socratic dialogue as a tool for teaching business ethics

Socratic Dialogue as a Tool for

Teaching Business Ethics? Kevin Morrell

ABSTRACT. Within a supportive learning environ-

ment, dialogue can allow for the identification and testing

of assumptions and tacit beliefs. It can also illustrate the

inadequacies in superficial thinking about ethical prob-

lems. Internal dialogue allows us to examine our beliefs,

and to prepare and evaluate arguments. Each of these

elements is important in the study of business ethics. This

paper outlines one teaching technique based on Socratic

dialogue, and shows how it can be applied to develop

business students’ thinking about ethics. After justifying

the suitability of this technique, and detailing its key

elements, the paper offers for consideration an illustration

of how the technique may be applied in a classroom

setting, using structured role play. The paper concludes

with a ‘‘teaching agenda’’, offering suggestions for how

this technique can be applied to teaching business ethics

in an undergraduate, or postgraduate module, where it

can examine language, structures and practices.

KEY WORDS: dialogue, ethics, Socratic method,

teaching

Introduction

Dialogue offers the potential to approach ideal

modes of discourse such as Mill’s vision of ‘‘fair

play to all sides of truth’’, and Habermas’ ‘‘ideal

speech situation’’ (Vardy and Grosch, 1999, pp.

261–262). Socratic dialogue in particular has been

recognised as an appropriate way to teach both

philosophy and ethics (Burnyeat, 1990). In addi-

tion, models of ancient wisdom, such as Socrates

have been advocated as a basis for enhancing

effective thinking about organisational life (Arnold,

1997), enabling ‘‘problem-finding’’ (Arlin, 1990),

and in guarding against complacency or misplaced

certainty (Meacham, 1990). In this light, the gen-

eral form of dialogue can be seen as a useful way of

enhancing understanding in many different con-

texts. To provide this paper with a core focus, the

more wide ranging applications of dialogue are not

examined. Instead, this paper outlines one partic-

ular technique: Socratic dialogue; and one partic-

ular context: the teaching of business ethics. This

focus is justified because there are particular reasons

for believing that dialogue can be seen as important

in enhancing students’ understanding of business

ethics. Initially, this can be illustrated by comparing

the original context for Socrates’ dialogues with

the contemporary context for teaching business

ethics.

Background

The historical setting for Socrates’ dialogues was

Athens, which was the first polis, or city state. The

development of the polis led to a rise in demand

for statesmen and diplomats versed in the virtues of

trade (Lee, 1987, p. 18). One group keen to pro-

vide answers and the necessary range of skills were

the sophists; itinerant lecturers cum salesmen who

professed to teach the necessary qualities of rheto-

ric, culture and statesmanship (Protagoras: 319a)1. A

‘‘Dr. Kevin Morrell (www.kevinmorrell.org.uk) is a Senior

Research Fellow at the Local Government Centre, Warwick

Business School, University of Warwick, Warwickshire,

where he is carrying out research into leadership in the public

sector. His prior post was as ESRC Postdoctoral Research

Fellow at Loughborough University Business School,

Loughborough, Leicestershire, and he recently finished

working on a Department of Health funded research project at

King’s College, London. His main interests are in the broad

subject areas of Organisational Behaviour (OB) and Human

Resource Management (HRM); particularly in careers, choice

and ethics.’’

Journal of Business Ethics 53: 383–392, 2004.

� 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

compelling subtext to these dialogues is the sub-

versive role of Socrates, who challenges the claims

of the sophists, as well as the Athenian system of

order. This is notable in the Meno, where Socrates

interrogates an imperious aristocrat versed in

sophist thought, and in the Apology, where he

mocks the Athenian judicial system. In both cases,

Socrates punctures the rhetoric of his discussants

and leaves them confused and bewildered. He does

this using a particular dialectical technique which

has become known as the elenchus. This is discussed

in more detail in the following section, but at

this stage, it is more interesting to understand why

it is that Socrates’ discussants are so easily embar-

rassed.

