Populist Challenges and the 2016 Presidential Nominations

Draft 1.0

Wayne Steger DePaul University

wsteger@depaul.edu

This paper analyzes the populism of Donald Trump in the 2016 Republican Party presidential nomination. Populism has a lot of different meanings and uses (e.g., Girdron and Bonikowski 2013), but the common thread is that populism is anti-elite or anti-establishment sentiment. This aspect of the populist movements means that party elites have few levers to avoid candidates like Trump whose nomination and election could potentially redefine the coalitions and policies of the two parties. Both the Sanders and Trump campaigns drew support from populist elements in their respective parties, potentially disrupting existing nominating coalitions with policy appeals that deviate from party orthodoxy (Steger 2016b). The left-wing populism of Sanders fused progressive economic policy ideas, cultural inclusivity, and anti-establishment rhetoric targeting Wall Street and their “enablers” in the Democratic Party. The right-wing populism of Trump fused economic nationalism, cultural exclusivity, and anti-establishment rhetoric accusing both political parties of abandoning white, working-class Americans. The darker side of right wing populism is a shading of white nationalism that is inherently threatening to political minorities defined along lines of race, ethnicity, and religion. The paper focuses on right wing populism because Trump's nomination and election makes this a more consequential feature of American politics than Sanders' left wing populism. I draw on multiple sources to create a narrative about the roots of populist appeal and then I use exit poll data to assess the extent of anti-establishment sentiment. The paper concludes with an assessment of the implications for the coalitions of the two major political parties and the direction of policy under a Trump Administration. Paper prepared for the “US Elections of 2016: Domestic and International Aspects” conference sponsored by the IDC Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel. January, 2016.

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The 2016 presidential elections shocked most observers with the nomination and eventual

election of Donald Trump. Donald Trump was an unlikely nominee, lacking the experience or

the self-discipline of previously successful candidates. He ran an unorthodox campaign that

resembled a concert tour more than a presidential nomination campaign. He did not build an

extensive campaign organization or spend much money on ads, opting instead to communicate

with prospective voters through social media and exposure on digital and TV news. He belittled

his Republican rivals and other officials. He spoke with near disregard for facts and fomented

racial, gender, and nativist prejudices. Trump departed from long-established Republican Party

policy positions on trade, social welfare, same-sex marriage, and more. Numerous party insiders

opposed his nomination. Some observers called his nomination a hostile take-over of the party.1

While there is a lot to Donald Trump’s nomination, this paper looks at Trump’s campaign and

the rise of right-wing populism (RWP) in the Republican Party.

Trump’s nomination and election matters. First, the Republicans have their biggest

window of opportunity since the 1920s to shape American politics and policies. Trump sits at

the top of a Republican Party that has substantial control of elective office in the United States—

holding the White House, both chambers of Congress, soon the Supreme Court, over 60% of

state legislatures and governorships, and over 75% of all county governments. Second, while

most Republican elected officials are not right-wing populists, Trump has considerable potential

to redefine partisan politics in the United States. The president is the foremost spokesperson of a

party and the personification of the party image (e.g., Miller and Gronbeck 1994) and the main

1 See for example, Ryan Lizza, 2016, “Donald Trump’s Hostile Takeover of the GOP,” http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/donald-trumps-hostile-takeover-of-the-g-o-p, January 28; Joe Scarborough, “Donald Trump’s hostile takeover of the Republican Party,” Washington Post, March. 1, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2016/03/01/ donald-trumps-hostile-takeover-of-the-republican-party/?utm_term=.ea3e4b2290ef,.

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definer of the policy direction of a political party (e.g., Riker 1986; Skowronek 1993; Herrera

1995; Karol 2009). The choice of presidential nominees helps shape what the parties stand for

and what they will try to do if they win the election.

Trump may have more potential than most presidents to redefine his party coalition and

policy direction. Throughout the nomination, general election, and post-election periods, Trump

demonstrated a willingness and even an eagerness to challenge and threaten Republican officials

who stand against him. Trump appears to have an authoritarian personality that demands

compliance or at least acquiescence of his associates. Republicans who want to challenge

Trump’s efforts to redefine Republican Party policies risk becoming the targets of Trump’s

vicious and effective counter-punches. Trump’s threats are backed by widespread anti-

establishment sentiments of a large portion of the Republican electorate demonstrated through

the Tea Party movement and Trump’s nomination and election. Trump’s attacks could impact

congressional Republicans’ own re-nomination campaigns which will begin in the fall of 2017.

Setting the Table for Populism: economic transformation and rising discontent

I will argue in the first part of this paper that the discontent that underpins the rising left-

and right-wing populism in America is diffuse in origin and that it transcends economic

inequality or economic discontent. The roots of anti-establishment discontent are a multifaceted

blend of factors related to economic, demographic, social, and cultural transformations of the

American economy and society. These multiple transformations have created tensions and

problems for which the political parties and government are failing to provide adequate relief.

Widespread discontent provides a fertile breeding ground for populist and authoritarian appeals

that offer simple targets for blame and facile solutions.2 How societies deal with socio-

2 I will argue that authoritarianism and populism are distinct phenomena that may overlap.

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economic, demographic, cultural, and technological change is or needs to be a central question

for the social sciences and political science in particular. This section discusses these

transformations, offering a few insights about how these patterns of change interrelate to produce

segments of the population that are open to left- and right-wing populist appeals.

These populist approaches offer alternate responses to the question of how political

parties/government/society should respond to the combination of economic, demographic, and

cultural transformations of society that have occurred more or less since the mid-1970s.3 Most

arguments about the drivers of populism focus on economic discontent—primarily economic

inequality for left-wing populists, and government rigging the system for right-wing populists.4

The focus on economic inequality or economic grievances, however, is too narrow to explain

what is happening. The transformation of the economy from a manufacturing base to the “new

economy” based in technology, information, and financial services also impact the social and

cultural fabric of society. Further, these changes have coincided with demographic and

technological changes that also impact the social and cultural fabric of society. Economic,

demographic, social, and cultural change all pose problems for societies to cope with, and

problems that political parties try to grapple with (and leverage) as they seek to win elections.

Most scholarship views populism as grounded in the economic discontent that has grown

for several decades (e.g., Norris 2005; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Mudde, 2007; 2014). I

contend that the discontent owes to a broader and more diffuse combination of factors that have

resulted from simultaneous economic, demographic, social, and cultural changes over the past 40

3 While bemoaning technological change and automation, there is not a degree of anger at technology that motivated the Luddites of the 19th century. It may be that technological change is seen as inevitable and or that there is widespread recognition that technology has made life easier though not necessarily better. 4 Economic inequality is not a central concern for right-wing populists (see below). Interestingly this populism has had its greatest appeal in areas of the country that do not have much economic inequality – which is relatively greater in large metropolitan areas that coincidentally have relatively more left wing populists.

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years in the United States and other industrialized societies. The economics intertwine with the

social and cultural dimensions to right wing populism. While there has been substantial

economic growth since the 1970s, the distribution of costs and benefits have been uneven with

winners and losers. The uneven distribution of economic gains, however, is about more than just

economic inequality.5 First, it gives rise to different economic grievances. Economic inequality

is more important to liberals and leftwing populists than it is to conservatives and rightwing

populists. A PEW survey, for example, found that “the gap between the rich and the poor” was a

very big problem to 72% of Hillary Clinton supporters but only 33% of Trump supporters.6

Second, the uneven distribution of economic gains is integrated with other social, demographic,

and cultural dimensions, such that the resulting discontent is multifaceted and integrated with

perceptions of economic conditions. It is this multifaceted character of discontent is making

more people amenable to anti-establishment, populist appeals that reject business as usual.

Though simplistic, one way to think about such diffuse public discontent is use a broad

indicator about “the way things are going in this country.” Gallup has routinely asked this broad

question in polls since 1980. Figure 1 shows that public satisfaction with the way things are

going has been low for a decade going back to the 2006 mid-term elections. That is the longest,

sustained period of dissatisfaction in the era in which Gallup has asked this question and may be

why we are witnessing relatively stronger populist sentiment in 2016 than the the early- and mid-

1990s when Pat Buchanan used many of the same appeals that Donald Trump used in 2016.

