Space Security

Ways forward

SETI Institute, CA, USA10.12.08

Will Marshall

Content Overview

1. Introduction1. Vulnerabilities of satellites2. Space Debris

2. Ways forward1. Technical2. Diplomatic

3. Space Weapons

4. Conclusions

1. INTRODUCTION

Why is space is important to International Security?

Take Iraq:- Decision to go in based in part on Satellite reconnaissance and SIGINT- Entire Military Operation conducted from Florida via comms satellite- Military units, ships, tanks, planes and missiles guided by GPS

Modern military functions near impossible without satellites

PROBLEMS

- Vulnerabilities of critical satellites- Increasing density of space debris

1. INTRODUCTION

AIM

“Secure and sustainable access to and use of space and freedom from space based threats.” *

PRE-REQUISITS FOR GENERALS AND POLICY MAKERS

- Keplers’ Laws - Rocket Equation

* Space Security Index, http://www.spacesecurity.org

1.1. VULNERABILITIES

T1. Electronic warfare, such as jamming or spoofing of satellite communications; T2. Physical attacks on satellite ground stations; T3. Dazzling or blinding of satellite sensors; T4. Radio-Frequency (RF) weapons, e.g. High-Powered Microwaves (HPM);T5. ‘Heat-to-kill’ ground-based laser ASAT weapons; T6. Pellet cloud attacks on low-orbit satellites; T7. Attacks in space by micro-satellites; T8. Hit-to-kill anti-satellite weapons; and T9. High-Altitude Nuclear Detonations (HAND).

1. Adapted from B. de Blois et al. International Security Fall 2004

1.2. SPACE DEBRIS

• Millions of pieces of man made debris• Debris >1mm can cause s/c malfunction• But SSN can only track objects >5cm !!• ~100,000 pieces that are *untrackable* today and yet

threaten s/c• Potential for going critical• NASA study: even if no new launches, debris continues to

rise

Chinese ASAT• 3000 debris >5cm• Increase of ~20%• Conjunctions up >30%

US ASAT • Less debris • Still increased risks

2. WAYS FORWARD

2.1. TECHNICAL1. Protection of satellites, Communication links and Ground Stations

2. Space Situation Awareness (SSA)

3. Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)

4. Multi-tiered micro-satellite constellations architecture

5. Space Traffic Management

2.2. DIPLOMATIC1. Treaties

1. Prohibit ASATs and other kinetic weapons- Space is a very transparent domain for kinetic events – for any ASAT event it is easy to (1) detect the event, and (2)

determine who was the perpetrator.

2. Orbital Space Debris- Chinese and US ASATs show that ‘guidelines’ are not enough

3. Space Traffic Management

2. Confidence Building Measures

Multi-tiered microsatellites constellations architecture (MMCA)

ConceptDesign a new satellite architecture less vulnerable to threats

Current Architecture:• Few key satellites• Many in LEO• Each system in single orbital tier Many places of single point failures

MMCA Features1. Multi-tiered (several orbital altitudes) 2. Higher altitudes (where attack is harder and including terrestrial layers

where possible) 3. Constellations (disperse) 4. Modular 5. Networked 6. Micro-satellites

Same capabilities as the few key satellites do today Less vulnerable to attack Using Existing technologies Similar or lower cost

Transition Through replacement of existing system as it fails/is retired/becomes obsolete

Multi-tiered microsatellites constellations architecture (MMCA)

Main functions of military satellites

1. Early Warning of Missile Attack– Early Warning of Missile Attack– Detection of nuclear explosions

2. Reconnaissance (Photo and Synthetic Aperture Radar)– Imagery Intelligence

3. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)– Listening to Communications (COMINT), Radar (ELINT), Telemetry of

missiles/rockets (TELINT)

4. Communications– Military-to-military communication

5. Navigation– Military navigational information– Rocket guidance

Multi-tiered microsatellites constellations architecture (MMCA)

Example: Early Warning Satellites

Difference of MMCA:

• More satellites• Multiple layers (GEO

and MEO layer)• Smaller Infra-Red

telescope• Telescope and

other instruments split into two satellites

Example: Topsat bus (SSTL) or Spiralle (CNES)

SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

Collision avoidance:

Conjunction Analysis

Manoeuvre

SSO slots

12 altitudes42 planes>1000 slots minimumUp to 12000 slots max.