Following MacIntyre’s analysis (MacIntyre,

1984), the reason Socrates is able to embarrass his

discussants to such great effect is not because he is

more rigorous, or that he has superior rhetorical

skills, but it is because his discussants unknowingly

exemplify a state of moral confusion. Athenians are

unaware of the inconsistencies that follow from

simultaneously trying to adopt universal notions of

goodness or virtue, and the particular maxims or

recipes for success designed to enhance one’s life in

the world of the polis. MacIntyre identifies this as a

problem of ‘‘incoherence’’ (ibid., 1984, p. 131) and

describes how our understanding of what it means

to be good involves considering the relationships

we have with others. These kinds of consideration

are ones that are ‘‘universal and human’’ (see

quoted extract below). Despite this, the character of

city life in Athens-as-polis has as one consequence

that there is an inconsistency between a universal

and human account of these interrelations, and the

‘‘local and Athenian’’ account. In the following

memorable passage from After Virtue, MacIntyre

outlines this idea, and since the theme of incoher-

ence is central to this paper it is worth quoting at

some length, because in this passage we can find

sufficient justification for the use of Socratic inquiry

in teaching business ethics.2 MacIntyre suggests that

whereas Socrates identifies and problematises the

state of moral incoherence, this confusion is not

identified in other, contemporary accounts of

Athenian life:

poets and philosophers for the most part do not dis-

tinguish in their account of these relationships what is

universal and human from what is local and Athenian.

The claim is often explicit; Athens is praised because

she par excellence exhibits human life as it ought to be.

Yet in these very acts of praise Athenian particularity is

distinguished from Homeric particularity. For

Homeric man there could be no standard external to

those embodied in the structures of his own com-

munity to which appeal could be made; for Athenian

man, the matter is more complex. His understanding

of the virtues does provide him with standards by

which he could question the life of his own commu-

nity and inquire whether this or that practice or policy

is just. Nonetheless he also recognises that he possesses

his understanding of the virtues only because his

membership in the community provides him with

such understanding. The city is a guardian, a parent, a

teacher, even though what is learnt from the city may

lead to questioning of this or that feature of its life.

Thus the question of the relationship between being a

good citizen and being a good man becomes central (ibid.,

p. 133, original emphasis).

The notion of incoherence can be extended and

applied in two ways that are relevant to our con-

sideration of the teaching of business ethics. This

provides a way to link the original context for Plato’s

dialogues to today’s undergraduates. Exploring this

link shows how Socratic techniques of question-

ing continue to have relevance and constitutes an

original contribution to the teaching of business

ethics.

First, these tensions are redolent of the way in

which many undergraduate and postgraduate stu-

dents seem to approach the study of business ethics.

In terms of their assessed work, students often seem

keen to identify an optimal ‘‘solution’’ and to settle

for an answer that is satisfactory in terms of a lim-

ited number of criteria (does it make enough use of

the ideas discussed in their course? will it be assessed

as a considered response and marked accordingly?).

This is perhaps unsurprising given the focus in

contemporary academic life on assessment and

marking, the pressures of student life, and the desire

to gain a marketable class of degree. In the context

of these ‘‘local’’ pressures, it is simpler to give what

is perceived as the conventional answer, because

this may be less likely to damage one’s chances of

gaining a satisfactory mark. Yet reliance on con-

vention runs counter to the idea that ethics should

be an applied discipline that involves reflecting on a

particular problem. For example, students’ answers

384 Kevin Morrell

to ethical dilemmas often invoke utilitarian argu-

ments. This may bear little resemblance to how

students conceive of ethical problems in their own

lives. In this sense the received format for

responding to questions on business ethics, is highly

conventional. There will be few answers that do

not invoke utilitarian ideas at some stage, even if

negotiating ethical problems in our daily lives is

often a matter of relying on other principles. Be-

cause of this, there is a fundamental incoherence

between the ‘‘universal and human’’ aims of the

discipline: to explore ethical issues as they relate to

business, say; and the ‘‘local’’ and particular way in

which the discipline becomes operationalised, and

practiced, as one element in an academic course of

study. This tension or incoherence could be de-

scribed as that between what it means to be a good

student and what it means to be a good person, and it

is analogous to the tension between ‘‘being a good

citizen and being a good man’’ (MacIntyre, 1984). The

rules for success in the university are formally

similar to the rules for success in the polis, a reliance

on convention, with a resulting incoherence be-

tween particular local virtues, and enduring prin-

ciples.

