrorist operations, or was there some way toleverage existing warfighting headquarters tocommand and control counterterrorist opera-tions?

Moreover, as USSOCOM became moreinvolved in GWOT operations, could it still per-form its service-like functions of organizing,training, and equipping SOF, and managingMFP-11? Should those service-like responsibili-ties revert back to the services or to some othercommand to allow USSOCOM to focus on opera-tions?

During the review process for the 2004 UCP,the GCCs, Joint Staff, and OSD negotiated theseand other points, and the coordination processwas long and sometimes difficult. The crux ofthe issues centered on USSOCOM’s positionthat it should have authority to compel othercombatant commands to recognize the lead roleof USSOCOM in GWOT plans. General Hollandwrestled with these challenges during his tenureas commander, as would General Brown duringhis. He did benefit from having worked on manyof these issues as deputy commander to GeneralHolland.

General Brown knew that the combatantcommanders and some on the Joint Staff werenot in tune with USSOCOM’s proposed role inthe GWOT, and he worked to assuage their con-cerns. He downplayed the possibility of USSO-COM becoming the supported combatant com-mander for counterterrorism missions andemphasized decentralized execution of GWOToperations by the GCCs. Eventually, he trans-ferred the requirement to train and maintain adeployable headquarters to the components.

15

When the 2004 UCP was presented to thecombatant commanders at the January 2005Combatant Commanders’ Conference forapproval, General Brown proposed that USSO-COM “synchronize” combatant commands’ plansand operations against terrorist networks. Theterm “synchronize” was important and con-tentious because USSOCOM would have author-ity to compel the combatant commands to meshtheir counterterrorist plans and operations withUSSOCOM’s campaign. With “synchronizing”authority, USSOCOM would be the lead combat-ant command for GWOT planning and opera-tions. The combatant commanders, however,voted 8 to 1 against this proposal, opting for aversion that gave USSOCOM only coordinatingauthority. After the meeting, Brown convincedthe Vice Chairman of the JCS, General PeterPace, to forward both USSOCOM’s proposal andthe one approved by the eight combatant com-manders to Secretary Rumsfeld.

On 1 March 2005, nearly three and one-halfyears after 9/11, President George W. Bushsigned the 2004 UCP, directing the USSOCOMcommander to serve

“as the lead combatant commander forplanning, synchronizing, and as directed,executing global operations against ter-rorist networks in coordination with othercombatant commanders.”

Facing a worldwide terrorist threat, thePresident gave USSOCOM unprecedentedauthority to control what had traditionally beenwithin the GCCs’ purview, as long as the com-mand coordinated with the other unified com-mands. The UCP further directed that

“CDRUSSOCOM leads a global collabo-rative planning process leveraging othercombatant command capabilities andexpertise that results in decentralized exe-cution by both USSOCOM and other com-batant commands against terrorist net-works.”

The USSOCOM commander was to integrate

“DOD strategy, plans, intelligence priori-ties, and operations against terrorist net-works designated by the Secretary [of

Defense]” and plan “campaigns againstdesignated terrorist networks.”

Thus, the Secretary of Defense would ensurethat USSOCOM focused on the high prioritytransnational and transregional terroristthreats. Commander, USSOCOM was alsoresponsible for

“prioritizing and synchronizing theatersecurity cooperation activities, deploy-ments, and capabilities that support cam-paigns against designated terrorist net-works in coordination with the geograph-ic combatant commanders.”

To assist in building counterterrorist networks,UCP 2004 further tasked USSOCOM with

“providing military representation to U.S.national and international agencies formatters related to U.S. and multinationalcampaigns against designated terroristnetworks, as directed by the Secretary.”

USSOCOM would be responsible for “planning operational preparation of theenvironment (OPE); executing OPE orsynchronizing the execution of OPE incoordination with the geographic combat-ant commanders.”

Twice the UCP provided for Commander USSO-COM to be the supported commander, whendirected, for

“operations in support of selectedcampaigns” and for “selected specialoperations missions.”Now, a single agency, USSOCOM, would

write global counterterrorism plans and would“synchronize” with the GCCs in developingregional plans that supported its global plans.The 2004 UCP clearly articulated the Secretaryof Defense and the President’s decision to desig-nate USSOCOM the lead combatant commandfor the GWOT. In April 2005, the USSOCOMand component commanders designated “syn-chronize the Global War on Terror” a coreUSSOCOM mission.

Secretary Rumsfeld’s July 2002 order forUSSOCOM to develop a plan to deal with terror-

16

ist organizations led not only to the overhaul ofthe UCP, but also marked the start of a collabo-rative process to write the GWOT plans.However, it would take several years to write,coordinate, and win approval for a family ofplans and execution orders so that USSOCOMcould discharge its GWOT responsibilities.

Because the GWOT plans would becomeDOD’s campaign plan, USSOCOM had to coordi-nate its plans with the other combatant com-mands, the Joint Staff and OSD, and also withthe interagency departments and agencies.During the writing phase, USSOCOM briefedSecretary Rumsfeld numerous times, apprisinghim of the plans’ assumptions, mission state-ments, intent, and revisions. LieutenantGeneral Dell Dailey also briefed the combatantcommands’ staffs on the GWOT plans. The UCPmade USSOCOM responsible for planning oper-ational preparation of the environment, and dur-ing the coordination process, some in the intera-gency arena expressed concerns over whetherthis mission would impinge on their responsibil-ities. Such issues were resolved at the Secretaryof Defense level.

During a 2005 Defense Senior LeadersConference, Deputy Secretary of DefenseGordon England told the combatant command-ers that DOD would use USSOCOM’s GWOTplans as guides for resourcing the combatantcommands’ GWOT programs. In effect, to gettheir GWOT plans and programs resourced, thecombatant commanders had to integrate themwith USSOCOM’s efforts. Secretary Rumsfeldapproved USSOCOM’s GWOT campaign plan on29 March 2006.

As part of this campaign plan, USSOCOMwould “synchronize” the combatant command-ers’ regional war on terror plans to ensure thatthey met all of USSOCOM’s requirements. Thecoordination was done during global synchro-nization conferences.

UCP 2004 and related documents and plansresulted in changes to USSOCOM’s missionstatement. In December 2004, General Brownchanged it to read:

“USSOCOM plans, directs, and exe-cutes special operations in the conductof the War on Terrorism in order todisrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorist

networks that threaten the UnitedStates, its citizens and interestsworldwide. USSOCOM organizes,trains, and equips Special OperationsForces provided to GeographicCombatant Commanders, AmericanAmbassadors and their CountryTeams.”

In May 2005, he shortened it: “USSOCOM leads, plans, synchro-nizes, and as directed, executes globaloperations against terrorist networks.USSOCOM trains, organizes, equipsand deploys combat ready SpecialOperations Forces to combatant com-mands.”

General Brown also changed USSOCOM’svision statement because the previous one wastoo broad for the command’s new GWOT focus.In the new vision statement, USSOCOM was:

“To be the premier team of special war-riors, thoroughly prepared, properlyequipped, and highly motivated: at theright place, at the right time, facing theright adversary, leading the Global Waron Terrorism, accomplishing strategicobjectives of the United States.”The expansion of USSOCOM’s mission for

the GWOT led to dramatic changes in the organ-ization of the headquarters. General Hollandretained the center structure, but to enable theheadquarters to conduct operations more effec-tively, he transferred the SOOP 2-star general todirect a new USSOCOM Center for SpecialOperations (SCSO).

When General Brown took command, hemade more far-reaching changes. In keepingwith the command’s new GWOT authorities,General Brown revived the J-staff structure butkept the directorates within the center struc-ture. SOCS, SOAL, and SORR retained the J-1under SOCS, the J-4 under SOAL, and the J-8under SORR. The SOIO and SOOP, however,were eliminated, and the personnel were incor-porated into the SCSO, encompassing the J-2, J-3, J-5, and other functions. General Brown alsosucceeded in making the SCSO director a 3-star

17

position. He created a Center for Knowledgeand Futures (SOKF) with a 1-star director thatencompassed the J-7 (exercises, joint training,and joint doctrine) and J-9 (future of SOF).Brown placed the J-6 and other C4 functionsunder a new Center for Networks andCommunications (SONC) with a civilian SESdirector.

USSOCOM ForcesThe activation of USSOCOM in 1987

required the assignment of components andforces, a task not without controversy. The lawestablishing USSOCOM said, “Unless otherwisedirected by the Secretary of Defense, all activeand reserve Special Operations Forces of allarmed forces stationed in the United Statesshall be assigned to the Special OperationsCommand.” Secretary of Defense CasparWeinberger initially assigned USSOCOM threecomponent commands and most of their forces.He assigned USSOCOM the 23rd Air Force,located at Hurlburt Field, Florida; the NavalSpecial Warfare Command (NAVSPECWAR-COM), headquartered at NAB Coronado, SanDiego, California; and the Army’s 1st SOCOM,at Ft Bragg, North Carolina. Weinberger

assigned the Joint Special Operations Command(JSOC) on 14 August 1987, after USSOCOM hadbecome operational. Later, JSOC became a sub-unified command of USSOCOM.

At the time of its assignment, 1st SOCOMhad charge of all the U.S. Army’s special opera-tions units. Its mission was to prepare, pro-vide, and sustain Army SOF to conduct foreigninternal defense, unconventional warfare, spe-cial intelligence, psychological operations,strike operations, and related special opera-tions. The 1st SOCOM forces included: the 1st,5th, 7th and 10th Special Forces Groups(Airborne); 4th Psychological OperationsGroup; 96th Civil Affairs Battalion; 75thRanger Regiment; 160th Special OperationsAviation Group (Airborne); numerous Reserveand National Guard units; and the John F.Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

Not all of these units, however, were imme-diately transferred to USSOCOM. SecretaryWeinberger withheld the active duty andreserve PSYOP and CA units, pending a specialreview. Earlier in 1987, the Office of theSecretary of Defense had proposed creating aseparate sub-unified command for PSYOP andCA forces. Like other SOF units, PSYOP and

18

HQ USSOCOM Organization Chart 2006

CA had suffered severe cutbacks dur-ing the 1970s and 1980s, and someproponents feared that they wouldnot fare much better under USSO-COM. General Lindsay opposed theplan, arguing that the commandcould use its authority to safeguardthese SOF assets, and AdmiralCrowe, the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, agreed with him. On15 October 1987, SecretaryWeinberger assigned all Army andAir Force Active and ReserveComponent PSYOP and CA units toUSSOCOM.

Secretary Weinberger’s actions,however, did not settle the PSYOPand CA issue completely. General Stineraddressed another long-standing issue in theassignment of PSYOP and CA. Reserve andNational Guard leaders argued that these forceswere assigned to USSOCOM only in wartime,upon mobilization. General Stiner pushedthrough an initiative that the Secretary ofDefense approved in March 1993, designatingPSYOP and CA as SOF. This decision enabledUSSOCOM to command and control these unitsin peacetime as well, which greatly improved thecommand’s ability to fund, train, equip, andorganize these forces.

Created by the Navy on 16 April 1987, theNAVSPECWARCOM only had the NavalSpecial Warfare Center (the training command)assigned to it. Naval Special Warfare Groups Iand II (and their SEALs and Special Boat Units)were not assigned because the Navy argued thatthese organizations and their forces belonged tothe Pacific and Atlantic fleets, respectively, andtherefore not available for assignment to USSO-COM. Secretary of the Navy James Webb andNavy leadership felt the assignment of the spe-cial warfare assets to USSOCOM would detractfrom their close relationship with the fleets.

General Lindsay maintained that the specialwarfare forces rightfully belonged to USSOCOMsince they were based in the United States. Hereasoned that the groups’ relationships to thefleets were no different than a Special ForcesGroup’s assignment to a particular theater, andhe wanted to integrate Naval Special Warfare(NSW) units with other SOF. On 23 October

1987, Secretary Weinberger ruled in favor ofUSSOCOM. Accordingly, operational control ofthe SEALs, Special Boat Units, and NSW groupspassed to NAVSPECWARCOM on 1 March1988, and that command assumed administra-tive control for these units on 1 October 1988.

The 23rd Air Force was a unique organiza-tion with two separate but interrelated mis-sions: it was both a numbered air force assignedto the Military Airlift Command (MAC), and asUSSOCOM’s Air Force component, it supportedSOF from all the Services. SecretaryWeinberger assigned only the 23rd’s specialoperations functions and units to USSOCOM,including its Reserve and National Guard unitsand the Air Force Special Operations School.MAC retained oversight responsibility for the23rd’s other mission areas (such as aeromedicalairlift, rescue and weather reconnaissance, andoperational support airlift missions). SinceGeneral Lindsay expected all components to bemajor command equivalents, this arrangementcreated problems.

From the outset, USSOCOM had wantedthe 23rd “purified” of its non-SOF elements.MAC went along with this request. GeneralLindsay’s paramount concern remained—hestill had to coordinate with MAC to effectchanges at the 23rd. The current organiza-tional arrangement thwarted his efforts tobuild the command that Congress had man-dated. The solution, he decided, was to ele-vate the 23rd to a major air command.General Larry Welsh, the Air Force Chief of

19

SEAL during submarine training.

Staff, agreed and on 22 May 1990, redesignat-ed the 23rd AF as the Air Force SpecialOperations Command (AFSOC).

The USSOCOM most recent component—theMarine Corps Forces, Special OperationsCommand (MARSOC) was established on 4February 2006. Headquartered at CampLejeune, NC, the Marine Corps component ofUSSOCOM started with approximately 1,400Marines, sailors, and civilian employees and wascommanded by a U.S. Marine Corps two-stargeneral. MARSOC includes five subordinatecommands: The Foreign Military Training Unit(FMTU), two Marine Special Operations battal-ions, the Marine Special Operations SupportGroup, and the Marine Special OperationsSchool. MARSOC was projected to grow to about2,500 by FY 2010. The U.S. Marine Corps wasnow a full participant in the special operationscommunity.

Budget and POM DevelopmentThe creation of MFP-11 was an important

priority for both General Lindsay and Congress.Although the Nunn-Cohen Amendment had cre-ated MFP-11 to reform SOF funding, the word-ing of the law permitted varying interpretations,and some Defense Department officials arguedthat the new command should not submit itsown Program Objective Memorandum (POM).General Lindsay and Ambassador Whitehouse,the ASD (SO/LIC), argued just the opposite andworked extremely hard to win approval of aPOM and budget for the command.

This debate lingered until September 1988,when Senators Nunn and Cohen clarifiedCongressional intent, saying that the sponsorsof the law “fully intended that the commanderof the Special Operations Command wouldhave sole responsibility for the preparation ofthe POM.” Congress enacted Public Law 100-456 that same month, which directed theUSCINCSOC to submit a POM directly to theSecretary of Defense.

On 24 January 1989, the Assistant Secretaryof Defense, William H. Taft IV, signed a memo-randum giving USCINCSOC budgetary authori-ty over MFP-11. Soon afterwards, the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense (OSD) gave USSOCOMcontrol of selected MFP-11 programs effective 1October 1990 and total MFP-11 responsibility in

October 1991. For the first time, a CINC wasgranted authority for a budget and POM.

The command needed to create a newPlanning, Programming, and Budgeting System(PPBS) process to structure a POM and budgetfor all SOF. Even with a Congressional man-date, the command found it difficult to establishMFP-11. Because of a staff shortfall, the com-mand took a measured approach to assumingthese tasks. The POM was the first step, withthe initial one completed and submitted in 1988through the Department of the Air Force. Basedon Secretary Taft’s directive, the commandassumed budget execution authority by October1990. In 1991 the command began to submitfully-supported POMs: this was the first timeUSSOCOM researched SOF mission require-ments and developed the analysis for the POMjustification instead of “crosswalking” require-ments, which the individual services had devel-oped in previous years. The establishment ofMFP-11 set up a more focused resource processand ensured a balanced review of special opera-tions requirements and programs.

General Downing directed the creation of theStrategic Planning Process to allocate the com-mand’s resources in the most effective ways.This prioritization and allocation process contin-ued. General Schoomaker made significantchanges in how the command allocated itsresources by ending the competition for scarcedollars and melding the headquarters and com-ponents into one team. This meant that the pri-orities decided upon by CINCSOC and his com-ponent commanders (the so-called Board ofDirectors or “BOD”) would be executed withoutchanges being made by subordinate commands.Second, charged by the CINC to ensure “fidelity”in the resourcing process, the Center for ForceStructure, Requirements, Resources, andStrategic Assessments (SORR) developed proce-dures to monitor how the budget was executed inaccordance with the BOD decisions. In this way,General Schoomaker aligned the dollars to thecommand’s most important acquisition pro-grams.

During General Schoomaker and Holland’stenures, the command completed a number ofsignificant resourcing initiatives. SORR com-pleted three important initiatives: the TSOC’smanpower study that downsized the headquar-

20

ters to provide person-nel to the TSOCs; creat-ing two joint specialoperations aviation com-ponent commands; andkeeping two NationalGuard Special Forcesbattalions. SORRsecured the transfer of1,687 Army spaces andfunding to support avariety of readiness andoperational require-ments. The USSOCOMPOMs maintained SOFreadiness while modern-izing by using off-the-shelf technology. WithOSD, the headquartersstaff developed and exe-cuted the DefenseFinancial AccountingSystem, which managedresources through ajoint accounting system.SORR got DOD to iden-tify a Service to providecommon support, base operations, and manage-ment headquarters support for unified com-mands and the TSOCs. Other initiatives includ-ed increasing the size of the 96th CA Battalionby 30 percent (84 billets) and creating the NavySmall Craft Instruction and Technical TrainingSchool.

Before 9/11, the USSOCOM budget stood atjust under $4 billion per year. During theHolland and Brown tenures, the wars inAfghanistan and Iraq and SOF involvement inthe GWOT led to a huge increase inUSSOCOM’s MFP-11. By FY 06, the USSO-COM budget, including supplemental funding,had nearly doubled to $7.4 billion, and the 2005QDR and PDM directed further increases for thenext five years. In FY 06, the USSOCOM budg-et accounted for only about 1.5 percent of thetotal budget for DOD. The nation received aremarkable return from the defense budget thatwent to SOF.

With SOF deployed around the world com-bating terrorism, USSOCOM relied for the mostpart on emergency supplemental funding to

meet the increasedOPTEMPO and result-ant requirements formore equipment andweapon systems. It wasnot until theQuadrennial DefenseReview (QDR) processbegan in early 2005 thatDOD systematicallyaddressed the GWOTrequirements and theresources USSOCOMwould need for this long-term commitment. The2001 QDR was pub-lished immediately afterthe 9/11 terroristattacks and did notaddress the GWOT.

When DOD startedpreparing for the 2006QDR in early 2005,USSOCOM was the leadcombatant command forthe GWOT. By 2005,after several years of

intense combat experience, USSOCOM had aclear vision of what was needed in terms of capa-bility and capacity to fight and win the GWOT.With the vast majority of SOF fighting in Iraqand Afghanistan, the command needed moreforce structure to prevent terrorist encroach-ment in other areas around the world. Gainingthis additional force structure was one ofGeneral Brown’s primary goals entering theQDR process.

On 1 March 2005, OSD published the QDRTerms of Reference (TOR) that emphasized spe-cial operations more than ever before, and there-fore, USSOCOM won approval to be treated likea fifth service during the QDR process. Thus, inthe key meetings that the Deputy Secretary ofDefense chaired, USSOCOM DeputyCommander VADM Eric T. Olson participatedas an equal member. This was first in a series ofchanges to the QDR process designed to meetthe GWOT demands. By the time the QDRreport was published in February 2006, not onlywas USSOCOM being treated as another serv-ice, but special operations was addressed as a

21

CAPABILITY, CAPACITY, AND THE 2006 QDR

An organization or a weapon systemprovides a capability. Building morecopies of existing organizations and sys-tems increases capacity but does notincrease capability.

During the Cold War, much of the forcestructure debate centered on capacityissues such as numbers of tanks, planes,and ships. When the Cold War ended,many believed that the U.S. had excesscapacity and debate shifted to new capa-bilities that might be needed, such asinformation technologies. The GlobalWar on Terrorism presented the U.S. withnew, adaptive adversaries requiring newcapabilities, but sustaining large, long-term deployments to Iraq andAfghanistan also strained U.S. militarycapacity. To address these two differenttypes of challenges, the 2006 QDR wasthe first to differentiate between capabili-ties and capacities.

separate category on a par with air,ground, and maritime operations.

The 2006 QDR acknowledged thatthe GWOT was going to be a “long war”and would extend far beyond Iraq andAfghanistan. The review providedstrategic guidance for U.S. defense plan-ning in the GWOT, addressed otherthreats to U.S. national security, andcontinued the transformation of DOD.

In another departure from previouspractice, the 2006 QDR led directly tochanges in programs and force struc-tures designed to implement its guid-ance. These changes were promulgatedin the Program Decision Memoranda(PDM) for the FY 2007-2011 Defense Program,and especially in PDM III published on 20December 2005. The force structure changesincluded a dramatic increase in the capabilityand capacity of forces assigned to USSOCOM,including the creation of a new component—theMarine Corps Forces, Special OperationsCommand (MARSOC). Indeed, PDM III direct-ed the largest increase in the authorized person-nel strength in USSOCOM’s 20-year history.

The Air Force Special Operations Command(AFSOC) would receive a squadron of PredatorUnmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and was slat-ed to double the size of the Combat AviationForeign Internal Defense (FID) Squadroncharged with training foreign air forces. EachArmy Ranger battalion would receive a fourthcompany of Rangers and a reconnaissance pla-toon. Every active duty Special Forces Groupwould receive a fourth SF battalion while theArmy National Guard SFGs were slated to growby almost 20 percent. PDM III directed thatArmy CA would grow by almost 20 percent andArmy PSYOP would increase by more than 50percent. USSOCOM would retain active dutyCA and PSYOP units, and the reserve compo-nent CA and PSYOP would be transferred to theU.S. Army Reserve.

PDM III increased NAVSPECWARCOMforce structure by 536 personnel, including anincrease in the size of the Naval SOF UAV pro-gram, additional non-SEAL divers to facilitateSEAL operations, and more personnel forSpecial Boat Units. The headquarters staffs ofNSW units would be increased to meet the

GWOT workload and incorporate informationoperations and other capabilities. The PDMdirected a study of the desired capabilities forafloat forward staging bases (AFSBs) to supportSOF. Once procured, the AFSBs would be amajor expansion of NSW capability.

To provide command and control for theseadditional forces, the TSOCs would grow byalmost 25 percent, and USSOCOM headquar-ters would also expand to handle its GWOTresponsibilities over the long term. To house thenew component and expansion of the existingstructure, USSOCOM and subordinate elements would oversee an expansion in military con-struction.

As the terrorists change their tactics and tar-gets often, USSOCOM must be equally flexible.UCP 2004, the GWOT campaign plan, QDR2006, and PDM III, all helped move DOD pastcrisis management and into a resourced long-term war against terrorism. But, the GWOTwould continue to require adjustments to plans,policies, and force structures to meet the evolv-ing threats posed by an adaptive enemy.General Brown promised not to lower standardsduring the growth of force structure. If subse-quent experience showed that the PDM III forcestructure was not ideal, then USSOCOM wouldrequest changes.

Systems Acquisitions and ForceModernization

A primary rationale for establishing the com-mand was the services’ failure to modernize SOFsystems. Keen congressional interest in this

22

Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) undergoes testing off the coast of Hawaii.

area continued after thecommand was activated,and a 17 November 1987conference report criti-cized DOD for the lack ofprogress in procuring“SOF-peculiar equip-ment.” Some on the Hilllabeled this lack ofprogress as “maliciousimplementation” of theNunn-Cohen Amendment.The Congress enacted anadditional piece of legisla-tion on 4 December 1987that authorized CINCSOCto function as a “Head ofAgency” for SOF acquisi-tion programs, an authori-ty normally reserved for the Service Secretaries.

The command took another major step for-ward when the Deputy Secretary of Defenseapproved establishment of the SpecialOperations Research, Development, andAcquisition Center (SORDAC) on 10 December1990. By early 1991, SORDAC had started per-forming its acquisition functions and operatedwithin the Resources Directorate (J-8). In 1992,General Stiner consolidated the command’sacquisition and contracting management func-tions in a new directorate under a Deputy forAcquisition, who was named the command’sAcquisition Executive and Senior ProcurementExecutive. To discharge its acquisition responsi-bilities, the command concentrated on fieldingsystems meeting component requirements.Emphasizing a streamlined acquisition process,the command’s procurement strategy was to

modify existing weapons or buy “non-developmental” (off-the-shelf technology) sys-tems—an approach which permitted quick, eco-nomical improvements to operational capabili-ties.

Since 1987, USSOCOM has fielded a numberof modified or new systems affecting nearlyevery aspect of special operations. Some of themore notable were the MC-130H Combat TalonII long-range insertion aircraft and theSOCRATES automated intelligence handlingsystem, both used in Operation DESERTSTORM, and the Cyclone-class patrol coastalships, used in Operations SUPPORT DEMOC-RACY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Other sig-nificant acquisitions included the MH-47EChinook, a medium-range helicopter designed toconduct insertion operations under all weatherconditions; the AC-130U Spectre gunship, used

for close air support and reconnaissance; andthe Mark V Special Operations Craft, a highperformance combatant boat capable of beingtransported aboard C-5 aircraft. In 1997, theAcquisition Center’s Naval Special WarfareRigid Inflatable Boat (NSW-RIB) Programprovided a long-sought capability for a highspeed SEAL insertion and extraction craft.The program, which was completed undercost and months ahead of schedule whileexceeding every performance objective, wonthe 1998 Defense Department’s PackardAward for excellence in acquisition.

23Rigid inflatable boats

CV-22 Osprey

The SOAL set the benchmark for acquisitionreform by developing and fielding new systemsmuch faster than the norm. In 1998, the head-quarters implemented SOALIS, the primary toolfor providing information on all USSOCOM pro-grams and a paperless system that saved moneyfor future investments. In 1999, SOAL devel-oped the Joint Special Operations MissionPlanner that provided the Theater SpecialOperations Commands with a planning andcommand and control tool. SOCCENT used thisplanner during two operations. The SOFIntelligence Vehicle, which provided tacticalintelligence processing and analysis to deployedunits, won the David Packard Award in 1997. In2000, SOAL was awarded the DefenseAcquisition Executive Award for the advancedground mobility system and for the multi-bandintra-team radio.

Moreover, USSOCOM’s acquisition capabili-ty was used a number of times during contingen-cies to provide SOF with the latest technology orto accelerate modifications. During DESERTSTORM, for example, the command modifiedChinooks with aircraft survivability equipmentbefore they deployed to the Iraqi area of opera-tions. USSOCOM procured specialized cold-weather gear for SOF deploying to Bosnia dur-ing JOINT ENDEAVOR. SOAL rapidlyresourced statements of requirements for SOFgoing into Kosovo.

In 1998, General Schoomaker designated afew key acquisition programs as “flagship sys-tems,” so called because they were deemedessential to the future of SOF. In an era of tight-ly constrained budgets, funding for these strate-gic programs would be preserved, even at theexpense of other acquisitions. The CV-22 air-craft program and the Advanced SEAL DeliverySystem (ASDS) were among the first flagshipprograms. The ASDS has undergone testing inHawaii.

During General Holland’s tenure, USSO-COM enhanced SOF by acquiring more weaponssystems. Because of the high OPTEMPO andbattle losses, USSOCOM has had to procuremore SOF aircraft, fielding more AC-130s, MC-130s, and MH-47s. Moreover, the CV-22 wouldprovide added capability in the near future.

With thousands of SOF personnel involvedin daily combat with a resourceful enemy,

USSOCOM’s acquisition process needed toadapt to meet the evolving needs of SOF war-riors. USSOCOM developed an urgent deploy-ment acquisition process to provide rapid acqui-sition and logistics support in response to com-bat mission needs statements from deployedSOF and those about to deploy. The commandhas acquired and fielded advanced technologysystems in as little as seven days once the com-bat mission needs statement was approved, andmost capabilities were delivered in less than sixmonths. The accelerated acquisition processproduced mobile electronic-warfare jammers,target video downlink capabilities for close airsupport aircraft, anti-structural grenades, andunmanned aerial systems. Because UAVs havebeen so invaluable in the GWOT, USSOCOMdeveloped a roadmap to consolidate tenunmanned aerial systems into five platformsthat would reduce cost and improve capabilities.

The GWOT has altered pre-9/11 procure-ment strategy in order to reprogram funds toenhance SOF warfighting capabilities. USSO-COM improved maritime systems with commoninfrared sensors, advanced armor protection,and improved creature comforts. USSOCOMfunded the AFSB proof of concept by using acommercial High Speed Vessel (HSV), modifiedto support special operations, to serve as a basefor SOF operations in littoral areas. The testwent well, and USSOCOM has identified therequirement for a SOF-controlled, high-speed,AFSB. Though the exact form of the futureAFSB has not yet been settled, procurement of asatisfactory system would enhance SOF capabil-ities in littoral areas. USSOCOM programmedfor the personnel and equipment needed for afourth battalion for USASOC’s 160th SpecialOperations Aviation Regiment.

General Brown has shifted the focus of SOFacquisition toward personal equipment criticalto the SOF Warrior. In 2004, he consolidatedmore than 90 acquisition programs into the SOFWarrior System Program and ranked it overother systems. This program included globalpositioning systems, night vision and opticaldevices, individual weapons, and body armor.Consolidating them under a single programoffice has ensured that these vital and relativelylow cost items were not overlooked or under-funded. In this way, USSOCOM has continued

24

to “equip the man.” The shift in funding priori-ties has been accompanied by an unprecedentedincrease in SOF funding, resulting in a forcethat is not only more experienced, but bettertrained and better equipped as well.

OPTEMPO and Quality PeopleThere has been a steady increase in SOF

deployments since USSOCOM’s inception,measured by both personnel deployments andthe number of countries visited. At varyingtimes during the 1990s, certain “highdemand/low density” specialties within SpecialOperations, Psychological Operations, and CivilAffairs forces endured repeated, long deploy-ments. Concerns arose within the DOD aboutthe long term impact these absences were hav-ing on retention and readiness. During fiscalyear 1993, USSOCOM averaged 2,036 personneldeployed away from home station per week; byfiscal year 1996 the average had more than dou-bled, climbing to 4,613. In fiscal year 1999, thenumber reached 5,141. From 1998 to 2001, SOFhad deployed to an average of 150 countries peryear. What caused this dramatic increase?

The fall of the Soviet Union and the end ofthe Cold War resulted in (to use GeneralLindsay’s term) a more “violent peace”— region-al destabilization, a new round of terrorism, andan increased availability of weapons of massdestruction. The changed military threat madeSOF’s capabilities more relevant to the nationalmilitary strategy.

Why were SOF used so often as an instru-ment of national policy? SOF were versatile,ready, and uniquely capable of operating in allpolitico-military environments, skilled at peace-time training, foreign internal defense, andnation assistance operations, as well as duringfull-blown conventional warfare. SOF’s versatil-ity was particularly useful in areas where polit-ical constraints prevented using conventionalforces. In combat situations SOF were “forcemultipliers,” conducting special reconnaissance,direct action, and coalition support, while inpeacetime, they deployed to every continent andconducted training, supported the theaterCINCs’ strategy, and did things that convention-al forces were not capable of doing.

Additionally, the theater CINCs and theirstaffs better understood SOF’s capabilities. This

increased awareness was due to USSOCOM’sefforts to involve the other CINCs in planningand joint mission area analysis, and to supporttheir Special Operations Commands with MFP-11 funding and personnel. Moreover, SOF werethe theater commanders’ force of choice for suchdiverse operations as counterdrug and deminingtraining, foreign internal defense, medical exer-cises, non-combatant evacuations, or handlingemergency situations like Operation PACIFICHAVEN in 1996, when CA and PSYOP forceshelped Kurdish refugees prepare to immigrateto the United States. As the number of peace-keeping missions and small-scale contingenciesgrew, so also did the need for SOF support.

Each CINCSOC identified as a basic require-ment the recruitment and retention of peoplewho could meet the rigorous warfighting stan-dards of special operations and also adapt to therole of warrior-diplomat. Special operators weremost likely to deploy to remote locations where,by virtue of being among the first, and often theonly, U.S. troops a host nation’s military andpolitical leaders might see, their military mis-sion took on diplomatic responsibilities. Whenin combat, SOF went deep behind enemy lines—for example, providing special reconnaissance,or conducting “tip of the spear” H-hour strikemissions. Regardless of the challenge, SOF sol-diers, sailors, and airmen have representedAmerica’s finest.

General Downing publicized the SOF Truths(first approved for use by then COL SidShacknow in the mid-1980s) as a way to codifythe need for quality people:

All subsequent CINCSOCs have embracedthe SOF Truths. To ensure that the forceremained professional, General Schoomakermade training and education—“trained for cer-tainty, while being educated for uncertainty”—

Humans are more importantthan hardware.

Quality is better than quantity.Special Operations Forces cannot

be mass produced.Special Operations Forces cannot

be created after emergencies.

25

one of his hallmarks. SOF often encounteredambiguous circumstances while conductingpeacetime operations, circumstances that couldhave a potential impact on strategic issues.The unique conditions SOF operated underrequired not only flexibility and mature judg-ment, but also uncompromising integrity.

General Schoomaker cited the maturity andpersonal qualities of SOF, coupled with theirwidespread presence around the world, as rea-sons why SOF served as “Global Scouts.” Duringcrises, by virtue of their cultural awareness,regional familiarity, ability to respond quickly,or simply due to their presence nearby, SOFwere called upon to support American interests.Examples of SOF Global Scout missions includ-ed the recovery of casualties after Secretary ofCommerce Ron Brown’s CT-43A crashed into aCroatian mountainside in 1996, the evacuationof U.S. citizens from Sierra Leone in 1997, andtransporting aid to Vietnamese flood victims in1999.

The 11 September terrorist attacks,Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, OperationIRAQI FREEDOM, and the GWOT presentedenormous challenges and placed heavy demandson SOF. With each combatant commanderrequesting more SOF, USSOCOM had to man-age the competing demands on the force. To dothis successfully, General Brown requested andreceived authority to manage SOF globally andproactively for the GWOT. The new approachwas embodied in USSOCOM’s Global SOFPosture Plan.

Before 9/11, the geographic combatant com-mands submitted Requests For Forces (RFFs) tohave SOF deploy to their areas; USSOCOMpassed the RFFs to the components to providethe forces or request relief from the tasking on acase-by-case basis. By 2004, SOF were in suchhigh demand that USSOCOM began conductingconferences to manage SOF deployments from aglobal, rather than the regional, counterterroristperspective. General Brown captured the newvision in USSOCOM’s Global SOF DeploymentPosture. The first annual Global SOFDeployment Order (DEPORD) was published in2006 and covered FY 2007, but only addressedGWOT and named operations. The FY 2008DEPORD was expanded to cover all SOF deploy-ments overseas, both operations and training

missions. The GCCs could still submit RFFs tomeet operational requirements.

By 2007, USSOCOM had the authority andplan to fight and win the GWOT and was “grow-ing” the force structure to do so. However,General Brown and the rest of USSOCOM knewthat as the United States continued to fight anadaptive enemy in a world full of uncertainty,requirements would change. The SOF commu-nity would have to remain flexible and preparedto change plans and force structure as new chal-lenges appeared.

26

COMMANDER’S TOP PRIORITIES FOR FY07

1. Take care of SOF Soldiers,Sailors, Airmen and Marines;DOD civilians; and their families.2. Synchronize the GWOT.3. Manage SOF capabilitiesfor 7500.4. Implement QDR and pro-grammed resources for FY07.5. Improve joint SOF inter-operability.6. Ensure continued healthof the SOF Force.7. Immediately implementSOCOM’s InformationStrategy.8. Reduce SOCOM bureau-cracy by streamlining staffingprocesses and rapidly staffingactionable items to the appropriate decision maker.

27

CJCS Gen Richard Myers Oct 2001 - Sep 2005

Gordon England, Deputy Secretary ofDefense, presided over the QDR.

CJCS Gen Peter Pace

Sep 2005 - present

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was instrumentalin granting USSOCOM new missions and authorities.

President George W. Bush signed the UCP which codified USSOCOM’sauthorities and responsibilities as the lead command in the GWOT.

28

1987 - MH-60 Blackhawk landing on Hercules.

2006 - A Predator UAV sits in a maintenance bunker in Afghanistan.AFSOC is scheduled to receive a Predator Squadron.

29

Since 1987, Special Operations Forces (SOF)have participated in a wide range of militaryoperations—from peacetime engagement, to amajor theater war, to a global war on terrorism.The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSO-COM) has worked steadily to enhance SOF sup-port to the theater Commanders in Chief andthe American Ambassadors. Providing this sup-port was not always easy, as it involved doingmilitary operations in different ways. In somecases, theater Commanders in Chief had to beconvinced that SOF offered specialized capabili-ties to them. USSOCOM had just been estab-lished when SOF faced an operational challengein the Persian Gulf, what the Commander inChief of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)called “guerrilla warfare on the high seas.”

Persian Gulf Operation EARNEST WILL

1987-1989During Operation EARNEST WILL, the

United States ensured that neutral oil tankersand other merchant ships could safely transitthe Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War.Iranian attacks on tankers prompted Kuwait toask the United States in December 1986 to reg-ister 11 Kuwaiti tankers as American ships sothat they could be escorted by the U.S. Navy(USN). President Reagan agreed to the Kuwaitirequest on 10 March 1987, hoping it would deterIranian attacks. Operation EARNEST WILLwas planned by CENTCOM under GeneralGeorge B. Crist.

The protection offered by U.S. naval vessels,however, did not stop Iran, which used mines

and small boats to harass the convoys steamingto and from Kuwait. To stop these attacks, theU.S. needed surveillance and patrol forces in thenorthern Persian Gulf and bases for these patrolforces. SOF, including Army helicopters andNavy SEALs and Special Boat Units, had thebest trained personnel and most capable equip-ment for monitoring hostile activity, particular-ly at night when the Iranians conducted theirmissions. The Army’s special operations helicop-ter crews trained to fly and fight at night. Thesehelicopters were difficult to spot on radar andrelatively quiet, allowing them to get close to atarget. Shallow-draft NSW patrol boats couldply waters that had not been swept for mines.

In late July 1987, RADM Harold J. Bernsen,commander of the Middle East Force, requestedNSW assets. Six Mark III Patrol Boats, otherSpecial Boat assets, and two SEAL platoonsdeployed in August. At the same time, two MH-6 and four AH-6 Army special operations heli-copters and 39 men received orders to the regionin a deployment called Operation PRIMECHANCE I.

The Middle East Force decided to converttwo oil servicing barges, Hercules andWimbrown VII, into mobile sea bases. Besidesobviating the need to ask for land bases, themobile sea bases allowed SOF in the northernPersian Gulf to thwart clandestine Iranian min-ing and small boat attacks. Each mobile seabase housed 10 small boats, three helicopters,sufficient fuel, ammunition, equipment, andworkshops to support their operations, and morethan 150 men. In October, the mobile sea basesbecame operational.

Major Operations: 1987 to 2001

Army and Navy SOF used the oil servicing barge Hercules as an operating base.

30

In the interim, SOF operated from varioussurface vessels. On 8 August, the helicopters,designated SEABATs, escorted the thirdEARNEST WILL convoy and looked for signs ofIranian mine laying. The patrol boats beganescort missions on 9 September.

Soon SOF showed what they could do. Onthe evening of 21 September, one MH-6 and twoAH-6 helicopters took off from the frigateJarrett (FFG-33) to track an Iranian ship, theIran Ajr. The helicopters observed the Iran Ajrextinguish its lights and begin laying mines.Receiving permission to attack, the helicoptersfired guns and rockets, stopping the ship. Asthe Iran Ajr’s crew began to push mines overthe side, the helicopters resumed firing untilthe crew abandoned ship.

RADM Bernsen then ordered the SEAL pla-toon from the Guadalcanal to board the IranAjr. Two patrol boats provided security. Shortlyafter first light, the SEALs boarded the ship andfound nine mines and various arming mecha-nisms. The patrol boats rescued 10 Iranians ina lifeboat and 13 in life vests floating nearby.Documents found aboard the ship showed wherethe Iranians had laid mines, implicating Iran inmining international waters. The Iran Ajr wassunk in deep water on 26 September.

The mobile sea bases entered service inearly October in the northern Persian Gulf.From these bases, U.S. patrol craft and heli-copters could monitor Iranian patrol craft inthe northern gulf and deter their attacks.

Within a few days, patrol boat and AH/MH-6helicopter personnel had determined theIranian pattern of activity—the Iranians hidduring the day near oil and gas separationplatforms in Iranian waters and at night theyheaded toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a nav-igation aid for the tankers.

With this knowledge, SOF sent three oftheir helicopters and two patrol craft towardthe buoy on the night of 8 October. TheAH/MH-6 helicopters arrived first and werefired upon by three Iranian boats anchorednear the buoy. After a short but intense fire-fight, the helicopters sank all three boats. TheU.S. patrol boats moved in and picked up fiveIranian survivors who were subsequently repa-triated to Iran.

SOF next saw action in mid-October, threedays after an Iranian Silkworm missile hit thereflagged tanker Sea Isle City near the oil termi-nal outside Kuwait City. Seventeen crewmenand the American captain were injured in themissile attack. In Operation NIMBLEARCHER, four destroyers shelled two oil plat-forms in the Rostam oil field on 19 October.After the shelling, a SEAL platoon and a demo-lition unit planted explosive charges on one ofthe platforms to destroy it. The SEALs nextboarded and searched a third platform two milesaway. Documents and radios were taken forintelligence purposes.

Iran AJR, caught laying mines, was disabled by ArmySpecial Operations helicopters and boarded by SEALs.

Mines found aboard the Iran AJR.

After NIMBLE ARCHER, Hercules andWimbrown VII continued to operate near KaranIsland, within 15 miles of each other, and sentpatrol boats and helicopters on regular patrols.In November 1987, two MH-60 Blackhawk heli-copters arrived to provide nighttime combatsearch and rescue. As EARNEST WILL contin-ued, SOF were rotated on a regular basis; even-tually, some personnel rotated back to thePersian Gulf for second or even third tours. In1988, the Army replaced the AH/MH-6 helicop-ters and crews with OH-58D Kiowa helicopters.

On 14 April 1988, approximately 65 mileseast of Bahrain, the U.S. frigate Samuel B.Roberts (FFG-58) hit a mine, blowing a 30 by 23foot hole in its hull. Ten sailors were injured.The United States struck back hard, attackingthe Iranian frigate Sabalan and oil platforms inthe Sirri and Sassan oil fields on 18 April duringOperation PRAYING MANTIS. After U.S. war-

ships bombarded the Sirri platform andset it ablaze, a UH-60 with a SEAL pla-toon flew toward the platform but wasunable to get close enough because of theroaring fire. Secondary explosions soonwrecked the platform.

Elsewhere, U.S. forces wreakedhavoc on Iranian vessels, sinking twoand damaging five others. In the north-ern Persian Gulf, Iranian forces firedtwo Silkworm missiles at the mobile seabarges, but chaff fired by the frigateGary decoyed the missiles. Later thatday Iranian F-4 jet fighters and patrolboats approached the mobile sea bases,but fled when the Gary locked its fire

control radars on them. Thereafter, Iranian attacks on neutral ships

dropped drastically. On 18 July, Iran acceptedthe United Nations cease fire; on 20 August1988, the Iran-Iraq War ended. On 16 July, thelast AH-6 and MH-6 helicopters departed fromthe theater. In December 1988, the WimbrownVII entered a Bahraini shipyard for reconversionto civilian use. The final EARNEST WILL con-voy was run that month. The U.S. Navy hadescorted 259 ships in 127 convoys since June1987. The mobile sea base Hercules was notwithdrawn until September 1989. The remain-ing SEALs, patrol boats, and helicopters thenreturned to the United States.

Special Operations Forces provided the criti-cal skills necessary to help CENTCOM gain con-trol of the northern Persian Gulf and counterIran’s small boats and minelayers. Their abilityto work at night proved vital, since Iranian units

used darkness to hide their actions.The most important lessons to comeout of Operation EARNEST WILLwere the need to have highly trainedSpecial Operations Forces capable ofresponding rapidly to crises anywherearound the globe and the vital need forinteroperability between conventionaland Special Operations Forces.Additionally, based on EARNESTWILL operational requirements,USSOCOM would acquire newweapons systems—the patrol coastalships and the MARK V SpecialOperations Craft.

31

AH-6 helicopter fire sank this Iranian Boghammer during a firefight on 8 October 1987.

SEALs approaching the Rashadat Gas/Oil Separation Platform afternaval shelling.

The invasion of Panama, known asOperation JUST CAUSE, was an unusually del-icate, violent, and complex operation. Its keyobjectives were the capture of Manuel Noriegaand the establishment of a democratic govern-ment. America applied overwhelming combatpower during the invasion, seeking to minimizeloss of life and destruction of property, and tospeed the transition to friendly relations. TheU.S. had bases located there, and U.S. troopshad a long-standing relationship with thePanama Defense Forces (PDF). American SOFpersonnel, having been based in Panama, wereacutely aware of the delicate nature of the mis-sion and were instrumental in achieving U.S.objectives.

During Operation JUST CAUSE, the spe-cial operations component of Joint Task ForceSouth (the overall invasion force) was the JointSpecial Operations Task Force (JSOTF). TheJSOTF, commanded by Major General WayneA. Downing, was organized into smaller taskforces: TF RED (the Army’s 75th RangerRegiment), TF BLACK (Army Special Forces),and TF WHITE (SEALs and Special Boat Unitassets). These task forces were supported byPsychological Operations and Civil Affairsunits, Army Special Operations helicopters,and USAF air commando units.

The Opening MissionThe JSOTF’s principal H-hour missions were

the capture of Noriega and the destruction of thePDF’s ability to fight. As it turned out, the U.S.forces did not know Noriega’s location at H-hour;accordingly, the JSOTF focused on the H-hourmissions against the PDF. The attack on theComandancia (the PDF’s headquarters inPanama City) and the rescue of an American cit-izen from the adjoining prison (the CarcelModelo) were the responsibility of a joint taskforce that included Special Forces ground ele-ments, SOF helicopters and AC-130 gunships,and TF GATOR [M-113 armored personnel car-riers and soldiers from the 4th Battalion, 6thInfantry (Mechanized)]. Because of indicationsthat H-hour had been compromised, the attack

on the Comandancia began 15 minutes early, at0045 on 20 December 1989.