(Currently ~300 SSO Satellites in operation)

3. SPACE WEAPONS

Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?

Why relevant at all? - Some propose SW to reduce s/c vulnerabilities!

Questions:1. Can Space Based Weapons reduce Satellite Vulnerabilities?2. Can Space Based Weapons ensure continued Secure access to space?

Net Security Analysis:

Security Benefits Security Costs

1. Missile Defense2. Protecting Space Assets3. Prompt Global Strike4. Space Defense/Attack Capability (space

control)5. Secondary Security Benefits

1. Arms race --> bankrupting adversary2. Maintaining Aerospace Workforce3. Stable domination

1. Arms Race --> more vulnerability of space assets, asymmetric means found by adversary, out competed

2. Harming the Environment (space debris)3. Long-term impact on security; inability to

retract that system if destabalizing

6. SPACE-BASED WEAPONS

Example: Space Based Interceptor for Missile Defense

Advantages:- Potential to intercept missiles from rogue states

Disadvantages:- Technical Difficulty V. Large cost- Other nations may do asymmetric capabilities to negate

missile defense e.g. ASATs- Missile Defense is provocative for many nations (e.g.

Russia)

4. CONCLUSIONS

Satellites are important and yet vulnerable

Main ways forward that need more energy:

1. Technical1. Multi-tiered micro-satellite constellations architecture

2. Space Traffic Management

2. Diplomatic1. Treaty Prohibiting ASATs and other kinetic weapons

Space Weapons:In my analysis, Space based weapons reduce US security principally because of

relative technical ease of countermeasures.

MORE INFORMATION

1. Space Security Index -- annual review of military space developments “Military Balance for Space” -- www.spacesecurity.org

2. Space Traffic Management -- International Space University Study -- www.isunet.edu + small study team at NASA-Ames

3. US National Space Policyhttp://www.ostp.gov/galleries/default-file/Unclassified%20National%20Space%20Policy%20--%20FINAL.pdf

4. W. Marshall, “Reducing the Vulnerability of Space Assets: A Multitiered Microsatellite Constellation Architecture”, Astropolitics, Volume 6, Issue 2 May 2008 , pages 154 - 199

QUESTIONS?

william.s.marshall@nasa.gov

Back up Slides

Category Specific weapons Past Use

Primary Task (secondary)

1. Space-to-Missile

1. Space-based Interceptor U Missile Defense (protection/control)

2. Space-based Laser (U) Missile Defense

(protection/control)

2. Space-to-Earth

3. Orbital Bombardment System (Long Rod Penetrator or Space-based Common Aero Vehicle)

Ground Attack (control)

3. Space-to-Space

4. Space Mine (Space-based ASATs/DSAT) (U) Control (Protection)

4. Earth-to-Space Ground-based ASATs (KK or pellet cloud)

Laser Blinding

Laser Dazzling

Radio-frequency (RF) weapons e.g. high-power microwave (HPM)

Radio communications jamming/spoofing

High Altitude Nuclear Detonation

5. Earth-to-Space-to-Earth

Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile

Fractional Orbital Bombardment System

Key (U) = formerly under development but programme largely discontinued

= developed and tested

U= under development

TYPES OF SPACE WEAPON

1. HOW CAN SPACE-BASED WEAPONS EFFECT NATIONAL SECURITY

Security Benefits1. Missile Defense2. Protecting Space Assets3. Prompt Global Strike4. Space Defense/Attack Capability (space control)5. Secondary Security Benefits

1. Arms race --> bankrupting adversary2. Maintaining Aerospace Workforce3. Stable domination

Security Costs1. Arms Race --> more vulnerability of space assets,

asymmetric means found by adversary, out competed2. Harming the Environment (space debris)3. Long-term impact on security; inability to retract that

system if destabalizing