Second, there is an incoherence in terms of the

relationship between business ethics as a taught

discipline, and other taught disciplines such as

marketing, accountancy, human resource manage-

ment (HRM) and business strategy. These subjects

will usually be taught following a modular ap-

proach, which can mean that students see ethical

considerations as reserved for one particular mod-

ule. Given the overall format of an undergraduate

business degree, or the modular nature of a Mas-

ters, ethics may become compartmentalised, so that

it is not a feature of a student’s thinking about an

accountancy problem, say, any more than a mar-

keting perspective will inform their approach to an

HRM problem. This illustrates another way in

which there is an incoherence between the ‘‘uni-

versal and human’’ elements of ethics as an ever-

present consideration, and the local and particular

concerns of students going through a modular de-

gree, or the concerns of tutors in their own

modules. In operation, the modular approach

necessitates an element of particularity, so that

consideration of ethics may be perceived as

less relevant, or even irrelevant in other modules.

This is troubling because it is inconsistent with any

received understanding of ethics as something

which influences all our actions. Seeing ethics as

some form of subset is also troubling given the

nature of the subject of management. Managers

cannot avoid the ethical implications of their ac-

tions, whether they recruit and train people, or

market and sell goods and services, or work in

administrative and accounting functions. This is not

an argument for the importance of business ethics

at the expense of other subjects. Nor is it a plea to

place business ethics in some super-ordinate rela-

tion to these other subjects, but given the functions

of management, and the nature of the subject, there

is some justification for being concerned about

the dangers of compartmentalisation of business

ethics.

This section has outlined how in the Athenian

city state, Athenians exemplified an incoherence in

terms of their universal and human considerations

of virtue, and the virtues implied by their local and

particular context. This historical setting forms the

backdrop to Plato’s dialogues and the practice of

Socratic dialogue exposes the incoherence in these

beliefs. Familiarity with the Socratic method also

enhances our ability to identify and to evaluate

inconsistencies in our own and other’s sets of be-

liefs. In doing so it offers an opportunity to develop

the skills of argument. This introductory section

also identified sources of incoherence between the

teaching of business ethics, and two spheres of

interaction: the way students approach business

ethics, and the way in which business ethics relates

to other disciplines. Readers may well be able to

identify other sources of incoherence (for example

in terms of the way in which a taught under-

standing of business ethics differs from received

practices in certain business contexts), but these

two are most immediately relevant to the topic of

business ethics as it is taught. This introduction

offers a justification for the relevance of Socrates as

a character exposing incoherence and inconsistencies

in belief. More specifically, it also stands as justifi-

cation for the use of a particular Socratic technique

to enhance skills of argument. Before suggesting an

example of how this technique may be applied in a

classroom setting, it is appropriate to offer some

more detail relating to the nature of Socratic dia-

logue.

Socratic Dialogue as a Tool 385

Socratic dialogue

Plato typically represents Socrates in discussion with

a protagonist, from whom a given dialogue takes its

name. These dialogues are often concerned with the

pursuit of a central question, for example, the Meno

and Protagoras focus on a question that is of interest

to business ethicists, namely, ‘‘Can virtue be

taught?’’. The central feature of each dialogue is

Socrates’ way of asking questions, frequently referred

to as the elenchus (see Burnyeat, 1990; Lee, 1987 for

more detail). The elenchus is a deceptively simple way

of asking questions about beliefs, where sustained

cross-examination and the use of counter-examples

reveal contradictions that would otherwise go un-

recognised. It is Socrates’ main mechanism for

identifying incoherence. A brief example of the

elenchus at work can be illustrated with reference to

the Republic. The central question of this work (again

relevant to business ethicists) is, ‘‘What is justice?’’