TF GATOR was responsible for moving M-113s to blocking positions around theComandancia and the prison, and then, in con-junction with the AC-130 and AH-6 gunships,attacking and leveling the PDF headquarters.Maneuvering to the blocking positions, theycame under increasingly heavy sniper fire fromPDF soldiers in buildings (including a 16-storyhigh rise) on the west side of the Comandanciaand prison complex. TF GATOR suffered somewounded and one killed while moving to theirblocking positions. Near the target, TF GATORencountered roadblocks; the M-113s squashedsome roadblocks and went around others. Theheavy enemy fire, coming from various direc-tions, continued as the armored personnel carri-ers began their assault on the Comandancia.

At 0045, the revised H-hour, AC-130s andAH-6s started firing upon the Comandanciaarea. The PDF shot down the lead AH-6, but itscrew managed a controlled crash in theComandancia courtyard. They were in thewrong place at the wrong time as the AC-130swere pounding the Comandancia. By keepingtheir wits about them, they evaded both enemy

32

M-113 armored personnel carriers supported SOF’s attackon the Comandancia and Carcel Modelo.

PanamaOperation JUST CAUSE

1989-1990

and friendly fire for over two hours, made it tothe back wall (where they captured a PDF sol-dier), climbed the wall, and linked up with a TFGATOR blocking position.

By now, buildings in the compound wereablaze, and the smoke obscured the area for theAC-130 firing. One TF GATOR element wasfired upon by an AC-130, wounding 12 soldiers.A second AC-130 volley about an hour laterwounded nine more. At first, the soldiersbelieved that they had been attacked by PDFmortars, but during the second volley, they real-ized it was coming from the AC-130 and calledthrough the fire support network to end theshooting.

During the attack on the Comandancia, arescue force had entered the prison and freed theAmerican citizen. The helicopter carrying partof the rescue force and the former prisoner wasshot down and crashed in analley to the north of the prison.Everyone on board, except theformer prisoner, was injured toone degree or another, but therescue force reacted as theyhad trained, formed a defensiveposition, contacted a TFGATOR blocking element, andwere evacuated by M-113s.

TF GATOR kept theComandancia isolated duringthe day of 20 December andcontinued to receive sporadicsniper fire. That afternoon,

Company C, 3rd Battalion, 75th RangerRegiment arrived from Omar TorrijosInternational Airport to clear the Comandancia.All of these forces then engaged in follow-on mis-sions.

Task Force RedTask Force RED was the largest component

of the Joint Special Operations Task Force. Itconsisted of the Army’s 75th Ranger Regimentreinforced by contingents from the 4thPsychological Operations Group (PSYOP) and96th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion, and includedAir Force Special Tactics teams and MarineCorps/Naval Gunfire liaison troops. Close airsupport aircraft included AH-6 attack helicop-ters from the 160th Special Operations AviationRegiment, AC-130H gunships from the 1stSpecial Operations Wing, and from the conven-tional forces, AH-64 Apaches and F-117A fight-er-bombers.

The task force was to perform two simulta-neous airborne assaults at H-hour (0100 on 20December 1989). One contingent would para-chute onto the Omar Torrijos InternationalAirport/Tocumen military airport complex,while another would drop onto Rio Hato air-field. Upon securing these objectives, TF REDwould then link-up with conventional forces forfollow-on combat operations.

The Assault on TorrijosAirport/Tocumen Airfield

Omar Torrijos International Airport was themain international airport serving Panama, and

33

As captured on FLIR tape, an AC-130 pounds theComandancia with 105mm cannon rounds.

After seizing the Torrijos Airport/Tocumen Airfield, Rangers cleared theComandancia.

the adjoining Tocumen Military Airfield was thehome base of the Panamanian Air Force.Capturing Torrijos/Tocumen was crucial to theJUST CAUSE campaign plan because it wouldenable the 82nd Airborne Division to come intothe country, while preventing the 2nd PDFCompany and the Panamanian Air Force frominterfering with American operations. TheTorrijos/Tocumen complex formed a target areaapproximately six kilometers long and two kilo-meters wide.

The TF RED Commander, Colonel WilliamF. “Buck” Kernan, gave the mission of capturingTorrijos/Tocumen to 1st Battalion, 75th RangerRegiment, commanded by LTC Robert W.Wagner. The Rangers had a tight schedule toseize this complex—an 82nd Airborne Divisionbrigade was supposed to jump onto the complexonly 45 minutes after H-hour to start follow-onmissions. First Battalion’s three companieswere augmented by Company C, 3rd Battalion,75th Ranger Regiment, PSYOP teams, a CivilAffairs team, two AH-6 attack helicopters, AirForce Special Tactics teams (combat controllersand pararescuemen), and an AC-130H gunship.

LTC Wagner’s plan called for the helicop-ters and AC-130H to attack the PDF positionsat H-hour, just prior to the Ranger parachuteassault. After parachuting in, Company Awould seize the Panamanian Air Force com-pound and destroy the aircraft. Company C,reinforced with a platoon from Company B,would seize the 2nd PDF compound anddestroy the PDF Company. The rest ofCompany B, reinforced with 12 gun jeeps and10 motorcycles, would clear both runways andestablish blocking positions to prevent otherPDF forces from interfering with the battal-ion’s operations. Finally, Company C, 3rdBattalion would clear the smaller buildingsnear the Torrijos terminal, isolate the termi-nal building, and then enter the terminalbuilding and destroy PDF resistance there.

Prior to the attack, three combat controllersand one pararescueman placed navigation bea-cons near the end of the runway. The attackbegan at 0100, with the AC-130H and AH-6sopening fire on PDF positions on the airfield.The AH-6s eliminated three targets while theAC-130H fired on the 2nd Rifle Company’s bar-racks and headquarters building. It should be

remembered that TF GATOR and other unitshad attacked the Comandancia in Panama City15 minutes early, at 0045, which meant the PDFat Torrijos/Tocumen knew of the invasion priorto the Rangers’ airdrop. At 0103, the firstjumpers left their aircraft.

Company A received only sporadic fire andsecured all of its objectives within two hoursafter capturing virtually the entire PanamanianAir Force on the ground. The company capturedabout 20 Panamanian Air Force personnel hid-ing in one of the hangars. Company B also land-ed on target and quickly secured its blockingpositions. Like Company A, it received only spo-radic enemy fire and took some prisoners. Thebiggest problem Company B had was withPanamanian vehicles ignoring its warning signsand barricades and trying to run its blockingpositions. Generally these vehicles turnedaround and fled after the Rangers fired warningshots, but one vehicle had to be disabled byshooting out its tires. One of the vehicles thatfled from warning shots contained ManuelNoriega, who had been visiting the CeremeMilitary Recreation Center. Company Cassaulted the barracks of the PDF’s 2ndCompany and received only ineffective enemyfire; they quickly cleared the area, killing onePDF soldier who had refused to surrender.

Company C, 3rd Battalion, 75th RangerRegiment was to secure the international air ter-minal, and this proved to be the only portion ofthe assault on Torrijos/Tocumen that was signif-icantly more difficult than expected. First, one-

34

Rangers preparing for airborne assault.

fourth of the company landed in ten-foot tallcunna grass to the west of the runway and tooktwo hours to join the main body. The depletedCompany C had no trouble securing its objec-tives outside the terminal building, however,and the troops were impressed with how com-pletely the AH-6s had destroyed the guard houseoutside the terminal and killed the two guardsthere. The 3rd platoon seized the fire station onthe north side of the terminal and then receivedfire from the second floor of the terminal.

These Rangers entered the terminal fromthe north, where they encountered two surpris-es. First, two civilian flights had arrived justprior to H-hour, and about 400 civilians were inthe terminal. The other surprise was that thePDF troops defended the terminal more deter-minedly than anywhere else in theTorrijos/Tocumen complex.

When two Rangers searched one of the air-port’s huge men’s rooms on the second floor, twoPDF soldiers jumped out of a stall and shot oneof the Rangers several times with a pistol. Theother Ranger returned fire and, with the assis-tance of two more Rangers, dragged his wound-ed buddy out of the men’s room. In the process,the Ranger pulling the wounded man was him-self shot twice in the back of the head, but hiskevlar helmet stopped both rounds. From out-side the men’s room door, the unhurt Rangersthrew in grenades, but the stalls protected thePDF soldiers. The Rangers then re-entered the

men’s room and waited for the PDF to showthemselves. The Rangers got the better of theensuing hand-to-hand struggle. One of the PDFsoldiers was killed in the men’s room while theother was knocked out of the window; he fell twostories and almost landed on a Ranger patrollingoutside. When the PDF soldier tried to draw hispistol, the Ranger killed him.

Meanwhile, 2nd Platoon entered the termi-nal from the south and started clearing thebuilding, with one squad on each of the threemain floors. Enemy soldiers opened fire on thethird floor, but the Rangers’ counterattackdrove them from the terminal, and they clearedthe rest of the third floor without incident.

The situation on the first floor was more dif-ficult; about ten PDF troopers had taken twoAmerican girls hostage. When their escaperoute led them right into the Ranger securitydetail stationed outside the terminal, they fledback inside, where 2nd Platoon Rangers cor-nered them after several exchanges of fire. At0500, after a tense two-and-a-half-hour standoff,the Rangers announced they were going to comein shooting. Rather than face an all-out assault,the holdouts then released their hostages andsurrendered.

Later that morning, at about 1100, the 82ndAirborne Division assumed operational controlof 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment andbegan operations out of Torrijos/Tocumen.Likewise, Company C, 3rd Battalion was put

35

AC-130H Spectre crewmember loading a 105mm round.

American soldiers the morning after seizingTorrijos/Tocumen.

under the operational control of TF BAYONETto clear La Comandancia at 1500 on 20December. The Rangers’ extensive training inairfield seizure and building clearing, along withtheir detailed mission plan, were key factors intheir successful seizure of the Torrijos/Tocumencomplex with minimal collateral damage andcasualties.

The Attack on Rio Hato AirfieldThe Panamanian military base near the

small village of Rio Hato was located 65 mileswest of Panama City. It contained a large air-field and was home to two PDF companies: the6th Rifle Company (Mechanized), equipped with19 armored cars, and the 7th Rifle Company, anelite counterinsurgency force known to be loyalto Noriega. In addition, the base housed a PDFengineer platoon and PDF training schools. TFRED’s mission was to destroy PDF forces andseize the airfield for follow on missions. Thetotal number of PDF forces was estimated toexceed 500 men; these units, particularly the 7thRifle Company, were expected to offer stiff oppo-sition to the TF RED forces.

The Rio Hato military base ranged along thecoastline of the Gulf of Panama, with the airfieldrunway nearly perpendicular to the shoreline.The barracks for the 6th and 7th Companieswere on the runway’s southwest side. Therewere a number of beach houses along a dirt laneto the south of the runway; Manuel Noriegaowned (and occasionally used) one of them. Tothe west of the runway, and above the 6th and7th Companies’ barracks, was the PDF schoolcomplex. The Pan-American Highway bisectedthe airfield.

The TF RED Commander, Colonel Kernan,led the forces assaulting Rio Hato, which includ-ed the 2nd Ranger Battalion, the 3rd RangerBattalion (minus one company, used in theTorrijos/Tocumen assault), and elements of the4th Psychological Operations Group, CivilAffairs assets, Air Force Special Tactics teams,and Marine Corps Air/Naval Gunfire liaisontroops. Aerial fire support was provided by twoF-117A fighter-bombers, two AH-64 and fourAH-6 helicopters, and one AC-130H gunship.The 2nd and 3rd Battalions split the responsibil-ity for taking and holding ground: the 2nd was toparachute into the area along the southern edge

of the runway and around the PDF barracks andengage the enemy, while the 3rd was to jumpfarther north, securing the area from counterat-tacks and clearing the runway.

Thirteen C-130 transports were cross-loadedwith Rangers from both battalions. The aircraftwere to approach from the south, with the 2ndBattalion soldiers parachuting first and the 3rdBattalion troops jumping second. The 2ndBattalion’s Company A would assault and clearthe PDF school complex. Company B, 2ndBattalion would assault the 7th Company fromthe east, and if it was still effective after destroy-ing that unit (planners had anticipated 30 per-cent casualties), it would push westward andclear the 6th Company area. If Company B suf-fered excessive casualties, Company C wouldtake over the assault. If Company B did notneed reinforcement, then Company C wouldseize Noriega’s beach house.

Though the Rangers wanted the F-117As tohit the PDF barracks, the bombing targets hadbeen changed to an area near the barracks in thehope of frightening, rather than killing, thePDF. The bombs landed on schedule, at H-hour,although one missed its target and explodedharmlessly near the beach. The AH-6s and AC-130H aircraft immediately followed with attackson their designated targets. Of particularimportance, the AC-130H destroyed two anti-aircraft positions before the Rangers jumped.

In spite of the three minute air attack, theRangers jumped into effective anti-aircraftmachine-gun fire. Eleven of the aircraft carry-ing Rangers were hit, and one Ranger was hit byanti-aircraft fire while still in the aircraft. Thejump, however, went on as scheduled at 0103.Those Rangers who had jumped into Grenada in1983 for Operation URGENT FURY judged theenemy fire to have been heavier at Rio Hato.

Once on the ground, the 2nd BattalionRangers saw a lot of tracers, but were able toreturn fire and assemble without too much trou-ble. The PDF troops apparently had left theirbarracks upon learning that the U.S. troopswere coming and had either set up defenses onand around the airfield, or fled. As planned,Company A assembled before the other unitsand moved up to clear the school complex.

As Company A was advancing on the schoolcomplex, Company B began its assault on the

36

7th Company area. After using demolitioncharges to blow holes in the wall surroundingthe compound, Company B moved in and setabout clearing each building, room by room.Having cleared the 7th’s area without seriouslosses, Company B continued to push west andhad begun clearing the 6th Company area bydawn on 21 December. Company B’s successfreed Company C to assault Noriega’s beachhouse area two hours after H-hour, and theRangers cleared the house by morning.

Company B finished clearing the 6thCompany barracks area that morning as welland, with all of its initial assault objectivessecured, continued to advance west into thesmall village inhabited by the families of thePDF troops. The Rangers detained all the adultmales found there for questioning, assumingthe vast majority were PDF troops in hiding.

The 3rd Battalion Rangers, who were loadedfirst in each of the 13 C-130s, jumped after the2nd Battalion. By the time they jumped into thewarm, humid night, the PDF knew they werecoming. The 3rd’s airborne assault includedheavy “drops” of four jeeps and six motorcycles.Company A’s motorcycles were to race northalong the runway and screen the Americansfrom possible counterattacks, while theCompany B jeep teams were to establish block-ing positions and watch for possible PDF activi-ties.

When the Company A Rangers jumped,they scattered from south of the Pan AmericanHighway to well north of it. This company’sprimary mission was to neutralize the .50 caliber machine gun positioned on the concreteand stone entryway leading to the Rio Hato air-field. By happenstance, the company’s executiveofficer and a few other Rangers landed within 30feet of the entryway; they killed the PDF gunneras he was firing at the other Rangers parachut-ing to the ground and took possession of the for-tified position.

Other Company A elements had begun toclear the NCO academy headquarters and class-room areas. The Rangers encountered morePDF soldiers than expected, and in the words ofLTC Joseph Hunt, 3rd battalion commander,these PDF soldiers “gave them a good run fortheir money for about 30 minutes.” As theRangers aggressively cleared the NCO academy

buildings, the Panamanian soldiers abandonedtheir resistance and fled from the advancingRangers. Company A Rangers did capture about167 cadets. Without their superior fire disci-pline and training, the Rangers could have easi-ly attacked these cadets before learning thatthey were unarmed, frightened, and eager tosurrender. Within an hour of H-hour, CompanyA had secured its objectives.

Company B, 3rd Battalion severed the PanAmerican Highway on the east side of the air-field. There was more traffic on the PanAmerican Highway than expected, and theblocking element fired warning shots at a fewvehicles to force them to turn around. Thelargest Company B element concentrated onclearing the runway south of the highway sothat aircraft could begin landing, and thisproved more time-consuming than anticipated.The Rangers quickly removed such obstacles asbarrels, barbed wire, and trucks, but neededextra time to pick up the hundreds of para-chutes left behind by the airborne assault.Company B Rangers also took control of the airtraffic control tower. Approximately 1.5 hoursinto the operation, the Rangers finished clear-ing the runway, and C-130s began landing withmore people and additional supplies.

The Rangers who were assigned to end PDFresistance north of the Pan American Highwayencountered a surprising amount of PDF opposi-tion. Here, as night turned to dawn, some PDFsoldiers conducted a deliberate withdrawal,

37

Rangers captured a .50 caliber machine gun guarding thestone entryway to Rio Hato.

fighting from building to building through asmall built-up area. A Ranger element engagedthe PDF and called for fire support from two AH-6 helicopter gunships. The gunships fired on thebuildings, but unbeknownst to the pilots, an ele-ment of Rangers moved into a tree line to flankthe PDF. As the gunships came around for asecond pass, one pilot saw movement in the treesand, believing they were PDF soldiers, firedupon the Rangers, killing two and woundingfour. The movement of the Rangers into the treeline had not been radioed to the AH-6 pilots.

Having secured the military complex on 20December, the Rangers conducted follow-on mis-sions out of Rio Hato for the next three days. At2200 on 20 December, Company A, 2ndBattalion left Rio Hato aboard special operationshelicopters and, at 0230 on the 21st, took oversecurity for the American Embassy in PanamaCity. That same day, the Rangers participatedin one of the early surrender missions—whatbecame known as the “Ma Bell” Campaign—when COL Kernan brought the PDF leaders ofthe Penonome Prison and 6th Military ZoneHeadquarters to Rio Hato to discuss their forces’surrender. Later, with an AC-130H circlingoverhead, the 3rd Battalion’s Company Aaccepted the surrender of the town’s garrison;then, the Rangers demonstrated a “dry run”assault on the prison, showing the Panamanianswhat would have happened to them if they hadresisted. Word of this display of force and sur-render quickly spread throughout the remaining

cuartels in the countryside. After relocating toHoward AFB, the Rangers, in conjunction withSpecial Forces soldiers, conducted the “Ma Bell”surrender of David, a major city in westernPanama.

The Rangers also performed stability opera-tions in areas around Panama City. In responseto civil disturbances and continued PDF andDignity Battalion (Noriega’s paramilitary sup-porters) activities, the 2nd Battalion, 75thRangers set up operations in Area of Operation(AO) Diaz, an area containing the towns ofAlcalde Diaz and Las Cumbres, on 27 December.With the assistance of PSYOP forces, they creat-ed a visible American presence by establishingcheckpoints and blocking positions, and running“saturation” patrols and night ambushes. Whilein AO Diaz, the Rangers rounded up former PDFand Dignity Battalion members and seized sev-eral caches of weapons. The American presenceof Rangers, PSYOP, and Civil Affairs soldiersstabilized the area and allowed the new govern-ment to reestablish control.

The Rangers came out of Panama with anumber of lessons learned. The tactical planwas well prepared, coordinated, and rehearsed,enabling the successful completion of their mis-sions. JUST CAUSE validated the Rangers’mission essential procedures and techniques,and their responsiveness to contingencies.Lessons learned included recognizing the impor-tance of intelligence gathering and manage-ment; planning logistical support for follow-onmissions; emphasizing training and equippingthe regiment for military operations in urbanareas; and enhancing the regiment’s interactionwith conventional and joint forces through theuse of liaison elements.

Task Force WHITEOn 19 December 1989, TF WHITE, the NSW

component of the JSOTF, established operationsat Rodman Naval Station on the west side of thePanama Canal. The task force consisted of fiveSEAL platoons, three patrol boats, four riverinepatrol boats, and two light patrol boats (22-footBoston Whalers), which were divided amongfour task units. Each task unit had its own H-hour mission: Task Unit (TU) Papa, the largestunit, was to deny use of the Paitilla Airfield; TUWhiskey was to destroy a Panamanian patrol

38

Rangers used this type of jeep at Rio Hato.

boat in Balboa Harbor; TU Charlie and TUFoxtrot were charged with securing, respective-ly, the Atlantic and Pacific entrances to thePanama Canal.

The Paitilla Airfield assault force, TU Papa,had a 62-man ground force comprised of threeSEAL platoons (Bravo, Delta, and Golf pla-toons), Air Force combat controllers to performliaison with an AC-130H gunship, and a com-mand, control, communications, and mortar ele-ment. A 26-man support team included surveil-lance forces, a signals intelligence team, a psy-chological operations team, and boat crews.

At 1930 on 19 December, 15 combat rubberraiding craft, carrying the ground force,launched from the Howard AFB beach, eightmiles from Paitilla, while two patrol boats leftfrom Rodman Naval Station. At 2330, with therubber boats waiting off the airfield, two SEALsswam ashore to reconnoiter the landing site andmark the beach with a strobe light.

At 0045 on the 20th, coming ashore near theend of the runway, the ground force heard firingand explosions from the attack on theComandancia. The element of surprise had beenlost. The SEALs hurried up the trail, through ahole in the security fence, and formed into pla-toons near the southern end of the runway.Learning of a report that Noriega was about toarrive in a small plane, Delta platoon set anambush halfway up the runway for a few min-utes, before advancing toward the tower. Theother two platoons, Golf and Bravo, had movedup the grass apron on the west side of the run-way.

By 0105, the SEALs were infront of the three northernmosthangars. Panamanians guardedthe middle hangar, which housedNoriega’s jet, and the hangar tothe north. Golf platoon was inthe lead, with one of its squadsmoving toward the northern edgeof the tarmac. After an exchangeof demands between theAmericans and guards, a SEALopened fire on a PDF guard whohad assumed a firing position. Ashort but fierce firefight ensued,and within a matter of a minuteor two, eight SEALs were wound-

ed, five seriously. The Golf platoon commandercalled for assistance on his radio, reportingheavy casualties. The ground force commanderordered other platoons to reinforce these SEALs.Two SEAL reinforcements were wounded asthey maneuvered to engage the PDF in thehangars. The combination of SEAL fire disci-pline and superior firepower soon took effect,however, and after three firefights, the remain-ing PDF defenders withdrew at about 0117.

The SEALs reported the airfield was secureat 0146, and a MEDEVAC helicopter finallyarrived at 0205 to recover the wounded. By0315, the SEALs had set up a more defendableperimeter on the southeast side of the airfield.The reaction platoon from Rodman arrived a fewminutes later. An AC-130H gunship, unable toestablish reliable communications with theground force, was replaced by an AC-130A at0324. At dawn a patrol conducted a reconnais-sance of the hangars, while other SEALsdragged airplanes onto the runway to block itsuse. The relief force did not arrive until 1400 onthe 21st, when five CH-47 helicopters delivereda Ranger company. The SEALs left aboard thesame helicopters. A planned 5-hour mission hadturned into a 37-hour operation. Four SEALshad died and eight others were wounded.

Subsequent to their operations at PaitillaAirfield, TU Papa conducted several search andseizure missions looking for arms caches andNoriega followers. The unit was disbanded on1 January 1990, and members returned to theUnited States the next day.

39Manuel Noriega’s disabled jet.

TU Whiskey’s H-hour mission was to destroythe Panamanian patrol boat docked in BalboaHarbor by having SEALs place demolitioncharges on its hull. Around 2300 on 19December, two combat rubber raider craft leftRodman Naval Station, cut across the canal,passing vessels, and tied up in a mangrove standnear the docks. The first craft took two SEALscloser to the pier, where they slipped overboardfor the swim to the Panamanian patrol boat,Presidente Poras. The next swim pair enteredthe canal five minutes later. The SEALs usedthe Draeger underwater breathing apparatuswhich left no trail of air bubbles. Reaching theboat, the SEALs attached haversacks of explo-sives to the propeller shafts, set the detonators,and swam to their extraction point. At 0100, anexplosion ripped a hole in the Presidente Poras,and it sank. As the SEALs swam, they passednear a firefight between American andPanamanian forces; despite the hazards, theSEALs returned safely. This mission markedthe first successful combat swimmer demolitionattack by U.S. forces.

Following the Balboa Harbor mission, TUWhiskey participated in the seizure of Noriega’syacht on 20 December and the capture of theBalboa Yacht Club the next day. On 23December, TU Whiskey members helped repelPDF forces trying to board the merchant shipEmanuel B in the Panama Canal. Its last mis-sion called for it to seize Noriega’s beach houseon Culebra Island on 25 December. TU Whiskeyredeployed back to the States on 2 January1990.

TU Charlie, assigned to secure theCaribbean side of the Panama Canal, workedclosely with TF Atlantic. The task unit hadeight SEALs, twelve soldiers, two riverinepatrol boats, and two Army mechanized land-ing craft. On the night of the invasion, TUCharlie blocked all ships from entering theCanal from the Caribbean side and patrolledthe shipping channel near Colon, preventingthe PDF from commandeering boats and pro-tecting the canal from sabotage.

After conducting patrols all night, at 0930 on20 December, TU Charlie received a report thatabout 30 PDF members had boarded a Germanmerchant ship, Asian Senator, in Cristobal.Once at the pier, the SEALs saw men in civilian

clothes running down the Asian Senator’s browand other men on the ship throwing weaponsonto the pier for them. One of the mechanizedlanding craft and the two riverine patrol boatsfired at the brow. The Panamanians on the ship,shaken by this firepower, surrendered. TheSEALs came under fire as they searched thePDF prisoners. As the volume of fire grew, theSEALs evacuated the prisoners to their boats.During subsequent patrols of the harbor andcoastline, TU Charlie occasionally exchangedfire with PDF on the shore. TU Charlie laterdetained and searched a Colombian vessel,which yielded a cargo of looted electronic equip-ment, but no drugs or PDF. On Christmas Eve,the SEALs searched 31 boats moored in thePanama Canal Yacht Club. TU Charlie wasdeactivated on 26 December.

TU Foxtrot, the fourth task unit, conductedmaritime patrols along the Pacific Oceanapproaches to the Panama Canal. At H-hour,SEALs in three patrol boats guarded the watersaround Howard AFB, and two riverine patrolboats covered the approaches to the Bridge ofthe Americas. SEALs in a cayuga canoesearched the small islands off Howard AFB forinfiltrators. For the remainder of the night, thepatrol boats searched and detained Panamanianfishing and pleasure boats found on the localwaters.

On 21 December, the SEALs located andsearched Passe Porte Tout and Macho de Monde,two of Noriega’s sport yachts, capturing 18Panamanians and large quantities of small armsand ammunition. TU Foxtrot continued its mar-itime interdiction operations, and beginning on26 December, it guarded the waters adjacent tothe Papal Nunciature, the last refuge of Noriega.No incidents took place during this mission, andTU Foxtrot was disestablished on 2 January1990.

NSW forces successfully executed all theirmissions during Operation JUST CAUSE.Success did not come easily, as four SEALs diedand eight more were wounded during the fightfor Paitilla Airfield, but TF WHITE accom-plished its other missions without casualties.These operations underscored the value of for-ward-basing these units.

40

Task Force BLACKTF BLACK was activated 18 December 1989

under the command of Colonel Robert C. “Jake”Jacobelly, who also served as commander ofSpecial Operations Command South (SOC-SOUTH). Before H-hour, SOCSOUTH person-nel and the headquarters unit of 3rd Battalion,7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) [SFG (A)]moved to Albrook Air Force Base and togetherserved as the TF BLACK headquarters andstaff.

The 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG (A), commandedby LTC Roy R. Trumbull, formed the core of TFBLACK and was reinforced by Company A, 1stBattalion, 7th SFG (A) from Ft. Bragg, NorthCarolina. TF BLACK had use of five MH-60 hel-icopters from the 617th Special OperationsAviation Detachment and two UH-60 helicoptersfrom the 1st Battalion, 228th AviationRegiment. Air Force AC-130s from the 1stSpecial Operations Wing were available to pro-vide fire support.

H-hour MissionsAt H-hour, TF BLACK was to perform two

reconnaissance and surveillance missions. Thefirst, conducted by a Special Forces team fromCompany B, 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG (A), was toobserve the PDF’s Battalion 2000 at FortCimarron. By the time the team was in place,however, Battalion 2000 had already left thefort. The second mission involved watching the1st PDF Company at Tinajitas. These SpecialForces did not see or hear anythingexcept for two mortar rounds beingfired early in the morning.

Another reconnaissance missionwas changed to direct action: seizeand deny use of the Pacora RiverBridge. The TF BLACK element,commanded by Major Kevin M.Higgins, consisted of 24 men fromCompany A, 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG(A), and 3 helicopters. The bridge wasthe best place to prevent PDFBattalion 2000 from moving out ofFort Cimarron to Panama City. Atten minutes after midnight, smallarms fire broke out at Albrook AFBwhile the troops were preparing to

load onto their helicopters. Higgins and histroops dashed to the waiting aircraft anddeparted under fire.

As the helicopters neared the bridge, thelead helicopter pilot spotted a column of sixPDF vehicles approaching. It was now 0045,the new H-hour, and the mission had become arace between the SF troops and the PDF convoyto see who would take the bridge first.

After the helicopters landed, Major Higginsyelled orders to his men to move up the steepslope and establish the ambush position by theroad, but his men had already seized the initia-tive. The first man on the road looked straightinto the headlights of the convoy’s lead vehicle(which was already on the bridge) and fired alight anti-tank weapon. He missed, but the nexttwo Special Forces soldiers did not. ThenSpecial Forces gunners armed with squad auto-matic weapons (SAWs) opened up on the columnwith automatic weapons fire, and M203 gunnersstarted firing grenades into the column.

With the column halted, the Air ForceCombat Controller contacted an AC-130 anddirected fire onto the PDF column. The AC-130responded with devastating fire, forcing the PDFsoldiers out of the trucks, and this circling air-craft provided vital intelligence on enemy move-ments. A second AC-130 was called in, provid-ing additional firepower and surveillance, andthe Special Operations Forces successfullyrepelled all PDF attempts to cross the bridge orthe river.

41Pacora River Bridge.

At daybreak, the TF BLACK quick reactionforce arrived to reinforce Higgins’ element.Major Higgins and his troops controlled thebridge while the quick reaction force underMajor Gilberto Perez cleared the east side of theriver. They captured 17 PDF members. The TFBLACK elements returned to Albrook AFB thatevening.

The fourth TF BLACK H-hour mission wasto take Panamanian TV Channel 2 off the air.The mission was given to OperationalDetachment Alpha (ODA) 785, commanded byCaptain John M. Custer and augmented bytechnical experts. At 0050 on 20 December, theeighteen-man team fast roped from two helicop-ters near the TV broadcasting complex in themountains northeast of Panama City. The PDFguards fled, the team took control of the com-plex, and the technical experts disabled the sta-tion. By 1500, the team had returned to base.

Post H-hour MissionsThe first three missions after H-hour focused

on stopping pro-Noriega radio broadcasts. Afterthe invasion began, Radio Nacional’s AM andFM stations had begun playing a recording ofManuel Noriega exhorting his followers to fightthe Americans. Company C, 3rd Battalion, 7thSFG (A), commanded by Major David E.McCracken, got the mission to silence the radiobroadcasts. Thirty-three Company C soldiersdeployed in three helicopters and arrived at theControlaria building, the location of the trans-mitter and antenna, at 1850 on 20 December.

The security element controlled traffic intoand out of the target area. The assault teamsfast roped onto the roof. One element blew upthe electronic junction boxes controlling theantenna, and the rest of the assault force madeits way to the 7th floor where they blew the AMstation off the air. The assault teams could notfind the FM transmitters.

As soon as the force returned to AlbrookAFB, they were briefed on their next target: theFM transmission antenna located on the out-skirts of town. Major McCracken and his 19men launched about 2015, and though conduct-ed after dark with very little planning time, themission went smoothly. By 2045, the CompanyC element had destroyed the FM antenna,silencing Radio Nacional.

On 21 December, ODA 785 went back to theTV transmission tower it had disabled the daybefore and replaced its damaged components.About this time, pro-Noriega forces began inter-mittent radio broadcasts from this area. On 24December, the rest of Company B, 3rd Battalion,7th SFG (A) arrived to reinforce their team-mates and to search for the phantom radio sta-tion. The large number of Spanish speakers inthe company and their long experience inPanama helped them to gain the trust of thelocals. On the 25th, local civilians led them to acache site containing weapons, ammunition, andmedical supplies. Following up on informationreceived from Panamanians, a patrol found thePDF’s radio transmission site and destroyed iton 29 December.

“Ma Bell” MissionsDuring the initial invasion, U.S. forces had

captured Panama City, its airport, the areasnear the Panama Canal, and Rio Hato, but inthe countryside the PDF still had nominal con-trol. PDF forces were scattered throughout thecountryside in small garrisons (“cuartels”); noone knew what these PDF forces would do, aseach cuartel was on its own. The Americanscould have easily crushed these posts, but thiswould have produced many casualties, destroyedPanamanian villages, and alienated the popu-lace. The U.S. instead developed a strategy ofcapitulation missions, with American forces con-tacting the PDF enclaves and offering them theopportunity to surrender before being attacked.Complicating the situation, PDF officers on the“most wanted” list commanded some of themajor cuartels.

The ideal capitulation scenario was for thePDF to remain in position and then surrenderto the U.S. forces as they spread throughout thecountryside. Once the PDF had surrendered,the Americans would separate PDF membersinto criminals and non-criminals. TF BLACKplayed a critical role in this capitulation effort,one of its most significant contributions to thesuccess of Operation JUST CAUSE.

Capitulation missions had not been includedin the plans for Operation JUST CAUSE, butfrom 22-31 December, they dominated TFBLACK’s activities. The typical method usedwas to attach a small Special Forces element

42

(with Spanish speakers) to a larger force (eitherthe 7th Infantry Division or the 75th RangerRegiment) to coordinate the PDF capitulation.The Special Forces commander would call thecuartel commander on the telephone and tellhim to put all of his weapons in the arms room,line up all of his men on the parade field, andsurrender to the U.S. forces that would arriveshortly. Because of the heavy reliance on tele-phones, these missions were nicknamed “MaBell” operations.

During this ten day period, TF BLACK ele-ments were instrumental in the surrender of 14cuartels, almost 2,000 troops, and over 6,000weapons without a single U.S. casualty. Severalhigh-ranking cronies of Manuel Noriega whowere on the “most wanted” list were also cap-tured in Ma Bell operations.

After each cuartel capitulated, the task ofrebuilding the town began. TF BLACK general-ly left small Special Forces elements in eachtown to support the rebuilding process andassist the U.S. conventional forces. The SpecialForces soldiers’ language skills, cultural aware-ness, and expertise in low intensity conflictproved invaluable in leading U.S. patrols, coor-dinating with local officials, gathering informa-tion on weapons caches, reestablishingPanamanian police forces, and performing amyriad of other tasks that sped the process oftransforming Panama into a more democraticnation. These operations were a textbook exam-ple of how Special Forces should be used in lowintensity conflict.

In the last days of December1989 and the first days of January1990, TF BLACK continued itstransition from the combat mis-sions of Operation JUST CAUSEto the stabilization missions ofOperation PROMOTE LIBERTY.In order to accomplish its newmissions, the Task Force was rein-forced by the 2nd Battalion, 7thSFG (A), a NSW unit, and an AirForce Special OperationsDetachment. With the assign-ment of SOF units from the AirForce and Navy, TF BLACKbecame Joint Task Force BLACK.The commander and staff from

7th SFG (A) also arrived to take command of theArmy Special Operations Forces in Panama as asubordinate of the JTF BLACK commander.The additional Army Special Forces battaliongave JTF BLACK enough personnel to conductstabilization operations throughout Panama.The Air Force Special Operations assets gaveJTF BLACK the transportation to get troopsinto remote locations and support them oncethey were out there. The NSW unit conductedpatrols along the coast and rivers, investigatedpossible weapons cache sites, and assisted thePanamanians in reestablishing their maritimesecurity force.

Noriega’s CaptureThe invasion culminated with Manuel

Noriega’s apprehension. Although the JSOTFhad missed capturing him at H-hour on 20December, SOF targeted his known associatesand hiding places in Panama; with few places tohide, Noriega sought refuge at the PapalNunciature on 24 December. JSOTF forces sur-rounded and isolated the Nunciature and, inconjunction with U.S. State Department andVatican diplomats, began to negotiate Noriega’ssurrender. Over the next ten days, JSOTF unitskept watch over the Nunciature and maintainedorder over the large crowds gathering nearby.On the evening of 3 January, shortly after10,000 anti-Noriega demonstrators had ended arally outside the Nunciature, the formerPanamanian dictator walked out and surren-dered to the JSOTF forces.

43

SOF’s language skills helped to stabilize the civilian populace andgather intelligence.

JUST CAUSE: SOF Proves Its WorthOn 16 January 1990, Operation JUST

CAUSE officially ended, and JTF BLACK ceasedto exist. Some JTF BLACK forces returned tothe continental United States or to the control ofU.S. Southern Command. The rest remainedunder the control of JTF BLACK headquarters,renamed Joint Special Operations Task ForcePanama, and continued PROMOTE LIBERTYoperations. Throughout Panama, SOF contin-ued the difficult and delicate task of restoring

peace, security, and democraticgovernment to Panama one vil-lage at a time.

JUST CAUSE demonstratedjust how far SOF had come sinceDesert One: not only with regardto internal enhancements toSOF capabilities and commandand control structures, but alsowith regard to the manifest closeintegration of SOF and conven-tional forces. SOF were subordi-nate to the Joint Task ForceSouth, so all SOF plans andoperations complemented thetheater campaign plan. JUSTCAUSE clearly validated howSOF were trained, equipped,and organized. This operationshowcased joint SOF capabili-ties, the high training standards

for operators and staffs alike, their quality andprofessionalism and the value of interoperabilityprocedures. PROMOTE LIBERTY planning,and post-conflict strategy in general, still neededwork. In particular, there were problems withintegrating nation-building plans into the cam-paign plan, incorporating CA and PSYOP plan-ning with operational planning, and mobilizingcrucial Reserve Component CA and PSYOPforces.

Psychological Operations Forces supported JUST CAUSE by disseminating newspapers, leaflets, and radio/TV broadcasts.

Noriega’s Surrender: After his apprehension, SOF remanded the former dictator into the custody of U.S. Marshals.

44

Iraq invaded Kuwait a few hours beforedawn on 2 August 1990, easily overran Kuwaitiforces, and massed along the Saudi Arabian bor-der. While the Saudi forces established a thindefensive cordon along the border, the UnitedStates deployed air and ground forces to theArabian Peninsula to deter further Iraqi aggres-sion. The United States Central Command(CENTCOM) had military responsibility for thisarea and prepared to reinforce the SaudiArabian forces. Its special operations compo-nent, Special Operations Command, Central(SOCCENT), likewise prepared to deploy andconduct combat search and rescue operationsand other assigned missions.

SOCCENT personnel deployed to Riyadh,Saudi Arabia, on 10 August 1990 and moved toKing Fahd International Airport (KFIA) on 17August. Its naval element, the Naval SpecialWarfare Task Group (NSWTG), arrived in SaudiArabia on 10 August 1990 and received its sec-ond increment of personnel on 9 September1990. Meanwhile, SOCCENT’s Air Force ele-ment, AFSOCCENT, established its headquar-ters at KFIA on 17 August 1990. In late August,the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) [5thSFG (A)] deployed two battalions to King KhalidMilitary City (KKMC) and retained the third atKFIA. Army aviation assets of the 160th SpecialOperations Aviation Regiment also deployed toKKMC.

Coalition WarfareCoalition warfare (warfighting with forces

from more than one nation) was arguably themost important of all the SOCCENT missions.With Saudi concurrence, SOCCENT’s first coali-tion warfare mission was given to NSWTG ele-ments, which deployed to the Kuwait/SaudiArabian border on 19 August 1990 to provideclose air support and to serve as “trip wires” incase of an Iraqi invasion. The 5th SFG (A) beganreplacing the SEALs on 5 September 1990, andprovided early warning, coalition warfare train-ing, and communications for close air support.

The number and type of coalition warfaremissions grew steadily throughout DESERT

SHIELD and into the early part of DESERTSTORM. The Saudis requested more SpecialForces teams to train them on the M-60A3tank, artillery, vehicle maintenance, and inother technical areas. Other allied forces, asthey deployed to the Arabian Peninsula, want-ed Special Forces to provide close air supportand liaison with friendly forces. These increas-ing requirements for coalition warfare soonabsorbed much of the 5th SFG (A).

SOF also trained Saudi naval forces in spe-cial warfare. Some Saudis had completed theBUD/S (Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL)training course in Coronado, California, andtheir commander had worked with SEALs dur-ing Operation EARNEST WILL. Instruction,which included combat swimming and leader-ship training, produced three Saudi SEALteams. Other NSWTG personnel trained theSaudi high-speed boat operators as well as con-ventional Saudi naval forces.

Another NSWTG mission was to reconstitutethe Kuwaiti navy. Only two gunboats (AlSanbouk and Istiglal), some patrol craft, and amotorized coast guard barge (Sawahil) hadescaped the Iraqis. In September, the NSWTGbegan training Kuwaiti naval personnel; theyused the Sawahil to train 35 Kuwaiti sailors innaval engineering, seamanship, and smallweapons. To instruct the Kuwaitis in surfacewarfare, the NSWTG borrowed rated expertsfrom the conventional USN. Beginning in

IraqOperation DESERT SHIELD/ DESERT STORM

1990-1991

Coalition Warfare: Arab forces training with U.S. SpecialForces.

45

November, the Sawahil and its crew conductedjoint training with NSWTG small boats and tookpart in a combat search and rescue exercise withUSS Nicholas. During DESERT STORM, theSawahil provided an operational platform forcoalition forces, including NSWTG Special BoatUnit detachments, Kuwaiti patrol boats, andSEALs.

Coalition warfare training continued untilthe eve of the ground war. The Arab forces inthe east and north faced formidable militaryobstacles along their projected areas of advance,including multiple Iraqi minefields, “fire trench-es,” and above-ground pipelines. A SpecialForces team worked with a Saudi engineer bat-talion to plan for clearing invasion lanes throughtwo Iraqi minefields and over an above-groundpipeline inside Kuwait. On 22 February, theSaudi engineers and U.S. Special Forces easilycleared six lanes because the Iraqis, battered forover a month by allied air power, failed to coverthe minefields with artillery fire. In the north,other SF teams worked with the Saudis and theEgyptians to create breaches in the minefieldsfor the passage of their forces. On 25 February,the Egyptians drove into Kuwait against spo-radic resistance. The Egyptian corps that the5th SFG (A) teams supported served as thehinge for CENTCOM’s huge turning movement.By the night of 26 February, the Egyptians andtheir SF advisors had reached their objectivesnear Kuwait City.

The 28 February cease fire marked the end ofmost SOCCENT coalition warfare activities. Ithad been a huge effort, requiring an entireSpecial Forces Group, SEALs, Special BoatUnits, and support elements. SF teams accom-panied 109 allied units, from battalion to corps,providing close air support and liaison betweenforces. SOF eventually trained some 30,000coalition troops in 44 subject areas.

Kuwaiti Reconstitution andUnconventional Warfare

American Special Forces units helped toreconstitute a number of Kuwaiti militaryforces, both conventional and unconventional.As a result of meetings between the SOCCENTcommander, Colonel Jesse Johnson, and theKuwaiti Armed Forces Chief of Staff, soldiers

from the 5th SFG (A) began training Kuwaitisoldiers in mid-September at KKMC. The initialmission was to form a Kuwaiti SF battalion anda commando brigade, but the training went sowell that the mission grew to include four addi-tional Kuwaiti infantry brigades. Eventually,SOF units trained a total of 6,357 Kuwaitis, whoformed an SF battalion, a commando brigade,and the Al-Khulud, Al-Haq, Fatah, and Badrinfantry brigades. The instruction includedweapons training, tactics, staff procedures, closeair support, anti-armor operations, and nuclear,chemical and biological defense.

Colonel Johnson also formed a SpecialPlanning Group to conduct specialized uncon-ventional warfare training for selected mem-bers of the Kuwaiti military. About a monthbefore the start of the Air War, 17 Kuwaiti mil-itary personnel underwent a rigorous five-week training course, but when DESERTSTORM’s air attack began on 16 January1991, the Iraqis closed the border, limitinginfiltration options. Out of necessity, trainingthen concentrated on infiltration methods.

From 14-20 February 1991, SEALs trained13 Kuwaitis for a maritime infiltration onto abeach area south of Kuwait City. They conduct-ed a dress rehearsal on 21 February 1991 andattempted infiltrating five Kuwaitis on the nextday. SEAL swimmer scouts first reconnoiteredthe shoreline and then escorted the Kuwaitis tothe pier. Unable to link up with the friendlyforces, the Kuwaitis signaled for extraction andwere picked up about 500 meters from thebeach. The mission was aborted, and the SEALsand Kuwaitis returned safely. Post-war exami-nation of the beach revealed undetected beachobstacles and heavier Iraqi troop dispositionsthan anticipated.

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)During DESERT SHIELD, SOCCENT estab-

lished procedures for CSAR, a mission that plan-ners expected would be of critical importance,given the projected losses of coalition aircraft.Before it would launch a CSAR mission, SOC-CENT required a visual parachute sighting anda voice transmission from the downed pilot, aswell as enemy threat analysis. SOCCENT con-ducted full scale CSAR exercises before the Air

46

War started. To support the CSAR mission,SOCCENT established forward operating basesnear the Saudi border, close to the projectedareas of operation.