5 Surveys by PEW, however, suggest that economic inequality is a minor concern for right wing-populists in America. 6 Inglehart and Norris (2016) may not have found a strong relationship between economic discontent and populism in part because they have focused on economic inequality. See PEW Research Center. http://www.people-press.org/2016/11/10/a-divided-and-pessimistic-electorate/

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Figure 1. Gallup Satisfaction Survey, 1980 to November 9, 2016

Source: Gallup. http://www.gallup.com/poll/1669/general-mood-country.aspx This particular measure of public dissatisfaction does not correlate particularly well with

economic indicators like unemployment, inflation, change in GDP, and job growth that fluctuate

more across time. Nor does it correlate well with economic inequality which has been trending

upward over a longer period of time. Further, discontent with the way things are going also may

not track these indicators because these aggregate economic measures mask the effects of

partisan bias. Democrats are relatively more discontent when Republicans control government

and vice versa. For example, recent Gallup polls taken the week before and a week after the

election illustrate that economic perceptions are heavily conditioned by the partisan lens of

respondents.7 The percentage of Republican respondents viewing the economy as getting better

increased from 16% in the week before the election, to 49% in the week after the election; while

Democratic perceptions declined from 61% to 46% over the same period. The proportion of

7 http://www.gallup.com/poll/197474/economic-confidence-surges-election.aspx Accessed, November 24.

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Republicans agreeing that economic conditions were getting worse declined from 81% before the

election to 44% after the election, while Democratic responses for this option increased from

35% before the election to 47% after the election. Overall discontent doesn’t change that much,

but who perceives economic discontent has changed. It is worth pointing how that Republicans,

in particular, have been more pessimistic about economic conditions since 2008 (see Gallup

trends). The psychological effects of partisanship are powerfully influential in shaping public

perceptions of reality, to the point of extraordinary bias in favor of one’s preferred party and

candidates and against the other (e.g., Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook, 2014; Gastil, et al. 2011;

Sharot, Korn, and Dolan, 2011). To the extent that discontent with the way things are going

creates the conditions in which populism thrives, then Republican leaning voters may have been

more susceptible to populist appeals than were Democrats in 2016.

Like other industrial societies, the United States has experienced growing income and

wealth inequality. These inequalities are the tip of an iceberg of socio-economic and cultural

changes that have occurred since the mid-1970s. On the losing side are people whose

livelihoods derive from agriculture, manufacturing, and coal mining in particular. On the

winning side are people engaged in the 1) the management of financial transactions, 2)

management of the production and distribution of manufactured goods, 3) the creation and

application of technology, and 4) knowledge and information services in a growing global

division of knowledge-based labor (whose complexities we are only beginning to recognize and

which portends additional winners and losers across service sectors including academia).

Importantly, the agricultural and manufacturing sectors have transformed rather than

declined. Talk about the decline of the manufacturing sector is inaccurate. Both agriculture and

manufacturing have largely maintained or increased the value of output while greatly reducing

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labor employment and wages in these sectors (controlling for inflation). The United States’

share of global agricultural and manufactured goods has declined since the 1970s because of

relatively greater growth in agricultural and manufacturing production elsewhere. While

production has maintained or grown, employment and wages in these sectors have declined

substantially. Labor and wages have declined in these sectors due mainly to automation of

production, secondarily to outsourcing of production, and tertiarily to changes in labor

compensation strategies of employers.8

Technological advances have enabled more food and goods to be produced with less

labor. In agriculture, this transformation has been occurring in the United States for over a

century as, so the recent decline is part of a longer trend in which advances in machinery and

equipment, technology, and applications of biology and chemistry enable farmers to produce

more food with less labor. Over the last 40 years, the agricultural sector has been transformed

from a labor- intensive to a capital-intensive sector. The costs of tractors, combines, and other

machinery now rival what entire family farms cost in the 1970s. The result has been a

consolidation of land ownership and a decline of the family farm as an economic model (with

diversified crop and commodity portfolios needed to balance risk against market fluctuations in

particular areas). The family farm is being replaced by larger mono-crop/commodity producers

that leverage economies of scale through automation and machinery with risk balanced by

government crop protections and other market guarantees.

The decline of the family farm and labor intensive agriculture has had massive economic,

demographic, and social impacts on rural communities. The population decline in rural America

has accelerated with fewer, larger farms operated with capital intensive machinery. The result is

8 This last factor maybe increasing economic discontent in myriad other “service” occupations in which employers have converted salaried employees with benefits to “contract” employees who are classified as self-employed.

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a depopulation of small towns and their small independent businesses that supported farmers.

Rural America has become a landscape of idle silos, barns, houses, and storefronts. The rural

population is older since many of the children go off to college and larger communities in search

of jobs. Figure 2 shows the decline in the number of independent farms and the average farm

size during the Obama Administration years. The number of farms declined 117,500 or roughly

five percent of all farms that existed in 2008. That follows an extended period of decline from

an estimated 6.8 million farms at the peak in 1935. A combination of market forces,

technological advances, globalization, and government policies likely account for these declines.

The decline was particularly acute in dairy farming in the upper Midwest, where industry

consolidation has been rapid.9 The end result, however, is discontented and depressed rural

communities throughout much of America. As an illustration of the despair, the rate of suicides

among farmers as an occupational group is almost double that of the US general population.10

9 Federal agriculture policy affected the loss of dairy farms in the upper Midwest in two ways. One, federal dairy price guarantees increase in value for every 150 miles from the epi-center in Eau Claire, WI. Dairy farmers in New York, Florida, Texas, California, and even Hawaii get much higher price guarantees than do farmers in Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, Illinois and Michigan where the price guarantee is often below the cost of production. Two, federal subsidies for ethanol production from corn raised the price of corn considerably. Since corn production in centered in the same Midwestern states, production costs have risen for dairy farmers precisely where federal dairy subsidies are lowest. The result has been a dramatic reduction in the number of dairy farms in these states. 10 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/terezia-farkas/why-farmer-suicide-rates-_1_b_5610279.html

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Figure 2: Number of Farms and Average Farm Size 2008-2015.

Source: USDA report: Farms and Land in Farms 2015 Summary (February 2016), ISSN: 1995-2004: http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/current/FarmLandIn/FarmLandIn-02-18-2016.pdf The story of declining employment and wages in manufacturing follows a similar story

line. The absolute value of goods manufactured in the US, controlling for inflation, is actually

greater as Figure 3 shows. Manufacturing, as a percentage of the US GDP, has declined from

28.3% in 1953 to about 11% in 2011 as other economic sectors grew more (Thompson 2012).

Figure 3: Industrial Production Index, 1920 to (September) 2016

Source: US Federal Reserve. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/INDPRO

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Manufacturing labor, however, has declined (See Figure 4). According to US Federal

Reserve statistics, US Manufacturing employment in the US peaked in July of 1979 with

19,553,000 workers and declined to a 12,260,000 by September of 2016, a 38% decline in

employment. Unlike agriculture, which witnessed significant declines during the Obama years

after holding fairly steady during the Bush years, the loss of manufacturing declined over 28%

since 2001 to 2010 before rebounding slightly. This may well be that there is much economic

discontent in states like Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania where manufacturing job

losses have been particularly acute. Further, this dissatisfaction is probably directed at

politicians of both political parties who advocated free trade—something which Donald Trump

capitalized in the nomination and general election campaigns. During both campaigns, Trump

used protectionist rhetoric, railed against unfair trade practices by China, and promised to

renegotiate NAFTA and deport illegal immigrants who were stealing jobs. Trump’s economic

nationalism blends with nativism for a particularly potent appeal to white working class voters

who have been trending toward the Republican Party since the election of 1980.11

Figure 4: Employment in manufacturing, 1938 to 2016

Source: US Federal Reserve: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MANEMP 11 The movement of white working class voters from the Democratic to the Republican Party began with “Reagan Democrats” in the 1980 election and has continued almost linearly to 2016, interrupted only by the strong appeal of Bill Clinton in 1992 and 1996.

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The right-wing populist rhetoric of Trump and others like Sarah Palin implies or asserts

jobs have gone abroad because politicians are rigging the system against US manufacturing with

unfair trade agreements. Trump, for example, claimed that the US was giving other countries a

better deal than American workers were getting. Although Trump’s rhetoric is contradicted by

studies, his argument appears to have resonated greatly in communities adversely affected by

global competition, free trade agreements, and China’s membership in the World Trade

Organization (Rothwell and Rosell, 2016). The one piece of evidence that Trump could point to

is circumstantial—the decline in job losses has been significant since 2001 when China gained

greater access to the American market when it joined the World Trade Organization. This is

likely a partially spurious result, since there has been a widening gap between growth in jobs and

productivity across economic sectors since 2000.12 Various studies have found that far more

jobs have been lost to automation and technology that increased productivity per labor hour than

have been lost to offshore relocation of production. “Almost 88 percent of job losses in

manufacturing in recent years can be attributed to productivity growth, and the long-term

changes to manufacturing employment are mostly linked to the productivity of American

factories.” … while net imports have “contributed to roughly 13% of job losses in the U.S. over

the last decade.” (Hicks and Devaraj, 2015, p. 6-7).

