supplementary report on aspects of raupatu in the mohaka ......reserve (wai 168) and assisted robert...

~ -WAITANGI TRIBUNAL

Te Roopu Whakamana i te Tiriti 0 WaitangiW

Supplementary Report on Aspects of Raupatu in the Mohaka-Waikare District

Richard Moorsom

Wellington, April 1999

Supplementary Report on Aspects of Raupatu in the Mohaka-Waikare District

Richard Moorsom

Wellington, April 1999

A supplementary historical report on selected issues arising from the Wai 299 and 638 claims.

The Waitangi Tribunal Level 3 - 116 Featherston St - Wellington

Author's Statement

Tena koutou. My name is Richard Moorsom. I reside in Wellington and work for the Waitangi

Tribunal as a research officer. I am trained as a historian, having gained in 1973 a first-class

BA(Hons) in English history and philosophy from the University of East Anglia, United

Kingdom, and a MA in African Studies from the University of Sussex, United Kingdom, in 1974.

Since then, I have worked professionally in Europe, Africa and New Zealand in the fields of

development policy and historical research.

My historical research has focused on processes of colonisation, land alienation and national

liberation, focussing especially on Namibia. I have published a number of articles in scholarly

journals and approximately a dozen books and short monographs. Since joining the Tribunal in

1997 I have completed research reports on the Tarawera and Tataraakina blocks in the Mohaka

Waikare Confiscation District (Wai 638), the Tarawera Road Depot (Wai 639), the Waitanoa

reserve (Wai 168) and assisted Robert McLean's report on the Kupa whanau claim (Wai 731).

Acknowledgements

My grateful thanks to the staff of the Alexander Turnbull Library, National Archives and the

Hawke's Bay Museum Library for their skill and tenacity in tracking down elusive primary

sources. Thanks also to Pat Parsons for his invaluable assistance in identifying several items of

obscure provenance and to Bruce Stirling for information on Wairarapa sources.

Contents

1. Issues to be Covered in This Report ..................................... 1

2. Ngati Hineuru's Interest in Mohaka River Valley Land ...................... 5 2.1 Occupation in the Mid-19th Century .................................. 5 2.2 The Mohaka Valley ............................................... 8

2.2.1 The Ahuriri Crown Purchase ............................. . . . . 8 2.2.2 The Purchasing ofNgati Hineuru's Interest? .................... 13

2.3 The Kaweka Ranges ............................................. 21 2.4 Waitara and Mohaka ............................................. 23 2.5 Conclusion ..................................................... 26

3. The Making of the 1866 'Rebellion' .................................... 29 3.1 Ngati Hineuru and the Pai Marire Challenge in Hawke's Bay ............. 29

3.1.1 Economic Engagement, Roads and Land (1858-65) .............. 29 3.1.2 War, Loyalty and Pai Marire (1863-1865) ...................... 34 3.1.3 Sheep, Dogs and Conflict Management on the Frontier

(January-May 1866) ....................................... 43 3.1.4 Defending Ngati Hineuru's Rohe (June-July 1866) ............... 49 3.1.5 Taking the Pai Marire Challenge to Hawke's Bay

(July-August 1866) ........................................ 53 3.1.6 Ngati Hineuru and the Expedition to Petane

(7 September-3 October 1866) ............................... 61 3.1.7 The Search for a Negotiated Settlement (4-8 October 1866) ........ 66 3.1.8 A Conspiracy to Attack Napier? (8-12 October) ................. 72

3.2 The Provincial Government and the Pai Marire Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 3.2.1 Containing the Kingitanga and Pai Marire (1863-1865) ........... 82 3.2.2 Sheep, 'Rebels' and Frontier Security (January-May 1866) ........ 92 3.2.3 The Offensive against Pai Marire in Hawke's Bay

(May-July 1866) .......................................... 98 3.2.4 Containing the Pai Marire 'Invasion' (mid-August-6 September) ... 100 3.2.5 Awaiting McLean (7 September-3 October) ................... 107 3.2.6 The End of Negotiation (4-8 October 1866) ................... 111 3.2.7 Preparing to 'Absolutely Crush Out the Danger'

(4-11 October 1866) ...................................... 113 3.2.8 Surprise Attack and Punitive Raid (12-21 October 1866) ......... 119 3.2.9 Provincial Self-Reliance ................................... 122

3.3 A Historical Mistake? ........................................... 126 3.3.1 The Historiography ofa 'Rebellion' ......................... 126 3.3.2 Persisting Grievances over Crown Land Purchasing ............. 127 3.3.3 Legacies of Disaffection ................................... 128 3.3.4 Pai Marire and Kawanatanga Reaction ....................... 131 3.3.5 A Conspiracy to Attack Napier ............................. 135 3.3.6 Negotiation and Surrender ................................. 136

4. The Fixing of the 1870 Agreement .................................... 141 4.1 Samuel Locke and the Final Stage, November 1869 to June 1870 ......... 141 4.2 Conclusion .................................................... 149

5. The Boundary of the Confiscation District .............................. 150 5.1 The Confiscation Order-in-Council of 12 January 1867 ................. 150 5.2 The District Boundaries under Subsequent Agreements and Acts ......... 152 5.3 Conclusion .................................................... 156

References ....................................................... 158

Appendix 1. Extracts from the Wai 299 and 638 Statements of Claim . . . . . . . . . 164 Appendix 2. Research Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 Appendix 3. Maori drafts of two letters from McLean to Panapa ............ 170

Maps & Figures ................................................... 172

Maps and Figures

Maps and Plans

(Atfront) Map 1.

(At back) Map 2. Map 3. Map 4. MapS. Map 6. Map 7. Map 8. Map 9. Map 10. Map 11. Map 12. Map 13. Map 14. Map 15. Map 16.

Figures

Figure 1. Figure 2. Figure 3. Figure 4. Figure 5.

Land Blocks in the Mohaka ki Ahuriri Inquiry District

Approximate Southern Boundary ofNgati Hineuru's Rohe, mid-19th Century The Mohaka Valley in the Ahuriri Deed Plan, 1851 Runholders in the Ahuriri Block, 1858 Te Rangatawhao and Kaweka Purchase Deed Plan, 1863 Runholders in the Ahuriri Block, 1864 Nesfield's Sketch of Localities Upstream of Church Crossing, January 1866 H. Guthrie Smith's Map of Hapu in the Mohaka-Waikare Area Sketch Plan Attached to the 8 May 1868 Agreement Differences between the 1868 Plan and the Confiscation Boundary Sketch Plan Attached to the 13 June 1870 Agreement Differences between the 1870 Plan and the Confiscation Boundary Survey Plan Referred to in the 1881 Act Differences between the 1881 Plan and the Confiscation Boundary Waitara Purchase Deed Plan, 1863 Te Whanganui-a-Orotu, 1865

Watercolour View of Omarunui, 1866 Photograph of a Painting of Omarunui, 1866 Photograph of Omarunui, 1866 Sketch of the Omarunui Battlefield, 1866 Plan of the Military Dispositions at Omarunui, 1866

Sources of Maps and Figures

Map 1

Map 2 Map 3 Map 4

Map 5 Map 6

Map 7

Map 8 Map 9 Map 10 Map 11 Map 12 Map 13 Map 14 Map 15

Map 16

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

Richard Moorsom, Mohaka ki Ahuriri inquiry: maps of claim boundaries, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1999), Map 3. Locality names added. Based on Moorsom, Claim boundaries, Map 3. Hawke's Bay Deed HWB 37, Sketch plan, LINZ HO (Waitangi Tribunal copy). Andersen, [Map of Hawke's Bay], 1858, AAFV 97 H4, NA. Taken from Patrick Parsons, In the shadow ofTe Waka, (Te Pohue History Committee, 1997), p.54. Hawke's Bay Deed HWB 80, Sketch plan, LINZ HO. A. Koch, Map of the Province of Hawke's Bay, 1864, AAFV 997 H12, NA. Taken from Parsons, Te Waka, p.59. Locality names added. Hand-drawn sketch in Nesfield, [memo], 27 January 1866, encl. in Whitmore to McLean, 30 January 1866, HB 417, NA. H. Guthrie-Smith, Tutira, (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1926), opp. p.54. H.H. Turton, Plans of land purchases in the North Island, vol.2, (1878), CLO 45. Based on Moorsom, Claim boundaries, Map 2. In LE 1118711201 and App Na 264/3, MLC-Tak. Based on Moorsom, Claim boundaries, Map 2. Roll Plan 203, LINZ Na and Hawke's Bay Deed HWB 47, LINZ HO. Based on Moorsom, Claim boundaries, Map 2. Hawke's Bay Deed HWB 40B, Sketch Plan, LINZ HO, reproduced in ROD A14, Appendix 6. Waitangi Tribunal, Te Whanganui-a-Orotu report 1995, p.128.

Thomas Samuel Kemp, Omarunui on the Tutaekuri, 1866, pen & watercolour sketch, D-P079005B-CT, ATL. Unknown, [Photograph of a painting of the battleground at Omarunui], 1866, F-117620- Yz, ATL. Wrigglesworth & Binns, [View of the battleground at Omarunui], 1866, photograph, F-90476-Yz, ATL. Miriam Macgregor, Early stations of Hawke's Bay, (Wellington: A.H. & A.W. Reed, 1970), opp. p.l92. Plan enclosed in McLean to Colonial Secretary, 15 October 1866, AD 1 97/2115, NA.

Abbreviations

Documentary Sources AJHR Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives NZG New Zealand Gazette DNZB Dictionary of New Zealand Biography RDB Raupatu Document Bank ROD Waitangi Tribunal Record of Documents, Wai 201 LPD Native Land Purchase Department MB Maori Land Court Minute Book ML

Terms n.d. TS MS CT Na Wai

Repositories ATL NA MLC-Tak HBM LINZHO LINZNa

Maori land survey plan

No date Typescript Manuscript Certificate of Title Napier Waitangi Tribunal Claim

Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington National Archives, Wellington Maori Land Court, Takitimu Registry, Hastings Hawke's Bay Museum Library, Napier Land Information New Zealand, Head Office Land Information New Zealand, Napier Regional Office

--------~ ~-:-J -,

KEY TO BLOCKS: ___

1 Ahuriri 2 Arapaoanui 3 Awa 0 Totara 4 Heru a Tureia 5 Kaiwaka 6 Maungaharuru 7 Maungataniwha

SH.t

6 Moeangiangi 9 Mohaka

10 Mohaka Crown block 11 Owhio 12 Pakaututu 13 Pakarutahi 14 Petane 15 Pihanui No.1 16 Pihanui No.2 17 Puketitiri Reserve 16 Purahotangahia 19 Putere 20 Rotokakarangu 21 Tangoio 22 Tangoio South 23 Tarawera 24 Tarawera Crown block 25 Tataraakina 26 Tatara 0 Te Rauhina 27 Te Harolo 26 Te Haroto rural sections 29 Te Kuta 30 Te Malai· 31 Te Pahou 32 Tutira 33 Waihua 34 Waihua Crown block 35 Waiohiki & Waitanoa 36 Walpapa 37 Wailara 36 Wharerangi Reserve 39 Whareraurakau 40 Wharetoto

1,------"1 Pre-1666 CrownJl~ichase

1 d Confiscated lan~f~(ained by the

c:QI] Stale forests

SH.SO State highways -=

-I ---I

o 10 20 :30 40km [ tIl r! ! [ I t I

I iii i i

-. -. -, --, -. -. -, -, -:=J -, -. ..., -1iIIIIf .. rI u a (

a:: ~

"C ..... r = == Q.

= -Q

o I ~ -:J9S-. ::;;" I;<!l .... == """ :::r ~

a:: Q :::r = ::;;" ~

::;;" ... > :::r = "'l .... "'l ... ~ ...

,.Q

= ... ~ 0 .... ~ ...,. "'l .... ~ ....

'Rebellion' & Confiscation Issues Page 1

1. Issues to be Covered in This Report

It must be stressed at the outset that this supplementary report is strictly limited in scope. It does

not aim to replace any of the extensive existing research on Crown purchasing, the 1866 armed

conflict, the 1867 confiscation and its aftermath. Nor does it attempt to present comprehensive

treatments of the themes that it addresses, since it would be pointless simply to retread ground

already satisfactorily covered in other reports. It is intended therefore to be read together with the

principal accounts previously placed on the Mohaka ki Ahuriri record of inquiry.

The main purpose of the report is to bring additional evidence to bear on several key aspects of

the Mohaka-Waikare confiscation in order to strengthen the historical analysis of the issues

arising. Four distinct topics are covered and define the structure of the report:

1. The Crown's handling ofNgati Hineuru's interest in land to the south of the Tarawera

and Tataraakina blocks, largely within the Mohaka River valley, before the confiscation

Order-in-Council of 12 January 1867.[1]

2. The intentions of Ngati Hineuru and government leaders in the period preceding the

battles at Omarunui and Petane in October 1866.[2]

3. The role of Samuel Locke in fulfilling his mandate of 17 November 1869 to arrange the

final settlement of the Mohaka-Waikare confiscation. [3]

The principal accounts are: Angela Ballara & Gary Scott, Crown purchases of Maori land in early provincial Hawke's Bay: Ahuriri, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1994); Vincent O'Malley, The Ahuriri purchase, (Wellington: CFRT, 1995); Dean Cowie, Hawke's Bay, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1996), pp.23-34; Richard Moorsom, Raupatll, restoration and ancestral rights: the title to Tarawera, Tataraakina and Te Haroto - main report, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1998), pp.25-8.

2 The principal accounts are: BaHara & Scott, Mohaka-Waikare, pp.19-34; Richard Boast, Mohaka-Waikare consolidatedrepol'f, yoU, (Wellington: CFRT, 1995), chapter 2.4; Stephen Robelison, The alienation of the Petane block, 1866-1912, (Wellington: CFRT, 1998), chapter 3; Cowie, Hawke's Bay, pp.l02-9; Moorsom, Tarawera, pp.28-48; Patrick Parsons, 111 the shadow ofTe Waka, (Te Pohue History Committee,1997), chapter 8.

3 The principal accounts are: Boast, Mohaka-Waikare, chapter 3.4D; Cowie, Hawke's Bay, pp.ll0-13; Moorsom, Tarawera, pp.55-77.


4. The geographic definitions of the confiscation district contained in the legal instruments

which determined the title of the land over the period 1867 to 1870J4]

The topics vary greatly in scope and complexity. Topic 4 is narrowly defined. It considers the

geography ofthe Mohaka-Waikare confiscation and restoration as given in the legal instruments

which executed them, and does not discuss the history of the confiscation as such. The definition

of the outer boundary ofthe confiscation district was subject to considerable confusion both at

the time and in later cadastral interpretations. Discussion of the boundary in most previous

research reports prepared for this inquiry has been less than comprehensive, or else limited to the

particular areas being researched.

Topic 3 addresses a specific aspect of the final stage of the process that led to the signing of the

Mohaka-Waikare agreement in June 1870. It attempts to fill a gap in previous research which left

uncertain how diligently Locke sought to carry out his mandate from McLean to finalise the

terms of the Mohaka-Waikare agreement.

Topic 1 traces a particular theme, Ngati Hineuru's grievances about the actual or contemplated

alienation of land within the southern margins of their rohe, through the whole of the period

between the Ahuriri Crown purchase and the Mohaka-Waikare confiscation. Its significance lies

not only in the grievances themselves but in the extent to which they might have influenced Ngati

Hineuru involvement in the events leading up to the conflict in October 1866. Much of the

ground has already been covered in previous research and this report seeks to do no more than

integrate the discussion, add a limited amount of new information and revisit previous

conclusions.

Topic 2 requires more extended treatment and takes up about two-thirds of this report. It attempts

to provide information relevant to several of the core issues in assessing the historical

antecedents of the Mohaka-Waikare confiscation. In particular, it discusses whether the Pai

Marire expedition to Omarunui in September-October 1866, especially its dominant Ngati

Hineuru component, intended rebellion; to what extent the government contributed towards

4 The principal accounts are: Boast, Mohaka-Waikare, chapter 3 passim; Moorsom, TaralVera, pp.97-100; Moorsom, Mohaka ki Ahuriri inquily: maps o/claim boundaries, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1999), pp.17-20; Cowie, Te Matai and Pakalltlltll, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1998); pp.44-6 & generally.


generating the crisis; and how adequately and appropriately the government responded to Maori

initiatives to resolve it.

The usage of the term 'rebellion' in this report requires clarification. During the conflicts of the

1860s, it took on different meanings for the contending parties, meanings which changed over

time and according to context. For some officials and settlers, Maori who supported the king

movement, refused to take the oath of allegiance to the Queen or espoused the Pai Marire religion

automatically became rebels. For some Maori, armed resistance to what they saw as unjustified

expropriation of their land or as military attack by the forces of the Crown did not in itself

amount to rebellion against the authority of the Queen. Contemporary understandings of what

might constitute rebellion against the British Crown form part of a broad and complex set of

historical issues concerning relations between Maori and the Crown which are beyond the scope

of this report. [5]

For present purposes, 'rebellion' is used in its dictionary sense of 'open resistance to authority,

esp. organised armed resistance to an established government' . [6] Since it cannot be presupposed

that the events of October 1866 actually constituted a rebellion, the term is placed within

quotation marks when referring to those events.

Previous historical research has covered the 1866 'rebellion' but has left several issues thinly

documented and questions only partly addressed. This report presents a range of additional

archival source material and attempts an integrated account of the processes and actions leading

up to the military conflict in October 1866. It remains, all the same, supplementary to previous

reports and does not go over the evidence and discussion previously presented in those reports.

There are, however, four exceptions: filling the gaps in incomplete evidence; reviewing, where

needed, the interpretation of evidence; developing alternative explanations of particular events

and issues; and ensuring continuity in narrative presentations. Because some of the source

material is new, quotations have been used fairly freely in preference to summarising the relevant

extracts.

5 M.P.K. Sorrenson, 'Maori and Pakeha' & Ann Parsonson, 'The challenge to mana Maori', in G.W. Rice (ed.), The Oxford history of Nell' Zealand, (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp.152-60, 183-7.

6 Concise Oxford Dictionary.


The report is based in the main on primary archival sources, the most important record groups

being the Hawke's Bay Provincial Council, the Government Agent Hawke's Bay, and Donald

McLean's private correspondence. A number of other collections have yielded significant

information. An effort has been made to identify Maori-language sources, mainly in private

letters to McLean and in official correspondence with McLean and the Hawke's Bay Provincial

Council. All translations are placed alongside the Maori original, where available. Nearly all the

translation texts derive from three sources: official translations, as found in the archival records;

the work of Cooper and Smith, commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunalpl and additional

translations supplied by Winifred Bauer for this report. The translator's name is footnoted in each

instance. Finally, any errors of spelling or syntax in quotations, whether English or Maori, are

retained without flagging.

7 Te Taite Cooper & Lee Smith, Ki a Te Makarini: correspondence between Donald McLean and Maori leaders prior to andJollolfling the Ahuriri purchase 1851, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1996. ROD M2). Transcriptions and translations.


2. Ngati Hineuru's Interest in Mohal{a River Valley Land

This chapter considers Ngati Hineuru's interest in land within the southern limits of its rohe, and

in particular the Crown's handling of its alienation, both actual and contemplated, between 1850

and 1866. The geographical area comprises all land south of the Mohaka River, west ofthe Ripia

River and east of the Te Hoe River in which during this period Ngati Hineuru claimed or was

attributed an interest, whether exclusive or overlapping the interests of other hapu. It lies mainly

but not exclusively within the south side of the Mohaka valley, between the river and the

Maungaharuru ridge line.

Following a brief review ofNgati Hineuru's occupation of the land in the mid-19th century, the

chapter is divided into three geographical sections:

• The Ahuriri Crown purchase, covering the southern Mohaka valley between the Taupo

track and the Mangatutu Stream.

• The Kaweka Ranges, covering the hill country adjoining the inland boundary of the

Ahuriri block, and also between the Ripia and Mohaka Rivers;

• Waitara and Mohaka, covering the southern Mohaka valley between the Taupo track and

the Mohaka Crown purchase, and extending beyond the Te Hoe River to the east.

2.1 Occupation in the Mid-19th Century

Ngati Hineuru's pattern of land occupation, both ancestral and in the mid-19th century, has been

documented and analysed in several previous reports.[8] During the 1840s and 1850s, their

population was concentrated in the main river valleys of the high country lying between the

Taupo plains and the Hawke's Bay lowlands (see Map 2).

8 Except where indicated, this section is based on: Parsons, The Mohaka-Waikal'e confiscated lands: ancestral overview, (1993), pp.23-7, 146-8, 161-79 & Ngati Hineuru cllstommy usage report, (1995); Bevan Taylor, Mohaka-Waikare confiscated lands: cllstommy usage report, (1993), pp.15-17; BaHara & Scott, MohakaWaikare, pp.1-18 & Maungahal'lIrll, pp.1-2; Moorsom, Tarawera, pp.11-18.


At this point in the central divide, the sharply defined ridge lines of the Ruahine and Kaweka

Ranges dissolve into a maze of broken hill country intersected by short, steep-sided valleys. In

the mid-19th century, most of the hilly land was thickly forested. Low-lying flats are few and

small and in the mid-19th century were valuable resources for cultivation. On the seaward side,

the Maungaharuru Range, running southwestwards from Te Heruotureia as far as Hukanui, forms

a distinct feature with its regular ridge line and escarpment. Between the range and the hill

country, the middle section ofthe Mohaka River cuts a deep, broad valley before itself entering

the hill country beyond the Kaweka Range. Between Pakaututu and the Waipunga River and

along the whole of the Maungaharuru Range, the valley slopes are generally less severe. Three

of its larger tributaries, the Te Hoe, the Waipunga and the Ripia dissect the hill zone, the last two

reaching the edge of the Taupo plain.

The middle Waipunga valley widens slightly to afford scarce flats and it was here, around their

main village Tarawera, that Ngati Hineuru people and kainga were most densely clustered. Small

kainga were also scattered widely through the valleys of the Mohaka and its tributaries.

Alongside cultivation, hunting and especially birding were important parts of the subsistence

economy, demanding seasonal mobility over large tracts of rugged land.

Tarawera was also at the mid-point of the long-distance walking track between Ahuriri and the

central plateau around Lake Taupo. Part of a network of tracks connecting the main tribal centres,

the route ran inland across the Titiokura saddle, the Mohaka and Te Haroto and onward to

Runanga and Tapuaeharuru. It was the principal mid-19th century corridor of communication

through the wild hill country. As such, it placed Ngati Hineuru at the centre of interactions

between the principal tribes of coast and interior. War-parties, political delegations, traders,

tohunga, kin-groups - nearly all passed through the Tarawera corridor. To their numbers were

added in the 1850s and early 1860s itinerant Pakeha priests, mission teachers, traders and

adventurers, and government engineers, officials and soldiers.

N gati Hineuru were positioned at the interface between the N gati Kahungunu and N gati

Tuwharetoa spheres of influence and thus vulnerable to fluctuations in the relations between

powerful tribal groupings. When he restored Ngati Hineuru to its rohe in the 1820s, Mananui Te

Heu Heu had appointed Te Rangihiroa as 'guardian' ofNgati Tuwharetoa's political boundary

with the coastal tribes, which he demarcated on the seaward side of the Maungaharuru range.


From the sparse descriptions in Colenso's journal it appears that Ngati Hineuru people were

ranging across the whole of the middle Mohaka valley either side of the walking track. How far

the Ngati Hineuru occupation extended up and down the valley is difficult to discern from the

scanty contemporary evidence available. To the east, Te Heu Heu's political boundary embraced

the whole of what became the Waitara block and from the evidence collected by Parsons it is

likely that Ngati Hineuru usage extended at times at least as far as the boundary of the Mohaka

Crown purchase but may have been shared with other hapu towards the eastern end.

West of the Ripia River and Hukanui, Ngati Hineuru, operating autonomously under the Ngati

Tuwharetoa umbrella, also shared occupational and seasonal rights with other hapu. They

exercised these rights mainly in the hilly watershed land that later became the Pakaututu and Te

Matai blocks, but periodically ranged further afield into the hills and the Kaweka Ranges. Te

Raroa Sullivan's evidence to the May 1951 Te Matai hearing gave a fairly detailed picture of

Ngati Hineuru's traditional residential occupation and economic usage of the Mohaka valley

from Church Crossing into the Pakaututu and Te Matai hill country. He also emphasised that Te

Matai was part ofNgati Hineuru's defensive boundary.[9]

Both the eastern and western ends of the middle Mohaka valley were fringe areas in which

customary rights shifted over time and would commonly be shared between several hapu. In the

west, the overarching mana ofNgati Tuwharetoa was significant both for Ngati Hineuru and for

other inland descent groups utilising the resources of the remote hill country. The principal zone

in which during this period Ngati Hineuru people lived and used the resources of the land and

waterways was in the middle Mohaka valley and especially along the Tarawera corridor. The

distinction between their rohe and those of the coastal hapu was more sharply defined than to east

and west, both by the Maungaharuru ridge-line and by Te Heu Heu's political boundary.

9 MLC Napier MB 89, pp.243-50, 7-8 June 1951. Te Raroa, born in 1872, derived some of his knowledge of Ngati Hineum's traditional histOlY from his grandmother Mangaroa, who 'died in 1908 aged between 80 and 90 years'.


2.2 The Mohaka Valley

2.2.1 The Ahuriri Crown Purchase

The Crown purchase of the Ahuriri block was one ofa batch of three large land deals in Hawke's

Bay negotiated by Land Purchase Commissioner Donald McLean between November 1850 and

December 1851. The Ahuriri purchase is considered here only to the extent that it affected the

interests ofNgati Hineuru. The discussion focuses on the Crown's treatment of those interests

and on possible indirect influences on Ngati Hinemu attitudes leading up to the conflict in 1866.

The previous section concluded that at the time that McLean was negotiating with the Hawke's

Bay chiefs, N gati Hineuru' s rohe extended throughout the upper Mohaka River valley to the east

and west of the Taupo walking track and up to the ridge line of the Maungaharuru range. There

were, as far as can be ascertained, no Ngati Hineuru signatories to the Ahuriri deed of purchase.

Yet the boundaries defined in the deed and its associated survey sketch included a substantial

slice of the southern Mohaka valley westwards ofthe Taupo track, as well as the southern face

of the Kaweka range (see Map 3):[10]

... thence the boundary runs along the ridge of the Kaweka to the confluence of the Mangatutu and

Mohaka Rivers and on in the course of the Mohaka to Mangowhata and on in the Mangowhata Stream

to the Taupo road and along the said road to Titiokura ...

BaHara and Scott conclude that McLean excluded Ngati Hineuru from the early 1851

negotiations on the sale of Ahuriri, stating that after his encounter with Te Rangihiroa in April

1851, 'he had managed to send Ngati Hineuru packing without discussing their claims' YI]

Ngati Hineuru's strategic location in the inland hill country between Hawke's Bay and the

volcanic plateau rendered it vulnerable to the interplay of larger forces. Crown purchasing

imposed a new type of obligation on the land sellers, to cooperate with the agent of the Crown,

in this case McLean and his surveyor Park, in marking out precise boundaries for the blocks to

be alienated. At the inland margin of their rohe, this procedure required the Hawke's Bay chiefs

10 H.H. Turton, Maori deeds of land purchases in the North Island, vo1.2, (Wellington: Government Printer, 1877), p.491.

11 Ballara & Scott, Ahuril'i, p.20.


to define an exclusive border with iwi and hapu whose leaders were not part of the purchase

negotiations. It confronted Ngati Hineuru with an immediate challenge not only to the

guardianship of their own lands but also to their close links with Ngati Tuwharetoa, which were

based on whakapapa and on their restoration to their rohe in the 1920s by Mananui Te Heu Heu.

McLean himself was well aware of the vehement opposition to land selling ofIwikau Te Heu

Heu, Mananui's brother and successor. During 1849 and 1850, just prior to his arrival in

Hawke's Bay, he had been the principal agent in negotiations with Te Heu Heu over the inland

boundary of the Rangitikei block, purchased by the Crown in May 1849.[12] In Wellington in

November 1850, reporting to the Colonial Secretary before setting off for the Manawatu and

Ahuriri, he acknowledged 'the opposition manifested by a large body of the interior tribes to the

inland extent of this boundary [of the Rangitikei purchase],. [13] In August 1850, now acting as

Land Commissioner, he moved to fix the inland boundary, 'the undefined state of which has

occasioned some opposition especially by Te Heu Heu of Taupo who has sanctioned the erection

of a boundary post on land within the purchase ... '. Te Heu Heu' s claim he though worthless and

at a meeting the chief, he said, had 'promised to withdraw his opposition after he had confelTed

with the Governor-in-Chief on the subject' p4]

Without waiting for Te Heu Heu or the Governor, in late August 1850 he set off for the interior

to head off a reported claim from 'a party of Otara Natives influenced by Te Heu Heu's

example' p5] Accompanying him was a supporting party he had mustered of coastal chiefs,

including Te Rangihaeata. On 6 September 1850 he 'placed under ground in a sealed bottle at

the point from where the line strikes off to Turakina' a message approved by the chiefs the

previous day endorsing 'the inland boundary of the European population at Rangitikei'.

Subsequently, however,

A party of Taupo Natives who opposed a settlement of the boundary met us at the Pohui,[16] and

signified their determination to oppose any boundary inland ofTe Heu Heu's mark at Parewa ...

12 O'Malley, Ahuriri, pp.105-7. 13 McLean to Colonial Secretary, New Munster, 9 November 1850, AJHR 1862 C-l, pp.256-7. 14 McLean to Colonial Secretary, Auckland, 17 August 1850, Official Letterbook, Police & LPD, qMS-1212,

ATL (ROD A21e, pp.1437-8). 15 McLean to Colonial Secretary, New Munster, 23 August 1849, Official Letterbook, Police & LPD, qMS-1212,

ATL & G 7/12/75 (transcript) (ROD A21e & d, pp.1439 & 861); ibid., 9 November 1850, AJHR 1862 C-l, pp.256-7.

16 Presumably not Te Pohue on the Napier-Taupo track.


McLean relied on the mana ofTe Rangihaeata, 'with whom I had a previous interview on the

subject', to warn off the Taupo claimants:

Rangihaeata directed Ngawaka, the principal man ofthis party, to discontinue any further opposition

to the Government on land they had fairly purchased, and also advised him to abandon certain

cultivations on European property, the obstinate retention of which the Natives previously expected

would be fully sanctioned by Rangi.

There was, in McLean's report on his actions, no attempt to negotiate; his message was, in effect,

a notice of expulsion. For Te Heu Heu, however, there was still unfinished business. On 2

December 1850, he dispatched a letter to McLean in New Plymouth attempting, with a hint of

exasperation, to cut through criss-crossing messages between himself, the Governor and McLean,

pointing out that McLean's unilateral action was inconsistent with the advice he had received

from the Governor. He requested a symbolic gift to bring the boundary question to a diplomatic

conclusion. [17]

By now McLean was on his way to Ahuriri. Whether or not he had by then received Te Heu

Heu's letter, in early January 1851 he deemed it politic to inform Te Heu Heu by letter of his

purchase negotiations in Hawke's Bay, a precaution, he wrote in his journal, 'in case of

opposition from him in future' . [18] A fortnight earlier, following the first maj or hui on the Ahuriri

purchase on 20 December 1850, he had been warned on 26 December 1850 by Te Moananui that

Te Heu Heu 'opposes the sale of this land as he does every other sale'. Both Te Moananui and

Te Hapuku clearly regarded the Tuwharetoa chief s attitude as significant, while asserting their

competence to deal in land they regarded as theirs. In tum, McLean took care to explain the next

day to the Hawke's Bay chiefs 'how the Rangitikei question was settled' .[19]

He followed up on 28 December by informing the Colonial Secretary in Wellington that his letter

to Te Heu Heu would request 'the Taupo claimants to meet me at the interior boundary, to

17 Te Heu Heu to McLean, 5 December 1850, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0674G, ATL (trans. Winifred Bauer). This letter is difficult to translate and the interpretation of it advanced here should be regarded as tentative.

18 McLean, Journal, vo!.3, 6 January 1851, MS-Papers-1284-6, ATL. 19 McLean, Journal, vol.3, 26-27 December 1850, MS-Papers-1284-6, ATL.


prevent their raising fresh claims or future difficulties'. [20] However, his journal reference to that

letter on 6 January gave no hint that he had actually requested a meetingY1]

Te Heu Heu continued to take a close interest. In mid-February 1851, 'Te Rakaito, a young

heathen chief of rank from Taupo', whose brother was residing at Colenso's mission station,

arrived at the coast 'to confer with the principal chiefs about the interior boundary of the block

of land about to be sold by them to the Government. .. ' . A few days later, he returned with 'a long

letter to Te Heu Heu' from Colenso.[22] By mid-March, McLean was informing Maori at

Colenso's station of 'the contents of Heu Heu's letters in reference to the sale of land'. [23]

This was active diplomacy. McLean, by contrast, seems to have relied upon his January letter and

the self-assertion of his Hawke's Bay negotiating partners. Neither his journal nor his dispatches

to Governor Grey disclose any further initiatives on the interior boundary during the first four

months of 1851. This inaction was despite a warning in late March from Colenso, for whose local

knowledge he professed great respect,[24] that 'no land should be purchased beyond Titiokura, as

it would rouse the interior tribes against the Europeans if such were done'. [25] He opted to

accompany the survey of Waipukurau, leaving Robert Park to undertake the Ahuriri boundary

survey in the company of the Ahuriri chiefs and owners. The itinerary recorded in his journal

makes it most unlikely that the proposed meeting with Te Heu Heu ever took place, nor was there

mention in the journal of any follow-up letters. Instead, Tuwharetoa and Hineuru leaders were

left to witness the block boundary being demarcated without their participation. This approach

had more than a passing similarity to 'how the Rangitikei question was settled'.

Surveyor Park set off up the Tutaekuri River on 18 March 1851 accompanied by 'a great number

of Natives ... to point out the boundaries of the lands to be sold', and arrived back at the coast on

14 April.[26] Ngati Hineuru were now unavoidably caught up not only in the larger diplomacy

between Kahungunu and Tuwharetoa chiefs but also in the defence of their own rohe, a large

20 McLean to Colonial Secretary, 28 December 1850, AJHR 1862 C-l, p.308. 21 McLean, Journal, vo!.3, 6 January 1851, MS-Papers-1284-6, ATL. 22 Colenso, Journal, 13-16 February 1851, qMS-0489, ATL. 23 McLean, Journal, vo!.3, 13 March 1851, MS-Papers-1284-6, ATL. The letters themselves have not been

traced. 24 Eg McLean, Journal, volJ, 9 January, 12 March 1851, MS-Papers-1284-6, ATL. 25 McLean, Journal, vo!.3, 30 March 1851, MS-Papers-1284-6, ATL. 26 Colenso, Journal, 18 March 1851, qMS-0489, ATL; McLean, Journal, vo!.3, 18 March & 14 April 1851, MS

Papers-1284-6, A TL.


section of which they had just witnessed being claimed for the Ahuriri sale. Park immediately

reported to McLean that 'there has been some squabbling with Te Rangihiroa arguing with Te

Heu Heu about the interior lands' .[27] As before, McLean's journal recorded no response from

him.

Faced with disagreement with Te Heu Heu and the imminent loss of part of Ngati Hineuru's

rohe, Te Rangihiroa took the initiative, leading a party to the coast at Tangoio 'to dispute the

rights of the Ngati Kahungunu tribe to sell some portions of the interior boundary of Tareha's

block above Titiokura'. [28] McLean's account of the ensuing encounter, although incomplete and

not entirely consistent, suffices to confilm that this was a diplomatic rather than a military thrust.

Misinformed by his Kahungunu partners that this was an armed 'war party', McLean found that

the Ngati Hineuru expedition was 'not hostile, or bringing arms', unlike the Kahungunu

contingent that he accompanied to Tangoio on 25 April. There was a tense initial standoff with

'a deal of squabbling, threatening, firing off guns', which, however, subsided into 'feasting; after

which they dispersed to their houses .. .' . [29]

McLean exploited the release of tension and 'had some talk with Te Rangihiroa's party .. .'. He

seems to have been concerned mainly to reassert his authority over a process that had threatened

to get out of hand. He advised the Ngati Hineuru 'to return quietly to their country, and not to

interfere rashly with land if it was not their own property ... ', adding that 'ifTe Rangihiroa, or his

party, had any claims to advance, or talk in support of them, to state what they had to say' YOl He

did not record Te Rangihiroa's response, which he appeared to invite, unlike those of his

Kahungunu negotiating partners in many exchanges. The implication is that he accorded it little

importance, despite Colenso's prescient warning to him a month earlier. Two days later, the

N gati Hineuru party travelled with McLean and the Kahungunu people to the Waiohinganga

River and possibly as far as the survey station at Te Whanganui a Orotu, after which they

disappear altogether from his recordYl]

27 McLean, Journal, vol.3, 14 April 1851, MS-Papers-1284-6, ATL. 28 McLean, Journal, vo!.3, 23 April 1851, MS-Papers-1284-6, ATL. 29 McLean, Journal, vol.3, 23 & 25 April 1851, MS-Papers-1284-6, ATL. 30 McLean, Journal, vo!.3, 25 April 1851, MS-Papers-1284-6, ATL. 31 McLean, Journal, vol.3, 27 April 1851, MS-Papers-1284-6, ATL.


Although the confrontation had been defused, the underlying issue remained unresolved. The

timing was significant, because the Hawke's Bay chiefs believed that the Ahuriri sale

negotiations were approaching their climax. On 22 April, just before the confrontation at

Tangoio, McLean noted that 'they all seem anxious for a settlement of the price of the Ahuriri

block, for which purpose they are now assembling from all quarters'. It is conceivable that Te

Rangihiroa's intention was to participate in the sale hui, which convened on 1-2 May at

Awapuni. It is possible but very unlikely that the Ngati Hineuru party proceeded on to Awapuni.

However, McLean made no mention ofTe Rangihiroa amongst the chiefs he named either at the

survey office on 28 April or in the negotiations at the hui on 2 May. It is more probable that

lacking an invitation either from the Hawke's Bay chiefs or from McLean, the Ngati Hineuru

party turned inland for home up the Waiohinganga valley. At the same time, McLean took care

to keep Ngati Tuwharetoa informed of developments: on 30 April, just before entering

negotiations, he had 'a long talk about land claims and boundaries with Poihipi, a chief of

Taupo' . [32]

Just as the sale was being concluded on 2 May, McLean himself 'suggested that a disputed

portion of the interior should be left out of the block, which has accordingly been done' y3]

Which portion he does not unfortunately specify. It might refer to the additional land which he

described to the Colonial Secretary on 14 April as 'some portions of the interior which it is most

desirable to purchase' and which he planned to send Park to examine immediatelyY4] If, more

probably, he was referring to the upper Mohaka valley claimed by Ngati Hineuru, this

commitment was subsequently abandoned, since Park's survey sketch and report as well as the

final purchase deed kept the disputed area within the Ahuriri block. [35]

2.2.2 The Purchasing of Ngati Hineuru's Interest?

The lengthy sequel to the inclusion of part of Ngati Hineuru's rohe within the Ahuriri Crown

purchase is covered in detail by O'MalleyY6] The government appeared to achieve a

32 McLean, Journal, vol.3, 30 April 1851, MS-Papers-1284-6, ATL. 33 McLean, Journal, vol.3, 2 May 1851, MS-Papers-1284-6, ATL. 34 McLean to Colonial Secretary, 14 April 1851, NM 8/51/580, NA (ROD A21d, pp.797-8). 35 Park to McLean, 7 June 1851, AJHR 1862 C-l, p.314; Crown purchase deed HWB 37, survey sketch; Turton,

Deeds, vol.2, p.491. 36 O'Malley, Ahuriri, pp.210-23 passim.


comprehensive settlement of Ngati Hineuru's Ahuriri claim with payments of £50 each in

February 1858 and August 1859Y7] Questions remain, however, as to how comprehensive and

inclusive the settlement was in practice.

Two main factors seem to have contributed largely to the settlement. The first was the influence

of Ngati Tuwharetoa and especially Te Heu Heu. On 2 December 1851, a fortnight after the

signing of the Ahuriri purchase deed, Te Heu Heu wrote to McLean reiterating his vehement

opposition to land selling and Pakeha settlement:[38]

Engari ko nga Maori no ratou to ratou porangi ki te tuku i to ratou whenua ... Koia hoki tenei rna te

pakeha te peinga mai ki uta nei maIm e pei atu nga tangata katoa pei mai ana Ime, pei atu ana ahau.

[Ngati Kahungunu] are responsible for their own madness in giving up their land ... So if the Pakeha

send people here to this shore, I will send them away, everyone. If you send, I will repulse.

He reminded McLean of what he had told him at their earlier meeting in Wanganui. Adding a

specific reference to Titiokura, he warned him not to intrude beyond the coastal lands:

E hoa kia tupato koe ki te Rohe aTe Heu Heu i Waiho i te rohe kai tiaki ahau[39} tenei ana tetahi kupu

aku kia tupato koe ki te korero a Ngati Kahununu kaua koe, e tukua ki te maunga. Engari kati mai ano

koe i te moana engari ko te maori me amai ki tua 0 ta taua rohe ki nga maunga haupu ai.

Friend, be careful of the land ofTe Heu Heu and Waiho, the area of which I am the guardian. This

is something else I will say. You should be careful of what Ngati Kahungunu tell you. You should not

be taken to the mountains but remain near the sea. The Maori should stay at the far side of our rohe

in the mountains.

Five years later, Te Heu Heu visited Hawke's Bay in late 1856 to mobilise support for what

District Commissioner George Cooper described as

a large meeting ... at Taupo, called by the ChiefTe Heuheu ... This meeting is attended by delegates

from nearly every tribe of any impoliance in New Zealand, and its object in as far as I can learn, is

37 Turton, Deeds, vol.2, pp.586-7. 38 Te Heu Heu to McLean, 2 December 1851, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0675A, ATL (trans. Winifred

Bauer). 39 Italics: grammar obscure, the translation only tentative.


the inauguration of a Maori Parliament, to be composed of deputies of all the tribes who join the

confederation.

Cooper believed its main aim was to halt the erosion of chiefly authority and 'as a principal

means to this end, it is to be proposed to put an immediate stop to all sales of land to the

Government' and to promote leasing instead. [40]

Cooper attributed part of the cooling of most Hawke's Bay chiefs towards land selling to the

influence of Te Heu Heu, whose visit 'has done much mischief. It was in this context that in

November 1856 he brought to McLean's attention Ngati Hineuru's unresolved claim to 'the

inland part of the Ahuriri Block', for which they 'say they received no payment and never

assented to the sale. They are backed up by Te Heu Heu and the sellers are, to say the least, very

lukewarm'. [41]

The second main factor was strategic overland communications. McLean was keen to establish

a land mail route connecting Napier with Auckland via Taupo and Waikato. In January 1857, he

instructed Cooper to make a trial journey from Auckland and soon had Cooper's confident reply

that 'a good bridle road might be made at a comparatively trifling expense', and with general

Maori support.[42] The route from Taupo, however, had to pass through Ngati Hineuru's Tarawera

corridor. Clearly it was expedient to settle old grievances.