The first successful CSAR operation ofDESERT STORM occurred on 21 January 1991.An Iraqi missile had shot down a Navy F-14 60miles northwest of Baghdad, and the pilot hadevaded capture. At 0730, an MH-53J Pave Lowhelicopter launched from Ar Ar in a fog so thickthat even when flying at 100 feet, the crew couldnot see the ground. They flew 130 miles intoIraq but could not contact the pilot—their coor-dinates for his location were nearly 50 miles off.The helicopter returned to Ar Ar to refuel andlaunched again at 1200. With better coordi-nates, the crew arrived at the pilot’s location justas an Iraqi truck was descending upon him. Thehelicopter copilot directed the two A-10 fighterplanes flying overhead to “smoke the truck.”The A-10s destroyed the truck with cannon fire,and the helicopter picked up the pilot.

The next successful CSAR effort occurredon 23 January when a USAF F-16 pilot bailedout over the gulf. A Navy SH-60B helicoptercarrying two SEALs launched from USSNicholas and found the pilot six miles off theKuwaiti coast. The SEALs jumped into thewater and attached a rescue harness to thepilot; the helicopter crew retrieved all threeand returned to the Nicholas just 35 minutesafter launching. The rescuers reported themission went “flawlessly” and described thepilot as “cold, but in good condition.”

On 17 February 1991, an F-16 went down insouthern Iraq 36 miles from the Kuwaiti border.Slightly injured, the pilot parachuted into aheavy concentration of Iraqi troops but stillestablished contact with rescue forces. Two MH-60s from the 160th Special Operations AviationRegiment launched from Rafha, plucked thepilot from the desert, and returned him directlyto KKMC for medical treatment.

For a number of reasons, most downed air-crew members were not rescued. The aircrewsneeded better survival radios, and there werenot always visual sightings of open parachutes.Many pilots landed in areas of heavy Iraqi con-centrations, and the Iraqis often beat the SOFrescuers to the downed airmen.

Special Reconnaissance (SR)Special Operations Forces conducted SR mis-

sions along the Iraqi border during DESERTSHIELD, providing CENTCOM with timelyintelligence and an early warning capability.During the war, SOCCENT’s SR efforts support-ed the ground offensive. SOCCENT forces con-ducted 12 SR missions during DESERT STORM.One mission included 15 separate near-shoreboat operations that the NSWTG conducted inKuwaiti waters between 30 January and 15February as part of CENTCOM’s deception plan.Another mission encompassed six searches formines by SEALs in the northern Persian Gulf.Three SR missions continued the early warningnetwork which the SEALs and 5th SFG (A)troops had established with Saudi and Kuwaitiforces during DESERT SHIELD.

47

DESERT STORM’s first successful CSAR operation: Navy Lieutenant Devon Jones running towards an MH-53J Pave Low.

At the request of VII Corps, SF teams per-formed a trafficability survey on 18 February,analyzing the terrain and soil conditions alongthe Corps’ planned invasion route into Iraq.Special operations helicopters inserted teamsfrom the 3rd and 5th SFG (A)s into two sites.The teams included engineers who performedpenetrometer tests on the soil, as well as combatcamera crews, who used low-level light lenses totake still and video shots of the terrain—whichlater proved to be the most valuable data collect-ed. The teams executed the missions withoutincident.

The campaign plan for the ground war calledfor the XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corpsforces to drive deep into Iraq, flanking and thenenveloping the strong Iraqi defenses in Kuwaitand southern Iraq. This movement would leavethe flanks of both corps vulnerable to counterat-

tack. The corps’ commanders requested SOC-CENT provide SR teams to go deep inside Iraq,watch important lines of communication, andlook for enemy movement toward the exposedflanks. G-Day was set for 24 February 1991.

Three missions provided ground reconnais-sance of the main routes that Iraqi units coulduse to move into VII Corps’ area of operations.Two of the missions successfully infiltrated on23 February; they reported regularly on enemyactivity until advance elements of the 1stCavalry Division arrived on 27 February. Thethird team, inserted among Iraqi forces, had tobe exfiltrated.

Special Forces launched three other SR mis-sions on 23 February, these in support of theXVIII Airborne Corps. One team landed in themiddle of a Bedouin encampment and called foran emergency exfiltration. After being pickedup, they scouted the area for an alternate siteand saw enemy activity everywhere. Comingunder anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missile (SAM) attack, they aborted themission. Another team went into the EuphratesRiver Valley to report on Iraqi military trafficmoving along a major highway. During theinsertion, one of the aircraft flew so low to avoidIraqi radar that it tore loose its rear wheel on asand dune.

By daylight, the team was in place, havingdug “hide” holes in a drainage canal about 300meters northwest of Highway 7. To the horror of

48

Special Tactics Teams train during DESERT STORM.

the hidden Americans, the surrounding fieldscame alive with people that morning, and theywere soon spotted by some Iraqi children and anadult. A party of 25 armed villagers, joined byan Iraqi Army company, moved toward theteam. Calling for close air support and an emer-gency extraction, the Americans destroyed theirclassified gear, engaged in a short but hot fire-fight with the Iraqis, and retreated to betterfighting positions. Using their emergency radio,the team contacted close air support aircraft,which dropped cluster munitions and 2,000pound bombs within 200 meters of the embattledteam until nightfall. During one lull in the airstrikes, two members of the team charged downthe canal and eliminated an Iraqi element.After dark, the team moved 300 meters from thecanal, where a helicopter extracted them with-out further opposition.

Another special reconnaissance missionsent two three-man teams to monitor an areabetween the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.Communications glitches prevented one teamfrom reporting what they saw, and the teamwas picked up early on 27 February. The sec-ond team’s reconnaissance site put it in themidst of Bedouin encampments, so team mem-bers established a hide site along a drainagecanal. At daylight, they discovered their “hide”site was near a major thoroughfare. ManyBedouins passed by without noticing them, butthey were soon compromised by a sharp-eyedlittle girl. The team fled with armed Bedouinsin hot pursuit. Iraqi soldiers soon joined thefirefight. The team held off the Iraqis for anhour and a half until F-16s appeared, followedby a 160th Special Operations AviationRegiment Blackhawk. Although riddled by

small arms fire, the helicopter made a dramat-ic daylight rescue of the team.

From 29 January until 16 February, NSWTGelements conducted nearshore and offshorereconnaissance missions in support ofCENTCOM’s deception strategy to fix Iraqiattention on a potential amphibious invasion byU.S. Marines. The SR missions resulted in thecollection of information, established a navalpresence along the Kuwaiti coast, and faked theinitial stages of a possible amphibious invasion.The deception effort culminated in a large-scaleoperation on the night of 23-24 February 1991,the eve of the ground offensive, which simulateda beach reconnaissance and clearing operation.The deception campaign prevented Iraqi units atthe beaches from reinforcing those beingattacked in the west.

Direct Action (DA) MissionsDuring DESERT STORM, General H.

Norman Schwarzkopf, CINCCENT, relied heav-ily on allied air power to hit targets which other-wise would have been SOF direct action (DA)missions. Even so, SOCCENT executed somecritically important DA missions. SOF’s firstand most important DA mission involved thedestruction of two Iraqi early warning radarsites guarding the southwestern approaches toIraq at the start of the Air War. Neutralizingthese sites allowed allied aircraft to fly undetect-ed toward the SCUD complexes in western Iraq.

Colonel Jesse Johnson, the SOCCENTCommander, turned to AFSOCCENT, his AirForce component, to plan the operation. Theconcept called for MH-53 Pave Low helicoptersto guide AH-64 Apaches to the targeted radarsites, which the Apaches would destroy. On 14

49

AH-64 Apaches destroyed Iraqi radars prior to H-Hour.MH-53J Pave Lows led the Apaches to the Iraqi radarsites.

October, Colonel Johnson assured GeneralSchwarzkopf that he and AFSOCCENT were100 percent certain of the success of this mis-sion. The Apache and Pave Low crews quicklyworked out interoperability issues, and they con-ducted a full dress rehearsal in late Decemberwith the crews duplicating the formations,routes, bearings, times, and attack tactics. At1500 on 16 January 1991, SOCCENT informedthe Apache/Pave Low task force that the missionwas a “go” for that night. H-hour for the start ofthe Air War was 0300 on 17 January with theopening helicopter strike beginning at 0238hours. The task force consisted of White andRed teams, with two Pave Lows and fourApaches assigned to each one.

At 0058 on 17 January, the White Team lift-ed off from Al Jouf and headed toward the bor-der, followed 15 minutes later by the Red Team.Flying less than 100 feet off the desert at 100knots, the two teams avoided detection and safe-ly reached the initial point, approximately 7.5miles from the targets, where the Pave Lowsdropped chemical lights and returned to the ren-dezvous point north of the border. The Apachepilots updated their navigational and targetingsystems, flew toward their targets, and withinseconds of the appointed time, opened fire on theradar sites. All aircraft returned safely. ColonelJohnson then notified General Schwarzkopf of

the mission’s success. At the same time, combatcontrol teams installed radar beacons along theSaudi-Kuwaiti-Iraqi borders to direct alliedattack aircraft to the gaps in the early warningradar system. SOF had played a crucial role onthe opening night of the Air War.

AFSOCCENT conducted two other DA mis-sions. The BLU-82 “Daisy Cutters” were 15,000pound bombs capable of destroying everything ina three mile radius on the flat desert terrain.Because of the anti-aircraft threat, AFSOC-CENT planners determined that the bombshould be dropped from 16,000 to 21,000 feet.Accordingly, MC-130E Combat Talons flew fivemissions and dropped a total of 11 BLU-82s onminefields and Iraqi military positions. Thesehuge bombs cleared wide routes through mine-fields, and their enormous blast either killed theenemy or acted as a potent psychological opera-tions weapon.

AC-130s flew fire missions in support ofground forces, to attack the SCUD missile sites,and to engage Iraqi troops. Although these air-craft belonged to AFSOCCENT, they were underthe operational control of Central Command’sair component, CENTAF. This arrangementresulted in the AC-130s being used for inappro-priate missions in medium threat areas. Afteran AC-130H was engaged by SAMs while on aSCUD hunting mission, the AFSOCCENT com-

50Enormous BLU-82 “Daisy Cutter” bombs had a lethal impact on the Iraqis.

mander was given mission oversight responsibil-ity to ensure these SOF assets were used cor-rectly.

On 31 January 1991, AFSOCCENT sufferedthe single worst air loss by any coalition unitwhen an AC-130H Spectre gunship, “Spirit 03,”was shot down while providing fire support toU.S. Marines defending Khafji against an Iraqiattack. Three gunships were airborne thatmorning over the Marines, and the first two haddestroyed numerous Iraqi armored personnelcarriers. At 0600, “Spirit 03” was due to end itspatrol when it received a call from the Marines,who wanted a missile battery engaged. Thecrew of “Spirit 03” took out the battery, but asdarkness gave way to daylight, a surface-to-airmissile hit the aircraft. At 0635, the aircraftsent out a “mayday” distress call and thencrashed into the gulf. All 14 crewmembers died.

During DESERT STORM, British SpecialOperations Forces carried out their own mis-sions in western Iraq. One British mission—very close to Baghdad—included four U.S. SOF(three Special Forces soldiers and one CombatController) brought along to coordinate close airsupport. Their goal was to destroy a buried fiberoptic cable supposedly used for SCUD commandand control. The 20 Brits and four Americanswere inserted by two helicopters on the night of23 January slightly southwest of Baghdad.Digging teams found and cut several cables, butfound no fiber optic cable. They then crammed800 pounds of explosives into the hole and blewup what was left of the cables. After 1.5 hourson the ground, the team returned safely to AlJouf by helicopter.

NSW units also had direct action missions.On 18 January 1991, when U.S. helicopterscame under fire from seven oil platforms in theDurrah Oil Field, NSWTG elements counterat-tacked. SEALs boarded and cleared each of theseven platforms, capturing prisoners, weapons,and documents. Eight Special Boat Unit per-sonnel and 32 Kuwaiti Marines also seizedQaruh Island on 8 February, Maradim Islandthe next day, and Kubbar Island on 14February—these operations marked the firstreclamation of Kuwaiti territory. In the finalhours of the war, NSWTG and Kuwaiti forcesseized Bubiyan Island and captured its Iraqidefenders. SEALs also flew aboard Navy heli-

copters for both CSAR and countermine mis-sions, during which they destroyed 26 mooredor floating mines.

The Liberation of Kuwait City:Operation URBAN FREEDOM

SOCCENT assisted Kuwaiti forces in liberat-ing their capital city and reestablishing Kuwaitigovernmental authority. SOCCENT initiatedOperation URBAN FREEDOM when alliedforces reached the outskirts of Kuwait City.SOCCENT deployed to Kuwait CityInternational Airport on 27 February, alongwith 3rd SFG (A) teams and other personnel.Surprisingly, the Iraqis had abandoned the city,and the liberation forces met little organizedopposition. As a precautionary measure, SOFunits conducted a “take down” of the U.S.Embassy compound in Kuwait City. A groundconvoy, composed of SEAL fast attack vehiclesand 3rd SFG (A) soldiers, surrounded the com-pound while a Special Forces assault force fastroped onto the roofs of buildings and searchedfor Iraqis and booby traps. None were found.

SCUD HuntingCoalition forces had air superiority in the

skies over Iraq and Kuwait from the war’s firstair strikes on 17 January 1991. Unable to dobattle in the air, Saddam Hussein struck backwith a clumsy, unsophisticated weapon—theSCUD missile—which he ordered to be launchedat Israel. Tactically, the SCUD would not havea major impact, but its strategic effect was felt

51

SOCCENT Planning to liberate the U.S. Embassy inKuwait City.

on 18 January when seven SCUDs hitIsraeli cities. If continued attacksbrought Israel into the war, then theCoalition aligned against Saddammight crumble. GeneralSchwarzkopf’s insistence that theSCUD was not a significant militaryweapon did little to placate the Israelisor ease the pressure on the BushAdministration. By the end of the firstweek of the war, over 30 SCUDs hadbeen launched at targets in Israel andSaudi Arabia. The air campaign wasnot working fast enough to eradicatethe mobile SCUD launchers.

By the end of January, the diplo-matic pressure on the BushAdministration was such that General Powellordered General Schwarzkopf to use SpecialOperations Forces to hunt SCUDs and stopthem from being fired at Israel. A Joint SpecialOperations Task Force (JSOTF), made up of spe-cial operations air and ground units, arrived inSaudi Arabia by 1 February. Operating from abase at Ar Ar in western Saudi Arabia, theJSOTF had a daunting mission: stop the SCUDattacks on Israel. Reconnaissance and surveil-lance teams would have to go hundreds of milesinside western Iraq to destroy the SCUD infra-structure.

The first JSOTF cross-border mission, con-sisting of 16 SOF personnel and two vehicles,occurred on 7 February. It set the pattern forsubsequent cross-border operations. ArmedBlackhawks, called defensive armed penetra-tors, accompanied the insertions. Once on theground, the teams hid during the day and con-ducted reconnaissance at night. These SOF

operations proved to be so successful— especial-ly the Blackhawk attacks on SCUDs and SCUD-related targets—that on 14 February, GeneralSchwarzkopf approved augmenting the JSOTFwith a reinforced Ranger company and more160th Special Operations Aviation Regimenthelicopters.

By the time the ground war started, theJSOTF was conducting a wide range of opera-tions. As many as four SOF teams at a timewere inside Iraq, conducting operations againstthe SCUD complexes. These teams called in F-15E, F-16, and A-10 sorties to strike the targetsthey found. On 26 February, SOF attacked aradio relay site: first, AH-6 attack helicopterspeppered the radio relay compound with mini-gun and rocket fire; Rangers then secured thecompound and set charges to destroy the 100-meter tall tower. The Blackhawks also conduct-ed “Thunder Runs,” direct action missions onSCUDs, their lines of communication, and othercommand and control facilities. The JSOTF also

used “Gator” minefields to limitSCUD mobile launcher movement.Because of JSOTF operations, thenumber of SCUD launches fell dra-matically, and their accuracy wasgreatly impaired.

PSYOP and CA MissionsPsychological Operations

(PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA)units contributed significantly to thesuccess of the Gulf War. The

52

SCUD hunting patrol in western Iraq.

MH-60 zeroes in on Scud launcher.

PSYOP campaign was directed toward individ-ual units and soldiers, and stressed a singletheme: the coalition’s quarrel was with SaddamHussein and not with the Iraqi people or itsarmy. In the early phases, the PSYOP themesemphasized “peace and brotherhood;” it laterevolved to stronger themes, and finally turned tosurrender appeals and threats. Once begun, thePSYOP campaign (in conjunction with sustainedair attacks) steadily eroded Iraqi morale.Resistance crumbled quickly when the coalitionground forces attacked. A total of 86,743 Iraqiswere taken prisoner, and most of them possessedsurrender leaflets when they capitulated. Some29 million leaflets were dropped from a variety

of aircraft, with a few more dis-tributed by artillery shells andballoons. Three AM and two FMground stations transmitted“Voice of the Gulf” broadcasts for72 days, which interspersed3,200 news items and 189PSYOP “messages” among sportsand music programs.

The Combined Civil AffairsTask Force (CCATF) was creat-ed in February 1991 to provideemergency services for KuwaitCity once it was liberated.Relief operations began on 28

February 1991 when the first convoy rolled intothe city. The CCATF stayed in Kuwait City fortwo months before turning the relief effort overto the Army Corps of Engineers. During thattime, it distributed 12.8 million liters of water,12,500 tons of food, 1,250 tons of medicine, 750vehicles, and 245 electrical generators.

Flexibility best describes Special OperationsForces’ contribution to the DESERT STORM vic-tory. Initially tasked with providing CSAR,SOCCENT steadily expanded its missions asconventional commanders gained confidence inSOF’s unique abilities and resources. The coali-tion support mission became an important new

SOF capability,used later in oper-ations in Somaliaand Bosnia; thenew geopoliticalenvironment hadmade SOF morerelevant. TheSCUD huntingmission demon-strated SOF’sability to deployrapidly and startoperations withlittle delay, and toexecute missionsof the gravestnational impor-tance.

53

General Schwarzkopf thanks SCUD hunters at Ar Ar.

Civil Affairs soldiers distribute food and supplies to hungry, displaced people.

In January 1981, the FMLN (FarabundoMarti Liberacion Nacional) launched their “finaloffensive” to overthrow the El Salvadoran gov-ernment. Its failure drove the insurrection intothe countryside. The U.S. SOF roles in counter-ing the insurrection began with a low-key surveymission in 1981 to assess the security of U.S.interests in that country.

The U.S. Army began training El Salvadoranunits, starting with the Atlacatl ImmediateReaction Battalion (IRB) in 1981, which wastrained by a Mobile Training Team (MTT) from3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (A).Another battalion (Ramon Belloso) was trainedby Special Forces personnel at Fort Bragg thefollowing year. In 1983, the United States estab-lished a Regional Military Training Center(RMTC) in Honduras to train Salvadoran units,and teams from the 7th SFG (A) rotated throughthe RMTC to conduct training in marksman-ship, communications, first aid, patrolling, smallunit tactics, and a host of other basic skills.Next, U.S. advisers began to train El Salvadoranforces in their own country. Because of theseefforts, the El Salvadoran Army expanded from8,000 men before 1980 to a hard-hitting force of54,000 by 1987.

At the same time, NSW worked with the ElSalvadoran Navy to set up SEAL teams, usingthe “train thetrainer” concept.One four-manMTT alsotrained garrisontroops to act asthe guard force.

S p e c i a lForces advisorsalso went toeach of the sixbrigade head-quarters wherethey lived (gen-erally no morethan 2-3 officersand NCOs),worked, andtrained with

brigade soldiers for six months to a year. With alimit of 55 advisors, a single officer or NCO wasassigned to some sites, thus making close coop-eration with his El Salvadoran counterparts amatter of life or death because of frequent guer-rilla (known as “Gs”) attacks. In the most publi-cized incident, the “Gs” attacked the headquar-ters of the 4th Infantry Brigade in El Paraiso,Chalatenango. The 31 March 1987, attack killed64 El Salvadoran soldiers and wounded 79. Asoldier from the 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG (A), SFCGregory A. Fronius, was killed while attemptingto organize the resistance to the attack. In 1988during a similar attack on the 4th Brigade cuar-tel, El Salvadoran forces and U.S. advisors—Major James Parker, SSG Michael Roth,Captain Gilberto Aguiar, SFC Mario Orozco-Torres and 1LT Byron Castleman— fought backand secured the camp by dawn.

The professional training imparted to the ElSalvadoran military led to ultimate success onthe battlefield. On 16 January 1992, the FMLNsigned peace accords with the government. U.S.advisors can take a large measure of pride intheir role in neutralizing the armed forces of theFMLN and forcing them to join the nationalpolitical process. In 1996, Congress ordered thePentagon to give Armed Forces ExpeditionaryMedals to all who served in El Salvador from

January 1981 toFebruary 1992.This allowed forother combatawards, includ-ing the SilverStar, BronzeStar, CombatInfantry Badge,A r m yCommendationMedal for Valor,and the CombatMedical Badgeto be awarded tosoldiers whoserved in ElSalvador.

54

SFC Gregory A. Fronius, shown here training a Salvadoransoldier in marksmanship, was later killed in a FMLN raid.

El Salvador 1981- 1992

Special Operations Forces first becameinvolved in Somalia as part of Operation PRO-VIDE RELIEF. In August 1992, soldiers of the2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group(Airborne) deployed to Kenya to provide securityfor relief flights. They formed an airborne reac-tion force, which included two desert mobilityvehicles loaded inside C-130 aircraft. The C-130s circled over Somali airstrips during deliv-ery of relief supplies. In addition, SOF medicsand ground observers accompanied many reliefflights into the airstrips throughout southernSomalia to conduct general area assessments.In many cases, they were the first U.S. soldiersin Somalia, arriving before U.S. forces who sup-ported the expanded relief operations ofRESTORE HOPE.

Operation RESTORE HOPETo support the United Nation’s relief effort

in Somalia, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, General Colin Powell, directed CENTCOMon 2 December 1992 to secure transportationfacilities in Mogadishu, Somalia. The operationwas designated RESTORE HOPE. An amphibi-ous squadron, consisting of USS Tripoli, Juneau,and Rushmore, with a Marine ExpeditionaryUnit, a SEAL platoon, and a Special Boat Unit(SBU) detachment, arrived off the coast ofSomalia shortly thereafter. To mount anamphibious landing to secure the Mogadishuairport, the Marines needed up-to-date chartsfor the beaches—charts which did not yet exist.The SEALs and SBU detachment conducted ahydrographic reconnaissance, the classic “frog-man mission” of World War II, to map the beach-es.

The first mission occurred on the night of 6December, when 12 SEALs conducted a hydro-graphic reconnaissance in the traditionalmethod, swimming in a line toward shore, andtaking depth soundings with weighted lines.Upon reaching waist deep water, they each shift-ed to the right and swam back out, repeating theprocess. Meanwhile, another five SEALs swamashore and reconnoitered the beach. The twoSEAL cartographers measured the berm andnoted the shore gradient and the presence ofobstacles on the beach. The SEALs returned to

the Juneau where they compiled charts, briefedthe Marines, and prepared for their next night’smission.

On the night of 7 December, the SEALsswam into Mogadishu Harbor, where theyfound suitable landing sites, assessed the areafor threats, and ascertained that the port couldsupport maritime prepositioned ship offloads.This was a tough mission: the SEALs swamagainst a strong current which left many ofthem overheated and exhausted. Furthermore,they had to swim through raw sewage in theharbor, which made them sick.

When the first SEALs hit the shore the fol-lowing night, they were surprised to meet mem-bers of the news media. Thankfully, the firstMarines came ashore soon thereafter, and thepress corps redirected their attention to them,freeing the SEALs to proceed with their duties.Four SEALs thereupon conducted surf observa-tions and initial terminal guidance for theMarines’ landing craft.

On 17 December, the SEALs surveyed theport of Kismayu from the French frigateDupleix. During this operation, Somali snipersfired at the SEALs, but no SEALs were hit.Later, the SEALs provided personal security forPresident George Bush during a visit toSomalia and provided snipers to the Marines.Before leaving Somalia in February 1993, theSEALs also conducted joint training missionswith Indian naval commandos.

A platoon from SEAL Team 2, with the WaspAmphibious Ready Group, replaced the departedSEALs. On their first mission, these SEALsreconnoitered the Jubba River (a mission whichincluded dodging crocodiles) to gather intelli-gence on gun smuggling. Based on this informa-tion, Marines staged two raids on towns alongthe river. These SEALs performed many opera-tions in April and May: a predawn shore recon-naissance of Kismayu; clearing a potential beachlanding site south of Mogadishu; reconnaissancemissions in the Three Rivers region south ofKismayu and at Koyaama Island; and a recon-naissance of Daanai Beach in extremely roughseas.

Meanwhile, on 28 December 1992, theSpecial Forces assets in Kenya moved to

55

Somalia 1992-1995

Somalia and joined Operation RESTOREHOPE. On 12 January 1993, a Special Forcesheadquarters unit [FOB 52 (-)] deployed toMogadishu as the Joint Special OperationsForces-Somalia (JSOFOR) that would com-mand and control all special operations forRESTORE HOPE. JSOFOR’s mission was tomake initial contact with indigenous factionsand leaders; provide information for force pro-tection; and provide area assessments forfuture relief and security operations. TheSpecial Forces under JSOFOR supported thenine humanitarian relief sector commanders.Before redeploying in April, JSOFOR elementsdrove over 26,000 miles, captured 277weapons, and destroyed over 45,320 pounds ofordnance. So successful were the SpecialForces teams, the commander of UN opera-tions in Somalia, LTG Bir (Turkey), consideredthem a “must have” asset.

The 96th CA Battalion (Airborne) deployed aCA Tactical Support Team and six CA DirectSupport Teams which provided a liaisonbetween Army and Marine commanders, localSomali committees, and representatives of over40 non-governmental organizations. CA person-nel also staffed humanitarian operations centersthroughout Somalia, from which they coordinat-ed medical and engineer civic action projects.

The Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) sup-ported unified operations by integratingPSYOP into all plans and operations, and byhiring more than 30 Somalis to help with thePSYOP newspaper Rajo (“Truth”) and radio

broadcasting. More than seven million copies of 37 different leaflets and a dozen handbillsand posters were printed and disseminated.PSYOP soldiers, including eight loudspeakersupport teams from the 9th PSYOP Battalion,with native linguists and pre-recorded tapes,supported both the Marine 7th RegimentalCombat Support Team and Army maneuverunits.

As a complement to Rajo, the JPOTF estab-lished a radio station in the U.S. Embassy com-pound, which broadcast a 45-minute Somali lan-guage program twice a day. The station fea-tured religious, news, entertainment, and musicprograms; its broadcasts eventually reachedevery city and town in Somalia where UN forceswere based.

Operation RESTORE HOPE gave way to UNOperations Somalia in May 1993, after havingbrought an end to starvation and making thelives of Somalis somewhat safer. But the overallsuccess of U.S. Special Operations Forces inSomalia will always be overshadowed by theevents of 3-4 October 1993, when U.S. troopsfound themselves in the fiercest urban firefightsince the Vietnam War.

UNOSOM IIOn 5 June 1993, General Mohamed Farah

Aideed’s Somalia National Alliance forcesambushed and killed 24 Pakistani soldiersassigned to UN Operations Somalia (UNOSOMII). The next day, General Joseph P. Hoar,Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command,

asked the Joint Staff tosend four AC-130 gunshipsto carry out air strikesagainst the Somalis. FourAFSOC gunships deployedon 7 June and remaineduntil 14 July, flying a totalof 32 interdiction, recon-naissance, and PSYOP mis-sions in support of UNO-SOM II. Eight of those mis-sions were combat sortiesflown over the streets ofMogadishu between 11-17June. As part of the initialstrike against Aideed, three

56Over 7 million leaflets were distributed during RESTORE HOPE.

gunships flew over Mogadishu on 11 June andused their 105mm and 40mm cannons todemolish two weapons storage facilities, anarmored tank compound, and Aideed’s “RadioMogadishu” propaganda station. The next day,two AC-130s obliterated a second radio stationand a weapons factory. On 13, 14, and 17 June,AFSOC crews flew single AC-130 missions thatconcentrated on destroying weapons storageareas and vehicle compounds belonging toAideed and his key supporters. During thesemissions, Air Force special tactics operatorsprovided target guidance. The AC-130 mis-sions and related ground operations togetherdrove Aideed into hiding. The AC-130s rede-ployed in mid-July, and other SOF later took upthe hunt for Aideed.

Task Force RANGEROn 22 August 1993, Secretary of Defense Les

Aspin directed the deployment of a Joint SpecialOperations Task Force (JSOTF) to Somalia inresponse to attacks made by Aideed supportersupon U.S. and UNOSOM forces and installa-tions. The JSOTF, named Task Force (TF)RANGER, was directed to capture Aideed andhis key lieutenants and turn them over to UNO-

SOM II forces. This was a challenging mission,for Aideed had gone underground in June, afterseveral AC-130 air raids and UNOSOM IIground assaults on his strongholds.

The command and control structure of TFRANGER still remains of interest. Per theGoldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act,the unified commander (in this case, GeneralHoar, Commander in Chief, U.S. CentralCommand) was entitled to organize his forces ashe saw fit. General Hoar had the TF RANGERcommander, Major General William Garrison,report to him directly. Thus, TF RANGER didnot fall under the UNOSOM II commander, andat all times TF RANGER remained under U.S.operational command and control. MajorGeneral Garrison did, however, coordinate TFRANGER operations with Major GeneralThomas M. Montgomery, the commander of U.S.Forces Somalia.

By 28 August, the task force had arrived incountry, was conducting training exercises, andwas setting up the necessary liaison and commu-nications networks. TF RANGER was made upof special operations ground forces, special oper-ations helicopters, Air Force special tactics per-sonnel, and SEALs. During August and

57Rangers taking cover and returning fire during the 3-4 October battle.

September 1993, the task force conducted sixmissions into Mogadishu, all of which were tac-tical successes. They ran these missions both byday and at night, and used both helicopters andvehicles to reach their targets. Although Aideedremained free, the cumulative effect of thesemissions limited his movements.

On 3 October, TF RANGER launched its sev-enth mission, this time into Aideed’s strongholdto capture two of his key lieutenants.Helicopters carrying assault and blocking forceslaunched at 1532 from the TF RANGER com-pound at Mogadishu airport, with a ground con-voy moving out three minutes later. By 1542,the ground forces had arrived at the target loca-tion, as the blocking force was setting up perime-ter positions and the assault force was searchingthe compound for Aideed’s supporters.

These forces came under increasingly heavyenemy fire, more intense than during previousraids. The assault team had captured 24Somalis and was about to load them onto theconvoy trucks when a MH-60 Blackhawk was hitby a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) andcrashed about three blocks from the target loca-tion. Almost immediately, one six-man elementof the blocking force, as well as an MH-6 assaulthelicopter and an MH-60 carrying a 15-mancombat search and rescue (CSAR) team, beganrushing to the scene. The MH-6 crew got therefirst and, amid a firefight, evacuated two wound-

ed soldiers to a military field hospital. Next, thesix-man blocking element arrived, followed bythe CSAR helicopter. As the last two membersof the CSAR team were sliding down the fastropes, their helicopter was also hit by an RPG,but somehow the pilot kept the helicopter steadywhile the two reached the ground safely andthen nursed the helicopter back to the airport.

The situation only worsened. Ground firestruck two more MH-60s, with one crashing lessthan a mile to the south of the first downed hel-icopter. A Somali mob overran this second siteand, despite a heroic defense, killed everyoneexcept the pilot, whom they took prisoner. Twodefenders of this crash site, MSG Gary Gordonand SFC Randall Shughart, were posthumouslyawarded the Medal of Honor. The other MH-60was hit broadside by an RPG, but the crew some-how coaxed it to the new port area where theydid a controlled crash landing.

Meanwhile, after loading the detainees onthe ground convoy trucks, the assault and block-ing forces moved on foot to the first crash area,passing through heavy fire that wounded a num-ber of soldiers, and occupied buildings south andsouthwest of the downed helicopter. They estab-lished defensive positions, laid down suppres-sive fire to hold the Somalis at bay, treated theirwounded, and worked to free the pilot’s bodyfrom the wreckage.

58

MSG Gary Gordon SFC Randall ShughartThese soldiers died defending a crashed MH-60 crew and were awarded the Medal of Honor.

With the detainees loaded on trucks, theground convoy force attempted to reach the firstcrash site from the north. Unable to find itamongst the narrow, winding alleyways, theconvoy came under withering small arms andRPG fire. The convoy had to return to base aftersuffering numerous casualties, losing two 5-tontrucks, and sustaining substantial damage tothe other vehicles. On the way back to base, thisconvoy encountered a second convoy that hadleft the airport in hopes of reaching the secondcrash site.

The second group loaded casualties into itsvehicles and escorted the first convoy back tobase. About this time, the mission’s quick reac-tion force (a company of the 10th MountainDivision in support of UNOSOM II) also tried toreach the second crash site. This force too waspinned by Somali fire and required the fire sup-port of two AH-6 helicopters before it couldbreak contact and make its way back to the base.

The TF RANGER soldiers at the first crashsite were resupplied from a helicopter thatevening. Reinforcements, consisting of Rangers,10th Mountain Division soldiers, SEALs, andMalaysian armored personnel carriers, finallyarrived at 0155 on 4 October. The combinedforce worked until dawn to free the pilot’s body,receiving RPG and small arms fire throughoutthe night.

All the casualties were loaded onto thearmored personnel carriers, and the remainderof the force moved out on foot. With the armoredpersonnel carriers providing rolling cover, therun-and-gun movement, known as the“Mogadishu mile,” began at 0542. Somalis con-tinued firing at the convoy, but the Rangers onlysustained minor wounds. AH-6 gunships rakedthe cross streets with fire to support the move-ment. The main force of the convoy arrived atthe Pakistani Stadium at 0630. Medical person-nel gave emergency treatment to the wounded,and all personnel were prepared for movementto the hospital or the airfield.

Thus ended one of the bloodiest and fiercesturban firefights since the Vietnam War. A totalof 16 members of TF RANGER were killed on 3-4 October and 83 wounded (the 10th MountainDivision suffered 22 wounded and two killed).Various estimates placed Somali casualtiesabove 1,000. All told during their time in

Somalia, TF RANGER experienced a total of 17killed in action and 106 wounded. Task forcemembers had to operate in an extremely difficultenvironment, which required constant innova-tion, flexibility, and sound judgment. The taskforce had more than held its own against a vast-ly superior enemy that was battle-hardenedfrom years of civil war and urban fighting.

The Withdrawal From SomaliaIn the aftermath of the 3-4 October battle,

U.S. military presence in Somalia increased sig-nificantly. Two AC-130s deployed to Kenya andflew reconnaissance missions over Mogadishu.More Special Forces also deployed as did a pla-toon from SEAL Team 2 and one from SEALTeam 8.

The SEALs provided security detachments toU.S. and UN troops by occupying sniper posi-tions and guarding allied encampments, by fly-ing on aircraft traveling between Somalia andthe carrier battle groups offshore, and by provid-ing VIP protection. Other SEALs aboard rigidinflatable boats provided harbor security forMarine Corps landing boats shuttling betweenships offshore and Marine Corps encampmentson the beach. Most U.S. forces pulled out ofSomalia by 25 March 1994.

To assist the UN forces’ withdrawal, the finalamphibious ready group arrived off Somalia on 5February 1995, carrying a platoon from SEALTeam 5. During February and March 1995, theSEALs first conducted hydrographic reconnais-sance missions on the beaches aroundMogadishu to determine the best evacuationroutes, and then performed initial terminalguidance for Marine landing craft and assaultvehicles. The SEALs maintained security on theevacuation route, conducting anti-sniper patrolson the beach flanks and around the harbor.Operation UNITED SHIELD, the withdrawalfrom Somalia, was completed on 3 March 1995.

SOF had made major contributions to theSomalia 1992-1995 operations. They conductedreconnaissance and surveillance operations;assisted with humanitarian relief; conductedcombat operations; protected American forces;and conducted riverine patrols. Additionally,they ensured the safe landing of the Marinesand safeguarded the arrival of merchant shipscarrying food.

59

Haiti had endured unremit-ting political oppression for hun-dreds of years. Although the peo-ple of this troubled countryenjoyed a taste of freedom in 1990when they elected Jean-BertrandAristide as their President, thearmy took control in a 30September 1991 coup.Attempting to reestablish theAristide government, the UNimposed economic sanctions on 23June 1993; four months later, on15 October, President Clintonordered USN ships to help enforcethis embargo. Admiral DavidPaul Miller, Commander in Chief,United States Atlantic Command (CINCACOM),activated Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)120 to plan and execute the multinationalOperation SUPPORT DEMOCRACY.

Operation SUPPORT DEMOCRACYThe U.S. and allied warships in CJTF 120

boarded over 600 ships during the operation’sfirst five months. The effectiveness of the bigships soon forced the smugglers into using smallvessels to carry contraband along shallowcoastal routes beyond the warships’ reach.

CJTF 120 selected the Cyclone class patrolcraft (PC) as the best response to the smug-glers’ new tactic. The PCs were new to

USSOCOM’s inventory, and needed sea dutycertification before assignment to Haiti. Afterbeing certified for participating in exerciseAgile Provider, USS Cyclone and USS Tempestdeparted for Guantanamo, Cuba, on 24 May toparticipate in SUPPORT DEMOCRACY.

On 30 May, CJTF 120 directed the PCs tobegin operations with the warships off the northHaitian coast. The plan to integrate the PCsgradually into the interdiction operation endedwhen the ships encountered a Bahamian sailingvessel trying to skirt the embargo on their veryfirst voyage. As the vessel headed for Port-au-Prince, the Cyclone ordered it to stand clear ofthe Haitian coast, but the vessel did not heave to

until Cyclone fired warningflares and launched a rigidinflated boat (RIB) with SEALsaboard. The vessel attemptedto play a waiting game thatnight, but at first light a com-bined party from the Cycloneand the HMCS Terra Nova—sixCanadians and three SEALs—conducted a boarding andsearch operation. They foundembargoed goods, and theCyclone towed this vessel toGuantanamo.

By 23 June 1994, theCJTF 120 fleet had boardedover 1,100 ships, but embar-

60

Haiti1994-1995

USS Cyclone (left) and the Bellatrix, a Domincan Republic patrol boat,enforced the UN-approved embargo of Haiti in 1994.

SEALs in a rigid inflatable boat (RIB) approach a possible smuggler.

goed goods flowed steadily into Haiti from theDominican Republic. General John M.Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, approved the PCs conducting patrolswith Dominican Republic ships. On 11 July1994, SEALs from the Cyclone boarded andcleared the Vinland Saga, a Danish vessel car-rying a cargo of wheat flour. CJTF 120 direct-ed Cyclone and Tempest to patrol the innerareas of the coast. These operations providedan opportunity to check sea traffic and collectinformation. USS Hurricane and USSMonsoon patrol craft replaced the Cyclone andTempest in September.

Because of the continuing political repres-sion in Haiti, the Clinton Administration soughtUN Security Council approval for an invasionand occupation of Haiti if the sanctions failed torestore Aristide to the presidency. The councilgranted its approval on 31 July 1994. The inva-

sion plan had two phases: first, a 15,000 multi-national force would invade, restore publicorder, and reinstate Aristide; subsequently,6,000 UN forces would train a new Haitianpolice force to maintain order.

Accordingly, Army, Air Force, and Navy SOFsupported the XVIII Airborne Corps in planningfor a full scale invasion of Haiti. The specialoperations portion of the plan envisioned thetakedown of key governmental sites followed bya link-up with conventional forces, similar towhat SOF had done for the invasion of Panamain 1989. After the main takedown, SpecialForces teams were to secure the countryside. Toserve as the SOF mobility and launching plat-form, an aircraft carrier, USS America, wasadded to the force package in spring 1994.PSYOP played a role in this operation as well.The 193rd Special Operations Wing’s (SOW) EC-130Es transmitted radio broadcast of recorded

61Special Operations Helicopters aboard USS America off the Haitian coast.

programs that covered all of Haiti. Thesethemes stressed national reconciliation andrestoration of democracy to the Haitians.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACYOn 10 September 1994, the administration

authorized General Shalikashvili to executeOperation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY within thenext ten days. On the night of 16-17 September1994, SEALs conducted a pre-invasion recon-naissance of the coastline along Cap Haitien, col-lecting intelligence and hydrographic data onpotential landing sites for the Marines. TheSEALs conducted their missions despite thelarge number of small vessels and Haitians onthe beach. The water was thick with traffic,strewn with garbage, and the SEALs heardHaitians beating drums on the shore. The teamsmet with varying degrees of success, as therewere just too many civilians in some areas topermit a full reconnaissance. Nevertheless, theensuing landings, which proceeded flawlessly(and uncontested) on the morning of 21September 1994, verified the accuracy of theSEALs’ work.

As the deadline for invasion neared, SOFmoved their equipment and supplies to their airand sea ports of embarkation. Rangers, SEALs,and Special Operations aviation assets wentaboard USS America. Other Rangers moved totheir waiting planes, prepared for an airborneassault. All theelements of acomplex planwere in place.

Before theAmerican forcesinvaded Haiti,however, for-mer PresidentJimmy Carter,Senator SamNunn, andretired GeneralColin Powells u c c e s s f u l l ybrokered a last-minute dealwith theHaitian mili-

tary. Because of these negotiations, all theforces moving toward Haiti on 18 September1994 were either aborted, diverted, or reconfig-ured for a peaceful entry. The invasion thusbecame a large-scale humanitarian mission,with the U.S. forces landing on 19 September.SEALs provided beach security and terminalguidance to the Marine landing forces. TheMonsoon had the honor of being the first U.S.ship to enter Port-au-Prince Harbor on 19September. From this point until their depar-ture on 24 October 1994, the PCs maintainedharbor patrols.

The Occupation of HaitiU.S. planners foresaw that Port-au-Prince

would be the “center of gravity” for the politi-cal and economic struggle that would followthe restoration of the Aristide government.The bulk of the conventional forces from the10th Mountain Division (and later the 25thInfantry Division) secured and remained in thecity. It was also important to maintain stableconditions in the remaining 90 percent ofHaiti. For this mission, XVIII Airborne CorpsCommander Lieutenant General Henry H.Shelton chose to use SOF.

Brigadier General Richard Potter formedJoint Task Force (JTF) RALEIGH as the JointSpecial Operations Task Force underLieutenant General Shelton. To implement the

62BG Potter, Commander JTF RALEIGH, on a crowded Haitian Street.

plan, the three battalions of 3rdSFG (A) set up three forwardoperating bases; 1st Battalion atLes Cayes, 2nd at CampD’Application, and 3rd atGonaives. Using the “hub andspoke” concept of employment,Operational Detachment-Alphateams (“A-teams”) deployed ini-tially to the forward operatingbases (the hubs) and then fartherout into the countryside (thespokes). SF teams in these vil-lages became the only source oflaw and order, and the villagerscalled on SF captains, sergeants,and warrant officers to act as policemen, judges,and juries for a wide variety of disputes.

A well thought out psychological operationscampaign orchestrated by the JointPsychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF),prepared the way for 3rd SFG (A)’s expansioninto the countryside of Haiti. The PSYOP cam-paign, conducted by elements of the 4thPsychological Operations Group, stressed thatcooperating with U.S. forces and avoiding bloodyconflicts with the existing illegal regime wouldlead to the reinstatement of the popular Aristideand the establishment of a working democracy.Using leaflets, radio broadcasts, and airborneloudspeaker platforms, JPOTF soldiers blanket-ed the countryside with their messages, to greateffect. In village after village, the Haitiansgreeted SOF soldiers with open arms.

While Special Forces soldiers were gainingcontrol over the countryside, Civil Affairs teamsfrom the 96th CA Battalion, augmented by CAreservists, assessed Haiti’s creaking infrastruc-ture. The hope was that a new Haitian govern-ment, assisted by USAID and various non-gov-ernmental organizations and private organiza-tions, would lift the country up from its endemicchaos and poverty. U.S. soldiers from CompanyA, 96th CA Battalion conducted operationLIGHT SWITCH in Jeremie, Cap Haitien, andother northern cities and towns, restoring elec-tricity to those areas for the first time in years.

SOF operations were notable as a large-scalepeacekeeping mission. Even after the UNMission took over on 31 March 1995 (UPHOLDDEMOCRACY became RESTORE DEMOCRA-CY), SOF still performed this vital mission. The

peace and order found in theHaitian countryside were aremarkable tribute to SOF,who fulfilled all of their mis-sion requirements and more.In addition, the PCs demon-strated their versatility dur-ing both SUPPORTDEMOCRACY andUPHOLD DEMOCRACY;they proved their usefulnessin coastal operations andshowed they could supportboth SEALs and SpecialBoat Unit operations.

63

PSYOP loudspeaker teams supported pacification efforts in Haiti by makingpublic announcements.

Civil Affairs soldiers helped to rebuild Haiti—shown here making a village’swell water drinkable.

In the early 1990s, rival ethnic states withinYugoslavia declared their independence andused force to align their borders to encompass alltheir ethnic population in neighboring states.The intensity of the fighting and “ethnic cleans-ing” shocked the UN and NATO into action.From 1992 to 1995, both of these organizationssent forces to the region to force a peace settle-ment in the former Yugoslavia. But, not untilNATO aircraft bombed Bosnian Serb targets(Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, August-September 1995) did the warring factions agreeto a cease fire in October. This cease fire, inturn, led to the Dayton Peace Accords (21November 1995) and the Paris peace agreement(14 December 1995).

Bosnia-HerzegovinaOperation JOINT ENDEAVOR

For Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR(December 1995-December 1996), the implemen-tation of the peace agreement, NATO’s missionsincluded peace enforcement (separating the war-ring factions, establishing demilitarized zones,and maintaining security) and support for thewithdrawal of UN forces from the formerYugoslavia. NATO vested command and controlin the Commander in Chief, ImplementationForce, and his assigned forces, known as theImplementation Force (IFOR).

Special Operations Command, Europe(SOCEUR) initially becameinvolved in these peace efforts inFebruary 1993 when it estab-lished the Joint SpecialOperations Task Force 2(JSOTF2). Located at San VitoAir Station, near Brindisi, Italy,JSOTF2 had the following mis-sions: combat search and rescue;fire support; and visit, board,search and seizure. To supportthe 1995 peace agreement,SOCEUR provided forces toestablish the Special OperationsCommand Implementation Force(SOCIFOR) and superimposed itover JSOTF2 at San Vito. SOCI-

FOR had several missions, but its most notableone was to provide SOF to the NATO and non-NATO forces in Bosnia. Like DESERT STORMand Somalia before, the emphasis was on SOF’scapabilities to interact with foreign militaryforces. Other missions included personnel recov-ery and fire support.