Productivity gains from technology also have reduced jobs in accounting and other

“middle class” occupations that involve highly repetitious activity (occupations with irregular

activity are less susceptible to this pressure). Of course, technology creates jobs, but the new

jobs are not going to the same people who are losing their jobs, a factor that contributes to the

growing economic inequity along geographic and educational lines. This social dynamic may be

12 https://www.technologyreview.com/s/515926/how-technology-is-destroying-jobs/

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contributing to the growing divide between people in areas of the country with low educations

and declining job opportunities and urban areas with more diversified economies and a higher

proportion of college-educated people.

Employment and wages have stagnated in part due to greater competition in a more

globalized world, which is a function of the reduction of barriers to trade and financial flows and

advances in transportation and communications technology. Some jobs have been lost to

offshoring production, but there are other indirect effects on employment and wages. The

greater mobility of capital and knowledge/technology relative to labor enables corporations to

replace workers with technology, relocate production, or threaten relocation to extract wage

concessions. The concomitant decline of labor unions has further reduced the collective ability

of labor to resist these wage pressures. Immigration also has changed the employment

landscape, increasing the supply of both skilled and unskilled labor and helping to reduce the

costs of production. But these are secondary forces compared to automation. But empirical

reality need not drive political perceptions and decisions (e.g., Sharot, Korn and Dolan, 2011;

Bolsen, Druckman and Lomax Cook, 2014). What matters is that large numbers of working

class people think foreign competition and offshoring of production are costing them jobs. One

of the challenges of right-wing populism is that its anti-elitism extends to “experts” and

academics, making it harder to educate people and get them to change their beliefs about the

relationship between globalization and jobs and wages.

Another sector which has experienced tremendous changes in labor and wages is the

energy sector where there have been winners and losers. The winners have been primarily in

natural gas and oil production (primarily in areas of the country using fracking to release small

deposits of natural gas and oil such as North Dakota, Montana, Oklahoma, and Texas). Coal

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production has declined greatly, particularly in the Eastern half of the United States which has

vast reserves of high sulfur-content, bituminous coal. Production of bituminous coal has

decreased for two reasons. One, the increased production of cheaper natural gas has put the coal

industry at a competitive price disadvantage in the production of electricity. Two, environmental

regulations, implemented to reduce greenhouse gasses, have raised the costs and reduced the

market for bituminous coal. The impact has been dramatic and rapid. An estimated 191,000

coal mining jobs were lost between 2014 and mid-2016, primarily in the Appalachian Mountain

region crossing Kentucky, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. The coal mining

industry has lost 45% of the jobs that existed in 1981. These job losses are geographically

concentrated, devastating entire communities where coal mining was the sole economic engine.

The lack of a diversified economy is particularly important because the end of an industry means

economic decline in these areas without realistic opportunities to find another job.

Economic discontent is not limited to these economic sectors. Another major economic

transformation has occurred in the structure of labor compensation that has reduced wages for

millions of employees in white collar occupations. Corporations have moved from hourly wages

with overtime compensation in the 1970s and 1980s, to salaries without overtime compensation

in the 1990s, and over the last fifteen years to more “1099” contract employment which typically

lack long term salary assurances or health and retirement benefits.13 Katz and Krueger (2016)

estimate that by late 2015, 15% of the US workforce was working in these alternative work

arrangements that do not provide benefits. Overall, fewer Americans are finding economic

security even when they are employed, and more of those who are employed are experiencing

stagnating or declining wages and benefits. Thus economic decline extends beyond rural

13 The 1099 economy refers to IRS Form 1099 which are given to contract employees who are hired, on demand, for specific tasks.

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America, Appalachia, and small towns and cities that have lost the factories that were the

economic engine of the community.

While employment and wages have stagnated for millions of people, most of the gains

from growing productivity have gone to corporate management and ownership in the form of

increasing compensation, dividends, and stock valuation. Not everyone has lost out in the new

economy. Employment and wage growth have occurred in the economic sectors of technology,

finance, and other services that leverage knowledge and technology. Employment in these

sectors typically require a college degree. Since the 1970s, there has been a growing income gap

between workers with a high school education or less and those gaining a college degree. That

has cultural and social ramifications that transcend the economic impacts of these

transformations. Lower education, working class people are losing jobs, their communities, and

their “way of life.”

Further, there is a geographic distribution of economic losers and economic winners may

well be feeding the large urban – rural divide. Small cities and the small towns of rural areas

have been hit hardest by the declines in agriculture, manufacturing, and mining. While urban

areas have lost a larger absolute number of manufacturing jobs, most large urban areas have

more diversified economies so that employment losses in one sector can be offset by gains in

other areas. Workers losing jobs in urban area like Chicago can participate in worker retraining

and education programs with a reasonable expectation of finding a job within or near their

community. Education and job retraining programs do not help coal miners in Appalachia,

factory workers in Beloit, Wisconsin, or the farmer whose small family farm operation is no

longer economically viable in capital intensive agricultural production. Companies in the

technology, finance, and other knowledge industries generally are not locating their offices the

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areas that are losing jobs. They are locating in large urban areas, primarily on the East and West

Coasts and in a few cities in between. People losing jobs in rural areas and small cities have to

relocate to obtain employment. While older populations often remain, younger generations tend

to move in search of jobs—resulting in older and impoverished population living in rural areas

and small cities that have lost their primary economic engine. As such, the losses are devastating

not only to workers in these areas, but to their entire communities. Interestingly, it is the

community that may be more consequential unit of analysis for measuring economic discontent

compared to individual pocketbook voting. Rothwell and Rosell (2016) find that it is self-

employed people who are relatively better off than others in their community who were drawn to

Trump during first half of 2016. The economic condition of the local community is a significant

predictor of Trump’s support in the daily Gallup tracking polls.

These socioeconomic and geographic changes in American society have coincided with

considerable demographic changes that have political effects (e.g., Cohn and Caumont, 2016;

Holbrook, 2016). These changes matter because demographic change and immigration has been

shown to produce a substantial cultural backlash even in Northern European countries that have

progressive political traditions (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Clearly, most of the attention has

been given to immigration, particularly of Hispanics and Middle Eastern Muslims who are more

visible by skin tone, language, and cultural differences. Hispanic immigration increased

substantially since 1991 before leveling off during the Obama years, but the geographic footprint

of the Hispanic population expanded to almost all parts of the United States including rural

America.14 It does not seem to matter for many that Mexican unauthorized immigration has

14 http://www.nytimes.com/projects/census/2010/map.html

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declined since 2009 according to the PEW Research Center.15 Interestingly, people who live in

communities with a growing Hispanic population were not more supportive of Trump; rather it is

people who live in homogenous white communities that were more supportive of Trump

(Rothwell, 2016).

Polling has shown that racial antagonism has been rising in battle ground states since the

election of Barack Obama (Belcher, 2016; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). The reaction,

particularly among whites in battle ground states, combined with growing diversity of the

population has produced a considerable increase in racial antagonism and cultural backlash. This

racial antagonism is reflected in the growth of hate groups, which has been rising steadily from

1999 to 2012 before declining somewhat (see Figure 5). According to the Southern Poverty Law

Center (SPLC), anti-middle Eastern/Muslim sentiment accounts for a large part of the rise of

hate groups after 9/11. This aggregate trend masks some differences, with a recent decline in the

number of white supremacy and Neo-Nazi groups but an increase in the number of KKK (from

72 to 190) and Neo-Confederate groups. The SPLC attributes the growth of KKK and Neo-

Confederate groups to the pro-Confederate battle flag rallies that took place after South Carolina

took down the battle flag from its Capitol grounds following the June massacre of nine black

churchgoers by a white supremacist flag enthusiast in Charleston. Racial antagonisms go both

ways, as there has been an increase of black separatist groups from 113 in 2014 to 180 in 2015,

growing in response to the killing of unarmed black men by police officers (Southern Poverty

Law Center, 2016). The antipathy among large numbers of white voters toward diversity and

cultural inclusivity has grown over the past two decades in response to the diversifying

population, the presidency of Barack Obama, and events that have heightened racial tensions.