Other matters, including the prolonged conflict between Te Hapuku and the other Hawke's Bay

chiefs, delayed a concrete initiative. But when Te Rangihiroa's party arrived in Napier on 27

January 1858 by appointment 'to discuss the mail road and disputed claim', [43] it was McLean's

obstinacy that prevented a conclusive agreement. During a two-day conference over 5-6 February

involving delegations headed by Te Moananui and Te Rangihiroa, as well as Poihipi, a pro-

40 Cooper to Chief Commissioner, 29 November 1856, AJHR 1862 C-l, p.323. 41 Cooper to McLean, 16 November 1856, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227, ATL. 42 Chief Commissioner to Cooper, 3 January 1857; Cooper to Chief Commissioner, 15 February 1857, AJHR

1862 C-l, pp.325-26. 43 McLean, Journal, vol.4, 26 & 27 January 1858, MS-Papers-1284-7, ATL.


government chief from Taupo, he refused to accept any reopening of the Ahuriri purchase,

treating it as an internal matter between the sellers and the claimants.[44]

According to the official report, Te Moananui admitted the Ngati Hineuru claim and agreed to

compensate them out of the proceeds of future land sales. On the strength of that undertaking,

McLean agreed to advance £50 on condition that Te Rangihiroa relinquish his claim.£45] Tareha

threw his weight behind McLean's proposal:[46]

Ka ki atu taua ki aTe Rangihiroa i te mea ka puta to korero, whakamutua to korero. Heoiti, ka tohe

tonu na a Te Rangihiroa ki tena korero. Wakamutua, e koe, tena korero. E he ana tena korero.

Wakarerea atu. Kati koe me he tohetohe, kaore e marama.

We told Te Rangihiroa that you had spoken your final word on the matter. However, Te Rangihiroa

continued to dispute it. Don't say anything further. That statement is wrong. Reject it. Do not persist,

the matter is not clear.

The official report confirmed Te Rangihiroa's rejection:[47]

The old chief declined to execute a deed to that effect but his brothers Kingitana and Kipa signed a

receipt for the amount. The money however they left in Mr McLean's hands as they were unwilling

to accept it until they had conferred with the Taupo and other tribes who had promised to aid them

in forcibly recovering the land.

McLean appeared to regard the outcome as successful with 'Rangihiroa's party giving up their

opposition to the Mohaka boundary' in return for Te Moananui's promise of compensation. [48]

In practice it was less conclusive. The negotiations were lengthy and involved separate sessions

between the parties. McLean congratulated himself on his tactical acumen:[49]

44 McLean, Journal, volA, 27 January & 5-6 February 1858, MS-Papers-1284-7, ATL; Report of the Chief Commissioner's visit to Ahllriri etc, Dec. 1857 etc, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0005, ATL (ROD C3a, pp.36-40).

45 Report of the Chief Commissioner's visit to Ahlll'iri etc, Dec. 1857 etc, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0005, ATL (ROD C3a, pp,36-40).

46 Tareha to McLean, 6 February 1858, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0682A, ATL (trans. Te Taite Cooper & Lee Smith).

47 Report of the Chief Commissioner's visit to Ahllriri etc, Dec. 1857 etc, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0005, ATL (C3a, pp,39-40).

48 McLean, Journal, vol.4, 6 February 1858, MS-Papers-1284-7, ATL. 49 McLean, Journal, vol.4, 6 February 1858, MS-Papers-1284-7, ATL.


The natives in this case have had their several meetings, which so far gratifies their pride, and

weakens their opposition.

But Te Rangihiroa refused to sign the deed and his two half-brothers, who did, defened

acceptance of the money. At stake was a wider issue than payment to owners excluded from a

land sale: recognition ofthe political boundary between Ngati Kahungunu and Ngati Tuwharetoa,

of which Te Rangihiroa had been appointed guardian by Mananui Te Heu Heu some thirty years

earlier. McLean had brought in a pro-government Taupo chief but, as Kingita and Kipa

recognised, the negotiating table was not fully representative.

On 24 February, Kingita and Kipa the deed together with Aperaniko.[50] The deed was not an

'advance' on account of the Ahuriri sellers as claimed by McLean but a standard deed of sale to

the Crown. It covered not only the Mohaka valley but also the Kaweka Range and the seaward

slopes of the Maungaharuru Range:

These are the boundaries: all the boundaries traversed by Ngatikahungunu in company with Mr Park

the Surveyor, from the Kaweka to Mangatutu, Mohaka, Mangaowhata, Titiokura, Karakiarangi,

Rongomaipapa, and including all the places included in these lands to which we have any claim.

It also contained what was tantamount to an injunction or trespass order, the signatories declaring

that 'we will never enter upon these lands to give trouble hereafter'. The signatory list

nevertheless omitted the majority ofNgati Hineuru's leaders, including Te Rangihiroa himself.

Neither the text of the deed nor the signatories indicated their hapu affiliations or whether they

were acting for particular group interests. [51]

It took another 18 months to secure broader N gati Hineuru acceptance of the deal. Details of any

negotiations have not survived but on 20 August 1859, another eight people signed an addendum

to the deed in return for a further payment of £50. It is not clear how many were from Ngati

Hineuru. The addendum was to be 'a complete settlement for the land sold by Ngatikahungunu

to the Europeans'. The signatories included the Ngati Hineuru chiefNikora Te Whakaunua and

50 'Tarewa' is written on a separate line and may be Kingita's second name or a different person. 51 Hawke's Bay deed HWB 71, LINZ HO; Turton, Deeds, vo1.2, pp.586-7.


Paora Te Huriwaka fl.-om Taupo, but still not the principal chief Te Rangihiroa. [52) A few days

later, McLean vented his frustration in his diary: 'Angry with old obstinate Rangihiroa, who is

a troublesome old man ofthe Old School'.(53)

Despite McLean's refusal to concede the Ngati Hineuru claim on Ahuriri, spurning Te

Moananui's endorsement of it, the two agreements were formal deeds of alienation, not advances

against later repayment. It may be doubted, however, whether Ngati Hineuru as a whole were

satisfied with the payment of only £100, not all of which came to them, for what was a large tract

of land. Several years later, McLean took a different view of similar interests in the inland

Ahuriri block. [54) On 18 April 1863 he paid £100

to Paora Huriwaka of Taupo and his tribe for claims advanced to the inland portions of the Ahuriri

block which the natives of this district would not recognise but which I considered it advisable to pay

to avoid any difficulties from the Taupo natives which might affect the inland settlers and as I

believed that the claim was upon the whole an equitable one.

The contrast with his treatment ofTe Rangihiroa and Ngati Hineuru is sharp (see section 2.3).

The two Crown payments had apparently succeeded in winning acceptance by most Ngati

Hineuru leaders of the alienation of their upper Mohaka lands. By this time the runholding

frontier had reached their rohe. On 12 October 1856, George Gray secured a 16,640-acre run that

extended over the Maungaharuru range down to the Mohaka River (see Map 4).[55) His

occupation of the eastern slopes does not seem to have met a Ngati Hineuru challenge, but when

his successor, Edward Towgood, attempted to build a new house in the Mohaka valley, Te

Rangihiroa pulled it down on 2 May 1859 'and ordered me to quit, as I had no right to the land,

that it belonged to him, as the commissioners of the Government had never paid him for it' .

52 Hawke's Bay deed HWB 71, LINZ HO; Turton, Deeds, vol.2, pp.586-7. The 'Henare Rangihiroa' signatory is more likely to have been Henare, brother of Kipa, than the rangatira Te Rangihiroa, who nowhere else signed himself or was referred to as 'Henare'. Even ifTe Rangihiroa is intended, the name, in the handwriting of the official who drafted the addendum, is not, like the other non-original signatures, marked with the confirming cross. Te Rangihiroa was anyway probably literate and able to sign for himself had he wished.

53 McLean, Journal, volA, 30 August 1859, MS-Papers-1284-7, ATL. 54 McLean to Fitzgerald, 21 April 1863; ibid. to Native Minister, 29 June 1863 & list of payments, LPD

Letterbook, 1863-66, pp.3-6, qMS-1214, ATL (ROD C3a, pp.20-3). 'Paora Hapi Huriwaka', who had already shared in the second £50 payment of August 1859, was probably the same Paora Hapi of south Taupo who was to feature as a prominent kawanatanga chief in the late 1860s.

55 Parsons, Te Waka, pp.54-5; Andersen, [Map of Hawke's Bay], 1858, AAFV 997 H4, NA.


Whether or not this action was designed to send a message to the government, the £50 payment

for a 'complete settlement' was forthcoming four months later and no further harassment was

reported from the Mohaka borderland. [56]

Commenting on apparent evidence of continued dissatisfaction on the part ofNgati Hineuru in

the early 1860s, Ballara and Scott claim that 'their disaffection stemmed from the ignoring of

their rights by Crown officials, and they turned to the gospel of Pai Marire in hope of some

solution to their difficulties' .[57] Despite the finality of the language of the August 1859

addendum to the deed, it had not attracted Te Rangihiroa's signature, and Ngati Hineuru

dissatisfaction may have persisted. In March 1860, Samuel Locke informed McLean:[58]

... the Ngatihineuru put in a claim for a portion of both [the Ahuriri and Ranga a Tawhau blocks] also

for a piece of the Kaweka Block they say that it is all raruraru and that there is no marama.

An undated note 'for Mr Commissioner McLean's private information' ,[59] which appears to refer

to the same context, records that

Kepa & people Rangihiroa etc claim ownership to the Ahuriri block along the b[a]nk ofthe Mohaka

River excepting that portion which Mr McLean paid £100 on Towgood & Campbell's run. Whaka &

people dispute Kepa etc claim to this'.

A couple of months later, Locke reported the abandonment of a visit he was to have made with

George Cooper to Tarawera, apparently to lease more land, 'although I do not think it would have

been much use for Kipa, Pataka and others told me that untill the other disputes are settled they

will not let fresh land'. [60] Cooper also referred enigmatically to this visit, informing McLean that

'I am going to take him [Locke] with me the day after tomorrow to Nikora's place between

56 Hawke's Bay Herald, 7 May 1859. 57 Ballara & Scott, Ahllriri, p.32. 58 Locke to McLean, 2 March 1860, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. 59 Attached to paper headed Native reserves not defined or surveyed, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0008

(ROD C3a, p.56). 'Whaka' is probably Te Waka Kawatini. 60 Locke to McLean, 1 May 1860, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. Cooper may eventually have

secured his lease because he is listed in an 1863 return as occupying 1,200 acres as a 'sheep-run' at Tarawera (see section 3.1.1).


Titiokura and Taupo, though I don't see much chance of doing any good there'. Later in the same

letter he commented:[61]

I am much afraid that the Ahuriri block question will cause us some trouble yet. I wish we dared to

bounce them - I should rather say to threaten them with condign punishment...

As the 1858-59 settlement appeared to cover all the Ahuriri land abutting on the Mohaka River,

it is difficult at this distance to know exactly what land was in dispute. To what extent Ngati

Hineuru leaders were continuing to pursue a specific claim to part of the Ahuriri block is unclear.

They may, additionally or alternatively, have been participating in the broader political debates

and movements of the late 1850s and early 1860s, in particular the rise of the kingitanga and the

runanga system. Both movements focused on regulating or restricting land selling and were

nourished in part by a continuing undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the terms of the Ahuriri

purchase.[62] At the great week-long Pa Whalmiro hui of April 1859, the Ngati Hineuru party was,

according to George Cooper,l63] divided between neutrality and opposition to the kingitanga but

were probably part of the consensus as

the meeting proceeded to appoint Runangas ... It was generally (though not unanimously) agreed that

no more land should be sold to the Government; but that all sales already made should be respected,

and that all bargains on which money had been paid in advance should be completed.

It was three months later that the second Ngati Hineuru deed was signed. Opinion was not

unifOlID. It was probably the Kipa of Ngati Hineuru whom Locke reported as having argued at

a runanga hui at Pa Whakairo in February 1860 for tribal and chiefly autonomy and against

placing their land under the runanga. [64] But his reluctance may have had more to do with a

determination to preserve hapu autonomy than a rejection of the new concept, for in late 1861

he was signing his suppOli for road-building in the Te Pohue area as 'from Kipa's runanga'.l65]

61 Cooper to McLean, 19 March 1860, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227, ATL. 62 O'Malley, Ahuriri, pp.211-12, 218-25; Cowie, Hawke's Bay, pp.50-1. 63 Cooper to Chief Commissioner (McLean), 9 May 1859, AJHR 1862 C-1, pp.341-2. 64 Locke to McLean, 2 March 1860, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL; Cooper to Chief

Commissioner, 9 May 1859, AJHR 1862 C-1, pp.341-2. 65 Kipa's runanga & Nikora to Governor and Mr Alexander, n.d., HB 4/13, NA.


The 1858-59 settlement largely achieved the government's strategic objective of defusing

resistance to the opening up of the line of communication between Napier and Taupo and thus

to the overland Napier-Auckland mail service. Te Rangihiroa may not have signed the deed, but

in return for recognition of his claim at the 6 February 1858 meeting, he 'consented to withdraw

his opposition to the formation of the overland mail through Taupo, a work of the utmost

importance to the Colony in generaL .. '. In fact by the time of the meeting N gati Hineuru were

already involved, for 'a most excellent commencement had been made by the ChiefNikora and

other natives under the superintendence of Mr Alexander'. Having signed the deed, Kingitana

and Kipa contracted with McLean 'to undertake the formation of part of the road themselves' for

£50, while McLean applied for a further £500 to finance the project.[66]

By inviting Poihipi, to whom he had given a long briefing after the encounter with Te Rangihiroa

in April 1851, McLean was also looking to secure the Taupo end of the route: 'Poihipi afterwards

held a conversation about the ca11'iage of the mails. In the general tone of his remarks he evinces

much friendship to the Europeans'.[67] With the cooperation of all Ngati Hineuru leaders, the

overland mail service could now be put in place.

2.3 The Kaweka Ranges

Ballara and Scott suggest that Ngati Hineuru may have had an interest in the Kaweka range and

that they were not consulted on the fixing of the interior boundary of this part of the Ahuriri

block as well.[68] The latter contention is as probable as in the case of the upper Mohaka valley;

in any event, no explicit reference to any Ngati Hineuru involvement has been found in the

available records.

BaHara and Scott also suggest that between Park's survey and the final purchase deed, the

boundary 'shifted from the eastern base of the Kaweka range to the top of the range itself'. This

may overstretch the rather loose description in Park's report, which traced the boundary 'to

Waiharakeke at the base of a high mountain range, Kaweka, ... ; on the west by Kaweka some 16

66 Report ojthe ChiejCommissioner's visit to Ahuriri etc, Dec. 1857 etc, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0005, ATL (ROD C3a, pp.41-2).

67 McLean, J01l1'l1al, vol.3, 30 April 1851 & vol.4, 6 February 1858, MS-Papers-1284-6 & 7, ATL. 68 Ballara & Scott, Ahuriri, p.25; also O'Malley, Ahuriri, pp.210-11.


miles to Mangatutu on the Mohaka River ... '. Park may equally have intended to refer, as in the

purchase deed, to 'the confluence of the Waiharakeke and Ngaruroro Rivers thence the boundary

lUllS along the ridge of Te Kaweka to the confluence of the Mangatutu and Mohaka Rivers ... ' . [69]

However, a purchase deed executed twelve years later casts some doubt on where exactly the

Crown purchase agents thought the exclusive interests of the Ahuriri hapu ended.[70] Signed on

18 April 1863 by Paora Hapi Te Huriwaka and eleven members of his hapu, Ngati Rangiita of

Ngati Tuwharetoa, it paid £100 for their interests in Te Rangatawhao and Kaweka 'and in fact

everywhere that the land has been sold to the Queen'. On the attached sketch are marked two

blocks, one of them a huge tract lunning south of the Mohaka River all the way from the Makino

River to the Oamaru River in the Kaimanawa Range. It is unmarked, except for a pencilled

'75,000', presumably an estimate of its acreage (see Map 5).

Between the Makino and Makahu Rivers, also on the south banle of the Mohaka River, is marked

a much smaller 'Rangataw[h]ao Block'. Behind it, stretching southwards to the Ngaruroro River,

is the Kaweka Block, pencilled in at 35,000 acres. Its eastern boundary, which should coincide

with that of the Ahuriri block, runs unmistakably from the Waiharakeke along the foot of the

Kaweka Range, not the ridge, and to the Makahu River, not the upstream Mangatutu as marked

on the Ahuriri deed sketch. It thus also overlaps part of the area covered by the 1858-59

settlement with Ngati Hineuru. That this sketch reflects the understanding of the southern Taupo

based hapu of Paora Hapi and recognises their interest in the Ahuriri block was confirmed by

McLean himself in reporting the payment (see section 2.2).[71]

There was no mention of the Kaweka land in the text of the 1858-59 settlement with Ngati

Hineuru, nor any reference to it in the various accounts of the negotiations. But in early 1860 they

told Locke that they had a claim 'for a piece of the Kaweka block', on which the Crown had

already advanced £130 to other owners.[72] Ngati Hineuru are not specifically mentioned in

subsequent reports from officials on Maori claims and Crown purchases in the Kaweka ranges

69 Ballara & Scott, Ahllriri, p.25; Park to McLean, 7 June 1851, AJHR 1862 C-1, p.314; Turton, Deeds, vol.2, pA91.

70 Hawke's Bay deed HWB 80 & sketch plan, LINZ HO. 71 McLean to Native Minister, 29 June 1863 & list of payments, LPD Letterbook, 1863-66, ppA, 6, qMS-1214,

ATL (ROD C3a, pp.20, 23). On the similar overlap in two 1859 purchase deeds for the Kaweka Range, see O'Malley, Ahllriri, pp.216-7.

72 Locke to McLean, 2 March 1860, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL.


inland ofthe Ahuriri block. Piecemeal buying up of interests continued into the mid-1860s and

beyond. In June 1864, McLean paid £300 to Tareha and other Hawke's Bay chiefs as a final

settlement of their claims in the area. [73)

Then on 8 January 1865 McLean issued a receipt for £200 to four signatories, 'being an advance

on account of land being sold by us to the Queen and situated between the upper Mohaka and

N garuroro rivers and the Kaweka range'. Two of the signatories, Te Whetu and Paora Hapi, were

Taupo chiefs with interests in the hill country bordering Hawke's Bay; Te Whetu was living at

least part of the time at his kainga by the confluence of the Ripia and Mohaka Rivers. Paora Hapi

was being paid a second time for much the same land. Also signing was Nikora Te Whakaunua

of Ngati Hineuruy4) The description of the affected land is vague but clearly overlaps the

Kaweka block as marked on the April 1863 deed sketch. To what extent Nikora may have been

representing a wider Ngati Hineuru interest is not clear.

2.4 Waitara and Mohaka

During 1863-64, Ngati Hineuru resisted a government attempt to purchase a large part of what

later became the Waitara block.[75) On 3 April 1863, Te Ngoki and seven others signed a receipt

for an advance of £ 100 on an area of about 20,000 acres. [76) The total purchase price was left open

in the deed: 'upon the completion of the survey the amount in payment for that land will be

fixed'. The deed itself was left curiously incomplete as its text did not specify the purchaser, nor

was there a purchaser's signature to complete the transaction, which was attested by two Pakeha

witnesses. A rough sketch plan marked out a rectangular block stretching along the south side

of the Mohaka River from the Mohaka Crown purchase boundary opposite the Te Hoe River

junction (see Map 15). The area thus covered a large part of the Mohaka valley east of the Taupo

track.

73 O'Malley, Ahuriri, pp.223-4; Cowie, Hawke's Bay, pp.115-7. 74 Native Land Purchase Department Receipt No.5 (translation), 8 January 1865, HB 8/30; also return of

McLean's land purchase account with the Provincial Treasurer, July-September 1865,66/420, HB 4/7, NA. The fourth signatory was Paora Takiri.

75 Parsons, Te Waka, pp.117,122 (no source referenced). The deed is not documented by Turton. 76 Hawke's Bay Deed HWB 40B, 3 April 1863, LINZ HO, reproduced in ROD A 14, Appendix 6. The deed and

attached sketch are discussed in George Thompson, The documentary evidence of the extent of Ngati Pahauwera interests outside the Waihua and L01l'er Mohaka valleys, (1996. ROD J20), pp.35-8.


McLean soon confirmed that this was the start of a Crown purchase. His accounts show a

payment dated 3 April 1863 for £100 to 'Te Ngoki Mohaka'. In a memorandum to the Land

Purchase Department three months later he itemised '£100 advanced on account of a new

purchase at Mohaka'. On 21 April he forwarded the deed to H. Fitzgerald in Napier,

commissioning him to survey the block. Fitzgerald had signed as a witness to the Maori

signatures and had drawn the sketch plan of the block. [77]

Apart from Te Ngoki, McLean did not specify either the signatories or the block. The Ngati

Hineuru protest (discussed below) named the chief seller as Te Pouaka ('Pouka', second

signatory on the deed), who had interests in the inland Mohaka Crown purchase block near the

Waikare RiverJ78] But he did reveal that he had also been negotiating with Ngati Tuwharetoa

claimants for the purchase of land in what looks like the same area. On 18 April, the date that

Paora Te Huriwaka sold his hapu's Kaweka and Rangatawhao interests, McLean informed the

Taupo Resident Magistrate Law that[79]

Paora Huriwaka and several Taupo Natives have been offering to dispose of land to the Government

on the South or European side of the Mohaka river ...

It seems therefore that McLean paid an advance of £1 00 to a coastal group of claimants, received

an offer from another Taupo-based group, but did not consult Ngati Hineuru on either.

Already the prospective purchase had run into trouble. McLean conceded to Law that he had

suspended the negotiations:[80] ' ... as the purchase of such land in the present unsettled state of the

natives might lead to disagreement among them I have declined their offer until the question is

more fully ventilated'. Parsons concludes that 'the sale appears to have been abandoned' in the

face of opposition from Ngati Hineuru, who alleged that the sellers were not the rightful

77 McLean to Fitzgerald, 21 April 1863; ibid. to Native Minister, 29 June 1863 & list of payments, LPD Letterbook, 1863-66, pp.3-6, qMS-1214, ATL (ROD C3a, pp.20-3).

78 Verbal information from Patrick Parsons, 7 April 1999. 79 McLean to Law, 18 April 1863, LPD Letterbook, 1863-66, p.2, qMS-1214, ATL. 80 McLean to Law, 18 April 1863, LPD Letterbook, 1863-66, p.2, qMS-1214, ATL.


owners,l81] A month after the deed was signed, Nikora Te Whakaunua protested vigorously

following a runanga meeting on the sale:[821

E hoa, kua he a Te Pouaka. Kaore i a ia te wenua. Heoi tena, ka tuku atu a au te korero a te iwi nona

te wenua kia kite koe. I hoki ai ahau, he raruraru kei uta mo te wenua i tukua a Paora Hapi ki a koe.

Ka nui te raruraru kei uta e hoa Te Makarini. Kei tuku koe i te Pakeha ruri i te wenua i tukua e Te

Pouaka ki a koe. Kia tae ake aTe Kepa ki uta, ka hoki mai ai ahau ki te korero ki a Ime, maua tahi ko

Te Kepa. E hold mai tenei, ka tukua atu e au te pukapuka a taua iwi ki a koe, ara, na te iwi nana te

kainga.

Friend, Te Pouaka was wrong. The land does not belong to him. I will tell you what the people who

own the land say so that you will see. When I returned there was big trouble. The land which Paora

Hapi sold you is inland. My friend, McLean, don't let the Pakeha land surveyor onto the lands which

Te Pouaka sold to you until Te Kepa [Kipa] arrives. I will come back to talk to you. That is myself

and Te Kepa. When he returns I will send you a letter from the rightful owners ofthe land.

The matter still rankled in January 1864 when a further letter conveyed a similar message, whilst

hinting at a possible compromise through recognition of the rightful owners and monetary

compensation. [83]

A year later, Crown land purchasing again reached the borders ofN gati Hineuru' s rohe. In March

1865, Samuel Locke, having 'just concluded the Waihua purchase' north of the Mohaka River,

pushed on inland:[841

I rode with Toha Teira Paia Heremia and others a few miles up the river where I met a party from up

the Waiau Moakena and his people who offered all the land from the back of the Waihua block to the

Mohaka up that river to the Ngatihineuru boundary then along this boundary to the Waiau then down

that river to a level with the upper part of the Waihua block. .. I told them that I must settle all the old

affairs first and then I would see them again with which they were well satisfied but requested me to

be quick.

81 Parsons, Te Waka, p.122. 82 Nikora Te Whakaunua to McLean, 4 May 1863, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0687C, ATL (trans. Te

Taite Cooper & Lee Smith). 'Wepa' corrected to 'Kepa'. 83 Petera [Te] Rangihiroa to McLean, 4 January 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0688A, ATL (trans.

Winifred Bauer). Petera (d.l917) was a cousin ofTe Rangihiroa's son Tawhana (d.1890) and became a leader of the reconstituted Te Haroto community in the 1880s and 1890s (whakapapa given by Aniheta Kingita at MLC Napier MB 72, p.290, 12 February 1925). Binney (Redemption songs) incorrectly identifies the two as one person; it was the fifteen-year-old Tawhana who was captured at Petane in 1866 and returned with Te Kooti in 1868.

84 Locke to McLean, 7 March 1865, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL.


This large area appears to have extended towards the Te Hoe River and the eastern edge of the

land under negotiation in 1864. Exactly where the 'Ngatihineuru boundary' was located is

unclear but Locke's account implies that the would-be sellers considered it to run eastwards

beyond the Te Hoe River as far as the Waiau River. Locke's proposed follow-up did not mention

consultation with N gati Hineuru.

The negotiations evidently got no further. The land north of the Mohaka Crown purchase later

came before the Native Land Court in three blocks, Rotokakarangu (October 1875), Te Putere

(October 1875) and Maungataniwha (June 1879).

2.5 Conclusion

N gati Hineuru were all but shut out of the Ahuriri Crown purchase. During his conduct of the

negotiations, Donald McLean had ample indication of their claim to land in the Mohaka valley.

He was well aware not only ofTe Heu Heu's general opposition to land sales but also that he

considered his interest to include the hills and ranges of the central divide bordering Hawke's

Bay. Led by their senior chiefTe Rangihiroa, Ngati Hineuru attempted to assert their interest

directly, but McLean did not allow them to negotiate, nor did they participate in the sale hui on

2 May 1851. The boundary survey proceeded without their participation and cut out a large slice

of the Mohaka valley within their rohe. Despite an apparent commitment at the sale hui, McLean

made no subsequent effort to adjust the boundary before completion of the purchase.

In the years following, Ngati HineulU sustained their claim. When the Tarawera corridor became

of strategic interest as a link in the overland mail route to Auckland, needing Ngati Hineuru's

cooperation, McLean agreed to negotiate. However, at the February 1858 meeting with Ngati

Hineuru leaders he refused to concede their claim, even though Te Moananui acknowledged it,

treating it as an internal matter for the sellers and claimants to resolve. A deed of receipt was

neveliheless executed in which the Crown purchased Ngati Hineum's interest for £50. Although

his two half-brothers were amongst the three signatories, Te Rangihiroa signed neither this nor

the August 1859 addendum, which recorded the payment of a further £50 and included amongst

its eight signatories Nikora Te Whakaunua of Tarawera and Paora Hapi Te Huriwaka of Taupo.

I I I


In April 1863, McLean paid Te Huriwaka and his people £100 for the Kaweka Range,

recognising their claim despite opposition from the Ahuriri sellers. The area included the inland

Ahuriri block and an overlap with the 1858-59 settlement. But there was no further

acknowledgement to Ngati Hineuru. In January 1865, the Crown paid £200 for land in the

Kaweka ranges south ofthe Mohaka and adjacent to the Ahuriri block to four signatories, who

included the Taupo chiefs Te Whetu and Paora Hapi Te Huriwaka, the third time that he had

been paid for part of this area. Nikora Te Whakaunua also signed but no other Ngati Hineuru

chiefs were involved.

The £1 00 payment to Ngati Hineuru in 1858-59 was not generous by the standards of other

Crown purchases in the region. For roughly 15,000 acres it amounted to about 1.6d per acre. This

is close to the low rate of 1.4 d per acre for the original Ahuriri purchase and compares with the

5d to 8d per acre paid over 1857-1859 for large blocks such as Ruahine bush (100,000 acres),

Porangahau (145,000 acres) and Moeangiangi (12,000 acres).

Circumstantial evidence from the late 1850s and early 1860s suggests that a sense of grievance

persisted amongst at least some Ngati Hineuru leaders regarding the inclusion of Mohaka valley

land in the Ahuriri purchase. There was no overt assertion of a Ngati Hineuru claim and no

further negotiations with the government took place. Nevertheless, Ngati Hineuru's agreement

to the mail route and bridle track improvement was not the same as acceptance of the land sale,

as Te Rangihiroa's responses in February 1858 and August 1859 make clear.

Crown purchasing pressure on the south side of the Mohaka valley increased in the mid-1860s.

As well as the piecemeal purchasing of interests in the Kaweka Range, in April 1863, £100 was

advanced on land between the Taupo track and the Mohaka Crown purchase to non-Ngati

Hineuru sellers. Ngati Hineuru protested vigorously and the sale made no further progress. In

March 1865, Samuel Locke opened negotiations for the purchase of a large area north of the

Mohaka Crown purchase 'to the Ngatihineuru boundary'. There is no sign that Ngati Hineuru

leaders were consulted. Once again the sale made no further progress.

Apart from the Kaweka payments, no land in the Mohaka valley was actually alienated and sale

negotiations did not continue. The pattern of the Ahuriri purchase persisted, however: most N gati

Hineuru chiefs were neither consulted nor included in the negotiations and deals affecting their

I I


interests in the Mohaka valley lands. From Ngati Hineuru's vantage-point at the interface

between the autonomous Maori polities of the interior and the increasingly land-hungry province

of Hawke's Bay, this exclusion can only have strengthened a sense of unease in a period already

disturbed by war and land confiscation.

I I I

I


3. The Malting of the 1866 'Rebellion'

This chapter examines events and processes leading up to the military conflict in October 1866

that was used to justify the Mohaka-Waikare confiscation in January 1867. It deals mainly with

the ten-month period preceding the conflict (January to October 1866). The focus is on the

motives and actions of the two principal parties to the conflict, Ngati Hineuru and the provincial

government, but other participants are also covered in less detail, in particular the kawanatanga

chiefs of Heretaunga.

The chapter is divided into two parallel parts, each of which develops a mainly chronological

narrative covering the same period, the years 1863 to 1866. Each part deals with one side of what

eventually became a conflict between opposing groups, first Ngati Hineuru and the other Pai

Marire groups who associated with them (section 3.1), and second the government and the

kawanatanga chiefs (section 3.2). The purpose of dividing the narrative into two complementary

sequences is to develop a coherent presentation and analysis of the contrasting perspectives,

intentions and actions of the principal historical actors, whether individuals or groups. The

presentation is structured so that the parallel accounts can also be read alongside each other. The

final section (3.3) integrates the analysis in addressing several ofthe main issues arising from the

two narratives.

3.1 Ngati Hineuru and the Pai Marire Challenge in Hawke's Bay

3.1.1 Economic Engagement, Roads and Land (1858-65)

The 1858-59 Ahuriri settlement marked the beginning of a period of active engagement between

Ngati Hineuru, the colonial authorities and the Hawke's Bay provincial government. The

Provincial Council, established by separation from Wellington in 1858, voted £500 for the

'Taupo road' in 1859, £500 for 'Titiokura and Tarawera' under 'Roads and Bridges' in 1860, £50

for 'Titiokura' in 1861 and, after a hiatus, £160 for the 'bridle track from Pohui to Tarawera

(mail track)' in 1863/64.[85]

85 Provincial Council of Hawke's Bay, Estimates of Expenditure.


Part of these appropriations financed contracts undertaken mainly by Ngati Hineuru leaders for

improving the walking track for horse transport and for building bridges. In late 1861, Kipa and

Nikora, who in early 1858 had agreed with McLean to begin improving the track, applied to the

provincial authorities on behalf of the tribe - 'from Kipa's Runanga and Nikora' - for funds to

make a road across William Marshall's land in the Te Pohue area:[86]

We have assented to Mr Marshall's road, as a road for the mail, because our horses and the Postmen

are greatly cut up with the floods.

In November 1861, Superintendent Carter informed them that money was already allocated and

invited them to Napier 'that we may talk about the mail, and also about the road on which the

mail is to travel'.[87] But the Ngati Hineuru chiefs explained that because the work was urgent,

they had already selected the route and had started the work. They committed considerable

resources to improving a bridle track that ran well beyond their rohe:[88]

It is great the weariness of our post men and their horses with the freshes in the Kaiwaka and the

Waiohinganga streams, our post men were all but in those streams, such is our reason for assenting

to making that road. We have been 15 days at work, there are at present 12 men at work.

This was a joint enterprise: in sending the Provincial Engineer to evaluate the line of road

between Titiokura and Tarawera, Carter took care to indicate to Nikora that the Engineer would

report back only 'when you both have decided on the best road and other subjects as well', and

to ask him 'what you think would be sufficient to complete it'. [89] Provincial Engineer Charles

Weber's report for the first half of 1862[90] records that

Between Pohui and Tarawera, our Auckland mail road, the Natives have contracted for the erection

of six bridle-track bridges, for the clearing and widening of some old side-cuttings, and for the

clearing of the bush track from Te Haroto to Turangakumu, which they report as completed.

86 Kipa's Runanga and Nikora to Governor and Alexander, n.d., HB 4/13, NA. 87 Carter to Kipa & Nikora, 8 November 1861, HB 4/13, NA. 88 'Kipa and his friends' to Alexander, 12 November 1861; see also 'Kipa's runanga and Nikora' to 'the

Governor and Mr Alexander', n.d., HB 4/13/72, NA. 89 Carter to Nikora, 17 March 1862, HB 4/13/100, NA. 90 Quoted in Parsons, Te Waka, p.64.


Nikora himself was paid £50 for road work in August 1863.[91]

Following the hiatus imposed by the invasion ofWaikato, McLean attempted to revive the road

building programme with Maori labour, his ultimate goal being a strategic road from Napier to

Auckland. Ormond responded positively:[92]

I think your idea of the employment of Native road-parties on the Taupo road is one that it is very

important to us should be followed out.

But when in late 1864 he learnt the likely capital cost of construction - £20-30,000 in Hawke's

Bay Province and £40-50,000 in Auckland Province - his enthusiasm soon cooled. He advised

McLean that the provincial revenue could not sustain anything like so large an outlay, however

significant the political gain - a gain to which he was fully alive:[93]

.. .I believe it to be the most necessary work to be undertaken in the Northern Island ... For this strikes

a line through and opens up the whole of Maoridom ...

Unaware of the provincial tussle between political ambition and financial restraint, at least some

Ngati Hineuru leaders were willing partners. In January 1865, Nikora Te Whakaunua's father,

Hohepa Te Tauru, congratulated McLean on the results of the provincial road-building

programme: [94]

Kia rongo mai a koe, he maramatanga ake no aku mahara ki tenei mahi pai. Katuhera tonu nei i enei

takiwa, ara, i te mahi rori. Ka pai tenei mahi. He nahi aroha tenei na korua ko te Kawana ki 0 tatou

huarahi, ara, ki 0 matou, ki 0 nga tangata Maori. Tenei te wahi kino rawa ko Turangaakumu. Me

korero koe ki nga tangata 0 Ngati Matepu kia mahia taua wahi. Mau tetahi kupu, ma matou hoki tetahi

kupu ki a ratou.

This is to let you know that I have been amazed with this good work. That is, the opening up of these

areas by road construction. This is good work and shows the love of yourself and the Governor to our

pathways - ours, those of the Maori. Turangaakumu is the worst place. You should talk to Ngati

Matepu to have that place developed. You talk to them and we will also.

91 Payment dated 3 August 1863, Donald McLean, LPD Letterbook, 1863-66, p.10, qMS-1214, ATL. 92 Ormond to McLean, 22 September 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0481, ATL. 93 Ormond to McLean, 12 January 1865, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0481, ATL. 94 Hohepa Te Tauru to McLean, 28 January 1865, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0689A, ATL (trans. Te

Taite Cooper & Lee Smith).


As late as March 1865, with Hawke's Bay convulsed with dissension over Pai Marire, Nikora

was still seeking road contracts:[95]

He kupu atu tenei kia koe kua oti te rori go[7] tini he hiahia hoki toku ki a tua mai hoki te tahi nahi

maku mo te Wahi e kino ana ano 0 te rori ki Tarawera kia hohor [illeg.] te pai.

The road [7] has been completed. I am also asking you to set up some work for me at this place. The

road to Tarawera is terrible. Send your approval quickly.

Nikora himself built a weatherboard house at Tarawera and even in the aftermath of Omarunui

was given credit for his previous hospitality to travellers.[96] Te Rangihiroa, portrayed then and

later as obdurate and traditionalist, was credited by Paora Rokino with having initiated the

building of an Anglican church on the Taupo track at the historical site of Te Purotu, just nOlih

of what became known as Church Crossing on the Mohaka River (see Map 6):[97]

I heard of Church Crossing. Rangihiroa and his family arranged for the church building. Pererika, my

father, my uncle Te Whetu, Parerohi and others procured the timber. Te Purotu was a meeting house.

Inangatahi is the place the timber for the church was obtained ... Rangihiroa and his people were

Protestants and erected the church for the Anglican worship.

During 1864-65, Nikora became involved in promoting land sales outside Ngati Hineuru's rohe.

In January 1864, he informed McLean that[98]

Kua tae mai nga tangata i korero ai ahau ki a koe i mua. I haere mai kia korero tahi koutou mo te tuku

atu i to ratou whenua kia a koe. Naku i pehi[7]. Engari mau te ritenga kia haere atu, a, ka haere atu

ai, ka tukua at ai au kia haere atu.

95 Nikora to McLean, 20 March 1865, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0689B, ATL (trans. Te Taite Cooper & Lee Smith).

96 Nikora to McLean, 20 March 1865, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0689B, ATL (trans. Te Taite Cooper & Lee Smith); Cooper to Native Secretary, 29 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.12.

97 Napier MB 72, p.175-6, also p.183 (Te Raroa Sullivan); Plan ofthe Mohaka ferry reserve,1873, AAFV 997 H6, NA; Parsons, Te Waka, p.101.

98 Nikora to McLean, 18 JanualY 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0687A, ATL (trans. Te Taite Cooper & Lee Smith).


The people I spoke about to you earlier have arrived. They came so that you could all talk about

selling their land to you. I agreed [7]. However, you have the responsibility whether I go, and ifI am

permitted to go ...

In early 1865, Nikorajoined the southern Taupo chiefPaora Hapi, Paora Matenga and Hohepa

Tamamutu in land sale negotiations with the Crown. In January 1865, they visited Napier in an

attempt to push through a land deal.[99] The Superintendent reported that 'a party of Taupo

Natives are on a visit to dispose of a large tract of land between Napier and Taupo' .[100] Shortly

afterwards, they asked for an advance of £30, promising that '1 will pay it back out of my

payments for my lands' [MaIm e whaka hold i nga utu 0 aIm wenua].[IOI]

There is also fragmentary evidence ofland dealing within Ngati Hineuru's rohe. An official

return from 1863, compiled from information provided by settlers, listed a squatting lease of

1,200 acres at 'Tarawera' as a 'sheep-run' to G.S. Cooper, who had been trying without success

to lease land at Tarawera from Nikora in 1860 (see section 2.2.2).[102] An 1865 return included

'Tarawera' in a list of Maori lands on which the Crown had begun purchase negotiations,

indicating a payment of £50 for 10,000 acres 'pending survey' p03] There is no trace of either the

lease or the purchase advance in other documentation, but it is likely, given his other dealings,

that Nikora Te Whakaunua would have been involved. [104]

Thus from 1858 to early 1865, a number ofNgati Hineuru leaders actively sought economic

partnership with the colonial and provincial authorities, whilst remaining cautious about selling

or leasing land from within their rohe.

99 Nikora, Paora Hapi, Paora Matenga & Hohepa Tamamutu to McLean, 10 January & 14 February 1865, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0689A, ATL (trans. Winifred Bauer). They do not indicate what land.

100 Superintendent to Native Department, 16 January 1865 (register), MA 3/2, NA. 101 Nikora to McLean, 20 March 1865, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0689B, ATL (trans. Te Taite Cooper

& Lee Smith). 102 Return o/persons occupying Native Lands, AJHR 1864 E-10, p.6. 103 Return 0/ land purchases in New Zealand, AJHR 1865 C-2, p.4. 104 Paora Torotoro is another candidate for receiving the £50 advance (Cowie, Hawke's Bay, p.108), but the gap

between payment (at latest July 1865) and his Native Land Court application (January 1866) makes a connection less plausible.

I I

!


3.1.2 War, Loyalty and Pai Marire (1863-1865)

Political relations, although fluctuating, were also on the whole positive. In March 1863, Te

Rangihiroa was prepared to engage with the colonial civil authorities, sending a messenger,

following an unspecified incident, to request 'that you give back to me the hatchet which was

taken away by the policeman'. He offered reassurance: 'The bad times and the trouble have

finished. There is only peace now' [Kua mutu te kino, te raruram. He pai anake inaianei. Te kupu

ki a koe, ko te patiti i tangohia atu na e nga Pirihimana me whakahoki mai e koe.].[105]

It was not to last. The British invasion of Waikato in July 1863 raised tension throughout the

North Island in what was now a full-scale national confrontation. Ngati Hineum, sitting astride

the strategic gateway to Hawke's Bay from the interior, were caught once again at the interface

between powerful and polarised political forces. Ngati Hineum leaders such as Nikora Te

Whakaunua attempted to protect their autonomy by providing intelligence on possible hostile

moves from the interior to the provincial authorities. In November 1863, Nikora reported a

planned invasion by a 300-strong force from Ngati Maniapoto,P°6] a mmour which circulated

widely at the time. The invasion did not materialise, but Nikora was far from alone in picking up

the false mmour and he warned the government promptly. He subsequently took pains to keep

the authorities updated, informing McLean in January 1864:(107]

Kaore tahi he korero hou mai 0 Waikato i tenei taima. Hoi ano, te korero. Kei te noho noa iho te

Pakeha raua ko te Maori. Kaore tahi he korero.

There is no news about Waikato at this time. What is being said, though, is that the Pakeha and the

Maori are simply living. There is no news.

Although the invasion scare had no foundation, there were nevertheless signs of growing local

support for the kingitanga. Whitmore, then Civil Commissioner at Napier, reported in January

1864 that Te Rangihiroa had been on the campaign trail:[108]

105 Te Rangihiroa to McLean, 3 March 1863, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0687B, ATL (trans. Te Taite Cooper & Lee Smith).

106 Nikora to McLean, 9 November 1863, Letterbook, Superintendent of Hawke's Bay, no.3, qMS-1203, ATL. 107 Nikora to McLean, 18 January 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0688A, ATL (trans. Te Taite Cooper

& Lee Smith). 108 Whitmore to Colonial Secretary, 27 January 1864, AJHR 1864 E-3, p.l5.


A chief named Rangihiroa has been making inflammatory speeches in this district. The natives told

him that they would not allow him to disturb the peace, and Renata threatened to kill him if he

continued to preach rebellion either here or elsewhere, for he would fight on our side. Karaitiana

spoke to the same purpose.