All SOF “in the box” (inside of Bosnia-Herzegovina) were assigned to Combined JointSpecial Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), theSOF component to the land forces component,Commander, Allied Command Europe RapidReaction Corps (COMARRC). A British officercommanded the CJSOTF with an American SOFofficer as his deputy. Beneath the CJSOTF,SOCIFOR established a U.S. SOF headquarters(known as FOB 101) using 1st Battalion, 10thSFG (A) assets.

Each of COMARRC’s three divisions [calledmultinational divisions (MNDs)] had a SpecialOperations Command and Control Element(SOCCE) assigned, which worked for the divi-sion commanders, controlled SOF in the divi-sions’ areas, and reported to FOB 101. TheSOCCE coordinated SOF activities with the con-ventional forces; advised the division command-er on SOF capabilities and employment options;and provided secure and reliable communica-tions (this last capability was so critical thatCOMARRC would have delayed the transfer ofauthority from the UN to NATO if SOF were notdeployed).

64

Balkans Operations 1995-Present

SOF and Romanian engineer battalion counterparts meet.

The SOCCEs sent outLiaison Coordination Elements(LCEs) to the NATO and, mostimportant, non-NATO unitswithin each division’s area ofoperations. The LCEs wereassigned to the battalion orbrigade commanders. Not unlikethe Coalition Warfare Teams ofDESERT STORM, the funda-mental LCE mission was estab-lishing communications betweenthe division and its non-NATObattalions. The LCEs made surethat the information and instruc-tions passed from the divisioncommander to the battalion orbrigade commander were understood, whichincluded explaining the intent and movementsof allied forces. If needed, the LCEs could alsodo laser target designation, call for fire, andrequest medical evacuations. Importantly, theLCEs had their own vehicles so that they couldkeep up with their parent units.

LCEs performed the following missions: con-ducting daily patrols with parent battalions;maintaining reliable communications; assessingthe attitudes of local populations and formerwarring factions; spreading the word on theIFOR mission; providing accurate informationon any incidents; and accomplishing route recon-naissance. In addition to their Special Forcesmembers, LCEs were augmented by SpecialTactics personnel trained in Special OperationsTactical Air Controller (SOTAC) procedures forclose air support. When the battalion or brigadebecame comfortable with doing its missionessential tasks, the LCEs redeployed. No otherforces, save SOF, had the requisite capabilitiesto do these delicate diplomatic operations.

In the early stages of JOINT ENDEAVOR,SOF’s flexibility and specialized capabilitieswere used to ensure that NATO forces arrived inthe right place at the right time. SOF’s majorcontributions included: SOF enabling forceswere in place on time; SOF aircraft (capable offlying in the most difficult weather) ensuredtimely SOF deployments into Bosnia-Herzegovina despite weather that grounded allother aircraft; SOF aircraft flew the IFOR com-mander through adverse weather to reach meet-

ings and ceremonies; SOCIFOR provided a quickreaction force; and SEALs supported the bridg-ing of the Sava River.

Civil Affairs forces likewise had importantmissions for JOINT ENDEAVOR. The CA forcescoordinated the reconstruction of the civil infra-structure and organized relief efforts of morethan 500 UN, government, and nongovernmentorganizations. Civil Affairs personnel, assignedto the Combined Joint Civil Military OperationsCenter (with CA task forces assigned to eachmultinational division), assisted in restoringbasic services such as public transportation,public works and utilities, public health, andcommerce, as well as helping with elections andsetting up new national governments. CA spe-cialists worked with organizations like theWorld Bank and the International Police TaskForce to facilitate the delivery of their services.CA soldiers also helped to develop plans for, andcoordinated the repatriation of, refugees.

PSYOP forces had the important task of dis-seminating factual information to the populaceinside the former Yugoslavia. Assigned to theCombined Joint Psychological Task Force, U.S.Army PSYOP forces used print media (the week-ly Herald of Peace newspaper and posters),“Radio IFOR” broadcasts, and some televisionbroadcasts to accomplish their missions. Theyalso conducted a mine awareness campaign,aimed primarily at children, and distributed lit-erature (such as coloring books) to stress thedangers of land mines and ordnance.

65

SEALS supported bridging the Sava River.

Operation JOINT GUARDOperation JOINT ENDEAVOR officially

ended on 20 December 1996, and the IFORgave way to Operation JOINT GUARD’sStabilization Force (SFOR). Planned to last 18months, JOINT GUARD built upon the successof JOINT ENDEAVOR—NATO-led forces hadseparated the former warring factions, allowedthe transfer of land, moved heavy weapons intostorage areas, and demobilized troops of the for-mer warring factions. In essence, SFOR was amaintenance force responsible for deterringhostilities and contributing to a secure environ-ment which promoted the reestablishment ofcivil authority.

SOCEUR disbanded SOCIFOR on 20December and lodged command and control ofall SOF inside Bosnia in the revamped CJSOTF.Now commanded by a U.S. SOF officer, theCJSOTF deployed the SOCCEs to each multina-tional division and LCEs to the RomanianBattalion, Hungarian Battalion, and RussianBrigade. In addition, SOF took on the responsi-bility of providing Joint Commission Observers(JCOs). These six-man teams roamed the coun-try as “honest brokers” to establish communica-tions between all the factions and the SFORcommanders. SOCEUR still had missionresponsibility for combat search and rescue, per-sonnel recovery, close air support, and specialreconnaissance. Likewise, Civil Affairs andPsychological Operations forces continuedaccomplishing under JOINT GUARD what they

had done for JOINT ENDEAV-OR. Psychological Operationsforces worked for the CombinedTask Force. All these missionsran until June 1998, when theoperation evolved again.

Operation JOINT FORGEOn 20 June 1998, Operation

JOINT FORGE began as thefollow-on operation toOperation JOINT GUARD.JOINT FORGE had the sameprimary goal as JOINTGUARD—to maintain peace inBosnia-Herzegovina and sus-tain the conditions necessary to

rebuild that nation. To carry out this mission,NATO continued the SFOR, comprised of forcesfrom both NATO and non-NATO nations. SFORensured the peace, kept the troops of the formerwarring factions demobilized, and prevented therevival of hostilities.

The primary changes in Operation JOINTFORGE were in the SOF’s command structureand missions. In JOINT FORGE, the CJSOTFconsolidated operations with Forward OperatingBase (FOB) 103. The combined headquartersexercised command and control over all U.S.SOF in MND-North. The combinedCJSOTF/FOB reported directly to COMSFOR.U.S. SOF operated only in MND-North, exceptfor liaison officers attached to MND-SE and

66

SOF LCE attached to the Russian Brigade. LCEslived and worked with coalition partners.

Distributing Herald of Peace in Bosnia.

MND-SW and Civil Affairs and PsychologicalOperations specialists, who operated throughoutBosnia-Herzegovina.

SOF’s missions saw little change in MND-North in JOINT FORGE. The SOCCE per-formed as it had in Operation JOINT ENDEAV-OR, and one LCE was still attached to theRussian Brigade. U.S. SOF in Bosnia-Herzegovina theater worked in eight-man JointCommission Observer Teams (JCOs) in theMND-North. The JCOs’ critical role was tomaintain situational awareness and provideground truth to the CJSOTF and SFOR com-

manders. To do this, they maintained directcontact with leaders of the former warring fac-tions and key members of the local civil andmilitary leadership. They served as contactpoints between the MND-North commanderand local ethnic leaders and as impartial infor-mation brokers between different elements ofthe populace. They also provided the MND-North commander with information about con-ditions throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S.SOF provided a quick reaction force that stoodready to defend any JCOs that were threat-ened. At the peak of the JCO mission in 1996and 1997 there were 16 teams covering all ofBosnia. Twice during their time in Bosnia,U.S. JCO houses were attacked by rocket-pro-pelled grenades.

As the environment in Bosnia-Herzegovinamatured, the JCO’s contributions were judged tobe of less importance as conventional forcesincreasingly reported similar types of informa-tion. In May 2001, the last U.S. JCO house wasclosed.

The majority of SOF personnel for JOINTFORGE were Civil Affairs and PsychologicalOperations specialists. They assisted inreestablishing civil institutions and helped pre-pare for elections that were held in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the autumn of 1998. SOF con-tinued its support to JOINT FORGE through-out 1999, helping to sustain peace in the areaduring the Kosovo conflict.

67

SOF Joint Commission Observer teams helped stabilize localareas and provided “ground truth” to senior military

commanders.

The 4th PSYOP Group distributed over 104 million leaflets in Serbia and Kosovo during Operation ALLIED FORCE.

KosovoOperation ALLIED FORCE

NATO initiated Operation ALLIED FORCEon 24 March 1999 to put an end to Serbia’sviolent repression of ethnic Albanians inKosovo. The 19-nation ALLIED FORCEcoalition conducted an unrelenting bombingcampaign in Serbia and Kosovo for 78 days,eventually forcing Serbian PresidentSlobodan Milosevic to withdraw his forcesfrom the province and stop the “ethnic cleans-ing” of Kosovar Albanians. The bombingstrategy did not prevent Serbia from forcingan estimated 800,000 refugees out of thecountry, however, which produced an enor-mous humanitarian crisis in the neighboringstates of Albania and Macedonia.Furthermore, the air campaign did not elimi-nate all of Serbia’s surface-to-air missiles, whichmanaged to shoot down two U.S. aircraft.

SOF played a strategic role throughout theBalkans region during ALLIED FORCE. InAlbania and Macedonia, Civil Affairs units par-ticipated in Operation SHINING HOPE, thehumanitarian assistance mission to aid Kosovarrefugees. CA elements coordinated large-scalehumanitarian relief efforts with U.S. govern-ment agencies and international relief organiza-tions, arranging food, shelter, and medical carefor the refugee camps. SOF helicopters airliftedsupplies into refugee areas prior to the conven-tional forces arriving in theater. Within Kosovoitself, SOF aircraft dropped food and supplies todisplaced persons.

SOF also carried out an extensive PSYOPcampaign. From beyond Serb borders, EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft transmitteddaily Serbian-language radio and televisionprograms into the area, informing the Serb peo-ple of their government’s genocidal practicesand televising photographs of Kosovar refugeesin Albania and Macedonia. MC-130H aircraftdropped millions of leaflets that decried theSerbs’ untenable situation, warning themagainst committing war crimes, and pointingout how Milosevic’s policies were ruining theircountry.

SOF also engaged in direct action and specialreconnaissance missions. AC-130 gunshipsattacked Serbian positions. In Bosnia-

Herzegovina, a SOF team destroyed a stretch ofrailroad tracks to prevent Serbian troop move-ments. SOF deployed near the Albanian-Kosovoborder and served as the “eyes and ears” of TFHAWK. These Special Forces soldiers andCombat Controllers called in targeting informa-tion, prevented friendly fire incidents, andreported on fighting inside of Kosovo.

SOF successfully rescued the only two U.S.pilots downed during ALLIED FORCE. In sepa-rate missions, SOF combat search and rescueteams rescued an F-117A pilot who was shotdown near Belgrade on 27 March and an F-16pilot shot down in western Serbia on 2 May. Oneach occasion, a mixture of MH-53 Pave Low andMH-60 Pave Hawk helicopters were used toretrieve the downed fliers. These rescues hadprofound effects on the outcome of the operationby denying Milosevic a potent information oper-ation campaign.

Operation JOINT GUARDIANOn 9 June 1999, the government of the for-

mer republic of Yugoslavia acceded to a “militarytechnical agreement” that ended its army’s occu-pation of Kosovo. Operation JOINTGUARDIAN, the mission led by NATO’s KosovoForce (KFOR) to enforce the peace agreement,maintain public security, and provide humani-tarian assistance, began immediately thereafter.By June 15, SOF units had entered theAmerican sector in Kosovo to reconnoiter the

68

F-16 CSAR, Operation ALLIED FORCE Members of the MH-60aircrew who successfully rescued an F-16 pilot shot down in

Serbia.

area and assess conditions for conventionalforces.

These SOF personnel encountered theantipathy between Serb and AlbanianKosovars. SOF applied techniques proven inBosnia-Herzegovina to Kosovo. SOF soonbecame KFOR’s source for “ground truth” inKosovo’s volatile environment. Special Forcesteams patrolled the American sector independ-ently and also as the U.S. liaison element toPolish and Russian units. For example, a SFOperational Detachment-Alpha conducted thefirst combined operations with the Russianssince World War II as they sought to quashnightly attacks by militants. PSYOP personnelworked to stabilize the situation by distributingnative-language leaflets that promoted mineawareness and acceptance of the rule of law.Special Forces soldiers also monitored the Serbmilitary’s withdrawal from the province andassessed the flow of refugees returning to theirhomeland.

Civil Affairs soldiers, previously engaged insupporting Operation SHINING HOPE, movedforward to assist in reconstituting Kosovo’sinfrastructure. One of their first actions was tohelp establish a civil-military coordination com-mittee, a step toward returning Kosovo to civil-ian control. CA soldiers soon improved condi-tions throughout the province, as they helpedorganize the importation of heating fuel, repairsto electric grids and water systems, the activa-

tion of a civilian-run radio station in the capitalcity of Pristina, and the reopening of schools.They also coordinated the activities of a numberof nongovernmental organizations and helped aUN-sponsored International Police Task Forcebegin work in Kosovo.

Special Forces liaison teams, including thoseattached to a Polish battalion and a RussianBrigade, initiated street patrols throughouttheir areas of operations. To counter ethnic vio-lence, these patrols arranged meetings betweenlocal Albanians and Serbs, sought out illegalweapons caches, and assisted war crimes inves-tigators in locating massacre sites. The teams’eyewitness reports gave the JOINT GUARDIANleadership a clear understanding of local condi-tions. In another application of SOF’s uniquecapabilities, a Special Forces detachment,skilled in the Arabic culture and language,deployed to Kosovo to serve as a liaison coordi-nation element between KFOR and units fromthe United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom ofJordan. In September 1999, SOF integratedthese forces into the Kosovo area of operations,further strengthening the KFOR coalition.

SOF provided the TF Falcon commanderswith unique capabilities—liaison, ground truth,special reconnaissance, direct action, and peace-keeping. Headquarters USSOCOM providedthese SOF forces with the oversight, resourcing,and equipment needed to complete these highlycomplex and sensitive missions.

69

During JOINT GUARDIAN, CPT Robert Schaefer and his ODA 056 served as the LiaisonCoordination Element (LCE) to the Russian 13th Tactical Group. This ODA supported theRussian Brigade, provided situational awareness for TF Falcon, enhanced force protection,and collected information on the locations and activities of both Serbian and KosovoLiberation Army (UCK) forces. For the first month and a half, ODA 056 had intense nightlyfirefights with UCK soldiers and Kosovar Albanian militants. The team also conducted pres-ence patrols, distributed PSYOP materials, and conducted quick reaction force (QRF) andMEDEVAC training with the Russians. In late July 1999, ODA 056 called in artillery fire insupport of the Russians—the first time that the United States has supported Russia withartillery since WWII. CPT Schaefer, fluent in Russian, helped the Russian brigade plan andexecute two large search and raid operations which confiscated UCK weapons. These raidswere the largest combined U.S.-Russian operations since WWII. These successful operationsdemonstrated how tactical success can influence the strategic environment by helping to buildbetter U.S.-Russian relations.

Since the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall,SOF have had to perform a variety of missionsthat fall under the category of “OperationsOther Than War.” At one time, these operationswere considered extraordinary, but during the1990s, operations other than war became thenorm. For example, in its first 40 years, the UNconducted only 13 such operations, but in theyears from 1988 to 1994, the number of peaceoperations more than doubled. Although peaceoperations were not new to the 1990s, what wasunprecedented were the numbers, pace, scope,and complexity of recent operations.

Operations other than war included a widerange of missions, such as humanitarian assis-tance and disaster relief, non-combatant evacua-tion operations (NEOs), humanitarian mineaction, peacekeeping operations, crisis response,combating terrorism, enforcement of sanctionsor exclusion zones, and show of force. With con-ventional forces, SOF have participated in thesetypes of operations, often as the lead militaryorganization. Such capabilities as cultural andlanguage familiarity, warrior-diplomat skills,maturity and professionalism made SOF anideal force for these operations.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORTSOF’s diverse talents made it a natural

choice to support humanitarian assistanceefforts. Perhaps the best example of SOF’s capa-bilities to deal with a large scale disaster wasOperation PROVIDE COMFORT. At the end ofDESERT STORM, in February 1991, IraqiKurds revolted against Saddam Hussein, but hisforces quickly crushed the rebellion. Hundredsof thousands of Kurds fled to the mountains innorthern Iraq and southeastern Turkey.

In April 1991, EUCOM initiated OperationPROVIDE COMFORT to stop further Iraqiattacks and to establish a safe haven for theKurds. On short notice, MC-130Es led in otheraircraft to drop emergency supplies to theKurdish refugees in the mountains of Iraq andTurkey. Next, Special Forces personnel, sup-ported by MH-53J helicopters, located suitablesites for refugee camps and worked with refugeeleaders to organize and distribute supplies to thepopulace. Civil Affairs units developed plans formedical assistance, food distribution, and dailycamp operations, and then managed their imple-mentation. Joint SOF medical teams providedmedical assistance and training, such as camp

70

Peace Operations and Crisis Responses

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (1991-1996) Following DESERT STORM, Saddam Hussein put down a Kurdish uprising in northern Iraq. The U.S. and its allies saved countless Kurds by establishing safe havens and providing

humanitarian assistance. SOF spearheaded this effort.

sanitation, and were instrumental in dramati-cally reducing the death rate. SEALs andSpecial Boat Unit personnel provided medicalsupport and security in camps. PsychologicalOperations forces supported efforts to end chaot-ic conditions by producing millions of leafletsand by loudspeaker presentations. Their effortsalso helped to convince the Kurds to return totheir homes. SOF were credited with savingthousands of lives by providing skilled personnelto rebuild the civil infrastructure, establish sup-ply networks, and furnish medical assistanceand training.

Humanitarian Mine ActionLandmines have proven to be one of the most

dangerous and lasting problems created byrecent conflicts. USSOCOM was a leader in theeffort to cope with the humanitarian disastercaused by the 100,000,000 mines buried aroundthe world. SOF conducted humanitarian demi-ning operations first in Operation SAFE PAS-SAGE in 1988. At that time, over 10,000,000landmines remained from the Soviet invasion,preventing millions of refugees from returningto Afghanistan. Troops from 5th Special ForcesGroup (Airborne) deployed to Pakistan to workwith the Afghan refugees and the UN. SAFEPASSAGE became the test-bed and prototypefor subsequent humanitarian demining opera-tions by both the UN and SOF.

The Special Forces soldiers faced enormouschallenges. There was no effective Afghan gov-ernment, and work with the refugees had to be

coordinated with the UN, Pakistan, and a vastarray of private organizations. In this amor-phous situation, the Special Forces troops had toinvent humanitarian demining doctrine and sellit to the other agencies. The mutually suspi-cious Afghan tribes and factions required theSpecial Forces to use their political skills as wellas their technical knowledge.

SOF developed training programs andemployed the “train the trainer” concept so theAfghans could run the demining program them-selves and continue the program without outsideassistance. This technique enabled millions ofAfghans to know how to identify, avoid, markand report mines, and thousands of Afghanslearned how to destroy mines. By the time theSpecial Forces troops left in 1991, the Afghanswere conducting effective mine clearing opera-tions.

SOF and the UN next conducted deminingoperations in Cambodia in 1993. Since then,the U.S. humanitarian demining program hasexpanded dramatically. In 2001, SOF conduct-ed humanitarian demining activities in 19countries: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan,Cambodia, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Ecuador,Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Guatemala,Honduras, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Oman,Peru, Thailand, Vietnam, and Zambia. Eachsituation was very different because of varioustypes of mines—40 different types of mineswere found in Afghanistan alone—the multi-tude of organizations, and the wide ranging ter-rain and environmental conditions—from the

Sahara Desert to mountainous jun-gles. Time and again, the knowl-edge, flexibility, and resourceful-ness of SOF enabled them to adjustthe program to suit local political,geographic, and technical circum-stances.

The humanitarian deminingprogram had three critical ele-ments: mine awareness, mine sur-vey and clearance, and nationalcommand and control. Mine aware-ness reduced civilian casualties byteaching people how to spot mines,how to get out of a mined area safe-ly, and how to mark and reportmined areas. The 4th Psychological

71

Operation SAFE PASSAGE (1989-1991) In a camp in Pakistan, a SpecialForces NCO and an Afghan instructor teach mine clearing techniques to

Afghan refugees.

Operations Group took the lead in mine aware-ness and developed effective programs tailoredto the specific needs of each country. These pro-grams used every sort of media from radio andtelevision to T-shirts, caps, book bags, and comicbooks.

The Special Forces groups developed andtaught the mine survey and clearance portionsof the program. SOF mine survey teams deter-mined the actual size of the mined area. Mineclearing, the centerpiece of the program, wasslow and potentially very dangerous work, soproper training was critical. Special Forces sol-diers employed the “train-the-trainer” approach

that trained mineclearers as wellas indigenous mineclearinginstructors, and eventually led tothe establishment of nationaldemining schools.

Civil Affairs troops workedwith the host nation to establisha national demining headquar-ters. In most nations, civilianagencies ran the mine aware-ness programs. Coordinatingthe efforts of several differentministries and determining thesequence of demining operationswere politically sensitive andcritical to the success of the dem-ining operations. Civil Affairstroops, therefore, were ideallysuited for helping developingnations solve these thorny prob-lems and integrating humani-tarian demining into nationalrecovery and development plans.

In 1997, President Clintoncommitted the U.S. to eliminatingthe threat of landmines to civil-ians by 2010. To achieve thisambitious goal, USSOCOM’shumanitarian demining effortexpanded substantially in 1998and 1999. Whereas in 1997 SOFhad deployed to 14 countries tosupport humanitarian deminingoperations, by 1999 that figurehad doubled to 28. One of themore complex operations occurredin Bosnia-Herzegovina, where

SOF worked with the UN, the U.S. StateDepartment, NATO’s SFOR, and the armies rep-resenting each of Bosnia’s ethnic groups toestablish three demining training centers in thecountry.

In 1998, SOF trained and equipped instruc-tor cadres for the Bosnian Serbs, Croats, andMuslims and guided them through their firstdemining classes. SOF also helped the localforces transform their ruined buildings into pro-fessional training facilities and taught them howto sustain their training operations. By the endof 1999, the three training centers had graduat-ed more than 500 deminers, who helped to revi-

72

In conjunction with the UN, the Organization of American States, andDC Comics, PSYOP soldiers distributed mine awareness comic books to

Central American children.

talize the Bosnia-Herzegovina economy byrestoring thousands of acres of land to produc-tive use. EUCOM reviewed the program in 1999and concluded that the SOF-developed trainingcenters continued to produce effective deminersand had become an integral part of the nation’sdemining operations. The training mission’ssuccess was attributed to SOF’s ability to devel-op a rapport with each of the entity armies andto inculcate a higher degree of professionalism inthem.

By late 1999, humanitarian demining opera-tions had been conducted by SOCCENT, SOC-PAC, SOCSOUTH, and SOCEUR; all five active-duty Special Forces Groups; all six active-dutyPsychological Operations Battalions; and theactive-duty Civil Affairs Battalion. The reservecomponents fully supported these operations, aswell. In Asia, for instance, SOCPAC, the 1stSpecial Forces Group, the PsychologicalOperations Battalion, and Civil Affairs troopsworked with the national governments ofCambodia and the People’s Republic of Laos, theUN, and many non-governmental organizationsto make people aware of the landmine dangerand to help clear mined areas.

SOF had conducted humanitarian mineaction activities in the following countries forFY2002: Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras,Guatemala, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia,Cambodia, Estonia, Honduras, Mauritania,Thailand, and Vietnam.

African Crisis Response InitiativeIn 1994, Rwanda experienced human

genocide of horrific proportions. As a resultof these atrocities, U.S. officials from theOffice of the Secretary of Defense visited theRwandan massacre sites, spoke withrefugees, and issued a report that helped tofocus attention on the region. The next year,Burundi, Rwanda’s neighbor to the south,also experienced political unrest andappeared to be heading down the same roadthat Rwanda had traveled some monthsbefore. By November 1995, the DefenseDepartment had drafted a proposal to dealwith the unrest in Burundi, the centerpiece ofwhich was the training of African peacekeep-ing troops. The objective was to train African

troops to conduct peacekeeping operations with-in their continent. This initial proposal wouldbecome the core for the African Crisis ResponseInitiative (ACRI), which the State Departmentlaunched in October 1996. The U.S., however,worked only with those African countries thatmet certain prerequisites, including democrati-cally elected governments, civilian control of themilitary, and human rights policies. SOF, andespecially Special Forces soldiers, became anintegral part of ACRI.

The African Crisis Response Initiative usedmilitary assets from the U.S. and its Europeanallies to train battalion-sized units from variousAfrican nations for peacekeeping operations ontheir continent. The 3rd Special Forces Group(Airborne) implemented the ACRI plan by devel-oping a program of instruction and sending inteams to conduct training. Drawing fromNATO, UN, and U.S. doctrine, Special Forcesplanners developed common peacekeeping tac-tics, techniques, and procedures. TrainingAfrican battalions to common doctrine and stan-dards assured that the different forces couldeffectively work together if deployed on a peace-keeping mission. As devised by the 3rd SpecialForces Group (Airborne), ACRI training consist-ed of two phases: an initial, intensive 60-daytraining period (individual, platoon, company,leader and staff training) followed by sustain-ment training and exercises. By the end ofFY2001, Special Forces teams, along with ele-ments of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and the4th Psychological Operations Group, had con-

73

Special Forces instructors train Senegalese soldiers inmarksmanship and other basic soldier skills for ACRI.

ducted ACRI training in Senegal, Malawi,Ghana, Mali, Benin, Kenya, and the Ivory Coast.This multinational peacekeeping effort in Africaheld out great promise for the future, and wasanother example of SOF fulfilling the role ofGlobal Scouts.

Operation FOCUS RELIEFAfter the collapse of civil authority in Sierra

Leone, the United States offered equipment andtraining to neighboring countries to establish aregional force capable of reestablishing civilorder in the country. Under Operation FOCUSRELIEF, up to five Nigerian battalions, oneGhanaian and one Senegalese battalion were tobe trained for peacekeeping operations in SierraLeone under the auspices of UN Charter,Chapter VII, for the purposes of establishingpeace and order.

In November 2000, members of the 3rd SFG(A) began the first phase of the operation, train-ing two Nigerian battalions. The trainingincluded basic training on the new equipment,combat lifesaver medical training, and infantrytactics. Special Forces medics worked with thehost nation medics on advanced lifesaving skills,and leaders were taught how to create combatorders and conduct military decision-makingand planning. During this deployment, three SFsoldiers were stopped by Nigerian police at alocal roadblock. They identified themselves tothe police; however, an altercation ensued.Shots were fired, and the ODA members andembassy driver evaded the police and local civil-ians who were chasing them. One of the soldiersfired warning shots when two civilians attacked

one of the ODA members. After dispersing thecrowd, the team made their way to a local gatedhouse, set up security, and notified the embassy.After completing training in December 2000,these troops deployed with the UN Mission inSierra Leone, to assist in the implementation ofthe Lomé Peace Accord.

The second phase of training took place inGhana and Senegal during June to August 2001.The troops were trained in the use of new equip-ment, small unit tactics, first-aid training, civil-military operations, and human rights.Ambassador Kathryn Dee Robinson said,“Operation FOCUS RELIEF demonstrates thecommitment of the U.S. government in assistingthe restoration of stability to the West Africasub-region.”

Counterdrug OperationsIllegal drug trafficking was an international

threat increasingly affecting all nations. USSO-COM conducted counterdrug (CD) training mis-sions during the decade of the 1990s and beyond.The National Drug Control Strategy, announcedin September 1989, significantly refocused theDefense Department’s CD effort. USSOCOMprovided forces to train and assist host nationforces to enforce their own counterdrug laws.SOF also trained personnel from drug lawenforcement agencies. In addition, the com-mand provided forces to patrol and reconnoiterportions of the border with Mexico and suppliedcommunications experts to support other the-ater CINCs’ CD efforts.

In 1992, the CD effort doubled to a total of233 military training teams, deployments fortraining and other missions. Support to

74

Special Forces soldiers train Nigerian forces.

Colombian Marines from Forward Riverine Post-93 ongraduation day with Counterdrug Mission SEAL Team

Four/SBU-22 trainers.

SOUTHCOM and law enforcement agenciesaccounted for most of the missions, but SOFbegan to expand CD efforts in the PACOM areaas well. The SOF CD effort remained a largepart of our national effort. In 1997, SOF beganto provide CD training to the Mexican Army andNavy. Another important initiative of the late1990s, USSOCOM began deploying patrol coastships to the SOUTHCOM area in order to inter-dict drug smuggling.

SOF Support to Plan ColombiaAt the request of the Colombian government,

SOUTHCOM in December 1998 agreed to assistin the formation of a Colombian Army (COLAR)CD battalion (later expanded to a brigade). In1999, USSOCOM supported a major trainingprogram in Colombia, whose goal was to developunits capable of deploying rapidly and conduct-ing independent CD operations in all types ofterrain, weather, and visibility. SOF completedtraining for all three COLAR battalions by May2001. SOF was scheduled to provide sustain-ment training to the COLAR CD Brigade on acontinuing basis.

Maritime Interdiction Operations inthe Persian Gulf

Special Operations Forces (SOF) were keyparticipants in anti-smuggling MaritimeInterdiction Operations (MIOs) in the PersianGulf. On 25 August 1990, the UN SecurityCouncil (UNSC) passed UNSC Resolution 665authorizing “those member states co-operatingwith the government of Kuwaitwhich are deploying maritimeforces to the area to use suchmeasures . . . to halt all inwardand outward maritime shippingin order to inspect and verifytheir cargoes . . . .” The pur-pose of MIOs was to halt vesselssmuggling illegal gas and oilfrom Iraq and to divert them toa port for auction of both thesmuggled goods and the vessel.

To date, SOF have partici-pated in hundreds of successfulMIOs, significantly curtailingSaddam Hussein’s efforts tofund the rebuilding of Iraq’s mil-

itary capabilities. Funds derived from auctionswere used to pay for continued MIO missions.

CT-43A Recovery OperationOn several occasions during JOINT

ENDEAVOR, SOCEUR had to discharge both itsnormal theater-wide responsibilities andrespond to small-scale contingencies. On 3 April1996, a CT-43A crashed on a mountainsideabove Dubrovnik, Croatia, killing all 35 aboard.Included as passengers were Secretary ofCommerce Ron Brown, a number of corporateexecutives, as well as the Air Force crew.Special operations helicopters flew to the crashsite in some of the worst flying conditions in theBalkans. SOCEUR completed the recovery oper-ation in four days, despite the extreme cold andwet conditions and rugged mountainside ter-rain.

75

Croatia, April 1996. A Pave Low hovers near Secretary Brown’s crashed CT-43A.

Maritime Interdiction of Russian tanker Volgoneft-147 on2 February 2000.

Operation SILVER ANVILSpecial Operations Command, Europe

(SOCEUR) conducted Operation SILVERANVIL, a noncombatant evacuation opera-tion (NEO) during a coup in Sierra Leone inSpring 1992. Commanded by BG RichardW. Potter, SOCEUR and its componentsplanned the operation, deployed, successful-ly conducted an evacuation from a remotelocation, sustained themselves, and rede-ployed, without any assistance from conven-tional forces.

The NEO force consisted of COMSOCEUR,elements from Company C, 1st Battalion, 10thSpecial Forces Group (Airborne) [1-10th SFG(A)], and the 39th Special Operations Wing(since redesignated the 352nd SpecialOperations Group). Also included were commu-nications specialists from the SOCEUR SignalDetachment, along with other SOCEUR staff,two MC-130 Combat Talons from the 7th SpecialOperations Squadron (SOS), two HC-130tankers from the 67th SOS, aircrews, combatcontrollers, and maintenance personnel.

On the night of 29 April 1992, Company Cwas conducting an exercise at Stuttgart, whenBG Potter informed them of a coup inFreetown, Sierra Leone, and directed them tobegin work on the “real-world” mission.Within 15 hours of notification, SOF per-formed mission analysis, configured the unit’sequipment, wrote orders, issued war-stocks,loaded the aircraft, and deployed. The coup inSierra Leone had created an unstable securityenvironment, but SOF quickly developed arapport with the local military and arrangedfor a safe evacuation with no incidents. Theyevacuated over 400 American citizens, third-country noncombatants, and USAF MEDCAPteam members in the following two days.

Previously, EUCOM had concentrated onCold War operations, so SILVER ANVIL sig-naled a transition as EUCOM focused more oncrisis response operations. Because of SOF’ssuccess in Sierra Leone, they became EUCOM’sforce of choice for first response in crises.Building on lessons learned from SILVERANVIL, SOCEUR developed a capability to exe-

cute contingency operations anywhere in thetheater within hours of notification. Theembassy assessment that the JSOTF conductedin Freetown became a model for the EUCOMsurvey and assessment teams (ESAT) thatSOCEUR would deploy to other embassies inlater years.

Operation ASSURED RESPONSEIn the Spring of 1996, while SOF were finish-

ing the CT-43A recovery effort, SOCEURresponded to a crisis in Liberia, where a civilwar endangered Americans and other foreignnationals. The U.S. had to deploy forces quicklyto save lives, protect the American Embassy,and initiate a noncombatant evacuation opera-tion (NEO). The only integrated force with itsown airlift and strike force ready and availablewas SOCEUR. In fact, within hours of redeploy-ing from Dubrovnik to Stuttgart on 7 April, SOFaboard an MC-130H had launched for SierraLeone, the intermediate staging base for

76

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Engine Running Onload (ERO) of a group of U.S. citizensdeparting Lungi Airport on 3 May.

Operation ASSURED RESPONSE (April 1996) SOF evacuated over 2,100 noncombatants from the U.S.

Embassy in Liberia.

Operation ASSURED RESPONSE. Using itsAir Force MH-53J helicopters (augmented laterby Army MH-47D helicopters), SOCEUR firstsent SEALs, on 9 April, and then Special Forcesto provide security for the U.S. Embassy andimplement an orderly evacuation of Americansand third country nationals. On 13 April, thePsychological Operations Task Force arrivedand was ready to conduct force protection loud-speaker operations for ASSURED RESPONSE.SOF had the situation well in hand and hadevacuated 436 Americans and 1,677 foreignnationals when the Marines relieved SOCEURon 20 April 1996.

Operation SHADOW EXPRESSSOF returned to Liberia in the fall of 1998

after violent civic unrest in Monrovia againthreatened the U.S. Embassy. On 18September, government forces fired on Krahnleader Roosevelt Johnson and his entourage asthey were talking to U.S. officials at the embassyentrance. The attack wounded two U.S. person-nel and killed four Krahn. The Americansreturned fire, killing two policemen. TheAmericans and the Johnson party retreated intothe embassy compound, setting the stage for anextended siege.

The next day, Liberian President CharlesTaylor demanded Johnson’s surrender, and anattack on the embassy appeared imminent.EUCOM responded by directing SOCEUR to dis-patch a 12-man ESAT, which was led by MajorJoe Becker, an Air Force SOF helicopter pilot,and Senior Chief Petty Officer Pat Ellis, a SEAL,and included several SOF intelligence special-ists. The ESAT team arrived at the embassy on21 September and, within a few hours, ascer-tained that an armed force was massing toattack the compound. SCPO Ellis and MajorBecker alerted ECOMOG, a Nigerian-ledAfrican peacekeeping force then in Monrovia.The ESAT team and the Marine embassy guardsdevised a defense plan, with the ESAT on thechancery roof and the Marines defending fromwithin the building. Shortly thereafter, anECOMOG checkpoint stopped two truckloads ofmen armed with rocket propelled grenadelaunchers from approaching the embassy. TheState Department subsequently arranged for

the Johnson entourage to relocate to a thirdcountry. The ESAT team planned the move,coordinated logistical support, and providedsecurity for the Johnson group’s departure.

On 26 September, the Defense Departmentordered additional U.S. forces into the region. Inanticipation of this mission, SOCEUR dis-patched USS Chinook, a SOF patrol coastal shipfrom NSWU-10, toward Liberia from Rota,Spain, with an 11-meter rigid inflatable boat(RIB) and four special boat operators aboard.Within 12 hours of notification on the 26th,SOCEUR deployed a SOF command and controlelement from Naval Special Warfare Unit 2(NSWU-2), accompanied by approximately 20SEALs, two Air Force Combat Controllers, andan Air Force flight surgeon, on an MC-130 to aforward operating location in Freetown, SierraLeone. The force landed in Freetown on the27th. Chinook came into Freetown’s port 30minutes after the aircraft landed, took 17 SEALson board, and embarked for Liberia, with theremaining SOF staying in Freetown to maintaina tactical operations center. By the 28th,Chinook was positioned 2,000 yards offshorefrom the embassy, ready to provide an in-extremis response force.

From 29 September to 7 October, SOFmaintained a highly visible maritime presenceoff the embassy’s coastline. First Chinook, andlater a second patrol coastal vessel, USSFirebolt, surveyed the Monrovia harbor andrepeatedly conducted launch and recoveryrehearsals of the RIB. The two patrol coastalsalso stood ready to evacuate the embassy, if

77

Operation SHADOW EXPRESS, ESAT, ECOMOG, andU.S. Embassy personnel patrolling in Monrovia, Liberia.

necessary. The 10-day “presence operation”provided a calming influence on the situationand reaffirmed SOF’s ability to deploy forcesrapidly into an uncertain environment.

Operation SILVER WAKEIn September 1996, a Special Forces ser-

geant first class was one of a four-personMilitary Liaison Team that went to Albania. Aspart of the Joint Contact Team Program, thisteam coordinated Albania’s requests for militaryvisits that fostered civilian control of the mili-tary in a democratic society. This mission, how-ever, was cut short by an incipient revolt insouthern Albania. In January, the SpecialForces sergeant assisted the American embassyin revising its emergency evacuation plan; thisassistance included surveying helicopter landingzones.

After releasing him to the Military LiaisonTeam in late January, the AmericanAmbassador recalled the Special Forces ser-geant to the American embassy in late February,as the Albanian people’s displeasure with theirgovernment had erupted again in open revolt.This lone noncommissioned officer became thefocal point for NEO preparations. His activitiesranged from coordinating a visit from theEUCOM Survey and Assessment Team, toprompting the embassy staff to define what

should be done and when to do it as the revoltapproached Tirana, to conducting area assess-ments that provided the embassy with accuratemilitary judgments.

JTF SILVER WAKE notified the embassythat 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit helicop-ters would start the evacuation on 13 March.The Special Forces sergeant then went to theevacuation site in the embassy housing area,where he helped to write the passenger mani-fests and set up “sticks” of approximately 20persons per helicopter. The helicoptersapproached the compound after dark. TheSpecial Forces sergeant guided the first helicop-ter in by flashing “SOS” with his flashlight,despite the risk from random gunfire. For theremainder of the NEO, he provided invaluableservice to the embassy staff and Marine evacu-ation force. The NEO ended on 26 March 1997,and the JTF evacuated nearly 900 civilianssafely without incident. The Special Forces ser-geant had shown again the maturity and pro-fessionalism of SOF. His leadership andexpertise reassured the embassy staff and evac-uees alike, and he provided a crucial link withthe evacuation force.

During the first days of the NEO, an AC-130U from JSOTF2 at Brindisi flew over Tiranaand the surrounding area, providing close airsupport, armed reconnaissance, and intelli-

gence. On at least one occasion, the AC-130U’s mere presence halted a AAA bat-tery’s fire. Its crew also directed evacuationhelicopters away from SA-2 surface-to-airmissile batteries. The crew ensured that theNEO proceeded safely.

Operation NOBLE OBELISKIn April 1997, an Operational

Detachment Alpha or “A” Team (13 SpecialForces soldiers) from the 3rd Special ForcesGroup (A) deployed to Freetown, SierraLeone, for Joint Combined ExchangeTraining. Their mission was to train and pro-mote a professional, apolitical military, onesupportive of the elected government. On 25May 1997, rebel forces and military memberstoppled the government. Once rebel shootingerupted at their training site, Special Forcessoldiers manned security positions insidetheir compound, communicated with

78

Operation SILVER WAKE (March 1997) evacuees boarding amarine helicopter in Tirana, Albania.

SOCEUR and EUCOM, and established inter-mittent contact with the embassy.

The next day, the detachment moved the 20miles to Freetown. The Special Forces soldiershad to pass through two rebel roadblocks andnear an army post, but the rapport with theirformer trainees enabled the Americans to pro-ceed safely to the embassy.

In Freetown, the detachment commanderdivided his team to secure the two embassycompounds, and team members performedadvance force operations, including reconnoi-tering the helicopter landing zone on the coast.They also defused a tense situation during ameeting of the senior ambassadors and rebelforces at the British High Commission resi-dence. All of these activities required move-ment through a town torn apart by looting andindiscriminate fire.

On 29 May, team members conducted anearly morning patrol through rebel-held areasto secure the landing zone for the Marines fromthe 22nd MEU. They established sniper posi-tions, security, and coordinated with theNigerians before the Marine helicoptersarrived. The next day, the NEO began, andafter escorting official U.S. personnel to thelanding zone, Special Forces soldiers served asa buffer by establishing two blocking positionsbetween the Marines and the maraudingrebels. They succeeded in turning back rebelforces trying to reach the landing zone. TheNEO evacuations ran from 30 May through 3June, and a total of 2,509 people (including 454U.S. citizens) were evacuated.

SOF played critical but very different roles innumerous NEOs in the late 1990s. GeneralHenry H. Shelton attributed ASSUREDRESPONSE’s success to SOCEUR having “theright organization, the best equipment and,most important, the finest men and women everfielded in special operations.” SOF operatorsemphasized that “training as you are going tofight” fully prepared them for this short noticecontingency. The NEO in Sierra Leone wasostensibly a Marine operation, but SOF made acritical difference by being in the right place atthe right time. A mere 13 soldiers saved theembassy from further looting, protected crucialtalks between senior ambassadors and the rebelleaders, and prevented firefights between theMarines and the rebels. Special Forces soldiers’so-called non-military skills—cultural sensitivi-ty and area familiarization—paid large divi-dends. Likewise, the Special Forces sergeant inthe American embassy during SILVER WAKEresponded creatively in very fluid and ambigu-ous circumstances. Also, SOF participated inNEOs in the Congo and in Liberia for a secondtime. These NEOs demonstrated that SOF werethe right force for situations that required inde-pendent initiative and mature professionalismto execute U.S. policy.

Operation FIRM RESPONSECivil unrest in Brazzaville, the Congo, led

EUCOM to direct SOCEUR to prepare to deployan ESAT and follow-on forces for an embassyreinforcement and possible evacuation. Twenty-two American and six Marine guards remainedin the embassy as the security situation deterio-rated quickly. The French had approximately1,500 troops on the ground with armored vehi-cles and commandeered private vehicles outfit-ted for mounted patrols.

On 10 June, BG Geoffrey C. Lambert, COM-SOCEUR, sent a 12-man ESAT with six supportpersonnel in a 7th SOS MC-130H to Brazzavilleto link up with the Defense Attaché and Frenchat the airport, proceed to the embassy, andassess the embassy’s security. Arriving atMaya-Maya Airfield amidst heavy gunfire, theESAT unloaded the aircraft, and French para-troopers put 56 evacuees on the MC-130. Theteam moved to the embassy and began to hard-

79

Operation NOBLE OBELISK (May 1997) Special Forcessoldiers were in doing PT when a rebel force began

shooting in their compound.

en their areas and improve living conditions atthe embassy. During their nine days inBrazzaville, LTC David Mamaux led the teamon multiple trips outside the compound toretrieve much needed supplies and sensitivematerials, and to coordinate with the Frenchmilitary.

On 18 June, the team loaded the 12 remain-ing embassy personnel, their baggage, all sensi-tive items, and one dog, onto a chartered DC-3.The ESAT members and one Peace Corps vol-unteer departed Brazzaville later that sameday. The assessment team provided crucialassistance to the U.S. ambassador when rebelforces attacked Brazzaville. The team conduct-ed route reconnaissance, coordinated with theFrench military, provided communications sup-port, and organized the embassy staff for theNEO. Amidst considerable violence and loot-ing, this SOF team insured the safe evacuationof 69 Americans.

FIRM RESPONSE proved again the obviousvalue of engagement, area orientation, and situ-ational awareness. FIRM RESPONSE alsoillustrated the good and bad of command andcontrol. CINCEUR directed that this would be alow profile mission. The decision to deploy onlyan augmented ESAT on a single aircraft con-strained how the SOF ground commander con-ducted the operation and, ultimately, put SOF atrisk on the ground. Moreover, BG Lambert hadto accept responsibility for the mission but gaveup control to EUCOM J-3. In stark contrast toEUCOM’s handling of this operation, BGLambert picked the team leader for all the rightreasons—experience, Africa time, and warriorand diplomatic skills. And, he empowered himto operate in the fluid circumstances inBrazzaville. Lambert’s trust and confidence inhis subordinates paid off.

Operation FIRM RESPONSE demonstrat-ed what SOF brought to the “fight”—rapidplanning and force sizing; an integrated pack-age of air, ground, and maritime capabilities;mature, motivated, and well-trained militarypersonnel; and an ability to operate in anambiguous environment. FIRM RESPONSEexposed the dilemmas and opportunities con-fronting SOF leaders and operators as theyfaced the complex battlespace, which charac-terized the post-Cold War era and the earlytwenty-first century. It had a “classic mergingof all levels—tactical, operational, strategicand diplomatic,” where a bullet or a word or agesture could have had ramifications farbeyond Brazzaville.