15 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/31/10-demographic-trends-that-are-shaping-the-u-s-and-the-world/

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The result is a more racially polarized electorate than in many years, if ever. Iyengar and

Westwood (2015) find that the psychological effects of partisanship are as great as that of race in

dividing American society.

Figure 5: Growth in the number of hate groups, as defined by the Southern Poverty Law Center

Source: https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2016/year-hate-and-extremism. The SPLC categorizes hate groups as follows: Klu Klux Klan, white nationalist groups, neo-nazi, racist skin head groups, Christian identity groups, neo-confederate, black separatist groups, and general hate groups.

In addition to increased Hispanic, Middle Eastern Muslim, and Asian populations, a

couple of other demographic changes are relevant to understanding the rise of right-wing

populism in the US. Another fundamental change that has been occurring throughout the

country owes to internal migration. Thomas Holbrook (2016) has identified internal migration as

a factor that is impacting partisan patterns across states. Rural Southern states, upper-midwest

states, and high-plains states have witnessed a net migration out of these states as people move in

search of jobs or upon graduating college. Sunbelt states, West Coast states, Nevada,

Southeastern states have all witnessed substantial increases in migration from other states. These

migrations have potential to change the complexion of political parties in states—potentially

moderating politics. However, there is a great deal of adaptation and assimilation that occurs as

people acclimate to the culture and politics of their new home. However, one aspect is

particularly important. The states that have experienced net declines in population have moved

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toward the Republican Party, while those gaining population have been moving more toward the

Democratic Party. Migratory patterns across states largely reflects economic opportunities, and

the states that are losing population are, as a result, older, less-educated, more white, and more

traditional in their cultural values. These demographic changes likely contributed to the rise of

populist sentiment in these states.

These trends have been abetted by the political world by both political parties. On the

Republican side, the Reagan era transformation of the Republican Party’s fiscal policy from neo-

liberalism to supply-side economics has played a role, though secondary to economic trends, in

the growing economic inequities in America. The dominant economic theory of the Republican

Party is no longer neo-liberal economics, but rather it has become the Republican variation of

supply-side economics, which has at its theoretical core, the reduction of the costs of production

(supply) to lessen prices and thus increase both production and consumption. It has been

successful in reducing real prices in a great number of areas including technology, transportation,

food, textiles, and other consumer goods. The pillars of supply-side economics overlap with

neoliberal economics in several areas: low inflation monetary policy (which benefits investors),

free trade, deregulation of production and finance, low taxes, and anti-union policies to give

producers greater flexibility in labor. The US government has played roles in supporting these

transformations—pursuing free trade agreements; deregulating financial, transportation, and

manufacturing processes (prior to Obama, see below); and reducing taxes on high income

earners and lowering taxes on wealth (by cutting the top rates of a progressive income tax

structure, capital gains, and estate taxes) (Steger 2016a). While cutting taxes that impacted the

wealthiest segments of the population, the Federal government sought to cover the growing costs

of the main social safety net in the United States (i.e, Social Security and Medicare) by a

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dramatic increase in payroll taxes in 1983. The result of these tax policies were to: 1) make

federal revenues less dependent on income and investment taxes and more dependent on payroll

(labor taxes), and 2) shift the burden of federal spending from the rich to the middle class which

saw tax bills grown considerably (mainly because of the increase from 4% to 7.65 percent;

doubled for individuals paying the Federal Self-Employment tax). At the same time, there has

been concerted efforts to reduce welfare safety-nets, raising retirement ages (1983), restricting

various welfare programs (1996), and efforts to narrow the eligibility for food stamps and other

direct payments (early 2000s). At the presidential level since 1932, both political parties have

nominated candidates who have been defenders if not promoters of free trade. Free-trade thus is

a source of resentment against some of the elites in both political parties. Donald Trump is the

first presidential candidate since 1928 to be nominated and elected on anti-free trade pledges (his

various rhetorical promises probably do not rise to the level of concreteness to be called a policy

platform). That gave Trump a great deal of cross-over appeal to working class voters who

increasingly have identified as Republicans and those remaining as Democratic-leaners.

A final note on context must include reference to the Obama Administration’s use of

regulatory policy to attain a variety of policy goals, particularly in regard to the environment and

the financial industries. Growing federal regulations have been a driver of antipathy toward the

federal government, particularly among Republicans. The Obama Administration vigorously

pursued administrative regulation of the environmental impacts of agriculture, manufacturing,

transportation, and energy production. Environmental regulations, in particular, are politically

problematic because they have an imbalanced distribution of costs and benefits. The benefits of

a cleaner environment and a reduction in the pace of global warming are diffuse, benefitting

hundreds of millions of people, while the costs are borne almost entirely by those in the

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regulated industries--coal mining most notably, but also agriculture, energy, and manufacturing

production in older facilities that do not meet new environmental standards. Federal regulations

of environment, finance, labor, transportation, and trade have raised costs of production and

greatly increased costs of compliance in companies. The trend toward greater regulation

preceded Obama, but increased during his administration as legislative options for attaining

policy goals were choked off by Republican gains in Congress (See Figure 6).

Figure 6: Expansion of the Federal Regulations, 1975-2015.

Source: George Washington University Center for Regulatory Studies. https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/reg-stats The total number of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations is often used as a proxy measure of the number of federal regulations.

Given that Obama implemented numerous regulations through administrative strategies

without the approval of Congress, Obama became the focus of intense anger among farmers,

miners, small business owners, real estate, and the financial industry. More generally,

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Republicans have vigorously criticized the expansion of federal regulations during the Obama

years, while being more subdued in their criticisms during the Bush years despite growing

regulation during that Administration. The expansion of federal regulation has not been popular

among the general public (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Perceptions of Federal Regulations, 2014.

Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/176015/few-americans-gov-regulation-business.aspx

The degree of dissatisfaction with federal regulations, however, has a very strong partisan

bias. Anti-regulatory attitudes are very strong among self-identified Republicans and

Republican-leaners (see Figure 8). Republican opposition to federal regulations of business and

industry have increased from 47% in 2007 (last year pre-recession) to 76% in 2014. Democrats,

by contrast, have shown greater support for federal regulations. As with perceptions of

economic conditions, these trends appear to be driven at least in part by partisan control of

government. Republicans, when they are out of power, use criticisms of federal regulatory

policy as a political weapon against Democrats and against Obama in particular. Thus,

Republicans are more upset about federal regulations during the Obama years than they were

during the Bush years; while Democrats have become more acceptant.

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Figure 8: Gallup Polls showing the partisan breakdown of views on Government Regulation.

Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/176015/few-americans-gov-regulation-business.aspx

As with race, the degree of extreme anti-government antagonism is reflected in the

growth of extremist groups like militias, anti-government groups, and others under the label of

“Patriot Groups.” These groups expanded considerably since 9/11 and the resulting growth of

federal government police authority under the Patriot Act, government surveillance, and the

extensive increase in federal regulations. But more than a reaction to actual events, the patterns

of growth among extremist patriot groups is highly linked to partisan control of government (see

Figure 9). The number of extremist, right wing patriot groups has been much higher when

Democrats have controlled the White House and Congress, and has declined considerably when

Republicans controlled Congress and especially the White House. The SPLC, which is

considered to be an authority on the number, memberships and activities of hate groups,

estimates that these figures under-estimate the size of the radical right because the rise of digital

media sites that are mainstreaming extremist anti-racial and anti-government sentiment.

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Figure 9: Growth in the number of anti-government patriot groups.

Source: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2016 Annual Report on Hate Groups. https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2016/year-hate-and-extremism

In sum, the matter of increasing economic inequality over the past 40 years is not just

about economic class, it also has social, cultural, geographic, and cultural dimensions that matter.

The economic patterns of the declining of agriculture, manufacturing, and mining and coinciding

rise of technology, finance, and knowledge services have produced different winners and losers.

The winners are disproportionately college-educated individuals located in urban areas that are

culturally and economically more diverse, especially urban areas more closely connected to the

global management of manufacturing, energy, finance, transportation and technology. The

losers have been less educated individuals living in rural areas, small cities with non-diversified

economies that depend(ed) on manufacturing, and the Appalachian region. Rural and small city

working class people (of all races and ethnicities) associated with the “blue collar” and farming

communities have experienced the greatest economic decline. These areas tend to be

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predominantly white, which will be a matter we will revisit below. The sense of decline and

despair, however, is not just economic but also has overlapping cultural, educational, and

racial/ethnic dimensions that cannot be ignored. Further, changing demographics with increased

immigration of Hispanics and Asians since 1990, along with the backlash to President Obama

and recent, polarizing violence between blacks and police or other white supremacists, have

contributed to a broader backlash among white Americans. This can be found in polling data on

racial antagonism (Belcher 2016) as well as the growth of extremist white identity and black

separatist groups (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2016). Rather than ushering in a new era of

post-racial politics, the election of Barack Obama in conjunction with an increasingly diverse

population, has increased racial polarization and antagonism.

