SOLIVEN,PETITIONERVS. JUDGE MAKASIAR,RESPONDENT167 SCRA 393

FACTS:This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the petitioners weredenied due process when information for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of aprima faciecase was still under reviewby the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently by the President

2. Whether or not theconstitutional rights ofBeltran(petitioner) were violatedwhenrespondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable clause

3. Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution,may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitionersthrough filing of a complaint-affidavit

DECISION:Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions.

The Order to maintain thestatus quocontained in the Resolution of the Courten bancis LIFTED.

RATIO:Background of thefirst issue MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion forreconsideration APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion forreconsiderationfiled by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice

MAY 2, 1988: Onappeal, the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice

MAY 16, 1988: Motion forreconsiderationwas denied by the Executive Secretary

Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.

-This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed, in effect,waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.

Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.Second issueThis calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest:

Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests.

-However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge isnot required to personally examine the complainant and his witness.

Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall: (1) Personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause (and on the basis, thereof, issue a warrant of arrest); or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of probable cause.Third issuePetitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the Presidents filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial courts jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat herprivilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

-This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office andmay be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf.

-The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person (And there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege).

Additional Issue:

Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a chilling effect on press freedom.

-Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the chilling effect point.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINIONGuitierrez, Jr., J.Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves around the three principal issues. With regard to whether or not the libel case would produce a chilling effect on press freedom, Gutierrez believes that this particular issue is the most important and should be resolved now rather than later.

Quotable quotes:Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.United States v. Bustos

No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath.People v. Perfecto

OKABE VS GUTIERREZ

FACTS: Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged, that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was subsequently approved by the city prosecutor. The trial court then issued a warrant of arrest with a recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial courts permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure order. Trial court approved the same. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; theaffidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondents counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the partieswere not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that she have 3 minor children residing there relying on her for support. Petitioner also questioned the irregularity of the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of bail and the filing motions for relief estopped the petitioner from questioning the same. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/ leave of court left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA a petition for Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure order however all the other motions were denied, hence this case.ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed a reversible error in determining existence of probable cause despite lack ofaffidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyamaand the latters documentary evidence, as well as thecounter-affidavit of the petitioner.HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that:SEC. 8. Records. (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case.The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based on the complete records, as required under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

BACHE & CO. VS. RUIZ (GR 32409, FEB. 27, 1971) Digest

FACTS:-Commissioner of Internal Revenue Vera wrote a letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache& Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.-In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Veras letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by Judge Ruiz.-At that time Judge Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, Judge Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, Judge Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.-The Judge signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios deposition. Search Warrant was then signed by the judge and accordingly issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR agents served thesearch warrant to the corporation and Seggerman at the offices of the corporation.ISSUE:WON the search warrant is valid.HELD:Search warrant is invalid.RATIO:There was no personal examination conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio). The judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against Bache & Co. andSeggerman. The participation of the judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance ofthe search was thus limited to listening to the stenographers readings of her notes,to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to thecomplainant and his witness. This cannot be considered a personal examination. Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.Next, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant was issued for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled inStonehillSuch is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.Lastly,the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be sRoan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)

F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on 5/10/84. The petitioner''s house was searched 2 days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. The officers conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner.

RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken of the complainant''s 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. It is correct to say, however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation. By his own accounts, all that resp. judge did was question Capt. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only bec. "the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant''s deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together w/ the affidavit presented to him. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. (Mata v. Bayona.) The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. personally known to him. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought.

It was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal info., to establish the applicant''s claims. Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take the deposition only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions. A study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the resp. judge. One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp. judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration of the witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant sought was issued forthwith. SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING. We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guaran

PEOPLE VS TEE

FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana.

Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and that the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with illegal possession of marijuana.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the description on the serach warrant which says an undetermined amount of marijuana, was too general and hence makes the warrant void for vagueness.

HELD: SC held that the appellants contention, has no leg to stand on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense. However, it is not required that technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could issue.

Tambasen vs People

FACTS: On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for the issuance of a search warrant from the MTCC, alleging that he received information that petitioner had in his possession at his house at the North Capitol Road, Bacolod City, "M-16 Armalite Rifles (Mags & Ammos), Hand Grenades, .45 Cal. Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and Subversive Documents," which articles were "used or intended to be used" for illegal purposes]. On the same day, the application was granted by the MTCC with the issuance of Search Warrant No. 365, which allowed the seizure of the items specified in the application (Rollo, p. 15).At around 6:30 P.M. of September 9, 1988, a police team searched the house of petitioner and seized among others, 2 envelopes containing cash in the total amount of Php 14,000.