By March 1864, following the return ofPaora Told from Waikato, more rumours were reaching

Locke, who informed McLean on 16 March:[109]

You will have heard that Paul has retu1'l1ed from the Waikato and that he is stirring up the people of

this District as much as he can ... Pomfrey says that he has heard that it is the intention of the Waikatos

to send down two or three hundred men into this Province for the purpose of exciting the people.

He conceded, however, that 'I cannot answer yet for the truth of this information'. McLean must

have raised the matter with Ngati Hineuru because a month later Nikora's father, Hohepa Te

Tauru, protested vigorously: [110]

E hoa, kaore matou i rongo atu i tenei korero kua tae atu na ki a koe. A ki ana taua korero kua tae mai

a Waikato ki Tarawera nei. E hoa, he horihori tena korero, kei whakarongo ki nga korero horihori a

te tangata. Mehemea ku (sic) rongo matou kua tuhituhi atu kia a koe. Kei a Tukuru te korero tika kia

a koe. Kia tae mai ia ki Tarawera nei ki te titiro a taua korero, kua kite ia i te horihori 0 tena korero.

Friend, we didn't hear about that story which reached you, saying that Waikato have arrived here in

Tarawera. My friend, that's a lie. Don't listen to other people's false stories. Ifwe had heard, I would

have written to you. Tukuru has the correct story for you. When he arrives here in Tarawera to look

into this matter, he will see its falsehood.

During May 1864, the provincial authorities became alarmed that a kingite attack on Hawke's

Bay might be imminent. On 28 May, a correspondent who may have been Samuel Locke sent in

a report from Napier to McLean detailing what he believed to have been plans for a coordinated

attack on Hawke's Bay, inspired by the Ngati Matepu leader Paora Told ofPetaneY"] Locke had

109 Locke to McLean, 16 March 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, A TL. 110 Hohepa Te Tauru to McLean, 24 April 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0688B, ATL (trans. Te Taite

Cooper & Lee Smith). 111 'James Locke' to McLean, 28 May 1864, McLean Papers TS, 44, pp.9-13, HBM. The identity of the sender

of this letter, located by Parsons (The Hauhall movement in HGll'ke 's Bay, (1994), pp.53-55) in the typescript copies ofletters to McLean held in the Hawke's Bay Museum library, is obscure because no 'James Locke' appears in the microfilmed correspondence in the Alexander TU1'l1bull Library'S McLean Papers. The obvious candidate is Samuel Locke, some of whose letters were mislabeled 'Jas Locke' by a cataloguer, but the letter

(continued ... )


written up a shorter version for Deputy Superintendent Rhodes on 17 May and parts of the story

buttressed McLean's plea for military reinforcements a week earlier. [112] Locke claimed to be

well-informed:

As instructed by your Honor, I have employed myself for the past six months, principally in

ascertaining the views and the purposes of the natives in this district, regarding their position to the

Europeans. In doing this I have been in constant contact, not only with the leading men of this

Province, but with a good many individuals of the different tribes.

In other words, his story derived from a mix ofPakeha and probably loyalist chiefs and is likely

to have been coloured with their views.

This time N gati Hineuru were woven into the plot. According to the Locke report,

The natives in the neighbourhood of the Pohui and the Haroto, assisted by the Ureweras, have been,

for the past ten or twelve months, preparing for an attack on this Province ... But when the General had

driven the natives out ofthe [missing word?] part ofthe country, and commenced operation in the Bay

of Plenty, the natives ofthe interior, namely the Urewera, and others, with the people about Tangoio,

Pohui, the Haroto and Tarawera considered the time was come for a combined attack on this district.

In his earlier memo, [113] Locke similarly asserted that

In the past nine months the Maoris living in the northern portion of the province especially those in

the neighbourhood of Petene Tangoio and Pohui have been preparing for an outbreak. They have

planted large plantations of potatoes, and maize in Pohui bush, and in the neighbourhood ofTarawera

and Haroto (Rangihiroa's village).

Upon his return from Waikato in early 1864, Paora Told was said to have set about trying to

provoke settlers into retaliation and to mobilise Maori support for the kingitanga in coastal

III ( ... continued) could not be found in the microfilms or originals. Other cross-checks also drew a blank. The content is, however, similar to 'a memorandum drawn up by Mr Locke which will give you the latest native information .. .', which Rhodes forwarded eleven days earlier (Locke, [memo], 17 May 1864; Rhodes to McLean, 17 May 1864, MS-Papers-0032-0394 & 0527, ATL), and in this report Samuel Locke is taken to have been the writer.

112 Locke, [memo], 17 May 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0394, A TL; McLean to Colonial Secretary, 11 May 1864, AJHR 1864 E-2, p.66.

113 Locke, [memo], 17 May 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0394, ATL.


Hawke's Bay, with some success. Samuel Locke had reported similarly in mid-March. [114] But

a meeting at Petane judged that reinforcements were needed and agreed that Paora Told

should return to the Waikato, and organise an attack upon the Napier district; Rangihiroa remaining

here to make preparation for the same purpose ...

According to the Locke report, Paora Told departed for Waikato with about 40 followers in early

April and returned about a month later:

During the absence of Paora, Te Rangihiroa was very active in organising the proposed attack, for

which purpose he sent messengers to the Urewera and the East Cape, asking for armed assistance.

Rhodes picked up a similar rumour of external reinforcements in mid-May: 'Henry Mr Biggs'

Maori sawyer says the Uriweras were mustering at Harota' . [115] In his 17 May memo, [116] Locke

reported unconfirmed information

... that there are about foUl' hundred of the Urewera and other inland tribes at Haroto and Pohui, that

they have stopped the road through Pohui bush and that they are building a Pa at Titiokura, and that

they claim all the land at the back ofthe Maunga-haruru range.

The land claim suggests that Locke had picked up a lingering N gati Hineuru grievance about the

Ahuriri purchase. But the rest probably relates to the preparations for a hui at Te Pohue described

by Jolm Parsons, who occupied an inland run south of Te Pohue alongside the Taupo track (see

Map 6):[117]

The Natives here have a considerable quantity of potatoes, much more than required for their own

consumption and are now collecting provisions for a large meeting shortly to take place at Pohui at

which Paora Toki is expected to attend.

At this hui, which followed the defeats at Orakau (31 March-2 April) and Maketu (late April),

the Locke report stated that 'Paora and Te Rangihiroa declared ... that they would defer their

purpose for a more fitting period' . He believed that 'there is no immediate danger for this district,

114 Locke to McLean, 16 March 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. 115 Rhodes to McLean, 14 May 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 116 Locke, [memo], 17 May 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0394, ATL. 117 Parsons to Superintendent, 14 May 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0495, A TL.


but that Paora and Rangihiroa and their party have merely deferred action for the present'. [Jl8]

Uncertainty persisted all the same as to Paora Told's intentions and in late Maya Maori

informant told Locke, rather obscurelyy19]

Na te Mani(?) ka haere nga hohia (sic) a Paora Toki ki te hanga tona pa, ki te tiakai hoki i a ia ki te

whiu i nga kau, i nga hohio (sic), i nga purapura(?) i nga mata.

On Monday, Paora Toki's soldiers are going to construct his pa and also to help him chase away the

cows, horses, the seeds(?) and the bullets.

There are echoes of this story in the government Maori newspaper Te Waka Maori, which

repOlied in mid-April that Paora Told had returned from Waikato and was trying to rally support

for an attack on Napier. It subsequently claimed that Kingita Te Whe, described as 'a person of

little authority', and Poihipi 'called the people of Tarawera to a meeting at Te Haroto in April'

to consider a proposal to attack Napier. Kipa, however, informed the provincial authorities via

Tareha and the kawanatanga chiefPitiera Kopu from Wairoa threatened to challenge Kingita at

Tarawera. ShOlily thereafter, 'the people of Heretaunga met at Petane on May 12th and reaffirmed

that they would not allow anything drastic to happen in their territory' . [120] There was no mention

in these articles ofleading Ngati HineulU chiefs such as Nikora Te Whakaunua and above all Te

Rangihiroa. If there was a Ngati HineulU proposal to attack Napier, it does not seem to have

gained broad support amongst Ngati HineulU as a whole.

To what extent the Locke report's constlUction of a far-flung conspiracy was real or fanciful is

impossible to determine at this distance. Hawke's Bay was not insulated from the widespread

unease amongst Maori communities throughout the North Island at the British invasion of

Waikato,[121] and Paora Told had certainly led a contingent to Waikato. Told was later to defend

118 'James Locke' to McLean, 28 May 1864, McLean Papers TS, 44, pp.9-13, HBM. 119 Mano to Locke, 28 May 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0687C, ATL (trans. Te Taite Cooper & Lee

Smith). The year appearing on the original letter, 1864, is correct. 120 Te Waka Maori, 1(23) & (25), summarised in Parsons, Hal/hall movement, pp.31-3. Parsons does not say

whether 'Kipa' and 'Kingita' were the Ngati Hineuru chiefs of the same name and the context is too vague to make a judgement.

121 James Belich, The Nell' Zealand wars and the Victorian interpretation o/racial conflict, (Auckland: Penguin, 1988), p.128.


his action on the grounds that local Pakeha had broken their pcui of a mutual commitment not to

get involved:[122]

Another law had been made that nobody should go fi'om Hawke's Bay to the war, but the pakeha went

first. Colonel Whitmore went to Orakau, and then he thought himself free to go.

However, the Locke report's picture of European-style military planning, if at all accurate, might

perhaps be more appropriately rendered as consultative hui debating appropriate responses,

defensive as well as offensive. Locke's memo of 17 May reported the return of Paora Told's

pcuiy £i'om Waikato to Tangoio in early May, 'where they are now holding runangas to consider

future proceedings' .[123] It is possible that Told also had some political ground to make up after

a rebuke from Tawhiao. A letter from Whitmore about this time noted his return to Te Pohue and

added: [124]

I learn that Matutaera sent him back "as he was acting contrary to the wish of the Heretaunga tribes"".

Toki is said to be much ashamed of himself but Europeans and Natives are much excited.

Local Maori leaders were also taking defensive measures. The Locke report credited Te

Rangihiroa and 'Pohipoi'[125] with stopping road-building on the Taupo track, 'using the

argument that they were cutting their own throats by making the road, which was evidently for

military purposes'. Only Te Whetu from Pakaututu was willing to continue.[126]

The fears ofTe Rangihiroa and Poihipi concerning the road projects were in any case not entirely

ill-founded. In November 1863, Joseph Rhodes had bracketed military settlement with road

building: [127]

122 Hawke's Bay Herald, 1 April 1866. 123 Locke, [memo], 17 May 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0394, ATL. 124 Whitmore to McLean, n.d., McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. 125 Probably the Taupo chief who had since 1851 been one of McLean's active partners and was to feature

prominently as a kawanatanga ally in the late 1860s and early 1870s. McLean stated two weeks earlier that 'Te Poihipi of Taupo' was cooperating with Te Rangihiroa in organising opposition (McLean to Colonial Secretary, 11 May 1864, AJHR 1864 E-2, p.66).

126 'James Locke' to McLean, 28 May 1864, McLean Papers TS, 44, pp.9-13, HBM. 127 Rhodes to McLean, 14 November 1863, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL.


I see the General Government have provided that 2,000 military settlers shall come here and I

sincerely trust that road making will commence at our end as above at once. The spade and pick will

prove the only Maori conquerors. This is a work of time so better commence early as possible.

The active role ascribed by the Locke report to Te Rangihiroa was consistent with his leadership

style and his seniority. But he could produce no evidence of actual military preparations directed

against provincial Hawke's Bay. His implied assignment ofNgati Hineuru to the 'rebel' camp

is in any case flatly contradicted by Hohepa's protest a month earlier, which at the least points

to divided opinions amongst Ngati Hineuru leaders.

As the Waikato war ground to a halt, the new Pai Marire religion swept rapidly across the North

Island, provoking intense debate and much local dissension amongst Maori communities. Pai

Marire burst into Hawke's Bay in full force during the first few months of 1865. The Ngati

Matepu leader Paora Told, an active supporter of the kingitanga in 1863-64, became a leading

advocate ofPai Marire from his Petane base during 1865. In March 1865, Rhodes noted that 'the

King's flag flys at Petene as usuaL .. '. [128)

Since many of the Pai Marire groups arriving from the interior travelled down the Taupo track,

it is scarcely surprising that Ngati Hineuru and Petane were exposed to Pai Marire influence and

once again attracted official scrutiny. From February 1865 onwards, various groups, often

labelled as 'Waikatos', passed through or remained at Petane. They were often reported to have

arrived from the interior via Te Pohue and Petane; the Tarawera corridor was once again brought

into focus in a time of heightened political tension.[129)

Both the loyalist Hawke's Bay chiefs and the government campaigned vigorously against the

spread ofPai Marire influence, and organised a series ofhui and official events between March

and May 1865. On 29 March, Noa Huke accompanied Cooper, Wi Tako from Wellington,

Karauria and Tareha to a showdown meeting with Paora Told at Petane, who had been branded

as the chief local promoter of Pai Marire and who at that time was living in a Pai Marire

settlement 'at a little distance apati from the rest of the Petane natives'. At the meeting, which

128 Rhodes to McLean, 6 March 1865, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 129 Hawke IS Bay Herald, 18,21,25 & 28 February, 7 & 25 March 1866.


lasted all day, Told challenged the claimed incompatibility ofPai Marire with maintaining the

peace. As reported in Te Waka Maori: [130]

He spoke of living peacefully; let the first sign of hostility be made by the Pakeha. He rejects the

murder ofVolkner, but that is a hostile territory, this is a pleasant place to stay.

According to Cooper's account, he picked up the Hawke's Bay chiefs' geographical definition

of their sphere of governance: [13 1]

The law of peace had been laid down for Heretaunga, which had been called "the post of peace".

Waikato, Taranaki, Wanganui, Tauranga, Opotiki, and other places, are" the posts of war". The law

had not been broken ... Now he was a Hauhau, he would still keep the peace. The murder at Opotiki

was a very bad thing, but that had occurred at "the post of war", and the pakeha need not be

suspicious of him on that account, for this is "the post of peace", and the law of peace will be kept

here unless the pakeha breaks it.

He asked Cooper 'to give him a flag to hoist in token of peace at Petane', which Cooper agreed

on condition that he hand his over first.

Paora Told's emphasis on contrasting districts of war and peace was an example of a widespread

use of concepts of zones of influence by Maori leaders articulating their positions amidst political

and religious conflict. [132] He followed up the meeting with a strong assertion of the Pai Marire

commitment to peace within Hawke's Bay:[133]

The "posts of war" are at Whanganui, Waitotara, Taranaki, Waikato, Turanga, Maketu, Te Awa

ateatua [Te Awa 0 Te Atua, eastern Bay of Plenty], Wakatane, Ohiwa. That bloodshed arose from

Pakeha's hands. It will not be right to bring that blood hither, leave it where it is ...

Hawke's Bay, which he defined as ' Waikare [to] Cape Kidnapper[ s]', should stay a 'post of

peace'. Within it, 'each separate chief has his own place and takes his own line of conduct. .. '. He

130 Te Waka Maori, 8 May 1865, quoted in Boast, Mohaka-Waikare, p.25. 131 Hawke's Bay Herald, 1 April 1865. By 'post', Toki appears to mean 'region'. Parsons also refers to 'posts'

(plural) in the sense of symbolic boundary markers, although he gives no documentary evidence that the Hawke's Bay chiefs used the word, or that it was used in that way (Parsons, Hal/hall Movement, p.60).

132 Paul Clark, 'Hallhall '; the Pai Maril'e search jor Maori identity, (Auckland: Auckland/Oxford University Press, 1975), p.67.

133 Paora Told & others to McLean & Cooper, 14 April 1865, MS-Papers-0032-0526A, translation in McLean Papers TS, 23, p.245, quoted in Clark, Pai Marire, pp.43, 67.


concluded emphatically: 'These are permanent sayings for ever and ever'. To ensure that there

was no room for misunderstanding, he asked McLean to publish his letter in the government

sponsored Te Waka Maori, 'that our Maori friends may see it and the Pakeha as well'. Although

a brief summary of his speech at the hui appeared in the May edition, it appears that this was not

done. [134]

To what extent Ngati Hineuru leaders were connected into the process is unclear, since reports

of the meetings usually mention only the principal loyalist chiefs giving speeches. At only one,

a large hui at Pakowhai on 21 April 1865, is there a specific indication that Ngati Hineuru

pmiicipated.[135] It is also noteworthy that Anaru Matete, later targeted by the government as a

dangerous rebel, was present with other Poverty Bay chiefs at a meeting in Napier on 1 May on

the situation in Turanga and again on 8-9 May at the large-scale banquet with which McLean

rounded off a week of shoring up loyalist sentiment amongst the chiefs of the regionY36]

Te Rangihiroa himself was said to have played an active role: after he was killed near Petane in

October 1866, he was accused by George Cooper not only of being 'an inveterate enemy of the

Pakeha' but also 'the chief who introduced Hau Hauism under a false pretext into Wairarapa last

year,.[137] Cooper was probably referring to a visit by a Ngati Hineuru group in early May 1865

as part of a reciprocal inter-hapu exchange. As reported by the local Resident Magistrate,

Wardell [138] ,

... a party of Natives, about thitiy in all, headed by a chief named Te Rangiura [Rangihiroa], have

arrived in this district from Tarawera, and are now at Waikaraka. They accompanied Auaru [Anaru]

ofWaikaraka on his return from Tarawera, to which place he had been for his sister, who was staying

there. These men profess to be believers in the Hau Hau faith, and are said to have exhibited their

power by curing some malformation in a horse at Mataikona, and some ofthe Natives of that place

are said to have become converts to their faith. The arrival of this party in this district has revived the

desire of a portion ofthe Natives here to become acquainted with the Hau Hau faith ... Auaru and his

immediate followers have expressed a desire that they should visit him, and it is probable that in the

course of a few days they will cross the valley for that purpose.

134 Te Waka Maori, 8 May 1865, quoted in Boast, Mohaka-Waikare, p.25; no mention in Parsons' edited extracts (Hallhall movement).

135 Te Waka Maori, 2(50), p.13, summarised in Parsons, Hal/hall Movement, pp.36-8 and Boast, Mohaka-Waikare, p.26.

136 Hawke's Bay Herald, 2, 6 & 11 May 1866. 137 Cooper to Native Secretary, 29 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.12. 138 Wardell to Native Minister, 3 May 1865, AJHR 1865 E-4, pp.29-30.


Wardell's account hardly suggests active proselytising on Te Rangihiroa's part, but suggests that

he was walking on fertile ground.[139] In fact Te Rangihiroa was visiting his relative, Anaru of

Waikaraka. His party was unarmed and amounted to no more than five men, three women and

three children. Its arrival was nevertheless turned into a full-scale confrontation by the belligerent

C.D. Ward, who had recently been dispatched with a force of troops to the Wairarapa by Prime

Minister Weld, to whom he reported directly. It was with great difficulty that local Maori chiefs

eventually negotiated safe passage for Te Rangihiroa's partyP40] Even the return journey in early

June was problematic, requiring an intervention from Tareha to prevent Te Rangihiroa being

detained during his passage through Hawke's Bay.[141] The experience of this trip was a sharp

lesson for the Ngati Hineuru rangatira in the risks of arbitrary attack and arrest within areas under

the control of a government which seemed to regard all followers of Pai Marire as rebels.

Over the following year, Petane remained one of the principal Pai Marire centres in Hawke's

Bay. In August 1865, the Pai Marire community brought logs downriver to erect a large niu pole:

'It is in three trees, each thirty feet long, which, when joined and raised, will be a flagstaff of

somewhat imposing height'. [142] It was probably during this period that a new Pai Marire

settlement formed and consolidated at Waiparati, close to Te Haroto in the centre of Ngati

Hineuru's rohe.

3.1.3 Sheep, Dogs and Conflict Management on the Frontier (January-May 1866)

In January 1866, Lieut-Col. Whitmore laid a charge of sheep theft with Superintendent McLean

against his Ngati Hineuru neighbours across the Mohaka. During the first week of February,

McLean sent a mixed police party led by Whitmore's Pakeha employees to Te Haroto to arrest

the alleged culprits and escort them to Pa Whakairo for investigation. In a tense stand-off, Ngati

Hineuru people obstructed the seizure of one of their chiefs and the party had to depart empty

handed.

139 He was not mentioned in Wi Tako's report on a Wairarapa hui in late May on Pai Marire (Wi Tako's report of speeches relative to the introduction of Hall Haufanaticism into Wairarapa, AJHR 1865 E-4, pp.33-5

140 Ward to Weld, 7,8,9,10,11,16 May 1865, Weld Papers, MS-Copy-Micro-0396, ATL. I am grateful to Bruce Stirling for these references.

141 Civil Commissioner to Native Depmiment, 5 June 1865 (register), MA 3/2, NA. 142 Hawke's Bay Herald, 29 August 1865.


This incident was a radical departure from nearly seven years of generally peaceful frontier

relations in the Mohaka valley. Since Te Rangihiroa's expulsion of Edward Towgood from the

Mohaka valley in May 1859, Ngati Hineuru rangatira had tolerated the intrusion of the pastoral

frontier into land they regarded as part of their rohe. Te Rangihiroa himself, however, had not

signed up to the alienation deed and other Ngati Hineuru leaders were not fully satisfied. To

varying degrees, they expected to continue a regime of economic coexistence with the sheep of

the Pakeha land-owners.

The arrival of Lieut-Col. Whitmore in 1863 placed extra strain on frontier relations. Whitmore

had purchased his run in November 1861 in partnership with Captain lC. O'Neill, whose cousin

at first managed it. [143] Whitmore had the capital, energy and business acumen to expand his

pastoral enterprise rapidly, which meant more sheep and more shepherds. He had an exc1usivist

approach to occupying land to which he had Crown-derived legal title and was little interested

in informal co-management for compatible economic uses. He also took the political view that

occupying the 'extreme frontier' strengthened the province's military security and bolstered the

confidence of other Pakeha settlers. Such an approach was bound to sharpen the lines of

distinction at the Mohaka interface between the tribes of the interior and the Pakeha runholding

system of Hawke's Bay (see Map 6).

Whitmore used the high country of the Maungaharuru Range and the Mohaka valley as summer

grazing, dividing it into the Te Waka and Hukanui runs, each under the supervision of a

shepherd. On the Mohaka side the sheep were left to roam free. This regime raised both

opportunities and problems. Te Whetu, who lived on the banks of the Mohaka near its confluence

with the Ripia River[144] (see Map 7) and had refused to join the opposition to road-building in

early 1864, adopted a strategy of engagement. He was, Whitmore reported, 'in the habit oftaking

contracts for work from me, and is generally on friendly terms with my people and with me'. He

also took pains to defuse risks of friction: 'I have on more than one occasion received friendly

143 James Belich, 'Whitmore, George Stoddart', DNZB. 144 Nesfield's sketch placed Te Whetu's village on the north bank of the Mohakajust downstream of the Ripia

River's confluence. It was thus very close to Mawhai Pajust upstream of the confluence (Cowie, Te Matai and Pakalltlltu, p.33 & figure 3). Te Whetu, whom Paora Rokino described in 1924 as 'my uncle', died before October 1867 (Napier MB 72, p.176; Whitmore to McLean, 24 October 1867, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL).


information from him relative to stray stock and such matters'. [145] Sheep pushed into the

unsupervised frontier pastures were bound to stray and Maori across the river were expected to

contribute to their shepherding by returning them.

Very little information emerges on parallel Maori usage of the station range along the southern

face of the Mohaka valley. However, Whitmore hinted at continuing hunting expeditions in

describing how his shepherds 'were accustomed to call the Maoris to account for having dogs

on the Run ... '. Perhaps this usage was one reason why 'for three years I have been unable to use

the Waka a large part of my summer country', close both to the Taupo track and to the

settlements near it. [146]

Whitmore claimed that sheep-stealing was 'not unfrequent on my Run' and that 'I have lately I

fear lost many sheep in this way' . [147] But he also conceded that since the alleged theft more than

three weeks previously, 'the Hau Haus have not attempted any further thefts of sheep'. In any

case, he would usually not get to hear of such thefts, because thieves 'may at any time rob me of

sheep without my knowledge unless as in the present instance I accidentally happen to hear of

it through a native ... ' . [148] In other words, he had no concrete evidence at all of previous thefts

from his run.

Even in the case of this theft, of which Whitmore was confident he had proof, the circumstances

were less than clear-cut. That sheep were taken - 12 at first count, 17 according to the police

party - was beyond doubt. But the abduction, according to Te Whetu, was from 'a flat at the

junction of Enungitihi [Inangatahi] and the Mohaka', in other words right by the border with

Ngati Hineuru's land. McNeill and Nesfield differed on precisely what Te Whetu's women

informants had told him: according to McNeill, 'his wife and two other Maori women saw some

native belonging to Ihaihia's (Isaiah) tribe driving 12 sheep off the Hukanui run'; but according

to Nesfield the information came 'from his woman and a girl called Mary, who had been down

145 Whitmore to McLean, 29 January 1866, IA 1 236/66/417, NA. 146 Whitmore to McLean, n.d. & 29 January & n.d., IA 1 236/66/417, NA. 147 Whitmore to McLean, 29 January & n.d., IA 1 236/66/417, NA. 148 Whitmore to McLean, 30 January 1866, HB 417, NA.


at Keepa's [Kipa's] Pa and saw them eating mutton' .[149) It is not inconceivable that these were

strays which the abductors had decided to appropriate rather than, like Te Whetu, return across

the river, and in so doing threatened Te Whetu's carefully constructed modus vivendi with

Whitmore's shepherds (see Maps 6 and 7).

Whitmore also realised that he might have difficulty proving that the sheep actually belonged to

him. On the back of McNeill's report of the police raid he scribbled a note to McLean:(150)

From what I hear from the policeman the question of earmark was raised. Do not allow this. The

sheep were many of them "longtails", never having been got in before but mine all the same. Some

had brands of previous owners whose rights have devolved to me, and the question if raised (as they

have no sheep of their own) will only complicate the matter.

How Whitmore could be certain that the people of the Maori communities opposite his station

had no sheep, especially as a number had arrived only recently, he does not divulge. What they

would have seen, by his account, was sheep with different brand-marks or no marks at all,

roaming at will and occasionally straying across the Mohaka River. The sheep taken, according

to McNeill, were 'rough sheep and were down the long range' JlSI]

Why were the sheep taken? Alongside his political and security rhetoric, Whitmore came up with

what may be a more plausible motiveJl52) There were, he informed McLean,

a very considerable number of strange natives ... at the Oharata Pah... In my opinion these strange

natives are nearly starving, and come from a distance. They have been coming onto the Hukanui and

Waka ranges ...

Te Whetu, according to McNeill, described the alleged thieves as 'Hau Haus who had lately

come to Isaiah's pah,.[153) As part of the fallout from the Waikato war and the East Coast

convulsions over Pai Marire, at that time focused on the Wairoa area, many Maori people and

149 McNeill to Whitmore, n.d., IA 1 236/66/417, NA; Nesfield, unsigned statement enclosed in Whitmore to McLean, 30 January 1866, HB 417, NA. The various accounts suggest that Ihaia was a local chief and Pai Marire supporter at Te Haroto.

150 Undated note signed 'GSW' on the reverse of McNeill to Whitmore, 6 February 1866, IA 1 236/66/417, NA. 151 McNeill to Whitmore, n.d., IA 1 236/66/417, NA. 152 Whitmore to McLean, 30 January 1866, HB 417, NA. 153 McNeill to Whitmore, n.d., IA 1 236/66/417, NA.


groups were on the move and the Tarawera corridor was a principal connecting route. Te Haroto

was becoming known as a Pai Marire centre and adherents from outside Ngati Hineuru's rohe,

as well as adventurers and refugees, were inflating its population and putting pressure on its food

resources.

McNeill's brief description of Te Haroto during the police visit gives a fleeting insight into the

processes under way:

We had an opportunity of witnessing the whole ofthe Hau Hau rites and ceremonies they have a fine

flag staff at Haroto and they treated us to a fine display of flags. A party arrived from the Wairoa

while we were there. There is also a native there who was engaged in the fight at Opotiki after

Volkner's murder.

Peita Kotuku was one of the new arrivals:[154]

I became a convert to Pai-marire ... and joined the Ngati-Hineuru tribe at Te Haroto and Titiokura, on

the mountain track between the Rangitaiki and Napier, the present main road. Here I lived for a time

in the kainga ofPanapa, the prophet of this tribe.

Not only were there more mouths to feed but established local tribal methods of managing

conflicting frontier interests were put under stress. The Pai Marire newcomers were also more

assertive. According to McNeill, on being accused by Te Whetu's women the thieves replied:

"'Never mind, we are Hau Hau and shall do as we please'''. In Nesfield's version, 'the women

told them it was wrong and said it might lead to a fight on which the natives said "Never

mind'" . [155]

When the police party suddenly arrived to call them to account, it is clear from McNeill's report

that the Ngati Hineuru rangatira made strenuous efforts to arrange a settlement.[156] Kipa, whose

kainga was on the north banle of the Mohaka close to the site of the abduction,

154 Te Kooti's scout: a Hal/hauwarrior's st01Y, the last o/the "Rifleman" escapees, TS, p.4, James Cowan Papers, MS-Papers-0039-041A, ATL.

155 McNeill to Whitmore, n.d., IA 1 236/66/417, NA; Nesfield, unsigned statement enclosed in Whitmore to McLean, 30 January 1866, HB 417, NA.

156 McNeill to Whitmore, 6 February 1866, IA 1 236/66/417, NA. The following account of the police raid is based on this report.


came with us to search for the 8 sheep left at Mohaka but though we were looking till near sundown

we were unable to find them. Kipa seems thoroughly frightened and very anxious to find the sheep,

which he says he prevented the other natives from taking to Haroto, he is to meet G. Gold early on

Thursday morning when they are to have another thorough search for them.

Kipa clearly had no idea where the sheep were - they had probably returned by then to the open

range. At Te Haroto, the community readily gave up the three surviving sheep in their custody.

The senior rangatira Te Rangihiroa, Nikora Te Whakaunua and Henare Kipa tried to negotiate

compensation for the five admitted to have been killed:

The chiefs were very anxious that I should take 3 tolerably good horses which they brought into the

Pah as payment for the missing sheep ...

In the one previous acknowledged theft Whitmore was able to cite, the case was settled by

payment of compensation to the aggrieved runholder, John Parsons.[IS?] On this occasion,

however, McNeill was there not to negotiate but to enforce McLean's order to Te Whetu to bring

out the alleged thieves to Pa Whakairo for investigation - and rangatira as well, through

McNeill's misreading of McLean's letter as stating 'that he wished the Haroto chiefs to come

down to Pa Whakairo to consult on the matter' .

Delivered without warning, the demand that Ngati Hineuru leaders submit themselves or their

people to immediate escort under arrest to the power centre of their Hawke's Bay political

opponents would have hit them as a shocking intrusion on their mana. Even so, they managed

to defuse a potentially violent confrontation. Although the culprits were suspected to be visitors,

they refused to name them. When the police party demanded the local chief ofTe Haroto, Ihaia,

they 'refused to give him up' and obstructed an attempt to seize him by force:[IS8]

We wanted to bring Mr Ihaihia away nolens volens, but the natives closed round him and we were not

strong enough for them. There were about 40 men in the pah.

McLean's police raid can only have jolted the confidence of Ngati Hineuru's leaders in the

willingness of the provincial government to respect their mana and tino rangatiratanga. They

157 Whitmore to McLean, n.d., IA 236/66/417, NA. Whitmore implied but did say directly that the culprits were from Ngati Hineuru.

158 McNeill to Whitmore, 6 February 1866, IA 1 236/66/417, NA.


must also have been uneasy as to what further moves he might make after the police party had

to leave empty-handed. The direct repercussions of the incident are obscure. There is no sign that

McLean initiated any further police or military action. It appears that matters now followed a

more accustomed diplomatic path for three months later, in early May, Nikora Te Whakaunua

was in Napier with Ihaia making final alTangements with McLean for the investigation the latter

had wanted:[1591

Kua riro mai i au Ihaia. Hei apopo ka haere maua ki Te Pawhakairo ki a Tareha. Ko te Tangata nana

i patu nga hipi, e kia nei, na Te Witi maa ...

Ihaia has arrived here. Tomorrow we are going to Pawhakairo to Tareha. They say that the person who

killed the sheep was Te Witi and some others ...

But you decide whether I should go or not. Or if you allow me to go my friend, send me a letter soon ...

The outcome of the sheep-stealing investigation is not known. In any case, it was shortly to be

pushed aside by a sudden escalation of political tension from a different quarter.

3.1.4 Defending Ngati Hineuru's Rohe (June-July 1866)

After the surrender of Te Waru in May 1866, McLean seized the opportunity to bring the

campaign against Pai Marire south from the Wairoa area into Hawke's Bay.[1601 During late May

and early June, the kawanatanga chiefs Ihaka Whaanga and Pitiera Kopu led an armed force

down the coast, into Napier and on to Pa Whakairo and Pakowhai. Given ostentatious support

by McLean, the expedition's sudden arrival made public demonstrations of loyalty highly

expedient for the Hawke's Bay chiefs. Ngati Hineuru quickly became a target of convenience,

Karaitiana going so far as to propose a combined military assault. Although this was not accepted

by the other chiefs, the threat remained in the background whilst Karauria was dispatched on a

mission to Te RangihiroaY611

159 Nikora Te Whakaunua to McLean, 9 May 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0690C, ATL (trans. Te Taite Cooper & Lee Smith). The Maori text ofthe second English paragraph is missing in Cooper & Smith's document.

160 Discussed in detail in section 3.2.3. 161 Hawke's Bay Herald, 12 June 1866.


Karauria's mission was unsuccessful. Giving evidence 58 years later to the Native Land Court,

the 83-year-old Waha Pango recalled:[162]

When the Hau Haus stalied Tareha and Karauria tried to bring them back into loyalty. Panapa saved

Karauria from being killed when he tried to bring the Hineurus back into the fold.

It was clearly an angry confrontation. Te Rangihiroa, by now an old man and principal rangatira

ofNgati Hineuru for more than four decades, adopted what the settler newspaper described as

'a very defiant attitude towards the government'. Williams claimed that N gati Hineuru and Paora

Told had 'threatened to tapahi any of the friendly Natives who might go that way to remonstrate

with them'. [163]

The kawanatanga chiefs responded with a military parade in Napier on 26 June 1866, again

welcomed by McLean, with offensive action still on their agenda. [164] Observing this noisy

display of belligerent loyalism, it is scarcely surprising that Ngati Hineuru should feel threatened.

It was Panapa, the Pai Marire prophet at Waiparati, who tried to defuse the confrontation. On 29

June, he wrote directly to Te Hapuku and Tareha from Waiparati. Referring probably to the

recent visit of Karauria, he appealed for calm and for mutual respect for each other's rohe:[165]

Ehara i te kupu hou, te kupu ka tukua atu nei ki a koutou. Ko taua kupu ano i tukua atu ki a koutou

i mua. Kaore matou a pai kia whawhai tatou. Kaua e whakaaetia te hara ate tangata ki runga ki 0 tatou

marae, he mea kia hara tahi tatou me ratou. Koia matou ka tuhi atu ki a korua, kia kaua a tineia ta

korua ta korua paL I mea hold matou, ko Heretaunga hei takotoranga mo ta koutou paL Engari ka

pirangi te tangata ki te whawhai, me haere ki Taranaki a te Tihema nei, ki reira tatou kitekite ai tena.

Ki konei kaore e pai kia mimi tonu iho ki tona whare.

What I have to say is not new. Its what I said to you all before. We do not want us all to fight. Don't

let an individual's sins onto our marae. Then we would be at fault just like them. That is why we are

writing to you two. Don't extinguish your goodwill. We have said that Heretaunga be the place where

your benevolence should lie. However, if people wish to fight, they should go to Taranaki in

December where we shall all see. But, here, it is wrong to urinate upon one's own house.

162 MLC Napier MB 72, pp.185-6. 163 Samuel Williams to his father, 28 June 1866, Williams Family Papers, MS-Papers-0069-0018, ATL. 164 Hawke's Bay Herald, 26 June 1866. 165 Panapa to Te Moananui & Te Hapuku, 29 June 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0690D (trans. Te

Taite Cooper & Lee Smith), A TL.


Simultaneously, Panapa joined Te Rangihiroa in sending an urgent and forceful message to

McLean, calling on him to assist in keeping the peace:[166)

Kaua e whakaaetia te whakaaro 0 te tangata ki te whakahe i to tatou nei kainga. Whakahokia tena

tangata ki ton a marae mimi ai. Waiho to tatou nei kainga kia takoto pai ana. Kaore matou a pai ki te

whawhai. Waiho to tatou nei kainga kia takoto pai ana. Ara, na te kaha 0 korua ko Tareha ki pupuri

i te pai ki roto Heretaunga. Ka pirangi te tangata ki te whawhai me tono ki Taranaki ki reira matou

kitekite ai.

Don't agree with the opinions of someone who is criticising our land. Tell that person to go back to

his own marae to urinate. Leave our kainga in peace, we don't agree with fighting. Leave us in peace.

It is because you and Tareha have been so forceful in holding on to peace, that this person wants to

fight. Send him to Taranaki and then we'll see.

The confrontation subsided but the causes of tension remained unresolved. Soon, a new factor

came into play. A month after the Ngati Hineuru letters, Cooper noted that the Ngati Matepu

leader Paora Told, writing from Waiparati, had requested one ofthe Hawke's Bay chiefs to visit

him: [167)

P. Toki has written to Paul Torotoro to go up and see him at the new pa called Waiparati near

Titiokura. He is to go up tomorrow.

There is no further information on what was discussed at this meeting but its timing may point

to another factor contributing to the tense political situation, the operations of the Native Land

Court.[168) Torotoro and his uncle Te Waka Kawatini had disputed Ngati Hineuru's claim to

Mohaka valley land within the Ahuriri block in 1860 (see section 2.2.2). In January 1866, he

joined two applications for title to large swathes ofland north of the Mohaka River, threatening

the loss of much ofNgati Hineuru's remaining rohe. Notices of the hearing ofthese applications

were published on 15 June, a week after Karaitiana's proposal for a military assault on Ngati

Hineuru. Also set down for hearing on 7 August on Torotoro's application were two other blocks

on the fringes of Ngati Hineuru's rohe, Mohaka and Maungaharuru, as well as Te Pahou and

166 Te Rangihiroa & Panapa to McLean, 29 June 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0690D, ATL (trans. Te Taite Cooper & Lee Smith).

167 Cooper to McLean, 29 July 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0228, ATL. 168 Moorsom, Tara1l'era, pp.39-42.


Petane, Paora Told's turangawaewae, which had already come before the Court's first sitting in

March.

If land issues were raised with Paora Torotoro during his visit to Waiparati, just a week before

the sitting, he may have been persuaded to concede some ground, for when the Court sat on 7

August he attempted to withdraw the two applications for Tarawera and on 16 August Mohaka

was dismissed and Maungaharuru postponed indefinitely. His uncle Te Waka Kawatini's

persistence, however, led to the Tarawera applications being postponed rather than dismissed,

a continuing threat to Ngati Hineuru's land. Title to Petane and Te Pahou, including Te Waka

Kawatini and Paora Torotoro as owners, was awarded on 16 AuguSt.[169]

The political repercussions of the threat of attack across the Mohaka River soon aroused wider

concern amongst Maori. In early July, Rhodes reported that 'Renata Pukutu ofPahtangata has

written about the Rangihiroa business .. .', though he didn't say in what respect.[170] In early

August, four chiefs describing themselves as 'the Queen's people of Taupo' - Poihipi, Paora

Matenga, Paora Te Huriwaka and Hohepa Tamamutu - expressed their concerns to McLean

regarding several conflicts with Pai Marire groups on the fringes of their rohe.[171] They signed

'otira na te iwi katoa' and all had been land sellers, road builders and friendly to the colonial

government for some years past. All had also been partners with Nikora Te Whakaunua at

various points in the 1860s.

They drew attention to what they saw as conflicting policies espoused by the Governor and

McLean, requesting the latter to keep his military action out of their region and to leave the

conflict management to them:

E Ma, ko nga whawhai mo to ratou rohe mo Taupo puta noa ki a Te Arawa ma te Kawana anake e

whakahau kia marama ai. E Ma, ko ta matau nei mahi inaianei he whakahaere anake i te pai. Na te

Kawana hoki i ki ki a matou kia kaha i te whakahaere i te pai ki nga Hauhau 0 Taupo, engari, e Ma,

kei tukua mai e koe te whawhai ki Taupo nei. Waiho tenei takiwa ki a matou, me te Kawana hoki,

mehemea ka kaha te whawhai ki a Ngati Hineuru ki a koe.

169 MLC Napier MB 1, pp.78-9, 106, 140-2, 147-9. 170 Rhodes to McLean, 12 July 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 171 Te Poihipi Tukairangi, Paora Matenga, Paora Te Huriwaka & Hohepa Tamamutu Kaituhi to McLean, 6

August 1866, HB 4/13, NA (trans. Winifred Bauer).


Ko Tarawera te rohe. Ki te mate ka rere mai nga oranga ki Taupo nei me waiho ki a matou te

whakahaere mo ena tangata i whawhai na ki a koe.

McLean, in connection with the fights for our area, Taupo to Te Arawa, the Governor himself will

order that they should be explained. McLean, our task is now solely to preserve the peace. The

Governor told us that we should be strong in establishing peace with the Hau Hau of Taupo. But

McLean, do not send the fight here to Taupo. Leave this area to us and the Governor too, if your fight

with Ngati Hineuru is strong.

As for the Tarawera district: ifthere are deaths, the living will flee to Taupo and the handling of those

people who fought you should be left to us.

3.1.5 Taldng the Pai Marire Challenge to Hawke's Bay (July-August 1866)

Confronted with threats to their land and what seemed the very real risk of unprovoked military

invasion, it appears that sometime during July Ngati Hineuru leaders participated in a wider

decision by Pai Marire leaders to mount a strategic initiative in the Wairoa and Hawke's Bay

regions. In May 1866, Anaru Matete, the N gati Maru chief from Turanga, who had escaped from

the Wairoa conflict, visited Tawhiao and for the first time accepted the kingitanga. During May

and June, he began to promote Tawhiao's message of unity and non-violence, issued in April

1866, to the East Coast tribes. [172]

In late July, George Cooper conceded that in and around his home area of Turanga, Matete's

arguments were making an impact:[173]

Things are looking rather bad at Poverty Bay. I am afraid Anam Matete's letters have had some effect

upon the lukewarm friend lies of that place ...

J.W. Harris noted from Turanga that 'Natives are anxiously awaiting answers from you

concerning the letters they forwarded from Andrew Matete' and observed that it was 'strange the

new infatuation (to which he appears to alude) should take hold of them after the lessons they

172 Judith Binney, Redemption songs: a life ofTe Kooti Al'ikil'angi Te TlIl'lIki, (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), pp.55-6; Moorsom, Tal'awera, pp,38-9; Bishop W.L. Williams, East Coast historical recol'ds, (Gisborne, n.d.), p.51.