Two Veins of Populism and the difficulty of taming the tigers

Populism itself has a lot of different meanings and uses, but the common thread is anti-

elite or anti-establishment sentiment (e.g., Girdron and Bonikowski 2013). Specific elements of

populist sentiment depend on the vein of populism operating in a place at a point in history.

In the United States, we are witnessing both left- and right-wing populism, which are

distinguished first by who or what constitutes the establishment at the locus of public antipathy.

The left-wing populist sentiment that motivated some of the support for Senator Bernie Sanders,

is primarily anti-establishment with respect to Wall Street, corporate managers, and the very rich

(i.e., one-percenters) who gained an outsized share of the economic growth that has occurred

since the 1970s. Left wing populists are highly concerned about economic inequality. Left-wing

populists are also angry, on a secondary level, at the “establishment” that serves the interests and

priorities of these economic elites. Left wing populists essentially view the political

establishment as tools of Wall Street and Corporate America. This was a central criticism of

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Hillary Clinton by Sanders and the various blogs and digital media that supported his brand of

politics. Oligarchy is a common theme in left-wing populist discourse on digital media.

The left-wing populism of Bernie Sanders fused progressive economic policy ideas,

cultural inclusivity, and anti-establishment rhetoric targeting Wall Street and their “enablers” in

the Democratic Party. Leftwing populism is not exactly a socialist alignment along class lines,

pitting the poor against the rich. Leftwing populist activists are largely young, white, urban,

and/or college educated/ing. These populists are socially and culturally liberal, frequently

urbanites who aspire for economic and social justice for historically disadvantaged groups

including people of color, immigrants, women and LGBTQ populations. This cosmopolitan

dimension of leftwing populism is the opposite of the cultural orientation of right wing populism.

Left-wing populism thus fuses a socialistic economic orientation with cultural inclusivity and

anti-establishment sentiments. It is the anti-establishment element, however, that distinguishes

left-wing populists from liberals or progressives.

Right-wing populists are anti-establishment primarily with respect to government

officials and bureaucrats, and secondarily with respect to Wall Street and corporate management

though not necessarily to the very rich who constitute the one-percent. Donald Trump, for

example, repeatedly attacked the government but he also criticized both Democrats and

Republicans for being tools of Wall Street (this was before he turned to Goldman Sachs for

several appointees). A common framing of the problem is “crony-capitalism.” Right wing

politicians like Sarah Palin and Donald Trump blame government for “rigging the system” in

ways that disadvantage working class Americans in favor of “special interests” and in favor of

the “undeserving” poor, minorities, and immigrants at their expense. Trump’s promise to “drain

the swamp” is a reference to the cozy relationships between lobbyists and policy makers, and

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system in which politicians who promote certain policies are rewarded by allied, moneyed

interests. His claim to be a billionaire businessman was a claim to credibility as an outsider who

was not beholden to special interests and the wealthy donor class.

The right-wing populism of Trump fused economic nationalism, cultural exclusivity and

nativism, and anti-establishment rhetoric. Trump’s right-wing populism deviates more from the

smaller government/lower taxes economic conservatism and the social conservatism of the

Republican Party, than Sander’s left-wing populism deviates from the progressive economic

orientation of the Democratic Party. His brand of right-wing populism is more than just anti-

establishment conservatism, which is why Trump’s populism is potentially more disruptive to

political party cleavages and coalitions than is Sanders. It is also why various commentators

likened Trump’s campaign to a hostile takeover of the Republican Party (Lizza 2016). Trump is

about change, which applies to the Republican Party as well as to Washington DC.

Trump’s economic populism is anchored in conservative economic philosophy in some

respects but deviates in other respects as it promotes a nativist and economic nationalist

approach. Trump adopted the lower taxes and especially the less federal government regulation

positions of conservatives, but he deviated from long-standing Republican positions by

expressing support for Social Security, Medicare, and promising a massive infrastructure

reconstruction program to create jobs. Trump essentially accepts big government programs for

“deserving people” which refers to working people who have paid Social Security and Medicare

taxes, and explicitly excludes welfare recipients and immigrants. His economic populism in this

regard should not be seen as containing elements of progressive economic policy, as much as it

should be recognized as nativism, limiting government services to “real Americans." It is fully

as much a cultural statement as it is a fiscal policy philosophy.

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Trump’s economic nationalism differs from conservative fealty to the free market.

Economic nationalism fuses an economic strategy with the emotional affect of patriotism, which

ties in with the nativism displayed in his fiscal policy philosophy. The economic strategy

deviates considerably from the free market and free trade principles of the neo-liberal economic

thought, offering instead a mix of policies that prioritize American producers and thus labor.

Trump vigorously attacked free trade agreements and promised to bring mining and

manufacturing jobs back to America. Trump’s economic nationalism is embodied in his frequent

comments about American jobs, promises to renegotiate free trade agreements (NAFTA), end

the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, and his comments about reducing the American

commitment to NATO. He routinely attacked China for unfair monetary and trade policies that

gave China access to American markets without reciprocating sufficiently.

While adopting the anti-abortion, law and order, and gun ownership positions of social

conservatives, Trump also deviated from social conservatism by expressing support for gay

marriage. For the most part, however, Trump’s rightwing populism is aligned with cultural or

social conservatives. He framed cultural liberals as anti-white by attacking “political

correctness.”16 This appeal, in particular Rightwing populists are also hostile to liberal

academics who are seen as promoting values that undermine the “American way of life.” The

culturally inclusive element of left-wing populism that holds “diversity” in esteem is an

anathema to right wing populists. The darker side of right-wing populism is its elements of

white nationalism that are inherently threatening to political minorities defined along ethnic,

16 Political correctness emerged in the late 1980s as a movement that promotes avoidance of expression or actions that are perceived to exclude, marginalize, or insult groups of people who are socially disadvantaged or discriminated against. In this respect, it promotes cultural inclusivity and diversity. From the right-wing populist perspective, political correctness is an effort to censor freedom and suppress traditional social values and social relationships (which includes implicit social hierarchies along gender and racial lines).

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religious, and racial lines. He proposed building a wall along the Mexican border, deporting

illegal immigrants, and banning Muslim immigrants. With respect to the wall and deportation of

illegal immigrants, Trump basically adopted the right-wing populism that Patrick Buchanan ran

on in the 1992 and 1996 Republican presidential nominations. Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric

goes beyond economics, to promoting a cultural nativism that holds white working and middle

class people in a privileged position, by denying legitimacy and government services to “others”

who were identified as “those people” living on welfare, immigrants, and Muslims.

The cultural exclusivity has its most recent proponent in Pat Buchanan’s presidential

campaigns of 1992 and 1996. Buchanan’s speech at the 1992 Republican convention mentioned

a “culture war,” which was a very similar meaning and content to the NAZI slogan of Kulture

Krieg in the 1928 and 1932 elections in Germany. Trump borrowed Pat Buchanan’s promise to

build a wall along the Mexican border. Trump did not go so far as then California Governor Pete

Wilson’s explicit promise to deny public services such as healthcare and education to non-

citizens, but Trump’s pledges to limit such services to deserving people is pretty similar in the

end effect. As with Buchanan, white supremacists were strongly supportive of Trump though

mostly operating under the rebranded label of the Alt Right. The overtness of the white

nationalist sentiments is visible in the reaction to the Black Lives Matter movement, which was

spawned by police killings of unarmed black men. Black Lives Matter provoked a strong,

negative reaction among white working class and others who rallied under the banner of “Blue

Lives Matter” and “All Lives Matter.” The backlash appears to have been particularly strong

among police and the military, but also was promoted by Trump’s calls for law and order.