Both Cephalus and Telemachus (Athenian citizens)

agree with a conventional definition that it is paying

one’s debts and ‘‘giving every man [sic] his due’’.

Though this is in harmony with conventional

accounting practice, and the language of assets and

liabilities, Socrates problematises this definition by

constructing a simple example of a case where this

definition would break down (332ab). He asks

whether we should repay a debt if repayment of that

debt would result in harm to our creditor. The

example he uses is whether we should return a

weapon we have borrowed from someone if (s)he

subsequently goes mad and is bent on self-harm. In

this example, they (and we) are compelled to con-

cede that this does not equate with principles of

justice, or doing the right thing. This reveals the

inadequacy of the conventional definition. In the

contemporary language of ethics, these simple

questions flesh out implicit tensions between con-

sequentialist and deontological ethical systems

(Chryssides and Kaler, 1993; Velasquez, 2001).

Using this brief example, we can see how a

simplified form of the elenchus could have three

stages. First, there is an attempt to answer a complex

question, such as ‘‘what is justice’’, ‘‘virtue’’, or

‘‘knowledge’’? In the example from the Republic

(above), the question Socrates poses is ‘‘what is

justice’’? Second, in response to this complex ques-

tion, Socrates’ discussant typically offers a conven-

tional definition, which Socrates refines and

simplifies. Again, in terms of the example above,

Cephalus and Telemachus hold that justice consists

in paying one’s debts (they are in fact relying on the

writings of Simonides, a contemporary poet for their

answer). The third stage is to show, by using

counterexamples, the ways in which this definition is

inconsistent with other beliefs. So, in the example

we have cited, we see a case where repayment and

truth telling would result in harm. This illustrates the

incoherence between a local, Athenian virtue

(where these principles are the basis of trade) and a

universal and human virtue (where we strive not to

harm others). Having offered a brief introduction to

the elenchus, it is now possible to consider its practical

implications in terms of teaching business ethics.

Using the elenchus

This section illustrates one potential application of

the elenchus, using a structured role play. This is in-

tended to familiarise participants and observers with

the dialogue form, as well as serve as a basic intro-

duction to the elenchus. The role play can be

administered in a class room, among small groups of

about four, with two participants: Delphi (who plays

the role of ‘‘Socrates’’); Oracle (who plays the role of

‘‘Socrates’’ protagonist); and two or more observ-

ers.3 The central question for the structured role play

is ‘‘What does it mean to do business ethically?’’ The

observers’ role is to try to record the dialogue in note

form, and one or more of them could agree to act as

a moderator(s), to ensure that both participants get

the chance to develop their arguments and also to

ensure that the discussion remains relevant. The

moderator(s) may intervene if either discussant strays

too far from the topic, or if the conversation be-

comes ‘‘stuck’’. They may want to introduce new

ideas, or simply encourage the main participants.

Delphi and Oracle are each given a prompt sheet

(Table I), which sets out the parameters for their

discussion, and neither of them should see the

other’s brief, or the briefs for the moderators. This is

to try to make the role play less artificial. It is also

suggested that neither knows that the roles they are

meant to be playing are based on a Socratic dialogue

(though see notes below).

386 Kevin Morrell

TABLEI

PromptsforOracleandDelphi–What

does

itmeanto

dobusinessethically?

What

does

itmeanto


Youplaythepartof:Oracle

Youplaythepartof:Delphi

Youknow

Delphiissometim

esvaguewhen

itcomes

toethicsin

business,andthat

thoughhe/shehas

somegoodarguments,they

always

tryto

duck

outofdefiningsomething.Yourgoalisto

get

Delphito

agreeto

adefinitiveansw

erto

thisproblem.Try

tocomeupwith

theperfect

answ

er,onethat

coversalltheangles.Don’tbe

discouraged

ifan

answ

erdoesn’twork

(itisatrickyproblem),just

developitabitbetter,ormoveonto

somethingnew

.Below

aresomeargumentsyoumightwantto

developto

get

agooddefinition,

butyoushould

also

tryandcomeupwithsomedefinitionsofyourown.