173 Cooper to McLean, 29 July 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0228, ATL.


have had showing the falacy of Hauhauism'. Matete' s influence remained significant, even if not

all those responding to it accepted his rejection of war. [174]

By this time the focus was shifting towards Hawke's Bay. On 17 May, according to Binney, he

had written to the Hawke's Bay chiefs Karaitiana Takamoana, Renata Kawepo and Paora

Kaiwhata [175] ,

telling them that the land has been saved and that the King movement was absolute. He therefore

urged them to 'return ashore' (,hoki mai ki uta') with him, likening the King to the high ground on

which the people might take refuge.

In a letter written at the end of July, Karauria informed McLean in passing of a recent hui at Te

Whaiti, a locality situated some distance north of Tarawera on the edge ofthe Urewera mountains

and the Kaingaroa plain:[176]

Kua hui katoa te Hauhau 0 raro 0 Tarawera a te Rangihiroa a Paora Toki kua hui katoa ki te Hui a

Taikomako ki te Whaiti. Ko te korero mo taua Hui he wehewehe i nga tangata tekau ma rua mo te

Wairoa tekau ma rua mo konei [ilIeg.]hei whakangaro rawa i au, i aku Pakeha ...

All of the Hauhau at the bottom of Tarawera have met and those of Te Rangihiroa and Paora Toki.

All have met at the hui ofTaikomako at Te Whaiti. The talk ofthis hui was about dividing the people

twelve for Wairoa and twelve for here in order to destroy totally me and my Pakeha ...

The hui was thus preparing the direction of future Pai Marire campaigns, to which Karauria

ascribed a decidedly aggressive intent.[177] Ifhe anticipated a military attack he was, however,

badly misinterpreting the main thrust of the campaign. Taikomako was a prominent Pai Marire

prophet from Taranaki, who had lived with Te Ua near Opunake and whom Anaru Matete had

recognised in early June as one of an emerging new Pai Marire leadership. [178] According to Paul

Clark, in late 1865 Te Ua had appointed 'a leader to baptize the Ngati Kahungunu tribe of

174 Harris to McLean, 18 June, 2 & 29 July 1866, MS-Papers-0032-0327, ATL; Binney, Redemption songs, p.56. 175 Binney, Redemption songs, p.61. 176 Karauria to McLean, 30 July 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0690E, ATL (trans. Winifred Bauer). 177 'Tekau ma rua' had a possible religious meaning but Karauria was probably using the phrase in its military

sense of a war-party of any size. 178 Anaru Matete to Paratene Titore, 7 June 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0690D, ATL, translated in

Bronwyn Elsmore, Mana /rom heaven, (TaurangaiWeIlington: Moana Press, 1989), pp.267-8; Binney, Redemption songs, p.56.


southern Hawke's Bay'. He was by this time insisting on a message of peace and on selective

baptising of willing converts. 'In their proselytising the Apostles, the Dukes of Peace and Action,

and the Porewarewa (mediums or priests) were to act deliberately and after careful

consultation' . [179]

At a meeting of the king movement at Hangatiki in May 1866 had 'reportedly appointed

Taikomako ... as a prophet of a new faith designed to replace Pai Marire'. This initiative, which

followed the seizure ofTe Ua in February and his subsequent humiliating parading around the

North Island by Governor Grey, was an adaptation rather than a radically new religious creed.

'Apparently associated with this new gospel were the Tekau-ma-rua (twelve) who were sent by

King Tawhiao to proselytise in the King Country, Bay of Plenty, and East Coast... , P80] The

reference to 'tekau rna rua' picked up by Karauria was thus more probably to the sending of

recognised Pai Marire evangelisers than to any military adventure.

Taikomako's presence at Te Whaiti made the hui a significant Pai Marire event in the regional

context of the eastern North Island. Paora Told, the political veteran from Petane, was also there.

It was probably the same hui on which on 29 July Cooper passed similar information to

McLean:[181]

There has been a meeting somewhere in the Tarawera Taupo country at which all the Ngatihineuru

attended. It was decided to plant diligently in inaccessible spots and when the kai is ripe make a

descent in Heretaunga and Wairoa.

Rhodes was cautious enough not to jump to the conclusion that a plan existed for a military

attack. But he and Karauria had undoubtedly picked up the early indications of a renewed Pai

Marire initiative in Hawke's Bay.

179 Clark, Pai Marire, p.24. 180 Clark, Pai Mal'ire, pp.25-6, 105-6. 181 Cooper to McLean, 29 July 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0228, ATL.


In mid-August 1866, the formation of a new encampment began near Te Pohue. It seems to have

been a practical outcome of the Te Whaiti hui. In mid-August Karauria passed the first

information on the move to Resident Magistrate Cooper:[182]

People have arrived from Titiokura and we heard (from them) last night that all the Hauhaus are

encamped there. Anaru Matete is one of them.

On 27 August, Rhodes reported this information and more to McLean, providing a rough

estimate of the numbers involved: 'Anaru Matete with 170 and Paora Toke and Rangihiroa

[with]100 say 270 men all armed .. .'Y83] These numbers were to feature prominently in later

assessments of the Te Pohue gathering.

Accusations of sheep-stealing were soon flying. On 2 September, Whitmore complained that 'the

Hau Haus from Pohui have made a foraging expedition upon my run' and that they had taken 50

to 70 of his sheep. In his view, 'this body ofHau Haus is one formed upon the nucleus of Paul

Told's followers, and they are nearly starving' Y84] During late August, his shepherds had come

across several killed sheep and the tracks of sheep, horses and men leading offTe Waka in the

direction of Titiokura.[185] By 4 September he had revised his estimate upwards: 'I learn tonight

that 200 of my sheep are actually now in the pa on the Titiokura road'. His sources were the

Maori wife and son of a fencer, who 'had been very lately there' y86]

They state that the Natives had, before this theft of my wethers, been living on the sheep upon the

Waka which had escaped the muster of last year, and which, in the language ofthis District, are called

wild sheep. There was a flock of this description beyond the Waipuna shepherd's boundary.

Te Waka had been effectively off limits to his shepherds for more than a year and the sheep there

were to all practical purposes unmanaged.

182 Cooper to Rhodes, 18 August 1866, HB 4113/380, NA, enclosing 'translation of part of a letter that I have just received from Karauria'.

183 Rhodes to McLean, 27 August 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 184 Whitmore to Rhodes, 2 September 1866, HB 417, NA. 185 George Smith, Affidavit, 4 September 1866 (copy), IA 1 239/6611670, NA. 186 Whitmore to Cooper, 4 September 1866 (copy), IA 1 239/66/1670, NA.


The targeting of Whitmore's sheep may have been selective. His military role in the Waikato

invasion was of course well known to all Maori in the region and in particular to the pro

kingitanga leader Paora Told, who had led a party to Waikato during the war. John Parsons,

whose run was closest to the encampment, was later to advance a compensation claim 'for 300

sheep destroyed on my run by the Hau Haus'. [187] Whitmore referred obliquely to their 'having

extorted all that Parsons can spare', but appears to have been referring to food supplies[188].

Parsons himself gave no hint of sheep losses at the time.

There was restraint in another quarter too. The rising tension flushed out local grievances in

frontier transactions. In late August, Rhodes noted drily that

The bush men want arms as they say Paora Toki is going to make a raid on them for the stores of flour

and sugar. This may be true as Rigby and Proctor owe the Natives a considerable amount of money

and utu is their notion.

The 'bush men' got their arms, but under restrictions;[189] yet there were no subsequent reports

of raids or clashes with members of the Te Pohue gathering. There was also at least one attempt

to establish positive relations. Peita Kotuku, a non-Hineuru member of the party from Waiparati,

said in an interview 55 years later that the party bore gifts for a local settler:[190]

An armed party of about eighty marched over the ranges to Hawke's Bay ... One of the objects of our

expedition was to carry gifts to Tahe (Charles), a European who raised sheep; his farm was at Te

Pohue.

Whitmore's Maori informants provided him with the only eyewitness description ofthe Te Pohue

encampment to have survived. Being concerned mainly about his sheep, it was the arrangements

for livestock that caught his attention:[191]

These Natives further declare that the Hauhaus have erected a stockade, and that they have made a

paddock in the bush to keep their horses in, in which my sheep are now feeding.

187 Parsons to McLean, 10 August 1868, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0495, ATL. 188 Whitmore to McLean, 18 September [1866], McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. 189 Rhodes to McLean, 1 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 190 Te Kooti 's SCOllt: a Hal/hall warrior's story, the last a/the "Rifleman" escapees, TS, James Cowan Papers,

MS-Papers-0039-041A, ATL. 191 Whitmore to Cooper, 4 September 1866 (copy), IA 1 239/6611670, NA.


Whitmore also reported information that seemed to reinforce his militarist interpretation of the

Te Pohue gathering:[I92]

Mr Parsons told my overseer on Monday the 27th [August], that he knows that the Hau Haus had a

blockhouse - on the road. So there is every reason to believe that they have fortified themselves.

Relying apparently on Whitmore, Rhodes informed Parsons on 8 September:[193]

The information we have at present is that the Hauhaus have erected a pa and have cleared and fenced

a paddock in the Bush ...

In mid-September, Whitmore amplified his information from accounts he had gathered. [194] He

described the people gathered at Te Pohue:

... these are formed into three parties. Originally ... they were 270 to 300 in number. Anaru Matete had

a party, Panapa had one, and the large one is Paul Toki's - in which Rangihiroa and Kipa are perhaps

the men of birth. But since then they have gained recruits. A considerable party fi'om Waikato has

joined them quite lately.

The encampment he described seemed to have been built for a long stay:

They are very comfortable, having nice huts (some roofed by the pulling down of a house of mine).

A paddock for their horses pretty well fenced, where my sheep or the survivors still are. And some

kind of fortification which I do not yet exactly understand ... two blockhouses very strongly put

together and on the high road.

However, none of the post-Omarunui accounts, including Whitmore's, mentioned 'blockhouses',

pa or any other fortification and it has to be doubted whether there was any military construction

at Te Pohue.

The organisation of the encampment also impressed him as a military man and does not fit easily

with his description of the inhabitants as 'the refuse of all the tribes in the island':

192 Whitmore to Rhodes, 4 September 1866, HB 417, NA. 193 Rhodes to Parsons, 8 September 1866, HB 6/6, NA. 194 Whitmore to McLean, 18 September [1866], McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL.


They keep up all military ceremony. Sentries night and day guard the road. An armed covering party

goes out to protect the foragers for wood and water.

None of the descriptions of the time gives the exact location of the encampment except that it

was right on the Taupo track - 'Titiokura' was used as much as 'Pohui'. It is likely to have been

somewhere between modern Te Pohue and the final rise to the Titiokura saddle. It was thus

strategically positioned on the tenurial boundary between the Ahuriri block and land to the

northeast still in customary Maori ownership. Equally significantly, it was at the political

boundary between the inland sphere ofNgati Tuwharetoa and Ngati Kahungunu and at the edge

of the rohe N gati Hineum had asserted since before the Ahuriri Crown purchase in 1851. It was

also right on the border of the region declared by the Hawke's Bay chiefs in early 1865 to be

under their governance and off limits to Pai Marire incursions from inland.

In practice the composition of the Te Pohue gathering was probably a great deal more complex

than Whitmore's rather simple analysis. Hirini Tipare informed Karauria that he had entered the

encampment on28 AuguSt:[195]

Those who were in advance of me were turned back on the ground that the pa was tapu. When I got

there, I was inside the fence before they saw me and they could not get me out. I staid there 2 hours

and then returned.

He said that 'Waikato, Taupo and Rongowhakaata (Turanga people) are at Titiokura'. Groups

continued to arrive from considerable distances: in late August, 'a party ofHau Haus from the

Wairarapa district passed through this province, en route to Titiokura, a day or two ago'.[196]

A breakdown of the hapu affiliations of the prisoners captured at Omamnui and Petane on12

October indicates a wide diversity of tribal origins. [197] Ngati Hineum comprised by far the largest

single group, but were still under half at 41 percent. Ngati Matepu, Ngati Tu and Ngati

Kurumokihi from the lowland Mohaka-Waikare area made up another quarter (11, 8 and 7

percent respectively) (see Map 8). Ngati Kahungunu, possibly more from Wairoa than

Heretaunga, and Rongowhakaata, following Anam Matete, added a further fifth (9 and 11 percent

195 Hirini Tipare to Karauria, 4 September 1866, [English text, appears to be a translation], HB 417, NA. 196 Hawke's Bay Herald, 25 August 1866. 197 Moorsom, Tarall'era, pp.36-8.


respectively). The balance (13 percent) came from eight different tribal affiliations scattered

across the North Island. Toha Rahurahu, asserting his interest in the Mohaka-Waikare block as

a loyalist, conceded in 1889:[198]

The Ngatihineuru were the people engaged in that fight and some of our people but few in number

joined them. We requested them to withdraw from the Hauhaus but they would not do so.

Given this complexity, it is likely that a diversity of political, religious and tribal considerations

motivated the formation of the Te Pohue gathering. Whitmore's disparaging reference to 'the

other rascals, ... who care precious little for any Chief of birth, and live as they can from place to

place ... '[199]refiects the hard reality faced by opponents of colonial expansion who had lost their

land in the Waikato war or suffered a series of defeats along the East Coast. There were few safe

places left at which to reassemble in the hinterland of Hawke's Bay. Te Pohue would have

afforded a haven and a base from which to renew the political challenge. The strongest common

threads they shared with members of local hapu were the Pai Marire faith that most of them

espoused and hostility to the loyalist Hawke's Bay chiefs closely associated with the provincial

and colonial governments.

Others had more specific local agendas. Paora Told had been forced to live as a virtual outlaw

since the Waikato war and only precariously at his home community ofPetane. His support of

the kingitanga and Pai Marire made him the target of particular Pakeha hostility. As he had

argued at the Petane meeting on 29 March 1865, he was being in effect denied the right to oppose

and to campaign non-violently.

Ngati Hineuru, for their part, had a 15-year-old land alienation grievance that some, especially

Te Rangihiroa, may still have regarded as unresolved. To this sense of injustice had been added

the threat to usurp the title to much of their rohe signalled by prominent Hawke's Bay chiefs

earlier in the year through their Native Land Court applications. Several of these chiefs had in

mid-year proposed a military assault on Ngati Hineuru as rebels, threatening further their security

in following their Pai Marire faith. The province's Pakeha military leader ruled their Mohaka

198 Toha Rahurahu, Hemi Puna & Hoani Ruru to Native Minister, n.d. [received 10 September 1889], MAl 5/13/132 (RDB 59, pp.22697).

199 Whitmore to McLean, 18 September [1866], McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL.


frontier as a powerfullUnholder whose employees had led the confidence-sapping police raid in

January 1866. Ngati Hineuru's particular concerns were thus mainly defensive, but inaction was

increasingly unlikely to assure their safety.

3.1.6 Ngati Hineuru and the Expedition to Petane (7 September-3 October 1866)

On 7 September, a sizeable party from Te Pohue moved down to Petane. Their discipline

impressed one Pakeha military man who observed them:[200]

I understand that the party at Petane marched down in "capital order". That was Carr's opinion, and

he met them on the march.

Thomas Richardson, a local settler, who hastened to report their arrival to Rhodes in Napier, put

their numbers at 'about 70', Captain Carr a week later at '85 armed men'.[201] Other groups are

likely to have followed to join them: Parsons reported that 'another party of natives in number

thirty intend leaving this place tomorrow [11 September] for Petane,.[202] Whitmore thought the

travellers were from 'Paul Toki's party' and, as usual, attributed the move to hunger: ' ... they have

thrown off this swarm to feed itself at Petane whence it came originally' y03] Some were, in other

words, returning to their turangawaewae. On 14 September, Rhodes informed McLean that

'Panapa of Tarawera is down at Petane and Rangihiroa and Paora Told - Panapa is the head

man ... '. [204] A day later, he corrected himself on the basis of information from Carr, confirming

that ' ... Rangihiroa [is] not yet amongst them,.[205] On 26 September, he identified 'the

ringleaders' ofthe Petane party as 'Kinita, Paora Told, Panapa and Kipa' and gave his opinion

that'Rangihiroa they seem to have pushed rather into the background' . [206]

This leadership - the most prominent political figure in the Petane community, two half-brothers

of Te Rangihiroa, and the Pai Marire priest of Waiparati - indicates that the Petane party

comprised mainly Ngati HineulU and followers ofPaora Told. On arrival at Petane, they made

200 Whitmore to McLean, 18 September [1866], McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. 201 Richardson to Rhodes, 7 September 1866, HB 417, NA; Whitmore to McLean, 18 September [1866], McLean

Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. 202 Parsons to Rhodes, 10 September 1866, HB 417, NA. 203 Whitmore to McLean, 18 September [1866], McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. 204 Rhodes to McLean, 14 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 205 Rhodes to McLean, 15 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, A TL. 206 Rhodes to McLean, 26 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL.

I I


immediate efforts to reassure the authorities and Pakeha settlers. Richardson, a local settler,

reported on the day of their arrival to Deputy Superintendent Rhodes in Napier: [207]

They profess not to have any hostile intentions, but have simply come at the request ofMr McLean

to talk over matters, so as to avoid any conflict amongst themselves or with us. They are all armed;

but I was particularly requested to tell the settlers of this district not to be alarmed at their advent.

The Petane party tried once again to reassure Rhodes via Richardson, who visited them late on

8 September, of their peaceful intentions:[208]

.. .1 have visited the party ofHauhaus at the Pah. They urge that they have no .intention of causing any

disturbance: they fully expected that Mr McLean would have returned from Wellington and it is only

in compliance with his request that they are here.

Richardson responded in kind, attempting to build mutual confidence:

I told them that I had written to you and the tenor of my note and that Mr Locke would be up

tomorrow and they seemed well satisfied.

Instructed by Rhodes, Locke travelled to Petane on 9 September. He came away with a letter that

goes a long way towards explaining why a substantial, organised group ofNgati Hineuru had

travelled to Petane at that particular time:[209]

The only reason for our coming here is, that Mr McLean's letter reached us, telling us to leave where

we were and talk with him, then good might come (an understanding might be arrived at). Therefore

we are come. Watene brought the letter to us. [210J We sent a letter informing you of our coming but the

europeans must have delayed it at Petane. That is all.

The letter was signed: 'This is from all the Ngatihineuru'.

207 Richardson to Rhodes, 7 September 1866, HB 417, NA. 208 Richardson to Rhodes, 8 September 1866, HB 417, NA. 209 Ngatihineuru to Locke, 9 September 1866, HB 417, NA. Unfortunately the letter survives only in Locke's

translation, and he appears not to have translated the first part of it. No trace has been found of McLean's letter, but McLean later confirmed that he had sent one.

210 Possibly Te Watene of Petane, 'a Waikato Hau Hau prophet and a friend of Paora Toki' (Hawke's Bay Herald, 12 June 1866). If it was, he had been forced to flee from Petane in early June.


In fact Ngati Hineuru's reply did get through, though when McLean actually received it is not

lmown. Writing on 30 August from Titiokura, nine days before the Pai Marire party's arrival at

Petane, Panapa and Te Rangihiroa were replying to an earlier letter from McLean:[211]

Kua tae mai to reta ki a matau a e pai ana taua kupu au e mea nei koe kia whakarerea e matau ta matau

karakia pokanoa. Ae. Tenei hoki matau ka haere atu i runga i taua kupu au me a matau wahine me a

matau tamariki me a matau pu ano me a matau mea katoa ka haere nui atu matau ki tou aroaro tenei

hoki ta matau kupu me homai e koe kia nui nga poti ki tenei taha 0 te awa hei uta atu i a matau me

tuku mai hoki e koe 0 hoia katoa ki ten a taha 0 te awa hei arahi atu i a matau ki tou aroaro ara ki te

taari 0 te kooti whakawa 0 Ahuriri kia whakarerea tenei karakia porangi a ki a kihi ano hoki ki tou

paipera ...

Your letter has reached us. What you said was good when you said that we should cast aside our

strange prayers. Yes. And so in accordance with those words of yours, we will come with our women,

our children, our guns, with all our things, we will all come into your presence. These are our words:

you should send many boats to this side of the river so that we can board them. You should also send

all your soldiers to this side of the river to escort us to your presence, to the office of the Court at

Ahuriri so that this misguided faith can be cast aside, so that your bible can be kissed again.

Te Rangihiroa and Panapa made it clear that this was a collective position, 'otira na te iwi katoa'.

The language is forceful but not aggressive. The Ngati Hineuru leaders seem to have envisaged

a tribal migration of biblical proportions to a meeting of destiny with the heads of the provincial

and kawanatanga establishment at their centre of power. They offered to cooperate, letting

McLean lmow that a large party was coming and requesting a military escort.

Interpreting this letter depends in part on how literally it is to be read. Conceivably, it was mere

deception, professing peaceful intentions as a cover for hostile intent. Bishop Leonard Williams,

cousin of Samuel, was later to damn as similarly false all such messages from the Pai Marire

leadersY12] But the letter does fit a consistent pattern of non-aggressive messages and actions

during the weeks before the move to Omarunui on 4 October. It is difficult to read the request

for transport and a military escort as anything other than as an attempt to alTange safe passage

to a formal meeting with McLean in Napier. Bringing the entire community into the provincial

domain challenged the authorities to act in good faith. Bringing in their guns under government

211 Te Rangihiroa & Panapa to McLean, 30 August 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0690E, ATL (trans. Winifred Bauer).

212 W.L. Williams, East Coast historical records, pp.51-2.


supervision would not only minimise the risk of conflict but place them at the disposal of the

government.

The offer to abandon their Pai Marire faith is more problematic. The offer does not fit easily with

the proactive strategy adopted at the Te Whaiti hui and the Pai Marire beliefs of the leaders and

people assembled at Te Pohue. Two possible interpretations seem plausible. The first is that the

offer was indeed meant to be taken at face value. Co-signed by their senior rangatira and religious

leader, the letter spoke to Ngati Hineuru's own agenda, which was primarily local and defensive

and did not extend to the broader political and evangelical ambitions of Paora Told, Anaru

Matete or other leaders with whom they were encamped at Te Pohue. It responded directly to

what they saw as a conditional invitation from McLean. If abandonment ofPai Marire was his

price of peace, they were prepared to agree in advance to pay it.

The second interpretation is that the two leaders were stating their acceptance of McLean's

agenda for the meeting he proposed in Napier, and acknowledging that the abandonment of Pai

Madre was a possible result. They were expressing a millenarian strand of Pai Marire belief,

accepting a challenge the outcome of which God would decide. At the same time, a real contest

of religious ideas may have been under way - Te Rangihiroa had, after all, built the Anglican

church at Church Crossing and since the mid-l 840s had held debates with both Anglican and

Catholic missionaries. The Ngati Hineuru leaders were also aligning their specific objectives

within a broader strategy espoused by Told and Matete which aimed to create legitimate space

for peaceful competition amongst Maori - between the Pai Marire and missionary faiths, kingites

and loyalists, supporters and opponents of land-selling.

The subsequent actions and statements of the Pai Marire expedition suggest that the primary aim

ofPanapa and Te Rangihiroa was to put their faith to the test rather than abandon it in advance.

If this interpretation is valid, they saw their main opponents as the kawanatanga chiefs of

Hawke's Bay rather than the government. There is no sign, however, that they were seeking to

challenge the authority of the Hawke's Bay chiefs over their own domain. Rather, the Ngati

Hineuru leaders' focus was on preserving their own autonomy. Their letter also made it plain that

even if they still hoped to mount a political or religious challenge, military action had no place

in their planning. To that end, they offered McLean the assurance of military supervision of their

arrival in Napier.


Standing in for McLean in Napier, Rhodes repOlied evidence that Anaru Matete 'is still at or near

Titiokura - waiting to hear how you get on with Panapa and his lot' .[213] A week later, Panapa had

moved to Petane and was also awaiting a response, as Rhodes informed McLean on 14

September: [214]

Panapa ... states that he and the rest have come in on account of a letter written by you to them asking

them to do so. They have come down to Petene thinking you were back.

There is little concrete information on developments during the next three weeks. Richardson

expected that Locke 'will be able to send them quietly and peaceably home again'. But the Pai

Marire party, comprising mainly Ngati Hineuru people, had come with serious intent and stayed

put. The days dragged on with no sign of McLean. Towards the end of September, Rhodes

reported a significant movement: 'The ringleaders Kinita, Paora Told, Panapa and Kipa are

staying with Paora Kaiwhata, so he told me, until you come back'. [215] This information was given

added credibility by Kaiwhata, chief of a section ofNgati Hinepare, himself being the source of

it, for his pa kainga was none other than Omarunui. Thus the principal Ngati Hineuru and Pai

Marire leaders ofthe Petane party had ah'eady moved to Omarunui by invitation sometime in mid

to late September, well before the return of McLeanPl6]

Given the proximity of Omarunui to Pa Whakairo, it is likely that some kind of communication

had begun between the Pai Marire and Ngati Kahungunu leaderships. The leaders' move to

Omarunui appears to fit in with diplomatic efforts by leaders on both sides to defuse the tension.

When the Pai Marire patiy led by Panapa reached Petane in mid-September, it was Tareha who

wanted the provincial authorities to provide them with food 'and stated they would do so

themselves, but they were hard up for money and supplies' .[217] Both sides, however, remained

on guard, the Pai Marire people moving armed and in large bodies and the Hawke's Bay chiefs

213 Rhodes to McLean, 28 August 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 214 Rhodes to McLean, 14 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 215 Rhodes to McLean, 26 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 216 Paora Toki left Omarunui sometime before the main body moved there from Petane on 4 October. 217 Rhodes to McLean, 14 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL.


pressing officials for more weapons. [218] As the wait lengthened, the kawanatanga chiefs contested

the allegiance of the Pai Marire followers. According to Waha Pango members of the Pai Marire

party moved over to the loyalist side, and some back again.[219]

Whitmore may well have been right in speculating that the Petane party were short of food - but

locally rather than at Te Pohue. This was a large number of people for the resident Petane

community suddenly to have to feed, a practical reality that Tareha recognised early on. In any

case, the visitors expected to meet McLean and to move onward nearer to Pa Whakairo and

Napier; they were unprepared for a long wait. That is nevertheless what they now had to face.

And despite acknowledging that they were, like everyone else, awaiting McLean, Rhodes'

hardball tactic of denying them food before surrender, as the 'enemy', ratcheted up the hardship

as the days wore on.

Economic hardship may have contributed to the otherwise obscure decision in late September

to dispose of - not destroy - the Petane church, one of Colenso's early mission centres, where

Paora Told himself had served as a mission assistant nearly two decades before. 'The Petene

people (the Hauhau) have sold their church to the europeans .. .', noted Locke, while according

to Rhodes, 'the Petene Maoris have pulled their church down and sold the materiaL.' .[220]

According to Locke, it was the local Pai Marire community which took the decision; very

probably they urgently needed cash to purchase food.

3.1.7 The Search for a Negotiated Settlement (4-8 October 1866)

McLean finally arrived back in Napier on 4 October. On the same day, the Pai Marire party

moved from Petane to Omarunui. Later official and settler narratives explained this move as a

step in a grand conspiracy to attack Napier. However, two more mundane influences provide a

more plausible explanation. First, the Petane group, having been obliged to wait nearly a month,

218 Contemporary accounts indicate that the Pai Marire parties used the Taupo track, at the boundary between the Ahuriri block and Maori-owned land, to travel between Te Pohui and Petane. But there is no information on the route taken fi'om Petane to Omarunui. Presumably it passed overland, skirting Te Whanganui a Orotu, since the passage of such large groups by water, as originally requested of McLean by Te Rangihiroa and Panapa, would surely have excited official or press comment.

219 Napier MB 72, pp.185-6. 220 Locke to McLean, 26 September 1866; Rhodes to McLean, 26 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-

0032-0393 & 0527, ATL.


were by now velY short of food. Omamnui would undoubtedly be better resourced. Second, the

al1'ival of McLean meant that action was at last imminent. Their leaders had been, and probably

still were, staying at Omarunui by invitation; they were now moving to join them. If discussions

were about to commence, Pa Whalmiro, the home base of Tareha and premier site of political hui

over the last decade, was the obvious venue. Omamnui was on the overland route to Pa Whakairo

and only a mile or so upstream on the Tutaekuri River.

The messages exchanged between McLean and Panapa on the following Friday and Monday (5

and 8 October) were published and have been examined in previous studies.[221] The published

versions correspond closely but not exactly to manuscript copies of the originals, [222] which also

reveal one significant mistake; and the published sequence is out of order. They are therefore re

examined here in some detail.

If the Pai Marire leaders expected McLean to receive them at an open meeting, as Panapa and

Te Rangihiroa had proposed, his opening letter to them of 5 October, the day after the move to

Omamnui, quickly disabused them. In it, he acknowledged that he had indeed sent Ngati Hineum

a letter and their statement 'that it was my letter which brought you to Petane'. But he raised

doubts as to whether they had conformed to the terms he said had been set down in that letter:

If [Te] Rangihiroa were one of your number, and you were coming to abandon evil proceedings, then

it would be understood that your intentions were for peace, and in accordance with my letter. I am not

yet clear whether this expedition of yours is intended for evil or for good.

McLean was demanding the presence of Ngati Hineum's senior rangatira to validate their

intentions; yet most if not all other N gati Hineum leaders of rank were present, including their

prophet-leader, Panapa. His none-too-subtle message was that their mana was insufficient for

any negotiations to proceed. Nor was he offering them the chance to indicate whether they

wished to 'abandon evil proceedings'. Despite being 'not yet clear', his next step was not an

attempt to find out but a peremptory order for them to depart without further negotiation:

221 In particular: Boast, Mohaka-Waikal'e, pp.38-40; Moorsom, Tara1l'el'a, pp.34-5. 222 Found in AD 1 9712115, NA & the McLean Papers, ATL; published versions in AJHR 1867 A-lA, pp.67-8.

The quotations used in this section are from the latter except where differences affect the meaning. See Appendix 3 for copies of the draft Maori texts of McLean's opening and concluding messages.


Therefore I say go back to your own homes; and when you visit Heretaunga do so in a proper manner

when you are invited, and with intentions of peace, that what you mean may be known to us and the

chiefs of Heretaunga.

This dismissal must have come as a body blow to the Ngati Hineuru leaders. They plainly

believed that McLean had invited them, and they had been waiting in hardship for a month for

the chance to meet. McLean's rejection of their proposal to go to Pa Wha1<airo confirms that they

had previously signalled their wish to do so. Now they were expected to return home without the

chance to present their case, or even to meet him face to face. By declaring that 'our thoughts and

those of the Chiefs of Heretaunga are one', his closing confronted Ngati Hineuru with an

apparently united refusal to allow any discussions.

The response from Omarunui was pained, angry and to the point:

This is the word to you: you have already known, and so also have the chiefs ofHeretaunga. From us

all.

They had, after all, ta1<:en pains to inform officials and settlers of their mission, as well as McLean

himself, and had offered assurances of their peaceful intentions. Contacts with the Hawke's Bay

chiefs had gone forward to the extent that Paora Kaiwhata had invited the Pai Marire leaders to

Omarunui.

McLean nevertheless professed not to understand what they meant:

I am at a loss to know the meaning of the one sentence in your letter which speaks of the knowledge

which I and the Chiefs possess. I do not know what this means, and I wish you to explain it.

The reply 'from us all' at Omarunui was exasperated:[223]

This is the word to you in answer to your long searching as to the meaning of that sentence. This is

your word, "that we should come here and throw off the foolish God".

223 AD 1 97/2115, NA. F.E. Hamlin's original translation is preferred to the published version.


They were challenging what they perceived to be game-playing on the part of McLean. They had

come, as he requested, to discuss their Pai Marire allegiance with McLean and the kawanatanga

chiefs, and expected to be conducted to a meeting for that purpose.

McLean did not reply immediately to the challenge from Omarunui. Instead, over the weekend

of 5-6 October he sent in three Hawke's Bay chiefs, Te Hapuku, Noa Huke and Paora Kaiwhata.

The composition ofthe delegation is interesting: Tareha was excluded, while Te Hapuku had for

a time openly suppOlied Pai Marire followers in Hawke's Bay, and Paora Kaiwhata had originally

invited the Pai Marire leaders from Petane and was returning to his own kainga, from which he

and his people had decamped to Pa Whakairo when the Pai Marire party arrived on 4 October.

The delegation's proposal was that if the visitors were here to renounce their Pai Marire faith,

'Panapa should come to the Pa Whakairo and arrange matters at that place before coming in

here' . [224] In other words, Panapa was to proceed alone to Pa Whakairo and make arrangements

for the final move to Napier. By 'coming in here', the Pai Marire people would have understood

McLean to have meant a surrender and loyalty oath-taking ceremony of the kind that he had

previously imposed on defeated Pai Marire groups along the East Coast, most recently in Wairoa

in May 1866.

But trust in the good faith of McLean and the chiefs was not strong enough for Panapa to be

exposed alone at the headquarters of his opponents. Within the previous ten months, Ngati

Hineuru had witnessed a police raid, authorised by McLean, attempting to seize one of their

chiefs and threats by the Hawke's Bay chiefs, with McLean's general backing, to attack them.

Beyond his letter requesting them to come in and renounce Pai Marire, he had made no

confidence-building gestures. The Omarunui leaders rebuffed the kawanatanga delegation's

attempt to isolate Panapa and reiterated the proposal made by Panapa and Te Rangihiroa on 30

August, that the people move together as a body. According to McLean, 'you did not accede to

their proposition - you answered that all were "Panapas"'.

Once again McLean was disingenuous, replying on Monday 8 October: 'I do not know what this

sentence means, and what you mean by your proceedings in general'. He noted that they had

224 McLean to Stafford, 9 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.66.


spurned 'the request that you should return peaceably to your homes' and demanded: 'Now if

your intentions are evil tell us, and if good let us know, that we may shortly understand each

other'. But the only means of communication he had left open to the people at Omarunui were

exchanges of written messages 01' sending their prophet-leader alone and unprotected into the

domain of their opponents.

The Pai Marire party tried one more reply on Monday 8 October. Its misdating to 5 October in

the published version has misled some into believing that the Pai Marire leaders had tried to cut

off communications the previous Friday. In fact it was the last message in the sequence and was

a serious attempt to break the deadlock: [225]

We have received your letter brought by Noa and Edward (Mr Hamlin). We see that you are asking,

yes. Do you listen, peace is a property, and evil is also a property, this is the answer to your question.

Our idea is that we have not been judged by you and the Chiefs, since while we were on the road we

were requested to go back by you. Now talking is at an end.

Brief as it is, this final letter from Omarunui gives some insight into how the Pai Marire leaders

expected to proceed. To McLean's demand for a categorical answer as to whether their intentions

were for good 01' evil, their reply was that this was amongst issues yet to be determined. Other

uncertainties still hung over Ngati Hineuru, not least the threat to their land title from Paora

Torotoro's Native Land Court applications. They wanted the chance to put their case to the

Hawke's Bay chiefs and McLean, and to be 'judged' by them. Theil' earlier proposal to go to Pa

Whakairo suggests that they expected the forum, as on many previous political occasions, to be

a formal hui convened by the Hawke's Bay chiefs, with McLean representing the government.

This is consistent with the request in the 30 August letter to be brought 'to your presence' and

with the repeated references to future discussions with McLean in the explanatory messages

coming out ofPetane during September. The final letter from Omarunui also implied, as did the

30 August letter, that even ifthey were not prepared to abandon their Pai Marie faith in advance,

they recognised that the discussions could have that outcome.

225 AD 1 97/2115, NA. F.E. Hamlin's original translation is preferred to the published version. 'Idea' is rendered as 'thought' in the latter and in the context probably means 'view' or 'position'. 'Peace' may refer to the 'good/evil' dichotomy posed in McLean's previous letter. Incorrectly dated 5 October and placed second in the sequence in AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.67.


Placed in context, the concluding sentence in the letter from Omarunui makes better sense as a

factual comment than a cessation of communication, as many subsequently interpreted it. The

complaint of the Pai Marire leaders was that having invited them to meet him, McLean was

tuming them away before the meeting had even taken place. There was nevertheless no further

formal communication between McLean and Omarunui until McLean's dawn ultimatum to

surrender just before the attack on 12 October.

Apart from the parsimonious formal exchanges, only one direct insight into the state of opinion

at Omarunui has survived from the week preceding the attack, and it is fleeting. Scribbled on an

envelope are undated notes in McLean's handwriting of his debriefing of a Pakeha, W.

McDonald, who visited the Pai Marire party:[226]

Mr W. McDonald called at Omarunui where the Hauhaus are encamped.

Mr McDonald asked what did you come for?

Henare Kipa's brother replied Na te Makarini i tono mai kia haere mai matou. [McLean sent for us

to come.]

McDonald said What did you bring your guns for, to take them to Napier. Kia kawea ki Nepia kia

mutu te raruraru. [To bring them to Napier to end the troubles.]

McDonald: It is reported you killed 2 white man's bullocks. They replied no - they killed six pigs

belonging to their own natives and a few fowls.

They talked freely to McDonald.

Renare in reply to McDonald.

McDonald thinks they have no desire to fight at all.

The openness of the Pai Marire people suggests that this exchange occurred before the mood

darkened at Omarunui on Monday 8 October once it became plain that McLean would persist

with his refusal to negotiate. The most likely timing would have been the preceding weekend,

during which the delegation of Hawke's Bay chiefs visited with their limited offer to allow

Panapa into Pa Whakairo. Three points emerge clearly from the message that the Ngati Hineuru

leaders wished to convey. First, they insisted that McLean had asked them to come, indeed, had

summoned them. Second, they had brought their guns with them not to fight but, as signalled in

the 30 August letter, to hand them over. Now, as then, they were willing to submit to government

authority in Napier in order to assure themselves against military attack. Third, they were

definitely not gearing up for battle.

226 MS notes, n.d., RB 4/13/364, NA (trans. Niwa Short).


3.1.8 A Conspiracy to Attack Napier? (8-12 October)

As late as Monday 8 October, the Ngati Hineuru leaders of the Pai Marire party at Omarunui

were still seeking a meeting at Pa Whakairo or Napier with McLean and the Hawke's Bay chiefs,

in other words at the venue of their opponents. All the documentary and circumstantial evidence

points towards their expectation as being that the occasion would be a formal public meeting, in

fact that this was what McLean had instructed them to do. There is no hint that such a meeting

might provide cover for a surprise attack, indeed the 30 August letter requested an official armed

escort. Yet on 8 October, McLean broke off communication and began preparations for a surprise

attack of his own.

Little information survives from Ngati Hineuru and Pai Marire sources as to what the Pai Marire

expedition would do if their peace initiative broke down. John Parsons, who was in touch with

those remaining at the Te Pohue encampment, gave his assessment to McLean on 9 October, the

day after contacts between McLean and the Pai Marire party at Omarunui ended:[2271

Rangihiroa and Paora Told are at the Titiokura with about fifty armed natives who are ready to assist

those in your locality should it be determined to fight, and I believe they are already sent for. The Hau

Haus here say that if the Europeans do not interfere, the settlers will be safe, but should they assist

the Queen's natives, they shall fall upon any they can; and as the Queen's natives are more numerous

and much better armed than the Hau Haus I hope they may not be interfered with.

Parsons' estimate of the numbers still at Te Pohue was far lower than McLean's on the same day

of about 150 men[2281 and reveals that the great majority had already joined the expedition to

Petane and Omarunui. It may also suggest that Whitmore and the colonial officials grossly

inflated the overall number of Pai Marire adherents above the approximately 200 assembled at

Te Pohue and Omarunui by early October. Whether these were all 'men' or 'armed men', as

usually described in official documents, is also uncertain.

The accuracy of Parsons' information on the intentions of the Pai Marire people remaining at Te

Pohue depends largely on whom he spoke with, and unfortunately he gave no names. It is

unlikely that he visited the encampment since the road was guarded. Possibly his informants

227 Parsons to McLean, 9 October 1866, Parsons Papers, HBM. 228 McLean to Stafford, 9 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.66.


wanted to warn him and other settlers off from getting involved. His account implied that the Pai

Marire leaders did not proceed to Omarunui with a predetermined plan of attack; the decision,

if theirs, had not yet been made. And it may not have been theirs; Parsons left it open whether

their readiness to fight may have been a commitment to self-defence against an attack from their

kawanatanga opponents, who had threatened their own assault on Ngati Hineuru the previous

June. The risk of attack would have been taken seriously by leaders, adherents and refugees with

direct experience of previous East Coast conflicts. Such fears may go some way to explain the

exclusion of all but a few women and children from the expedition, and the rearguard held back

at Te Pohue with three key leaders, Te Rangihiroa, Paora Told and Anaru Matete.

Parsons thought that the rearguard had already been summoned to Omarunui. It was in fact three

days later that the Te Pohue party travelled down to the coast, where it was ambushed near

Petane. After the battles, Samuel Williams quoted Te Rangihiroa's son Tawhana as saying that

the summons was sent on 11 October, the day before the attack on Omarunuip29] Whichever

timing was correct, the most likely reason for the call from Omarunui was McLean's complaint

that the expedition's leadership lacked credibility without the presence of Te Rangihiroa. By

bringing him in, together with the other two principal figures, Paora Told and Anaru Matete, the

leaders at Omarunui may have hoped to break the negotiating impasse.

Was there a Pai Marire plan to attack Napier, as claimed by McLean in his pre-battle briefing to

Stafford on 9 October7[230] Independent evidence from the Pai Marire side is sparse in the

surviving documentary record, mainly because McLean quickly shut down any avenue of

negotiation and because most of the Pai Marire leaders were soon killed, imprisoned 01' forced

to flee. Shortly after the attack, McLean forwarded to Wellington three letters taken from

prisoners captured at Omarunui, on which Stafford commented: 'These letters show that the

action taken by the Hau Haus has been [illeg. ]ated [=meditated 7] for some time'. [231]

The letters all date from late July and early August, the period following the Te Whaiti hui during

which the Pai Marire leaders were making active preparations for their move into Hawke's Bay.

229 Reverend Samuel Williams to McLean, 13[12] October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.n. 230 McLean to Stafford, 9 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.66. 231 McLean to Colonial Secretary, 15 October 1866 & enclosures, IA 1 243/66/3115, NA. Unfortunately McLean

forwarded only the translations.


From Taupiri, near Ngamawahia, came a letter to Panapa from Manuera offering moral support

but no specific assistance:[232]

Your letter has reached us. It (your letter) urges us to be active in recruiting. What you say is right.

I also say to you that in your work you must be active in arranging the men within your boundary, that

is to say, in the Taupo and Urewera Districts. Be strong.

So much for that matter. One other word to you in reference to the men of Taupo and Tarawera who

lease (lands). Let us have the sheep for our mutual subsistence.

Panapa's call to proselytise for the Pai Marire cause met Manuera's approval, but his message

in retUlTI was for Panapa to concentrate on his own district outside the sphere ofthe Hawke's Bay

chiefs - the envelope was addressed 'to Panapa at Wanangananga, Part of Canaan' . [233] Reflecting

the economic hardship amongst the king' s followers after the Waikato war and land confiscation,

he also sought access to a food resource that was undoubtedly in plentiful supply on the Hawke's

Bay frontier.