Petitioner filed an urgent motion for the return of the seized articles. MTCC issued an order directing Sgt. Natuel to make a return of the search warrant. The following day, Sgt. Natuel submitted a report to the court. Not considering the report as a "return in contemplation of law," petitioner filed another motion praying that Sgt. Natuel be required to submit a complete and verified inventory of the seized articles. Thereafter, Sgt. Natuel manifested that although he was the applicant for the issuance of the search warrant, he was not present when it was served. On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed before the MTCC a motion praying that the search and seizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. MTCC ruled in favor of the petitioner, however the Solicitor General alleged that assuming that the seizure of the money had been invalid, petitioner was not entitled to its return citing the rulings stating that pending the determination of the legality of the seizure of the articles, they should remain in custodia legis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SW was valid.

HELD: On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The caption of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and void (People v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 101 [1992]). Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. "The presumption juris tantum of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759)

As the Court aptly puts it in Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors."

Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

33PEOPLE VS VELOSO48 PHIL. 169 (1925)MALCOLM, J.Facts:-In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by anorganization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time amember of theHouse of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.-The police of Manila hadreliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club wasnothingmore than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of thegamblingsquad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As aresult, on May 25, 1923, Detective AndresGeronimo of the secret service of theCity of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrantfrom Judge Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid theParliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date above-mentioned. They foundthe doors to thepremises closed and barred. Accordingly, oneband of police including policemanRosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter awindow of the house. Other policemen,headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.-Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One ofthem was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showedhim the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he wasRepresentative Veloso andnot John Doe, and that the police had no right to search thehouse. Townsend answered thatVeloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as ifit contained gamblingutensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five minuteswas consumed in conversation between the policemen andthe accused the policemen insistingon searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search.-At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Velosoonly to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in theright forearm, and gave him a blow inanother part of thebody, which injured the policeman quite severely.Through the combinedefforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets ofpaper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken fromhis pockets.-All of the persons arrested weresearched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Velosoagain refused to obeyand shouted offensive epithets against the police department. Itwasnecessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted sotenaciously that three policemen were needed toplace him in thepatrol wagon.-The warrant read as follows:

SEARCHWARRANT(G)The People of thePhilippine Islands, to any member ofthePolice Force of the City ofManila.GREETINGProof by affidavit having this day been made before meby Andres Geronimo that hehas good reason to believe and doesbelieve that John Doe has illegally in hispossession in the building occupied by him and which isunder his control, namely inthe building numbered 124Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certaindevices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law, towit: money, cards,chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and otherutensils used in connection withthegame commonly known as monte and thatthe said John Doe keeps and conceals saiddevices and effects with the illegal and criminal intention of using them in violation ofthe Gambling Law.Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time inthe day or nightwithin ten (10) days on or after this date to make a search on the person of said JohnDoe and in thehouse situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, PhilippineIslands, in quest of the above described devices and effects and if youfind the sameor any part thereof, you are commanded tobring it forthwith before me as providedfor by law.Given under my hand, this 25th dayof May, 1923.(Sgd.)L.GARDUOJudge, Municipal Court

Issue:WON the search warrant and the arrestof Veloso was valid.

Ruling:Yes.

RD:It is provided, among other things, in the Philippine Code on Criminal Procedure that a searchwarrant shall not issueexcept for probable cause andupon application supported by oathparticularly describing the place to be searched and the person of thing to be seized.The name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrantandwhere the name is unknown there must be such adescription of the person accused as willenable the officer to identify himwhen found.A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true nameis unknown, by the name of "JohnDoe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or truename in unknown," is void, without other and furtherdescriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer inacting under it. Such awarrant must, in addition, contain the bestdescriptio personae possibleto be obtained of the person or personsto be apprehended, and this description must be

sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is tobeserved; and should statehis personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation andplace of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.In the first place, the affidavit for the searchwarrant and the search warrant itself described thebuilding to be searched as"the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, Cityof Manila, PhilippineIslands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched.As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in thebuilding occupied by him at No.124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe wasJose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as JoseMa. Velosowithout difficulty.

LIM VS FELIX

FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the incident then followed.Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused..On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the RTCt of Makati to avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations, among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt,pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.Yousef Al Ghoul vs CA

FACTS: Herein petitioners are detention prisoners who were arrested and charged with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, as a consequence of the search conducted pursuant to the search warrants issued by the RTC of Kalookan City. After their arrest, petitioners filed a motion for bail. However, the resolution of the same was held in abeyance by the trial court pending the presentation of evidence by the prosecution to enable the court to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. Subsequently, the trial court issued the Order dated February 19, 1996 denying petitioners motion for bail on the ground that the law under which petitioners are charged prescribes a penalty of reclusion perpetua and that the evidence of guilt is strong. Thereafter, petitioners proceeded to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing the aforementioned orders issued by the trial court admitting the evidence of the prosecution and denying petitioners motion for bail. In its Decision dated September 30, 1996, the CA affirmed the assailed orders of trial court, hence this case. On October 30, 1997, petitioners filed a Manifestation with alleging that with the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, amending P.D. 1866, the penalty for the offenses under which petitioners are being charged has been reduced from the penalty ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to only the penalty ranging from prision mayor to reclusion temporal, hence, petitioners are now entitled to bail regardless of the strength of evidence against them.ISSUE: Whether petitioner, thru the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, amending P.D. 1866 reducing the penalty for the crime charge against him is now entitled to bail.HELD: Consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty prescribed in Section 1 and 3 of P.D. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives under which petitioners were charged, has now been reduced to prision mayor in its minimum period[11] and prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal,[12] respectively. Evidently, petitioners are now entitled to bail as a matter of right prior to their conviction by the trial court pursuant to Section 4 of SC Administrative Circular No. 12-94 which provides as follows:SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right.x x x. (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule.MICROSOFT vs. MAXICORP