Goodluck!

Youknow

Oraclehassomegoodideasaboutwhatisethicalin

business,butis

often

toosimplistic.Youdon’twanthim

/her

tothinkthey

havefound‘the’

answ

er.Yourgoal

isto

get

Oracleto

acknowledgeproblemswith

his/her

definitions,

sotryto

thinkofspecificexam

pleswhen

itwon’t

work,oris

inconsistentwithother

ideasaboutethicalbusiness.IfOracleagrees

adefinition

doesn’twork

andwantsto

trysomethingnew

,agreeto

explore

that.Below

are

somequestionsyoumightwantto

putto

Oracle(ifrelevant),butyoushouldtry

andcomeupwithsomecounterargumentsofyourown.Goodluck!

Doingbusinessethically

isdoingthingswhen

no-onegetshurt,orat

least

whereyouminim

isethetotalam

ountofhurt

Can

youmeasure

painandsufferingin

thesameway

youmeasure

money?

(thinkofaspecificexam

ple)


meansprotectingtheinterestsofshareholders

–ifacompanygoes

bustitcan’tdobusiness

Are

nottheresomethingsthatareprinciples-i.e.nomatterwhatthecostsand

consequencesit’swrong?(thinkofaspecificexam

ple)


meanstellingthetruth,payingone’sdebtsand

lookingafterone’sem

ployees

What

aboutwhen

differentgoals(employee

welfare,customer

service,

profit

etc.)arein

conflict?(thinkofaspecificexam

ple)


The observers are given a separate prompt sheet

(Table II) that gives them an eagle eye view of the

discussion, and suggests the kinds of arguments they

are looking for, to enable them to trace the deve-

lopment of the dialogue. They are encouraged to

participate and to think of ideas for feedback once

the role play has ended. In this way, each participant

should gain a sense of how the dialogue form can

work, and be able to identify its limitations, as well as

its advantages.

This role play can be used as an introductory

workshop or seminar, prior to a session on the

dialogue form and the elenchus. One of the things it

should illustrate is the problems with finding a

perfect resolution for problems in business ethics,

but it is also a vehicle for introducing the dialogue

form. It is probably better to introduce this role

play partway through a course, so that students

have had the chance to get to know each other,

and so they feel safe enough to participate.

Otherwise, it may be difficult to get sufficient

interaction. It is intended to be used prior to a

more formal teaching component introducing the

theme of dialogue, and the elenchus. This is so

students will be able to reflect on their practical

experience of working with dialogue during the

course of a more formal lecture. However, this may

be less important than securing interaction, and

tutors may wish to precede the role play with an

introduction as to how the method should

work. This is perhaps particularly appropriate for

undergraduate students, who may be less able to

identify examples from organisational life that show

up the limitations of a definitive view of business

ethics.

Timings are flexible, but as an indication, one

could allow: 5 minutes for an introduction and

allocation of roles and groups; 5 minutes for

people to read their prompt sheets; 10–15 minutes

for the role play; 5 minutes for within group

feedback; 5–10 minutes for plenary feedback. In a

2-hour session, this exercise could be adminis-

tered in the first hour, prior to a brief lecture on

the merits and limitations of dialogue and

argument. Having introduced this brief example of

how the elenchus may be applied in a classroom

setting, it is worthwhile considering the wider

potential of this technique as a tool for enhancing

learning.