A second letter to Panapa, dated 8 August, came from Kenana Poutama at Pouam:[234]

I salute you under the protection of our God. I greet you. I can (now but) simply give expression to

my sympathy from beyond the boundaries. I greet you and Patena who are now separated from me.

I have to say further that if our opponents approach send a letter to me so that I may know.

My friend, I did not see Kipa (killed at Omarunui) when he came, but I then had gun caps. However,

they have been distributed amongst the "hard entrances" (ie determined and resolute leaders and

supporters). I have no further greetings for you.

Kenana's message was that he had nothing but sympathy to offer. It appears that Kipa, described

by Cooper after the battle as a 'fighting chief ,f235] paid him a visit, possibly to seek arms, but

came away empty-handed.

232 Manuera to Panapa, 21 July 1866, IA 1 243/66/3115, NA. 233 See Elsmore, Mana from heaven, chapter 25. Te Ua had repOliedly told Tawhiao in late 1864 that New

Zealand was 'Canaan' and Pai Marire followers regarded Maori-controlled land as 'New Canaan'. 234 Kenana Poutama to Panapa, 8 August 1866, IA 1 243/66/3115, NA. 235 Cooper to Native Minister, 29 October 1866, AJHR A-lA, pp.11-12.


The most significant of the letters, dated 21 July at Tokangaamutu, came from King Tawhiao:[236]

To all the tribes I have fixed upon as friends in various parts of this island - Greeting. Your letter has

arrived asking for the twelve to be sent. I say this that although I have not seen Panapa he must be the

"light" for your boundary - the man who will give expression to the commands of the God.

Panapa's request for 'the twelve to be sent' was a reference to what Binney calls 'the Twelve

apostles of Tawhiao', to whom Anaru Matete had also referred in his letter of 6 June 1866 to the

chiefs of Turanga. [237] They were the appointed priests of a new kingite initiative under the Pai

Marire umbrella led by Taikomako, who had attended the Te Whaiti hui in July.[238] Tawhiao's

message was, in effect, that he did not need to send one of the 'Tekaumarua' since Panapa

himself had sufficient priestly authority to perform that role in his area. Tawhiao's clear

recognition ofPanapa gave a major boost to his mana as the Pai Marire prophet of his people.

Fragmentary though they are, these letters indicate that Ngati Hineuru leaders, working under the

Pai Marire umbrella, made an effOli to drum up wider support for their coming venture, seeking

religious and political endorsement and possibly also guns and ammunition. To be acquiring

arms was not necessarily an indicator of aggressive intent - Ngati Hineuru had every incentive

to prepare defensively in strength. But endorsement is all they seem to have achieved at that early

stage.

The diversity ofhapu affiliations amongst the Omarunui prisoners confirms that as the Pai Marire

movement into Hawke's Bay gathered momentum at Te Pohue and Petane, it drew in refugees

and Pai Marire adherents from a wide spread of localities across the region and beyond. The

reputation and networks of the two experienced campaigners, Anaru Matete and Paora Told,

complemented the local focus ofthe Ngati Hineuru leadership, with Panapa as the connecting

religious linle.

During the preparations and establishment of the Te Pohue encampment, the Hawke's Bay chiefs,

in particular Karauria, received and amplified information suggesting aggressive intentions on

236 Tawhiao 'to all the tribes ... ', 21 July 1866, IA 1 243/66/3115, NA. 237 Anam Matete to Paratene Titore, 7 June 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0690D, ATL, translated in

Binney, Redemption songs, pp.56., 61 238 Clark, Pai Marire, pp.105-6.


the Pai Marire side. The Te Whaiti hui, Karauria claimed, made plans 'to destroy me and my

Pakeha' .[239] In mid-August, he sounded the alarm for an imminent attack on Hawke's Bay,

including Napier. [240] Officials relied largely on the flow of information from their kawanatanga

allies, though with varying degrees of credulity. Resident Magistrate Cooper, however, was

scepticalY41] So was Deputy Superintendent Rhodes, who reported without conviction on 27

August: [242]

... We have had rumours of invasion from the Hauhaus at Titiokura... say 270 men all armed

threatening the town and country last Monday and Tuesday, but we have seen nothing of them.

The kawanatanga consensus during August was roughly that a multi-hapu Pai Marire initiative

in Hawke's Bay was imminent, that it might extend to an attack, and that they and perhaps Napier

were the principal targets. Only Samuel Williams conceded that defensive considerations might

be mixed in given that the threat of attack on Ngati Hineuru by the Hawke's Bay chiefs

themselves was still hanging in the air:[243]

It is just possible that they have collected to resist an anticipated attack from these people there having

been some talk of their taking such a step.

The arrival ofthe largely Ngati Hineuru Pai Marire party in Petane in early September defused

kawanatanga and settler concerns, since it came with a credible agenda of meeting McLean in

peace and surrendering weapons.

Nevertheless, after the Omarunui attack, colonial officials put considerable effort into proving

their hypothesis of a Pai Marire conspiracy to attack Napier. Their information came from

interrogations of prisoners taken at Omarunui and Petane. The first, ofTe Rangihiroa's fifteen-

239 Karauria to McLean, 30 July 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0690E, ATL (trans. Winifred Bauer). 240 Cooper to Rhodes, 18 August 1866, HB 4/13/380, NA, enclosing 'translation of part of a letter that I have just

received from Karauria'. 241 Cooper to Rhodes, 18 August 1866, HB 4/13/380, NA, enclosing 'translation of part of a letter that I have just

received from Karauria' . 242 Rhodes to McLean, 27 August 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 243 Samuel Williams to his father, 29 August 1866, Williams Family Papers, MS-Papers-0069-0018, ATL.


year-old son Tawhana, was undertaken by Reverend Samuel Williams on the afternoon of the

attack. [244) According to Williams, Tawhana told him that Panapa sent a messenger

to order Rangihiroa, Paora Toki, Anam Matete and their party, to come down today, and take up their

position at the Fishing Huts on the Western Spit, where two canoes were placed for their use, and that

they were to be ready to cross over to attack the town upon notice being given when Panapa and his

party were ready to make the attack from the other side.

BaHara and Scott have severely criticised Williams for, in effect, having put words in the mouth

of the prisoner. [245) Williams later admitted that

I could not get a word out of him at first. So I told him to sit down, and I myself would tell him, which

I proceeded to do.

It was only after Williams had put to Tawhana his theory that 'they intended to attack Napier

from the west across the lagoons' that Tawhana 'carried on the story himself, and said that if we

looked in a certain place, we would find the canoes with which they intended to cross. This was

verified later'.f246) So Tawhana did not in fact confirm Williams' story about an attack, but led

on from it.

If two canoes were in fact made ready at the Spit, this would have been consistent with the

request to McLean from Te Rangihiroa and Panapa on 30 August for boats to bring their people

into his presence in Napier. Such an explanation appears more plausible that secret preparations

for a coordinated surprise attack on Napier. The Western Spit, adjacent to the lagoon entrance,

narrow and exposed, closely overlooked from the hills of Mataruahou and remote from any

communication with Omarunui, could hardly have been a less suitable point from which to

launch any sort of attack (see Map 16).

244 Williams to McLean, 13 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.72. Williams must have composed his message on the evening of the 12th.

245 Ballara & Scott, Mohaka-Waikare, p.28. 246 W.T. Williams, Life o/the Venerable Archdeacon Samuel Williams, (1929), cited in Boast, Mohaka-Waikare,

pA5.


Whitmore himself had taken precautions on the night of the attack to immobilise a second and

larger group of canoes by Park's Island at the southern end ofthe lagoon on the opposite side:[247]

The Cavalry Volunteers, enrolled the previous evening, had been despatched to seize the canoes at

Park's Island, believed to have been intended to enable the Hau Haus to escape, or to cross the

harbour to attack Napier.

The Maori custodians told the volunteers that the canoes, twelve of them, in fact belonged to

Tareha, which was later confirmed, but they cut them loose anyway.[248]

John Parsons had warned McLean on 9 October of his belief that the Te Pohue party had been

called to Omarunui, and the group ambushed near Petane on the morning of 12 October did

include the three senior leaders, Te Rangihiroa, Paora Told and Anaru Matete. The new angle put

up by Williams, which flatly contradicts the focus on the kawanatanga chiefs reported by

Parsons, was the existence of a specific plan for a coordinated attack, by canoe and land, upon

Napier itself It is difficult to regard this plan, given the logistical difficulties of communication,

timing and transport, as anything more than a product of Williams' over-inventive imagination.

During the following week, George Worgan interrogated a number of prisoners 'personally

known to me' and reported the statements of two, he stated, 'virtually as furnished to me', to

which several others were similar.[249] The first was given by Whe Taipura, who had been

captured at Petane:

Panapa was the instigator of the whole proceedings and solely guided the movements of the tribes.

Anaru Matete and Paora Toki were travelling to Taupo when they were constrained by Panapa to join

his party. Kipa and Henere were the only repositories of Panapa's views and secrets. Rangihiroa and

Anaru Matete were not parties in knowledge. It was thought by the people that Panapa possessed some

supernatural influence and aid and was therefore blindly followed by the people. Waikato and Taupo

to our knowledge had nothing to do with it. Panapa only knew their thought (ie the designs of Waikato

and Taupo tribes). Panapa pledged himself to the destruction of Napier, saying that his Atua had

delivered the Pakeha into his hand. Panapa had been a missionary, it was at Waikato that he became

a Prophet. His tribes were the Ngatihineuru.

247 Whitmore to McLean, 13 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.70. 248 Hawke's Bay Herald, 16 October 1866. 249 Worgan to McLean, 20 October 1866, HB 417, NA.


The second came from Ihaka, an Omarunui prisoner:

We the tribe went with Panapa and Kipa under their direction but with fears for the result. All that was

imparted to us was that it might be good or evil. Panapa encouraged us by saying that his God had

delivered Napier into his hands.

W organ's claims to literality notwithstanding, these accounts read like syntheses mediated by

European concepts such as 'repository', 'supernatural' and 'destruction'. It is difficult to detect

anything more specific in them than the broad millenarian promise of deliverance. The outcome

might be good or evil, but God would decide. The term 'Napier' might have symbolised Pakeha

political and economic power rather than a specific asset to be pillaged by military assault -

similar language may have deceived Williams into a literal rather than symbolic reading of what

was the target. There is no sign here of planning, let alone a military conspiracy. It is also

apparent that despite the collective signature 'from us all' on the messages from Omarunui, the

people vested their hopes in the prophet's ability to interpret the divine will.

George Cooper, the Resident Magistrate, also interrogated the prisoners, and found it tough

going: [250]

I have had many interviews with the prisoners since their capture but find them very reticent. .. .I have

extracted from these men and others, by cross-examination, confirmation of the following facts ...

Two ofthe 'facts' fitted neatly with the by now well worn conspiracy theory:

1. The intention was to take the Town of Napier by a bold and sudden night attack from the Petane

side, to be carried out by the party under Te Rangihiroa, Pa[ 0 ]ra Toki, and Anaru Matete ...

2. The Omarunui party were then either to gain over or annihilate the friendly tribes, and then

devastate the homesteads in the neighbouring country.

However, confronting the prisoners' 'reticence' seems to have led Cooper, like Williams, to hear

what fitted the preferred story. He conceded that 'they all adhere firmly to the same story that

Panapa, the Prophet, and Kipa and Kingita, the fighting chiefs, all killed at Omarunui, kept the

rest in the dark as to their intended movements ... ', yet managed to vouch for a precise and far-

250 Cooper to Native Secretary, 29 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, pp.11-2.


fetched scheme of attack. It does not seem to have occurred to him that travelling into Petane in

the morning by the route most conspicuous to settlers, as did Te Rangihiroa, Told and Matete on

12 October, was quite the worst way imaginable either to prepare or to mount a surprise attack

across open water on the capital of the province. Nor did it apparently dawn on Williams,

Worgan and Cooper that maybe there was no detailed plan of campaign in the heads of the Pai

Marire leaders at Omarunui: their followers trusted their judgement and the Prophet's ability to

interpret the will of the atua.

The reactions of the Pai Marire party encamped at Omarunui to McLean's unexpected refusal to

negotiate remain, however, obscured by the complete lack of eye-witness reporting during the

final three days. Their main aim had been to secure an open meeting with McLean and the

Hawke's Bay chiefs at which their continued adherence to the Pai Marire faith would be the key

issue. McLean's abrupt closure of that option posed a dilemma. To obey his order to leave the

district would not only have wasted two months of enormous effort but also have constituted a

humiliating retreat. By Monday 8 October, the situation had entrenched into a tense stand-off:

the Pai Marire party at Omarunui were blocked from proceeding to Pa Whakairo, but were

unwilling simply to pack up and return home.

That the mood at Omarunui was darkening was obvious to F.E. Hamlin, McLean's message

bearer and interpreter, who 'describes them to be in a sulky and evily disposed state, and he states

that they told him their future conduct whether for good or evil would depend upon the directions

their Hau Hau god might give them' .£251) This was essentially, however, a passive 'wait-and-see'

response. Militarily, they faced the more numerous and better-armed forces of the settlers and

kawanatanga chiefs. After nearly two months on the road with insufficient food and makeshift

shelter, their condition and morale would have been poor for any aggressive move.

Even when surrounded at dawn on 12 October, the occupants of Omarunui seemed unable to take

the impending attack seriously. They took some time to respond to Hamlin's appearance bearing

Whitmore's ultimatum, and then asked for more time to consider the matter. Only when

challenged the second time did they say they would fight - the first and only indication in the

entire expedition that they signalled that they would use their arms. Even then, as the attacking

251 McLean to Stafford, 9 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.66.


force was going in, women from Omarunui were still fetching water from the river and the men

were preparing for battle by circling the niu pole in the open chanting karakia.[252] The Napier

militia were permitted to cross the river without being fired on, apparently on Panapa's

orders,[Kotuku??]It was only when the attacking force opened fire at close range that the

occupants of Omarunui fired back. [253]

It should be borne in mind, finally, that amidst the welter of conspiracies and far-flung linkages

woven around the Pai Marire expedition to Hawke's Bay in late 1866, no sign of actual military

preparation could be cited. The party stayed nearly a month at Petane without any report of

friction with the local settlers. During its eight-day stay at Omarunui, no effort at all was made

to fortify the position, even after communication with McLean ended on 8 October. This suggests

that even if fighting remained an option, as Parsons reported on 9 October, it was scarcely taken

seriously. Omarunui itself was Paora Kaiwhata's kainga, an unfortified open village site on a

raised part of the west banle of the Tutaekuri River, and surrounded by old and new field

cultivations on flat terrain between low hills (see Figures 1-4, at end). A less suitable defensive

position would be hard to find (see Figure 5), as the occupants found to their cost when attacked

on the 12th. Leaders such as Paora Told, who visited it during September, and Kipa and Kingita,

described as 'the fighting chiefs' by Cooper after the battle,[254] would have been well aware of

its poor defensive attributes.

It was scarcely more suitable as a base for offensive action against Napier, lying within sight of

Tareha's power centre of Pa Whakairo. Its only possible military significance was in

concentrating a large group ofPai Marire followers close to the kainga ofthe kawanatanga chiefs

ofHeretaunga. It is possible, judging by the sentiment that Parsons picked up at Te Pohue, that

some may have contemplated an attack on the kawanatanga chiefs. But fighting in self-defence

is the more likely interpretation. One strand ofPai Marire thinldng in Hawke's Bay during 1865

and 1866 was that any aggressive move would come from the Pakeha, not them, or as Paora Told

told Cooper and Wi Tako at Petane in March 1865, 'the law of peace will be kept here unless the

252 Whitmore to McLean, l3 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, pp.69-70; Te Waka Maori, summarised by Parsons, Hallhall movement, pp.39-43.

253 Whitmore to McLean, l3 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.70; Neil Finlay, Sacred soil: images and stories of the New Zealand Wars, (Auckland: Random House, 1998), p.87. The context suggests that he was reporting the opinion of Dan Panapa, descendent of the Ngati Hineuru prophet, whom he interviewed.

254 Cooper to Native Minister, 29 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, pp.ll-l2.


pakeha breaks it' P55] Even then, no attempt at all was made to prepare defensive positions at

Omamnui. Taking account also of the open manner in which the Te Pohue leaders rode towards

Petane on the 12th, a political and religious reading of the expedition's movements is a far more

plausible interpretation.

3.2 The Provincial Government and the Pai Marire Challenge

3.2.1 Containing the Kingitanga and Pai Marire (1863-1865)

During the tense period which ensued with the invasion of the Waikato, the Tarawera corridor,

regarded as the gateway to Hawke's Bay from Waikato and Taupo, became a particular focus

of official and settler fears of invasion by kingite forces. In November 1863 Nikora Te

Whakaunua, attempting to preserve Ngati Hineum's autonomy by keeping the provincial

authorities informed of any hostile movements, picked up an invasion mmour and reported it to

Napier: [256]

On the 9th of this month I heard a report that the Waikato were coming to attack Ahuriri with an army

of 300 men ... Friend, ifI hear that the army is at Taupo I will go to you.

Joseph Rhodes reported to McLean Nikora's warning that [257]

300 Ngatimaniapotos are to invade us very soon and plunder and destroy. Karaitiana has

communicated to Whitmore information to the same effect, with sundry embellishment... Mr Law the

C.C. Taupo communicates the same news and implicates Te Hapuku.

At the same time, Samuel Locke reported to McLean:[258]

There has been fresh alarms here, one that Wi Tako and some of his people are on their [way] here

through the forty mile bush, the other that the Waikatos are coming by way of Waipuna. [259] Major

255 Hawke's Bay Herald, 1 April 1865. 256 Nikora to McLean, 9 November 1863, Letterbook, Superintendent of Hawke's Bay, no.3 (English transcript),

qMS-1203, ATL. 257 Rhodes to McLean, 26 [November] 1863, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL; also Civil

Commissioner (Cooper) to Native Department, 23 November 1863 (register), MA 3/2, NA. 258 Locke to McLean, 24 November 1863, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. 259 Southwest ofTe Pohue on Whitmore's run.


Whitmore has sent some of the defence force there, and has written to Mr Parsons and others to come

in.

Rhodes was sceptical and so too was Locke:

I cannot find out that there is much foundation for the rumours more than that some natives have

arrived at Petene to a tangihanga, and that a few more have settled at Tita-o-Kura for the purpose of

cultivating.

Rhodes took the precaution of sending Locke on a scouting expedition 'to pick up any news

amongst the natives that he can' . [260] Locke ventured as far as 'the Taupo plains' o~ a three to four

day trip but found nothing; he sent McLean a copy of his journal, 'thinking you might like to hear

all that I could tell of my journey which is not much ... '. [261]

McLean, however, tried to milk the invasion scare for political advantage. From Auckland, the

seat of government, he pressed the Colonial Secretary for reinforcements and military settlers.

On 21 November 1863, he copied the letter from Nikora, whom he described as 'a trustworthy

and intelligent young chief residing at Tarawera'. Not only was there risk of imminent invasion,

but' a large section of the native population located on the North-Eastern frontier of Napier,

irrespective of the Waikatos, are at any time prepared to rise against the Europeans'. [262]

Two days later, he pinned the invasion threat on Ngati Maniapoto, declaring that since 'Maori

supremacy and plunder are the chief incentives that this tribe have in view in making war', their

reverses in Waikato might tum their attention to other settlements. They might be joined in

plundering, he believed, by local Maori who had not shared in the economic rewards of leasehold

rents. Pointing to an unnamed chief - possibly Paora Told - he claimed that

... a secondary chief of this class, anxious to obtain some distinction, has not very long ago

endeavoured to influence the natives of Tarawera to murder the out settlers ofPohui near the Taupo

road. This chief did not urge these natives to commit the acts themselves but hinted that he and his

immediate followers would do so ifthey would only countenance the proceedings.

260 Rhodes to McLean, 26 [November] 1863, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 261 Locke to McLean, 8 December 1863, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. 262 McLean to Colonial Secretary, 21 November 1863, Letterbook, Superintendent of Hawke's Bay, no.l, qMS-

1203, ATL.


Needless to say, he wanted additional troopS.[263] The next day, he also requested 1,000 military

settlers to guard the frontier. [264] A week later, he scaled the number down to 600, to be placed

at either Te Pohue or Puketitiri.[265] It is unlikely that Nikora ever learnt of the use to which his

intelligence, sent in good faith, had been put.

Pakeha officials and settlers attempted to prevent widespread Maori sympathy for the kingitanga

translating into active involvement. Paora Told, who led a party to Waikato in early 1864, was

the target of particular hostility. In March 1864, Ormond vented his frustration at the seeming

impunity with which Paora Told was able to travel between Hawke's Bay and Waikato:[266]

Those Petane scoundrels seem still to adhere to their former intentions. It is a great pity that scoundrel

Paora Toki could not be caught. The Govt would in my opinion do a great deal of good if they made

an example of a man like him. Surely he can be got at in some way - has he no land to seize?

A week later, Ormond rammed home his message:[267]

The Natives about here are very keen for news in relation to Mr Paora Toki. I tell them that the

Governor will have him imprisoned whenever he is caught and that his land is of course gone. How

would it do to point out his position in the Maori paper? I have a great opinion of the value of these

beacons of consequences.

Following the battle of Orakau (31 March-2 April), in early May Ormond received word from

Locke that Paora Told had now returned for the second time from Waikato,[268]

... and a number of followers with him. Also that a section of the Ureweras were following him. If

these reports were true we may have trouble brought on our hands at last by that miserable Petane

section.

263 McLean to Colonial Secretary, 23 November 1863, Letterbook, Superintendent of Hawke's Bay, no.3, qMS-1203, ATL.

264 McLean to Colonial Secretary, 24 November 1863, Letterbook, Superintendent of Hawke's Bay, no.7, qMS-1203, ATL.

265 McLean to Colonial Secretary, 2 December 1863, Letterbook, Superintendent of Hawke's Bay, qMS-1203, ATL.

266 Ormond to McLean, 30 March 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-048I, ATL. 267 Ormond to McLean, 6 April 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0481, ATL. 268 Ormond to McLean, 18 May 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0481, ATL.


Provincial officials were unsure ofPaora Told's intentions and somewhat unnerved. In mid-May

1864, Rhodes reported to McLean what he interpreted as a threatening situation. John Parsons

had just written in from his inland run to warn that although 'I am not an alarmist', he

nevertheless believed 'that this part of the Province is in a dangerous state' and urged 'steps ... to

prevent the movements of the Natives, which I believe are contemplated'. [269] Rhodes attempted

to get a grip on developments:[270]

I have just concluded an interview with the Rev. Samuel Williams and Major Whitmore to try and sift

a few of numerous and somewhat contradictory, although alarming reports that are current here.

Williams was unworried: 'Mr Williams has just returned from a northern journey ... and generally

thinks there is no immediate sign of a rising to the northward ... '. But his opinion was discredited

since being a missionary he 'of course as in duty bound speaks in mild terms of his native flock'.

Rhodes' informants thought that Paora Told was recently in hiding at Petane and not at Te Pohue

as Williams believed. Williams had, however, observed 'a number of the natives who left this

Province with him at Petani on Sunday last'. [271]

The Locke report, written in late May and portraying a conspiracy led by Te Rangihiroa and

Paora Told to attack the Province, implies that the hui at Te Pohue passed off in mid-May

without further alarm.[272] The scare subsided. Writing on 20 May, Samuel Williams thought that

much of the insecurity resided in the minds of the Pakeha:[273]

All is quiet and I hope will continue so notwithstanding the great difficulty there is in convincing the

Europeans that the Natives ... are not meditating their destruction. Master Paora Told ofPetane has

been giving a little trouble but I don't anticipate any evil results. He has been to Waikato; and has

returned again without going to fight, and I hope has made up his mind to keep quiet.

But Rhodes echoed the frequent settler call for military reinforcements to protect the exposed

inland boundary:[274]

269 Parsons to Superintendent, 14 May 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0495, ATL. 270 Rhodes to McLean, 17 May 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 271 If accurately represented, Williams' moderation stands in sharp contrast to his alarmist hostility two years later

to the frontal religious challenge of Pai Marire. 272 Locke to McLean, 27 May 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. 273 Samuel Williams to his father, 20 June 1864, Williams Family Papers, MS-Papers-0069-0018, ATL. 274 Rhodes to McLean, 17 May 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL.


The preventive measures I mean should be taken to preserve the peace are just placing 200 or 300

men at the most commanding position on our northern frontier. We have hardly sufficient men here

now to ensure the safety of the main centres of population.

McLean had pre-empted him. On 10 May he interviewed the Colonial Secretary and followed

up the next day with an urgent plea that 'a reinforcement of five or six hundred troops is

absolutely required, and such a force might even now be the means of averting hostilities' in

Hawke's Bay. He warned of 'the present critical state of that Province' and the dire predicament

of its inhabitants, 'who are in danger of losing their lives, their homes, and property' .[275]

Justifying his demand for what amounted to a major troop redeployment, he painted a lurid

picture of imminent attack, this time not from Waikato but from Tuhoe:

The Uriweras have openly avowed their determination to attack Napier, and from their wild, savage

state, and revengeful feelings, consequent upon losses sustained at Orakau, there is every reason to

expect they will soon carry their threat into execution ... The scarcity of food in the districts where

hostilities prevail - the love of war, plunder, and excitement that still exists among the large majority

of the different tribes, and the facilities with which supplies can be obtained in the Ahuriri district,

fully indicate the very dangerous and precarious position of that Province.

He claimed that Tuhoe were busy organising wider support, which included N gati Hineuru:

Emissaries are now engaged in enlisting the co-operation of other disaffected tribes to join Uriwera.

Te Rangihiroa, of the Ngatihineuru, ofTarawera, and Te Poihipi, of Taupo, are most active in their

exertions to excite other tribes, both against Europeans and Natives at Ahuriri.

Ammunition and provisions were being stored at Te Pohue and Tutira and Maori women and

children were to be evacuated from a wide area north of Napier 'to the Tutera and Maungaharuru

ranges'.

Relying largely on rumour and speculation picked up by Locke from the kawanatanga chiefs of

Hawke's Bay, McLean had constructed a largely abstract nightmare oflarge-scale invasion out

of a series oflocal hui in the Mohaka-Waikare debating support for the Waikato war, instigated

by Paora Told amidst considerable tension throughout central Hawke's Bay (see section 3.1.2).

He warned that 'the time allowed by the Natives for an attack does not exceed twelve or fourteen

275 McLean to Colonial Secretary, 11 May 1864, AJHR 1864 E-2, p.66-7.


days'. The colonial government was more sceptical, recommending the Governor to reinforce

the garrison but 'as a precaution only, as from all they can learn they do not consider an outbreak

so imminent as Mr McLean apprehends' . [276]

N either invasion nor further local participation in the Waikato war materialised. In mid-1864,

British military operations in Waikato and Tauranga came to a halt.[277] This removed another

option popular amongst provincial politicians: land confiscation. Joseph Rhodes was not alone

in expressing strong support for the confiscation policy to complement complete military

subjugation of resisting Maori:[278]

.. .I at the same time hope that no false philanthropy will prevent the wholesale confiscation of the

rebel lands. It is the only rod that can touch them and the only lever by which to move them.

By early 1865, a new influence was reaching Hawke's Bay that Pakeha officials and settlers

found as disturbing as the oft-feared invasion by Waikato or Tuhoe, the Pai Marire religion. In

February 1865, Locke warned an absent McLean that 'your presence will soon be required' and

described local Maori responses to the 'fifty or so Waikatos and other people members of the

new religion assembled at Petene .. .' as they moved through the settlements of Hawke's Bay.[279]

Rhodes also foresaw trouble coming: 'Everything is still quiet - but the Native element shows

symptoms of restlessness'. [280]

The arrival ofPai Marire in central Hawke's Bay aroused intense debate and triggered renewed

political strife at all levels of leadership. Whether converts themselves or simply exploiting

political opportunity, several rangatira gave tacit and even open support to followers of Pai

Marire, notably Te Hapuku at Te Hauke. The contest for allegiance was fought out at a series of

hui between March and May 1865. [281] The first, at Pakowhai on 7 March, was convened by 'the

chiefs of Heretaunga' , who also invited the acting Civil Commissioner George Cooper and other

276 Whitaker to Govel'11or, 11 May 1864, AJHR 1864 E-2, p.66. 277 Belich, NZ wars, pp.197-200. 278 Rhodes to McLean, 5 December 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 279 Locke to McLean, 23 February 1864[1865], McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. His next letter,

written on 26 February 1865, confirms that this letter was composed in 1865. 280 Rhodes to McLean, 6 March 1865, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 281 Parsons, Hallhall Movement, pp.2-14, 35-8; Clark, Pai Marire, pp.42-6.


Pakeha to attend. The speeches, as reported by the Hawke's Bay Herald, [282] were finnly loyalist:

'The meeting was addressed by the principal chiefs, all of whom expressed their determination

not to permit the new superstition to be received'. Attempts by Pai Marire speakers to present

their case were ignored and cut short. Referring to the Pai Marire people gathered under Te

Hapuku's protection,

the speakers also said that they had ordered the strangers to leave the province, but that a number of

them were returned slaves from Waikato ... who had embraced the new religion while in that district;

these would remain in the province. With reference to the arrival ofWaikatos at the north, they ... said

that the party was beyond the reach of interference on their part ...

Transcripts of half a dozen of the chiefs' speeches give a more complex and nuanced view. [283]

A key dilemma they faced was how, as partners of the Crown, to exercise their responsibility for

the behaviour of Maori whilst preserving general freedom of movement. Harawira Tatere from

Waimarama described the obligations of partnership:

It was formerly arranged that you, Ml' M'Lean, should prevent any intruders on your side and we on

ours; ... you prevent on your side and we on ours any evil that may come among us.

However, according to Karaitiana Takamoana,

... it was formerly arranged that this place should be open to travellers, so long as they travelled in

peace; but where they (the present party) have erred is in teaching these people that which will lead

to confusion.

Pointing to divisions within regions of Pai Marire influence, he admonished the Pai Marire

participants:

Potatau said when their king movement was in proper working order, then carry it into other parts -

thus with this Hau. I say, let them try it properly at home before bringing it here.

The most forthright assertion of Hawke's Bay as a Pai Madre no-go zone came towards the end

from Karauria Pupu:

282 Hawke's Bay Herald, 9 March 1865. 283 Printed in Hawke's Bay Herald, II March 1865.


... what I say is (as there are several present) go back, stay away altogether; this is the object of this

meeting. These parties will not stop here, they will come again and again and cause excitement;

therefore I say everyone go back to their own place ...

Civil Commissioner Cooper was of a similar opinion, but considered the available military forces

insufficient for direct action against the travelling Pai Marire parties without local Maori

support: [284]

In the present state of the Province, it is evident that if large bodies of armed fanatics are permitted

to be constantly travelling about, a state of peace cannot long exist; and if the Natives cannot, or will

not, prevent them from coming, we certainly cannot.

The Pakowhai hui took place just days before news arrived ofthe murder ofthe missionary Carl

Vollmer at Opotiki on 2 March 186SY85] The murder sent shockwaves through settler and Maori

society in Hawke's Bay, provoking the Hawke's Bay chiefs to publish a joint public

condemnation adopted at a large hui at Pakowhai on 20 March. The letter made it plain that they

would take active steps to prevent outside people proselytising for the Pai Marire cause:[286]

We had already expressed our displeasure at its being carried about and taught in our villages, and

we told them to take it back to the land from whence it came and carry it on there ... Those murderers,

by travelling through the country of other tribes, have saved themselves, and have obtained time to

spread about their doctrines. For had they come this way we should have seized them and with our

own hands handed them over to you. But as they have not yet come, we have laid down the above rule

for our conduct with regard to those bearers ofPakehas' heads through our places, and if they resist

us, we will not spare them, we will kill them.

At the Pakowhai hui on 7 March, Noa Huke defined a boundary between the spheres of influence

of Pai Marire and the kanawatanga chiefs, linking it directly to the latters' responsibility for

keeping the peace:[287]

Come, it is on this account that we shall draw the boundary for this "Hau" at the back of this mountain

range going from thence to Whanganui and to Tauranga - this side to remain peaceable. Nothing has

284 Cooper to Native Minister, 25 February 1865, AJHR 1865 E-4, pp.19-20. 285 First reported in Hawke's Bay Herald, 18 March 1865. 286 Karaitiana & others 'from the whole meeting at Pakowhai assembled .. .' to the Governor, 20 March 1865,

translation printed in Hawke's Bay Herald, 25 March 1865. 287 Hawke's Bay Herald, 11 March 1865.


as yet happened; therefore let it remain so .... therefore this "Hau" must return to the back of this

mountain, and we shall remain as before ...

Noa appeared to be marking out the whole of the eastem North Island as off limits for Pai Marit'e

evangelism. In central Hawke's Bay, he was probably indicating the central divide and may have

meant the Maungaharuru range, though there is no other specific evidence as to exactly how far

the Hawke's Bay chiefs saw their authority as extending. [288]

Karaitiana Takamoana and Renata Kawepo convened a further hui on Pai Marire at Pakowhai

on 21 April. The account of it published in the government-sponsored newspaper Te Waka Maori

suggests that only loyalist, anti-Pai Marire speeches were delivered.[289] This was the only hui

during this period in which Ngati Hineuru leaders were recorded as participating. [290] They heard

Henare Matua speak

of christianity coming, to hold on to the faith, love, the law and kotahitanga. These four instructions

were to be the law and to have influence over both Maori and Pakeha. They established a good basis

for the province to function in harmony.

According to Parsons,

A variety of other speakers expressed a determination that the Hauhaus return to their own territory

and leave Heretaunga in peace. Karaitiana Takamoana stated, "This I say we should turn to the

Government and let Christ be our god. The Hauhau should be returned to Waikato. Hauhau should

cease their practice."

In this fraught atmosphere, N gati Hineuru themselves became a test case of the rhetoric on

freedom of movement when Te Rangihiroa returned from his visit to the Wairarapa in early June

1865. It seems that his party was under some risk of detention by the govemment because Cooper

reported an intervention on their behalf by Tareha, who 'wishes Te Rangihiroa and party to be

allowed to retum home'. [291] Travel for followers of Pai Marire, whether defined as local or

outsider, was becoming a risky business.

288 Parsons states that 'the ranges referred to are believed to be the Maungaharuru ranges', but provides no further evidence (Parsons, Hal/hau movement, p.56).

289 Te Waka Maori, 2(50), p.13, summarised in Parsons, Hauhau Movement, pp.36-8. 290 Boast, Mohaka-Waikare, p.26. 291 Civil Commissioner to Native Department, 5 June 1865 (register), MA 3/2, NA.


The government took its own rallying initiatives as well. On 10 April, Governor Grey arrived

unannounced and gave the Hawke's Bay chiefs a pep talk. [292] For his part, McLean organised a

week-long series of meetings in early May. It began with a three-hour meeting on 1 May in the

Council Chamber, primarily on the situation in Turanga. At a further meeting on 5 May, McLean

and several Maori speakers criticised Te Hapuku and Tareha, who had not attended on 1 May but

were now present, for their apparent Pai Marire sympathies. Both were again absent from the

sumptuous banquet laid on over 8-9 May in the Council Chamber, which attracted a very large

gathering ofMaod leaders from Hawke's Bay and beyond. There is no sign of a Ngati Hineuru

presence. But Anaru Matete, later targeted by the government as a dangerous rebel, was there

with other Poverty Bay chiefs throughout the week. [293]

The competitive bidding for followers blurred the political stance of a number of Hawke's Bay

chiefs - there were significant numbers of Pai Madre adherents to take account of, and not only

people arriving from outside the Province. McLean himself was concerned at the number oflocal

Pai Mat'ire adherents and sympathisers and took care not to polarise them in the wrong direction.

In June 1865, following his efforts to woo the support of the chiefs, he warned the colonial

government: [294]

Were hostilities to break out at this moment, under circumstances that could be made to appear as if

the Government were the aggressors, the whole of the waverers above alluded to, would join the Hau

Haus; and guerrilla warfare would rage throughout this Province, and the Wairarapa district, the end

of which would certainly not be reached within one or two years of its commencement. The above are

the considerations which have induced me to refrain from interfering with the party ofHauhaus at the

Pawhakairo.

For the next year, the focus of government intervention in local conflicts between Pai Madre

groups and their opponents remained to the north - Ngati Porou and the East Coast, Poverty Bay

and finally Wairoa. Meanwhile, more aggressive action against Pai Marire centres in and around

central Hawke's Bay remained on hold.

292 Te Waka Maori, 2(47) & Hml'ke 's Bay Herald, 11 April 1865, summarised in Parsons, Hauhau movement, pp.9,36.

293 Hawke's Bay Herald, 2, 6 & 11 May 1866. 294 McLean to Colonial Secretary, 21 June 1865, quoted in Parsons, Hauhau movement, p.65.


3.2.2 Sheep, 'Rebels' and Frontier Security (January-May 1866)

On 29 January 1866, Lieut-Col. Whitmore complained to Donald McLean about 'a depredation

committed on my Run by the Hau Haus at Ihaia's Pah'. [295] He referred McLean to a letter from

'an outstation shepherd of mine' ,IM. McNeill, who had been informed by Te Whetu, 'the chief

from the Mohaka Pah', that 'his wife and two other Maori women saw some natives belonging

to Ihaihia's (Isaiah) tribe driving 12 sheep off the Hukanui run' .[296] Whitmore followed up the

next day with a statement from Nesfield, a cadet on his station (see Map 7):[297]

Te Wittu [Whetu] informed George Gould, with whom I was living, that the natives of the Oharuta

[Te Haroto] Pa had some 3 weeks previously driven off 12 sheep, from a flat at the junction of the

Enungitiki [Inangatahi] and the Mohaka, and had driven the same over the Mohaka and through the

bush to the Oharuta Pa.

Whitmore was by this time by far the largest runholder within the Ahuriri block (see Map 6). His

sheep station, managed from his residence Rissington, extended over the Maungaharuru Range

to the banks of the Mohaka River and occupied the whole of the southern Mohaka valley from

the Taupo track to the Kaweka Range, precisely the land that Te Rangihiroa had contested with

McLean so tenaciously through the 1850s.[298] He had organised it into two sections each

supervised by shepherds and named after the mountains, the Hukanui run to the west and the Te

Waka run to the east (see Map 6).

Whitmore gave prominence to the economic losses he stood to suffer. This was, he affirmed, 'an

occurrence I fear not unfrequent on my Run' and he threatened to withdraw from the Mohaka

valley: [299]

.. .I shall await your answer before removing my sheep which of course are very much exposed. For

three years I have been unable to use the Waka a large part of my summer country through the close

vicinity of these rebel Pahs, and should no protection be afforded to me now it will be impossible to

295 Whitmore to McLean, 29 January 1866, IA 1 236/66/417, NA. 296 McNeill to Whitmore, n.d., IA 1 236/66/417, NA. 297 Unsigned statement enclosed in Whitmore to McLean, 30 January 1866, HB 417, NA. 298 Macgregor, Early stations, pp.I92-4; Matthew Wright, Hawke's Bay: the history of a province, (Palmerston

North: Dunmore Press, 1994), p.83. 299 Whitmore to McLean, 29 January 1866, IA 1 236/66/417, NA.


persuade my shepherds to remain in isolated whares on the Hukanui and I must therefore withdraw

my sheep.

Concerned though he was about the profitability of his business - and he was already a serious

and successful large-scale sheep-farmer[300] - Whitmore's consuming interest was military

strategy. He ended his letter to McLean by 'assuring you that I will continue, as I have throughout

the war, to keep my sheep on the extreme frontier so long as shepherds can be induced to remain

with them, and cause no alarm by anything I say or do' .

Whitmore's perception of the alleged culprits was less of thieves than of 'rebels'. For hard by his

run, 'a very ill-disposed body of natives had congregated behind the Pohui Bush on the Mohaka,

and I am therefore by no means surprised at this occurrence' Y01] According to McNeill, 'Isaiah

is a strong supporter of the Pai Marire faith and I believe a thorough old scamp'.[302] Whitmore

himself asserted that 'all the natives in that direction [Te Haroto] avow themselves to be Hau

Haus'. Their numbers had, moreover been reinforced by 'a very considerable number of strange

natives ... ' . [303] For him, the war he had departed as a soldier was very much in progress and he

was still in the front line.

In a private note to McLean, Whitmore expressed his views more frankly.[304] He confessed that

'this affair is a bore of course to me, and perhaps to you'. His motive in sending his shepherds

to the frontier was primarily strategic: 'I have always sent my sheep up to the hills since the war

broke out because I argued that ifthey go there (ie the Maoris take them) they will go anywhere

and my not sending them would cause much alarm in this District'. He claimed that he had 'lately

I fear lost many sheep in this way - and I do trust you will be able to do something to overawe

these insolent savages who will yet, mark my words, give trouble if you do not' .

The more immediate cause of trouble, however, he feared might be his own shepherds. Neither

McNeill nor Nesbitt seemed in the least bit fazed by the incident and neither hinted at fears for

their personal safety, McNeill ending his letter by declaring: 'I will go up to Hukanui, after I have

300 Macgregor, Early stations, pp.192-3. 301 Whitmore to McLean, 29 January 1866, IA 1 236/66/417, NA. 302 McNeill to Whitmore, n.d., IA 1 236/66/417, NA. 303 Whitmore to McLean, 30 January 1866, HB 417, NA. 304 Whitmore to McLean, n.d., IA 1 236/66/417, NA.


seen my sheep all right, tomorrow ... ' y05] Whitmore acknowledged that 'they have been

accustomed to call the Maoris to account for having dogs on the Run and might make a

disturbance if they caught them stealing sheep which would lead to blows perhaps or more' . [306]

It was, in other words, the new spirit of Maori self-assertion he detected that might put his staff

injeopardy: his Maori neighbours might no longer acquiesce in the summary justice they were

used to handing out.

The key difference in this instance was, Whitmore believed, that he had enough evidence to

demand action. Another employee corroborated McNeill's account of his interview with Te

Whetu, while Nesfield passed on similar information given by Te Whetu to a second shepherd,

George Gould. What's more, Te Whetu believed that the women who had the first-hand

information, one being his own wife, 'were willing to be witnesses should any steps be taken in

the matter' . [307] This was, Whitmore declared, 'at last a definite report of an occurrence I fear not

unfrequent on my Run' [308] - he had his pretext for demanding government action.

The 'action' he envisaged, but held back from stating - 'if you wish it I will tell you how I should

have acted and you can do as you like,[309] - went beyond police arrest for theft. Whitmore's

private agenda was more belligerent and strategic. During December 1865 and January 1866, in

the latest of a sequence of convulsions along the East Coast, a series of clashes took place in the

Wairoa area between Pai Marire followers and their opponents, who were able to call in military

support from the colonial government.[310] As Agent of the General Government, McLean was

intimately involved in the colonial interventions. Writing in late December 1865 to offer his

support, Whitmore gave his view that 'unquestionably now the retreat of the rebels will be direct,

either by Petane or Maungaharuru towards Taupo,,Pll] He claimed that 'they [the 'rebels'] have

enormous plantations Pohui way and I feel quite sure you will find that if they fall back

Southward, and not into the Uriwera territory, it will be upon Maungaharuru'. In that locality he

perceived a specific problem:

305 McNeill to Whitmore, n.d., IA 1 236/66/417, NA. 306 Whitmore to McLean, n.d., IA 1 236/66/417, NA. 307 McNeill to Whitmore, n.d.; Whitmore to McLean, 29 January 1866, IA 1 236/66/417, NA; unsigned statement

enclosed in Whitmore to McLean, 30 January 1866, HB 417, NA. 308 Whitmore to McLean, 29 January 1866, IA 1 236/66/417, NA 309 Whitmore to McLean, n.d., IA 1 236/66/417, NA. 310 Belich,NZwal's, pp.208-10. 311 Whitmore to McLean, 29 December 1865, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL.

i'

I


There is a nest of ruffians at Pohui and Rangihiroa, Paul Toki, and others are there often though

possibly not just now. Old Kiriwera and Whetu are both gone there from Mohaka ...