80

ESAT team leader coordinates with French Legionnaires at Brazzaville. Amidst considerable violence and looting, thisSOF team, in the words of Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, “played a vital role . . . in ensuring the safe

evacuation of scores of official and non-official Americans. It is a testament to their superb training and talents that thisoperation was successfully carried out with no American casualties.”

Operation FIRM RESPONSE, ESAT vehicle at the U.S.Embassy in Brazzaville, June 1997.

Operation FUERTE APOYOIn October 1998, Hurricane Mitch brought

near 180-mph winds and approximately 18 inch-es of rain to Central America. The storm wasthe worst natural disaster to strike CentralAmerica, claiming nearly 10,000 dead andanother 13,000 missing in Honduras, Nicaragua,El Salvador, and Guatemala. Mitch destroyedapproximately 60 percent of the affected area’sinfrastructure, destroying over 300 bridges and70 percent of crops in the region, leaving2,000,000 homeless. U.S. SOF responded to thecall for aid before the rains had ended.

Phase I of the relief effort focused on therescue of flood victims and lasted until the endof November. Navy SEALs and Army SOF,working together, used Zodiacs and MH-60Blackhawk helicopters to rescue an estimated1,500 victims, including Carlos Flores Facusse,the president of Honduras. Members of the15th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) were

already in the area for a joint combinedexchange training (JCET) exercise when thehurricane struck. They immediately refocusedtheir mission to one of emergency assistance,delivering some 80 tons of oil, rice, beans, andsugar to villages cut off by the hurricane.

81

Humanitarian and Other Contingencies

MH-60G Blackhawk crew members provide emergencyevacuation to stranded villagers in the aftermath of

Hurricane Mitch.

Operation MOUNT HOPE III illustrated SOF’s capabilities to do quick turnaround, low visibility operations.In June 1988, MH-47s from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Group (now Regiment) airlifted a Soviet MI-25Hind helicopter from an isolated desert location to an airfield at night under extremely adverse weather conditions.

In Phase II, the relief phase, Civil Affairs(CA) soldiers helped to rebuild some of the infra-structures destroyed by the category five storm.SOF personnel cleaned wells, built roads andbridges, and ferried food, water and medical sup-plies to the hardest hit regions. Phase III of theoperation began in early March with the exer-cise NEW HORIZONS 99, whose aim was therestoration of the beleaguered region.

Ecuador, May 1999A test of SOF’s warrior skills occurred on the

evening of 2 May 1999 in northern Ecuador. Aconvoy, transporting 37 SOF personnel andEcuadorian soldiers to a joint counterdrug train-ing exercise, was attacked by local bandits. Thesix-vehicle convoy was negotiating a hairpinturn on a muddy jungle road when it came upona roadblock set up by a dozen masked and armedrobbers.

The bandits had already stopped two passen-ger buses and several cars, and were holdingabout 50 civilians along the side of the road.Two bandits opened fire on the convoy, hittingthe lead vehicle. The four Special Forces sol-diers in that vehicle and a Civil Affairs soldier inthe second vehicle engaged the bandits withtheir sidearms. Ecuadorian soldiers opened fireas well. After a firefight that lasted several min-utes, eight of the bandits fled, leaving behindtwo dead and two prisoners, one of whom was

wounded. One U.S. and one Ecuadorian soldiersuffered minor wounds, but there were no civil-ian casualties.

When the Ecuadorian soldiers interrogatedthe prisoners, the crowd turned ugly, shoutingfor the prisoners’ execution. The SOF soldierstook control and protected the prisoners fromthe angry crowd while a Special Forces medictreated the wounded. The dead and capturedattackers were then taken to the training siteand turned over to the local police. The govern-ment of Ecuador subsequently praised the actionas professional and appropriate. This incidentreaffirmed SOF’s mature judgment, readiness toreact to ambiguous situations, and commitmentto human rights.

Colombia, July 1999SOF’s ability to support far-flung contingen-

cies was again demonstrated in July 1999, dur-ing the recovery of a U.S. Army reconnaissanceaircraft that had crashed in the ColombianAndes. The crash killed five U.S. Army and twoColombian soldiers who had been engaged in anairborne counterdrug reconnaissance mission.

A search plane found the wrecked aircraftthe day after the crash, but poor weather andrugged terrain inhibited recovery efforts. At thedirection of General Charles Wilhelm, USCINC-SOUTH, Special Operations Command, South(SOCSOUTH) deployed two MH-60L helicopters

82

MH-60L helicopters from D Company, 160th SOAR (A) transported SOF personnel to the crash site in Colombia.

and support from Company D, 160th SOAR(A),and a liaison element. USSOCOM providedrefueling assets, combat controllers, weatherforecasters, and the requisite operational sup-port. Two 16th SOW MC-130E Combat Talonand one MC130H Combat Talon II moved theAFSOC elements from Hurlburt Field to Bogota,Colombia. An eight-man Special Forces elementfrom the 7th SFG (A)—already supporting thecounterdrug operational planning mission inBogota with the U.S. country team—was incor-porated into the operation to provide communi-cations, coordination with host nation units, andtheir unique operational skills. BrigadierGeneral James Parker, Commander SOC-SOUTH, was assigned to lead the effort.

The MH-60L crews had trained in high-altitude operations and were familiar with theregion and the host nation forces. The helicop-ters transported and inserted the SpecialForces soldiers and a USAF combat controllerinto the crash site. These SOF helpedColombian and other U.S. personnel searchthe wreckage. The MH-60Ls evacuatedremains from the crash site to the forwardoperating location, whereupon an MC-130Eand host nation aircraft carried them forwardto Bogota. The Combat Talons also providedrefueling capabilities at remote airfields thatlacked adequate fuel stores.

The crash siteproved to be anextremely danger-ous environment.The wreckage wassituated on a steepmountainside, withmuch of it suspend-ed from trees andbrush. The groundteams made anexhaustive searchof the wreckage andsurrounding areabut were unable toenter the aircraftfuselage or movelarge pieces of theaircraft. To meetthat challenge, aSpecial Forces team

with mountaineering experience and uniquedemolitions capabilities was brought in fromCompany C, 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG (A) inPuerto Rico. The team employed their special-ized skills to good effect and completed therecovery of remains and equipment from thecrash site. Upon completion of their mission, theSpecial Forces soldiers destroyed the remainingwreckage with explosives.

Approximately 120 SOF participated in themission. At the conclusion of the recovery oper-ation, General Wilhelm commended all of theparticipants, declaring that the “unknown tacti-cal situation, adverse weather, and rugged ter-rain made this the most difficult and challengingoperation of its type that I have seen in my 36years of service.”

Vietnam Flood ReliefOn 9 November 1999, after 60 inches of rain-

fall, the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam requestedan expedited military airlift of relief supplies.SOCPAC sent an MC-130H and an MC-130Efrom Okinawa to Guam to pick up relief sup-plies. Both aircraft were back in Okinawa,awaiting mission tasking three hours beforeSOCPAC received its orders. The aircraft deliv-ered relief supplies to Hue, Vietnam, andreturned to Okinawa by 11 November. The353rd SOG executed this mission in less than 36

83

A 353rd SOG crewman helps to unload supplies at Hue.

hours, including the time to pre-position sup-plies. The U.S. ambassador congratulated the353rd, saying that they were “the first to deliveraid to their doorstep. No other internationaldonor has made as immediate an impact on thevictims of the region as these flights allowed usto provide.”

Operation FUNDAMENTALRESPONSE

Two weeks of unrelenting rain led to flashflooding in northern Venezuela, roads andbridges were damaged or destroyed, and floodingand landslides isolated many communities. On16 December 1999, the government of Venezueladeclared a state of emergency. By 27 December,officials reported a possible death toll of up to30,000 with 400,000 people homeless. Soldiersfrom the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne)and the 160th Special Operations AviationRegiment (Airborne) were among the U.S. troopswho provided assistance to flood and mudslidesurvivors in Venezuela.

The Special Forces soldiers assisted in theevacuation efforts. The company’s mission wasto provide search and recovery and humanitari-an assistance in support of the relief effortnamed Operation FUNDAMENTALRESPONSE. The team arrived in the area on 17December 1999 and aided in the rescue andevacuation of approximately 3,000 people.

Joint Task Force FUNDAMENTALRESPONSE was established on 27 December1999 in response to a request from theAmerican Embassy in Caracas for search andrescue support and humanitarian assistance.The operation was conducted in twophases, emergency and rehabilitation.During the emergency phase, JTF-FRevacuated 5,558 Venezuelans; deliveredand distributed over 381 tons of food,medical supplies, water and other sup-plies; and participated in disaster relief,engineering, medical (to include haz-ardous materials), and water assess-ments. During the rehabilitation phase,the JTF mission was to produce and dis-tribute potable water. Reverse osmosiswater purification units produced2,891,686 gallons of potable water and

distributed 2,542,568 gallons of water. Rotarywing aircraft (MH-60 and MH47) flew 344 sor-ties.

Operation FIERY RELIEFSpecial Operations Command, Pacific forces

led U.S. humanitarian assistance operations inthe southern Philippines following the eruptionof the Mount Mayon Volcano. From 19 Feb - 4Mar 2000, SOCPAC forces transitioned fromExercise BALIKATAN 00 to relief operations toassist the Republic of the Philippines in easingthe suffering of over 70,000 refugees. A SOC-PAC C2 cell, an Operational Detachment Bravoand two Operational Detachments Alpha from1/1st SFG (A), and two C-130H Combat TalonIIs from 353rd Special Operations Group air-craft were employed to transport supplies andset up tentage for the refugees in Legazpi City.On 5 March, 23 tents were erected, using the“train the trainer” concept—the Special Forcessoldiers taught Filipino personnel to build tentswithout further assistance. The force reactedwithin 12 hours of notification and flawlesslyexecuted the mission, delivering 36,000 poundsof tents and dust masks to families staying atevacuation centers. The JTF Commander sum-marized the operation as follows:

“This was an outstanding example ofthe responsiveness and flexibility ofCINCPAC’s Special Operations Forces.Our operational time line was so con-strained that it afforded little room for anydelays or failures. It was a series of minormiracles and hard work on the part of the

84

Mount Mayon volcano erupting.

entire JTF and the U.S. embassy that con-tributed to the success of the mission.Those miracles were the result of personalrelationships developed by JTF personnelduring BALIKATAN and relationshipsestablished by the US Embassy over thelast few years. These relationships werethe key to our success.”

Operation ATLAS RESPONSEIn 2000, two tropical storms dumped heavy

rain in southeast Africa that left approximatelya million people homeless. In Mozambique, hun-dreds of thousands of residents fled their homes.Germany, France, Britain, Spain, Portugal,Malawi, and theNetherlands respondedwith a multinationalhumanitarian relief effort.Working with thesenations, the United Statessent Joint Task Force-ATLAS RESPONSE (JTF-AR) to provide assistanceto the devastated region.

SOCEUR provided theJoint Special OperationsTask Force-ATLASRESPONSE (JSOTF-AR),consisting of a headquar-ters and a Joint SpecialOperations Air Component(JSOAC). SOF alsoworked in the two Civil-Military Operations

Centers (CMOCs). Most impor-tant, the JSOTF integrated seam-lessly into the JTF structure,enabling SOF to make a numberof contributions that were criticalto the success of relief efforts inMozambique.

The JSOTF-AR flew the onlyhelicopters that were air refue-lable. These aircraft permittedthe JSOTF to extend the range ofcoverage and duration of flight sothat its aircrews could reach out-lying areas. MC-130P CombatShadow tankers provided fuel forthese aircraft.

SOF personnel, both CA soldiers andJSOTF staff members, worked closely withindividuals from various Non-GovernmentOrganizations (NGOs), Private VolunteerOrganizations (PVOs), and InternationalOrganizations (IOs) to coordinate relief efforts.After assessing conditions in the countryside,CA soldiers developed an exit strategy whichconvinced the government of Mozambique thatit could then manage the relief efforts.

The JSOTF used for the first time long haulcommunications system called the theaterdeployable communications system (TDC) andthis system contributed immeasurably to theJTF’s communications requirements. SOF intel-

85

CAPT Robert Harward, DEPCOMSOCPAC, led the SOF relief effort inFIERY RELIEF.

SOF Helicopters, like the MH-53M, were crucial to the relief because of the air refueling capability.

ligence assets augmented the JTF’s capabilitiesby having SOF intelligence personnel take low-level digital photographs from SOF aircraft offlooded and damaged areas, significantlyimproving information products.

By the end of the mission, the United Stateshad delivered more than 1.5 million pounds ofcargo and had flown more than 1,100 passengersas part of the international relief efforts.

Tsunami ReliefSOF participation in Operation UNIFIED

ASSISTANCE, the U.S. military Asian tsunamirelief effort, included a group from SBT-20 and22 that led teams of Thais and conventional U.S.sailors in riverine special warfare boats search-ing for and retrieving the dead from rivers,swamps, and coastal areas in Thailand.

An assessment team from the 4thPsychological Operations Group helped tobroadcast information for local officials andrelief organizations. CA teams from the 96thCivil Affairs Battalion assisted in planningand coordinating relief efforts. One of theseteams discovered refugee camps in remoteareas with unsanitary living conditions andmade sure that these conditions wereimproved. Thus, the refugees could safelyremain in the camps. Members of 1/1 SFG(A)assisted with relief efforts in Sri Lanka.

The 353rd SOG, flying five C-130s, wasinstrumental in the delivery of humanitarianaid and disaster relief to the tsunami ravagedcountries of Thailand and Indonesia. All told,they delivered 796,500 pounds of supplies, 591relief workers, conducted 32 casualty evacua-tion, and opened 4 airfields. The leadership and

assistance provided by 353rd SOG made a sig-nificant difference in improving the situation inBanda Aceh, as relief supplies and workers werepouring into the area creating a chaotic situa-tion.

Hurricane Katrina Relief EffortAfter Hurricane Katrina devastated the

coastal areas of Louisiana and Mississippi inAugust 2005, AFSOC forces, led by the 347thRescue Wing, assisted in emergency rescue oper-ations. From 30 August to 17 September, a totalof 20 HH-60 helicopters flew a 1,677 hours, sav-ing 4,283 trapped individuals and delivering52,598 pounds of cargo. This was the largestrescue operation ever conducted by the UnitedStates Air Force.

Personnel from 1/19th and 3/20th SFG (A)deployed to Louisiana to support HurricaneKatrina Relief efforts. In Mississippi, 126 per-sonnel from 4th Psychological Operations Groupsupported relief efforts.

86

Ramp at Banda Aceh in early January 2005 during Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. A 353rd SOG MC-130 is in the background.

38th Rescue Squadron airman and a young boy are lifted tosafety from the roof of the child’s flooded home in

New Orleans.

87

The U.S. Government quickly determinedthat Usama bin Laden (UBL) and his al Qaeda(AQ) terrorist network were responsible for the9/11 attacks. The Taliban regime inAfghanistan harbored Usama Bin Laden and hissupporters, and President Bush demanded thatthe Taliban hand them over to U.S. authorities.When the Taliban refused to comply, thePresident ordered U.S. Central Command(CENTCOM) to eliminateAfghanistan as a sponsor andsafe haven for internationalterrorists. This requiredremoving the Taliban frompower and liberating theAfghan people.

Afghanistan is a land-locked country approx-imately the size of Texas with a population ofaround 24 million. The massive mountainranges and remote valleys in the north and eastcontrasted with the near desert-like conditionsof the plains to the south and west. Road andrail networks were minimal and in disrepair.The rough terrain would challenge any U.S. mil-itary effort, especially moving large numbers ofconventional troops. Because bombing andcruise-missile attacks, which could be launchedquite soon, would probably not be decisive, andbecause a ground invasion might be decisive, butcould not begin for some time, even convention-al staff officers realized that an unconventionaloption could fill the gap between the convention-al courses of action.

In September 2001, CENTCOM did not havean Unconventional Warfare (UW) plan for

Afghanistan. Initially, CENTCOM only taskedthe Special Operations Command, Central(SOCCENT) with Combat Search and Rescue(CSAR), but SOCCENT planners, nonetheless,developed a plan for a UW campaign forAfghanistan in September. Late that month,after SOCCENT briefed its UW campaign plan,the CENTCOM Commander, General TommyFranks, said, “Okay. Do it.” Thus, SOF would

be his main effort against the Taliban.U.S. Army Special Forces doctrine described

seven phases of a U.S. sponsored insurgency:psychological preparation, initial contact, infil-tration, organization, buildup, combat opera-tions, and demobilization. Other governmentagencies, such as the State Department or theCentral Intelligence Agency, took the lead rolein the first three phases. U.S. SOF and DODwould typically take the leading role in the nextthree phases: organizing the insurgent forces;buildup (training and equipping the insurgentforces); and conducting combat operations withthe insurgents. The final phase would be demo-bilization, which would involve a variety of U.S.agencies and the newly-installed government, sothe “lead agency” for demobilization would varydepending on the situation.

Operation ENDURING FREEDOMAfghanistan

The Taliban (taken from “Tulaba,” referring tostudents of Islam) was a Sunni Islamic, pro-Pashtun movement that ruled most of the countryfrom 1996 until 2001, except for some small areasheld by Northern Alliance forces northeast ofKabul and in the northwest of the country.

GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Operation RESOLUTE EAGLEAfter 9/11, the first SOF counterterrorism operations were not conducted in Afghanistan oreven in the Middle East, but in Europe. Islamic extremists had transited the Balkans for yearsand had been involved in ethnic warfare in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In late September 2001, U.S.SOF learned that Islamic extremists with connections to Usama bin Laden were in Bosnia.SOCEUR forces quickly put together Operation RESOLUTE EAGLE to capture them. U.S.SOF surveilled the terrorists, detained one of the groups, and facilitated the capture of anoth-er group by coalition forces. These raids resulted in the capture of all the suspected terroristsand incriminating evidence for prosecution and intelligence exploitation.

The use of indigenous Islamic, anti-Talibanforces would undermine Taliban legitimacy andreinforce that the fight was between Afghans,and not a U.S. led war against Afghanistan orIslam. In September 2001, the only insurgencyopposing the Taliban was the beleagueredNorthern Alliance, which controlled about 10percent of Afghanistan.

To execute the plan, SOCCENT would standup Joint Special Operations Task Forces(JSOTFs), the first of which would be estab-lished in Uzbekistan and would focus on CSARand then UW. Beginning on 5 October, JointSpecial Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF-N) stood up CSAR operations (under commandof Col Frank Kisner) at Karshi-Kanabad (K2),Uzbekistan, and the bombing of Afghanistanbegan on 7 October. The 5th Special ForcesGroup (Airborne) (5th SFG(A)), under the com-mand of COL John Mulholland, deployed to K2and formed the core of this JSOTF, more com-monly known as Task Force (TF) DAGGER. UWbecame DAGGER’s principal mission. This taskforce included aviators from the 160th SpecialOperations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) and

Special Tactics personnel from the Air ForceSpecial Operations Command.

Operations in NorthernAfghanistan—Mazar-e Sharif

The UW plan called for SF OperationalDetachments Alpha (ODAs), augmented withtactical air control party (TACP) members, toland deep in hostile territory, contact members

88

Unconventional Warfare: A broad spec-trum of military and paramilitary opera-tions, normally of long duration, predomi-nately conducted by indigenous or surrogateforces who are organized, trained, equipped,supported, and directed in varying degreesby an external source. It includes guerrillawarfare and other direct offensive, low visi-bility, covert, or clandestine operations, aswell as the indirect activities of subversion,sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasionand escape. Special operations Forces (SOF)provide advice, training, and assistance toexisting indigenous resistance organizations.

Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia 16 July 1997

Map of Afghanistan displaying terrain and major cities.

of the Northern Alliance (NA), coordinate theiractivities in a series of offensive operations, callU.S. airpower to bear against Taliban and AQforces, and help overthrow the government ofAfghanistan. Bad weather in Uzbekistan andnorthern Afghanistan delayed the infiltration ofthe first ODAs in Afghanistan until the night of19 October 2001. This insertion, and the onesthat followed, required a hazardous, two-and-a-half hour flight, at night, through high moun-tains, and in extremely dicey weather.

After the first 12-man detachment, ODA 595,reached its landing zone south of Mazar-eSharif, it linked up with General Abdul RashidDostum, a warlord with a strong power base inthis area. ODA 595 split into two elements tobetter assist Dostum’s scattered forces.

Team Alpha began calling in close air sup-port (CAS) from U.S. aircraft, but Dostum ini-tially forbade the team from moving close to theTaliban lines. He told the SF soldiers, “500 ofmy men can be killed, but not one American caneven be injured or you will leave.” Shortly, theteam chose their own observation posts (OPs),and their calls for fire became more effective.

The massive close air support, brought downby the team, had a huge adverse psychologicaleffect on the Taliban and a correspondingly pos-itive effect on General Dostum’s men. Startingon 22 October, Team Alpha rode on horses withDostum’s cavalry, and from OPs, team memberscalled in CAS missions. In one 18-hour period,they destroyed over 20 armored and 20 supportvehicles. At first, the Taliban sent in reinforce-ments, but all that did was provide more targetsfor the SOF in the OPs. Numerous key com-mand posts, armored vehicles, troop concentra-tions, and anti-aircraft artillery pieces weredestroyed by air strikes.

Meanwhile, Team Bravo, also mounted onhorseback, moved south and interdictedTaliban forces in the Alma Tak MountainRange, destroying over 65 enemy vehicles, 12command positions, and a large enemy ammu-nition storage bunker. ODA 534, who insertedin early November to assist Mohammed Atta’sforces allied with Dostum, also directed CAS tosimilar effect.

Mazar-e Sharif fell to Dostum and the ODAon 10 November. The capture of Mazar-e Sharifwas the first major victory for the U.S.-led coali-tion in the war in Afghanistan, giving it a strate-gic foothold and an airfield in northernAfghanistan. The victory once again validatedSF’s UW role as a combat multiplier. This tem-plate was used elsewhere in Afghanistan.

Objectives Rhino and GeckoOn the night of 19-20 October 2001, U.S.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) airdropped intoAfghanistan, seizing two objectives and demon-

89

“Right off the bat,” RADM Albert Calland, SOCCENT Commander, recalled, “we knew thatthe Northern Alliance was working, we knew the history that the Soviets had, and that bring-ing a large land force into Afghanistan was not the way to do business. So, it became quickly

apparent that the way to do this was to get 5th Group and put them in place to start a UWcampaign.”

strating America’s ability to assault into Talibanstrongholds. The plan called for pre-assaultfires and then a Ranger airborne insertion onObjective Rhino and a helicopterinsertion/assault on Objective Gecko.

Objective Rhino, a desert landing stripsouthwest of Kandahar, was divided into fourobjectives, TIN, IRON, COPPER, and COBALT(a walled compound). Before the Rangers para-chuted in, B-2 Stealth bombers dropped 2,000pound bombs on Objective TIN. Then, AC-130gunships fired on buildings and guard towerswithin Objective COBALT, and identified no tar-gets in Objective IRON. The gunships placedheavy fire on Objective TIN, reporting 11 enemyKIAs and 9 “squirters.”

After the pre-assault fires, four MC-130sdropped 199 Army Rangers, from 800 feet andunder zero illumination, onto Objective RHINO.A Company(-), 3rd Battalion, 75th Rangers, withan attached sniper team, assaulted ObjectiveTIN. They next cleared Objective IRON andestablished blocking positions to repel counter-attacks. C Company assaulted ObjectiveCOBALT, with PSYOP loudspeaker teamsbroadcasting messages encouraging the enemyto surrender. The compound was unoccupied.

A Combat Talon landed 14 minutes afterclearing operations began, and six minutes later,a flight of helicopters landed at the RHINO for-ward arming and refueling point (FARP). AirForce Special Tactics Squadron (STS) personnelalso surveyed the desert landing strip, and over-head AC-130s fired upon enemy reinforcements.After more than five hours on the ground, theRangers boarded MC-130s and departed, leavingbehind PSYOP leaflets.

Objective GECKO was the compound belong-ing to Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar.SOF’s mission was to disrupt Taliban leadershipand AQ communications, gather intelligence,and detain select personnel. AC-130s and MH-60s delivered pre-assault fires on the objective.Four MH-47s infiltrated 91 SOF troopers ontothe compound. Security positions were estab-lished, and the buildings on the objective werecleared. While the ground forces were clearingthe buildings, the MH-60s provided CAS, andthe MH-47s loitered waiting to pick up the force.The ground force spent one hour on the objec-tive.

While Objectives RHINO and GECKO werebeing assaulted, four MH-60K helicoptersinserted 26 Rangers and two STS at a desert airstrip, to establish a support site for contingencyoperations. One MH-60K crashed while landingin “brown-out” conditions, killing two Rangersand injuring others.

Securing Kabul and northeasternAfghanistan

On 19 October, TF DAGGER also infiltrateda second detachment, ODA 555, into northeast-ern Afghanistan to contact the NorthernAlliance forces dug in on the Shomali Plains,where they controlled an old Soviet airbase atBagram. The Special Forces team met with war-lords General Fahim Khan and GeneralBismullah Khan on 21 October at BagramAirfield (BAF) to establish a plan to retake theShomali Plains between Bagram and Kabul.Upon surveying the airfield, the detachment dis-covered that the air traffic control tower was anideal position for an OP. The control tower pro-vided observation of Taliban forces across theplains, and 555 began calling in air strikes. Thecalls for fire lasted through mid-November, and“Triple Nickel” was assisted by ODA 594 whichinserted on 8 November.

The bombings so weakened the Taliban andits defenses that the Generals Khan decided toattack south, well ahead of schedule. When theNorthern Alliance soldiers attacked on 13November, the enemy defenses crumbled, andon the next day, to the surprise of the worldpress, General Fahim Khan’s ground forces lib-erated Kabul without incident. The Taliban andal Qaeda forces had fled in disarray towardKandahar in the south and into the sanctuary ofthe Tora Bora Mountains to the east nearJalalabad.

While prosecuting the fight for Mazar-eSharif and the Shomali Plains, TF DAGGERsimultaneously focused on the central northernarea around Taloqan-Konduz, to the east ofMazar-e Sharif. ODA 585 had infiltrated intothe area on 23 October to support BurillahKhan. On 8 November, ODA 586 inserted andmoved quickly to link up with General DaoudKhan, a warlord who had gained fame fightingthe Soviet invaders. By 11 November, SF sol-diers had established OPs overlooking the defen-

90

sive positions around Taloqan and were pre-pared to call in close air support. Daoudlaunched his offensive that day and by midnightTaloqan had fallen, a major victory for the NA.Daoud and his SF began moving west, towardthe city of Konduz.

On 13 November, Daoud met his first heavyresistance, andafter receivingboth heavy directand indirect fire,the SF elementrepositioned to adifferent OP,called in airstrikes, andhelped to repel aTaliban counterat-tack. Daoud reliedon U.S. air attacksto weaken theTaliban, and forthe next ten days,the ODAs andtheir TACPscalled in air support to pound Taliban forcesnear Khanabad and Konduz. Daoud initiatedtalks with the enemy in Konduz, and theTaliban leaders agreed to surrender on 23November.

Qala-i JangiAs part of the terms, the Taliban and foreign

fighters would capitulate on 25 November, andthe Northern Alliance would incarcerate them inQala-i Jangi fortress, Dostum’s former head-quarters. But on 24 November, at a checkpointnear the Mazar-e Sharif airport, NA forcesstopped an armed enemy convoy and acceptedthe surrender of the enemy force, a day earlyand 100 miles west of the agreed upon capitula-tion site. Despite warnings by the AmericanSpecial Forces soldiers, the NA did not searchthe prisoners and, instead, only simply toldthem to lay down their arms. The prisonerswere taken to the Qala-i Jangi fortress, meaning“house of war.” This huge, nineteenth centuryfortress on the western outskirts of Mazar-eSharif was divided in half by a 20-foot high mud-brick wall. The enemy prisoners were housed inthe southern compound, which contained a stor-

age area for ammunition and weapons and anunderground bunker.

As the prisoners were unloaded at thefortress, NA guards attempted to search them,and one prisoner exploded a grenade in a suicideattack, killing himself, two other prisoners, andtwo NA officers. Later the same evening, prison-

ers carried out asecond grenadesuicide attackagainst theguards, whomthey outnum-bered four toone. The nextday, two CIAagents went tothe fortress toquestion thep r i s o n e r s .While theyquestioned pris-oners, theenemy attackedand overpow-

ered their guards, seizing control of the southerncompound along with its stockpile of ammuni-tions and weapons. They killed one of theAmericans, Mike Spann, and the secondAmerican narrowly escaped but remainedpinned down inside the fortress.

The Battle of Qala-i Jangi lasted from 25 to29 November, and U.S. SOF assisted the NAforces in quelling this revolt. The ad hoc reac-tion force—consisting of American and Britishtroops, DIA linguists, and local interpreters—established overwatch positions, set up radiocommunications, and had a maneuver elementsearch for the trapped CIA agent. This

91

An Aerial View of Qala-i Jangi.

U.S. SOF and NA on the northwest parapet of the Qala-i Jangi Fortress.

American escaped on the 25th. The next day, asthe SOF reaction force called in air strikes, onebomb landed on a parapet and injured fiveAmericans, four British, and killed severalAfghan troops. The pilots had inadvertentlyentered friendly coordinates rather than targetcoordinates into the Joint Direct AttackMunition (JDAM) guidance system. Later dur-ing the battle, AC-130s were used to contain theenemy. Ultimately, the NA forces, supported bytank fire, fought their way into the southerncompound. An American team recovered thebody of the dead American. On 29 November,the last of the enemy fighters surrendered.

The timing of the enemy uprising suggestedthat the Taliban planned to use the “TrojanHorse” attack to slip armed enemy soldiers intoa lightly defended position near Mazar-e Sharif.Had the gambit succeeded, the Taliban couldhave controlled the main approach to Mazar-eSharif and the massive munitions stockpile atQala-i Jangi, and would likely be reinforced byarmed enemy forces pre-positioned nearby. U.S.SOF and Northern Alliance efforts at Qala-iJangi prevented that from taking place.

The U.S. SOF officer who commanded theground force, MAJ Mark Mitchell, received thefirst Distinguished Service Cross awarded sincethe Vietnam War for his leadership. A NavySEAL, BMCS Stephen Bass, received the NavyCross for his actions and leadership during thisbattle.

During the Mazar-e Sharif and Taloqan-Konduz campaigns, the Northern Allianceforces, accompanied by SOF ODAs and joint tac-tical air controllers (JTACs) directing air strikes,liberated six provinces of Afghanistan. Toaccomplish this feat, SF and JTAC personnelhad traveled by horse, all-terrain vehicle, pickuptruck, and on foot along hazardous mountaintrails, often at night and in extremes of weatherand terrain. They did all of this in about amonth with only a few U.S. casualties, whileinflicting thousands of casualties on the enemyand completing the destruction of Taliban andAQ defensive positions in the north.

Beside SF and AFSOC, other SOF combatmultipliers made significant contributions to theliberation of northern and central Afghanistan.PSYOP leaflets offered rewards for fugitiveTaliban and AQ leaders, informed the Afghan

people about their pending liberation, andwarned them of the dangers of unexploded ord-nance and mines. Civil Affairs teams with TaskForce DAGGER began assessing humanitarianneeds even as the fighting was winding down innorthern Afghanistan.

Two Approaches to KandaharFollowing the tactical successes in northern

Afghanistan, Kandahar, far to the south, wasthe next U.S. objective. The populous city was ofa different ethnic makeup—Pashtuns, notTajiks—and was the spiritual and political cen-ter of the Taliban movement.

Two separate SF elements infiltrated intothe region on 14 November, linked up with anti-Taliban forces, and approached the city from thenorth and the south, with the host nation com-manders picking up support along the way.ODA 574 inserted into Tarin Khowt to supportand protect the emerging choice asAfghanistan’s future leader, Hamid Karzai.Only two days later, ODA 574 had to act quicklyto save Karzai’s resistance group from destruc-tion. Fearing Karzai’s potential power, Talibanleaders sent 500 soldiers north to crush him. Inresponse, Karzai deployed his handful of menand relied on his SF team for CAS. U.S. planespounded the Taliban convoy, and the Afghanopposition fighters repulsed the attack.

On 5 December, the U.S. effort suffered a set-back. While the Special Forces were calling inCAS, a 2,000-pound JDAM bomb landed in themiddle of their position. The soldiers were liter-ally blown off their feet. Three Americans werekilled and dozens wounded, along with many oftheir Afghan allies.

As the SF teams were recovering from thebomb accident, Karzai’s negotiators finalized an

92

Two SOF operators identify targets.

agreement for the surrender of the Talibanforces and the city of Kandahar. On 6December, the force began moving again towardthe now open city.

Meanwhile, to the southeast of Kandaharnear thePakistan border,on the night of18 November,another SF ele-ment from TFDAGGER, ODA583, infiltratedand joined thelocal anti-Taliban leader,Gut Sharzai, theformer governorof Kandahar.His force washeavily outnum-bered by thelocal Taliban andin a vulnerable position. The SF team movedquickly to provide weapons and food to supporthis army of close to 800 tribesmen.

In late November, the ODA’s CAS callsdrove the Taliban out of the Takrit-e Pol area,and Sharzai’s forces seized the town and themain highway from Spin Boldak to Kandahar.These successes allowed Sharzai’s forces to manan OP overlooking the Kandahar Airfield, andfor the next week, ODA 583 directed CAS onTaliban positions. On 7 December, as his forcesmoved to attack the airfield, Sharzai learned ofthe surrender terms Karzai had negotiated.Sharzai gathered his personal security detailand, along with members of 583, sped into thecity toward the governor’s mansion, his formerhome. The city had fallen without a shot, andKarzai subsequently confirmed Sharzai as thegovernor of the city.

Tora Bora

In mid-November 2001, the CIA beganreceiving reports that a large contingent of AQ,to include UBL, had fled from the area aroundKabul to Nangahar Province. Subsequentreporting corroborated AQ presence in the vicin-ity of Jalalabad and to its south along the SpinGhar Mountain Range. Analysts within both

the CIA and CENTCOM correctly speculatedthat UBL would make a stand along the north-ern peaks of the Spin Ghar Mountains at a placethen called Tora Gora. Tora Bora, as it was re-dubbed in December, had been a major strong-

hold of AQ foryears and provid-ed routes intoPakistan. Themountainous com-plex sat betweenthe Wazir andAgam valleys andamidst 12,000 footpeaks, roughly 15kilometers northof the Pakistanborder. AQ haddeveloped fortifi-cations, stockpiledwith weapon sys-tems, ammunitionand food within

the jagged, steep terrain. The terrorists hadimproved their positions over many years, dig-ging hundreds of caves and refuges and estab-lishing training camps. UBL knew the terrainfrom the time of the Soviet invasion and chose it,undoubtedly, as a place to make a stand prior tothe onset of winter and to defeat Americanattempts both to capture senior leaders anddestroy the organization. Estimates of AQ troopstrength ranged widely from 250 to 2000 person-nel. With large numbers of well-supplied, fanat-ical AQ troops dug into extensive fortified posi-tions, Tora Bora appeared to be an extremelytough target.

Moreover, the local anti-Taliban forces of theEastern Alliance (also dubbed OppositionGroup—OG—forces), under the command ofGenerals Hazarat Ali and Haji Zaman, wereeven more disorganized than those of the NA.Not only were OG forces divided into mutuallyhostile factions competing for control ofNangahar Province, but each group was alsodeeply distrustful of American aims. Ali wasespecially reluctant to ally himself overtly toU.S. forces, given his fears that he would beblamed for introducing foreign occupying troopsinto eastern Afghanistan. Based on estimates,Ali and Zaman may have had up to 2000 men,

93

Hamid Karzai (middle row, third from left)and Special Forces.

but whether this force would prove adequate toboth assault fortifications and encircle theenemy remained to be seen. Given AQ’s orienta-tion, surrounding and cutting off the terrorists’egress routes would also prove a tremendouschallenge, especially given uncertain forceratios. Added to these challenges were theadvent of Ramadan in December and the factthat AQ was known to have a sympathetic fol-lowing in Nangahar Province, particularly in the

vicinity of Tora Bora. The likelihood of success-fully repeating combined operations that hadworked so well in the Shomali Plains, Konduz,and Mazar-e Sharif seemed remote.

American troop levels in Afghanistan werefar from robust in late November 2001. In mid-November, the CIA had deployed one of its“Jawbreaker” teams to Jalalabad to encourageGeneral Ali’s pursuit of UBL and to call airstrikes against the AQ forces. The Jawbreakerelement, however, was very small and the oper-atives needed assistance. Few conventionalforces were available. At the time, the U.S.Marines had established a small forward base atRhino, south of Kandahar, and only a reinforcedcompany of the 10th Mountain Division was atBagram and Mazar-e Sharif.

TF DAGGER had already committed most ofits forces elsewhere in Afghanistan. Whenapproached by the CIA, the Dagger commander,COL John F. Mulholland, agreed to commit anODA and potentially a few others once the“Jawbreaker” team had established a presenceand developed a feasible plan. Even if TF DAG-GER—or even CENTCOM—had the forces tocommit, the existing logistics infrastructurewould likely have proven insufficient to sustaina long fight. Few MEDEVAC and resupply plat-forms were currently in country.

Thus, a general consensus emerged withinCENTCOM that despite its obvious limitations,the only feasible option remained the existingtemplate: employment of small SOF teams tocoordinate airpower in support of Afghan mili-tia. On 2 December, ODA 572, using the code-name COBRA 25, convoyed to Jalalabad both toprod General Ali to attack and coordinate airsupport.

The forces of Hazarat Ali were a heteroge-neous mixture of Eastern Alliance soldierswhose fighting qualities proved remarkablypoor. Given its resource constraints, TF DAG-GER would permit COBRA 25 only to providethe Afghans advice and assistance with air sup-port, not to lead them into battle or venturetoward the forward lines. The plan was to sendthe Afghan forces into the Tora Bora Mountainsto assault AQ positions located in well-protectedcanyons, with the ODA in observation posts.The latest intelligence placed senior AQ leaders,including UBL, squarely in Tora Bora.

94

ISAF’s Role

Following the fall of the Taliban regime inNovember 2001, factions from Afghanistangathered in Bonn, Germany, to develop aplan for Afghanistan’s future. The Afghanleaders signed an agreement on 5 December2001, establishing an interim governmentand setting milestones for establishment ofan army, a constitution, and presidentialand parliamentary elections. Six days later,on 11 December, Hamid Karzai was swornin as Prime Minister of the interim govern-ment.

With the Bonn Agreement in place, theinternational community pledged support tohelp the new government and committed anInternational Security Assistance Force(ISAF). ISAF was to assist the Governmentof Afghanistan (GOA) and the internationalcommunity by maintaining security withinits area of operation. Additionally ISAFwould support GOA efforts to provide a safeand secure environment for elections,spread the rule of law, and assist in thereconstruction of the country.

Initially, ISAF focused on securingKabul. In August 2003, the UN SecurityCouncil authorized the expansion of theISAF mission beyond Kabul, and in August2004, NATO assumed authority for ISAF.Over time, ISAF took over responsibility forsecurity operations from the U.S.-led coali-tion in the regional commands (RCs) estab-lished throughout the country. ISAF wouldtake over RC North in October 2003, RCWest in September 2005, RC South in July2006, and RC East in October 2006.

Directing joint fires and various groups ofAfghans toward AQ positions, COBRA 25 hopedto either capture or destroy UBL and his AQ fol-lowers.

The detachment moved south out ofJalalabad to General Ali’s headquarters in thevicinity of Pachir Agam on 6 December and com-pleted plans to establish OPs along the highground northwest and northeast of the canyon.The ODA established an OP on the canyon’seastern ridgeline on 7 December with seven per-sonnel and immediately began directing air sup-port. The detachment called the positionCOBRA 25A. The detachment then establisheda second OP, COBRA 25B, with six personnel onthe northwestern side of the canyon Bora on 8December. Small Afghan security elementsaccompanied each split teams to protect themwhile they called air strikes. COBRA 25Brelieved a “Jawbreaker” element that had beenin position calling air strikes for five days. Thesplit teams then coordinated their air strikes,bottling AQ into its defensive positions and pre-venting it from moving north.

As COBRA 25 established its surveillancepositions, CENTCOM committed an additionalSOF Task Force, TF 11, to the fight at ToraBora. On 8 December, TF 11 assumed commandand control of the battle. Lacking the restric-tions imposed upon the ODA, TF 11 planned tomove its elements farther south in concert withAli’s troop movements and along his front linetrace. TF 11 could commit a larger number ofU.S. SOF personnel, and even employ a smallBritish contingent. Still, the TF 11 force pack-age would total only 50 SOF personnel, andadded to the 13 personnel from COBRA 25, theSOF contingent would be up against a muchlarger force in a mountainous area approximate-ly 9.5 kilometers wide and 10 kilometers long.

Along with General Ali, TF 11’s ground forcecommander conducted his initial reconnaissanceof the Tora Bora area on 8 December. He caughta glimpse of just how well-defended the AQ for-tifications were during this reconnaissance.After entering the northeastern portion of themain battle area, the reconnaissance partyreceived accurate small arms and mortar fire.Fortunately, the party took no casualties. TheTF 11 commander also discovered that GeneralAli’s forces maintained no real front line trace,

but rather clusters of troops in the Agam Valleythat were scattered willy-nilly.

The restrictions placed on COBRA 25 pre-vented them from observing activity in the cen-ter and south of the battle area. The TF 11 com-mander planned on inserting several OPs for-ward of OPs 25A and 25B during hours of dark-ness of 10 December, and augment both 25A and25B OPs with two TF 11 operators each.

In the late afternoon on 10 December, how-ever, General Ali requested that several SOFpersonnel accompany him to the front to directCAS in support of a planned frontal assault.With only a five-minute notice, the SOF com-mander sent two SOF and one translator to sup-port the general and show that Americans wouldface the same dangers his men did. At approxi-mately 1600 local, Afghan troops reported thatthey had not only spotted UBL but had him sur-rounded, and asked for additional help.Changing mission from planning to execution,the TF 11 commander directed his task force (33soldiers) to move quickly to the front to supportAli. With darkness rapidly approaching, theSOF element spent at least a half-hour convinc-ing Ali’s rear echelon to provide guides to thefront. Guides secured, the SOF element loadedinto six Toyota pick-ups to begin its 10 kilometertrek at approximately 1730 local. Midway enroute while traversing a steep, one vehicle trail,the Americans ran into a convoy of Ali and hismen departing the battlespace. As the Afghanforces passed by, Ali promised the TF command-er that he would turn his convoy around at thebottom of the hill to continue the pursuit of UBL.Neither Ali nor his forces would return thatnight.

In the meantime, the two SOF operators whohad accompanied Ali began receiving effectivefire from multiple AQ positions in the northeastquadrant of the battlespace. Upon receivingfire, the remaining Afghan soldiers fled the bat-tlefield, leaving the two special operators andtheir translator both stranded and potentiallysurrounded. These SOF personnel radioed theirevasion codeword and began moving underenemy fire toward friendly positions.Fortunately, the SOF evaders had communica-tions with the TF 11 soldiers in 25A OP; theysent word to the task force, now mounted androughly two-thirds of its way to the front.

95

As the evaders attempted to clear the dangerareas, the men of TF 11 tried to locate anyAfghan OP with eyes on the AQ front line andUBL specifically. No such position existed. TheAfghan guides who accompanied the SOF per-sonnel grew extremely nervous as the partyapproached known AQ positions and refused togo farther. Faced with the improbable circum-stance of Ali’s return, much less pinpointingUBL’s position at night, the QRF turned itsattention to recovering the evaders. After mov-ing several kilometers under cover of darkness,attempting to ascertain friend from foe, andnegotiating through “friendly” checkpoints with-out requisite dollars forthe required levy topass, the evaders finallylinked up with their par-ent element. Allreturned to base toreassess the situationand plan for subsequentinsertion the followingday.

Despite what in ret-rospect may haveseemed a comedy oferrors, the events of 10December proved to bethe decisive ones of theoperation at Tora Bora.The decision to augmentCOBRA 25A with twoTF 11 personnel provedvery beneficial. Havingobserved and recordedthe events unfolding atthe AQ strongpoint, to include Ali’s retreat andthe SOF evasion, the TF 11 soldiers successfullyidentified AQ mortar positions and heavymachine guns. Upon the departure of friendlypersonnel the night of 10 December, these twosoldiers, along with the COBRA 25A JTAC,called air strikes for 17 continual hours on 10-11December, knocking out principal AQ positions.The decisive point in the battle for Tora Bora,the actions on 10-11 December, caused AQ ele-ments to retreat to alternate positions andenabled the Afghan militia to capture key ter-rain in the vicinity of UBL’s potential locationthe following day.

Events of 10 December also led TF 11 torevise its plan. It had originally intended toemploy several small OPs while keeping thebulk of its forces at General Ali’s headquartersto provide a quick reaction force (QRF). Thepurpose of the QRF was to respond either tosightings of UBL or to employ forces to assist Aliin exploiting an advance. After his experiencesof 9-10 December, the task force commanderdetermined that he needed more forces forwardto establish a front and thus entice Ali to holdterrain. Additionally, he and his men believedthat there would be nothing “quick” about anyresponse from a rearward position, given the dif-

ficulties they hadencountered and theirlack of any rotary winglift.

Thus, on the after-noon of 11 December,TF 11 elements begantheir treks into the ToraBora Mountains. Thetask force planned toinsert at least four OPsin a northern arc andmove them graduallyforward as they directedjoint fires onto AQ posi-tions. Two mission sup-port sites (MSSs) woulddeploy just behind theOPs to provide local, dis-mounted QRF and logis-tics support and to liaisewith General Ali’sforces. For the most

part, the movements proved slow and haz-ardous. After a short trip in the ubiquitous pick-up trucks, the various TF 11 teams unloadedand moved forward on foot with burros carryingtheir packs. Moving into mountains where thealtitude varied from 10,000 to 12,000 feet, theyprogressed slowly over rocky and narrow paths.