A teaching agenda for Business Ethics:

langu-age, structure and practices

Rather than offer a research agenda, this section

briefly outlines a ‘‘teaching agenda’’: a range of

topics describing settings and processes that could be

examined using the principles of the elenchus. This is

organised in terms of three themes: language,

structure and practices. Within each theme, a spe-

cific problem is chosen as an example for application

of the elenchus. The problems chosen below are all

relevant to business ethics, but the dialogue form,

and use of structured role plays could be incorpo-

rated in other settings and modules. Doing this

would involve transferring the principles underlying

a process of critique, and this may be one way in

which the threat of incoherence, ever present in a

modular approach, could be addressed. Familiarity

with internal dialogue as a means of throwing con-

tradictions into relief and problem finding (Arlin,

1990; Arnold, 1997) may be a way of encouraging

coherence between one’s beliefs about what it means

to be a good student and one’s personal beliefs, since

to some degree these features of ‘‘advanced think-

ing’’ involve being able to reconcile contradictory

goals (Kramer, 1989).

The scope for applying the elenchus in teaching

business ethics is vast, perhaps most easily in iden-

tifying the gaps between the rhetoric of management

and the reality of business practices (Legge, 1995). A

potential challenge for students would be to identify

modern forms of sophistry, for example in the

manipulation of language which disguises the human

impact of organisational processes. A ready target

could be the organisational shibboleth ‘‘flexibility’’,

whose use sometimes glosses over the cost in human

terms (to peripheral workers, say) of a numerically

flexible workforce (Atkinson 1984; Hyman, 1991).

The elenchus can be revealing about structure as

well as rhetoric. For example, in many roles status

and authority are traditionally understood as

dependent on a notion of expertise (Baldwin, 1995,

p. 380). Inquiry that identifies frequently unques-

tioned assumptions (such as the belief that one can

say what expertise is) could highlight how some

truth claims rest on value judgments, or social

structures (Illich et al., 1977). In extremis this is seen

in the idea that knowledge only makes sense in a

given discursive practice (Foucauld, 1979/2002).

388 Kevin Morrell

TABLEII

PromptsheetsforModerator(s)

What

does

itmeanto


Role

playwithOracleandDelphi.Youplaythepartofan

Observer

OracleandDelphiarecomingatthisproblem

from

twodifferentangles.Delphiwantsto

show

thatanydefinitionhasitsproblems,because

itwon’tbeableto

cover

everypossiblesituation,butOracleiskeento

tryto

pin

Delphidownto

aspecificdefinition.Oraclehassomeargumentsthat(s)hecanuse

todevelopa

definition,andDelphihas

someexam

plesofproblematic

questions,andisencouraged

touse

specificexam

plesto

counterOracle’sefforts(theseareshown

below

foryoureyes

only).Youarenotmerelyapassiveobserver,butyourroleisto

takenotesontheirconversation,so

thatin

thediscussionthatfollowsthe

roleplay,youwillbeableto

summarisethekey

ideas,andgiveasense

ofhow

theargumentwent,aswellasoffer

constructivecriticism

forboth

ofthem

.This

willbeim

portantfeedbackforboth

DelphiandOracleandyouarejustasinvolved

intheprocess,becauseyouhavean

overallsightoftheproblem.Can

youfor

exam

plesaywhether

oneofthem

isgettingtheupper

hand?Isthisdownto

them

,orisitaconsequence

ofwhatthey

arebeingasked

todo?Whatwerethe

highlightsoftheirdiscussion?What

werethemostconvincing/leastconvincingarguments?What

was

agood/w

eakexam

ple.Try

tobeencouragingin

your

feedback,andshow

that

youareinterested

intheirdiscussion.

Ifeither

ofthem

getsstuck,then

youmightencouragethem

usingthepromptsheetbelow,if

they’vemissedsomethingout,orifsomethingcomes

tomindyoucould

suggestityourself.Try

toencourageOracleto

keepgoing,bysummarisingwhatwas

goodin

his/her

argumentso

far;andtryto

encourageDelphito

thinkofspecificexam

ples.

Oracle’sdefinitions

Delphi’squestions


isdoingthingswhen

no-onegetshurt,orat

leastwhereyouminim

isethetotalam

ountofhurt

Can

youmeasure

painandsufferingin

thesameway

youmeasure

money?