Intellectual Property Law on Copyright Probable Cause in Issuing Search WarrantIn 1996, Dominador Samiano, an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp Inc. He observed that Microsoft Software (Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged within the premises of Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of Windows. For their purchase, they were issued a receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a certain Joel Diaz. Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC. He brought with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought as evidence as well as the receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a computer technician, who showed the judge that the software in the computer unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated. The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of copyright infringement and unfair competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the warrant before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its decision it highlighted the fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos or Sacriz name hence the proceeding in the trial court was infirm from the onset.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD:No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorps premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.

The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos name nor was it in Sacriz name does not render the issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists.Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTCs findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samianos purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.

UY vs BIR

FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof.On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code. Abos, who claimed to be a former employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit alleging illegal activities being practiced by the said company among others, selling thousands of cartons of canned sardines w/o issuing receipt.On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of the BIR, applied for several search warrants.The application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the Philippine National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of petitioner corporation. A return of said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.Petitioner impugned the intrinsic validity of the SW stating that it violates constitutional right to unreasonable search and seizure.xxxx1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;5. Sales Records, Job Order;6. Corporate Financial Records; and7. Bank Statements/Cancelled ChecksxxxxxISSUE: WON the SW complied with the proper constitutional mandates.HELD: The SC AFFIRMED the order of the RTC insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search Warrants authorizing the seizure of the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, but REVERSED with respect to the rest of the articles subject of said warrants.GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [206 SCRA 138; G.R. NO. 101837; 11 FEB 1992]

Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioners plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.Issues:(1) WON warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.(2) WON petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted continuing crimes, i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond.Alvarez vCFI64PHIL33 (1937)Facts: On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department ofJustice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court ofFirst Instance ofTayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, Narciso Alvarez kept inhis house inInfanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connectionwith his activities as a moneylender, charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In hisoath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questionswere correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statementsupon his own knowledge of the facts butupon the information received by him from a reliable person.Upon the affidavit the judge, on said date,issued the warrant which is the subjectmatter of the petition,ordering the search of the Alvarezs house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books anddocuments and the immediate delivery thereof tohim to be disposed of in accordance with thelaw.With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered Alvarezs store and residence at 7:00p.m. of 4 June 1936, and seized andtook possession of the following articles: internal revenue licensesfor the years 1933 to 1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order books, 4 notebooks, 4 check stubs,2 memorandums, 3 bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4stubs, 48 stubs of purchases of copra,2 inventories, 2bundles of bills of lading, 1 bundle of credit receipts, 1 bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, 2packagesof correspondence, 1 receipt bookbelonging to Luis Fernandez, 14 bundles of invoices and other papers,many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504chits, promissory notesand stubs of used checks of theHongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). The search for andseizure of said articles weremade with the opposition of Alvarez who stated his protestbelow theinventories on the ground that the agentsseized even the originals of the documents. As the articles hadnot been brought immediately to the judgewho issued the search warrant, Alvarez, through hisattorney, filed a motion on 8 June1936, praying that the agentEmilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, beordered immediately to deposit all the seizedarticles in the office of theclerk of court and that saidagent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of thecourt. On said date the courtissued an order directing Siongco to deposit all the articles seized within 24 hours from thereceipt ofnotice thereof and giving him a period of 5days within which to show cause why he should not bepunished for contempt of court. On 10 June,Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-UsuryBoard, filed a motion praying that the order of the 8th of said month beset aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of 30days for the necessaryinvestigation. On June 25, the court issued an order requiring agent Siongco forthwith to file thesearchwarrant and the affidavit in the court, together with the proceedings taken by him, andto present aninventory duly verified by oath of all the articlesseized. On July 2, the attorney for the petitioner filed apetition alleging that the search warrantissued was illegal and that it had not yet been returned to datetogether with the proceedings taken in connection therewith, and praying that said warrantbecancelled, that an order be issued directing the return of all the articles seized to Alvarez, that the agentwho seized them be declared guilty of contempt of court, and that chargesbe filed against him forabuse of authority. On September 10, the court issued an order holding: that thesearch warrant wasobtained and issued in accordance with the law,that it had been duly complied with and, consequently,should not be cancelled, and that agentSiongco did not commit any contempt of courtand must,