From the 11th - 14th of December, the TF 11teams continually rained fire onto enemy posi-tions as the Afghan forces of Hazarat Ali beganmoving into the canyons. The teams hit targetsof opportunity, to include the suspected locationsof UBL, all the while attempting to avoid fratri-cide in the absence of any semblance of a front

96

Air Strikes in the Tora Bora Mountains.

line trace. On the afternoon of 11 December, ina Byzantine twist, Ali’s erstwhile compatriotturned rival, General Zaman, engaged in negoti-ations with AQ elements for a conditional sur-render. CENTCOM refused to support theaction, but the negotiation caused TF 11 topause bombing for several hours to avoid fratri-cide. For each evening through the 14th, Ali andZaman’s forces departed from the terrain thatthey had seized to seek shelter and eat.Ramadan had commenced, and Eastern Allianceforces observed religious requirements to fastduring daylight hours. The TF 11 operatorswere frequently the only individuals occupying

terrain from the combinedeffort, save a nominalAfghan security detail.

Despite the challenges,each day the various TF 11observation posts would alsomove forward to call formore accurate fire and sup-port the movement of Ali’sforces. Each night, as theenemy forces would lighttheir campfires to keepwarm, the teams used theirthermal imagers and opticsto bring in bombs and firemissions from a variety ofaircraft, including AC-130gunships. Having obviatedthe need for OPs 25B and25A, the task force com-

mander pulled both elements on the early morn-ings of 13 and 14 December respectively. By 14December, the task force commander convincedAli and his men to occupy overnight the terrainthat they had captured. The noose around AQtightened consistently through 17 December,and the enemy pocket shrank accordingly. By17 December, Ali declared victory. The generalconsensus remained that the surviving AQforces had either fled to Pakistan or melted intothe local population. TF 11 forces departed thebattlefield on 19 December, but without know-ing whether they had killed UBL and destroyedAQ in Afghanistan.

97An SF Soldier assists Eastern Alliance Soldiers in supervising al Qaeda Prisoners.

The enemy had fought stubbornly; yet, theirfortifications proved no match for the tons of ord-nance, coordinated by SOF in OPs. Estimates ofAQ dead from the battle were hard to determine.TF 11’s ground force commander estimatedroughly 250. What has since been determinedwith reasonable certainty was that UBL wasindeed in the vicinity of Tora Bora in December2001. All source reporting corroborated his pres-ence on several days from 9-14 December. Thefact that SOF came as close to capturing orkilling UBL as U.S. forces have to date makesTora Bora a controversial fight. Given the com-mitment of fewer than 100 American personnel,U.S. forces proved unable to block egress routesfrom Tora Bora south into Pakistan, the routethat UBL most likely took. Regardless, thedefeat for AQ at Tora Bora, coupled with thelater defeat during Operation ANACONDA,ensured that neither AQ, nor the Taliban wouldmass forces to challenge American troops in thefield until 2006. SOF elements proved onceagain that combining airpower in support of asurrogate force could result in a decisive defeatof a well-fortified and numerically superiorenemy force, no matter how disciplined.

With the capture of Kabul and Kandaharand the destruction of organized resistance inTora Bora, Afghanistan was now in effect liber-ated. It had taken fewer than 60 days of concen-trated military operations and only a few hun-dred soldiers to seize the country from theTaliban and its terrorist allies. On 11 December2001 Hamid Karzai was sworn in as PrimeMinister of the interim government.

Operation ANACONDABut, the success of the SOCCENT UW cam-

paign did not mean that all Taliban or AQ hadbeen killed or driven out of Afghanistan. Thecoalition forces continued to search for under-ground enemy networks. The focus of U.S.intelligence shifted toward the southeast,specifically the Gardez-Khowst-Orgun-e trian-gle. Indications pointed to a major concentra-tion of enemy forces in the Shah-i-Khot Valleyin Paktia Province. The operation to destroythe enemy there was code-named OperationANACONDA.

U.S. SOF had been monitoring for well overa month a large-scale pocket of forces in the

Shah-i-Khot valley, southeast of Gardez. TFDAGGER began planning for an operationagainst AQ and Taliban forces in late Januaryafter ODA 594 was told of their existence duringa reconnaissance mission. DAGGER initiallyconsidered the option of attacking into the valleyusing ODAs to lead Afghan militia forces.Intelligence, however, painted a daunting pic-ture, indicating potentially 1,000 al Qaeda.

Judging his troop to task ratio as insuffi-cient, COL Mulholland turned to conventionalforces for assistance. The planning effort, andcommand and control of the forces involved inthe operation, was assumed by CJTF MOUN-TAIN under the command of the 10th MountainDivision Commander, MG Franklin L. “Buster”Hagenbeck, on 15 February. The plan grew toinclude additional troops from the 10thMountain Division and 101st Airborne Division.By mid-February, a total of six ODAs, three SOFC2 elements, three other SOF elements, and aU.S. infantry brigade of three battalions wereinvolved, along with nearly 1,000 AfghanMilitary Forces (AMF) trained by the SpecialForces.

The operation called for isolation and encir-clement of the valley area, followed by converg-ing attacks to destroy AQ forces. A mixture ofAfghan militia, U.S. and coalition SOF (CSOF),and conventional forces would establish threesets of concentric rings astride enemy escaperoutes before the main strike into terroristdefenses in the valley. JSOTF-S, known as TFK-BAR, would lead the initial reconnaissanceeffort. At approximately D-3, CSOF from TF K-BAR, to include TF 64 (Australian SAS), wouldbegin occupying infiltration positions to observeenemy movements and direct air strikes. Infact, TF K-BAR would insert 21 SR teams whosubsequently called in a steady stream of CASthroughout the operation, arguably saving theday for forces introduced on Takur Ghar.

At D-1, 1 March, about 600 SF-led Afghanmilitia (TF ANVIL) would move into positionalong major enemy routes of retreat and CJTFMOUNTAIN would air assault elements of boththe 101st and 10th Mountain Divisions into aninner ring of blocking positions along the easternside of the valley. Finally, TF HAMMER, a 260-man combination of ODAs and Afghan militia,would assault into the valley as the main effort.

98

TF HAMMER included a secondary effort of 40Afghans that would establish a blocking positionin the vicinity of the Little Whale (a terrain fea-ture).

The ANACONDA planners believed that thiscombined maneuver would clear AQ from theWhale—a distinctive terrain feature southeastof Gardez—and adjacent valleys, forcing theminto the blocking positions or into the openwhere they would be eliminated.

In war, however, things rarely go exactly asplanned—the enemy has a “vote.” OperationANACONDA proved to be no exception. ThreeSOF teams were inserted into OPs before D-Dayto validate TF RAKASSAN’s LZs, verify pres-ence of High Value Targets (HVTs), and provideterminal guidance for CAS. These teams veri-

fied heavy enemy presence and were able to dis-able a heavy machine-gun covering one of theconventional HLZs. During the operation, theycontinually called in CAS. Rather than flee, thedisciplined and well trained AQ soldiers stoodand fought, and at times were reinforced along aseries of draws and trails at the southern end ofthe valley near Marzak, dubbed the “ratline.”While TF ANVIL met minimal resistance on D-1, TF HAMMER met intense resistance on D-Day, 2 March. The enemy halted the Afghanforces pushing east toward the Whale, and theAfghan forces then withdrew to Gardez.Because of a brief period of bad weather and theunexpectedly heavy enemy resistance, only aportion of the TF MOUNTAIN troops insertedinto their intended positions on D-Day, 2 March.

99

Some of those thatdid insert foughtunder intense mor-tar and small armsfire. SOF, wellhidden in theirobservation posts,used direct fireweapons and coor-dinated close airsupport bombingonto enemy fight-ing positions. Thisprovided somerelief for the TFM O U N T A I Nforces, especiallyin the south atHLZ Ginger east ofMarzak. Due tothe collapse of TFHAMMER and thedifficulty in hold-ing BP Ginger, MGHagenbeck decid-ed to reposition hissoldiers to thenorthern end ofthe Shah-i-Khotvalley on 4 March and attack AQ from thisdirection.

As the battle became more fluid, TF MOUN-TAIN recognized the need to put U.S. “eyes” onthe southern tip of the valley and the “ratline.”It needed additional observation posts near HLZGinger to provide surveillance and to call in U.S.airpower on the numerous concentrations ofenemy forces. A 10,000-foot, snow-cappedmountain, named Takur Ghar, appeared to U.S.planners as a perfect location for an observationpost. It dominated the southern approaches tothe valley and offered excellent visibility intoMarzak, two kilometers to the West. The moun-taintop also provided an unobstructed view ofthe Whale on the other side of the valley. TakurGhar was a perfect site for an observation post,unfortunately, the enemy thought so too. Theenemy had installed a well-concealed, fortifiedforce, which included a heavy machine gun per-fectly positioned to shoot down coalition aircraftflying in the valley below.

On 2 March2002, U.S. forcesbegan planning toinsert forces intotwo observationposts the follow-ing night. TwoMH-47Es from2nd Battalion,160th SpecialO p e r a t i o n sA v i a t i o nR e g i m e n t(Airborne) wouldinsert two teams;one MH-47E,RAZOR 04, wouldemplace a team tothe north whilethe other MH-47E, RAZOR 03,would deploy ateam of U.S.SEALs and an AirForce combat con-troller (CCT) onTakur Ghar. Latethe next evening,the two helicop-

ters took off from their base. Originally plannedto go in earlier to an offset HLZ, maintenanceproblems with one of the helicopters and a near-by B-52 strike in support of TF MOUNTAINdelayed the insert.

At approximately 0300 local time, RAZOR03, carrying the SEAL team, approached itsHLZ in a small saddle atop Takur Ghar. On theapproach, both the pilots and the men in theback observed fresh tracks in the snow,goatskins, and other signs of recent humanactivity. Immediately, the pilots and team dis-cussed a mission abort, but it was too late. AnRPG struck the side of the aircraft, woundingone crewman, while machinegun bullets rippedthrough the fuselage, cutting hydraulic and oillines. Fluid spewed about the ramp area of thehelicopter. The pilot struggled to get theChinook off the landing zone and away from theenemy fire. Petty Officer Neil Roberts stoodclosest to the ramp, poised to exit onto the land-ing zone. Roberts and an aircrew member were

100

knocked off balance by the explosions and thesudden burst of power applied by the pilot. Bothslipped and fell out of the helicopter. Othercrewmembers pulled the tethered crewmemberback into the aircraft. Untethered, Roberts fellapproximately 5-10 feet onto the snowy moun-taintop below. Roberts survived the short fallfrom the helicopter, likely activated his signal-ing device, and engaged the enemy with hissquad automatic weapon (SAW). He was mor-tally wounded by gunfire as the enemy closed onhim.

Meanwhile, the crew managed to keep theheavily damaged aircraft aloft for a short timebefore the pilots executed a controlled crashlanding some seven kilometers north of TakurGhar. Once on the ground, the SEALs did aquick head count that confirmed what theyalready knew—Petty Officer Roberts was miss-ing. TSgt John Chapman, the team’s Air Forcecombat controller, immediately contacted anearby AC-130 for protection. A short timelater, RAZOR 04, after inserting its “recce”team, arrived on the scene and picked up thedowned crewmen and SEALs, taking them toGardez. The SEALs and pilots quickly formulat-ed a plan to go back and try to rescue Roberts,despite the fact that they knew a force of heavi-ly armed AQ manned positions on Takur Ghar.Knowing how the AQ brutally treated prisoners,Roberts’ teammates knew that time was run-ning out on Neil Roberts. RAZOR 04, with itscargo of five SEALs and TSgt Chapman, depart-ed Gardez and returned to Roberts’ last knownlocation on the mountaintop. There were noknown nearby, suitable landing zones—otherthan where Roberts had fallen. Inserting therescue team at the base of the mountain was notan option—they would lose valuable time mak-ing the two- to three-hour climb up the moun-tain. Their only real chance of success was toreinsert in the same proximity of where RAZOR03 had taken intense enemy fire.

At about 0500 local time, RAZOR 04approached the HLZ atop of Takur Ghar.Despite enemy fire cutting through the MH-47E,all six members were safely inserted, and thehelicopter, although damaged, returned to base.Once on the ground near Roberts’ last knownlocation, the team assessed the situation andmoved quickly to the high ground. The most

prominent features on the hilltop were a largerock and tree. As they approached the tree,Chapman saw two enemy personnel in a forti-fied position under the tree. Chapman and anearby SEAL opened fire, killing both enemypersonnel. The Americans immediately begantaking fire from another bunker position some20 meters away. A burst of gunfire hitChapman, mortally wounding him. The SEALsreturned fire and threw hand grenades into theenemy bunker position to their immediate front.

As the firefight continued, two of the SEALswere wounded by enemy gunfire and grenadefragmentation. Finding themselves outnum-bered and in a deadly crossfire with two of theirteammates seriously wounded and one killed,the SEALs decided to disengage. They shot twomore AQ as they moved off the mountain peak tothe Northeast—with one of the wounded SEALstaking “point.” As they moved partly down theside of the mountain for protection, a SEAL con-tacted the overhead AC-130—GRIM 32—andrequested fire support. GRIM 32 respondedwith covering fire as the SEALs withdrew.

Back at the U.S. staging base, the Rangerquick reaction force (QRF)—a designated unit onstandby for just such situations—was directed tomove forward to a landing zone at Gardez. The23-man QRF loaded on two MH-47Es: RAZOR01 and RAZOR 02. RAZOR 01 carried 10Rangers, an enlisted tactical air controller(ETAC), a combat controller (CCT), and apararescueman (PJ). RAZOR 02 carried 10Rangers.

Taking off from their base, the QRF had lit-tle knowledge about what was actually happen-ing on Takur Ghar due to very limited communi-cations. As the QRF flew toward Gardez, theembattled SEALs requested immediate assis-tance. Headquarters approved the request anddirected the QRF to proceed quickly to TakurGhar and insert their team at an “offset” HLZ,not the landing zone where RAZORs 03 and 04had taken fire. Due to intermittently function-ing aircraft communications equipment, theRangers and helicopter crews never received the“offset” instructions, nor did the QRF command,RAZOR 01, receive tactical situational aware-ness. Communications problems plagued head-quarters’ attempts to determine the true condi-tion and location of the SEAL team.

101

Thus, the Rangers believed that the SEALswere still located on top of Takur Ghar and pro-ceeded to the “hot” HLZ. At about 0545 local, asthe sun began to crest the mountains to the east,RAZOR 01 approached from the south. On finalapproach, an RPG round exploded on the rightside of the helicopter, while small arms fire pep-pered it from three directions. The pilotsattempted to abort the landing, but the aircrafthad taken too much damage. The right sidemini-gunner, SGT Phil Svitak, opened fire butwas killed by AK-47 fire. The helicopter droppedten feet and landed hard; both pilots were seri-ously wounded as they crash landed their crip-pled aircraft.

The helicopter nose was pointing up the hilltoward the main enemy bunkers—where TSgtChapman had been killed. The impact of thecrash knocked everyone to the helicopter floor.The Rangers, CCT, and the eight-man Chinookcrew struggled under intense fire to get up andout of the helicopter fuselage. The rear doorgunner and a Ranger opened fire out the back ofthe aircraft, killing an AQ soldier. SGT BradCrose and CPL Matt Commons survived thelanding but were killed by enemy fire as theyexited the rear of the aircraft. Another Ranger,SPC Marc Anderson, was hit while still insidethe aircraft, dying instantly. Despite the intensesmall arms fire, the PJ, Senior Airman JasonCunningham, and another medic remainedinside the helicopter and began treating thewounded.

At the same time, the surviving Rangersquickly assembled at the helicopter ramp toassess the situation and fix the enemy locations.One of the Rangers exited the helicopter andkilled two more AQ, including an RPG gunner,enabling the Rangers to form up off the ramp.Using rock outcroppings as cover, they thenbegan maneuvering to better positions. TheRanger platoon leader formulated a plan toassault the bunkers on top of the hill. But afteran initial attempt to do so, he quickly realized hewould need a larger force. The Air Force combatcontroller worked to get close air support on sta-tion. Within minutes, U.S. aircraft began tobomb and strafe the enemy positions, dropping500lb bombs within 50 meters of the SOF posi-tions. By 0700 local time, the Rangers were nolonger in danger of being overrun. They consol-

idated their position and established a casualtycollection point to the rear of the helicopter.

After the shoot down of RAZOR 01, RAZOR02 was directed to move to a safe area and awaitfurther instructions. Later, RAZOR 02 insertedthe other half of the QRF with its force of 10Rangers and one Navy SEAL at an “offset” land-ing zone, down the mountain some 800 meterseast and over 2,000 feet below the mountaintop.The Navy SEAL linked up with the SEAL“recce” element, which was by now some 1000meters from the mountaintop. The Rangers’movement up the hill was a physically demand-ing 2-hour effort under heavy mortar fire and inthin mountain air. They climbed the 45-70degree slope, most of it covered in three feet ofsnow, weighted down by their weapons, bodyarmor and equipment.

By 1030 local time, the ten men of RAZOR 02reached the Rangers’ location, and they pre-pared to assault the enemy bunkers. As the AirForce CCT called in a last air strike on theenemy bunkers and with two machineguns pro-viding suppression fire, seven Rangers stormedthe hill as quickly as they could in the knee-deepsnow. Within minutes, the Rangers took thehill, killing multiple AQ. The Rangers began toconsolidate their position on the top of the moun-tain, which the platoon leader deemed moredefendable, and safer for their wounded. TheRangers, Army crewmembers, and Air Forcepersonnel began moving the wounded up thesteep slope; it took four to six men to move onecasualty — it was a difficult and slow process.

As the soldiers moved the wounded, addi-tional AQ began firing from a small ridgelinesome 400 meters to the rear of the downed heli-copter’s position. The wounded at the casualtycollection point were completely exposed to theenemy fire, as were the PJ and medic tending tothem. While the Rangers maneuvered to returnfire, enemy fire struck the Army medic and PJ atthe casualty collection point as they worked ontheir patients. Rangers and helicopter crewmenalike risked their lives to pull the wounded tothe relative safety of nearby rocks. Once again,the combat controller called in close air support,and a few well-placed bombs and Rangermachine-gun fire eventually silenced the enemyfire. The wounded PJ, Senior Airman JasonCunningham, eventually succumbed to his

102

wounds. Throughout the ensuing hours, theAmericans continued to take sporadic sniper andmortar fire. During the day, observation postson adjoining hilltops, manned by TF K-BARcoalition SOF, called in fire on AQ forcesattempting to reinforce the mountaintop.

At about 2015 local time, four helicoptersfrom the 160th SOAR extracted both theRangers on Takur Ghar and the SEALs downthe mountainside. Two hours later, the sur-vivors and their fallen comrades were back attheir base. Medical personnel from the 274thForward Surgical Team, operating out of theBagram airfield tower, worked on the 11 wound-ed personnel. By morning, all the wounded wereheaded to hospitals in Germany and elsewhere.

On the morning of 4 March, TF RAKASSAN(2-187/101st AA) air assaulted into BattlePosition (BP) DIANE and began clearing east ofthe Whale, specifically the high-ground south-ward toward BP GINGER. SF elements simul-taneously helped Commander Zia’s Afghan mili-tia launch a reconnaissance element into thenorthern portion of the Little Whale to watchenemy movements in the valley as renewed airstrikes hit Objective REMINGTON. BecauseZia lacked sufficient force to take REMINGTON,TF DAGGER coordinated for additional Afghanmilitia. These forces arrived on 10 March underthe command of General Gul Huidar. On 12March, both Huidar and Zia’s troops, with direc-tion and assistance from several ODAs, beganclearing Objective REMINGTON. The Afghanforces seized the objective and nearby villagesquickly; all resistance elements had either fledor been destroyed.

Operation ANACONDA would continue foranother seven days. TF RAKASSAN would be

replaced by 10th Mountain elements from TFSUMMIT, which cleared the eastern area of thebattlefield to BP GINGER on 13 March.Additional elements from 10th Mountain and3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s CanadianLight Infantry, designated TF COMMANDO, airassaulted onto the Whale on 14 March and con-ducted a series of sensitive site exploitationswhile clearing the mountain. TF COMMANDOcompleted its operation on 19 March.

The execution of Operation ANACONDAwas far from perfect. Poor weather, difficult ter-rain, and uncharacteristically poor air-groundcoordination contributed to a less than desiredoutcome. More important, a well disciplinedenemy had expected the fight and had preparedhis defenses well. Despite initial setbacks, coali-tion forces adapted and destroyed a significantnumber of AQ. The terrorists also lost a signifi-cant amount of supplies and their last refuge inAfghanistan. Neither SOF nor conventionalforces would meet AQ concentrations of thismagnitude and aggressiveness again until 2006.

Evolution of Roles andMissions – Through Spring 2004

TF K-BARShortly after 9/11, CENTCOM tasked its

Joint Force Special Operations ComponentCommand (JFSOCC) to establish JSOTFs toprosecute UW throughout Afghanistan. TFDAGGER, as previously mentioned, was estab-lished at K2 in mid-October 2001.

The JFSOCC also planned to establishanother JSOTF, which it would designate TF K-BAR, to conduct operations in the southern por-tion of the country. The K-BAR element, com-

103RAZOR 01 abandoned on top of Takur Ghar.

manded by CAPT Robert Harward, began organ-izing at Masirah, Oman, in mid-October. TF K-BAR’s role would be to conduct special recon-naissance (SR) and direct action (DA) to seekand destroy or capture remnants of the al Qaedaand Taliban networks. It still needed forces anda place to stage to assist TF DAGGER in itsprosecution of the UW campaign. But with theUW teams’ rapid successes in November 2001,DAGGER was able to infiltrate detachments tosecure Kandahar. In essence, DAGGER wasabout to have its forces in almost every section ofAfghanistan and was quickly running out ofODAs to execute emerging operations.

In its efforts to establish the two JSOTFs,JFSOCC had faced two large challenges. Thefirst was basing. Achieving permission fromUzbekistan to use K2 had proven difficult inSeptember and October. JFSOCC experiencedarguably greater challenges in stationing ele-ments of CJSOTF-S. Fortunately, the seizure ofairfields throughout Afghanistan eased the bas-ing challenge. The second major challenge con-cerned manning the various JSOTF headquar-ters. Despite its successes, DAGGER’s chal-lenges had proved legion. The Special ForcesGroup headquarters element was not designedto form a JSOTF. DAGGER lacked planners,joint fires, and logistics personnel needed to sus-tain current operations, much less plan forfuture operations. These same challengesapplied to TF K-BAR when JFSOCC establishedthe Combined Joint Special Operations TaskForce-South, more commonly known as TF K-BAR, on 15 November.

TF K-BAR initially established forwardheadquarters at Camp Rhino with the Marineson 22 November. By 15 December, however, itpermanently moved to Kandahar Airfield. Anumber of diverse elements comprised K-BAR:CSOF from Denmark, Canada, Norway, NewZealand, Germany, and Australia; two SEALPlatoons from SEAL Team 3; elements of 720thSpecial Tactics Group; and A Company, 1stBattalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne),which DAGGER provided. Like DAGGER, K-BAR remained under operational control(OPCON) to the JFSOCC. By the time that itstood up, however, the Combined Force LandComponent Commander (CFLCC) exercised tac-tical control (TACON) over TF K-BAR to syn-

chronize battlespace for the introduction of con-ventional forces.

K-BAR began executing large-scale directaction missions in January 2002. The first mis-sion of this kind occurred at Zhawar Kili, a C2complex in Paktia Province located in southeast-ern Afghanistan. The SEAL platoon, ST-3E,executed the operation in conjunction with theMarine TF-58 out of Rhino. Following an aerialbombardment on 6 January, ST-3E inserted intoZhawar Kili to capture surviving al Qaeda mem-bers. They found a series of caves, tunnels, andintricate rooms that required exploitation. Themission lasted eight days. ST-3E and support-ing Marines found numerous documents andother items of intelligence value, including oneposter of Bin Laden complete with a plane crash-ing into a building in the background. Aftereight days on the ground, the force withdrewhaving dropped 406,000 pounds of ordnance,destroyed a vast tunnel complex, and killed anestimated 10-15 Taliban.

The day after the SEALs and Marines insert-ed into Zhawar Kili, A/1/5th SFG (A) and a smallforce of Canadian SOF conducted a raid againstYahya Khehl in the one of the first joint U.S.-Canadian operation since World War II, and oneof the largest SOF direct action missions sinceJUST CAUSE. Transported by seven MH-53sfrom the 20th SOS, the assault force cleared allfour compounds on the target and detained sev-eral HVTs. The operation vividly demonstratedthe challenges of conducting such DA missionsin Afghanistan. Rotor-wash stirred up largeclouds of dust and dirt, causing dangerousbrownouts obscuring the landing zones. Onlyluck and the considerable skill of the 20th SOSpilots avoided serious mishaps.

Over the next two weeks, the coalition con-tingent of TF K-BAR conducted four successiveSSE/DA missions, including a joint AustralianSAS and SEAL Desert Patrol Vehicle (DVP) spe-cial reconnaissance mission and airfield survey.While only one target yielded any significantintelligence, these missions marked the firstcombat operations by most countries in the waron terrorism and enabled K-BAR to fuse the dif-ferent SOF forces into a combined team.

The raid against Hazar Khadam, formerly acompound inhabited by Mullah Omar, demon-strated the difficulty of targeting an indistinct

104

enemy in Afghanistan, especially in the earlymonths of the war when a great deal of intelli-gence was uncorroborated. Lying approximately100 miles northeast of Kandahar, HazarKhadam consisted of two distinct compoundsabout one and a half kilometers apart.Intelligence suggested that a large number ofTaliban still held the compound, but thatnumerous civilians also resided on the target.TF K-BAR assigned A/1/5 the mission of secur-ing potential HVTs at the compounds.

On 23 January, Marine and Air Force SOFhelicopters inserted the detachments of A/1/5onto the two objectives. While one group movedby foot to the northern most compound, code-named Objective KELLY, the other traveled bytwo HMMWVs to the other southern target des-ignated Objective BRIDGET. Despite the occa-sional barking dog, both groups reached theirobjectives undetected as an AC-130 providedoverwatch. When the ground force commandergave the command, the two forces simultaneous-ly stormed both KELLY and BRIDGET.

After blowing a breach through the wall sur-rounding the compound, two ODAs stormedKELLY and began clearing the nine separatebuildings that comprised this sprawling com-pound situated on the slope of a hill. Severalenemy opened fire with AK-47s on the soldiers,who returned fire killing at least two. OneAmerican was wounded when an enemy bulletricocheted and hit him in the foot. Within shortorder, the A/1/5 detachmentssecured the objective, captur-ing 26 enemy combatants anda large stockpile of munitions.

Meanwhile, the otherassault force, comprisingODAs 511 and 516, dismount-ed from the HMMWVs andapproached Objective BRID-GET. Having achieved tacti-cal surprise, the ODAs foundthemselves engaged inextremely close combat uponentering the complex. Handto hand fighting occurred inseveral places. Fortunately,the detachments securedBRIDGET without a singlecasualty. Only one enemy

combatant chose to surrender while approxi-mately 18 others had been killed. As the U.S.forces retired, the AC-130 destroyed both targetsand their stockpiles of ammunition.

The intelligence leading to the raid on HazarKhadam had turned out to be obsolete. AfterA/1/5 seized the objectives, one of the assaultersidentified a flag of the new Afghan government.The soldiers discovered that the Afghan fightershad recently changed sides. This episode wasnot the fault of A/1/5, which returned fire whenfired upon. However, it did demonstrate thecomplexities of combat operations that the coali-tion would face for the next several years tocome.

In the month following Hazar Khadam, TFK-BAR began a series of raids in the mountainsalong the Pakistani border. Operating in excessof 10,000 feet, SEALs and coalition forcescleared a number of large Taliban complexes.All told, K-BAR conducted 42 SR and 23 DA mis-sions, not including the various missions that itexecuted in support of Operation ANACONDA.

CJSOTF-A EmergesEven prior to Operation ANACONDA, plan-

ners at JFSOCC intended to collapse the twoCJSOTFs into one headquarters. In March2002, 3rd SFG (A) arrived to assume that mis-sion. TF DAGGER had started preparingBagram Airfield (BAF) for introduction of forcesin November. By February 2002, DAGGER had

105Soldiers from 3rd SFG (A) conduct “tailgate” MEDCAP.

established a sizeable forward headquartersthere. Both TFs DAGGER and K-BAR mergedinto CJSOTF-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), forwhich 3rd SFG provided the headquarters.JFSOCC, coupled with component commands inthe United States, did a far better job of enablingthe CJSOTF-A to perform its varied functions.JFSOCC sponsored a joint manning document(JMD), which added NAVSOF, AFSOF, andadditional Special Forces personnel to executeboth operations and planning functions.Additionally, the CJSOTF contained a healthynumber of liaison slots to facilitate the opera-tions of the CSOF elements. While the JMD hasbeen tweaked by various CJSOTFs in the lastseveral years, its base structure has survivedlargely intact.

In addition to the transition of the CJSOTF,the maneuver elements from 5th SFG (A) rede-ployed as well. The three battalions from 5thSFG (A) fully departed by March and werereplaced by two battalions from 3rd SFG (A),FOBs 31 and 33, and FOB 192 from 19th SFG(A). Both FOB 33 and FOB 192 had actuallyarrived much earlier, with FOB 33 originallyproviding forces to TF K-BAR and FOB 192assuming administrative and isolation facility(ISOFAC) duties at K2. The CJSOTF main-tained OPCON of the SEAL task unit and theCivil Affairs and PSYOPs teams. It also exer-cised TACON of the various CSOF elements thatremained in country.

With the establishment of an interim Afghangovernment in the winter of 2001-2002, theCJSOTF’s mission changed from UW to FID.CJSOTF elements still conducted a significantnumber of SR and DA missions through andwith various Afghan forces to capture anddestroy ACM. The chief assigned task, however,turned to enhancing the security institutions ofthe interim government, mainly through train-ing and advising Afghan forces. FOB 31 estab-lished its headquarters in Kabul and begantraining the fledgling Afghan National Army.FOB 32 transitioned with FOB 33 in May 2002and assumed C2 of SOF in southernAfghanistan from Paktika Province west toHerat. FOB 192 occupied K2, but controlleddetachments working in the northern half of thecountry, from Khowst Province to Mazar-eSharif.

Two conditions, however, would define thisfirst “post UW” rotation for the SF detachmentsin firebases across Afghanistan. First, most ofthe SOF firebases remained under CJSOTF con-trol through 2006 and thus defined theCJSOTF’s force concentrations along the easternand southern boundary with Pakistan. Minus afew detachments in Herat, Mazar-e, andKonduz, SOF found itself principally occupiedwith controlling terrain along the border withPakistan. Second, ODAs lacked a supply of gov-ernment-sanctioned and therefore legitimateforces, at least in the eyes of the internationalcommunity and the emerging Afghan govern-ment. Facing an impossible task of securingtheir respective areas of operation (AOs) them-selves, the ODAs had to use the militias of war-lords of questionable loyalty to secure terrainand dislodge ACM. In the north, where NAforces were still largely dependent on Americansanction for their legitimacy, this challengeproved tough but manageable. In the south,where Pashtuns comprised the majority of thepopulation, the ability to cobble together suffi-cient Afghan forces proved problematic.Additionally, the ODAs had to secure their fire-bases by hiring and training additional Afghansfor force protection.

In April 2002, CENTCOM also establishedthe Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180,assigning it responsibility for the entire JointOperational Area (JOA) that comprisedAfghanistan. Interestingly, CENTCOM also“chopped” the CJSOTF OPCON to the CJTF,severing the relationship with CFSOCC. TheCJSOTF would take its mission directives andguidance from the CJTF until December 2005.Thus, the history of SOF and its employment inAfghanistan would be significantly character-ized by its command relationship with the CJTF.

In summer 2002, 20th SFG (A) assumed theCJSOTF from 3rd SFG (A), marking the firsttime a National Guard SF Group executed suchduties. In the fall, FOBs 201, 195, and 72 rotat-ed into theater, replacing battalions from 3rdSFG (A). The CJSOTF would maintain threebattalions for Afghanistan through September2003, with one battalion primarily aligned in thenorth and operating out of K2, while a secondone continued operating in the south out ofKandahar. The third FOB trained the ANA in

106

Kabul. FOB 31 handed the responsibility toFOB 195 in October 2002, and then reassumedthe training mission in April 2003. In July 2003,the CJSOTF handed over its ANA initial train-ing duties to TF Phoenix, a National Guardheadquarters, which assumed responsibility forthe management of this training.

Appointed the executive agent forAfghanistan by U.S. Army Special ForcesCommand (USASFC), 3rd SFG (A) would bearthe lion’s share of unit rotations from the activeduty forces. To provide 3rd SFG (A) battalionssome relief, the USASFC, responsible for deploy-ing SF units, had activated several NationalGuard Battalions from 19th and 20th SFGsthrough early 2004. While NG battalions cer-tainly provided much needed relief during 2002-2003, their activations meant that they wouldnot be available en masse for several more years.Thus, USASFC, responsible for deploying SFunits, developed a long term force rotation thatalternated 3rd and 7th SFGs into Afghanistan,beginning in 2004. USASFC also stabilizedrotation length to seven months for the SF ele-ments in country. NSW and AFSOC elementsconducted rotations of various lengths, but usu-ally for 120 days.

USASFC’s changes to the rotation plan coin-cided with significant changes on the battlefield.Shortly before the transition of ANA training inKabul, ISAF agreed to assume responsibility fornorthern Afghanistan. The CJSOTF thus pulledits forces from places like Mazar-e Sharif andalso ceased operations out of K2 in September2003. To align its forces with the future CJTFtemplate, the CJSOTF established an FOB inBagram during the summer of 2003. By the endof that year, the CJSOTF had reduced its SF sig-

nature from three to two battalions, with theFOB at Bagram commanding forces in RegionalCommand (RC) East, and the FOB at Kandaharcontrolling forces in RC South.

CJSOTF-A retained TACON of CSOF, andwhile many of these forces had redeployed by2003, some of them made subsequent deploy-ments to OEF. Additionally, other countriesjoined the coalition, providing SOF to theCJSOTF for various lengths of deployment. Thetwo remaining FOBs, along with NAVSOF ele-ments, found themselves engaging in signifi-cantly more DA and SR missions during thesummer and fall of 2003 than originally antici-pated. Still, the CJSOTF’s primary focus was todisrupt the remaining ACM network within theinterior of Afghanistan. While forces were cer-tainly positioned to interdict the flow of insur-gents from Pakistan, this task remained a localone for the detachments.

During 2003, however, Afghanistan saw asurge in politically related violence and criminalactivity. Combined Forces Command –Afghanistan (CFC-A), which was created tooversee both ISAF and CJTF operations, subse-quently requested the increase in U.S. forces tosecure the interior of Afghanistan. Concernedwith the internal security situation, CFC-A hadto bolster the Karzai government and to preparethe country for projected transition to ISAF (orNATO) sponsorship in 2005. CFC’s requestprompted an increase in the number of U.S. con-ventional forces, raising troop levels inAfghanistan from a low of 7,500 in January 2003to a high of 18,000 exactly one year later. Theincrease in forces created command, control, andbattlespace synchronization issues largelyabsent prior to 2004. SOF, previously able to

107

Special Forces trained the Afghanistan National Army (ANA), beginning in May 2002 at the Kabul KMTC. By July2003, when this responsibility was handed over to TF Phoenix, a total of seven ANA battalions had been trained.

conduct missions as they saw fit, now had toobtain mission approval at numerous levels toconduct operations. Additionally, SOF wouldsoon see its most significant change of missionsince initiating the Afghanistan campaign in2001.

Evolution of Roles andMissions: February 2004 to

PresentThe CJSOTF’s mission and battlespace ori-

entation changed very little in the broad senseduring its first two years in Afghanistan. Minusits initial training of the Afghan Army, its chiefrole remained the capture or destruction of keypersonalities within the ACM network inAfghanistan. Arguably, this mission focus pre-vented SOF from maximizing its FID capabili-ties, the chief of which was training, advising,and employing government forces to enhancesecurity. A number of constraints existed onboth SOF and conventional forces, chiefly a U.S.troop-to-task ratio insufficient to secure largeswaths of the country and a corresponding lackof Afghan military forces to fill the gap. SFlacked sufficient, “legitimate” Afghan forceswith whom it could work. During the time peri-od from 2004 – 2006, however, both of these fac-tors began to change. Subsequently, the role ofSOF changed as well.

In March 2004, the U.S. Army’s 25thInfantry Division assumed command of CJTF-180. To capture the historic significance of par-liamentary and national elections scheduled forthat year, it changed the designation of theCJTF to CJTF-76 and instituted several majorchanges.

In April 2004, the CJTF tasked CJSOTF-A tofocus primarily on border security operations inboth Regional Commands South and East. TheCJTF intended to halt the flow of ACM and theirsupplies from Pakistan. In part, the CJTF want-ed to align missions based on geography. ODAsoccupied the several firebases along thePakistani border in Regional Command East:Bari Kowt, Asadabad, and Chapman. Even inRC South, the CJSOTF had ODAs positioned inthe farthermost fire-bases, including Qalat,Geresk, and Gecko. Furthermore, CJTF-76intended for conventional forces to concentrateon stability and support operations (SOSO)

within the interior of the CJOA. ProvincialReconstruction Teams (PRTs), composed prima-rily of Civil Affairs personnel, assumed evengreater emphasis under CJTF-76, and the head-quarters wanted secure conditions to facilitatereconstruction and the fall elections.

The chief challenge for the CJSOTF was itslack of access to Afghanistan National Armyforces for employment in combat. In the springof 2004, the CJSOTF had only two ANAKandaks (battalions) OPCON to it: theCommando Kandak (SF trained), operating inRC East, and 2nd Kandak 201st Corps. ODAsdid employ relatively large numbers of AfghanSecurity Forces (ASF) to provide local security attheir firebases; however, these security elementscould not legally conduct operations beyond 10-15 kilometers of the firebase, and these missionshad to be directly related to the firebase defense.Additionally, the government of Afghanistan(GOA) and CFC-A both wanted to demobilize theASF. The GOA viewed the ASF as a militia andwanted to rid the country of all forces that didnot belong to the army or police. To place ameaningful dent in the flow of ACM forces andsupplies from Pakistan, the CJSOTF clearlyneeded access to a far larger number of Afghangovernment troops.

Additionally, the directive from the CJTFignored the CJSOTF’s need for access to theinterior to maximize its collection of intelligenceconcerning the insurgency. The occupation offirebases in the interior population centers, suchas Jalalabad, Gardez, Zormat, Deh Rawood,Tarin Kowt, and Deh Chopan, remained essen-tial for ODAs to gather information on the flowof ACM insurgents into Afghanistan. With only25 ODAs in country, numbering perhaps 250 sol-diers, it seemed a tall challenge indeed to coverroughly 750 miles of the Pakistan border anddeny movement, much less remain active in theinterior of the country. To put this task in per-spective, the Soviets could not seal the bordertwo decades previously with over 100,000 troopsin Afghanistan.

During its tenure from 1 June - 1 December2004 as the CJSOTF, 3rd SFG (A) repositionedsome of its forces in concert with CJTF-76 direc-tives, especially in RC East. FOB 32, responsi-ble for CJSOTF operations in RC East, directedthe occupation of both Bari Kowt, in northern

108

Kunar Province, and Torkham, in easternNangahar Province. It ceased operations inMazar-e and Konduz, making forces available tore-occupy both Shkin and Lwara, two con-tentious villages in Paktika Province in whichODAs had worked in during the previous year.The purpose of placing detachments near theseborder towns was to disrupt the flow of insur-gents and materiel into population centers. Inthe vicinity of Khowst, where infiltration ofmassed ACM forces was highest, the FOB estab-lished another border control point, BCP-6, toaugment the five BCPs established by coalitionforces in 2002. FOB 32 also conducted a detailedassessment of Chamkani, north of Khowst,where an ODA presence could choke the flow ofinsurgents and materiel from Parachinar,Pakistan, into the cities of Khowst and Gardez.Despite its requests, however, 3rd SFG (A) couldnot obtain more ANA forces for the expansion offirebases along the border.

When it assumed responsibilities from 3rdSFG (A) on 1 December 2004, 7th SFG (A) facedthe same challenges as its predecessor for its ini-tial rotation as the CJSOTF. It soon inheritedthe added task of standing up a Crisis ResponseElement (CRE). CENTCOM intended the CREto conduct raids against emerging targets any-

where within the AOR. The element wouldremain in Afghanistan TACON to the CJSOTF,but OPCON to CFSOCC. Lacking additionalforces, CJSOTF-A used several of its deployedODAs, as well as the Navy SEALs, to establishthe response force. Additionally, it had to createan operational detachment-Bravo (ODB) com-mand and control element out of hide, and havefour ODAs in reserve if additional forces wereneeded. This requirement certainly conflictedwith CJTF-76’s emphasis on border securityoperations and, subsequently, constrained theCJSOTF’s ability to meet the CJTF’s intent.

The four ODAs of the CRE organized andtrained in Kandahar, and were TACON to FOB71. While it did not perform missions for CENT-COM, it did execute a number of missions forFOB 71 in RC South and succeeded in capturingnumerous mid-level ACM personalities.

In RC East, FOB 12 expanded upon FOB 32’schanges to the battlespace, especially in Khowstand Paktika Provinces. In December, it con-structed a firebase at Chamkani, and one ODAoccupied it. Consequently, northern KhowstProvince witnessed an immediate improvementin the security situation. In the central part ofthe province, the ODB commissioned the con-struction of an additional BCP at Jaji Maydan,

east of the city of Khowst.While both the firebase andthe BCP improved the localand arguably regional secu-rity of Khowst, each positionwas protected largely bylocal security hires, viceANA. Significant restric-tions remained on the ODAs’use of these forces for mis-sions other than local fire-base security. More impor-tant, these positions wereintended to reinforce thelegitimacy of the Afghangovernment along the borderwith Pakistan. The require-ment for governmenttrained forces in these areaswas growing larger, evenwhile the CJSOTF could notfully employ those veryforces.

109

In early 2005, Afghanistan experienced its harshest winter in 30 years. CivilAffairs Team 414 identified an urgent need for food, medicine, and blankets to aid

villagers in Zabul Province. The CJSOTF-A from 7th SFG(A) and 1st SFG(A)rapidly configured and air dropped containerized delivery systems (CDS) bundlescontaining sought-after supplies. They hit the mark and saved numerous lives.

FOB 12 continued the expan-sion of firebases and BCPs alongthe border. In the late spring of2005, 7th SFG (A) ODAs that wereOPCON’d to FOB 12, constructednew firebases at Gayan andBermel Bazaar in Paktika Provinceto enhance security at district cap-itals. An ODA at Lwara estab-lished a long-awaited BCP at Wriceand placed its ANA Company inthe position.

The goal of the firebase andBCP expansion remained two-fold:bolster the security environment inselect locations and enable theCJSOTF eventually to turn over border securityto Afghan forces. The CJSOTF proved largelysuccessful in meeting the first objective. Withboth firebases and BCPs came security forces,which frequently dampened the flow of insur-gents, cut down on local crime, and led to animproved local economy. Afghans built the facil-ities, manned them, and subsequently spenttheir wages locally. But in mid-2005, the ANAsimply could not field enough forces to man thecamps that the CJSOTF had constructed. Evenif the ANA could have assumed border security,many within CFC-A and CJTF opposed basingthe ANA there for fear of inciting tensions withPakistan. The century-long dispute over thePakistani border could have sparked a conflictbetween coalition and Pakistani forces at anytime. While ASF manned many of the firebasesnear the border, their status as “militia” vicegovernment-sanctioned forces meant that theywould not fill long-term security needs. ODAscould not leave them unattended.

A significant initiative that went hand inglove with border security operations was coor-dinating with Pakistani elements at key loca-tions. To elicit cooperation from the Pakistanmilitary, ODAs from FOB 12 fielded communica-tions equipment to Pakistani forces across fromTorkham, BCP-4, Lwara, and Shkin. FOB 12even fielded SATCOM radios to the Pakistanimilitary in Miram Shah. In return for theradios, the Pakistan military was supposed toreport ACM activities and to coordinate opera-tions in the vicinity of the border. While thecommunications initiative received a great deal

of attention from the CJTF, Pakistani militaryofficials did not reciprocate to the degreedesired. The initiative did reduce tensions dur-ing border clashes.

FOB 12 did obtain OPCON of a secondKandak in the spring of 2005. 2-5 Infantry,which had covered Oruzgan Province, shifted itsforces to another area within Afghanistan. FOB71 needed a force to fill this void. FOB 71, oper-ating out of Kandahar, requested and received asecond Kandak in March 2005. It was thus ableto employ one Kandak in Paktika and a secondin the vicinity of Jalalabad. It was in RC Souththat Kandak employment established a prece-dent for CJSOTF’s eventual return to a sponsor-ship of the ANA.

After weeks of preparation, FOB 71 elementsexecuted Operation NAM DONG in April 2005with the ANA Kandak in the lead. The Kandakcommand post successfully commanded and con-trolled its 217 soldiers within the area of CaharCineh. With 50 SF advisors assisting theAfghans and directing joint fires, the Kandakpacified a heretofore ACM sanctuary. ODAsfrom FOB 71 proved that a well-advised andresourced ANA force could achieve decisive bat-tlefield effects. Operation NAM DONG was thefirst ANA led operation in RC South and thelargest within the entire country at the time.The operation gave the force heightened credi-bility in the minds of coalition planners. Mostimportant, the local populace proved more sup-portive and accepting of ANA presence. TheANA helped to establish GOA legitimacy in pre-viously enemy-held terrain.

110

In March 2005, CJSOTF flood relief efforts in Oruzgon Province savedover 200 people.

Operation NAM DONG significantly influ-enced the psychology of CJTF-76 and CFC-Aand, therefore, the future mission assignment ofCJSOTF-A. NAM DONG occurred just after thetransition of authority at the CJTF between25ID and SETAF headquarters. Arguably awatershed moment, the operation influencedCFC-A to make partnering with ANA forces itskey task for 2006. It subsequently issued ordersto that effect in the fall of 2005. Based onCJSOTF’s successes in employing Kandaks andits persistence in requesting them, CJTF-76would soon assign CJSOTF forces the lion’sshare of combat advisory duties acrossAfghanistan.