(thinkofaspecificexam

ple)


meansprotectingtheinterestsofshareholders

–ifacompanygoes

bustitcan’tdobusiness

Are

nottheresomethingsthatareprinciples-i.e.nomatterwhatthecostsand

consequencesit’swrong?(thinkofaspecificexam

ple)


meanstellingthetruth,payingone’sdebtsand

lookingafterone’sem

ployees

What

aboutwhen

differentgoals(employee

welfare,customer

service,

profit

etc.)arein

conflict?(thinkofaspecificexam

ple)


Similarly, in a range of other organizational set-

tings, practices are open to scrutiny by the elenchus.

Within bureaucratic organizations, formal proce-

dures or rules can disguise the level of ambiguity,

and consequent scope for discretion some types of

bureaucrat typically manage (Lipsky, 1980). Thus, in

their application, formal rules can be used to express

an individual’s set of particular virtues or vices, ra-

ther than their representing an abstract truth. If these

rules are unthinkingly adhered to, or wrongly be-

lieved to be objective and impartial, this may be a

source of moral incoherence. In general, the differ-

ence between practices that are acceptable at work,

but would not be considered so in other social set-

tings could be examined using the principles of the

elenchus, with its potential to reveal incoherence.

Limitations

In many of the dialogues, the elenchus is savage, akin to

what Nietzsche (1888/1990, p. 42) called ‘‘the knife

thrust of the syllogism’’. This dramatic tension in

Plato’s dialogues underlines the epistemological gap

between a Socratic approach to philosophy and a

reliance on conventional wisdom (as proffered by the

sophists). From a teaching perspective however, this

confrontational aspect presents problems in terms of

transferring this technique to the classroom, where

even a metaphorical knife thrust would rarely be

conducive to learning! This is a consideration that

skilled facilitators will recognise as one of the limita-

tions to the Socratic method, but there is no reason

why the principles of the technique cannot be em-

ployed in an environment that is conducive to learn-

ing and participation. There are, for example, extracts

from the Platonic corpus where the exchanges be-

tween Socrates and his discussant are respectful and

shared. This is certainly the case in the Theaetetus,

where we see Plato outline a philosophy of education,

and the dialogue illustrates a version of collaborative

inquiry (Burnyeat, 1990). This is partly evinced by the

metaphor Socrates uses to describe his role, namely

that he is a ‘‘midwife’’, who ‘‘attends to the labour of

men’s [sic] souls’’ (150b). One thing that is notable

about this dialogue is that Theaetetus approaches the

Socratic project with an openness, and willingness to

have his ideas challenged (161a, 187c). Though this

ideal may be unrealistic in a large, group setting,

imaginative and relevant scenarios, and the use of small

scale, well structured role plays could encourage par-

ticipation along these lines in smaller groups.

An unfortunate consequence of using Socrates as a

role model is that this can reinforce the power

imbalance between teacher and students. Though this

is not insurmountable (the role play allows students to

play the part of Socrates for example), it is important

to be aware of this and other potentially negative

connotations to Socrates, such as patriarchy, or a

seeming monopoly on knowledge. To try to avoid

these dangers, it is perhaps more useful to focus on the

particular technique (the elenchus), or the dialogue

form, than on the dramatic character (Socrates).

A final limitation is the seeming inevitability that

Socratic dialogue is destined to remain fruitless, and

that no absolutely definitive answer can be given.

To counteract this familiar argument in brief, it is

worth emphasising three things. First, it is open to

question whether ethical problems can ever be

solved. Though there is a sense in which ethical

issues in business can, and must, be resolved, this is a

very different proposition from suggesting that there

will be one, definitive solution ‘‘out there’’ that will

be accepted by everyone, or is axiomatic. Second,

this criticism misses the point of a fundamental

purpose of education. That is, that education should

provide people with resources with which to help

them negotiate their lives. This goal is fundamen-

tally different from that of training, or consultancy

for example, in the sense that the purpose of edu-

cation is not and should not be a particular destination,

or end point (Schofield, 1972). Third, this paper

does not, of course, argue that the elenchus is the only

way, or the best way to teach business ethics. In-

stead, it propose this three stage version of the

elenchus, as a potential tool for teaching business

ethics. The hope is that the rudiments of the method

as illustrated, will inspire inventive, skilled facilita-

tors to encourage dialogic interactions between, and

with students.