The cultural exclusivity dimension of Trump’s populist reach is embodied in the idea of

“real America,” a concept that has percolated in Republican political discourse for over a decade

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and made famous by Sarah Palin in the 2008 presidential election campaign. Real America

embodies a nostalgic vision of America in a simpler, more prosperous era of middle class wages

gained with a high school education through manual labor or ownership of a small business,

traditional families with male role models at the head, local communities centered around

churches, and a time when concepts like diversity, sexual orientation where not even an

afterthought. Real America is small town and blue collar traditionalism. The idea of “real

America” gained currency in the 2008 Republican presidential campaign when Vice Presidential

candidate, Sarah Palin used the term frequently. Numerous Tea Party candidates also adopted

the slogan in 2010, 2012 and 2014 congressional elections. This cultural exclusivity is in a sense

white-working class identity politics. It is foremost seen in anti-immigrant sentiment, but that

thread is found throughout his economic and fiscal policy ideas. Trumps’ economic nationalism

and nativism/cultural exclusivity is most explicitly the aspects of rightwing populism that mesh

with the authoritarian dimension advanced by Hetherington and Weiler (2009).

Populist Coalition Merchants vs. the Establishment

The political class, including politicians, candidates, journalists, commentators, and

digital media purveyors, provide ideas, arguments, and mechanisms for giving direction and

voice to mass numbers of sympathetic grass-roots activists who organize locally as best they can

in coordination with the national direction. Grass roots sentiments such as populism do not form

a movement without organization and direction. Individuals do not necessarily move in a

common direction without some form of coordination. What we know is that there is a lot of

discontent about economics and divisions over the growing diversity of the country. That

discontent, however, exists as a necessary but not sufficient condition for populism to flourish

politically. David Karol (2009) uses the term, coalition merchants to refer to the politicians,

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group leaders, commentators, and other activists who assemble individuals and groups into a

viable coalition to given them direction and purpose (See also, Bawn et al. 2013). These elites

communicate with each other and to large numbers of individuals who are followers or at least

sympathetic toward the ideas and arguments being put forth.

For populist movements, that leadership typically takes the form of the charismatic

leader. Politicians like Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders (on the left) and Pat Buchanan,

Sarah Palin, and Donald Trump provide a “leadership” for populists that enables the

establishment of a movement. What is new in the 21st century, is the ability of other groups and

activists to communicate with large numbers of people through digital media (aka blogs) and

social media. There are a variety of left-wing and right-wing digital media that were highly

supportive of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, respectively. The audiences of these media in

turn shared stories on social media, expanding the reach of these insurgent campaigns without

interacting with journalists of national print and broadcast media. In addition, there are political

commentators who appear on various cable TV and radio programs and who churn out books

that appeal to conservative audiences. Leading right wing commentators include Sean Hannity,

Mark Levin, Laura Ingraham, Glenn Beck, Ben Shapiro, Ann Coulter, and (a fading) Rush

Limbaugh. These spokespeople for anti-government conservatives were sympathetic at worst

and outright promoters of Donald Trump and his populist messages. In doing so, they helped

give shape and direction to millions of angry Republicans and Republican leaners.

Instead of raising money to pay for TV ads, Trump relied on social media and exposure

on digital and TV news media. Right wing, anti-establishment digital media have grown and in

2015 through 2016, were strongly supportive of Trump (e.g., Breitbart.com, The Blaze, The

Daily Caller, RedState, and Infowars). Trump also used Twitter to incredible effect, steadily

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growing his number of followers to over 12 million by election day.17 In using alternate and

social media, Trump largely bypassed the national print and broadcast news programs (even

attacking FOX news). What was potent about Trump’s approach to getting attention is that he

still got coverage and exposure, without subjecting him to the tougher questions that journalists

at national media outlets pride themselves. Trump gained massive exposure on social media and

digital and TV news media—more than what his support in national polls would have

predicted.18 Trump received 34% of all news coverage devoted to the top six candidates on eight

national news outlets, compared to Bush (18%), Rubio (14%), Carson (14%), Cruz (13%),

Kasich (7%) (Patterson 2016). Trump’s coverage in these traditional media also was more

positive in tone and remained more positive than negative until he locked up the nomination in

May.19 Trump thus used an unorthodox strategy of speaking directly to voters through social

media, with his views endorsed and supported in right-wing anti-government digital media, and

covered extensively and favorably in the traditional national media. In doing so, Trump

established himself—more than other candidates seeking to run as anti-establishment heroes like

Senator Ted Cruz and NJ Governor Chris Christy, as the leading figure in a populist movement.

He was communicating and asking people who often vote Republican in general elections to vote

for him in the nominating election.

There may be very little that party elites and other public opinion leaders can do to reign

in populism. People who are angry with the party establishments will not follow the lead of

party elites, limiting the efficacy of elite-level messaging in opposing candidates who would take

advantage of populist sentiment to advance their own candidacies. This aspect of the populist

17 https://www.socialbakers.com/statistics/twitter/profiles/detail/25073877-realdonaldtrump 18 Candidates’ share of TV news coverage corresponds closely to their support in national polls (Steger, 2002). 19 See Thomas Patterson’s analysis of news coverage of the candidates at http://scholar.harvard.edu/thomaspatterson/home.

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movements leaves political party elites with few means to avoid candidates whose nomination

could potentially redefine the political party coalitions and policies. Both the Sanders and

Trump campaigns drew support from populist elements in their respective parties, potentially

disrupting existing nominating coalitions with policy appeals that deviate from party orthodoxy

(Steger 2016b).

The nomination campaign: the hostile take over succeeds

Though unlikely, the contemporary nomination process makes possible the selection of a

candidate whose policy positions deviate from established political party principles. Since 1972,

both political parties have empowered party voters to express their preferences in caucuses and

primaries. This process opened the door for outsider candidates to compete for the nomination

(Kirkpatrick 1978; Polsby 1983). Outsider candidates usually do not win (e.g., Cohen, Karol,

Noel and Zaller 2008), but the conditions were ripe for such an occurrence in 2016 (Steger

2016b).

The dominant view of presidential nominations is what is called the Party Decides thesis

in which party insiders and group leaders coordinate among themselves through signals and

conversations as to which candidate should be the nominee; and then they rally behind that

candidate early in the campaign in order to create an uneven playing field that benefits the

party’s preferred candidate (Cohen et al 2008). But, there are two patterns of presidential

nomination campaigns—one in which party insiders engage in the process and unify behind a

candidate (such as the 2000 Democratic and Republican presidential nominations or Hillary

Clinton’s 2016 Democratic nomination), or races in which party insiders stay undecided or

divided in their support as happened in the 2016 Republican presidential nomination (Steger,

2015, 2016b). Political party insiders unify sooner and extensively when, the party coalition is

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stable and there is a candidate in the race who has demonstrable national support. Party elites

remain on the sidelines when the party is divided (Steger 2015) or when there is uncertainty

about the popular appeal of candidates (Anderson 2013; Ryan 2011; Steger 2015; Whitby 2014).

In 2016, Republican elites lacked both conditions for weighing in on their presidential

nomination. First, there was no early favorite in the race which contributed to a large field of

candidates since more potential candidates thought they could win in these circumstances

(Adkins, et al 2015; Steger 2015, ch. 8). Second, the Republican Party is deeply divided and a

substantial portion of the party’s nomination voters were angry with the party’s national leaders.

This anti-establishment sentiment benefitted an “outsider” candidate and starkly disadvantaged

experienced politicians like former FL Governor Jeb Bush. While several candidates, including

Governor Chris Christy and Senator Ted Cruz, sought to become the “outsider” candidate who

would take on the establishment, Donald Trump succeeded in attracting more attention than

other candidates, knocking down rivals, and drawing support from across the factions of the

Republican Party. He slowly gained momentum as other candidates withdrew from the race

(Steger, forthcoming). Republican Party elites were unable to stop Trump. They were divided

about an alternative to Trump, they faced an angry electorate, and they had attacked the “liberal

media” for so long that even conservative criticisms of Donald Trump were ignored or

discounted by many Republican voters.

Recent Republican presidential nominations have exhibited four factions with differing

preferences for candidates and policy—a declining faction of moderates, a large faction of

somewhat conservatives, and very conservatives who further divide into religious and secular

branches (Olsen and Scala 2016). These divisions make it very difficult for a particular

candidate to unify all of these factions. Previous Republican nominees like John McCain and

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Mitt Romney struggled to get support of one or more of these factions (Olsen and Scala, 2016).

But that very disunity and the lack of a clear front-runner in national polls also made it very

difficult for party elites to figure out which of the candidates would resonate with Republican

voters and who they should back. Instead of backing a candidate, the Republican insiders stayed

on the sidelines until it was too late (Steger, 2016b).

