Studying who values whom Studying who values whom in the U.S. House of in the U.S. House of

RepresentativesRepresentatives

Kristin KanthakKristin Kanthak

EITMEITM

July 11, 2007July 11, 2007

This talk is based on…*This talk is based on…*Group ‘Tokenism’ and Descriptive

Representation within Political Organizations:

Gender and Colleague Valuation in the U.S. House of Representatives

Kristin Kanthak †University of Pittsburgh

George A. Krause ‡University of Pittsburgh

& Amanda Driscoll #

Washington University – St. Louis

* Coauthors bear no responsibility for the “crimes of research” confessed herein.

Operationalizing the Operationalizing the “smoke-filled room”“smoke-filled room”

Real legislating happens behind Real legislating happens behind closed doorsclosed doors

Member-to-member contribution Member-to-member contribution patterns allow us to glimpse member patterns allow us to glimpse member valuationsvaluations Leadership PACsLeadership PACs

Leadership PAC dataLeadership PAC data

Donor/recipient dyadsDonor/recipient dyads Each leadership PAC matched with each Each leadership PAC matched with each

party memberparty member Values range from zero to $15,000Values range from zero to $15,000

91 percent of observations are zero91 percent of observations are zero Donations are a consumption goodDonations are a consumption good

No effect on electoral outcomesNo effect on electoral outcomes Tiny percentage of total campaign Tiny percentage of total campaign

receiptsreceipts

““Soaking and poking”Soaking and poking”Proportion who received donation, 2000 Proportion who received donation, 2000

cyclecycle

Men DonorsMen Donors Women Women DonorsDonors

DemocratsDemocrats Men: 0.10Men: 0.10

Women: 0.08Women: 0.08Men: 0.11Men: 0.11

Women: 0.14Women: 0.14

RepublicansRepublicans Men: 0.12Men: 0.12

Women: 0.17Women: 0.17Men: 0.07Men: 0.07

Women: 0.06Women: 0.06

TokenismTokenism

E.g., Kanter (1977), Laws (1975)E.g., Kanter (1977), Laws (1975) ““Token” minorities receive special Token” minorities receive special

attention from majority, are attention from majority, are suspicious of each othersuspicious of each other

Non-“token” minorities worry the Non-“token” minorities worry the majority, can work together majority, can work together

Why should we care?Why should we care?

Descriptive representation critical to Descriptive representation critical to democracy (Mill 1861, Pitkin 1967, democracy (Mill 1861, Pitkin 1967, Mansbridge 1999)Mansbridge 1999)

Representation of women increases Representation of women increases legitimacy of government (Schwindt-legitimacy of government (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005, Lawless Bayer and Mishler 2005, Lawless 2004)2004)

The paper, beta versionThe paper, beta version

Report of the empirical patternReport of the empirical pattern Grounded in tokenism literatureGrounded in tokenism literature Reviewers didn’t buy itReviewers didn’t buy it

The paper, reloadedThe paper, reloaded

Need to think carefully about first Need to think carefully about first principlesprinciples What do utility functions look like?What do utility functions look like?

What is the role of ideology?What is the role of ideology?

First principlesFirst principles

Token minorities get “special” Token minorities get “special” attentionattention Pressure to “be one of the boys”Pressure to “be one of the boys”

Non-token minorities get ignoredNon-token minorities get ignored But “old girls’ network” startsBut “old girls’ network” starts

But really, ideological proximity is But really, ideological proximity is most importantmost important

Constrained optimizationConstrained optimization

The idea: Members value their The idea: Members value their colleagues subject to some budget colleagues subject to some budget constraintconstraint

The problem: What’s the constraint?The problem: What’s the constraint? The moral: Formal models can reveal The moral: Formal models can reveal

assumptions that do not make senseassumptions that do not make sense

Decision theoryDecision theory

““Am I better off with or without Am I better off with or without another member of my own group?”another member of my own group?”

Valuation is not a strategic choiceValuation is not a strategic choice A consumption goodA consumption good

How to value the other How to value the other groupgroup

Small “other” groups are tokensSmall “other” groups are tokens Larger groups threaten, then take, Larger groups threaten, then take,

the majoritythe majority Very large “other” groups make you Very large “other” groups make you

the tokenthe token

Marginal utility from the other Marginal utility from the other groupgroup

First derivative provides the utility First derivative provides the utility for each additional member of other for each additional member of other groupgroup The valuation of each individualThe valuation of each individual

What does this look like?What does this look like?