In July 2005, 3rd SFG (A) and its subordi-nate battalions transitioned with 7th SFG (A)and again assumed duties as the CJSOTF. Itssubordinate battalions, FOBs 31 and 32, gearedtheir initial missions to support the fall parlia-mentary elections. The FOBs also continuedborder security operations. Significant changesto mission and command relationships occurredin the fall of 2005. First, CJTF-76 assigned theCJSOTF the mission to conduct combat advisoryand employment of ANA Kandaks. The CJTFrelieved the CJSOTF of primary responsibilityfor securing the Pakistani border and assignedthe mission to an infantry brigade. Second, inDecember CFSOCC resumed OPCON of theCJSOTF and placed it TACON to CFC-A. Bothchanges have had a major impact on SOF

employment in Afghanistan, arguably enablingthe CJSOTF to maximize its capabilities in sup-porting the legitimacy of the GOA.

In October 2005, the CJSOTF issued OPORDVALLEY FORGE, which directed the most sig-nificant change to both its mission and footprintsince the early months of OEF in 2001. VAL-LEY FORGE directed the FOBs to conduct FIDto advise and employ ANA battalions. Thebroader purpose of the CJSOTF mission was toexpand the operational capacity of the ANAcountry-wide. FOB 31, in Kandahar, assumedresponsibility for ANA 205th and 207th Corps inRCs West and South, respectively. After assess-ing ANA locations and requirements, FOB 31 co-located three ODAs with three differentKandaks in Shindand, Farah, and Herat, alltowns in western Afghanistan. FOB 32 at BAFtransitioned its firebases in Bermel, Lwara, andTorkham to conventional forces and beganassessing the ANA 201st and 209th Corps ineastern and northern Afghanistan, respectively.It also established permanent liaison officers(LNOs) at TF Phoenix, the national ANA train-ing headquarters, to facilitate the equipping andtraining of Kandaks. Finally, VALLEY FORGEordered the FOBs to begin demobilizing the ASFat all of its locations.

The CJSOTF established CMO and IO assupporting lines of operation to VALLEYFORGE. It subsequently requested additionalCA and PSYOPs units to promote infrastructure

development and train ANAunits to do likewise. USSO-COM approved these addi-tions. Thus, 3rd SFG (A) suc-cessfully established condi-tions for 7th SFG (A) to com-plete the CJSOTF’s transitionof mission tasks in the winterof 2006.

During 7th SFG (A)’s 2006rotation, the CJSOTF execut-ed the remaining tasks ofOperation VALLEY FORGE.ODAs from FOB 202, operat-ing out of BAF, assumed thecombat advisory mission,partnering with Kandaksthroughout Afghanistan. TheODAs established a perma-

111

Afghan and SF Troops are inserted into the Cahar Cineh area during Operation NAM DONG.

nent presence in RC North where U.S. forceshad been scarce since 2003: Konduz, Mazar-eSharif, and Mainama. ODAs from FOB 202 alsocollocated with Kandaks in RCs West and South.The CJSOTF employed six CAT-As and sixTPTs, twice the number of Civil Affairs andPSYOP elements of previous rotations. It alsoemployed CSOF from five different countries.Most of these elements continued to conductdirect action and special reconnaissance; howev-er, several also began executing missionsthrough, with, and by the newly created Afghanborder security force, the Afghan NationalSecurity Force (ANSF). Six ODAs did remain inRC East to disrupt insurgent flow along bordertowns. These detachments, still occupying ter-rain from Bari Kowt to Shkin in support of theconventional forces, were headquartered atChapman, where an ODB performed the tradi-tional role of SOCCE to the RC East command-er. By and large, however, the CJSOTF hadfully transitioned to its FID assignment.

The CJSOTF rotation from February –August 2006 witnessed unprecedented interop-erability with the CJTF. 7th SFG (A) estab-lished conditions for this relationship by con-ducting pre-mission training with the 10thMountain Division prior to its assumption ofCJTF responsibilities. Processes were workedout, and ideas for implementing operations wereshared. The relationship quickly paid dividendsfor the CJSOTF in the winter of 2006. Duringplanning for Operation MOUNTAIN THRUST,an operation designed to disrupt ACM activityand thereby set conditions for NATO’s assump-tion of command in RC South, the CJTF madethe CJSOTF its main effort. The CJTF assignedthe CJSOTF an infantry battalion TACON andan infantry company OPCON, and placed bothan engineer company and aviation squadron indirect support. What made this arrangement allthe more remarkable was that no command rela-tionship existed between the CJTF and theCJSOTF.

FOB 73, operating out of BAF, employed theCJTF forces largely in support of ANA opera-tions. The operation kicked off in April and ranthrough late May. The results of OperationMOUNTAIN THRUST were measurable: hun-dreds of Taliban and ACM were killed; theNATO transition of RC South occurred as sched-uled; infrastructural improvements, such asbridges over the Helmand River and several newgovernment broadcasting stations, were com-pleted at an unprecedented pace; and ANAauthority spread over large swaths of RC South.The ANA employed and permanently assignednine Kandaks in RC South in conjunction withthe operation.

Through the fall of 2006, 3rd SFG (A) contin-ued to execute Operation VALLEY FORGEthroughout Afghanistan. While the transition ofauthority between ISAF and CFC-A havebrought changes to coordinating responsibilities,SOF forces have adapted to these nuances andare working not only with the Afghan military,but with other coalition partners to buttressGOA legitimacy.

Despite successes that SOF has enjoyed inAfghanistan, great challenges remain. ACM vio-lence increased during 2006. A great deal of thespike in the insurgency was certainly due to are-organization of the Taliban within westernPakistan and in southern Afghanistan.However, it is probably a fair assessment toattribute some of this spike to the increasednumber of coalition forces in certain parts of thecountry. Permanent coalition presence hasengendered both resentment and desperation onpart of the ACM to dislodge these forces to pre-vent the government of Afghanistan from estab-lishing its authority. In the coming years, SOFwill undoubtedly play an even larger role inshaping the security environment inAfghanistan to frustrate Taliban resurgence. Byadvising and employing ANA forces and therebyimproving their condition, SOF bolsters the gov-ernment of Afghanistan.

112

Further ReadingsBriscoe, Charles H., et al, Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, CSI

Press, 2001.Stewart, Richard, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM: The United States Army in Afghanistan

October 2001-March 2002, CMH Pub 70-83-1, 2004.USSOCOM, Tip of the Spear, 2002-2006.

113

Planning

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) beganplanning for the invasion of Iraq in January2002. Dubbed operations plan (OPLAN) 1003V,the plan called for a simultaneous attack fromfive different directions. Conventional landforces would attack out of Kuwait, led by mount-ed forces from the U.S. Army’s 3rd InfantryDivision (ID) and the U.S. Marine Corps’ IMarine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). Coalitionair forces would attack deep targets from SaudiArabia and carriers in the Persian Gulf. Theplan called for an information operations (IO)campaign that barraged the Iraqi airwaves withsurrender appeals. From Kuwait, Naval SpecialOperations Forces seized oil and gas platformsand secured oil facilities on the Al FawPeninsula. SOF would execute operations onthe two remaining fronts, attacking fromKurdish held areas in the north and insertinginto the Iraqidesert.

CENTCOM des-ignated theCombined ForcesLand ComponentCommand (CFLCC)as the supportedforce for the inva-sion. SpecialO p e r a t i o n sCommand, Central(SOCCENT) wasassigned its appor-tioned forces andbegan constructingits campaign plan.It planned to inserta Combined JointSpecial OperationsTask Force(CJSOTF) intoK u r d i s hAutonomous Zone(KAZ) in northernIraq to leverageKurdish forces in

tying down several Iraqi Corps in the north.10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) would con-stitute the crux of this organization, CJSOTF-North, and conduct unconventional warfarethrough, by, and with the Kurdish forces, thePeshmerga. 10th SFG (A) deployed its twostateside battalions (2/10th SFG (A) and 3/10thSFG (A)) and received 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG(A) to round out its combat power. 10th SFG (A)also received a robust planning component fromthe 352nd Special Operations Group (SOG) toperform the mission of Joint Special OperationsAir Detachment.

SOCCENT assigned 5th SFG (A) the task ofestablishing CJSOTF-West, and its three battal-ions would constitute the bulk of the task force(TF). As operations approached, CJSOTF-Wgrew to include Australian and British SOF,Psychological Operations (PSYOP) elementsfrom B Company, 9th PSYOP Battalion, and301st PSYOP Company, with Civil Affairs (CA)

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

augmentation. The CJSOTF planned to searchfor and destroy SCUD missiles in the westerndesert. In previous editions of OPLAN 1003,SOCCENT envisioned CJSOTF-W organizingand employing regime opposition groups insouthern Iraq, but CENTCOM’s latest plan envi-sioned a rapid seizure of Baghdad, which wouldobviate the requirement for organizing insur-gent forces against Saddam. CJSOTF-W’s mis-sion in southern Iraq subsequently changed tosupporting CFLCC’s assault north, to includethe provision of intelligence and SOF seizing ter-rain.

To its credit, SOCCENT had learned a greatdeal from the understaffing of TFs DAGGERand K-BAR during the initial phases ofOperation ENDURING FREEDOM inAfghanistan. It determined not to make thesame mistake in Iraq, instructing allocatedforces to build joint manning documents toreflect their needs. Each SOF headquarters wasmore sufficiently staffed with air planners,PSYOP, CA, and coalition liaison officers(LNOs). As important, both CJSOTFs had

enough personnel to provide LNOs to conven-tional force commands, enabling SOF to syn-chronize its operations with CFLCC forces.Consequently, the various SOF TFs were betterprepared to conduct joint special operations.

Other U.S. SOF would also perform essentialroles in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Inlate 2002 and early 2003, CENTCOM addedadditional SOF forces to compensate for the rel-ative paucity of conventional forces. The 75thRanger Regiment was assigned numerous mis-sions to secure key terrain along the outskirts ofBaghdad to facilitate the mounted advance of3rd ID. Other coalition SOF (CSOF) forces wereassigned special reconnaissance (SR) missionsdeep within Iraq to target Iraqi maneuverforces.

SOCCENT also had operational control ofNaval Special Warfare Task Group–CENTCOM(NSWTG-CENT), tasking it to secure oil and gasfacilities on the Al Faw Peninsula and two oilplatforms off the Iraqi coast; NSWTG-CENTalso supported the Combined Force MaritimeComponent Command (CFMCC) in the execu-

tion of various missions. SOFaviation from both the 160thSpecial Operations AviationRegiment and 352nd SOGwould support various infiltra-tions during the course of theinvasion.

As events unfolded, allSOF elements would have toexecute numerous inherenttasks that included attackingIraqi forces, seizing key infra-structure, and preventing thedestruction of critical nodes.Although conducting shapingoperations in support ofCFLCC, SOF often found itselfin the supported role duringthe initial stages of combat.

The InvasionOIF formally commenced

the night of 19 March 2003,and SOF played a critical rolein defeating Iraqi forcesthroughout the battlespace.

114

Map of GEN Franks’ five fronts of attack.

OIF represented the largest commitment of SOFto an operation since the inception of USSO-COM. SOF aquitted itself exceptionally wellthroughout the campaign.

Operating primarily out of Kuwait,Operational Detachments-Alpha (ODAs) fromCJSOTF-W infiltrated into Iraq on 19 March.Their primary purpose remained the preventionof Iraqi SCUD launches, and they accomplishedtheir mission as not a single SCUD waslaunched against the coalition. Directing U.S.

and allied aircraft, the detachments dominatedthe vast terrain of the western desert and quick-ly overwhelmed the Iraqi military. ODAs alsosecured key terrain, including the airfield atWadi al Khirr and the line of communication(LOC) on the outskirts of Najaf. In one of thekey actions of the invasion, ODA 551 providedSR of the LOC passing through the Karbala gap,keeping it open for 3rd ID’s movement intoBaghdad. In the early days of the operation, allof the SF teams in the western desert were incontact with the enemy. Remarkably, the ODAssuffered no casualties, a testament to their plan-ning, training, and leadership.

In southern Iraq, the primary tasks ofCJSOTF-W remained target acquisition. MH-53s from the 20th Special Operations Squadron(SOS) inserted ODAs deep into Iraq to providesurveillance of Iraqi troop movements.Directing air strikes, the detachments supportedthe speed of the ground campaign. AdditionalODAs in the south worked with Iraqi nationalssympathetic to the coalition cause and were ableto identify and root out Fedayeen soldiers(Saddam loyalists), Ba’ath party members,Regime Death Squads, and other terror cells.

CJSOTF-N, dubbed TF VIKING, certainlyhad a more difficult task staging and insertingits forces. Turkey had denied access to both itsair and land space for coalition forces. Theforces of TF VIKING would have to insert intonorthern Iraq under extremely daunting circum-stances. While TF VIKING had advance ele-ments in Iraq prior to hostilities, these detach-ments were probably not sufficient in number tothwart a large Iraqi assault, much less securekey objectives originally tasked to 4th ID. Since

4th ID could not movethrough Turkey tonorthern Iraq, TFVIKING would have tofill this void.

Beginning 22March, MC-130s flewthrough heavy Iraqianti-aircraft fire andlanded SOF team mem-bers. One of the MC-130s took so much fireit was forced to land inTurkey. The incident

did result in Turkey’s subsequent lifting of itsairspace restrictions. In the meantime, the352nd SOG managed to insert 51 ODAs intonorthern Iraq within the next several days.

On 19 March, the initial ODAs in Kurdistandirected air strikes on to Iraqi positions. AsCJSOTF-N forces arrived from various parts ofEurope, TF VIKING orchestrated an offensive.On 28 March, ODAs from Forward OperatingBase (FOB) 103 and 6,500 Peshmerga (Kurdishfreedom fighters) attacked Ansar al Islam—anal Qaeda affiliate—in a fortified enclave that

115

Karbala Gap hide site.

5th SFG (A) resupply site.

housed 700 heavilyarmed terroristsnear Iran. Within30 hours, the com-bined force crushedthe terrorist pocket.Through a subse-quent series of coor-dinated attacksalong the GreenLine, the linedemarcating theKAZ, SOF andPeshmerga troopssteadily advancedagainst Iraqi mili-tary forces, occupy-ing abandoned posi-tions. The effectiveintegration of airand ground forcesdestroyed theenemy’s will to fightand opened the avenues of approach to the twolargest northern cities, Kirkuk and Mosul.

As operations progressed, it became appar-ent that TF VIKING would need additional com-bat power to seize objectives in the north. Tofacilitate operations, the Combined ForceCommander, General Tommy Franks, assignedTF VIKING tactical control (TACON) of the173rd Airborne Brigade. This marked the firsttime that a SOF operational headquarters hadbeen the supported command, complete with aconventional brigade, since the Vietnam War.TF VIKING would later assume TACON of

another conventional unit, the 26th MarineExpeditionary Unit (Special OperationsCapable).

The 173rd made an airborne assault into theKAZ on March 26 and prepared to support coali-tion operations. These airborne soldiers con-ducted an area defense operation around Irbil todeny enemy movement along the major lines ofcommunications between Mosul and Kirkuk.The brigade’s actions subsequently freed ODAsto prosecute objectives with the Peshmerga. On10 April, SOF and their Peshmerga alliesattacked Kirkuk from three sides, and the cityfell by nightfall. The coalition established theirheadquarters in a government building. MoreSOF and elements of the 173rd AirborneBrigade soon reinforced the coalition peacekeep-ing efforts. Together, the combined forcesecured nearby oil fields, maintained check-points, and conducted joint patrols that calmedthe city residents. Meanwhile, other coalitionforces negotiated the orderly capitulation andoccupation of Mosul.

While the two CJSOTFs provided the bulk ofthe fighting forces, other SOF elements executedequally important operations. These SOF forcesgathered vital intelligence, secured numeroushigh-value targets, attacked terrorist networks,

116Preparing to attack Ansar al Islam.

Peshmerga Forces.

and assisted coalition forces in accomplishingtheir missions. While assigning SOF the tough-est of missions, CFLCC provided numerous con-ventional capabilities to SOF, greatly enhancingits lethality. For example, the 75th RangerRegiment assumed TACON of elements of the82nd Airborne Division, a High MobilityArtillery Rocket System platoon, and a tankcompany team to execute its missions in thevicinity of Baghdad. SOF also frequentlyreceived the allocation of fixed-wing CAS to sup-port its missions.

Al Faw–Direct Action MissionsOn 20 March 2003, a Naval Special Warfare

Task Group (NSWTG), consisting of U.S. NavySEALs, the United Kingdom’s 40 CommandoBrigade, and Polish SOF, conducted one of thelargest direct action missions conducted inOperation IRAQI FREEDOM. The goalwas to simultaneously take control of twooff-shore oil platforms, Mina Al Bakr(MABOT) and Khor Al Amaya (KAAOT),and secure onshore pipeline support valvesfor each platform and their metering andmanifold stations located on the Al Fawpeninsula. By taking control of these tar-gets before Iraqi forces could damagethem, the NSWTG would avert an environ-mental disaster and preserve the only oilexport capability in southern Iraq.

The missions crossed several AOs, soplanning involved coordination with theCombined Force Maritime ComponentCommand (CFMCC) and Combined ForceLand Component Command (CFLCC). Aspecial operations command and controlelement (SOCCE) was also established tocoordinate between conventional and SOFunits operating in the I MEF’s AOR.

The overall concept for securing the Al Fawtargets and the scheme of maneuver were set-tled almost five months prior to execution.NSWTG forces would conduct the initial seizureand be relieved by British Royal Marines (3Commando Brigade). The Kuwait Naval Base(KNB) would serve as the main base of opera-tion. NSWTG forces conducted countlessrehearsals and “sand-table” exercises for a four-phase operation, which consisted of intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); pre-

assault fires; simultaneous assaults on all objec-tives; and speedy relief of NSWTG forces byRoyal Marines.

The rehearsals uncovered a vital weak spotin the Iraqi defenses: reliance on radio commu-nications. As a result, electronic warfare wasincluded in the plan to jam Iraqi communica-tions. Additionally, an information operations(IO) campaign was initiated to capitalize onreports that enemy troops suffered from lowmorale and high desertion rates. Thousands ofleaflets were dropped with capitulation instruc-tions as well as phrases dissuading soldiers andworkers from destroying oil facilities and equip-ment — “you’re hurting your family’s livelihoodof fishing if you destroy the oil.” This informa-tion was also broadcast across the Iraqi airwaves from the USS Constellation (CV-64) andUSS Duluth (LPD-6).

With numerous Iraqi vehicles, fighting posi-tions, and 130mm artillery guns near its objec-tives on the Al Faw peninsula, the NSWTG firescell targeted 24 enemy positions with two FA-18s, four F-15Es, four British GR-4s, six fight-ers, bombers, and AC-130s.

Finally, on the morning of 20 March, theCFSOCC commander notified NSWTG that themission was a “go” for that evening. Just beforesunset, NSWTG forces departed for their tar-gets: both oil platforms (MABOT and KAAOT)in the Persian Gulf, and the pipeline (Objective

117

One of the IO leaflets dropped on Al Faw.

TEXACO) and metering and manifold stations(Objective CORONADO) on the Al Faw peninsu-la.

The SEALs arrived at MABOT at approxi-mately 2200, boarded the facility, and weregreeted by several Iraqis waiving white sheetsand t-shirts. The SEALs secured the Iraqis inthe platform’s dining facility and searched thefacility, finding large amounts of ammunition,AK-47s, and RPGs. After about 40 minutes, theSEAL platoon commander radioed that MABOThad been secured. It was turned over to a RoyalMarine platoon, and the SEALs returned toKNB.

KAAOT was similar in appearance and sce-nario. The facility, however, was seriouslydegraded and not operational. Polish SOF sub-dued 18 Iraqis who offered little resistance andwere very cooperative during interrogation.After turning the Iraqis over to a Royal Marinesrelief force, the Poles searched the dilapidatedstructure and found only a few weapons, someloaded magazines, and a small amount of explo-sive materials. Once the search was complete,the Poles likewise returned to KNB.

Meanwhile, eight MH-53 PAVE LOW heli-copters transported the rest of NSWTG andtheir equipment to Objectives TEXACO andCORONADO. Unexpectedly, the initial landing

zones (LZs) at CORONADO were surrounded byknee-deep, oily mud. The SEALs struggled tounload equipment from the helicopters andtrudged 150 meters to their objective. An A-10destroyed the one enemy vehicle in the area.Once they reached their objective, the SEALssearched the buildings and the manifold, andfound nothing. In just over an hour from launch,the NSWTG had established a command postand radioed for British relief forces (40Commando, Royal Marines).

The commandos cleared a LZ on dry ground,eliminated a lone enemy sniper, and called infire on 100-plus Iraqi forces gathered north oftheir area. The SEALs at Objective TEXACOalso encountered muddy conditions and lost useof their three desert patrol vehicles (DPVs) tothe insidious muck. The SEAL assault teammoved out on foot toward their objective and,after a hasty sweep of the area, found no signif-icant weapons or explosives. The SEALssecured the south and east gates to the complexand called for relief forces. The Royal Marinesarrived within minutes, took control of the area,conducted a thorough search of all structures,and secured 100 enemy prisoners of war. In onebunker, the Brits found several dead Iraqi offi-cers. The bulk of the SEAL team was sent backto KNB after only two hours on the ground—

118

NSWTG-CENT SEALs aboard MABOT GOPLAT.

mission accomplished. A few SEALs remainedwith the DPVs until they could be extractedlater that day.

The Al Faw missions succeeded because ofdetailed planning, exhaustive rehearsals, use ofoverwhelming force, and an IO plan that dimin-ished the enemy’s desire to fight. Most impor-tant, decentralized execution allowed tacticalcommanders to make quick and unhindereddecisions in seizing the objectives.

Seizing Other InfrastructureSOF also conducted ground and airborne

assaults to seize infrastructure, including air-fields, oil fields, and dams. On 1 April, 3/75thRanger Battalion seized the Haditha Dam tothwart Saddam loyalists who planned to destroythe facility and create a disaster downstream.Ordered to hold the dam by General Franks, theRangers repelled Iraqi counterattacks andendured heavy shelling. By occupying thisobjective, 3/75th effectively cut the LOC runningwest out of Baghdad along the Euphrates River.

1/75th Ranger Battalion quickly followed themission at Haditha by interdicting and cuttingthe LOC running north out of Baghdad along theTigris River. The remaining LOC into Baghdadwas to the south, and this route was being usedby the main coalition invasion forces. When1/75th cut the LOC running north, it helped toisolate Baghdad and facilitated the eventualcapture of Iraqi troops and leaders trying to fleethe city. In mid-April when Iraqi Army unitstried to escape Baghdad, the tanks and Bradleyssupporting SOF operations proved to be benefi-cial during fighting along both the Euphrates

and Tigris Rivers. This combined arms effortkept the LOC open for assaulting U.S. conven-tional forces. By 20 April, maneuver units from3rd ID linked up with the Rangers along boththe Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. SOF couldnow turn its attention to capturing high-priorityindividuals.

The fall of Baghdad and the collapse of theIraqi Army led to a deceptive period of calm inIraq in mid-2003, and most of the SOF in Iraqredeployed in May and June 2003. CJSOTF-Nwas deactivated, and CJSOTF-W was re-desig-nated CJSOTF-Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP), having moved to Baghdad in April. By July2003, CJSOTF-AP had drawn down to the 5thSFG (A) Headquarters, consisting of oneNSWTU and one FOB. The FOB commanded 14ODAs, few of them at full strength. The bulk ofthese forces remained in Baghdad with outsta-tions covering Al Qaim, Ramadi/Fallujah,Najaf/Nasiriyah, Hillah, Kut/Amarah, Tikrit,Balad, Samarra, and Kirkuk. CJSOTF-APplanned more forces reduction in early 2004.

Chasing High Value Targets SOF and conventional forces integrated their

capabilities as never before during OIF. Bothelements cooperated remarkably well at the tac-tical level by providing forces to the other, oftenwithout direction from higher headquarters.The two elements contributed according to theirstrengths: conventional forces conducted the“heavy lifting,” and SOF provided the “surgical”capability.

Reliable intelligence remained the key tocounterinsurgency and counterterrorist opera-tions, and SOF took the lead in improving coali-tion intelligence about the enemy in Iraq. SOFprovided a disproportionate amount of the intel-ligence collected by coalition forces and sharedtargeting information with the coalition. WhileSOF provided vital intelligence for conventionalforces, conventional forces frequently providedcombat power to secure and pacify joint objec-tives.

Saddam’s CaptureSOF and conventional integration would also

prove essential to the capture or elimination ofseveral key persons of interest. Initially, theultimate target was Saddam Hussein al-Majid

119

Tanks and special operations vehicles refuel at H-1Airfield.

al-Tikriti, the deposed President of Iraq. Inaccordance with his importance, Saddam wasdesignated the number one target on the BlackList (BL #1) developed by national intelligenceagencies. The coalition employed a host of forcesand capabilities in its effort to track Saddam andthe persons who could provide clues to hiswhereabouts. In July 2003, SOF and elementsfrom the 101st Airborne Division conducted anoperation in Mosul to capture or kill Saddam’ssons, Qusay and Uday (BL #2 and #3). Afternumerous assaults on their well-fortified hide-out, the U.S. forces took the objective and foundQusay’s and Uday’s bodies. But Saddamremained elusive.

By July 2003, both SOF and the 4th ID lead-ership concluded that capturing persons on theoriginal Black List would not lead to BL #1. Thekey to finding Saddam was uncovering the fam-ily-tribal ties of those Iraqis who had long-stand-ing relations with him. Both SOF and the 1stBrigade Combat Team (BCT), 4th ID developedlink analysis based on information gatheredfrom numerous operations in Baghdad and thesurrounding area. The analysis showed whichfamilies were supporting Saddam and the insur-gency. These families were largely concentratedin and around the Tikrit area where Saddamretained a loyal following. SOF and the 1/4thBCT believed that targeting specific individualswithin these families would yield information onSaddam. Once the importance of the tribal orfamilial tie was established, the U.S. forces tar-geted the patriarchs of these families.

This systematic approach to finding“enablers” who could identify Saddam worked.In mid-October, a SOF team captured an indi-vidual who provided essential information con-cerning the locations of additional memberswithin Saddam’s inner circle. Based on theseindividuals’ subsequent interrogation, SOF and4th ID units hit a series of targets in December.These raids led to a substantial find in Baghdadon 12 December. Here, SOF detained four indi-viduals, and upon questioning, one turned out tobe the person who would lead SOF and conven-tional forces to Saddam’s hide-out.

The source first reported that Saddam washiding west of Tikrit. SOF alerted COL JamesB. Hickey, 1st BCT/4th ID commander, and thetwo forces prepared to act on the information.

By 1300 on 13 December, the individual hadchanged his story and now claimed that Saddamwas hiding southeast of Tikrit. He stated thatSaddam would be located at one of two locationsnear the town of Ad Dawr, southeast of Tikrit.The first location—code-named WOLVERINEI—was the home of Saddam’s cook. The secondwas a nearby farm, designated WOLVERINE II.A SOF team reconnoitered the area.

By mid-December, SOF and conventionalforces had perfected their battle drills for cordonand search operations. The SOF commanderwould control the immediate target area, includ-ing assaulters, SOF helicopters, and an AC-130.1/4th BCT typically sealed the outer perimeterto prevent interference from resistance forces.To execute the WOLVERINE targets, COLHickey committed a battalion-sized TF to offsetany chance of a fight with Saddam loyalists. GTroop, 10th Cavalry would be TACON to SOF toestablish inner cordons at the two objectives.The 4-42nd Field Artillery (FA) occupied theouter cordon to stop enemy reinforcements andkeep BL #1 from escaping. The 2-99th EngineerBattalion would establish observation posts andscreen along the west bank of the Tigris River.Attack helicopters (AH-64s) from A/1-4 Aviationwould orbit on the west side of the river to sup-port the outer cordon forces and screen Highway1 for possible Iraqi reinforcements.

Just after 2000 hours, as the convoy passedthe northern outskirts of Ad Dawr, 4-42nd FAsetup an outer cordon and checkpoints. The con-voy made a right turn, heading towardWolverine I. The lead elements—SOF and 1stPlatoon, G Troop—continued on toward thefarm, Wolverine II. The trail elements—SOFand 2nd Platoon, G Troop—peeled off from theconvoy and rolled directly into an assault onWolverine I. The assaulters rushed into thehouse and found four individuals: the cook, hiswife, and two children.

About halfway between Wolverine I and II,the SOF and 1st BCT headquarters elementssetup the C2 node. The assault element forWolverine II proceeded toward its objective.From the lead vehicle, the enabler directed theassaulters to a grove of trees and then a com-pound surrounded by a six-foot high wall. Theassault began immediately. After the target wassecure and one Iraqi caretaker was detained,

120

SOF elements led the sourceinto the compound. Hewalked over to a flower bednear a concrete patio andpointed at a patch of ground.He started scratching thedirt with his shoe.

While some assaultersbegan searching this areafor a bunker, another SOFteam moved westward intothe orchard. It cleared sev-eral small buildings and then patrolled to thesouth, but did not find Saddam. Meanwhile,those SOF at the compound questioned theenabler, and he once again walked over to theflower bed and began scratching at the dirt withhis shoe. All of a sudden, he uncovered a ropehandle. The SOF element recalled the otherassaulters, and soon, everyone had gatheredaround the rope loop.

Two of the assaulters grabbed hold of thehandle, and just as they were ready to heaveupward, the caretaker began screaming,“Saddam is in there! Saddam is in there!” Theyeasily pulled up the styrofoam block. Theassaulters pointed their guns and flashlightsinto the hole, and a few moments later a pair ofhands emerged from the hole. An assaulterpulled the man out of the hole, and then fourassaulters grabbed him and got quite a surprisewhen they saw Saddam’s face. They finally hadtheir quarry.

By approximately 2030 hours, the assaultelement notified the SOF commander that theyhad detained Saddam. The SOF commander

ordered the assaulters to takeSaddam, the detainee, andenabler to Tikrit. A SOF teamsecured a helicopter landing zonein a nearby field, and a helicop-ter landed and picked upSaddam.

The capture of SaddamHussein culminated six monthsof painstaking targeting efforts.These forces had steadily elimi-nated BL #1’s support mecha-

nism by capturing and interrogating enablers.Equally important to the capture of Saddam wasthe integration of tactical intelligence and oper-ations between SOF and conventional forces.Intelligence personnel and interrogators per-formed key roles in tracking down Saddam.Both conventional and SOF leaders emphasizedthe need for more interrogators, interpreters,and human intelligence capabilities.

4th ID and SOF leaders agreed that theirexperience in capturing Saddam should be stud-ied as a model for future joint operations. Bothsides benefited from the capabilities that theother force brought to the fight, validating thetenets of joint warfare.

Combatting the InsurgencyBy late 2003, however, there were growing

signs that an insurgency was building amongthe Iraqi Sunnis who had been Saddam’s mostloyal supporters. To meet this new challenge,SOF built up forces and developed a sustainablerotation plan to continue OIF into the indefinitefuture. When 10th SFG (A) took over theCJSOTF-AP in January 2004, it brought twoFOBs (one from 10th SFG (A) and one from 5thSFG (A)). One FOB remained in the vicinity ofBaghdad. The second FOB, however, deployedto Mosul to increase the SOF in areas north andwest of Baghdad where the insurgency was rap-idly growing in strength. In February, the SEALcontingent also increased to a Naval SpecialWarfare Task Group (NSWTG) with forces locat-ed in Baghdad, Mosul, and Haditha.

While the CJSOTF would have certainly pre-ferred to conduct combined operations with Iraqiforces, few such elements existed in early 2004.The Iraqi Army had disintegrated and been dis-

121

Entryway to Saddam Hussein’s hideout.

$750,000 in cash was found with Saddam Hussein at thetime of his capture.

banded. Thus, SOF focused primarily on unilat-eral direct action missions to capture or killmembers of Saddam’s regime, terrorists, andinsurgents throughout the first year of the war.

Operations in urban areas again validatedthe benefits of the joint approach. Urban war-fare was particularly intense in 2004 with majorbattles for control of Fallujah, Najaf, and othercities. During the battle for Fallujah in April2004, coalition forces had relied almost entirelyon conventional light infantry to retake the city,but the infantry suffered heavy losses. A fewmonths later, Muqtada al Sadr and his Shiitemilitia took over the holy city of Najaf. To driveSadr out of Najaf, coalition forces changed tac-tics. The conventional commanders requested aSOF contingent of SEALs and ODAs from FOB51 and employed a sophisticated mixture ofSOF, light infantry, tanks, and other armoredvehicles. SOF conducted reconnaissance andsurgical raids, while conventional forcesdestroyed large pockets of enemy resistance.The integration of SOF into the operation helpeddefeat Sadr and other radical Shiite elements intough urban combat. American forces receivedfar fewer casualties than in Fallujah.

Training and Employing IraqiForces

Despite the great attention it earned, DAwas not the only SOF mission in Iraq. SOFunits were among the first to train and equipIraqi forces for combat. In late 2003, theCoalition Provisional Authority (CPA) wanted to

create a small but highly effective, multi-ethnicunit as both an example of inter-ethnic coopera-tion and a deterrent to the insurgency. Thecoalition command turned to SOF to organize,train, equip, and advise the new Iraqi 36thCommando Battalion. The initial recruits weredrawn in equal numbers from each of the fivemost prominent Iraqi political parties at thetime.

The 36th Commando Battalion got off to arocky start when some of the recruits sent by thepolitical parties showed up with ping-pong pad-dles because they had been told they were goingto a sports camp. But once the recruits who didnot want to be commandos were weeded out,SOF training and leadership quickly turnedthem into an effective unit. In early 2004, whenmany units of the new Iraqi police and militaryforces broke under insurgent pressure, 36thCommando consistently retained its cohesionand fought effectively.

In late 2003, CJSOTF-AP began buildinganother Iraqi element, the Iraqi CounterTerrorism Force (ICTF). Whereas the 36thCommando was a light infantry strike force, theICTF would be an even smaller, more clandes-tine counterterrorist and hostage rescue forcewith robust intelligence capability. TheCJSOTF planned to place the 36th Commandoin a supporting role to the ICTF, and to eventu-ally organize a premier counterinsurgency capa-bility around the two forces. ICTF training wasconducted initially both within and outside Iraq.By February 2006, appropriate facilities had

been built in Iraq, and subsequentICTF training was conducted strict-ly in that country.

The 36th Commando Battalionstaged its first combat operationsin April 2004, and the ICTFentered combat in May. As the bestunits in the Iraqi military, theyquickly took a prominent role inoperations throughout Iraq. Inaddition to operations to eliminateterrorists and insurgents, they alsotook on extremely sensitive mis-sions, where political considera-tions dictated that the assaultsassume an Iraqi face.

The ICTF and 36th Commando122

U.S. and Iraqi SOF returning from a combined operation in Baghdad.

played a vital role in the battle for Najaf inAugust of 2004, and if Sadr had not surrendered,they would have stormed his hiding place. InSeptember 2004, the ICTF and the commandosconducted offensive operations in Samarra, andin the November 2004 battle to retake Fallujah,36th Commando assaulted an insurgent strong-hold within a hospital. Had the latter operationbeen conducted by U.S. forces, the enemy couldhave easily exploited anticipated collateral dam-age for propaganda.

As two Iraqi units grew in size and scope, itbecame necessary to build a stronger commandand support structure. With SOF assistance,the Iraqi Army created the Iraqi SpecialOperations Forces (ISOF) Brigade in July 2005.The 36th Commando became the 1st Battalion ofthe ISOF Brigade, and the ICTF became the 2ndBattalion of the ISOF Brigade. The brigade hadboth training and support battalions, giving it atotal of four. By 2007, the ISOF Brigade hadcontinued to grow and operate effectively underits new organizational structure. ISOFremained arguably the most effective Iraqiforces and the most impressive success story inthe American-led effort to build new Iraqi secu-rity forces.

Training and AdvisingConventional Forces

SOF’s training and advisory mission did notstop with the ISOF brigade. Conventional forcestook the lead in training and organizing Iraqipolice and conventional military forces.American commanders, however, recognizedSOF’s enormous experience in organizing andtraining foreign forces. As a rule, SOF not onlytrained forces, but accompanied them duringoperations to provide continuing advice, assis-tance, and assessment. To meet the trainingneeds of the broader Iraqi Army, the multi-national command subsequently requested theCJSOTF’s assistance in training conventionalIraqi forces in 2004. Thus, SOF grew increas-ingly involved in training a variety of Iraqiunits.

When 10th SFG (A) replaced 5th SFG (A) incommand of the CJSOTF-AP in December 2004,SOF began partnering with local Iraqi securityforces in their AOs. CJSOTF-AP instructed eachoperational detachment to build partnership

relationships with the most effective Iraqi forcesin its AO. Usually these units were from theIraqi National Guard (later re-designated IraqiArmy units), but in some places SOF workedwith Iraqi police units. SOF have continuallytrained and accompanied into combat a host ofIraqi conventional units, significantly improvingtheir effectiveness.

SOF’s most pronounced effort in trainingconventional Iraqi forces occurred from June toDecember 2005. During this 5th SFG (A) rota-tion, the CJSOTF-AP force structure increasedfrom two to three FOBs to augment the conven-tional force training capabilities. At that time,conventional forces provided embedded MilitaryTransition Teams (MiTTs) for the Iraqi Armyunits in their area. Due to force constraints inthe United States, the U.S. Army could not pro-vide the MiTTs needed to train forces in north-ern Iraq. USASOC filled the gap by deploying athird FOB to Iraq.

The SOF training elements were calledBattalion Augmentation Training Teams(BATTs) to distinguish them from the conven-tional MiTTs. Consisting primarily of singleODAs, the BATTs enhanced security across alarge part of northern Iraq. During the battlesfor Tal Afar, the BATTs, Iraqi Army units, andthe U.S. 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment workedtogether in liberating and securing that city.The integration among SOF, Iraqi forces, andU.S. conventional forces proved essential to suc-cess.

SOF Foreign Internal Defense activities alsoincluded training the new Iraqi Air Force.

123

BATT personnel conducting combined operation with Iraqisoldiers and U.S. conventional forces.

Members of AFSOC’s “FID Squadron,” the 6thSOS, started training Iraqi airmen in 2004. TheIraqi Air Force started with few aircraft and per-sonnel. Using light, inexpensive, and easy tomaintain aircraft, the 6th SOS enhanced thecapabilities of Iraqi forces to conduct intelli-gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mis-sions. Combat aviation advisors from 6th SOSnot only taught the Iraqis to fly and maintaintheir aircraft, but to plan and conduct effectivejoint and combined missions.

Training and Advising Iraqi PoliceSOF also trained the renowned Hillah SWAT

element, one of the most effective police units inIraq. Located in Babil Province, Hillah laysouth of Baghdad in a relative hot bed of insur-gent activity. An ODA first linked up with theHillah SWAT team in March 2004, and U.S.SOF has had an outstanding working relation-ship with Hillah SWAT ever since. In August2004, when Muqtada Sadr’s militia attackedcoalition forces across Iraq and nearly took con-trol of Hillah, its SWAT held out against hismilitia until coalition forces arrived and drovethe insurgents out. Having grown into a battal-ion-sized force, Hillah SWAT has worked closelywith ODAs and coalition forces from ElSalvador. Accompanied by ODAs, Hillah SWATunits have conducted highly successful coun-terinsurgency and counterterrorist operationsacross Babil Province and all the way to the out-

skirts of Baghdad. One of the greatest strengths of the unit has

been its strong and independent leadership.Though part of the Ministry of Interior, HillahSWAT has not been accused of supporting a par-ticular sect or political party as have many otherpolice units. Because its leadership hasremained professional and impartial in Iraq’spolitical struggles, Hillah SWAT has been par-ticularly effective in suppressing insurgents andterrorists. The leaders of Hillah SWAT, howev-er, paid a price for their impartiality. In October2006, the respected commander and deputy com-mander were assassinated. These losses led to adifficult period of uncertainty, but a new leaderhas since been named. Equally important, SOFtraining helped develop strong junior leaderswho ensured that Hillah SWAT continued con-ducting successful combat operations.

SOF’s relationship with various Iraqi policeforces has continued to evolve. In early 2006,CJSOTF-AP assumed the task for providingtraining and advisory assistance to theEmergency Response Unit (ERU), the premierIraqi police counterterrorism unit. Prior to SOFinvolvement with the ERU, a contract companytrained unit members only at the ERU com-pound, but performed no advisory role duringoperations. This limitation slowed the progressof the ERU.

CJSOTF-AP subsequently tasked itsNSWTU and one ODA to train and advise the

124SOF training Hillah SWAT.

ERU. The CJSOTF instructed its elements toenhance the ERU’s counterinsurgency and coun-terterrorist capabilities, and to promote itsinteroperability with Iraqi SOF. By April 2006,the SEALs and Special Forces were fullyengaged with training the ERU.

Unlike Iraqi Army units, the ERU and otherIraqi police units executed arrest warrants.Enhancing police capabilities was vital toincreasing security in Iraq. The ERU’s growingability to handle the toughest targets, specifical-ly eliminating those terrorists attacking police,had the potential to heighten the security of allIraqi police forces. Moreover, other police unitswould then be free to target less dangerous indi-viduals against whom they were more effective.

The ERU has conducted many successfulcombat operations with SOF assistance andadvice. In May 2006, the ERU conducted aneffective raid in central Baghdad during which itcaptured members of two IED cells working outof a university. The ERU detained seven addi-tional individuals, including three foreign fight-ers. Most impressively, the raid resulted in min-imal damage and disruption to the universityand innocent students. The impressive perform-ance of the ERU on this mission led the NSWTUcommander to affirm: “ERU did an excellent jobtonight . . . the operation was well-controlled andefficient. ERU treated the dorm and studentsrespectfully. There was virtually no damagedone inside the dorm.” The ERU conducted fol-low-on operations to reduce the enemy’s abilityto target coalition and Iraqi security forces.

While conducting combined combat opera-tions with the Iraqis, SOF detachments madeon-the-spot corrections and remedied any weak-nesses in Iraqi planning or execution. The train-ing cycle was continuous. SOF evaluated theeffectiveness of the training that the Iraqisreceived and incorporated appropriate correctivemeasures prior to the next operation. SOFassisted the Iraqis with their intelligence collec-tion, analysis, and targeting. Subsequent com-bat operations proved or disproved the validityof the intelligence and the effectiveness of Iraqitargeting and planning processes.

Hunting of ZarqawiSOF units were also targeting terrorists, to

include members of the Ansar al Islam (AI) and

the network of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (AMZ).Prior to OIF, AMZ had built an alliance betweenal Qaeda (AQ) and AI in northern Iraq. AfterBaghdad fell to coalition forces, AMZ built hisnetwork, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ), into a deadlyterrorist organization. AMZ’s ultimate goalswere to foment a civil war between Sunnis andShiites, use that civil war to drive out the coali-tion forces, and create a fundamentalist“Caliphate” in Iraq.

SOF had made significant progress againstAQIZ until April 2004, when all coalition forceswere pulled out of Fallujah. The absence ofcoalition forces in Fallujah provided terrorists asafe haven. The coalition determined that it hadto control the city to counter both the insurgencyin general and AMZ specifically. In the fall,coalition forces reentered that city. SOF provid-ed significant assistance to conventional forcesin destroying the Fallujah safe havens inNovember 2004.

Terrorists subsequently shifted their effortsnorth to Mosul in late 2004. SOF operations inMosul increased dramatically to meet thethreat, and more SOF were sent there. In con-junction with conventional forces, SOF estab-lished enough security to facilitate the January2005 elections in Mosul. The effort to eliminatethe AQ terrorists, however, was particularlylong and difficult. In summer 2005, SOF finallycaptured Abu Talha, the leading terrorist inMosul. Later that year SOF was able to breakthe back of the existing terrorist network inMosul.

Meanwhile, terrorist activity spread to west-ern Iraq and along the Euphrates River, as for-eign suicide bombers moved into Baghdad. Thefight in the west intensified in early 2005 asadditional SOF deployed into the area. Thefighting in the Euphrates River Valley climaxedin the fall of 2005 when SOF and conventionalforces finally defeated the foreign-fighter net-works. The west and Baghdad remained hotlycontested into 2006.

SOF maintained the lead in attacking AMZand his network, but finding AMZ proved diffi-cult as did penetrating the AQIZ network.Relying on a tight-knit network, AMZ and hisassociates could move about more easily thanhad Saddam before his capture. This ease ofmobility made it very difficult initially to eradi-

125

cate AQIZ and the terrorist networks associatedwith it.

SOF had tracked down Saddam by targetinghis facilitators, and this methodology nearly ledto AMZ’s capture in early 2005. To expedite thetargeting process, SOF made several keychanges. SOF expanded its intelligence, surveil-lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capacity and itsanalytical capacity. SOF conducted operationsto drive the acquisition of intelligence. Perhapsmost importantly, SOF brought to bear an inter-agency effort to disrupt AQIZ and capture AMZ.By devoting a variety of intelligence resourcesand increasing the operations tempo, SOF sig-nificantly increased both the speed at which itplanned and executed and the number of terror-ists it caught. These tactics significantly dis-rupted AQIZ operations, but even with theadded resources, capturing AMZ proved to bedifficult.

In spring 2006, a break in the hunt for AMZoccurred when SOF learned the identity andlocation of AMZ’s closest advisor. Instead oflaunching an immediate raid to capture or killthis terrorist, SOF monitored the advisor andwaited for any indication of a meeting withAMZ. On 7 June, SOF learned when and wherehe would next meet withthe head of AQIZ. AMZ,however, had chosen hishideout so well that itwould be nearly impossi-ble to prevent him fromescaping if SOF conduct-ed a raid on the house.SOF leadership decidedto call in an airstrike andthen land a ground forceto do sensitive siteexploitation. An F-16dropped two bombs,killing both AMZ and hisadvisor.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had terrorizedIraq for years. The fol-low-on search of the sitealso uncovered docu-ments that enabled SOFto capture or eliminate

more terrorists in the weeks that followed. Additional Tasks

In addition to conducting direct action andadvisory tasks, SOF also took on a number ofother high priority missions. One of the mostsuccessful was providing personal securitydetachments for high-ranking members of theIraqi government. It was a mission where fail-ure would be highly visible but success would golargely unnoticed. Terrorists targeted key Iraqigovernment ministers because successful assas-sinations had political and psychological effectson the Iraqi government. However, the terror-ists were unable to assassinate any of the Iraqileaders who had SOF security details.