Another cleavage exists that crosses these preferential groupings is the split between the

Tea Party movement and “Establishment” Republicans (Skocpol and Williams, 2012).20 The

Tea Party movement, which began after the 2008 bailout of large banks and the election of

Barack Obama, challenged “establishment” Republicans who held moderate positions or

compromised with Barack Obama. The Tea Party movement pushed Republican candidates and

elected officials to adopt more conservative policy positions (Mann and Ornstein, 2012). By

2016, the Tea Party movement had faded as an organized political force, but the underlying

sentiments remained in the form of strong anti-establishment attitudes. A PEW Research Center

survey found that 42% of politically engaged Republicans were “angry with government.”21 In

the same survey, 89% of Republican identifiers and leaners responded that they “can seldom, if

ever, trust the federal government,” and 75% agreed that government needs “major reform.”

These attitudes made it tough to be an “establishment candidate” like Jeb Bush who was

the candidate most associated with the establishment wing of the party. Other candidates sought,

to varying degrees to establish themselves with one or more of the preferential groupings

20 Skocpol and Williams identify three distinct components of the Tea Party movement—thousands of grass roots, local organizations, supportive commentators providing cheerleading and direction through print, digital and broadcast media; and multimillionaire/billionaire financing of groups and candidates. It is the grassroots and media components that are most aligned with the populism of Donald Trump. 21 Pew Research Center, November, 2015, “Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government,” p. 9; see also, March, 2016, “Campaign Exposes Fissures Over Issues, Values and How Life Has Changed in the U.S.,” and July, 2016, “2016 Campaign: Strong Interest, Widespread Dissatisfaction.”

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identified by Olsen and Scala or with the anti-establishment Republicans forming the populist

wing of the party. John Kasich was viewed favorably by moderates, but there are too few of

them to win a nomination. Chris Christie and Rand Paul sought the support of secular

conservatives, while Ben Carson and Ted Cruz sought support from religious conservatives.

Marco Rubio offered himself as a candidate with cross-over appeal to somewhat and very

conservative Republicans. Of the governors and senators, Ted Cruz most directly courted the

support of Tea Party Republicans. No candidate, however, was more effective in attracting

support from Republicans who wanted an anti-establishment candidate. Moreover, exit polls

from the caucuses and primaries show that Trump’s support crossed all four of the

ideological/political factions of the Republican Party identified by Olsen and Scala.

Perhaps the most stunning aspect of the Exit Polls conducted for the Republican caucuses

and primaries was the inclusion, for the first time, of a question that asked, “Do you feel betrayed

by Republican politicians in Washington?” The very act of asking the question is a powerful

recognition of the antipathy of rank-and-file Republicans toward their own party leaders. Across

28 states in which this question was asked, over 53% of Republican respondents, agreed that

they felt betrayed by Republican Party leaders. Interestingly Trump gained about as much

support among those who felt betrayed as he did among those who did not feel betrayed by their

party’s leaders. Ted Cruz polled second among the disaffected Republicans.

Table 1: Percent of Respondents in 2016 Republican Caucus and Primary Exit Polls that Feel Betrayed by Republican Politicians in Washington. Average percent of all

respondents identifying Average percent of

respondents voting for Trump

Not Betrayed 42.5% 44.4%Betrayed by Republican politicians 53.3% 43.1%

Source: CNN Exit Polls. Note that exit polls are from 28 states.

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Another question asked in the exit polls, however, does indicate that anti-establishment

sentiment among Republican caucus and primary voters was key to Trump’s support in the

caucuses and primaries (See Table 2). In the 28 states in which exit polls were conducted,

almost 54% of Republican voters preferred a candidate who was “outside the establishment.”

Further, Trump won over 65% of the votes from these anti-establishment Republicans. Of the

40% of Republican voters who preferred a candidate with experience in politics, Trump won the

support of only 8.3%. Trump’s support was relatively even across the four ideological wings of

the party identified by Olsen and Scala (2016). For example, Trump did better than other

candidates among moderates in states like Iowa and New Hampshire, religious conservatives in

South Carolina, secular conservatives in New York, and somewhat conservatives in most states.

Every one of the other Republican candidates drew support from one of these ideological niches,

which helps explain why they could not gain the pluralities across states that Trump did.

Table 2: Percent of Respondents in 2016 Republican Caucus and Primary Exit Polls that Agree that: “The next president should be experienced in politics” or “from outside the establishment” Average percent of all

respondents identifying Average percent of

respondents voting for Trump

Experience in politics 40.0% 8.3%Outside the establishment 53.6% 65.1%

Source: CNN Exit Polls. Note that exit polls are from 28 states. The candidates were also influenced by Trump’s penchant for “telling it like it is.” This

is an irony which befuddles most liberal observers because of Trump’s indifference to factual

accuracy. What this indicates is that Trump said the things that Republican rank-and-file voters

think and what they wanted to hear. Among the 20% of Republican voters who found this

candidate characteristic most important, a whopping 77% said they voted for Trump. Trump

also won a majority of the 31% of Republican voters who said they wanted someone who could

bring change as their most important candidate characteristic (See Table 3). Trump did much

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less well among “values voters” who tend to be religious conservatives who prioritize family

values and social conservatism. This was the candidate characteristic with identified by a

plurality of Republican caucus and primary voters, and Trump received only 15% of their

support. This is the one category of voters that Ted Cruz edged out Donald Trump. Voters who

preferred a candidate who can win tended to divide their support among Marco Rubio and

Donald Trump in the early nominating elections, but Trump’s support grew among these voters

as the primary season progressed and Trump’s momentum grew.

Table 3: Most important candidate characteristic Identified by Respondents in 2016 Republican Caucus and Primary Exit Polls Average percent of

Respondents IdentifyingAverage percent of issue respondents voting for

TrumpCandidate can win 13.0% 35.0%Candidate shares my values 34.5% 15.2%Candidate tells it like it is 20.0% 77.2%Candidate can bring change 31.2% 51.6%

Source: CNN Exit Polls. Note that respondents were constrained to select from four options, and exit polls are from 28 states. Populism or Authoritarianism or Both

Building on Stenner (2005) and Hetherington and Weiler (2009), Matthew MacWilliams

(2016) has argued that authoritarian voters in the Republican Party fueled Trump’s nomination.

MacWilliams built on research showing that citizens with authoritarian voters have been moving

to the Republican Party and that this sorting is contributing considerably to political polarization

in the American political party system (Hetherington and Weiler, 2009; Hetherington and Suhay,

2011). Voters who have authoritarian attitudes or dispositions value uniformity and social order.

These are voters who want a conventional society, law and order. They are deferential to

authority. They oppose Democratic Party emphasis on diversity, fear the “other.” They tend to

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see the world in black and white terms, good guys against bad guys, and us vs. them distinctions.

According to Hetherington and Weiler (2009), the authoritarian disposition is consistent across

time, and the non-authoritarians may act similarly when threatened as in terrorist threats after

9/11. Hetherington and Weiler (2009) make a strong case that the issue positions of the

Republican Party have led to movement of authoritarians to the Republican Party, such that most

Republicans hold authoritarian dispositions (or can be activated as such by threats (Hetherington

and Suhay 2011).

MacWilliams (2016) argued that terrorist attacks in Europe (France) and in San

Bernidino, California and others raised the salience of this attitudinal dimension in the 2016

Republican Presidential nomination, increasing the appeal of a “strong man” leader like Donald

Trump. Trump offered himself as the savior who could solve all manner of problems, including

the threat of terrorism.

While authoritarian disposition is an increasingly clear differentiator between Democratic

and Republican Party identifiers, it is less clear that it is the dominant factor influencing the

candidate preferences of Republican caucus and primary voters. When facing the choice

between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, it is very likely that voters with authoritarian

dispositions supported Trump far more than Clinton. It is less clear that these voters favored

Trump over other Republicans like Ted Cruz who also appealed to voters with an authoritarian

disposition. That is, Trump’s appeal to authoritarians was a factor, but not the factor that

differentiated Republican support for him compared to other Republican candidates.

Exit polls from 28 states holding caucuses or primaries offer additional evidence on this

hypothesis. It is clear that terrorism was an important concern to a large number of Republican

caucus and primary voters and that these voters identifying terrorism were more supportive on

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average than other candidates (see Table 4). Across these 28 states, 24.2% of respondents in

Republican exit polls identified terrorism as the most important problem facing the country

(when offered a constrained choice of four issues—immigration, the economy/jobs, terrorism,

and government spending). Of these voters, an average of 40.44% supported Trump in the

caucuses and primaries.