-0.4

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Group BProportion

Uti

lity

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Mar

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w*- w*+

Figure 1:Group A Utility and

Marginal Utility from Members of Group B

w**

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Group BProportion

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Group BProportion

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w*- w*+

Figure 1:Group A Utility and

Marginal Utility from Members of Group B

w**

How to value your own How to value your own groupgroup

Small token groups feel threatened Small token groups feel threatened by each otherby each other

After some threshold, large enough After some threshold, large enough to work togetherto work together

When very large, new token group is When very large, new token group is valuedvalued

Marginal utility of own Marginal utility of own groupgroup

Again, derivative gives utility for Again, derivative gives utility for each additional member of own each additional member of own groupgroup The valuation of each individualThe valuation of each individual

What does this look like?What does this look like?

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0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1Group B

Proportion

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lity

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Proportion

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Figure 2: Group B Utility and

Marginal Utility from Members of Group B

w**

Valuation within the same Valuation within the same larger grouplarger group

Assumption: Valuations are symmetricAssumption: Valuations are symmetric If group sizes were switched, behavior would If group sizes were switched, behavior would

be the same (Young and James 2001)be the same (Young and James 2001) Therefore, inflection points are the sameTherefore, inflection points are the same Behavior for different subgroups on Behavior for different subgroups on

different sides of the inflection points different sides of the inflection points ought to be differentought to be different

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0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1Group B

Proportion

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rgin

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Group B

Group A

Figure 3: Differences in Group A and Group B Marginal Utility Valuations

Within the Same Larger Group

**w

**w

**w

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Group A

Figure 3: Differences in Group A and Group B Marginal Utility Valuations

Within the Same Larger Group

**w

**w

**w

Gender is binaryGender is binary

Gender is a dichotomous variable, WGender is a dichotomous variable, W Not enough variation in wNot enough variation in w

Parties are on either side of Kanter’s Parties are on either side of Kanter’s (arbitrary) 15 percent inflection point(arbitrary) 15 percent inflection point Republicans are 8-9 percent womenRepublicans are 8-9 percent women Democrats are 18-19 percent womenDemocrats are 18-19 percent women

What about ideology?What about ideology?(other group)(other group)

Conservative theory: Ideology is Conservative theory: Ideology is what really matterswhat really matters At the extremes of ideological At the extremes of ideological

divergence, being in the other group has divergence, being in the other group has no effectno effect

2 2 2, 1 2 31 ( 2 3 ),A DMU D D w w

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y D=0

D=.25

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D=.75

D=1

Figure 4: The Impact of Value Divergence (D) on Group A

Marginal Utility Valuations

wHwL

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D=1

Figure 4: The Impact of Value Divergence (D) on Group A

Marginal Utility Valuations

wHwL

The mirror image of other group The mirror image of other group valuationvaluation At the extreme of ideological At the extreme of ideological

divergence, being in one’s own group is divergence, being in one’s own group is all that mattersall that matters

What about ideology?What about ideology?(same group)(same group)

2 2 2, 1 2 31 ( 2 3 ),B DMU D D w w

Figure 5:The Impact of Value Divergence (D) on Group B

Marginal Utility Valuations

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0.51

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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1Group B Proportion

Ma

rgin

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tilit

y D=0

D=.25

D=.5

D=.75

D=1

wHwL

Figure 5:The Impact of Value Divergence (D) on Group B

Marginal Utility Valuations

-3.5-3

-2.5-2

-1.5-1

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0.51

1.5

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1Group B Proportion

Ma

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tilit

y D=0

D=.25

D=.5

D=.75

D=1

wHwL

Theoretical predictionsTheoretical predictions

Majority group (or fellow minority group) Majority group (or fellow minority group) valuations of minority group members valuations of minority group members are negatively (or positively) related to are negatively (or positively) related to the minority’s relative group sizethe minority’s relative group size

The size of the minority group The size of the minority group influences how dramatically preference influences how dramatically preference (ideological) divergence affects (ideological) divergence affects colleague valuation colleague valuation

Nature of the dataNature of the data

Donor/recipient dyadsDonor/recipient dyads Every leadership PAC matched with Every leadership PAC matched with

every party memberevery party member Donations range from $0 to $15,000Donations range from $0 to $15,000

Virtually all donations are $0Virtually all donations are $0

Ancillary variablesAncillary variables

Donor and recipient from same stateDonor and recipient from same state Donor and recipient from same regionDonor and recipient from same region Donor and recipient on same committeeDonor and recipient on same committee Percent of vote recipient received in last Percent of vote recipient received in last

electionelection Number of terms recipient servedNumber of terms recipient served Recipient in leadership, on power committeeRecipient in leadership, on power committee Size of PACSize of PAC

Tobit modelTobit model

Workhorse of campaign contributions Workhorse of campaign contributions empirical modelsempirical models

Allows truncated normal distributionAllows truncated normal distribution But what does zero mean?But what does zero mean?