When the interim Iraqi government wasestablished in June 2004, the NSWTG-APassumed the task of guarding key Iraqi govern-ment ministers. The mission continued after theIraqi national elections of January 2005, and theSEALs executed it flawlessly. The SEALs hadbeen training Iraqis to take over the securitymission from the start. By August 2005, theSEALs were able to turn the mission over to theIraqis but remained as mentors until mid-November when the Iraqis took over the missioncompletely.

In another high-priori-ty, low visibility mission,SOF provided SpecialForces Liaison Elements(SFLEs) to other coalitionforces. Beginning in 2004,1st SFG (A) maintainedSFLEs with the SouthKorean elements in north-ern Iraq, and the 7th SFG(A) sent SFLEs to advisethe El Salvadoran ele-ments in the PolishDivision sector southeastof Baghdad. The ODAsfrom 1st SFG (A) chieflyassisted the South KoreanArmy in its conduct ofCivil-Military Operations.The South Korean battal-ion operated in a relative-ly secure part of northernIraq, freeing the ODAs to

126

THE RESCUE OF JESSICA LYNCHOn 1 April 2003, a joint SOF element,

consisting of NAVSOF, U.S. ArmyRangers, Marines, and SOF aviation,launched a successful raid to rescue

PFC Jessica Lynch from a hospital inNasiriyah. Army and Marine ground

forces also conducted diversionaryattacks to prevent reinforcements

from moving to the hospital duringthe rescue.

PFC Jessica Lynch being rescued.

train and advise local Iraqi unitsas time permitted. TheSalvadorans, on the other hand,had a small force operating in ahostile environment and con-ducted many aggressive combatoperations. The ODAs from 7thSFG (A) assisted theirSalvadoran counterparts in theconduct of these missions.

SOF also conducted a numberof successful hostage rescue mis-sions. The rescue of PFC Jessica Lynch in 2003was the first and most famous hostage rescue inIraq, followed by the rescue of several westernhostages in 2004, including U.S. citizen RoyHallums in 2005 and a significant number oflocal Iraqi citizens. In addition, U.S. SOF facili-tated the rescue of other western hostages bycoalition SOF forces.

SOF also contributed a variety of innovativeapproaches to Information Operations connectedwith OIF. For example, SOF pioneered an IOeffort to counter the recruitment of foreign ter-rorists to fight in Iraq. SOF worked with theIraqi government and other nations to returncaptured foreign terrorists to their countries oforigin. SOF also publicized these terrorists’apologies for their actions in Iraq, announcingtheir disillusionment with Jihad, and the AQIZrecruiter’s lies that had induced them to go toIraq.

The Evolving ThreatIn February 2006, a terrorist attack on the

Shiite Golden Mosque in Samarra provoked adramatic rise in sectarian violence betweenSunnis and Shiites. The worst manifestation ofthis strife was the startling rise in so-called“extra-judicial killings” conducted by bands ofmurderers who kidnapped, tortured, and killedpeople based on their religious sect. SOF hadalways targeted known kidnappers and murder-

ers, but after the rise in sectarian violence in2006, death-squad members became a primarytarget set. In the six months after the Samarramosque bombing, SOF conducted hundreds ofoperations against suspected murderers, captur-ing over 150 known killers, detaining over 500suspects, and killing another 150 of them incombat operations. At the time of this writing,death squads and sectarian violence were still alarge problem for Iraq, and SOF will probably betargeting ethnic militias for the foreseeablefuture.

As in Afghanistan, the evolution of SOF rolesand missions in Iraq continues. SOF willremain at the forefront of targeting specific ter-rorists in Iraq. While SOF has earned countlessaccolades for its successes in eliminating specif-ic persons, its chief contribution over time willundoubtedly prove to be its investment in build-ing the Iraqi security forces. As SOF expandsthe capability of Iraqi units, however, it willincreasingly conduct its targeting through, by,and with Iraqi forces. As a combat multiplier,SOF have proven enormously successful inpreparing Iraqi units to defeat the insurgency.Continued success most likely hinges on SOF’sability to employ this indirect approach: toapply components of FID, IO, and CMO to legit-imize specific security and government institu-tions in Iraq.

127

U.S. Soldiers maintain a perimeter during a CA assessment patrol just blocksfrom the Golden Mosque of Samarra 14 February 2006.

Further Readings

Briscoe, Charles H., et al, All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq,GPO, 2006.

USSOCOM, Special Operations Forces: Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003.

USSOCOM, Tip of the Spear, 2003-2006.

128

“Special Operations Forcesare in Afghanistan andIraq defending our nationagainst terrorism on adaily basis. However, it isSpecial Operation’sunique, but less visible,ability to help establish theconditions to counter anddefeat terrorism throughUnconventional Warfare,Psychological Operations,Foreign Internal Defense,Special Reconnaissance,and Civil Affairs that willbecome increasingly vitalto our long-term success inthe Global War onTerrorism.”

GEN Bryan D. Brown

Operation ENDURING FREEDOMTrans-Sahara Africa

In 2005, the United States government directed an agency-wide effort called the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorist Initiative (TSCTI). Billed as a 10-15 year effort, the initiative wouldenable nations across the North African Pan-Sahel region to deny physical and ideological sanc-tuary to terrorist organizations affiliated with al Qaeda. The Joint Chiefs designated the mil-itary’s participation in this initiative as Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS).

The Joint Chiefs made the European Command (EUCOM) the supported commander forexecution of OEF-TS. Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR) acts as the executiveagent for planning and execution. In 2006, SOCEUR commissioned a detailed assessment ofrequirements to build the counterterrorist capacity of partner nation forces throughout thePan-Sahel. Meanwhile, SOF elements from each component continue executing JointCombined Exchanges for Training (JCETs) and EUCOM sponsored exercises (e.g. FLINT-LOCK) to train with select partner nation units. SOCEUR’s foreign internal defense (FID) ini-tiative to support the TSCTI was scheduled to grow in the coming years, including significantadvisory assistance in Civil Affairs, Information Operations, and other activities to improvephysical and human infrastructures. SOCEUR’s goal was to separate the terrorists from thepopulation.

The strategic importance of OEF-TS to both American and North African governments wassignificant. At the end of 2006, OEF-TS remained one of the largest commitments of U.S. gov-ernment resources to North Africa since World War II. Assigned and apportioned SOF willhave an opportunity to shape conditions not only to defeat al Qaeda-associated franchises, butalso to establish military-to-military relationships that support U.S. objectives in North Africafor decades to come.

JTF-HOA PSYOP leaflet developed for use in Ethiopia.

Even before 9/11, the Commander of SpecialOperations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) hadidentified the al Qaeda-affiliated Abu SayyafGroup (ASG), operating in the Philippines, as asignificant threat to Filipino and Americaninterests. The Philippines was and still is expe-riencing several on-going insurgencies, somerelated to Islamic extremist groups. The ASG—with ties to Al Qaeda, Jemiah Islamiya, and theMoro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)—was

infamous for its hostage for ransom and bomb-ing for extortion activities. In response to arequest from the Filipino government, SOCPACdeployed a mobile training team (MTT) from 1stBn, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) betweenMarch and July 2001 to develop a counterterror-ist capability in the form of a Light ReactionCompany (LRC).

The timing proved fortuitous. While theSpecial Forces detachments from 1/1st SFG

trained the Filipino compa-ny, the ASG kidnapped twoAmericans and held themon the island of Basilan.Upon completion of the itstraining, the LRC deployedto Basilan in July 2001 toassist conventional ArmedForces of the Philippines(AFP) battalions in destroy-ing the ASG and in rescu-ing the American and otherforeign hostages.

After 11 September2001, the United StatesPacific Command (PACOM)planned to aggressivelyattack terrorist groups inSoutheast Asia, particular-ly in the Republic of thePhilippines. In October2001, PACOM and theAFP’s Southern Command(SOUTHCOM) conducted acombined assessment oftroubled areas in the south-ern Philippines. PACOM’sCommander then requestedand received authority todeploy a training and advi-sory package to BasilanIsland to assist SOUTH-COM in its efforts to defeatthe terrorists.

Brig Gen DonaldWurster, Commander,SOCPAC, commanded the

129

Operation ENDURING FREEDOMPhilippines

resulting operation known as Balikatan 02-1 to the Filipinos, but as OperationENDURING FREEDOM – PHILIPPINES(OEF-P) to the United States. SOCPACdeployed a Joint Task Force (JTF) 510 toZamboanga City on Mindanao, Philippinesin January 2002 to prepare for the introduc-tion of forces onto Basilan.

From February – July 2002, tenOperational Detachments Alpha (ODAs)and three Operational Detachments Bravo(ODBs) of 1st Special Forces Group(Airborne) from both 1/1st SFG (A) inOkinawa and 1st SFG (A) at Ft Lewis,Washington, provided training, advice andassistance to 15 AFP Infantry Battalions.Their mission on Basilan, as directed by FOB 11,was to work through, with, and by AFP units todestroy the ASG organization on the island.Prohibited from conducting combat operationsand performing advisory tasks below the battal-ion level, the ODAs focused on denying ASGsanctuary by preparing the AFP to improvesecurity operations by controlling lines of com-munication, improving the infrastructure for thelocal populace through civil affairs, and bolster-ing the government in the eyes of citizensthrough information operations (IO). Both 96thCivil Affairs Battalion and the 4th PsychologicalOperations Battalion (POB) deployed forces tofacilitate these efforts.

SOF met most of its aims during OEF-P onBasilan. By July 2002, the ASG had fled theisland. One of the two American hostages hadbeen recovered. As importantly, enhanced secu-rity and public infrastructure (wells, roads,

bridges, etc.) improved economic and social con-ditions. As of 2006, the AFP assigned only twobattalions on Basilan compared to the 15employed there only four years earlier.

After completing operations in the late sum-mer of 2002, JTF-510 departed Zamboanga; yet,it did leave in place a JSOTF headquarters(JSOTF-P), stationed in Manila, and a SOUTH-COM Liaison Element (SLE) to continue advis-ing and assisting the AFP’s efforts to deny sanc-tuary to terrorists on Mindanao and the SuluArchipelago. In 2003-2004, SOCPAC supportedthe AFP by training a larger number of Filipinoforces. Again, 1st SFG (A) deployed two succes-sive force packages, consisting of one ODB andfive ODAs, to conduct Security Assistance dur-ing 2003, and a third force package in 2004 ofone ODB and three ODAs. All told, the ODAstrained five AFP army and one AFP marine bat-talions. During the same period, 1/1st SFG con-tinued training the Filipino CT force, preparingand outfitting an additional two LRCs. ODAsfrom 1/1 also assisted in the design of a JointSpecial Operations Group (JSOG), includingAFP air force rotary wing lift assets.

The purpose of the JSOG was to employ CTforces to capture or kill terrorists. Members ofthe 6th SOS from Hurlburt Field provided NVGtraining, helping to create a night infiltrationcapability to insert and support the LRCs whenemployed.

Recognizing the need to provide a maritimeinterdiction capability, SOCPAC tasked NAV-SOF elements from Guam to conduct a SecurityAssistance MTT to train Filipino naval units

130

NSWTU-P personnel conduct VBSS with NAVSOU SIX andEIGHT on a Filipino PG ship.

On 1 February 2002, U.S. and Filipino Special Forcesbegan operations on Basilan Island, a jungle stronghold

of the Abu Sayyaf guerrillas.

from SOUTHCOM on maritime patrolling andinterdiction tasks during 2004. In 2005, NAV-SOF shifted to a permanent Subject MatterExpert Exchange (SMEE) effort on Mindanaoand at Tawi-Tawi, an island at the southern endof the Sulu Archipelago.

SOCPAC also introduced operations/intelli-gence fusion teams (O/IFTs) to work with vari-ous organizations in SOUTHCOM. The O/IFTsprovided advice and assistance on collection pri-orities and force employment at division andbrigade. Beginning in 2004, 1/1st SFG providedtwo ODAs continuously to serve as O/IFTs,both to the newly created JSOG and to 6thInfantry Division in Central Mindinao.Additionally, NSWTU-1 provided small boatunit and SEAL O/IFTs to the PhilippineNavy in Zamboanga and on Tawi-Tawi. TheNAVSOF elements provided similar typeadvisory assistance to NAVSOU in south-eastern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.

In 2005, SOCPAC and SOUTHCOMpushed for a significant expansion ofAmerican assistance to the Filipino CTeffort. In the summer of 2005, terroristsfrom the ASG and JI had moved fromMindanao to the island of Sulu where theysought refuge. Sulu was predominantly

inhabited by Muslims and was the site whereIslam was introduced to the Philippines. Manymembers of both the Philippine and Americangovernments believed that introducingAmerican forces onto Sulu would have been metwith intense resistance. Events in Sulu havethus far dispelled both fears.

Based on a PACOM assessment recommend-ing such a deployment, the SECDEF approved asecond iteration of OEF-P to combat terrorism inthe SOUTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR),specifically on Sulu. SOCPAC established a

131

NAVSOU SIX and RIB DET FOXTROT conducting coast patrol and interaction in the vicinity of General Santos.

Two members of the SOS-T perform advanced traumamanagement on a Filipino firefighter on Sulu.

larger JSOTF in Zamboanga and deployed aforce package to the island of Sulu, conductingoperations based on the Basilan model. Usingthat template, SOCPAC deployed one ODB, fiveODAs, and elements of the NWSTU to Sulu toadvise and assist AFP units in their effort tocapture key terrorists. The JSOTF developedthree main lines of operation: capacity building,targeted civil military operations (CMO), andinformation operations. SOCPAC had wiselyrequested a number of combat multipliers: aCAT-B, MIST, PAO, EOD specialists, and even aSpecial Operations Surgical Team (SOS-T) fromHurlburt.

Like operations on the island of Basilan,JSOTF-P forces conducted advisory assistanceand SMEEs down to the battalion level. The goalremained to conduct all operations through,with, and by AFP forces.

From October 2005-July 2006, JSOTF-Punits assisted Task Force Comet, the AFP com-mand on Sulu, in setting conditions to deny ter-rorist sanctuary. ODAs advised their partnerarmy and marine infantry battalions in routeand area security to facilitate Filipino sponsoredmedical, veterinary, and engineer civilian actionprograms, along with various populationengagement activities. These combined effortssucceeded in separating the terrorists from thepopulation. The NSWTU rehearsed Filipinounits in maritime interdiction. AFSOC person-nel continued working with the Filipino aviation

units. Special Forces detachments trained andrehearsed select units within Filipino army andmarine battalions in collective patrolling tasks.

On August 1, 2006, TF Comet launchedOperation ULTIMATUM to capture the ASGand JI leadership on Sulu. Filipino Army,Marine, and Special Operations units succeededin driving the terrorists from their sanctuarieson the island. Filipino naval units effectivelycordoned Sulu Island so that the terrorists couldnot escape. Most impressively, TF Comet syn-chronized joint operations for more than 90days, supplying logistics in the field and main-taining continuous pressure on the terrorists, allwithout losing the support of the local popula-tion.

On both Basilan and Sulu, OEF-P hasdemonstrated the efficacy of a population-basedcounterinsurgency fight. Such campaigns canand will work when the local and national gov-ernments and security forces of a partner nationremain committed to eradicating conditions forterrorist sanctuaries. By building the capabilityof host nation forces, developing a combinedInformation Operations campaign which pro-moted government legitimacy, and refurbishingphysical and human infrastructure, SOF havehelped provide options to the Filipino populaceand to sever its ties to terrorist ideology. OEF-Pcurrently provides an example where a smallSOF footprint has combined with collectiveresolve to defeat terrorism.

132

133

ACRONYMS

I MEF....................I Marine ExpeditionaryForce (UK)

4th ID........................4th Infantry DivisionA

A-10 ............................................jet aircraftAAA ............................antiaircraft artilleryACM ...........................anti-coalition militiaACRI .....................African Crisis Response

InitiativeAFP.............................Armed Forces of the

PhilippinesAFSB............Afloat Forward Staging BaseAFSOC .........Air Force Special Operations

CommandAFSOCCENT ..................Air Force Special

Operations Command, CentralAH-64..............................assault helicopterAI .........................................Ansar al IslamAK-47.......................assault rifle (Russian)AMF.......................Afghan Military ForcesAMZ........................Abu Musab al-ZarqawiANA........................Afghan National ArmyANSF.......Afghan National Security ForceAO...................................area of operationsAOB.....................advanced operating baseAOR...........................area of responsibilityAQ..................................................al QaedaAQIZ..................................al Qaeda in IraqARNG ......................Army National GuardASD (SO/LIC)..........Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict

ASDS..................Advanced SEAL Delivery System

ASG................................Abu Sayyaf GroupATF ..............................anti-Taliban ForcesAVN ................................................aviationAWACS .....Airborne Warning and Control

SystemB

BAF ...................................Bagram AirfieldBATT ...........battalion augmentation teamBCT ...........................brigade combat teamBL..................................................black listBN..................................................battalionBOD ...............................Board of DirectorsBUD/S ............................Basic Underwater

Demolition/SEAL

CC2..............................command and controlC4...................................command, control,

communications, and computersC4I ...........................command and control,

communications, computers, and intelligence

CA.............................................Civil AffairsCAOC ........Combat Air Operations CenterCAS...................................close air supportCASEVAC ...................casualty evacuationCCATF ...................Combined Civil Affairs

Task ForceCCT .................................combat controllerCD ............................................counterdrugCENTCOM............U.S. Central CommandCFC-A ..............................Combined Forces

Command-AfghanistanCFLCC ...................Combined Forces Land

Component CommanderCFMCC.............Combined Force Maritime

Component CommandCIA.................Central Intelligence AgencyCINCSOC.................Commander in Chief,

U.S. Special Operations CommandCIO.....................Chief Information OfficerCJFSOCC...............Combined Joint Forces

Special OperationsComponent Command

CJSOTF ................Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force

CJSOTF-A ............Combined Joint SpecialOperations Task Force-Afghanistan

CJSOTF-N ............Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North

CJSOTF-W ...........Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-West

CJTF...............Combined Joint Task ForceCMO .....................civil-military operationsCMOC....Civil Military Operations CenterCOLAR ............................Columbian ArmyCOMARRC...................Commander, Allied

Command EuropeRapid Reaction Corps

CPA ..........Coalition Provisional AuthorityCRE.....................Crisis Response ElementCSAR ..............Combat Search and RescueCSOF .....................................coalition SOFCTBM......counter-tactical ballistic missile

DDA............................................direct action

Glossary

DIA ................Defense Intelligence AgencyDOD .......................Department of DefenseDPV ............................desert patrol vehicle

EEOD................explosive ordnance disposalERU ....................emergency response unitESAT..........................EUCOM Survey and

Assessment TeamETAC ..........enlisted tactical air controllerEUCOM .............U.S. European Command

FFA ...........................................field artilleryFA-18.................................strike fighter jetFARP ..........forward arming and refueling

pointFBI ..........Federal Bureau of InvestigationFID........................foreign internal defenseFMLN ..............................Farabundo Marti

Liberacion NacionalFMTU.......Foreign Military Training UnitFOB........................forward operating base

GGCC ........geographic combatant commandGMV ......................ground mobility vehicleGOA................Government of AfghanistanGWOT.................Global War on Terrorism

HHIMARS ................High Mobility Artillery

Rocket SystemHLZ........................helicopter landing zoneHSV ...............................High Speed VesselHVT .................................high-value target

IICTF ..............Iraqi Counterterrorist ForceID .....................................Infantry DivisionIDA...............Institute of Defense AnalysisIFOR........................Implementation ForceIMEF...........I Marine Expeditionary ForceIO ..........................Information OperationsIRB .............Immediate Reaction BattalionISAF ........................International Security

Assistance Force (NATO)ISOF ........Iraqi Special Operations ForcesISR..............intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissanceJ

JACE .......Joint Air Coordination ElementJCET.....joint combined exchange trainingJCO ................Joint Commission ObserverJCS..............................Joint Chiefs of StaffJDAM...........Joint Direct Attack MunitionJFSOCC........................Joint Force Special

Operations Component CommandJMD .....................joint manning documentJOA ........................Joint Operational AreaJPOTF.......Joint Psychological Operations

Task ForceJ-Staff..........................................Joint staffJSOAC.................Joint Special Operations

Air ComponentJSOC ...................Joint Special Operations

CommandJSOFOR-Somalia ...................Joint Special

Operations Forces-SomaliaJSOG........Joint Special Operations GroupJSOTF .................Joint Special Operations

Task ForceJSOU...................Joint Special Operations

UniversityJTAC.................joint tactical air controllerJTF ...................................Joint Task Force

KKAAOT...............................Khor Al AmayaKAZ..................Kurdish Autonomous ZoneKFIA ......King Fahd International AirportKFOR .......................Kosovo Force (NATO)KKMC ...............King Khalid Military CityKMTC......Kabul Military Training CenterKNB .............................Kuwait Naval BaseKSK ...........................................Kommando

Spezialstreitkräfte (German SpecialForces Group)

LLCE ............Liaison Coordination ElementLNO........................................liaison officerLOC .........................line of communicationLRC ........................light reaction companyLZ.............................................loading zone

MMABOT .................................Mina Al BakrMAC ..................Military Airlift CommandMARSOC .........Marine Special Operations

CommandMEDEVAC...................medical evacuationMEU .................Marine expeditionary unitMEU(SOC) ........MEU (Special Operations

Capable) MFP-11................Major Force Program 11MILF..........Moro Islamic Liberation FrontMIO .......maritime interception operationsMiTT ....................military transition teamMND........................multinational divisionMSS ............................mission support siteMTT...........................mobile training team

134

NNA ..................................Northern AllianceNATO .................Northern Atlantic Treaty

OrganizationNAVSOF............Naval Special Operations

ForcesNAVSPECWARCOM.............Navy Special

Warfare CommandNCO.....................noncommissioned officerNEO...................noncombatant evacuation

operationNGO ..........nongovernmental organizationNORTHCOM......U.S. Northern CommandNSW........................Naval Special WarfareNSW-RIB................Naval Special Warfare

Rigid Inflatable BoatNSWTG ..................Naval Special Warfare

Task GroupNSWU............Naval Special Warfare Unit

OODA .........Operational Detachment-AlphaODB .........Operational Detachment-BravoOEF.............Operation Enduring FreedomOEF-P ........Operation Enduring Freedom-

PhilippinesOG...................................Opposition GroupOIF......................Operation Iraqi FreedomO/IFT ......................operations/intelligence

fusion teamOP ...............................observation positionOPCON .........................operational controlOPE .....................Operational Preparation

of the EnvironmentOPLAN ............................Operational PlanOPTEMPO .....................operational tempoOSD.........................Office of the Secretary

of DefenseP

PACOM...................U.S. Pacific CommandPC ..............................................patrol craftPDF ......................Panama Defense ForcesPDM...........Program Decision MemorandaPERSTEMPO ...................personnel tempoPJ ..................................pararescue jumperPME..........professional military educationPOB......................psychological operations

battalionPOM ..............................Program Objective

MemorandumPPBS ...................Planning, Programming,

and Budgeting SystemPRT .........Provincial Reconstruction TeamPSYOP .................psychological operations

PVO .........Private Volunteer Organization

QQDR .............Quadrennial Defense ReviewQRF..............................quick reaction force

RRC ..................................regional commandRFF................................Request for ForcesRHIB ...................rigid hull inflatable boatRIB ..............................rigid inflatable boatRMTC ...............Regional MilitaryTraining

CenterRPG.....................rocket-propelled grenade

SSAM...........................surface-to-air missileSAS ............Special Air Service (Australia)SASC......................Senate Armed Services

CommitteeSATCOM ............satellite communicationsSAW ....................squad automatic weaponSCSO ..........Center for Special OperationsSCUD ....................................Soviet missileSEAL.......................................sea, air, land

(SF team member)SES......................Senior Executive ServiceSF ...........................................special forcesSFG (A)...........special forces group (alpha)SFLE......Special Forces Liaison Element\SFOR ............................Stabilization ForceSIO....................Senior Intelligence OfficerSLE ............SOUTHCOM Liaison ElementSOAL.............................Special Operations

Acquisitions and LogisticsSOAR ............................Special Operations

Aviation RegimentSOC.............Special Operations CommandSOCCE........Special Operations Command

and Control ElementSOCCENT ....................Special Operations

Command, CentralSOCEUR.......................Special Operations

Command, EuropeSOCIFOR....Special Operations Command

Implementation ForceSOCPAC .......................Special Operations

Command, PacificSOCS................Chief, Staff and Command

Support CenterSOCSOUTH..................Special Operations

Command, SouthSOF ....................Special Operations forcesSOG ...................Special Operations Group

135

SOIO................Center for Intelligence andInformation Operations

SOKF ................Center for Knowledge and Futures

SOLE ...............Special Operations LiaisonElement

SONC..................Center for Networks andCommunications

SOOP............Center for Operations, Plansand Policy

SORDAC......Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center

SORR.........................Center for Structure,Requisitions, Resources, and

Strategic AssessmentsSOS ................special operations squadronSOSO ......stability and support operationsSOS-T.............Special Operations Surgical

TeamSOTAC............Special Operations Tactical

Air ControllerSOUTHCOM ......U.S. Southern CommandSOW ....................Special Operations WingSR............................special reconnaissanceSSE ....................sensitive site exploitationSTS .......................special tactics squadronSWAT .............special weapons and tactics

TTACON................................tactical controlTACP ...................tactical air control party

TDC ...............................theater deployablecommunications system

TF .................................................task forceTIC....................................troops in contactTLAM........Tomahawk land attack missileTOR ..............................Terms of ReferenceTSCTI .....................Trans-Sahara Counter

Terrorist InitiativeTSOC.................theater special operations

commandTST-W ......Time Sensitive Targeting WestTU..................................................task unit

UUAV.....................unmanned aerial vehicleUBL ................................Usama bin LadenUCK .....................Kosovo Liberation ArmyUCP.......................Unified Command PlanUK.....................................United KingdomUN.......................................United NationsUNOSOM.............UN Operations SomaliaUNSC.........................UN Security CouncilU.S. .......................................United States

U.S. SOF ..................United States Special Operations Forces

USAF ....................United States Air ForceUSASFC......................United States Army

Special Forces CommandUSASOC .....................United States Army

Special Operations CommandUSCINCSOC...............U.S. Commander in

Chief, Special Operations CommandUSN.............................United States NavyUSREDCOM.......................U.S. Readiness

CommandUSS ...............................United States shipUSSF ........................United States Special

Forces (Army)USSOCOM ..........U. S. Special Operations

CommandUSSTRATCOM ....................U.S. Strategic

CommandUW ........................unconventional warfare

YY2K..............................................Year 2000

TERMS

9/11: Month/day terrorists attacked the WorldTrade Centers, September 11, 2001.

Caliphate: An Islamic federal government.

cuartel: A small garrison.

ECOMOG: A Nigerian-led African peacekeep-ing force headquartered in Monrovia in 1998.

Fedayeen: An irregular force of soldiers loyalto Saddam.

Jihad: A Muslim holy war.

Operational Preparation of theEnvironment: To prepare and shape the envi-ronment in support of future operations.

penetrometer: A device for measuring thepenetrability of semi-solids.

Peshmerga: Kurdish freedom fighters.

136

1st SOCOM 15, 181st SFG (A) 13, 84, 126, 129, 1301st Special Operations Wing 33, 4110th Mountain 59, 62, 94, 98, 103, 11210th SFG (A) 18, 64, 76, 113, 121, 12316th Special Operations Wing 8219th SFG (A) 86, 106, 107101st Airborne Division 98, 103, 120160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment

18, 24, 26, 33, 45, 47, 49, 52, 83, 84, 88, 100, 103, 114

20th SFG (A) 86, 106, 107, 11520th SOS 104, 11523rd Air Force 18, 1926th MEU(SOC) 76, 1163 Commando Brigade 1173rd SFG (A) 48, 51, 62, 63, 73, 74, 78, 83, 105,

106-107, 109, 111-112, 113352nd Special Operations Group 76, 114, 115353rd Special Operations Group 83-84, 864th Psychological Operations Group 18, 33, 36,

63, 72, 73, 8640 Commando, Royal Marines 1185th SFG (A) 18, 45, 46, 47, 48, 88, 104, 106,

113, 115, 119, 1236th SOS 123, 124617th Special Operations Aviation Det 417th SFG (A) 18, 41, 42, 43, 54, 83, 84, 107, 109,

111, 112, 1267th SOS 7675th Ranger Regiment 18, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38

43, 90, 114, 117720th Special Tactics Group 10482nd Airborne Division 34, 36, 1179th PSYOP Battalion 56, 110, 11396th Civil Affairs Battalion 18, 33, 56, 63, 73,

86, 130A

Abu Sayyaf Group 11, 129AC-130 16, 24, 26, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42,50, 51, 56, 57, 59, 68, 78, 90, 92, 97, 101, 105,

120ACM 103, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112Ad Dawr 120Afghan National Army (ANA) 106, 107, 108,

109-112Afghan Security Force 108, 110, 111, 112Afghanistan 1, 11, 19, 20, 23, 24, 71, 87-112Africa 72, 73, 74, 77, 80, 85, 113

AFSOC 16, 22, 28, 56, 57, 83, 92, 107, 123, 132Aguiar, Capt Gilberto 54AH-6 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 52, 59AH-64 33, 36, 50, 120Aideed, Mohammed 56, 57, 58Al Faw 113-114, 117-119al Qaeda (AQ) 11, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92-98, 99, 100-

104, 115, 125, 126, 127, 129al Qaim 119Albania 9, 68, 69, 78Alma Tak Mountains 89ALLIED FORCE 10, 19, 67, 68Amarah 119ANACONDA 98, 99, 103, 105Anderson, SPC Marc 102Ansar al Islam 115, 116, 125Aristide, Jean-Bertrand 60, 61, 62, 63Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 129,

130, 132Asadabad 108ASD (SO/LIC) 7, 8, 20, 24ASDS 24Asian Senator 40Aspin, Les 57ATLAS RESPONSE 85-86Atta, Mohammed 89Australia 98, 104

BBabil Province 124Baghdad 114-115, 117, 119-122, 124-126Bahrain 31Balad 119Balboa Harbor 39, 40Balikatan 130Balkans 68, 75Bari Kowt 108, 112Basilan 129, 130, 132Bass, BMCS Stephen 92Becker, Maj Joseph 77Bermel 110, 111Bernsen, RADM Harold J. 29, 30Bosnia-Herzegovina 9, 10, 24, 53, 64-69, 72-73Brazzaville 79, 80Bridge of the Americas 40Brindisi 64, 78Britain 85Brown, General Bryan D. 1, 4, 8, 12, 14, 15, 16,

17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 26Brown, Ronald 17, 75

137

Index

Bush, George W. 1, 11, 16, 27, 87Bush, George H. W. 52, 55

CCanada 104Carter, James 5CFC-A 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113CFLCC 104, 113, 114, 117CFMCC 114, 117CH-47 39Chamkani 109CINCEUR 80Civil Affairs 9, 12, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 32, 33,

34, 36, 38, 44, 53, 56, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69,70, 72, 73, 82, 85, 86, 92, 106, 108, 111, 112, 113, 114, 127, 128, 130

CJSOTF-Afghanistan 105-107, 108, 109, 111

CJSOTF-Arabian Peninsula 119, 121-124CJSOTF-North 88, 113, 115, 119CJSOTF-South 104CJSOTF-West 113, 114, 115, 119CJTF Mountain 98CJTF-180 108CJTF-76 108, 109, 111Clinton, Jefferson William 60, 61, 72COBRA 25 94-95, 96Cohen, William 5, 6, 7, 8, 20, 23Colombia 75, 81, 82, 83Colon 40Comandancia 32, 33, 34, 36, 39Combat Talon 50, 76, 83, 84, 90Commons, CPL Matt 102Congo 79, 80counterinsurgency 119, 122, 124counterterrorism 11, 12, 15, 16, 122, 124,

129, 131Crist, General George B. 29Crose, SGT Brad 102Crowe, ADM William J. 6, 7, 19Cuba 60Cunningham, SrA Jason 102CV-22 23, 24

DDaanai Beach 55Dailey, LTG Dell 17Daniel, Dan 5, 6Dayton Peace Accords 64Deh Chopan 108Deh Rawood 108DELIBERATE FORCE 64demining 9, 25, 71-73

Denmark 104Desert One 5, 44DESERT SHIELD 9, 45-53DESERT STORM 9, 23, 24, 45-53DESERT THUNDER 10Dominican Republic 61Dostum, General Abdul Rashid 89, 91Downing, General Wayne 8, 9, 10, 12, 20, 25,

25, 32Dubrovnik 75, 77

EEARNEST WILL 8, 29-31, 45Eastern Alliance 93, 94, 97ECOMOG 77El Salvador 54, 81, 124ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) 1, 11, 25, 87-

112, 129-132England, Gordon 17, 27ERU 124, 125ESAT 76, 77, 79, 80Euphrates 48, 119, 125

FFacusse, Carlos Flores 81Fallujah 119, 122, 123, 125Farah 111Fedayeen 115Filipino 129-132FIRM RESPONSE 79, 80FMTU 26FOB 11 130FOB 12 109, 110FOB 31 106, 107, 111FOB 32 106, 108, 109, 111FOB 33 106FOB 51 122FOB 52 56FOB 71 109, 110FOB 73 112FOB 72 107FOB 101 64FOB 103 66, 115FOB 192 106FOB 195 107FOB 201 107FOB 202 112Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 22, 25, 106,

108, 111, 112, 123, 127, 128Fort Cimarron 41France 85Franks, General Tommy 87, 114, 116, 119fratricide 96, 97

138

Freetown 76, 77, 78, 79, 80FUERTE APOYO 81

GGardez 98, 99, 101, 108, 109Garrison, MG William 57Gayan 110Gecko 89-90, 108Geresk 108Germany 85, 94, 103, 104Golden Mosque 127Goldwater, Barry 5, 6, 7Goldwater-Nichols 6, 7, 57Gonaives 62Gordon, MSG Gary 58Green Line 116Grenada 5, 6, 7, 36Guadalcanal 30Guam 130Guantanamo 60

HHaditha 119, 121Hagenbeck, MG Franklin L. “Buster” 98, 100Hallums, Roy 127Harward, CAPT Robert 85, 104Haiti 9, 60-63Herat 106, 111Hercules 29, 31Hickey, COL James B. 120Hillah 119, 124Hoar, General Joseph P. 56, 57Holland, General Charles R. 8, 10, 11, 14, 15,

17, 20, 21, 24Holloway, ADM James L. 5Hunt, LTC Joseph 37Hurlburt Field 18, 83, 130, 132Hurricane Mitch 81-82Hussein, Qusay 120Hussein, Saddam 10, 52, 53, 70, 75, 114, 115,

119, 120, 121, 122, 125Hussein, Uday 120

IICTF 122, 123IFOR 64-66IMEF 113, 117Information Operations (IO) 113, 117, 119, 127,

130Iran 5, 29-31, 116Iraq 21, 29, 31, 45, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 70, 75,

113-127IRAQI FREEDOM 1, 11, 24, 25, 113-128Iraqi National Guard 123

Iran Ajr 30IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) 1, 20, 25, 113-127

JJacobelly, Col Robert C. “Jake” 41Jaji Maydan 109Jawbreaker 94, 95JCET 9, 82JCO 66, 67Jemiah Islamiya 129JOINT ENDEAVOR 9, 24, 64-67, 75JOINT FORGE 10, 66-68JOINT GUARD 9, 10, 66JOINT GUARDIAN 10, 68-69Jordan 69JSOFOR 56JSOTF2 64, 78JSOTF-P 130, 132JSOU 14JTF-510 130JTF-FR 84JTF Raleigh 62JTF SILVER WAKE 78JTF AR 85Jubba River 55JUST CAUSE 8, 32-44, 104

KK2 88, 103, 104, 106, 107KAAOT 117-118Kabul 87, 90, 93, 94, 98, 106Kandahar 90, 92, 93, 94, 98, 104, 110, 111, 112Kandaks 108, 110, 111, 112Karbala 115Karzai, Hamid 92, 93, 94, 98, 107KAZ 113, 116K-Bar 98, 103-106, 114Kernan, COL William F. “Buck” 34, 36, 38Khowst 98, 106, 109King Fahd International Airport (KFIA) 45Kirkuk 116, 119Kismayu 55Kisner, Col Frank 88Koch, Noel 5Konduz 90, 91, 92, 94, 106, 109, 112Kosovo 10, 24, 68-69Koyaama Island 55Kunar Province 109Kut 119Kuwait 10, 29-30, 45-53, 75, 113, 115, 117

LLadin, Usama Bin (UBL) 87, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97,

98, 104139

Lambert, BG Geoffrey C. 79, 80Lebanon 5Legazpi City 84Les Cayes 62Liberia 9, 76, 77, 79LIGHT SWITCH 63Lindsay, General James 4, 7, 8, 12, 19, 20, 25Locher, James R. III 6Lwara 109, 110, 111Lynch, PFC Jessica 126, 127

MMABOT 117, 118Macedonia 68Mainama 112Manila 130Mark III Patrol Boats 29Mark V Special Operations Craft 23, 31MARSOC 1, 20, 22Marzak 99, 100Masirah 104Maya-Maya Airfield 80Mazar-e Sharif 88-92, 94, 106, 109, 112MC-130 23, 24, 50, 68, 70, 76, 77, 79, 80, 83, 85,

90McCracken, MAJ David E. 42Meyer, General Edwin “Shy” 5MFP-11 7, 8, 12, 15, 20, 21, 25MH-47 23, 24, 77, 90, 100, 101MH-53 47, 50, 68, 70, 77, 104, 115, 118MH-6 29, 30, 31, 58MH-60 31, 41, 47, 58, 68, 81, 83, 84, 90Military Airlift Command (MAC) 19Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) 123Miller, ADM David Paul 60Milosevic, Slobodan 67, 68Mindanao 130, 131Miram Shah 110Mitchell, MAJ Mark 92Mobile Training Team (MTT) 129, 130Mogadishu 55-59Mosul 116, 120, 121, 125MOUNT HOPE III 81MOUNTAIN THRUST 112Mozambique 85Mulholland, COL John 88, 94, 98

NNajaf 115, 119, 122NAM DONG 110, 111Nangahar Province 93, 94, 108Nasiriyah 119, 126NATO 64, 65, 66, 68, 72, 73, 94, 107, 112

NAVSPECWARCOM 18, 19Netherlands 85New Zealand 104NIMBLE ARCHER 30, 31NOBLE OBELISK 9, 78-79Noriega, Manuel 32, 34, 36-44Northern Alliance 87-92Norway 104NSWTG-Arabian Peninsula 126NSWTG-Central 114, 118NSWTU-1 131NSWU-2 77NSWU-10 77Nunn, Sam 5, 6, 7, 8, 20, 23, 62

OODA 511 105ODA 516 105ODA 534 89ODA 551 115ODA 555 90ODA 572 94ODA 574 92ODA 583 93ODA 585 90ODA 586 90ODA 594 90, 98ODA 595 89ODA 785 42Olson, VADM Eric T. 24Oman 104Omar, Mullah Mohammed 90, 104Orozco-Torres, SFC Mario 54

PPACIFIC HAVEN 25Pachir Agam 95Pacora River Bridge 41Paitilla 37-40, 41Paktia 98, 104Paktika 106, 109, 110Pan-Sahel 113Panama 8, 32-44, 61Papal Nunciature 40, 44Parachinar 109Pave Hawk 68Pave Low 68, 118PDF 32-43PDM 23, 24, 25Peace Corps 80Perez, MAJ Gilberto 42Peshmerga 113, 115, 116Philippines 1, 11, 84, 129-132

140

Polish 69, 117, 118, 126POM 20, 21 Portugal 85PRAYING MANTIS 31PRIME CHANCE I 8, 29Pristina 69PROMOTE LIBERTY 8, 43-44PROVIDE COMFORT 9PROVIDE RELIEF 9, 70-71PSYOP 9, 12, 14, 18, 19, 22, 25, 33, 34, 44, 53,

56, 62, 63, 65, 68, 69, 90, 92, 106, 111, 112,113, 114

QQala-i Jangi 91, 92Qalat 108Quadrennial Defense Review 14, 21-23

RRamadi 119Ramadan 94, 97Reagan, Ronald 7, 29RESOLUTE EAGLE 87RESTORE DEMOCRACY 63Rhino 89, 90, 94, 104RIB 23, 60, 77, 78Rio Hato 33, 36-38, 42Rodman Naval Station 38, 39, 40Roberts, PO Neil 100-101Romanian 64, 66Roth, SSG Michael 54RPG 58, 59, 100, 102, 118Rumsfeld, Donald 1, 14, 16, 17Russian 66, 67, 69

SSabalan 31Sadr, Muqtada al 122, 124Samarra 119, 123, 127Saudi Arabia 10, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 52, 113Sava River 65Schaefer, CPT Robert 69Schoomaker, General Peter J. 8, 10, 13, 14, 20,

21, 24, 25, 26Sea Isle City 30SEABATs 30SEAL Team 2 55, 59SEAL Team 3 104SEAL Team 8 59September 11th 1, 11, 14, 15, 16, 21, 24, 26, 87,

104, 129SETAF 111SHADOW EXPRESS 77-78Shah-i-Khot Valley 98, 100

Shalikashvili, General John M. 61, 62Sharzai, Gut 92, 93Shelton, General Henry H. 8, 9, 13, 62, 69Shiite 122, 125, 127Shindand 111SHINING HOPE 68-69Shkin 109, 110, 112Shomali Plains 90, 94Shughart, SFC Randall 58Sierra Leone 9, 25, 74, 76-77, 78-79SILVER WAKE 10, 78, 79SOAL 14, 18, 24SOCCENT 11, 24, 45-53, 73, 87, 88, 89, 98, 113,

113SOCEUR 64, 66, 73, 75, 76, 77, 79, 85, 87SOCIFOR 64-66SOCPAC 19, 73, 83, 84, 129-132SOCRATES 23SOCSOUTH 41, 73, 83SOF Truths 25SOIO 14, 18Somalia 9, 53, 55-59, 64SOOP 13, 14, 18SORDAC 23SORR 14, 18, 20, 21Spain 77, 85Spann, Mike 91Special Operations Surgical Team (SOS-T) 131,

132Stiner, General Carl W. 8, 9, 19, 23Sulu 130-132Sunni 121, 125, 127SUPPORT DEMOCRACY 9, 23, 60-63Svitak, SGT Phil 102SWAT 124

TTaft, William H. IV 7, 20Takur Ghar 98, 100-103Talbott, Strobe 80Taliban 11, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 98,

104, 105, 112Taloqan 90, 92Tarin Khowt 92Tawi-Tawi 131Taylor, Charles 77TF 11 95, 96, 97, 98TF 58 104TF 64 98TF Anvil 98, 99TF Atlantic 40TF Bayonet 36

141

TF Comet 132TF Commando 103TF Dagger 88, 90, 92, 93, 94, 98, 103, 104, 105,

106, 114TF Falcon 69TF Gator 32-34TF Hammer 98, 99, 100TF Hawk 68TF Mountain 99, 100TF Pheonix 111TF Rakassan 99, 103TF Ranger 57-59TF Summit 103TF Viking 115, 116Tigris River 49, 119, 120Tikrit 119, 120, 121Tirana 78Torkham 109, 110, 111Turkey 115

UUCP 15, 16, 17, 22UH-60 31, 41ULTIMATUM 132UN Security Council 61, 75Unconventional Warfare (UW) 18, 46, 87,

88, 89, 98, 103, 104, 106, 113, 129UNIFIED ASSISTANCE 86United Arab Emirates 69UNITED SHIELD 59UNOSOM II 9, 56-57, 59UPHOLD DEMOCRACY 9, 23, 62-63URGENT FURY 36Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) 87, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97,

98, 104USASOC 24, 123USCENTCOM 11, 15, 29, 31, 45, 46, 47, 49, 55,

87, 93, 94, 95, 96, 103, 106, 109, 113, 114USEUCOM 15USPACOM 11, 15, 75, 129, 131USSOUTHCOM 75, 129, 130, 131USS Chinook 77USS Constellation 117USS Cyclone 60, 61USS Duluth 117USS Firebolt 77USS Juneau 55USS Rushmore 55USS Tripoli 55Uzbekistan 88, 89, 104

VVALLEY FORGE 111, 112

WWadi al Khirr 115Wasp Amphibious Ready Group 55Webb, James 19Weinberger, Caspar 18, 19Wimbrown VII 29, 31Wurster, Brig Gen Donald 129

YYahya Khehl 104Yugoslavia 64, 65, 68

ZZaman 93, 97Zamboanga 130-132Zarqawi, Abu Musab al- (AMZ) 125-126Zhawar Kili 104

142

The 20th Anniversary edition of the USSOCOM History owes much to the entire staff of the Historyand Research Office—civil service, contract, and active duty and reserve personnel. Staff who con-tributed mightily by gathering photographs, editing, researching, and writing portions of this edi-tion include LTC James Burns, Ms. Cristin Daniel, CDR James Fossa, Mr. Rick Green, Ms. LaurenKata, Ms. Gaea Levy, LTC Tom Searle, Ms. Deborah Seed, SSgt Angela Vazquez, LTC James“Dave” Wood, and Dr. Shawn Woodford. Dr. John Partin performed a myriad of tasks to bring thisedition to fruition. Ms. Levy laid out the text and photographs; Mr. Randy Nabors designed thecover. Special thanks go to all involved.

For comments or suggestions, please contact the USSOCOM History and Research Office at:

USSOCOM/SOCS-HO7701 Tampa Point BoulevardMacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323

Telephone: Commercial (813) 826-4431DSN: 299-4431; FAX 299-5528

Acknowledgements