Connecting the local threat with military strategy, he argued: 'I think a post at Petane or Pohui

would be a good move just now ... '. A military post would of course be conveniently adjacent to

his large sheep run and he made clear his readiness to enter the fray on a private or public agenda:

I am at all times prepared to fight for my Station or to lead the Colonial Forces or anything which can

be called my duty and you need not stand on any ceremony in calling upon me for that.

It was a police action, however, that on receipt of Whitmore's complaint McLean ordered. He

promised Whitmore a prompt investigation 'in order that the offenders may be brought to justice.

In the meantime I am sending a letter to Whetu requesting his cooperation in the matter' . [312]

Whitmore backed off, reverting to his alter ego of runholder:

Please settle this matter as you choose. I have no wish one way or the other except to have a certainty

of exemption from depredation for the future which [certainty] I should feel if some punishment or

fine was inflicted on these persons.

But he was ready to contribute in his own style: 'If things do not improve [I] shall send more men

up country and arm them'.[313l

McLean's letter to Te Whetu, delivered by Whitmore's shepherd McNeill and a Maori

policeman, was an order he could not refuse:[314]

... me he mea e tika ana aua korero kia mauria mai e koe aua tangata nana i tahae i nga hipi ki te Pa

Whakairo, kia ata kimihia to ratou na he .

.. .If those things that were said are correct, you should bring the people who stole the sheep to Pa

Whakairo so that their wrongdoing can be investigated.

312 McLean to Whitmore, 1 February 1866, IA 1236/66/417, NA. 313 Whitmore to McLean, n.d., IA 1 236/66/417, NA. 314 McLean to Te Whetu, 31 January 1866 (copy), HB 4/13/274, NA (trans. Winifred Bauer).


McLean concluded his draft: 'and if its correct, they should pay' [a ki te mea ka tilea me utu e

ratou], but had second thoughts and crossed it out. In the margin he added a reassurance: 'The

Maori policeman is coming as a friend' [Tenei te Pirihimana Maori te haere atu hei hoa].

The three men were joined by Kiriwera, Ihaka, Raroa, the shepherd George Gold and the cadet

Nesfield and set off for Te Haroto, where they recovered three sheep out of the nine taken there.

At Kipa's kainga near Church Crossing on the Mohaka River, they failed to find any of the eight

sheep said to have ended up there.[315] Amidst considerable tension, McNeill rejected the Ngati

Hineuru chiefs' offer of compensation in horses. The reason, he explained to Whitmore, was that

'after Mr McLean's letter to Te Whetu stating that he wished the Haroto chiefs to come down

to Pawhakairo to consult on the matter, I could not take upon myself to settle it'. That was not

exactly what McLean had demanded ofTe Whetu, but perhaps it made little difference: prisoners

were wanted and Ihaia's was the one name they had. There was a standoff as McNeill's party

tried and failed to make an arrest.

It is possible that McLean had calculated on this result, but he decided to proceed more

cautiously than Whitmore. This was, after all, an unprecedented and peremptory projection of

provincial authority into an area previously treated as independent territory, with matters of

mutual interest handled by diplomacy and negotiation. He also had two hats to wear, for not only

was he Superintendent of Hawke's Bay but also the Agent of the General Government for the

East Coast. Switching hats, McLean seized immediately upon the pretext he perceived, writing

the next day to the Native Minister:[316]

Te Whetu and the policeman have just arrived in town and report that the Hauhaus interfered to

prevent the apprehension of the accused; but that they admitted to having killed 5 sheep for which

they are willing to give 3 horses in payment. May I request your instructions as to what action the

Government would wish to have taken in this case.

He also discussed the matter the same day with Col. Russell, who had taken office in October

1865 as Native Minister and, in Alan Ward's judgement, 'brought a stiff-necked, insensitive

315 McNeill to Whitmore, 6 February 1866, IA 1 236/66/417, NA. The following account is based on his report. 316 McLean to Native Minister, 7 February 1866, IA 1 236/66/417, NA.


attitude to the administration of Maori affairs'. [317] Russell, he informed Colonial Secretary and

Prime Minister Stafford, 'will be able to afford any information that may be thought necessary

as to the steps required to be taken' 'p18]

The speed of McLean's response bespeaks a clarity of purpose. Within the space of eight days

from receipt of Whitmore's report, he had eschewed any attempt at diplomacy, launched a police

raid into independent Maori te11'itory and applied for colonial government backing for escalated

action. This was a sudden and radical initiative: there is no record of any previous border incident

involving Ngati Hineuru and the Provincial authorities, and McLean and his officials had

previously fostered good relations by handing out road contracts and cultivating informants such

as Nikora Te Whakaunua.

Duly primed, Stafford minuted the government's response on 12 February and conveyed it by

letter to McLean three days later:[319]

The Government is strongly of opinion that depredations of this kind should be checked at once or

otherwise the Hau Haus will be led to believe that such crimes may be committed with impunity. It

relies on your judgement and discretion to determine what steps should be taken in this case, and, if

you should think it necessary, you are authorised to avail yourself of any armed force at your disposal

to bring the criminals to justice.

McLean did not divulge exactly what he had told Russell about 'the steps required to be taken

in the matter'. What he had now acquired, however, was blanket government backing for any

military action he might now decide to launch against Ngati HineulU in their rohe.

With this authorisation McLean may have got what he wanted. He took no further police or

military initiative and appears to have used his more accustomed diplomatic method to try to

have the sheep-stealing case dealt with by Tareha at Pa Whakairo during May 1866. [320] Nor were

there any further complaints of sheep theft during the first half of 1866 from the vigilant

Whitmore. Since the Hukanui and Te Waka runs were summer grazing, it was anyway likely that

by May he had moved his flocks away from the Mohaka borderlands.

317 Alan Ward, A show a/justice, (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1973), p.195. 318 McLean to Colonial Secretary, 7 February 1866, IA 1 236/66/417, NA. 319 Colonial Secretary to McLean, 15 February 1866, IA 1 236/66/417, NA. 320 Nikora Te Whakaunua to McLean, 9 May 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0690C, ATL.


3.2.3 The Offensive against Pai Marire in Hawke's Bay (May-July 1866)

In May 1866, Te Warn Tamatea, the principal Pai Marire chief from upper Wairoa, surrendered.

On 24 May, he took the oath of allegiance along with 100 other prisoners. [321] With the ending

of resistance in the Wairoa area, the way was open for McLean to intensify his campaign against

Pai Marire influence in his provincial heartland of central Hawke's Bay. This time the main

thrust was to be intimidation rather than persuasion. On 29 May, acting on an 'understanding'

with McLean, the kawanatanga chiefs Ihaka Whaanga and Pitiera Kopu led a force of' 100 aimed

and mounted followers' out ofWairoa on a swing down the coast, with prisoners in tow. 'Their

objective was to warn the natives on the line of coast that they must, for the future, conduct

themselves peaceably and respect the law'. They were also hunting down political opponents to

take prisoner. During its march the kupapa force cut down all niu poles it found en route,

including three at Petane. There, 'some of the natives appeared inclined to resist the cutting down

of these poles, but the formidable array of the friendlies intimidated them, and they wisely

refrained from interfering' . [322]

On 1 June, Ihaka and Kopu marched into Napier. They moved on to Pa Whakairo and Pakowhai,

the home bases of Tareha and Karaitiana respectively, hammering home the demand for loyalty

at large hui and showing off their prisoners, the most prominent being Te Warn. Before their

departure, they were feted at a public dinner in the Council Chamber in Napier attended by most

of the leading Hawke's Bay chiefs. McLean delivered his keynote political message:[323]

The chiefs of Heretaunga - Karaitiana, Te Hapuku and others - have wavered (in their loyalty), but

Kopu and Ihaka never had two thoughts; they had always been the friends of the Europeans in this

district...

The kupapa expedition sent shock-waves through the volatile and competitive relationships

between the Hawke's Bay chiefs, triggering a scramble to demonstrate their kawanatanga

credentials. Karaitiana paraded his loyalism at the dinner, as did Renata and Tareha.

321 Hawke's Bay Herald, 19 & 29 May 1866, summarised in Parsons, Hallhall movement, p.16; Binney, Redemption songs, pp.40, 56.

322 Hawke's Bay Herald, 1,2& 12 June 1866. 323 Hawke's Bay Herald, 12 June 1866.


The Ngati Hineuru settlement at Waiparati, although beyond the sway of both the provincial

authorities and the Hawke's Bay chiefs, was vulnerable as one ofthe two remaining strongholds

ofPai Marire in the region, the other being Paora Told's community at Petane. It was probably

at the Pakowhai hui that Karaitiana suggested a joint military expedition against Ngati

Hineuru: [324]

We are informed, however, that Karaitiana proposed to join his forces with those ofKopu and Ihaka,

and together attack Te Rangihiroa, an old Hau Hau savage of Tarawera on the road to Taupo. This,

however, was overruled, and Karauria was dispatched to the settlement of the old chief for the

purpose of endeavouring to bring him to reason. If the mission should prove an unsuccessful one,

ulterior (sic) measures were to be considered.

In other words, the proposed attack was suspended, not abandoned. Following news ofthe failure

of Karauria's mission, on 26 June, the Hawke's Bay chiefs mounted a show of strength in

Napier: [325]

It is now known that Rangihiroa of Titiokura has assumed a very defiant attitude towards the

government, and that the friendly natives are very anxious to be allowed to take the bounce out of him.

A large party of natives are coming to town today to offer their selvices to the Government, to proceed

to Titiokura, or to repel any aggression from that or any other quarter.

A force of2-300 men, 'all of whom were armed', paraded outside the militia office, performed

haka and drilled. They were welcomed by McLean and the chiefs delivered warlike loyalty

speeches, declaring their readiness to fight 'against any tribe, either from Waikato or elsewhere,

that might threaten to disturb the peace of the district' .[326] Commenting a couple of days later,

Samuel Williams expressed prevailing Pakeha confidence that this show of force had deterred

any threat from the provincial borderland: [327]

You will be happy to hear that the prospect of immediate war in this Province has blown over and that

matters appear more settled again. Paora Toki and the Ngati Hineuru who had been exceedingly

impudent to say the least and threatened to tapahi any of the friendly Natives who might go that way

324 Hawke '8 Bay Herald, 12 June 1866. 325 MLC Napier MB 72, pp.185-6 (Waha Pango); Hawke '8 Bay Herald, 26 June 1866. 326 Hawke '8 Bay Herald, 14 July 1866. 327 Samuel Williams to his father, 28 June 1866, Williams Family Papers, MS-Papers-0069-00 18, ATL.


to remonstrate with them, when they found that these people were preparing to attack them if

necessary they began to sing small and sent to urge that fighting might be transferred to Taranaki.

3.2.4 Containing the Pai Marire 'Invasion' (mid-August-6 September)

In mid-August 1866, parties of Maori began to arrive from a number of places in the Te Pohue

area. The Heretaunga chief Karauria Pupu quickly gave the provincial government its first

information that a Pai Marire encampment was forming near Te Pohue:[328]

Their word (intention) is to come down upon us all here, and the town itself is included in this word,

in these days and these nights (ie at any moment). Do you communicate this to the Pakehas.

Such alarms had been common currency since the start of the Waikato war and on 18 August

Rhodes himself did not give this one much credence: 'I don't suppose there is any reason to be

uneasy'. [329] On 5 August 1866, Locke had reassured McLean from Napier that' everything hear

is going on quietly .. .', and again a week later that 'everything here is very quiet...' .[330] But now

at Pa Whalmiro, the Hawke's Bay chiefs picked up the message that they were in the firing line:

the expedition's objective was not so much Napier itself but 'to attack the friendly natives in the

vicinity of Napier'.£331] A week later, on 27 August, Locke reported that 'letters have been

received from Poihipi, Paora Huri Waka and others to the effect that Anaru Matete and others

were at Maungaharuru and that they intended attacking this place'. His assessment was still

cautious: 'I have not seen Tareha yet so I can not give an opinion. But old Ihaka will be here I

expect today and then I will find out all about the case'. [332]

In early September, the Hawke's Bay chiefs received brief but first-hand information in a letter

from Hirini Tipare, who was reporting back to Karauria on his foray into the Te Pohue

encampment on 28 August. According to him, 'the word of the Hauhau is you, the Queen

Natives, shall not have a vestige left in the world'. He also believed that 'Waikato, Taupo and

Rongowhakaata ... wish to do some work', the translator adding '(ie to fight)' .£333] For the

328 Translated extract ofletter from Karauria, enclosed in Cooper to Rhodes, 18 August 1866, HB 4/13, NA. 329 Cooper to Rhodes, 18 August 1866, HB 4/13, NA. 330 Locke to McLean, 5 & 12 August 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. 331 Hawke's Bay Herald, 21 August 1866. 332 Locke to McLean, 27 August 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. 333 Hirini Tipare to Karauria, 4 September 1866, [English text, appears to be a translation], HB 417, NA.


Hawke's Bay chiefs, Tipare' s infonnation reinforced the messages they had been receiving from

pro-government chiefs in the interior and their own belief that they would be the target of a

renewed Pai Marire campaign which might include an attack.

Anaru Matete's presence would have been unwelcome news to McLean, who was aware of his

campaign to win over East Coast chiefs to the kingitanga. Matete, who had been involved in the

Pai Marire conflicts in Poverty Bay and Wairoa, had visited Tawhiao in May 1866 and had then

returned via Taupo to the East Coast interior by early June. The fact that his 7 June letter to

Paratene Titore promoting the kingitanga, which its Turanga recipients passed on to McLean, was

sent from Ruatahuna also suggested links with Tuhoe, the most feared symbol of Maori

independenceP34] With his active advocacy ofPai Marire and the king and his extensive political

network, Matete's arrival placed the Te Pohue gathering in a wider regional context in official

eyes.

Towards the end of August 1866, officials in Napier began to take notice of the Te Pohue

assembly with more urgency. Deputy Superintendent Rhodes reacted to the 'rumours of invasion'

by arming two of the Provincial Council's principal Maori allies, giving Karaitiana and Tareha

10 more rifles each with a small quantity of ammunition', an action he later regretted as 'quite

unnecessary, but could not then see' . [335] They agreed 'at my request to send scouts and observe

the enemy. '[336] On 28 August, with no sign of scouting, Rhodes sent Locke 'to enquire about the

truth of the Hauhau business at Titiokura and get all the information he can ... '. [337] But a week

later, Locke was still unconcerned, reporting that 'everything goes on quietly at present here' .[338]

Rhodes' aggressive stance nevertheless led him to look for opportunities to take the military

offensive. Sheep-stealing, he told McLean on 28 August, might offer a pretext: [339]

I do not think that these fanatics will venture down to their destruction, but it may be that they will

borrow sundry sheep from Whitmore, and otherwise make it desirable to root out their nest.

334 Binney, Redemption songs, pp.55-6, 61. 335 Rhodes to McLean, 14 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 336 Rhodes to McLean, 27 August 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 337 Rhodes to McLean, 28 August 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 338 Locke to McLean, 4 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. 339 Rhodes to McLean, 27 August 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL.


Whitmore's sheep quickly entered centre stage. On the same day, 'a man from Whitmore's

station' alTived who 'stated the Hauhaus were stealing the Major's sheep'. There was little

substance to the story: the man, who had 'no letter or credentials from the overseer, ... had seen

one skin and one sheep with its throat cut...'. No corroborating information had come in 'from

Parsons or anyone living in that direction'. [340]

A week later, however, Locke reported that Whitmore was 'very much excited about what has

been going on at the back of his run' and was advocating military action. Locke thought that

'there appears to be no doubt but that sheep have been stolen, but the number is not known' .[341]

Whitmore himself was more precise. On 2 September, he informed Rhodes that he knew who,

how many and why;P42]

... the Hau Haus from Pohui have made a foraging expedition upon my run ten miles from their

stronghold and stolen a flock offi'om 50 to 70 sheep, and killed many more in wantonness. This body

ofHau Haus is one formed upon the nucleus of Paul Toki's followers, and they are all close upon

starving ... Impunity and hunger are making the natives bold and what has already befallen me will

before long be of very frequent occurrence everywhere.

It was the abduction from his shepherded flock of wethers 'ten miles from their stronghold' that

particularly upset Whitmore. He soon recalculated his alleged losses upwards by deduction -

sheep put onto the range less sheep mustered in - to claim an aggregate of 300 sheep takenP43]

However, some may have remained beyond the reach of his shepherds and the numbers observed

at the Te Pohue encampment may anyway have been gathered in over a period of months.

The raiders, being 'Hau Haus', were in Whitmore's opinion a menace to settlers as well as

sheep;P44]

Some forty or fifty Europeans unarmed and defenceless are located within a few miles of them, and

these innocent persons will in all human probability be butchered if no energetic steps are taken

before long.

340 Rhodes to McLean, 28 August 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 341 Locke to McLean, 4 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. 342 Whitmore to Rhodes, 2 September 1866, HB 417, NA. 343 Whitmore to Rhodes, 4 September 1866, HB 417, NA. 344 Whitmore to Rhodes, 2 September 1866, HB 417, NA.


He left Rhodes in no doubt as to the 'energetic measures' he had in mind, or his own readiness

for active service:

I am led to believe that Mr Ormond intended to have authorised you in Mr McLean's name to adopt

strong measures if any outrage was actually committed. I am in hope therefore you will have sufficient

authority to summon Major Fraser and the ChiefKopu with their men to this part ofthe country, to

raise a Volunteer body of the natives from the plains and with the Defence force to make a strong

combined effort to root out this body of banditti from the fastnesses of Pohui.

Rhodes preferred to await the retUlTI of McLean, which he expected by 10 September. His reply

to Whitmore on 3 September nevertheless made quite clear where his inclinations lay:[345)

In the meantime I have taken such steps as I judge best to tide over the present difficulty. When that

nest of Hauhaus are rooted out as soon they will be I trust, I advise that a crushing force should be

used and a front and rear attack to be arranged simultaneously.

As a preliminary step, he wanted to prepare the way for covering extra military expenditure and

for Whitmore to be able to get compensation. He requested Whitmore to send someone to town

to lay a positive information before the Resident Magistrate of this raid and demand a warrant for their

apprehension. This would go far to justify us in the eyes of the General Government if any

extraordinary expenditure should have suddenly to be incurred, and would be a fair ground on which

you could claim compensation in case of the ... failure of the Law to give you redress.

His official advice to Whitmore, he wrote to McLean a couple of days later, was 'to have

recourse to the ordinary machinery ofthe law, at least, as a first step'. He was hopeful that police

action could be mobilised through the kawanatanga chiefs: 'I have some reason to believe that

a document could be used through Tareha to effect the capture of the ringleaders ... ' . [346]

Whitmore responded with alacrity. On 5 September, he sent Rhodes an application for a warrant

of arrest against the perpetrators and for the recovery of his sheep, supported by an affidavit from

his overseer, George SmithY47] Rhodes passed the application to George Cooper, the Resident

Magistrate. He told Whitmore privately that' although no direct evidence as to the individual

345 Rhodes to Whitmore, 3 September 1866, HB 6/6, NA. 346 Rhodes to McLean, 5 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 347 Whitmore to Cooper & enclosure, 4 September 1866, IA 1 239/6611670, NA.


robbers can be obtained, yet it is sufficiently plain that the ringleaders in this case are well-known

and may be called upon by name to answer for the misdeeds of themselves or their follower-in

arms' . [348) For Rhodes, in other words, specific evidence was not necessary and collective

punishment would meet the case.

Cooper, however, required a modicum of due process. Whitmore could supply no eyewitnesses,

no names of alleged thieves and little concrete evidence even that theft had occurred. He made

it clear to Whitmore that he could not issue a warrant on such flimsy evidence. Normally, he

explained, he would now turn the case over to 'the Native Assessors and Police' to identify the

culprits, gather the required evidence and apply for warrants. But in this case, to do so might put

their lives at risk. Such a clash would oblige the colonial government to put in force the Outlying

Districts Police Act. Before taking any action, therefore, he wanted instructions from the

government. [349) Like Rhodes, he duly referred the matter to Wellington, noting that McLean was

also there. [350)

Samuel Locke remained sceptical of tactics of escalation and told McLean plainly that police

action was as far as it should goY5l) Sheep stealing was

more a case for "The Outlying Districts Police Act 1865" than for a declaration of war. We shall never

have peace if we are going to fight over every theft etc that may take place in the Colony. It is a

robbery and ought to be just acted upon as such.

Locke did, however, support the military settlement of the provincial frontier:p 52)

I like the scheme of settling a regiment in the interior, it will be expensive but it will disperse that

cloud of uncertainty that always hangs over the Taupo country.

Rhodes and Whitmore, both substantial sheep-farmers, were more belligerent. In a private letter

to Whitmore, Rhodes explained his tactics:[353)

348 Rhodes to Whitmore, 7 September 1866, Whitmore Papers, Box A/8, HBM. 349 Cooper to Whitmore, 7 September 1866, IA 1 239/6611670, NA. 350 Cooper to Native Secretary, 7 September 1866, IA 1 239/6611670, NA. 351 Locke to McLean, 4 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. 352 Locke to McLean, 4 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. 353 Rhodes to Whitmore, 7 September 1866, Whitmore Papers, Box A/8, HBM.


I have sent for Cooper and will give him the documents, and if that gentleman declines to issue a

warrant on the grounds that he has no power to execute the same, he will officially inform you thereof;

then you will be in a better position to demand compensation, and likewise strengthen the hands of

the Government in any contemplated move against this nest of fanatics.

Thus invoking colonial government intervention on security grounds would assist Whitmore's

private interest as well as legitimate a decisive attack on the Pai Marire encampment. A military

solution, Rhodes indicated, had been the principal strategy for some time past and he implicated

McLean in its planning:

I heard the Hauhaus had fortified themselves some time ago from Native sources and M'Lean knows

of it. Indeed we had determined on rooting out the nest of robbers at Titiokura before the meeting of

the Assembly, but for many and varied reasons it dropped through at that time - only to trouble us

again as it appears and more urgently. I think this job will be done effectively when it is done although

that may be some little space distant yet.

Cooper also portrayed the Pai Marire gathering in military terms to the Native Minister,

describing it as 'a war party ofHauhaus lying under arms in a stockade near Titiokura, within the

settled districts of this Province, and less than 30 miles from Napier' . [354) Rhodes urged McLean

to prepare the way in Wellington: 'You should get the sanction of the Govt to crush this nest of

robbers ... ' y55)

For his part, Whitmore was sceptical whether the decisive attack he urged would ever eventuate,

and for that he knew whom to blame. On 4 September he sounded off to Rhodes:[356)

I do hope McLean will act. The whole of this arises from his having allowed this affair to go on so

long. I told him of it twice - and his untimely absence from Wellington when the mail arrived and left,

and consequent ignorance of the state of affairs for the last half of last month, has deprived us of the

opportunity of having things put to rights for a long time. When he does move I hope it will be with

his former success and rapidity.

Once again he pushed the virtues of his plan for a surprise pincer attack from front and rear on

the Pai Marire gathering at Te Pohue.

354 Cooper to Native Secretary, 7 September 1866, IA I 239/66/1670, NA. 355 Rhodes to McLean, 3 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 356 Whitmore to Rhodes, 4 September 1866, HB 417, NA.


A week later, after Cooper had rejected his application for a warrant, his mood was darker. Had

his warning at the time of the first sheep theft last January been heeded, 'it would have been

comparatively a small affair' to settle the matter. Bitterly he confided to Rhodes:[357]

I doubt if, when your report reaches McLean and Ormond, they will do much ... McLean may put a

sort of an end to the affair by korero - but this is merely putting off the day of reckoning and I do hope,

therefore, in spite of the manifest difficulty, vigorous measures may be adopted.

On 18 September, discovering that McLean had still not arrived back as expected, Whitmore

vented his frustration to him directly and at considerable length. [358] He considered it imperative

that McLean either take charge himself or depute someone else to act:

I am very much disappointed that you have neither come nor written anything about the Hau Haus at

Titiokura. Both Europeans and Maoris regard this affair so velY differently from this, to what you and

Ormond do from Wellington ... Every day since [30 August], you have been looked for, or some letter

giving someone here authority to act.

Meanwhile, his losses continued to mount:

Personally, having been plundered pretty constantly for the last 18 months, and having had all the

sheep within 10 miles of the Hau Haus stolen by them except the comparatively small number they

could not get hold of - why to me personally this protracted delay is not of more consequence than any

other period ofthe same length for 18 months past.

Whitmore had only anger and contempt for all he considered 'rebels'. Paora Told, whom he

believed he was prevented from capturing three years before,[359] was an especial target:

Paul Told, of course, is the leading spirit of the whole thing, and he has been so long allowed to

escape punishment that our District will never be safe till he is shot or sent to the Chathams.

The rest of the Pai Marire gathering he described as 'the other rascals, the refuse of all the tribes

in the island, who care precious little for any Chief of birth, and live as they can from place to

place ... '. A considerable head of steam was building up for colonial military action.

357 Whitmore to Rhodes, 11 September 1866, HB 417, NA. 358 Whitmore to McLean, 18 September [1866], McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. 359 Whitmore to Rhodes, 11 September 1866, HB 417, NA.


3.2.5 Awaiting McLean (7 September-3 October)

But events soon took a wholly unexpected turn. The arrival at Petane on 7 September of a 70-

strong party led by Paora Told and Panapa took the Pai Marire initiative close to the provincial

power centre in Napier. Unexpectedly, they said they had come in at McLean's instigation and

with peaceful intentions. Rhodes was disconcerted to find a large Pai Marire party suddenly on

his doorstep rather than 30 miles away up country. He told Richardson the next day that he had

sent Locke 'to come up to you and see what the 70 Hauhaus are about. I am obliged to you for

your information and depend upon you for early intimation of any movement of this body of

fanatics day or night'. The government would pick up the bill for any expenses incurred. [360]

Standing in for McLean in Napier, Rhodes was clearly unaware of the 30 August letter from

Panapa and Te Rangihiroa to McLean which announced their coming. However, on 1 September

he indicated his knowledge of McLean's previous communication with Panapa and Ngati

HineumY61] Read with the Ngati Hineum letters and statements, his remark is further evidence

that McLean had previously written to Panapa inviting Ngati Hineum to engage in some form

of political reintegration.

Apparently reassured by the reports from Richardson and Locke, Rhodes was inclined to believe

Ngati Hineum's explanation that they were responding in peace to an invitation from McLean.

On 14 September he informed McLean, who was still away:[362]

Panapa ... states that he and the rest have come in on account of a letter written by you to them asking

them to do so. They have come down to Petene thinking you were back.

He nonetheless treated it as a military surrender of 'enemy' forces. He bmsquely cut short

Tareha's diplomatic attempt to send them food supplies:[363]

Today he asked me point blank to send food to the enemy at Petene ... I told him that I could give no

food until the arms were given up and due submission made.

360 Rhodes to Richardson, 8 September 1866, HB 6/6, NA. 361 Rhodes to McLean, 28 August 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 362 Rhodes to McLean, 14 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 363 Rhodes to McLean, 14 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL.


Rhodes was in little doubt that a surrender was imminent and rebuffed Tareha's request for more

weapons, telling him that [364]

... the Hauhaus were desirous of submitting, and in any case the Europeans were not alarmed but could

protect themselves if necessalY ... According to Tareha and my own judgement, the people at Titiokura

are getting tired of being hungry and are seriously thinking of peace.

The Hawke's Bay chiefs meanwhile pressed the officials insistently for more weapons, with scant

success. Three days after the Petane arrival, Cooper informed Rhodes that[365]

Karaitiana has send in to ask for some powder and caps for his fowling pieces. He did not get any

when they were given to Tareha.

On 14 September, reporting ajust concluded meeting with Tareha, Rhodes revealed to McLean

how much pressure he was under:[366]

Tareha wound up as usual with begging for arms etc, which of course I refused ... next at the last

moment in a whisper that I will write to you that he wants more arms etc and that you will bring him

some when you return. Both parties are at me every alternate day, for arms, powder, caps etc, and

persevere wonderfully.

Rhodes did, by contrast, respond to a request from the settlers Carr and Richardson by issuing

15 stand of arms to Carr at Petane. [367] He nevertheless showed little sign of concern while the

Pai Marire party remained peacefully at Petane, nor again in late September when reporting that

'the ringleaders' had gone to stay with Paora Kaiwhata to await McLean's return.[368]

Whitmore did not agree. The profession of peaceful intentions was, he told McLean on 18

September, not serious:[369]

364 Rhodes to McLean, 14 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 365 Cooper to Rhodes, 10 September 1866, HB 417, NA. 366 Rhodes to McLean, 14 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 367 Rhodes to McLean, 15 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 368 Rhodes to McLean, 26 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 369 Whitmore to McLean, 18 September [1866], McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL.


A few (85) of Paul Toki's party are at Petane nominally to see you about some letter you have written

them and to korero ... I also hear that they talk of surrendering at discretion to you. But this would only

be a repetition of the ceremony of swearing in, at least that is their idea, and you have tried that with

Toki once already.

Returning as before to the familiar certainties of his military world, the real motive, in his

opinion, was hunger, 'because they are tired of mutton for breakfast dinner and tea without any

admixture of other food'. But he also considered that 'they are really hungry I believe, and want

Rhodes to feed them'. This brought to his mind a couple of novel solutions:

I suppose it would not do to introduce a little "mix" or "arsenic" into the flour sent over to them? Or

else they might be very profitably "fed off', at Petane. But seriously could you not perhaps manage

to get them to agree to be deported to the Chathams on a promise of plenty offood for 6 months? They

would do a good deal for 6 months' food right now.

Black jokes aside, [370] Whitmore was urging that the people's hunger be exploited towards a more

drastic solution than the mere 'surrender' he would regard as a sham.

The officials in Napier appeared unwonied about any security threat that the Te Pohue gathering

might pose, despite Whitmore's alarmist warnings about pillage and plunder. Rhodes confessed

to him on 7 September:[37!]

The Europeans beyond the Mohaka I am afraid would pay no attention to any message from the

Government recalling them; and as to Mr Parsons, he has already refused to move more than once

when in similar danger.

The risk came rather from outlying settlers like Parsons getting caught up in military action

initiated by the government side: 'I fancy the hauhaus will not molest him until they have

provoked in other ways an hostile movement on our part ... ' .

370 In another show of personal animosity, Whitmore had remarked to McLean at the time of the threatened attack on Te Rangihiroa in June 1866: 'Hang old Rangihiroa to a totara tree. If you like to send people my way I'll go and show them how to tie the noose. Ah! Its a pity you and Tareha prevented me from nailing P. Toki long ago, but now don't let the brute escape'. (Whitmore to McLean, 19 June [1866], MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL).

371 Rhodes to Whitmore, 7 September 1866, Whitmore Papers, Box A/8, HBM.


John Parsons, whose run extended up the Taupo road close to Te Pohue, was the most exposed.

On 8 September, Rhodes dispatched a messenger asking him to send regular information on 'the

motions of the Bauhaus in your neighbourhood', and suggested that he evacuate his family: ' .. .it

is very doubtful whether it is safe to leave females in such close neighbourhood to the

Bauhaus'. [372] Two days later, Parsons replied in some anger, making it clear that he would not

spy, that he intended to stay put and that the Pai Marire gathering was awaiting the response of

the government:[373]

I have no information to give in addition to that already in your possession. The future movements of

the natives here will no doubt depend in a great measure upon the steps decided to be taken by the

Government.

Except in a case of the greatest danger, I would rather you would not send over a special messenger

for as it is not my intention to leave here unless forced to do so by the natives, I do not wish to give

them reason to suppose I give information relative to their movements, as this might be used as an

excuse to plunder ...

As late as 26 September, Locke was quite unworried about the unresolved situation: 'There is

but little going on here' .[374] Nor was Rhodes, who informed McLean briefly the same day ofthe

disposal of the Petane church but that 'the Petene Maoris ... have otherwise been quiet'. Two days

later, Rhodes wrote laconically: 'Nothing new in the native line,.[375]

By late September, McLean's alTival, as well as the imminent meeting of the Provincial Council,

had been repeatedly postponed for a month past. Rhodes, who had been holding the provincial

fort for some considerable time, was himself losing patience, telling McLean on 26 September:

'The Gazette is out and I shall expect you up by the Ashley as Council has been twice called now

and it won't do to put it off too often'. [376] McLean had not delegated the executive control over

security matters concentrated in his hands and the strategy of escalation adopted by his local

officials was effectively paralysed. Cooper expected the Government Agent to assist, Rhodes

372 Rhodes to Parsons, 8 September 1866, HB 6/6, NA. 373 Parsons to Rhodes, 10 September 1866, HB 417, NA. 374 Locke to McLean, 26 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. 375 Rhodes to McLean, 26 & 28 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL. 376 Rhodes to McLean, 26 September 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0527, ATL.


awaited the Superintendent. Maori awaited the great negotiator. In McLean's absence, little could

happen.

3.2.6 The End of Negotiation (4-8 October 1866)

With McLean's arrival in Napier on 4 October the pace of events quickened dramatically. On the

same day, the Pai Marire party, which had been waiting at Petane for nearly a month, moved to

Omamnui and Paora Kaiwhata evacuated his people to Pa Whakairo. Its leadership and a fair part

of its membership - though by no means all - was from Ngati Hineum, whose Pai Marire prophet

Panapa was the unifying leader of the party.

McLean's opening letter of 5 October to the new arrivals at Omamnui generated a quickfire

exchange of messages. He conceded that it was his earlier letter to Ngati Hineuru that had

brought them down, but questioned their intentions in the absence of Te Rangihiroa and an

explicit willingness 'to abandon evil proceedings'. Without offering them the chance to clarify

their position, he demanded that they depart the Province forthwith without further negotiation.

McLean's public profession of uncertainty as to their intentions was disingenuous: since as far

back as June he had received letters and messages from Te Rangihiroa and Panapa, as well as a

stream of information from Rhodes, Locke and Whitmore. The drafts of this letter, heavily

corrected and in English - he wrote his other messages to Omamnui in Maori and had them

translated - reveal that he invested considerable effort in preparing its final form. The syntax is

complex and appears to have an eye more to a Pakeha than a Maori readership.

Over the next three days McLean pursued a similar course, seeking clarifications to which, as his

increasingly exasperated Maori counterparts at Omarunui pointed out, they had already provided

answers. At the weekend he sent in a delegation ofkawanatanga chiefs with an offer he can only

have expected them to find unacceptable: to send their prophet, Panapa, alone to Pa Whakairo

'to arrange matters at that place before coming in here'. In other words, there was to be no hui

no korero, no negotiations at Pa Whakairo, simply a planning meeting to arrange what amounted

to a surrender in the form of a loyalty oath-swearing ceremony in Napier at which the Pai Marire

party would hand in their weapons. The brevity of McLean's reference implies that the

kawanatanga delegation had established at the weekend that the leaders at Omamnui might be


prepared to undergo such a ceremony. They also confirmed this to McDonald, whom McLean

may well have debriefed at the weekend. [377]

But McLean appeared to have in mind a ritual of humiliation such as he had imposed on Te Waru

and his followers six months earlier at Wairoa and had tried to impose on the Turanga leaders

before the attack on Waerenga-a-Hika:[378]

McLean set arbitrary terms for 'peace', which were impossible for most of the Turanga leaders to

countenance. All Maori had to take an oath of allegiance; ... all arms were to be surrendered ... McLean

refused to negotiate or discuss his terms. The Poverty Bay tribes were being treated as rebels before

they had become so.

McLean's final letter to Omarunui on Monday 8 October, demanding to know whether their

intentions were 'good' or 'evil', offered the Pai Marire leaders nothing new. Once again he

claimed not to understand the meaning of their reply, this time the response to his demand that

Panapa should come alone to Pa Whalmiro, that 'all were Panapas'. But F.E. Hamlin had

annotated the obvious interpretation in the margin of his English translation of McLean's Maori

original: 'meaning that all the war party should come in a body' . [379] The impression given is that

the clarifications repeatedly sought were intended for a wider government and public audience

rather than to improve his own understanding.

The choice he presented to the Pai Marire leaders was either to surrender and disarm or to depart

the Province. The latter, they knew, was not a viable option, at least for Ngati Hineuru: they had

only recently been under threat of attack, and much of their land was still under threat of

alienation. But surrender without negotiation would have spelt utter humiliation and would still

not resolve the threats to their autonomy, safety and land. The Pai Marire leaders continued to

insist on a meeting at which they could present their case. This McLean probably anticipated

from the outset: he allowed a short window of time for his 'surrender or withdraw' ultimatum

to succeed peacefully, but by boxing the Pai Marire leaders into a small corner, he greatly

narrowed the chances that it would. The primary objective, as he explained to Stafford when

377 MS notes, n.d., HB 4/13/364, NA. 378 Binney, Redemption songs, pp.47-8. 379 McLean to Panapa & friends, 8 October 1866 (translation), AD 1 9712115, NA.


outlining his military preparations on 9 October, was 'to obtain their submission, and by that

means to absolutely crush out the danger which at present menaces the district'. [380]

3.2.7 Preparing to 'Absolutely Crush Out the Danger' (4-11 October 1866)

In briefing Stafford, McLean played upon the supposed threat that 'a general movement of the

disaffected Natives was to take place shOlily, and that this place, if feasible, was to be the point

of attack'. He claimed that upon his arrival on 4 October 'the resident Natives at once came to

me and confessed their conviction that the Hau Haus had come to fight...'. The kawanatanga

chiefs may well have done so though there is no evidence in the surviving documentation and

they may not have been unanimous at the outset. According to Samuel Williams, around that

time at least two Hawke's Bay chiefs he encountered were sure that the Pai Marire party intended

to negotiate a peaceful solution:[381]

A week previous to the fight, 1... met one of Renata's chief men at Paki Paki. I asked him how things

were going with regard to the Hau-Hau visitors and he replied that everything was quite satisfactory -

they were coming to make peace. I made no remark and passed on [to] Karaitiana's place at

Pakowhai. He also considered that matters were entirely satisfactory ... [Returning, I] asked him ifhe

believed the nonsense he had been telling me about the Hau-Haus coming in to make peace. He

replied in the affirmative.

If Ormond's retrospective account given late in life is to be believed, prominent amongst the

'resident Natives' who did think an attack on Napier was imminent was Tareha. Addressing the

Omarunui Jubilee celebration, Ormond placed great weight on a flow of intelligence from Tareha

from June 1866 onwards as to the movements and aggressive intentions of Panapa and Ngati

Hineuru. [382] There is, however, no sign in the records of written information from Tareha, who

380 McLean to Stafford, 9 October 1866, AHJR 1867 A-lA, p.67. A jotting at the end of McLean's notes on his interview with McDonald may offer a clue as to his state of mind at the time: 'Nga raho 0 te Rangihiroa. Nga taringa 0 Nikora'. [The testicles ofTe Rangihiroa. The ears ofNilcora.] A person of McLean's quarter century experience of Maori tikanga would have appreciated that if spoken, these could be construed as serious insults against the two Ngati Hineuru chiefs. The name 'Porolcuru' is written above these words and it is possible that he was reporting the remarks of someone else (MS notes, n.d., HB 4/13/364, NA). 'Porokuru' may possibly be the Porokoru Mapu who co-signed the Ngati Kahungunu letter announcing the 'whata ofTe Herunga' in 1858 (Te Moananui and others to Governor, 29 September 1858, AJHR 1862 C-l, p.340-1).

381 John Thornton, Life of Samuel Williams, MS, chapter IX, pp.4-5, quoted by Ballara & Scott, Mohaka-Waikare, pp.25-6. Williams dictated his account later in life and muddled up the sequence of the events he describes. He also talked up his own importance.

382 Quoted in Thomas Lambert, The st01Y of old Wairoa, (Auckland: Reed Publishing, 1925), pp.605-11.


was anyway trying to assist the Petane party during September by arranging food supplies. That

Tareha was simultaneously pressing Rhodes for more firearms suggests that he saw a risk of

military action, whether defensive or offensive.

Williams claimed to have succeeded in persuading McLean that a Pai Marire attack was

imminent. Whether or not he was instrumental in achieving this, it was Karaitiana, who had

proposed the attack on Te Rangihiroa in June and whose loyalty McLean had at that time called

into question, that tried to persuade McLean on Saturday 6 October that the messages he had

received from Omarunui the previous day were more threatening than they seemed:[383]

Have you understood the answers of the Hauhaus to your two letters, which state both you and the

Chiefs ofHeretaunga have knowledge (or are aware of) their movements? That term ofthe Hauhaus

means we are aware that their God is a man eating God and that they are come to fight. Make up your

mind to do something.

He also requested' a short gun, not a revolver, and also a sword'.

But Karaitiana, writing from his kainga at Pakowhai, may not have felt too threatened as he also

appeared willing to provide hospitality for the Omarunui peopleY84]

We are going to Pawhakairo there to listen to the proceedings ofthe Hauhaus the people from inland

have arrived here. I have told them to stay here at Pakowhai.

The united view presented by McLean to the Pai Marire leaders the previous day, which rejected

their wish to go to Pa Whalmiro, may not have been so united after all. It seems that McLean got

his way in the end: the negotiations died and the Pai Marire party remained penned up at

Omarunui. On Tuesday 9 October, the day after communications with Omarunui ended, the

Hawke's Bay chiefs collectively decided to launch an attack. They informed McLean of their

decision 'from the chiefs and the Government Runanga ofHeretaunga,:[385]

383 Karaitiana to McLean, 6 October 1866, IA 1 243/66/3116, NA. 384 In the absence of the Maori original, the meaning may be ambiguous; I have assumed here that 'the people'

refer to 'the Hauhaus'. If a separate group, it is nevertheless apparent that Karaitiana expected a meeting with Pai Marire people from Omarunui to take place at Pa Whakairo.

385 Chiefs and Government Runanga of Heretaunga to McLean, 9 October 1866, IA 1 243/66/3116, NA.


We have all assembled here at Pawhakairo, and this is the decision at which we have arrived, namely

that a day be fixed for attacking these people (the Hau Haus). If you say that you and we together

should fix the day, it is well - talking is at an end. If you leave it to us alone to fix the day, it is well.

If McLean believed from the outset that the Omarunui party were planning an attack, he showed

no urgency in taking precautions to aveli it. Between 4 and 7 October there was no sign of any

defensive measures. When on 9 October the Hawke's Bay chiefs offered to take matters into their

own hands, McLean asked them to have patience and be on their guard: [386]

My desire with respect to the subject of your letter is that we have patience. When the proper time

arrives to carry out your proposal I shall not fail to write to you. In the meantime do not be troubled

at our present inaction.