Some unobserved latent value, NOT the Some unobserved latent value, NOT the value itselfvalue itself

Heckman modelHeckman model

Two stage Heckman modelTwo stage Heckman model Do I donate?Do I donate? How much do I donate?How much do I donate?

Zero here means donor chose zero in Zero here means donor chose zero in the first stagethe first stage

But regressors cannot be the same in But regressors cannot be the same in the selection and outcome equationthe selection and outcome equation

Corner solution semi-Corner solution semi-logarithmic Tobit modellogarithmic Tobit model

Zero is a (meaningful) corner solution Zero is a (meaningful) corner solution to an optimization problemto an optimization problem Wooldridge 2002; Gordon, Hafer, and Wooldridge 2002; Gordon, Hafer, and

Landa 2006Landa 2006 (But they all give about the same (But they all give about the same

results anyway)results anyway)

““Additive model”Additive model”

What is the effect of gender on What is the effect of gender on valuation?valuation?

Gender, plus ideological distanceGender, plus ideological distance, , plus ancillary variablesplus ancillary variables

ResultsResults

IndependentVariable

Rep. Men Rep.Women

Dem. Men Dem.Women

WomanRecipient

1.808*(0.3326)

1.819(1.265)

-3.270*(0.5421)

-2.193*(0.8763)

IdeologicalDistance

-12.01*(1.425)

-28.29*(7.202)

-6.966*(1.120)

-6.183*(1.979)

Effect of genderEffect of gender

Republican and Democratic men have Republican and Democratic men have significantly different donation patternssignificantly different donation patterns Republicans give 20 percent more to womenRepublicans give 20 percent more to women Democrats give 26 percent less to womenDemocrats give 26 percent less to women

So do Republican and Democratic womenSo do Republican and Democratic women Republicans give 10 percent more to womenRepublicans give 10 percent more to women Democrats give 22 percent less to womenDemocrats give 22 percent less to women

““Multiplicative model”Multiplicative model”

Do colleagues “punish” men and Do colleagues “punish” men and women equally for ideological women equally for ideological divergence?divergence?

Gender, plus ideological distance, Gender, plus ideological distance, plus gender X ideological distanceplus gender X ideological distance, , plus ancillary variablesplus ancillary variables

ResultsResults

IndependentVariable

Rep. Men Rep.Women

Dem. Men Dem.Women

WomanRecipient

1.424*(0.3596)

0.5995(1.265)

-3.030*(0.5729)

-2.276*(0.9236)

IdeologicalDistance

-13.76*(1.864)

-37.45*(9.646)

-6.437*(1.193)

-6.435*(2.267)

WomanRecipient xIdeologicalDistance

7.425*(2.484)

32.81*(12.60)

-4.324*(3.469)

1.575(4.545)

SimulationsSimulations

What are the “real” effects of gender What are the “real” effects of gender and ideological distance on donations?and ideological distance on donations?

Two sets of deterministic simulations, Two sets of deterministic simulations, setting ancillary variables at their setting ancillary variables at their meansmeans Decision to giveDecision to give How much to give, given a decision to giveHow much to give, given a decision to give

Figure 6: Simulated probability of donation for differing ideological distance,

all other values held to their means

Men Women

Republican Men Donors

0

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Ideological distance

Pr(D

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Democratic Men Donors

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Republican Women Donors

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Democratic Women Donors

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Men Women

Republican Men Donors

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Democratic Men Donors

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Republican Women Donors

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Democratic Women Donors

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Ideological distance

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Figure 7: Simulated amount donated (given that a donation is made)

for differing ideological distance, all other values held to their means

Republican Women Donors

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Republican Men Donors

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Republican Women Donors

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Republican Men Donors

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Support for theorySupport for theory

Republican men give more to womenRepublican men give more to women Democratic men give less to womenDemocratic men give less to women Republicans punish more than Republicans punish more than

Democrats for ideological divergenceDemocrats for ideological divergence

Divergence from theoryDivergence from theory

Republican women do not give less to Republican women do not give less to womenwomen No significant gender effectNo significant gender effect

Democratic women do not give more to Democratic women do not give more to womenwomen They give significantly less to womenThey give significantly less to women

Republicans punish women less for Republicans punish women less for divergencedivergence

Democratic men punish women more for Democratic men punish women more for divergencedivergence

ConclusionsConclusions

Tokenism existsTokenism exists Explains majority group behavior and Explains majority group behavior and

ideology-based valuationsideology-based valuations Token valuations can trump ideology-Token valuations can trump ideology-

based valuationsbased valuations Minorities may feel pressure to mimic Minorities may feel pressure to mimic

majority group behaviormajority group behavior