But, terrorism was not the most commonly identified “most important problem” (MIP).

Indeed, it ranked third among the four options given to Exit Poll respondents, behind the

economy/jobs (35.2%) and government spending (27.64%) but well above immigration (10.6%).

Nor did Trump do as well among voters concerned with “terrorism” as he did with voters

identifying immigration or the economy jobs. Among voters identifying one of these issues,

Trump received an average of 60.7% of the votes of people identifying immigration as the most

important issue; 42.5% of those identifying the economy/jobs, 40.4% of those identifying

terrorism, and 37.5% of those identifying government spending. The low percentage of

respondents identifying immigration is notable because this is another category on which

authoritarians might find Trump appealing because of Trump’s strong anti-immigration rhetoric.

Trump did very well among these voters, but it was a decidedly small percentage of the

Republican caucus and primary electorate.

Morever, concern with terrorism did not particularly distinguish Trump from the other

Republican candidates (until the candidate field was winnowed substantially). Trump’s main

issue appeal was immigration and the ban on Muslim immigration. Across the 28 states, Trump

had an average of a 37.1% vote advantage over the next closest candidate on immigration. He

had a much less notable advantage over other candidates on the other issues. Among voters

identifying the economy or jobs, Trump had an advantage of only 12.5% of the vote compared to

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the next highest candidate. Among voters identifying terrorism, Trump had an advantage of over

11.44% over the next highest supported candidate. Voters who were most concerned with

government spending did not particularly favor Trump—Trump had an average advantage of

only 4.54% of voters over the next best candidate in these states.

Table 4: Most Important Problem Identified by Respondents in 2016 Republican Caucus and Primary Exit Polls Average percent of

Respondents Identifying

Average percent of issue respondents voting for Trump

Trump vote advantage over next closest rival on issue

Immigration 10.6% 60.7% 37.1%Economy/Jobs 35.2% 42.5% 12.5%Terrorism 24.2% 40.4% 11.4%Gov. Spending 27.6% 37.5% 4.5%

Source: CNN Exit Polls. Note that respondents were constrained to select from four options, and exit polls are from 28 states. Even these figures over-estimate Trump’s appeal among voters most concerned with

terrorism (of these four issues). The nomination race was effectively over well before the end of

the five-month caucus and primary season. Trump effectively became the prohibitive favorite in

the delegate count after the March 15th primaries, when he won Florida (ending Rubio’s

campaign), Illinois, Missouri, North Carolina, and losing only Ohio to Ohio Governor John

Kasich (who did not win another state). In the exit polls for states holding caucuses or primaries

from February 1 through March 15, only 11% of Republican voters identified immigration as the

most important problem—a level that was generally consistent across states. Trump won 56.7%

of these voters in the early states with an advantage of 31.2% over his next closest rival. An

average of 33.5% of the voters in these early states identified the economy or jobs as the most

important issue, and of these voters, Trump won the support of 37.1% with an advantage of only

5.9% over his next closest rival (only marginally distinguishing Trump from the other

candidates). Terrorism ranked third among MIP concerns for these voters where an average of

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24.1% identified terrorism as the MIP, with 37.7% supporting trump—or an advantage of only

7.1% over his next closest rival. An average of 28.4% of these early state voters identified

government spending as the most important issue, and Trump won only 32.3% of these voters—

running 2.2% behind his next closest rival in these states).

Table 5: Most Important Problem Identified by Respondents in Exit Polls from early 2016 Republican Caucuses and Primaries Average percent of

Respondents Identifying

Average percent of issue respondents voting for Trump

Trump vote advantage over next closest rival on issue

Immigration 11.0% 56.7% 31.2%Economy/Jobs 33.5% 37.1% 5.9%Terrorism 24.1% 37.7% 7.1%Gov. Spending 28.4% 32.3% -2.2%

Source: CNN Exit Polls. Note that respondents were constrained to select from four options, and exit polls are from 20 states holding primaries from February 1 to March 15, 2016. In short, Trump was slightly preferred over other Republicans who identified terrorism as

the most important problem, but the issue was less important than the economy and jobs or

government spending. The defining issue that distinguished Trump from the other Republican

candidates was immigration, but it was identified as the MIP (of four options) by less than 11%

of Republican caucus and primary voters.

Concluding Thoughts

We do not yet know if the 2016 elections signal a deviation from the normal party

politics in the United States or something more enduring. The temptation is to say that Donald

Trump was an aberration in many ways, and that the Republican Party will return to normalcy

after the election. But Trump was (and is) an opportunistic political entrepreneur. He has tapped

into and took advantage of a deeply discontented segment of the Republican Party electorate.

Bernie Sanders similarly took advantage of Democratic Party identifiers who are dissatisfied

with the party establishment and policies. The existence and durability of these dissatisfied party

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constituencies suggest that what we witnessed in 2016 will be substantially more enduring and,

at a minimum, something that both political parties will need to adapt to in order to maintain the

electoral support of these voters.

Donald Trump consistently outperformed skeptics who did not think he would win the

election, and thus may do incredible things—both bad and good—as president, there are reasons

to realize that Trump’s economic populism and white identity politics (aka cultural exclusivity)

have limited appeal even within the Republican Party and that he is limited by the Constitutional

structure of government. I am operating under two assumptions here. One is that Trump will

not ignore these constitutional limits and get away with it. James Madison’s dictum that

ambition checks ambition will be put to a test, and other elected Republican officials have a

different, conservative agenda than does Trump.

Before too much is made of Trump’s economic nationalism as the future direction of the

Republican Party and the United States. There are multiple possible winning coalitions that can

be formed in any broad collection of people and groups like a national political party (e.g., Riker

1962). As political parties become more diverse, there are more possible combinations of

constituencies that can be assembled to win a majority in the nominating process. The American

national parties consist of diverse collections of groups and constituencies. While diversity adds

to the innovativeness and cultural richness of America, it also gives rise to differences of

interests, beliefs, and opinions that result in political conflict. Disagreements among the

stakeholders of the Republican Party are going to result in political competition over future

nominations which will affect the ideological and policy direction of the Party, and political

competition among and between the American political parties operating in the various

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institutions of government. The diversity of the political parties at the national level makes it

harder for a majority party to collude in operation of government.

It is tenuous to say with confidence what will happen next. Trump’s nominating and

electoral coalition changes the composition of the Republican coalition, but we do not know how

durable these loyalties will be. We cannot say if this is a personal coalition drawn to Trump’s

personal charisma and “telling it like it is.” We cannot say what Trump himself will follow

through on given his facility for telling whoever is in the room what they want to hear, ignoring

facts, lying, and shifting his positions. While it be the establishment conservatives who are

disappointed or his populist base?

We cannot say how successful Trump will be in governing. He faces tremendous

challenges managing a White House that is staffed with a mixture of pragmatists, economic

populists, cultural populists, and conservatives. He has as an apparently close advisor, Steve

Bannon, who is an avowed economic nationalist, who prioritizes American economic welfare

and American jobs over corporate profits and over trade-offs in foreign policy (such as

containing China through development of closer economic ties with Pacific countries in the

TPP). Former COO of Breitbart.com and a leading Trump advisor, Steve Bannon is going to

conflict mightily with other appointees who are much more orthodoxly conservative.

Trump has majorities in the House and Senate, but the Republican congressional

delegation is divided between moderates (Libertarians), fiscal conservatives, supply-side

conservatives, and populists. Few members of Congress share Trump’s economic nationalist

views. Some of Trump’s goals have a lot of fans in Congress, like cutting taxes, repealing the

Affordable Care Act, and especially cutting the number, scope, and enforcement of federal

regulatory policy. Other policies, like restricting immigration to Muslims, deporting millions of

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unauthorized immigrants, building a wall along the Mexican border, expanding construction and

rebuilding the nation’s infrastructure, and renegotiating or cancelling trade agreements like

NAFTA are going to run into considerable opposition from Republicans. Republican leaders in

Congress are eager to “reform” Social Security and devolve authority for Medicare and Medicaid

to the states, which will make it politically feasible to cut spending on these programs in the

future (since members of Congress won’t have to vote to directly cut these programs). These

policy goals run into Trump’s pledges to protect Social Security and Medicare, at least for

deserving people. So, much will depend on who prevails in these disagreements and whether

Republicans can cooperate and coordinate their efforts. How well or badly the Republicans’

policies are received by the millions of disaffected partisans will have a lot to do with how

enduring Trump’s populist redefinition of the Republican Party will be. At this point, we don’t

know.

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