Nevertheless we must meanwhile take every precaution and be on our guard. You are on the alert and

so are we. If anything should transpire within out knowledge I shall inform you.

By this time McLean was mobilising for a surprise attack, a period during which he needed to

preserve the illusion of calm. He seems to have regarded the risk of a premature attack as more

likely to come from the Hawke's Bay chiefs than from the Pai Marire patiy at Omarunui. On

Wednesday 10 October there was indeed a scare: Capt. Oswald Carr at Petane picked up a

rumour[387]

from George Herbert of the Whareponga valley that the Hauhau natives were fighting with the

friendly natives on Meeanee flats and plundering the settlers; and also that a mounted constable had

been to his house to warn the outlying people to retire into Napier.

McLean hastened to reassure him that all was quiet and denied that constables had been sent out

to bring in the settlers'p88] But he was sending out warnings. On 8 October, he sent a letter to the

surveyors and bush cutters in the Te Pohue area:[389]

As I understand that yourself and family and some 20 men are living at or near the Pohui bush and

as there is some probability that fighting may take place between the Pa Whakairo natives and the

386 McLean to Chiefs of the Government, 9 October 1866, IA 1 243/66/3116, NA. Maori text in Letterbook, Superintendent of Hawke's Bay, following no.94, qMS-1203, ATL.

387 Carr to McLean, 10 October 1866, HB 417 & AD 1 97/2115, NA. 388 McLean to Carr, 10 October 1866, AD 1 97/2115, NA. 389 McLean to Butler, 8 October 1866, HB 6/6, NA.


party ofTitiokura natives who are in this neighbourhood, I send you this intimation in order that you

may warn the men near you that fighting may take place between them.

There was not necessarily any danger and he was just taking precautions. One of these was to

send up 20 stand of arms via Whitmore.

On the same day he sent a warning to John Parsons near Te Pohue with the same message: ' .. .I

am apprehensive a collision is about to take place between the Pa Whakairo natives and those

of Titiokura'. [390] He suggested that Parsons withdraw to 'a place of safety', but Parsons would

have none of it. [391] To Carswell and Livingstone he wrote on 10 October: 'I have to inform you

that it is possible a disturbance may take place between the Pawhakairo and Titiokura natives ... ' .

The warning was' a precautionary measure, it is possible hostilities may be averted'. [392]

Thus between Monday and Wednesday (8-10 October), following the ending of communications

with the Omarunui party, McLean was distinctly worried that the Hawke's Bay chiefs might jump

the gun and launch an attack on Omarunui. Hints of doubt persisted, however, about the strength

of support for an attack amongst the chiefs' followers. Whitmore, for one, was less than fully

confident, telling McLean on 8 October, the day he called up military reinforcements: 'If our

people are faithful the H.H.s will surrender I feel sure'. [393] McLean had grounds for concern at

the volatility of the situation on the kawanatanga side.

In contrast, McLean does not appear to have worried about the Pai Marire people attacking either

the kawanatanga centres or Napier because he posted no defensive positions. From Monday

onwards, he did call out the Militia and Volunteers 'to meet daily', but not for active service. [394]

Nor did he lack confidence in the odds in favour of his impending attack, on 11 October

declining Major Miller's offer of imperial troops, just arrived, to strengthen his attack force then

assembling, and instead asking that they 'should remain to garrison the town of Napier' .[395]

390 McLean to Parsons, 8 October 1866, HB 6/6, NA. 391 Parsons to McLean, 9 October 1866, Parsons Papers, HBM. 392 McLean to Carswell & Livingstone, 10 October 1866, HB 6/6, NA. 393 Whitmore to McLean, 8 October 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. 394 McLean to Stafford, 9 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.67. 395 Miller to McLean, 11 October 1866; McLean to Miller, 11 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.73. The copy

of the second letter is dated 10 October in the provincial file (HB 6/6. NA).


If Samuel Williams was right, McLean was part of a general consensus amongst Pakeha in

Napier just before the attack on Omarunui that the Pai Marire party did not intend aggression.

Greeting McLean on his return and not yet aware of the move to Omarunui, the bellicose

Whitmore told him on 4 October:[396]

I hope you will be able to settle matters at Petane and Titiokura without much trouble. Some say they

want to give in. I hope they may do so and get sent to Chatham Island.

Feeling vindicated by what he took as confirmation of the plan for a two-pronged assault on

Napier from his interview on 12 October with a captive Tawhana ,Williams commented three

days after the attack:[397]

The evening before the movement was made against the Hauhaus [ie 11 October] I was quite ridiculed

for representing matters in so serious a light and I don't think more than two people in the place

believed me when saying that the fellows intended to fight, but since the fight they can see the great

danger that they were all in.

Williams was later to claim that a week before the attack he had warned 'the authorities' in

Napier of the danger of imminent attack: 'I pointed out that they had all their forces in the wrong

places, and their magazine most dangerously placed as regards the hostile natives' .[398] McLean

himself, possibly influenced by Williams, referred to 'the magazine [as] having been especially

named by the Hau Haus as one of the chief objects of their expedition', the only specific

allegation of a plan to attack Napier in his briefing to Stafford on 9 October. [399]

But this was convenient propaganda: it is reasonably apparent that he gave little credence to a

threat of attack from Omarunui. Similarly, after his own attack on the Pai Marire party, he played

up Williams' letter as revealing 'that an attack on the town of Napier had been planned by

Panapa and Rangihiroa'. He added: 'It is also stated by the prisoners that the attack was to have

been made in three days' - which begged the question of how Te Rangihiroa's party ambushed

396 Whitmore to McLean, 4 September [October] 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. 397 Samuel Williams to his father, 15 October 1866, Williams Family Papers, MS-Papers-0069-0018, ATL. 398 John Thornton, Life of Samuel Williams, MS, chapter IX, p.5, quoted by BaHara & Scott, Mohaka-Waikare,

p.26. 399 McLean to Stafford, 9 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.67.


near Petane was supposed to conceal itself for three further days. [400] If Williams' memory is

accurate,r401] as late as the aftemoon of Thursday 11 October McLean remained firmly ofthe view

that there was little threat of attack from the Pai Marire side, and

... was very reluctant to yield, though I did my utmost to convince him ofthe danger. He could not see

any necessity for immediate action, declaring that the Hau-Haus had been guilty of no act of

aggression ...

Whitmore, for one, was soon exasperated by Williams' exaggerations. Two days after the battle,

a man he suspected of deserting 'brought me a message, evidently fabricated, from Mr Williams

to say that "the Natives now attacking Major Fraser were well backed up by the Waikatos'''.

Whitmore's reason for thinking it fabricated was that it seemed to him preposterous, and further

evidence that the man was a 'double spy'. But he added:[402]

S. Williams should be stopped alarming people and fabricating stories which he must invent or repeat

on no authority. Conceive his going about saying that it was a dangerous country, that the enemy were

in great force, that I had no plan, and only 17 men!

McLean had in fact been preparing since Monday 8 October for a decisive surprise attack, as he

clearly spelt out to Stafford on the 9th :[403]

It will be seen that by tomorrow night, if these measures are successful, a force will be collected with

which I trust to be able to deal conclusively with the intruding Hau Haus, which I trust may be done

without bloodshed, for able as I shall then be to surround them with an infinitely superior force, I trust

to obtain their submission, and by that means to absolutely crush out the danger which at present

menaces the district.

He planned to be ready to move by the moming ofthe 11 t\ as it tumed out he was delayed a day,

and perhaps Williams' persuasive powers saved a second day's delay. His military strategy was

simply to surround the Pai Marire party at Omarunui with an overwhelming force. A bloodless

victory would do, but as when seeking a voluntary surrender over 5-8 October, the 'submission'

was the key objective.

400 McLean to Stafford, 15 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.69. 401 W.T. Williams, Life a/Samuel Williams, cited in Boast, Mahaka-Waikare, p.41. 402 Whitmore to McLean, 15 October 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. 403 McLean to Stafford, 9 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.67.


3.2.8 Surprise Attack and Punitive Raid (12-21 October 1866)

Preparations began on Monday 8 October at about the same time that the final message from

Omarunui made it clear that the Pai Marire leaders would not accept unconditional surrender. [404]

Messages went out to call in kupapa and military settler reinforcements from Wairoa and Mahia;

imperial troops were marched down from the Waipawa-mate stockade; the local militia and

volunteers were paraded; and the Hawke's Bay chiefs put on alert. As soon as all were

assembled, McLean deployed these forces on Thursday night under Whitmore's command to

have Omarunui surrounded by dawn on Friday 12 October. The fighting was over by 8.30 am.

Simultaneously, the military settlers under Major Fraser ambushed the patiy arriving from Te

Pohue near Petane. [405]

In the immediate aftermath of the Omarunui attack, McLean launched a raiding expedition up

the Taupo track into the heart ofNgati Hineuru's rohe. This he had not mentioned in his pre

attack briefing to Stafford and it was hastily put together in the immediate aftermath of the battle.

During the day, Whitmore urged McLean that 'not a moment should be lost in following up the

successes of today, and I should much prefer sending a single column or the second one [ie

column] of a smaller number of white people' .[406] McLean was evidently of the same mind, for

Whitmore repOlied 'attending the Native meeting with your Honor, at Pa Whakairo, to concert

further operations to complete the discomfiture of the survivors of the Hau Haus in their especial

part of this Province ... ' . [407]

McLean was already aware that few people were likely to remain at the Te Pohue encampment,

since many of the 50 or so men reported there by Parsons on 9 October had been killed or

404 Whitmore to McLean, 8 October 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. This letter seems to have been written in the early morning and implies that McLean had already briefed Whitmore on his military strategy.

405 In addition to the correspondence published in AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.67: McLean to Major Fraser, 8 October 1866, HB 6/6; Whitmore to Defence Minister, 15 November 1866, AD 1 66/4937; Militia District Order AI, 11 October 1866 & other documents, Whitmore Papers, Box A/8 & B/2, HBM; McLean to Ihaka [Whaanga], 8 October 1864, Letterbook, Superintendent of Hawke's Bay, no.94, qMS-1203, ATL.

406 Whitmore to McLean, 12 October 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. 407 Whitmore to McLean, 13 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.71.


ambushed by Major Fraser near Petane.[408] His key objective was to capture Paora Toki and

Anaru Matete, whom he regarded as dangerous political opponents; for this, he was willing to

risk pursuit beyond the main target, the Pai Marire kainga of Waiparati.[409] For Whitmore,

however, leading the expedition was the opportunity he had been seeking for many months to

clear his sheep-station frontier of all he regarded as enemies.

Whitmore's raiding force, combining volunteers, military settlers and a large Maori contingent

under several leading Hawke's Bay chiefs, set off inland on 15 October and returned six days

later. The force found the Te Pohue encampment deserted and Te Haroto nearly SO.[41O] Told and

Matete had escaped and there were very few people left to fight 01' take prisoner. [411] By the time

the raiding force arrived, most Ngati Hineuru people who had remained behind had fled their

homes and land, the kawanatanga forces that penetrated as far as Tarawera reporting that 'the

enemy had fled from every kainga on the road.[412] Whitmore cut down the niu pole at Waiparati

and posted a notice at what he believed to be the provincial border at Turangakumu, warning 'the

Hauhaus' that 'if in future you attempt to oppose the sovereignty of the Queen you will be

followed up even to the furthest end of New Zealand' .[413] Whitmore's 'pou rahui' had stamped

his military brand of frontier pacification emphatically on the land ofNgati Hineuru.

For the kawanatanga forces under Renata, Tareha and Karaitiana, the raid was also a chance to

settle old scores. They had wanted to invade the previous June; now, their men pushed on as far

as the principal Ngati Hineuru kainga, Tarawera, destroying and plundering. Whitmore conceded

that he had lost control, but his main concern was to ensure the safety of his allies rather than

prevent the plundering:[414]

These allies were all pretty well paid for their trouble as they got all the loot. They must have swept

off200 horses I think, and much rubbish that they value.

408 A register entlY of a letter from Cooper on 29 October suggests he believed that '36 men were killed at Petane not 12 as stated before' (entry for Cooper to Native Department, 29 October 1866, MA 217, NA). This is far in excess of other casualty estimates.

409 McLean to Whitmore, 13 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.73. 410 Whitmore to McLean, 16 October 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. 411 Whitmore to McLean, 19 October 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. 412 Whitmore to McLean, 18 October 1866, HB 417, NA; ibid., 20 October 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-

0032-0635, ATL; Whitmore, Report, [untitled], 22 October 1866, AGG-HB 111127, NA. 413 Whitmore to McLean, 22 October 1866, AGG-HB 111127, NA. 414 Whitmore to McLean, 20 October 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL.


In his general reportl415] he remarked that

The Natives dispersed to catch horses and collect what they could find ... They dispersed very widely

in search of horses as soon as we reached Waiparati, and have I believe driven nearly 200 head ...

[They] pushed on as far as Tarawera to plunder.

Plundering was also the theme of a local press report:[416]

... we hear that a party of friendly natives proceeded on to Tarawera and burned the pah there, together

with Nikora's weather board house; and on their return also, they destroyed the whares at Te Haroto,

Titiokura and Te Pohue.

The personal accounts of several participants published in the Herald over the following weeks

confirm the widespread destruction wreaked by the raiders. Travelling up the Taupo track in

November, Lieut. St George reported that 'along the whole road from Waiparati to the edge of

the plains you come across deserted kaingas and plantations, showing that to within the past few

months the country has been thickly populated' .[417] Only the few Ngati Hineuru people unable

to escape as refugees remained behind.

The ravaging ofNgati Hineuru's rohe stands in sharp contrast to the careful behaviour of the Pai

Marire expedition to Hawke's Bay which over a period of five weeks, with minor exceptions

during the final few days at Omarunui, respected the homes and property of Maori and settler

residents alike.

3.2.9 Provincial Self-Reliance

McLean shared a further agenda bearing on the strategy pursued in handling the Pai Marire

challenge: the promotion of Hawke's Bay provincial interests. In the mid-1860s, the Hawke's

Bay economy was small and fragile and the Provincial Council's finances precarious. As leading

businessmen and runholders as well as politicians, men like McLean, Rhodes, Whitmore and

415 Whitmore, Report, [untitled], 22 October 1866, AGG-HB 111127, NA. 416 Hawke's Bay Herald, 23 October 1866. 417 Hawke's Bay Herald, 11 December 1866.


Olmond were acutely aware of the need to promote an image of stability and progress in order

to attract settlers and investment.

Fear of Kingite invasion and Pai Marire 'fanaticism' both struck hard at settler self-confidence.

Once Ngati Hineuru had adopted the Pai Marire faith, they were soon demonised as anti

government, hostile to Pakeha and fanatical - a brooding, unpredictable threat in the provincial

hinterland. The strong Ngati Hineuru presence in the Pai Marire expedition to Hawke's Bay put

their leaders firmly in the spotlight. For McLean, this latest Pai Marire challenge had reached the

gates of his provincial centre of power and compromised his political leadership. A decisive

victory won without colonial government assistance would not only end the challenge for good

but give a powerful boost to the credibility of provincial autonomy. As a triumphant editorial

expressed it a week after Whitmore's return from Te Haroto:[418)

... without any external aid and relying entirely upon local resources, we have, with one short, sharp

and decisive blow, signally repelled, once and for all, a most determined attack; and have, to all

intents and purposes, crushed and annihilated the turbulent and insolent tribe by whom it was

intended ... The settlers, on the one hand, have shown the loyal natives that they are to be depended

upon as allies, and, on the other, the disaffected tribes that they are to be feared as foes.

In early February 1866, McLean had exploited the minor sheep-stealing incident on the extremity

of Whitmore's run to secure colonial government endorsement for the use of military force

against Ngati Hineuru at his discretion (see section 3.2.2). When the new Pai Marire encampment

began to form at Te Pohue, Whitmore urged Rhodes to mobilise for an immediate military

attack. [419) He also pressed the colonial government in Wellington, which was less than

sympathetic: [420)

.. .I did place the General Government in a position to take the necessary steps to prevent this outbreak

six weeks before it occurred. I wrote at that time to Mr McLean who was at Wellington, pointing out

the danger and describing the plan of operations in my opinion necessary to suppress the movement.

I wrote again further details, and my letters were placed in the hands of the Colonial Secretary

[Stafford]. That gentleman after holding them for three weeks stated to the members from this

Province that he had other sources of information at Hawke's Bay and that my statements were

exaggerated.

418 Hawke's Bay Herald, 27 October 1866. 419 Whitmore to Rhodes, 2, 4 & 11 September 1866, HB 417, NA. 420 Whitmore to Defence Minister, 25 October 1866, AD 1 9712115, NA.


To McLean he complained bitterly:[421]

... when six weeks before I wrote to you at Wellington, stating the facts, and what I advised to be done,

they treated my communication with contempt ... Had I not felt that to resign my command at such a

time would have been wrong, I would have flung my Commission at Stafford directly I heard of his

behaviour to you and Ormond when you sent my letter to him.

There was little love lost between Whitmore and 'these crawling flinching politicians' in

Wellington, and especially the Stafford government, 'with whom if I live I shall be square

yet' . [422] But McLean may have had difficulty mustering political support in Wellington. A couple

of days before arriving in Hawke's Bay on 4 October, he briefed Stafford in person in greater

detail. His despatch to Stafford five days later, written in his capacity as Government Agent, set

out the grounds for calling out the various military forces he was assembling and for preparing

offensive action. He played up the threat of a wider conspiracy to attack Napier, the aggressive

intent of the Pai Marire expedition, and the danger arising from its move to Omarunui 'in the

centre of the settled agricultural district adjoining Napier Town ... '. [423]

Portrayed in this context, the messages from Omarunui were set up to be read in Wellington as

confilmation of ill will. Following a preconceived agenda, McLean was working towards a rapid

showdown which would avert any interference from the colonial government. He was even able

to claim credit in that 'the expense involved in these preparations will be small' and promised

good chances ofa bloodless victory. Stafford could only comment: 'Mr McLean's action appears

to have been judicious' . [424]

The victory was Clushing but it was bloody, and followed by an unheralded raid into the interior.

Stafford was months later to be forced to defend the colonial government against stinging

criticism of Governor Grey by the British Colonial Secretary. At the time, the only reaction to

the unilateral decision-making in Napier, behind the usual public congratulations, was a reminder

to Whitmore to report directly to the Defence Ministry in future rather than, as he had been,

421 Whitmore to McLean, 20 October 1866, from 'Mr Parson's place', McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL.

422 Whitmore to McLean, 8 & 20 October 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. 423 McLean to Stafford, 9 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, pp.66-7. 424 Note dated 16 October on McLean to Colonial Secretary, 9 October 1866, AD 1 97/2115, NA.


through Government Agent McLean. [425] In defence, Whitmore pointed to the practical

difficulties he faced at the time, but also exposed doubts about the legality of the attack on

Omamnui:[426]

If on the one hand they [the settlers] wished to defend the right on the other their existence depended

on suppressing the outbreak at once for they had learned that they could expect no help from without.

It was a matter of no moment to them therefore whether or not the legal formalities were strictly

adhered to, and they paraded for the field ignorant that they were called out by law for actual servIce.

Indeed as you are aware both His Honor and I had grave doubts whether we were empowered to take

that step. The operations have therefore been merely a general rising ofthe settlers to support the civil

power, and hardly can be dignified by the title of operations in the field.

Thus both McLean and Whitmore doubted the legality of unilaterally committing volunteers to

active service, and had informed the colonial government. What McLean had launched under

Whitmore's command, however, was not a 'general uprising' but an organised surprise attack

and a seven-day punitive raid on people who had not committed any violation of civil order.

Whitmore himself was acutely aware that McLean had taken political and perhaps legal risks in

seizing the initiative, and privately paid him fulsome compliments for 'the moral pluck you

showed in taking the very heavy responsibility you accepted'. [427]

One further strand of unease influenced the responses of Pakeha officials and settlers and not a

few of their Maori allies: the fear of large-scale invasion from more distant and powerful Maori

tribes than Ngati Hineum. Few rumours generated in Hawke's Bay in the mid-1860s were

complete without the addition of 'the Ureweras' or 'the Waikatos' to the equation of threat.

Reality checks made little difference, even though no 'Ureweras' ever materialised and the only

'Waikatos' arriving in large numbers were peaceful travelling groups ofPai Marire converts.

Preparing the ground for his surprise attack, McLean did not hold back from playing up a

formidable military threat against Hawke's Bay:[428]

425 McLean to Defence Minister, 15 October 1866 & note by Haultain, 16 October 1866, AD 1 9712115, NA. 426 Whitmore to Defence Minister, 25 October 1866, AD 1 97/2115, NA. 427 Whitmore to McLean, 20 October 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. 428 McLean to Stafford, 9 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.66.


The resident Natives ... confessed their conviction that the Hau Haus had come to fight, and that in

their opinion they were supported by the disaffected people in the Taupo country and Waikato. From

these, and from the friendly Natives on the East Coast, I received information of projected movements

by the Hau Haus which went to establish the fact that a plan was organized under which a general

movement of the disaffected Natives was to take place shortly, and that this place, if feasible, was to

be the point of attack, but if not, then an attempt was to be made to attack Wairoa and Poverty Bay.

In the aftermath of the hostilities, McLean requested arms and ammunition, 'to be retained on

this coast during the present unsettled state, and while the Natives are concocting plans in the

interior for a combined movement on this district'. [429] There is more than a passing similarity to

his plea in May 1864 for urgent reinforcements - an imminent invasion by the' Uriweras', a wider

combination of 'disaffected' tribes, settlers and Napier the principal targets, and plunder and food

the main attraction (see section 3.2.1). George Cooper constructed a similar conspiracy from his

interviews with the taciturn prisoners:[430]

3. Ngairo and Wi Hapi were to march on Porangahau and demolish the Queen Maories and settlers

in the southern end of the Province.

4. The Urewera were to undertake the re-conquest of the Wairoa and Poverty Bay.

5. Waikato and Taupo were to come down afterwards, recruit their commissariat and their supplies

of ammunition, and the next point of attack was to be decided upon.

Two weeks after Omarunui, a group of 'Taupo Loyal Chiefs', including Paora Hapi, sent a

message from Oruanui near Taupo to 'the Arawa', warning:[431]

The army ofWaikato are going to Harataunga, an army to avenge the death ofPanapa. They are on

the move, now on the road. The chiefs of that army are Rewi and Kereopa ...

The warning found its way via the Superintendents of Auckland and Hawke's Bay to the Colonial

Secretary three weeks later. [432]

There was no 'army' of revenge marching on Hawke's Bay from the interior. Nor did the

invasion materialise from the Wairarapa that Cooper had depicted as an imminent threat. Ngairo

429 McLean to Stafford, 15 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.69. 430 Cooper to Native Secretary, 29 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.12. 431 Taupo loyal chiefs to the Arawa, 25 October 1866, IA 1 244/66/3381, NA. 432 Superintendent to Colonial Secretary, 15 November 1866 & enclosures, IA 1 244/66/3381.


had indeed tried to intervene together with two other Pai Marire leaders 'and all the people', but

only in the form of two letters sent to the principal Hawke's Bay chiefs. Dated ironically on the

day of the attack on Omarunui, they appealed to the chiefs to 'tum unto our God' and hold back

from military engagement: 'Should the Europeans attack Titiokura do not assist them ... ' . [433]

Nor could there have been many Pai Marire people left at Te Pohue to flee Whitmore's raiding

force. As for the battalions from the interior, Whitmore himself conceded in a report from the

field to McLean on 20 October:[434]

I fancy that there is no real ground for all the Uriwera and Waikato reinforcement reports. It is clear

that it was on the cards once, but I am equally sure that our late successes will stop this sort of thing

for the future.

3.3 A Historical Mistake?

3.3.1 The Historiography of a 'Rebellion'

The historiography ofthe Hawke's Bay conflict is by now extensive but nevertheless incomplete

and inconclusive. Richard Boast, whose commissioned report for the Wai 299 claimants is the

fullest to date, considered that 'much is puzzling about the events surrounding the battle of

Omarunui...'; that 'why so many ofNgati Hineuru descended on lowland Hawke's Bay in 1866

in the first place is still rather a mystery'; and that 'it must be said, too, that the battle of

Omarunui is a genuinely puzzling event and it is very difficult today to reconstruct in a

reasonably neutral way exactly what occurred' .[435]

In his recent regional history of Hawke' s Bay, Matthew Wright is justifiably critical of previously

published historical accounts of the 1866 conflict: [436]

433 Tamaihikoa, Te Manihera, Ngairo and all the people to Te Hapuku, Tareha, 'to all my relations', 12 October 1866; ibid. to Karaitiana & Renata, 12 October 1866, HB 4/13/329 & 330, NA. In late October, Ngairo and Wi Hapi's party was reported as comprising '40 armed men, strangers to the Wairarapa, and a few who have joined it in that district', and to be heading for the East Coast (Gisborne to McLean, 6 November 1866, Inward Letters, Government Agent, qMS-1213, ATL.

434 Whitmore to McLean, 20 October 1866, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0635, ATL. 435 Boast, Mohaka-Waikare, pp.28, 35, 38. 436 Wright, Hawke's Bay, p.86.


The first accounts were unashamedly pro-Victorian. James Cowan, writing in the 1920s, drew on

Colonel Whitmore's battle report to compile an account reflecting traditional nineteenth century views

of 'Hau Hau' fanatics. J.G. Wilson again looked to Whitmore's report as inspiration for his 1940

centennial history of Hawke's Bay. Eighteen years later, A.H. Reed gave the battle similar treatment

in his book on early Hawke's Bay history ... James Belich ... gave Omarunui a paragraph, but

mentioned only that Panapa's force "refrained from acts of violence", and that they were then

"attacked and crushed" by Whitmore. This was true enough, but both the strong kupapa presence and

the 'Hau Hau' response to McLean's effOlis to negotiate were omitted from Belich's narrative, which

in consequence offered quite a different interpretation.

Yet Wright's own two-page narrative differs little in substance from the self-justifying settler

rationalisation that he criticises in his predecessors. Whitmore's land was 'particularly vulnerable

to depredation' because of proximity to Pai Marire people on two sides; presumably, that was

how 'Hau Hau' usually behaved. Te Rangihiroa was a 'warrior' /437] the expedition to Omarunui

a 'force'. The timing of the Pai Marire move into Hawke's Bay, which he places in early October,

is plainly wrong. He assumes without analysis that McLean was attempting negotiations and that

the Pai Marire party cut them off. Battle details dominate his account as much as those of other

authors. [438]

Research prepared for the Mohaka ki Ahuriri inquiry has examined the precedents of the 1866

conflict in greater depth. Dean Cowie has thoroughly reviewed most of this extensive body of

new work[439] and the following discussion therefore focuses selectively on five issues arising

from the historical analysis in this chapter.

3.3.2 Persisting Grievances over Crown Land Purchasing

The first issue is to what extent N gati Hineuru retained a sense of grievance over Crown dealings

in lands within their rohe and were concerned about possible future purchasing. Ballara &

Scott[440] consider that Ngati Hineuru 'had been disillusioned with the Government over many

issues since their rights to land in the Kaweka area had been ignored by the Crown in the 1851

Ahuriri purchase' and that in the mid-1860s 'they were threatened by other purchases'. 0 'Malley

437 He is unlikely to have seen military action since the 1820s. 438 Wright, Hawke's Bay, pp.84-5. 439 Cowie, Hawke's Bay, pp.l02-10. 440 BaHara & Scott, Mohaka-Waikare, pp.21-33.


provides evidence of continued Ngati HineulU dissatisfaction at least up to the signing of the

second deed in August 1859.[441]

Offsetting this undercurrent of dissatisfaction is the fact that several key Ngati HineulU chiefs,

including Nikora Te Whakaunua and Te Rangihiroa's half-brothers Kipa and Kingita, did accept

the two payments of £50 negotiated with McLean in 1858-59 for the Mohaka valley land taken

by the Ahuriri purchase. Thereafter, Ngati HineulU tolerated Pakeha sheep without interference.

In the mid-1860s, Nikora in particular was willing to engage in discussions of possible land sales

to the Crown and signed one of the Kaweka land purchase deeds.

Yet although the senior rangatira Te Rangihiroa lifted his opposition to the overland mail route

once Ngati Kahungunu had recognised his rights to the Mohaka valley land, he did not accept

the Ahuriri compensation deal. Ngati HineulU may have shared the broader dissatisfaction of the

early 1860s with the terms of the Ahuriri purchase, since it had to share the second payment of

£50 with members of other hapu and the price per acre was nearly as low as in 1851. The

government's attempt to purchase the rest of the south side of the Mohaka valley (later the

Waitara block) from non- Ngati HineulU sellers in early 1863 provoked its leading Ngati HineulU

ally, Nikora Te Whakaunua into vigorous opposition, without a clear result. The more intensive

occupation of the Mohaka valley west of the Taupo track by Colonel Whitmore, lUnholder and

Commandant of the Colonial Defence Force, can only have strengthened Ngati HineulU unease

in times of war and religious upheaval. At the height of the 'excitement' in April-May 1864

following Paora Told's return from the Waikato war zone, one of the unconfirmed rumours

picked up by Locke, apparently referring to Ngati HineulU, was that 'they claim all the land at

the back of the Maunga-halUlU mountains'. [442] A sense of grievance about the loss of their

Mohaka valley land through the Ahuriri Crown purchase seems to have persisted into the mid-

1860s amongst at least some sections ofNgati HineulU.

3.3.3 Legacies of Disaffection

A second issue arises in the extent to which, if at all, the leaders who came together in the Pai

Marire expedition to Hawke's Bay were reviving former agendas of disaffection and aggressive

441 O'Malley, Ahul'iri, pp.210-17 & passim. 442 Locke, [memo], 17 May 1864, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0394, ATL.


intent. After the conflict, this perception became a prominent part of the case justifYing the

pre-emptive strike at Omarunui. For George Cooper, conveniently ignoring the church-building,

the road and post contracts and deed-signing of the 1850s and early 1860s, Te Rangihiroa was

now 'a savage ofthe old school, an inveterate enemy ofthe Pakeha', Kipa and Kingita were 'both

troublesome men of notoriously bad character', and Paora Told and Anam Matete were

'ruffians', 'notorious' and 'already well known at the Native Office' .[443]

Cooper noted but failed to explain why 'men hitherto of good character, and generally lmown as

being very friendly and hospitable to travellers', such as Nikora Te Whakaunua and Henare

Poata, were participants in the Pai Marire expedition to Omarunui. In fact not only Nikora but

also the derided Kipa had a lengthy track record of involvement with provincial projects, in

particular improving the Taupo track and assisting the overland mail service. As the kingitanga

began to gain support in Hawke's Bay in the late 1850s, Ngati Hineuru leaders at first held back,

although several joined the powerful runanga movement in the early 1860s.

The British invasion of Waikato in July 1863 intensified the polarisation between Maori and

Pakeha begun with the first Taranaki war, generating severe strains in the Hawke's Bay chiefs'

strategy of economic and political partnership. Joy Hippolite has concluded:[444]

In fact, far from unqualified support for the Government, Ngati Kahungunu generally sympathised

with the King movement, if not suppOliing it outright. At one stage it even looked like they would go

to war to suppOli the King movement if forced to by a clearly aggressive action on the part of the

Government. In the end, the m~ority did not, but for their own reasons, rather than because they fully

supported the Government's cause.

No organised contingents from Hawke's Bay are recorded as having fought in the Waikato war.

Paora Told, the Ngati Matepu leader from Petane, did, however, twice travel to Waikato, on the

second occasion taking a group of20-30 men in early April 1864. This brought the wrath oflocal

Pakeha on his head and Whitmore would have arrested him had McLean and Tareha not

restrained him. The protective intervention of Tareha, the government's principal ally, is telling.

443 Cooper to Native Secretary, 29 October 1866, AJHR 1867 A-lA, p.12. 444 Joy Hippolite, Rallpatu in HaJl'ke 's Bay, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1993), p.50.


Paora Toki's political association with Te Rangihiroa, if not already established, was forged

during the former's campaign in April-May 1864 to drum up support for the kingitanga in the

Mohaka-Waikare area amidst heightened tension throughout central Hawke's Bay. A number of

meetings culminated in rival hui, loyalists at Petane and kingites at Te Pohue. According to

Locke, the Te Pohue meeting decided to defer further action. Exactly what action was

contemplated remains obscure. Locke, condensing information from mainly kawanatanga

sources, was in no doubt that the plan was to attack Hawke's Bay with reinforcements from

Waikato and Tuhoe. He had no concrete evidence, however, and this may have been but the latest

in a series of invasion scares. Paora Told's movements suggest that his attention was focused in

the other direction; in any case, if Whitmore was right, he did not have Tawhiao's support for

acting contrary to the inclinations of the chiefs of Heretaunga. Nikora, who kept McLean

regularly informed from Tarawera at the strategic gateway to the Province, was adamant, once

again, that there was no Waikato army marching on Hawke's Bay.

The signs are that Te Rangihiroa actively supported Told's campaign, further demonising the

former in the eyes ofPakeha officials. Cowie notes his prominence but Boast omits the episode

altogether and Ballara and Scott neglect the invasion scare while treating as fact Locke's claim,

of which there was no later evidence, that a pa was being built at Titiokura. Both they and Boast

confuse the issue further by mistaking Told as a chief ofN gati Hineuru. [445] Whether the obj ective

was a diversionary attack on Hawke's Bay or active support for the Waikato war, the campaign

aroused intense debate amongst Maori and Locke declared that 'this Province has just passed

through one of the most critical periods since the breaking out of the War at Taranaki' ,l446] Yet

there is no record ofNgati Hineuru participation in the Waikato war and the one concrete step

they did take at this time, stopping the road-building, was a well-founded defensive precaution.

Te Rangihiroa further blackened his name by daring to travel to the Wairarapa shortly after the

murder ofVolkner. In the eyes of many Pakeha, for a Pai Marire chief to travel outside his rohe

was tantamount to promoting the Pai Marire faith and therefore rebellion. But his visit to

Waikaraka was occasioned by family business and there is no sign ofNgati Hineuru participation

in the intense Pai Marire campaign which convulsed central Hawke's Bay during March to May

1865, in which Paora Told took a leading role. Clark, Boast and Hippolite point out that local

445 Cowie, Hawke's Bay, p.103; Ballara & Scott, Ahuriri, pp.22-3; Boast, Mohaka-Waikare, p,44. 446 'James Locke' to McLean, 28 May 1864, McLean Papers TS, 44, p.9, HBM.


agendas often determined chiefs' responses to Pai Marire, responses that included toleration in

a competitive bidding for followers, rejection in order to minimise the risk ofPakeha intrusion

into their autonomy, and a variety of political and religious debates. Alliances became unstable

and tension increased.[447] For all that the opposing chiefs attempted to prohibit the entry into the

Province of outside Pai Marire groups, the non-violent tactics of such travelling parties gave little

pretext for stopping them. Chiefs had anyway to take account of the widespread, if minority,

support for Pai Marire amongst their own people.

Pai Marire reached Ngati Hineuru in early 1865, if not before, and soon attracted a strong

following. The Tarawera corridor was a principal route for travelling Pai Marire groups, once

again attracting settler and loyalist Maori hostility as a centre of opposition and now fanaticism.

By early 1866, Te Haroto was attracting refugees from other conflicts, especially Pai Marire

groups in Poverty Bay and Wairoa which had suffered military defeats. It appears that the new

Pai Marire village ofWaiparati, close to Te Haroto, was built during the first half of 1866 under

the leadership ofthe Ngati Hineuru prophet Panapa. Yet from the first days of conversion up to

mid-1866, there was little sign of N gati Hineuru taking evangelical initiatives beyond their

borders, unlike the activist Paora Told from his Petane base. Ngati Hineuru leaders also sought

to defuse frontier incidents that Pakeha runholders like the aggressive Whitmore could exploit

to invoke punitive government action against them.

3.3.4 Pai Marire and Kawanatanga Reaction

The third issue is how prominent a factor was antagonism between the Ngati Hineuru and

kawanatanga chiefs. Boast argues that the arrival of Pai Marire tended to exacerbate existing

tensions and rivalries.[448] Ngati Hineuru, who had since the 1820s acted to varying degrees as

guardians ofNgati Tuwharetoa's political frontier with the coastal tribes and especially Ngati

Kahungunu, were especially sensitive to shifts in the relationships between the interior tribes and

the provincial power centre in Hawke's Bay. These larger forces sometimes intersected with their

own local interests, as when the Ahuriri sellers' intrusion into the Mohaka valley had brought

them close to open conflict in April 1851. Ballara and Scott conclude:

447 Clark, Pai Mal'il'e, pp.42-6; Boast, Mohaka-Waikal'e, pp.22-7; Hippolite, Rallpatu, pp.22-5. 448 Boast, Mohaka-Waikal'e, pp.23, 27.


It is clear that Ngiiti Hineuru conceived themselves as having two enemies; one was the Crown; the

other was that group of powerful Hawke's Bay coastal chiefs who had seen fit to sell their lands to

the Crown. The correspondence of the Government agents makes it clear that relations between Ngiiti

Hineuru and Ngiiti Kahungunu were bad in 1850, and had no cause to improve in subsequent years.

This picture is somewhat overdrawn. Ngati Hineuru leaders participated in a number of regional

hui in Heretaunga between the late 1850s and mid 1860s. There were instances of cooperation,

such as Te Rangihiroa supplying arms to the opponents ofTe Hapuku in the 1857-58 conflict.[449]

Kingita was reputed to have lived for a time at Te Moananui's village.[450] Rangatira from coast

and interior passed in both directions through the Tarawera corridor.

But the polarising impact of the invasion of the Waikato and the rise of Pai Marire sharpened the

political and religious divide between Ngati Hineuru and the kawanatanga chiefs, who moved

towards tightening their alliance with the government in order to preserve their own autonomy.

During the kingite campaign of April-May1864, Renata was reported to have threatened to kill

Te Rangihiroa. During 1865 and early 1866, the attention of the Hawke's Bay chiefs was

absorbed by their local dissension over Pai Marire and the conflicts in the East Coast and Wairoa.

So too were the energies of government officials, who deployed holding tactics of persuasion

through feasts and oaths of allegiance.

The surrender of Te Waru in May 1866 ended Pai Marire resistance in Wairoa and afforded

McLean the chance to harden the drive against Pai Marire influence on his home patch around

Napier. Suddenly, the ground-rules of loyalty changed. Ihaka Whaanga and Pitiera Kopu's force

cut down niu poles along the Mohaka-Waikare coast and in early June confronted the Heretaunga

chiefs in their own villages.

Previous research has ignored or underplayed the political impact ofthis campaign. It unleashed

a rush to conspicuous displays ofloyalism, one outcome of which was Karaitiana's proposal to

launch a military attack on Ngati Hineuru. Although the attack was deferred, Karauria was

dispatched to convey what were in all probability terms of sun'ender similar to what Te Waru had

just undergone at Wairoa. Ngati Hineuru would have been well informed by refugees arriving

449 Moorsom, Tarawera, p.27. 450 Hawke's Bay Herald, 16 October 1866. Te Moananui died in 1861.

.1 \


from Wairoa ofthe risks involved: paraded through the streets of the Pakeha town, handing over

guns, taking the oath of allegiance to the Queen, then release, captivity, land confiscation or even

transportation at the pleasure of the government. It is worth stressing that at this point, Ngati

Hineuru had for some considerable time not been involved in disputes or active campaigns.

It was an angry confrontation. Karauria may have been lucky to escape with his life, courtesy of

Panapa, who was then instrumental in trying to cool the temperature and restore peaceful

coexistence. But the flare-up, following hard on the heels of the Whaanga/Kopu expedition,

provided a sharp reminder that keeping the peace was no guarantee of protection from attack by

the coastal kawanatanga chiefs.

Boast and Cowie argue that a more specific catalyst provoked Ngati Hineuru: the Native Land

Court applications headed by Paora Torotoro for title to a large swathe of their rohe north of the

Mohaka RiverJ451] Notice of the hearing was published at the height of the June confrontation.

There is no direct evidence that Ngati Hineuru knew ofthe application; the letter from Panapa

and Te Rangihiroa of 30 June addressed only the threat of attack. Paora Told's invitation to Paora

Torotoro to visit him at Waiparati a month later is likely to have had land on the agenda since

Torotoro's title application for Petane, Told's home and political base, was due for hearing in

the Native Land Court at the same time as Tarawera, on 7 August. The venue is in itself

suggestive: a land-capturing offensive spear-headed by Torotoro and his uncle Te Waka Kawatini

was driving Paora Told and Te Rangihiroa once more into common action. Seen from their

perspective, the Native Land Comi applications would have seemed part of the broad threat of

attack upon their autonomy.

Threatened with armed attack and the loss of much oftheir rohe, Ngati Hineurujoined a strategic

initiative adopted at a Pai Marire hui at Te Whaiti sometime in July 1866. The initiative, so far

as can be discerned, was to take the form of a peaceful Pai Marire expedition into Hawke's Bay.

The expedition soon took shape with the formation in mid-August of a new encampment between

Te Pohue and Titiokura, carefully positioned on the border not only with the Pakeha runholders

but also between Ngati Hineuru and the coastal tribes. Under the general Pai Marire umbrella,

Ngati Hineuru were pursuing a more specific and defensive agenda, responding to what they

451 Cowie, Hawke's Bay, pp.108-9; Boast, Mohaka-Waikare, pp.28-9.


believed was a summons from McLean to come in to discuss the renunciation of their Pai Marire

faith. They requested safe passage to Napier and were willing to surrender their guns.

In early September, the majority ofthe Te Pohue gathering moved to Petane, expecting to meet

McLean in Napier. Ngati Hineuru formed by far the largest component of what was a multi-hapu

group, their prophet and chiefs led the expedition, and their more specific agenda came to the

fore. They remained at Petane as the weeks dragged on and the food ran out, finally moving to

Omarunui on 4 October, the day of McLean's return. There were few signs of military intent, but

in the face of aggressive opponents the expedition came armed, comprised mostly men and left

a reat'guard with three senior leaders at Te Pohue. No military preparations, whether defensive

or offensive, were made at Te Pohue, Petane, or later at Omarunui. On the other hand, there were

efforts to defuse the tension. The Pai Marire party respected property and caused no trouble.

Several kawanatanga chiefs were ready to assist the Pai Marire people, by trying to arrange

supplies of food or hosting their leaders. But equally, they made efforts, with only small success,

to win Pai Marire followers over to the kawanatanga camp.

Several factors may have influenced the Pai Marire party to move to Omarunui. Cowie attributes

it to Paora Torotoro's title application for Tarawera - and one might add Petane, which he

secured with others on 18 August - since he was 'the principal grantee of the two Omarunui

blocks' ,£452] Paora Kaiwhata, the chief based at Omarunui village, had fought against Pai Marire

in the Wairoa campaign; one group which had joined the Pai Marire party were from that area.

There were three other more practical inducements. First, Kaiwhata had invited several Pai

Marire leaders to stay at Omarunui. When McLean returned, the rest of the party joined them

there. Second, the people were shoti of food at Petane, blockaded for nearly a month by the

government's refusal to allow through supplies. Third, expecting to meet McLean and the

Hawke's Bay chiefs at the usual venue, Tareha's political centre at Pa Whakairo, they took the

direct overland route, stopping at the last village before reaching it. This was a well-worn trail

that other Pai Marire travellers had followed in early 1865.