Conclusion

This paper shows how the technique of the elenchus

can be applied in contemporary settings to the

teaching of business undergraduates. In this context,

it can be used to show how there may be tensions

390 Kevin Morrell

between ready-to-hand answers to ethical problems

(for example the use of utilitarian arguments) and the

particular intricacies of an ethical problem. This is

analogous to the incoherence MacIntyre identifies

between moral principles (as summarised by the

sophist’s prescriptions for successful life in the city

state) and the difficulties of grappling with a partic-

ular ethical dilemma (the example Socrates gives is of

whether we should return a weapon to someone

who has lost their sense of reason and may be bent

on self-harm). Using the Socratic technique, rather

than focusing on the example of Socrates as a dra-

matic character can contribute to the teaching of

business ethics through role play.

Dialogue can be an important mechanism for

enhancing skills of argument, and the elenchus as a

dialectical mechanism can be used to illustrate how

there may be inconsistencies in an individual’s belief

set. The context for this approach was developed

and justified with reference to the historical setting

for Socrates’ dialogues and MacIntyre’s theme of

‘‘incoherence in the use of evaluative language in

Athenian culture’’ (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 131). This

theme of incoherence was developed and related to

the teaching of business ethics, and as well as illus-

trating a potential application of this in practice, an

agenda for the use of the elenchus was offered.

The focus for this paper has been to provide

guidelines for how the influential idea of the elenchus

can be applied practically, in a classroom setting, and

to the teaching of business ethics. To this end, the

paper offered an example of how this technique

could be used. This took the form of a structured

role play, where two students play the roles of

Delphi and Oracle, who are prompted to pursue

competing goals. Oracle is directed to pursue a

perfect answer to the question ‘‘what does it mean to

do business ethically’’. Delphi’s goal is to subvert this

definitional project through the use of specific

counterexamples. Other students (observers) partic-

ipate through tracing the development of the argu-

ment, evaluating the performance of the students

playing Oracle and Delphi and providing feedback

once the dialogue has run its course. Familiarity with

the elenchus may be one way in which to encourage

greater coherence between student’s learning about

business ethics as an assessed, taught subject, and the

development of their personal skills in evaluating and

developing ethical argument.

Acknowledgements

Kevin Morrell gratefully acknowledges the support

of the ESRC, grant T06271314. Thanks to two

anonymous reviewers for their comments.

Notes

? An earlier version of this paper was given at the

‘‘Teaching Business Ethics: Business in the Curriculum’’

conferences, held at the Institute for Business Ethics,

London, November 6, 2003.1 This paper follows the standard convention whereby

references to Plato use page numbers from an early

collection of the dialogues (Stephanus, 1578), where

every page was divided into roughly equal parts.2 The cited extract does not qualify MacIntyre’s use of

‘‘he’’, ‘‘him’’ and ‘‘she’’, as it is an already lengthy

quotation, and this would make it unwieldy and disrupt

the flow. Elsewhere in the manuscript, the use of

language that is open to being interpreted as sexist is

avoided.3 Tutors may wish to choose their own, more ‘‘student

friendly’’ names for the main characters. In this paper,

which is targeted at a more sophisticated audience, I

originally chose these names because of Socrates’ links

with the ‘‘Oracle at Delphi’’. I allocated Delphi to the

character based on Socrates (since his questioning is

redolent of our modern sense of the Delphic), and Oracle

to the character charged with providing a definition (since

this connotes divine wisdom – surely needed in the case

in point!). These names also have the advantage of being

gender neutral. Thanks to Jack Mahoney for pointing out

this potential learning barrier.

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The Local Government Centre,

Warwick Business School,

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Coventry CV4 7AL,

United Kingdom

E-mail: [email protected]

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socratic dialogue as a tool for teaching business ethics

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