When he finally arrived, McLean's negotiating strategy quickly derailed the concluding process

that the Ngati Hineuru and at least some kawanatanga chiefs expected. Their messages to

452 Cowie, Hawke's Bay, p.109.

I \


McLean from Omarunui, according to Ballara and Scott, indicated that 'Ngati Hineuru were

hoping for McLean to mediate between themselves and what they saw as the belligerent Ngati

Kahungunu chiefs, and to discuss with him their Paimarire allegiance'. They expected a formal

meeting to discuss their differences and Pai Marire faith, leading on to some kind of disarming

or oath-swearing ceremony. Instead, he required the Pai Marire people either to declare in

advance that they would abandon their faith or return home forthwith.

Within this narrow framework, there was insufficient trust for the Pai Marire party to acquiesce

in the proposal of the chiefs' delegation that visited Omarunui over the weekend, that Panapa

should come to Pa Whalcairo alone to make practical arrangements for a surrender. Confidence

also dissipated amongst the Hawke's Bay chiefs, who had hitherto tolerated the Pai Marire

expedition for a month without apparent friction. The day after McLean terminated the exchange

of messages with Omarunui, the chiefs' runanga resolved to attack the Pai Marire party. McLean

had real apprehension of an armed clash, but held the chiefs in restraint until he could integrate

their forces into his own surprise attack three days later on 12 October.

3.3.5 A Conspiracy to Attack Napier

Was there a Pai Marire conspiracy to attack not the kawanatanga chiefs but Napier? Such a plan

took a prominent place in McLean's justification of 9 October for his military preparations and

in government and settler narratives after the conflict. Interviews with reluctant prisoners in the

fortnight before they were shipped off to the Chatham Islands were cited as plain proof.

However, the records of the interviews were poorly compiled, summarised and internally

inconsistent; if interpretable at all, they tell a story quite at odds with the constructions placed

upon them by officials and the inventive Samuel Williams. Nor do the letters found at Omarunui

sustain the conspiratorial interpretation placed upon them after the battles by McLean and others.

They reveal, at best, that the Ngati Hineuru effort to drum up support, mainly from the

kingitanga, achieved no material results, but was primarily diplomatic in any case.

The only identifiable threat before the conflict was the warning to Parsons at Te Pohue that

Pakeha should not get in the way if it came to a fight with the kawanatanga chiefs. Throughout

the two months of the expedition, its behaviour matched the peaceful intentions repeatedly

proclaimed by its leaders. Even Whitmore was impressed by the self-discipline of the

I , I


encampment at Te Pohue and the march to Petane. Settlers were not attacked, their property not

disturbed. Only Whitmore suffered losses in sheep and shepherd's shelters. Nor were there any

signs of defensive or offensive military preparations at Omarunui, a disastrous defensive position.

The reat'guard from Te Pohue rode down the highway in broad daylight straight into an ambush.

And Whitmore found no signs of reinforcements from afar. The 'attack on Napier' story was, like

so many invasion scares that preceded it, pure invention, the product of a prevailing climate of

Pakeha sentiment in which followers ofPai Marire were automatically bloodthirsty fanatics and,

as Ballara and Scott put it, 'settlers feared a general outbreak, and every manifestation of Maori

disenchantment seemed part of a concerted threat' . [453]

3.3.6 Negotiation and Surrender

The final issue discussed here is the government's handling of the Pai Marire expedition. This

was entirely in the hands of McLean, who as Superintendent and Government Agent had

complete personal charge. His conduct of the final week before the attack on Omarunui receives

fairly sympathetic treatment £i.-om Ballara and Scott. They consider that he was initially 'in doubt

as to their intentions' but later, pushed by Whitmore's anger at sheep-stealing and 'convinced of

the necessity by Samuel Williams, he seems to have decided to pre-empt the situation'. [454]

Persuaded by Williams, McLean misread the Pai Marire leaders' motives:

Their intentions, whatever they may have been, were hardly material to the action of European forces

in surrounding Omarunui... The battle at Omarunui. and the skirmish at Petane, were less a rebellion

than a mistake.

Boast downplays the influence of Williams, pointing out that McLean had already summoned

military reinforcements and stressing his focus on 'strategic considerations'. Between 4 and 7

Octo bel', 'McLean, warily watching what he regarded as a threatening intrusion in Hawke's Bay ...

had in fact delayed taking precipitate steps', but faced pressure from all sides. Nevertheless, when

he did call in troops, 'it is very possible that McLean did not himself believe that Panapa's group

posed much of a threat; that the troops were a precaution only; and that it made sense to carry on

453 BaHara & Scott, Mohaka-Waikare, p.33. 454 BaHara & Scott, Mohaka-Waikare, p.31, 33.


talking rather than proceeding with anned confrontation'. Preparing his attack, McLean seriously

expected a surrender and 'wanted to avoid bloodshed'. [455]

Gaps and inconsistencies remain in these accounts, however, and there is evidence of a more

premeditated approach. McLean's heavy-handed police raid on Ngati Hineum in early February

1866, on an accusation of sheep-stealing by Whitmore, had shaken their leaders' confidence in

the provincial government's willingness to respect their autonomy. In mid-year, his intimidatory

use of the Whaanga/Kopu force and public backing of the Hawke's Bay chiefs' militaristic

posturing ratcheted up the sense ofthreat. Refugees reaching Te Haroto from Wairoa and the

East Coast would have passed accurate news on McLean's military tactics against Pai Marire in

the field.

As the year advanced, Whitmore urged a pre-emptive military strike, and Deputy Superintendent

Rhodes was not far behind. Rhodes claimed that McLean himself was party to such a plan but

that external factors had delayed any action. McLean had exploited the sheep-theft accusation

in F ebmary to secure general government authority to use a military force against N gati Hineum,

but had not followed it up. He was nonetheless prepared to give Ngati Hineum the chance of a

non-violent entry into the loyalist camp. Sometime in mid-year, he wrote to Ngati Hineum, as

they saw it, inviting them to come in and discuss giving up their Pai Marire faith. [456] This

invitation was the key factor in persuading all strands ofNgati Hineum's leadership and so many

followers to join the Pai Marire expedition.

The move to Petane, led by Panapa and predominantly Ngati Hineum in composition, was timed

for McLean's expected return. Both they and the officials in Napier were obliged to wait another

month. When McLean finally arrived, the Petane party moved without delay to Omamnui,

expecting to be called to Pa Whakairo. McLean's opening letter to Omamnui on 5 October makes

it quite clear that he understood this expectation and that his letter had occasioned it. Boast finds

the exchange of messages 'rather baffling' and Ballara and Scott consider them 'obscure in

455 Boast, Mohaka-Waikal'e, pp.33-4, 40-2. 456 BaHara & Scott (Mohaka-Waikare, pp.29-30) mistake Stafford's reference to McLean's surrender ultimatum

just before the attack for the pre-expedition letter to Ngati Hineuru. That letter would have been couched in less peremptory language.


meaning'. [457) Sorted in proper order and set in context, however, they tell a reasonably clear

story.

McLean had arrived in Napier already very well informed on the situation by a stream of letters

from Locke, Whitmore and especially Rhodes. His claim not to understand the intentions of the

Pai Marire leaders and his repeated requests for clarification are implausible given his intimate

knowledge of the case, leading to the suspicion that they may have been designed for a wider,

mainly Pakeha readership. The leaders holed up in Omarunui were baffled that McLean was

asking them to explain again intentions they thought they had clearly communicated. Further,

having invited them, he was breaking his word by ordering them home. The notes on

McDonald's interview with Kipa and others at Omarunui make it quite clear that N gati Hineuru,

at least, were prepared to surrender their guns and undergo some sort of loyalty ceremony. It

could even be conjectured that Te Rangihiroa was in the group travelling into Petane on 12

October in part in response to McLean's complaint that his absence from Omarunui raised doubts

about Ngati Hineuru's good faith. Increasingly exasperated, the final message from the Omarunui

leaders, to which McLean did not reply, can be read as a demand for real negotiations and action.

At no point in the exchanges between Friday 5 and Monday 8 October did McLean offer to

negotiate. His only concession, through the weekend delegation of kawanatanga chiefs, was for

Panapa to come alone to Pa Whakairo. He appears to have wanted to allow a short interval for

a voluntary surrender. This was in line with his practice at Wairoa - Panapa might be allowed to

arrange the details, but no more. Yet Ngati Hineuru had been and still were at peace. To go home,

as McLean demanded, would not 'end the trouble' and would put them at high risk of attack

even ifnot aware ofthe Hawke's Bay chiefs' decision on 9 October to launch an attack, they had

good reason to anticipate one.

Over 8 to 11 October, McLean gathered his forces for a surprise attack and made no further

contact with the Pai Marire party at Omarunui, which remained in limbo and isolated. The

strength of his commitment to a bloodless outcome has to be questioned. It is clear that on the

eve of his attack he did not believe the Pai Marire leaders had aggressive designs. He also knew

they wished to cooperate in ending the confrontation, yet closed off the remaining avenues of

457 Boast, Mohaka-Waikare, p.38; BaHara & Scott, Mohaka-Waikare, p.30.


communication. The intentions of Anaru Matete and Paora Told, whom McLean regarded as

dangerous political opponents, were irrelevant, whatever they might have been, to his handling

ofthe Omarunui party since they were only a distant threat at Te Pohue. Surrounding a large body

of almed men with superior force is a high-risk strategy if avoiding bloodshed is top priority. The

unifying theme in McLean's handling of the Pai Marire challenge was his focus on achieving

their immediate departure from the Province or alternatively their complete surrender. In the end,

the sUTI'ender was more important than the considerable bloodshed it cost. For the survivors from

Ngati Hineuru and other tribes, branding as 'rebels' followed automatically.

As a postscript to the historical review, it may be noted that the New Zealand Settlements Act

1863, under which the Mohaka-Waikare confiscation was promulgated on 12 January 1867,

lacked a specific definition of 'rebellion', the sole pretext it allowed for land confiscation. [458] The

Governor had to be 'satisfied that any Native Tribe or Section of a Tribe or any considerable

number thereof had been 'engaged in rebellion against Her Majesty's authority'. The Act

excluded from entitlement to compensation anyone who

1) carried arms or made war against the Queen or the forces of the Crown;

2) 'adhered to aided assisted or comforted any such persons';

3) 'counselled advised induced enticed persuaded or conspired with' any such person;

4) was involved for the above purposes in 'any outrage against person or property'; or

5) 'on being required by the Governor by proclamation to that effect in the Government

Gazette to deliver up the alms in their possession shall refuse or neglect to comply with

such demand after s celiain day to be specified in such proclamation'.

These categories provided by default a working definition of whom the government regarded

formally as rebels. It is difficult to see how any member of the Omarunui and Petane parties

458 New Zealand Settlements Act 1863, ss.2 & 5. See also the analysis in Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki report (1996), chapter 5.


could be regarded as fitting any of the first four categories. Nor does McLean's surrender

ultimatum appear to conform to the requirements of the fifth category.


4. The Fixing of the 1870 Agreement

4.1 Samuel Locke and the Final Stage, November 1869 to June 1870

McLean seems to have returned to the Mohaka-Waikare settlement again shortly after he took

office at the end of June 1869 as Native and Defence Minister in the Fox-Vogel government.

This was at the height of the Taupo campaign against Te Kooti in which Tareha and other Ngati

Kahungunu rangatira were proving indispensable military and political allies. In late September,

George Cooper told John Ormond, McLean's ally and successor as Superintendent and General

Govemment Agent for the East Coast, that he had been asked to prepare a memorandum on the

confiscation block. He requested copies of any papers on the 1868 agreement because the papers

in Wellington had been lost.[459] So too, however, had been the papers in Napier, as Ormond had

to admit to McLean in mid-November. But 'Mr Locke is conversant with what took place'. [460]

It is probable that Locke had not paliicipated either in the preceding two-day hui of Hawke's Bay

chiefs or at the final meeting with McLean in Napier on 8 May 1868 at which the first Mohaka

Waikare agreement was concluded and signed (see below). In any event, after taking office

McLean quickly decided to hand him the task. Five days later, on 18 November 1869, he wrote

to Samuel Locke instructing him to negotiate a final resolution of the Mohaka-Waikare

confiscation.[461] On the same day he informed Ormond of his initiative, stressing its urgency:[462]

I have instructed Mr Locke to carry out a settlement of the Waikare-Mohaka confiscated district, as

it is very important that all questions of this nature should be adjusted as speedily as circumstances

will admit.

McLean gave Locke a broad, briefly specified mandate, instructing him to 'carry out the

settlement of the Waikare Mohaka block', cutting short by saying that 'I need not supply you

with more detailed instructions as you are already acquainted with the history of this block'.

Locke was 'to effect as equitable a settlement with the Natives as possible, taking care that large

Reserves are made for their own use'. In paliicular, Tareha, who 'is becoming dispossessed of

459 Cooper to Ormond, 25 September 1869, AGG-HB 1/1, NA. 460 Ormond to McLean, 13 November 1869, AGG-HB 111, NA. 461 McLean to Locke, 18 November 1869, MAl 5/13/132, voU, NA (RDB 60, p.22949). 462 McLean to Ormond, 18 November 1869, AGG-HB 1/1, NA.


most of his landed property', was to receive generous provision. [463] Ormond, too, saw such

provision as helping to secure him against the growing impoverishment of many Hawke's Bay

rangatira as military campaigns and private land-selling decimated their resources.[464]

Locke moved quickly and on 9 December sent in a general report on his actions to McLean. [465]

His opening remarks reveal that two factors apart from devotion to duty motivated him. First,

there was the matter of payments for the Native Land Court surveys undertaken in mid-1866,

payments which had now been in suspension for fully three years:

Some ninety thousand (90,000) acres of this block. .. had been previously surveyed at the request of

the owners and prepared for the Native Land COUli, which was to sit at Napier before the issue ofthe

proclamation, for which work a considerable sum of money is still due to the surveyors, but on its

being represented that the land in question was to be confiscated, the claim was withdrawn to facilitate

the action ofthe Government in settling the matter.

Locke did not need to remind McLean that he himself was one of the surveyors still awaiting

payment. [466]

Second, rents from former leaseholders of the confiscated land, which would furnish the

surviving owners with the means to payoff the surveyors, were still blocked by the failure to

achieve a final restoration of maj or patis of the Mohaka-Waikare district to 'loyal' Maori owners:

At the time the block was confiscated the whole of the land above mentioned had been leased for a

fixed term of years to different persons who were in occupation, in blocks varying from four or five

thousand to thirty thousand acres each.

463 McLean to Locke, 18 November 1869, MAl 5/13/132, voU, NA (RDB 60, p.22949). 464 Ormond to McLean, 11 December 1869, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0483, ATL; see also his evidence

to the Native Affairs Committee, AJHR 1888 1-3C, p.1-2, 7. 465 Locke to Native & Defence Minister (McLean), 9 December 1869, Locke letterbook, HBM. Unless otherwise

referenced, quotations referring to the December 1869 hui are taken from Locke's report. 466 Boast, Mohaka-Waikare, pp.57, 60, 68.


Locke's claim that the whole of the district had been leased by late 1866 is far-fetched and would

have been surprising and unwelcome news to Ngati Hineuru if accurate,l467] In any case, such

leasing would have been legally void in advance of awards of title by the Native Land Court,l468]

Locke was, however, in no doubt about the disruptive impact of the unfinished restoration oftitle

on the leasehold economy which he saw as the way of the future:

During the interval between the issue of the proclamation in January 1867 to the present time the

settlers on the land have been in a most unsatisfactory footing with the remnant of those [from] whom

they originally leased the land, and in regard to their own position with respect to the land they are

occupying. The Natives continually demanding payment for the land, the lessees refusing on the

grounds that the ownership of the land was not settled, and again the settlers complaining that they

would not improve ... [illegible] ... slich land on their properties[469] as they might have done had the

matter been settled sooner, a further complicated question is likely to arise out of this dispute.

Locke remarked with a hint of exasperation that since the May 1868 agreement, 'for some reason

unknown to myself, no further steps were taken in the matter up to the present time to confirm

those arrangements or to finally settle the question in any way'. In June that year he had urged

upon McLean the importance of getting a final settlement: 'I hope something will be done about

the Petane-Mohaka Block soon. I have heard nothing more about it' .[470]

Mandated at last, Locke swung into action without delay and 'called a meeting of the Natives

interested in the question at Napier on the 6th December for the purpose of concluding a final

settlement, based on your agreement at the Waiohiki', the first Mohaka-Waikare agreement

signed on 8 May 1868. He was handicapped by the fact that 'the document then drawn up has

since been lost at Wellington' - he had been no more successful than Cooper and Ormond in

finding the missing papers. He implied that he had not in fact been present 'about March or April

1868, when you held a meeting [at] Waiohiki Pa, when arrangements were agreed on and

signed ... '. He was thus obliged to rely on the memories of the Maori participants as to what had

been agreed. This included, 'as far as can be ascertained', the return to Maori ownership with

467 The correspondence on the sheep-stealing incident in January/February 1866 strongly implies that no sheep were being run north of the Mohaka River. See section 3.1.1.

468 Native Lands Act 1865, s.75. 469 Italicised words: a tentative reading, original very faint. 470 Locke to McLean, 7 July 1869, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL; Boast, Mohaka-Waikare, p.68.


certificates of title of ten named blocks: 'Petane, Pakuratahi, South Tangoio, Parahotangihia,

Taratara-o-te-Rauhura, Tutira, Pakaututu, Awaototara, Waikare and Arapaoanui'. All other land,

including 'North Tangoio', was to remain in the hands of the Crown.

The area identified for return accorded fairly well with the text of the 1868 agreement and the

sketch map attached to it as copied by Turton. Locke's list included, however, one anomaly and

an addition. The anomaly was the Petane block, which had passed the Native Land Court in

October 1866 and been Crown granted to the owners determined by the Court on 11 January

1867, the day before the confiscation. [471]

The addition was Pakaututu, which was not mentioned in the 1868 agreement. The Native Land

Court had granted title to it on 18 November 1869, the very day that McLean dispatched his

instructions to Locke. The circumstances were unusual, arising from a promise by McLean to

Paora Hapi. Although the Court was aware that the block was within the confiscation boundary,

it allowed the hearing to proceed on 9 November. But Judge Munro required government

authorisation to proceed, which he obtained in the form of a telegram from Prime Minister Fox

waiving the government claim on the land, which was also sent on the 18th,l472] Whether Fox and

McLean spoke that day the sources do not reveal. But both McLean and Locke had been directly

involved in the case and were fully informed. Now, three weeks later, Locke simply added it to

the list as though it had been part of the May 1868 agreement.

With the exception ofPakaututu, when on 6 December 'a large meeting of Natives assembled

at the Council Chamber Napier', Locke's opening position rested squarely on the 1868

agreement:

.. .1 explained that on a former occasion you had entered into an arrangement with them at Waiohiki

for the settlement of the question and that the Government were now prepared to carry out that

agreement.

471 Robertson, Petane, p.lO. 472 Details in Cowie, Te Mafai and Pakaufufu, pp.5-I7.


Locke soon found that without the text of the agreement to hand, his negotiating position was

weakened. He had learnt, apparently before the meeting, that 'Tareha and Toha say that the

Tataraakina block was also to be returned to them'. Now,

... some of the owners put forward a claim to the North Tangoio block which has been handed over

to the Government, the most urgent on the point was Peti Hineitarakeo wife ofMr William Morris,

who declared that she had not signed the previous agreement, and would not relinquish her claim on

the land.

Worse was to come, for Tareha now upped the stakes:

Tareha also stated that the arrangement made at the Waiohiki was that all the land included in the

block, excepting a piece called Ohurukura between the Kaiwaka and Titiokura[47J] and the land lying

between the top of the Maungaharuru range and the Mohaka River [later the Waitara block] should

be returned to the Natives.

Tareha's claim was difficult to turn away: McLean had specifically requested him to ensure that

Tareha personally was well looked after in any settlement. Moreover, the kawanatanga forces led

by Tareha and other Hawke's Bay rangatira had returned in triumph less than a couple of months

before from the Taupo campaign against Te Kooti. 'After some further discussion', Locke

reported, the meeting adjourned to Waiohiki two days hence. It was agreed 'that during the

interval the natives should arrange among themselves whose names should be inserted in the

certificates of land returned' .

The meeting reconvened on 8 December at Waiohiki, 'where a large assembly of Natives was

collected, when they handed over the list of names proposed to be inserted in the certificates,

which appeared to me to be a fair adjustment'. But the issue of which land was to be returned

was still to be resolved. 'Tareha reiterated his former statement respecting the Tangoio block, and

the land north of Mohaka river being returned to Natives ... '. Locke's report is curiously silent on

the actual outcome of the negotiations, confining himself to remarking that

I believe that he [Tareha] will be quite satisfied to abide by the original agreement, more especially

if the Tatara-a-kina block be included in the Native portion, on hearing from you an outline of that

473 The locality Ohurakura is situated on the Okurakura Stream, a tributary of the Waiohinganga, about 4 km northeast of Te Pohue and directly below Titiokura.


agreement, so that Reti Hineitarakea and her brother Hirini Karareopi's claim on Tangoio North will

be the only obstacles in the way of a final settlement of the question.

The clear implication of this closing is that agreement was not in fact reached on the main issue,

how much land was to be returned. Locke stuck by what he understood to be the terms of the

1868 agreement, with the possible further concession of Tataraakina, while Tareha argued for

the return of nearly all the land except Waitara.

Locke concluded by recommending that a formal agreement be made:

I would suggest that this arrangement be confirmed before the Native Land Court, or a Commission

of Judges, so that a record be made and no further dispute might arise on the question, and that that

should be done with as little delay as possible.

Four days later, picking up pressure for compensation for 'losses occasioned by and for special

services in suppressing Native disturbances during the war', he added the further

recommendation that[4741

... should a Commission be sitting at Napier to confirm the arrangements made with the Natives

respecting the land at Mohaka-Waikare that those claims be also adjudicated on as the Natives are

frequently making inquiries on the subject.

Locke's report conveys the main sequence of events but little of the substance of the negotiations

and is especially thin on the claims and arguments advanced by the Maori participants.

Subsequent Maori accounts, in particular those of Toha Rahurahu and Waha Pango,l4751 support

parts of his report and add a few details. Their later recall, respectively 20 and 55 years

afterwards, may have conflated their memories of the May 1868 and December 1969 hui, both

of which convened at the Council Chamber and WaiohikilPa Whalcairo, and also ofthe large hui

at Waiohild in June 1870 which, according to Waha Pango, finalised the actual agreement. Both

the 1889 letter from Toha, Hemi Puna and Hoani Ruru and the evidence given in 1924 by Waha

474 Locke to Native & Defence Minister, 13 December 1869, Locke letterbook, HBM. 475 Toha's 1888 petition and 1889 letter; Waha Pango's 1925 petition and 1924 Native Land Court evidence.

Petition of Toha Rahurahu, No.261-1888, AJHR 1888 1-3C; Toha Rahurahu, Hemi Puna & Hoani Rum to Native Minister, n.d. [received 10 September 1889], MAl 5/13/132 (RDB 59, pp.22697-8); Petition of Wah a Pango and six others, No. 172125, MAl 5/13/132, vo1.3, NA (RDB 62, pp.23635-6); Napier MB 72, p.186, 13 May 1924 (Wah a Pango).


Pango appear to describe mainly that concluding event, although confusingly they refer to the

presence of McLean, who participated only in the first meeting in 1868.

Tareha, although present, did not sign the 1868 agreement. His insistence at the December 1869

meeting that the return of additional land had been promised has an echo in the indications given

by McLean himself in his report on the 1868 agreement that he was still in negotiation for the

return of palis of the land retained by the Crown. These included 'some provision for the

Ngatihineuru tribe resident at the Chatham Islands' and also that 'probably some reserves of

some small extent might be required for other Natives'. He implied that he had marked some

possible blocks for return on the accompanying sketch plan ofthe district which were 'to indicate

the nature of the proposals made to the Natives and if approved by you I will endeavour to get

the question further adjusted with as little delay as possible' . [476] The 1868 agreement, in other

words, was not the end of the matter despite its apparent finality; there were still interests to

provide for, including perhaps Tareha, the non-signatory, who may have been expecting rather

more than McLean was then willing to concede.

Locke's account does not record his reply, if any, to Tareha's demand at the December 1869

meeting for the return of the inland blocks. His apparent confidence in holding to his

understanding of the 1868 terms notwithstanding, the Maori participants may have had reason

to believe that they had won the concessions they sought. Tareha's persistence is evident in

Locke's exasperated comment in April 1870:[477]

Tareha still persists in stating that all the land in the Petane-Waikare block on the Taupo side of

Mohaka was promised him back, and that he wants that, or a sum of money in lieu of it. He is

receiving a good sum in rent from that portion of the Block.

The question remains to what extent Locke and his superiors followed up the inconclusive

December hui. Locke's comment in April 1870 confirms that one of the critical issues - how

much land the Crown would retain - had still not been settled nearly five months later, and

despite 'a meeting with Tareha and his people to finally settle that question' earlier in the

476 McLean to Colonial Secretary, 8 May 1868, AGG-HB 4/1, NA. 477 Locke to McLean, 25 April 1870, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. Boast, Mohaka-Waikare,

p.74.


month.[478) Informal communication between Ormond, Locke and the Hawke's Bay chiefs

undoubtedly continued. If so, the results were, with the April letter a rare exception, evidently

too insignificant to report. There is no trace in Locke's letterbook of any further involvement in

arranging the restoration of confiscated land to Maori before the Mohaka-Waikare agreement was

signed on 13 June 1870.[479) Nor is there any significant evidence of follow-up during this period

in the voluminous flow of telegrams to Ormond, to whom, as Government Agent, he officially

reported, and in his letters to McLean. [480) It seems that he considered that after the December hui

his job was done: he had revived the 1868 agreement, inspected lists of prospective owners at

the hui, and the rest was up to McLean's powers of persuasion.

There is very little evidence for Ormond's claim before the Native Affairs Committee in 1889

that Locke actively followed up with meetings and name-taking)481) Toha remembered his role

as being passive:[482)

The Government then sent a Commissioner to take the list of names of those who were entitled to be

placed on those twelve blocks who only conducted the enquiry amongst the Natives then present in

his office at Napier but did not prosecute the enquiry amongst those who owned the land nor did he

inform us that the list of names he was taking down would be entered in the Crown Grants to those

blocks.

Waha Pango, who stated in his 1925 petition that the ownership lists were kept open for seven

further months for additions, implied that Locke's subsequent role was at best marginal: 'The

Maoris themselves made the arrangements. All Tareha and McLean did was to confirm these

arrangements' . [483)

478 Locke to McLean, 28 March 1870, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0393, ATL. 479 The only other reference to the agreement found in the letterbook was an intervention on behalf of Toha,

whose name, he advised, had been omitted from the schedule of owners' names and should be inserted into certificates or Crown grants, when made out, for the Waikare, Te Kuta, Awa 0 Totara and Heru a Tureia blocks. Locke to Ormond, 18 February 1871, Locke letterbook, HBM.

480 Boast, Mohaka-Waikare, pp.70-1. 481 Native Affairs Committee, Report on the petition ofToha Rahurahu, AJHR 1888, 1-3C, p.2. 482 Toha Rahurahu, Hemi Puna & Hoani Ruru to Native Minister, n.d. [received 10 September 1889], MAl

5/13/132 (RDB 59, pp.22700). 483 Petition of Wah a Pango and six others, No.172/25, MAl 5/13/132, vo1.3, NA (RDB 62, pp.23635-6); MLC

NapierMB 72, p.187, 13 May 1924 ..


4.2 Conclusion

From an examination ofthe official and private archival records, Richard Boast concluded that

Locke did not actively follow through his mandate.l484] Locke's report on the meeting he

convened on 6 December 1869 and the hui two days later confirms that he did take an active

initiative to execute his mandate from McLean. The outcome was nevertheless surprisingly

inconclusive given that McLean had requested him to finalise the matter and had given him broad

latitude. Perhaps Ormond was a restraining influence: Locke was instructed to 'confer' with him

and 'act in accordance with his views in the carrying out of these instructions' . [485]

In any event, at the December 1869 meeting he persisted with the 1868 terms, reported but did

not address additional Maori claims, and did not come up with textual revisions to the 1868

agreement. Later Maori accounts suggest, albeit in a confused manner, different understandings

of what was discussed, on which Locke's report is surprisingly uninformative.

The main practical achievement of the meetings on 6 and 8 December was the preparation of

block lists of prospective owners. To what extent these lists were kept open for later additions

must remain largely a matter of conjecture: Ormond insisted that Locke followed up actively;

Locke's own letters and telegrams imply little follow-up; Waha Pango indicated an open process

of name-taking under Maori control; and Toha was adamant that Locke did not pursue his

enquiries.

But the gap between the terms of the 1868 and 1870 agreements reveals how much negotiating

the December 1869 meeting still left to be done. Most ofthe land retained by the Crown in 1868

was in fact returned in 1870: Kaiwaka to Tareha exclusively, Heru a Tureia to multiple owners,

and also, as Tareha had demanded, Tarawera and Tataraakina except for the three strategic blocks

in the Tarawera corridor. There were other new components too. Given the inconclusive outcome

of the December 1869 meeting, it is not surprising that there is no formal reference to it in the

final agreement of 13 June 1870, which is presented as an extension of the May 1868 agreement

to achieve a 'final settlement'.

484 Boast, Mohaka-Waikare, pp.70-1. 485 McLean to Locke, 18 November 1869, MAl 5/13/132, voU, NA (RDB 60, p.22949)


5. The Boundary of the Confiscation District

Unceliainty and at times outright confusion as to the true location of the outer boundary of the

confiscation district has continued into recent times. Many of the anomalies have been discussed

in previous reports presented in this inquiry, most recently in the inquiry district mapping

report. [486] In several instances parts of the boundary were later altered; in others, mistakes were

made in locating other parts, mistakes upon which officials and judges later relied in making

decisions on Maori grievances. This section does not attempt to present a complete survey and

mapping history of the Mohaka-Waikare confiscation district, but instead identifies and reviews

each of the anomalies in the formal title documents and plans, and briefly assesses their

significance. [487]

5.1 The Confiscation Order-in-Council of 12 January 1867

The confiscation Order-in-Council issued on 12 January 1867 was the legal foundation of the

Crown's negotiations for the return of confiscated land to Maori ownership and of its defence of

its title against all subsequent challenges. Relying on the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 and

amendments, it provided a geographical definition of the land it confiscated that appeared to be

both precise and comprehensive:

All that land in the Province of Hawke's Bay lying within the following boundary: the sea coast from

the mouth of the River Esk or Waiohinganga, to the mouth ofthe River Waikare; thence the said River

Waikare to a point distant nine miles in a direct line from its mouth; thence a straight line drawn

north-west, true bearing, till it intersects the northern boundary of the said Province; thence the said

northern boundary to its western extremity; thence the western boundary of the said Province to its

intersection with the River Mohaka; thence down the said river to its intersection with the Titiokura

path from Taupo to Ahuriri; thence the said Titiokura path to the said River Esk or Waiohinganga;

thence the said River Esk to its mouth.

The outer boundaries of the district are defined mostly by natural features (the coastline, the

Waikare, Mohaka and Waiohinganga Rivers), by the 39th parallel and by angled connecting lines

486 For the principal references, see section 1.1. 487 The instruments are: Order-in-Council 12 January 1867, NZG 1867, p.44; Mohaka-Waikare agreement no.1,

8 May 1868, in TUlion, Deeds, pp.556-8; Mohaka-Waikare agreement no.2, 13 June 1870, in Turton, Deeds, pp.559-61; Mohaka and Waikare District Act 1870; Native Land Acts Amendment Act 1881, s.7-8.


referenced to fixed points. The only exception is the Napier-Taupo track, by that time a

permanent feature, between the Waiohinganga and Mohaka Rivers. Donald McLean's intention

appears to have been to secure the entire area between the Mohaka and Ahuriri Crown purchases

up to the inland Hawke's Bay provincial boundary (see Map 1).

The northeastern boundary was, however, a fudge, as it cut off a corner of the Mohaka Crown

purchase itself. But it had no material effect, since the Order-in-Council provided for the

exclusion of all land already owned by the Crown, which at this point also included the

Moeangiangi and Maungaharuru blocks within the district.

The text also left an ambiguity at its southeastern corner: which mouth of the Waiohinganga

River it meant to adopt. The weight of cartographic evidence from the maps of the 1850s and

1860s was that the main channel disgorged into Te Whanganui a Orotu and that the direct outlet

to the sea was a secondary dry flood channel. [488] The Ahuriri deed boundary had followed the

main channel to the lagoon. Since Donald McLean both negotiated the Ahuriri purchase and

imposed the confiscation, his understanding of the boundary was likely to have been the same

in both cases. It might be argued that he was aware that the Te Pahou block, which included not

only the land between the Waiohinganga and the sea but also three islands in Te Whanganui a

Orotu, had already passed the Native Land Court in 1866, and that he therefore excluded it. But

the adjacent Petane block north of the Waiohinganga had also passed the Court in 1866 and was

nevertheless included. A reasonable interpretation of the Order-in-Council would thus be that it

included the coastal strip between the main channel and the sea, in other words the Te Pahou

block less the islands within the lagoon.

The district definition introduced a potential title anomaly. Both the Petane and Te Pahou blocks

had passed the Native Land Court during 1866 and the owners issued a Certificate of Title. That

was not itself sufficient to save the land from confiscation under the New Zealand Settlements

Act, which allowed any land within a proclaimed district to be taken regardless of title and

provided for those having 'any title interest or claim' to be compensated. [489] But the 12 January

1867 confiscation order specifically excluded land 'being the property of or held under grant

from the Crown'. Both Te Pahou and Petane thereby escaped the confiscation: Te Pahou got its

488 See Moorsom, Claim boundaries, p.l8-19. 489 New Zealand Settlements Act 1863, s.2 & 5.


Crown grant on 3 October 1866 and whether by intention or coincidence, the Crown grant for

Petane was issued on 11 January 1867, the day before the confiscation,l490] Thus both blocks can

be regarded as lying within the confiscation district but, like the Crown blocks, were exempted

from confiscation.

5.2 The District Boundaries under Subsequent Agreements and Acts

Both the first and second Mohaka-Waikare agreements, signed on 5 May 1868 and 13 June 1870

respectively, relied explicitly on the definition of the district given in the 1867 Order-in-Council.

The first agreement simply referred to the order's schedule, the second reproduced it in its

preamble. The Mohaka and Waikare District Act of 12 September 1870, which implemented the

1870 agreement, and the Native Lands Act Amendment Act 1881, which sent the returned blocks

to the Native Land Court to determine title and issue certificates, also referred to the district

specified in the Order-in-Council.

Neither the text of these formal documents nor the plans attached to them are entirely consistent

with their reliance on the 1867 Order-in-Council. The 1868 agreement defined separately the area

to which the Crown was waiving its claim and then the area to remain in Crown title. The first

area it described as 'commencing at the sea coast from the old mouth of the river Esk or

Waiohinganga ... ' and returning 'down that river to its mouth being the starting point of the

boundaries of the said Block'. This interpretation included Petane but excluded Te Pahou; it

construed the ambiguous 'mouth' in the Order-in-Council as the 'old mouth', being the direct

outlet to the sea. McLean's sketch map, which he sent in with the agreement, excluded Te Pahou

altogether, as did the plans attached to the 1870 agreement and the 1881 ACt.[491] Whatever his

view in January 1867, by May 1868 he evidently did not regard Te Pahou as within the

confiscation district. His inclusion ofPetane in the area to be returned to Maori ownership was

unnecessary because it already had a Crown grant and was therefore never confiscated.

The text description of the area to be retained by the Crown, which closely matches the sketch

plan, introduced two significant errors (see Maps 9 & 10). Why it did not simply copy the

490 Richard Boast, Petane and Te Paholl blocks, (Wellington: CFRT, 1998), pp.13, 22. 491 McLean to Colonial Secretary, 8 May 1868, AGG-HB 4/1, NA; Turton, Plans, vo1.2, CLO 45.


Schedule to the Order-in-Council is a mystery - perhaps McLean did not have a copy to hand

when finalising the draft for signing and went from memory.

The first error mistook the line from the Waikare River to the northern provincial boundary:

... thence [eastwards] along the nOlihern boundary for about nineteen miles to a point which intersects

a line nearly due north and south running into the Mohaka river thence along the western boundary

of the Mohaka block to the source of the Waikare river ...

This description replaced the straight line drawn northwest from a point nine miles up the

Waikare River. Perhaps the purpose was to avoid cutting across the Mohaka block. The effect

was to reduce the area of confiscated land east of the Te Hoe River. At the time it made no

difference since no title transactions were based on it.

The second error took the western boundary of the province down not to the Mohaka but to the

Ripia River, thereby appearing to exclude the watershed land between the two from the

confiscation district:

... thence up the Mohaka river to its junction with the Ripia river thence up the Ripia river to the

Western boundary ofthe Province of Hawke's Bay ...

Again there is no explanation for the deviation from the 1867 Schedule; why the land between

the Ripia and Mohaka Rivers should now be excluded is obscure.

Despite the error, Judge Munro recognised that the Pakaututu block, part of the area, was within

the confiscation district and required a government waiver before he would issue title in the

Native Land Court in November 1869.[492) That waiver, although of doubtful legal finality,[493)

was one reason why Pakaututu did not appear in the block list schedules to the 1870 agreement,

despite being listed by Locke in December 1870 as a candidate for return to Maori ownership

(see section 4.2).

492 Cowie, Te Mata! and Pakalltlltll, p.14. 493 Cowie, Te Matai and Pakalltlltll, pp.16-17.


The June 1870 agreement recited the 1867 Schedule, defined the blocks to be retained by the

Crown, and stated that 'with the above exceptions the whole Block described in the proclamation

before cited, shall be conveyed to the loyal claimants under the following conditions'. While the

intention was clearly to return the whole residue, the first of the 'conditions' introduced further

inconsistencies:

The whole Block shall be subdivided into several portions as shown by the tracing annexed.

The Government shall grant certificates of title for the several portions to the Natives mentioned in

the following Schedule.

In other words, the sketch plan and the block lists of owners were an integral part of the

agreement (see Maps 11 & 12).

The 1870 plan restored the connecting line between the Waikare River and the northern

provincial boundary more or less to its correct position. By so doing, it extended the boundary

of the 'Tatara-o-Kina' block well eastward of the Te Hoe River, which it did not show.

If the plan now had the northeastern boundary correct, its interpretation of the western provincial

line was a travesty. The line was taken due south at right angles to the 39th parallel and from a

point a little to the east of the correct 176 0 30 I east. As a result, it excluded from the confiscation

district a large slice of Tarawera, roughly a thousand acres in a corner of Wharetoto, half of

Pakaututu and all ofTe Matai. The practical impact of this gross error was lessened by the fact

that Pakaututu had already been dealt with and that Tarawera was later simply resized. The part

of Wharetoto that was confiscated land was apparently ignored in later title transactions, which

treated the whole block as being in Maori ownership. The worst impact of the faulty 1870 line

was on Te Matai, which was as a result excluded from the preparation of lists of owners for the

return of confiscated land to Maori owners under the 1870 agreement.

The 1870 Act that implemented the agreement referred to its text and schedule. It also required

the blocks

to be defined and the boundaries thereof to be ascertained by surveyor otherwise but so that the

boundaries so to be ascertained may coincide as nearly as possible with the boundaries indicated on


a certain plan of the said district deposited in the Office of the Secretary for Crown Lands at

Wellington.

Thus the statutory instrument limited the ownership to the block lists in the agreement and tied

the boundaries to the faulty district plan. [494]

The 1870 Act was inadvertently repealed in 1877 before the completion of the required block

boundary definitions. A revised district plan was prepared (see Maps 13 & 14) and recognised

in the 1881 statute that sent the blocks to the Native Land Court for award of title: [495]

And whereas, in pursuance of the [1870] Act, the Governor has caused the pieces of land mentioned

in the said agreement and in the Schedule thereto to be defined, and the boundaries thereof to be

ascertained by survey, and marked on a plan now deposited in the Office of the Chief Surveyor at

Napier ...

The new plan produced yet another rendering of the northeastern confiscation line, this time

taking it, incorrectly, up the boundary of the Mohaka block and the Te Hoe River, which became

the final boundary of Tataraakina. The boundary of what became the Rotokakarangu block was

thereby taken up to the Te Hoe River. Although not shown on the 1881 plan, a sizeable chunk

of eastern Rotokakarangu was, in terms of the 1867 Schedule, confiscated land. There is no sign

that this status was taken into account when the block passed the Native Land Court in October

1875 or when it was purchased by the Crown in May 1877. [496] If not, presumably the Maori

sellers gained from the Crown repurchasing confiscated land. But it is certain that the owners of

Tataraakina lost out from the cartographic shrinkage of the block returned to them in the 1870

agreement.

The 1881 plan did finally achieve an accurate drawing of the western provincial boundary. This

revealed that not only a sizeable corner of Wharetoto but also nearly all of Te Matai lay within

the confiscation line. The consequences for the ownership ofTe Matai were drastic. Instead of

the whole block, now only a small 254-acre fragment lay outside the line to be taken before the

494 Mohaka and Waikare District Act 1870, s.2-3. 495 Native Land Acts Amendment Act 1881, s.7. 496 MLC Napier MB 4, pp.59-61, 419; Auckland deeds AUC 122, 126l. The issue is not mentioned in

Alexander's detailed review of Native Land Court, survey, lease and sale proceedings (David Alexander, Rotokakarangu and Whareraul'akali blocks, (1996. ROD J25), pp.2-17).


Native Land Court in the normal way. Nearly all the block remained confiscated land that had

not been returned to Maori owners because excluded from the 1870 agreement. Cowie has

analysed in detail the horrendous complications that dogged the block and its eventual owners

for decades. [497]

The 1881 plan also adjusted the size of another anomaly, a narrow corridor between the

confiscation line and the Wharetoto block. The gap became the Umupapamaro block, which was

duly titled after much confusion by the Native Land Court in 1881.[498]

One final curiosity remains from the flexible cartography of the confiscation block's outer

boundary. The provincial boundary supposedly followed the 39th parallel. However, at some point

Tarawera - but not Tataraakina - 'lost' a strip several hundred metres wide to neighbouring

blocks to the north. The gap is shown on Bristed's provincial map of 1889,[499] so probably

appeared in the 1880s. The reason remains obscure. Notionally, therefore, the southernmost edge

of the Runanga 2A block falls within the confiscation district.

5.3 Conclusion

Looking at the processes by which confiscated land remaining in or returned to Maori ownership

was vested, it is apparent that significant areas were covered by neither the 1868 nor the 1870

agreements. The Te Pahou and Petane blocks went through the Native Land Court in 1866 and

their titles were not interfered with. The Pakaututu block passed the Court in 1869, on a

government waiver after the first agreement, and was thus excluded from the 1870 agreement.

All ofTe Matai and parts ofWharetoto and Rotokakarangu, were left outside the agreements and

titled later by statute and through the Native Land Court.

All subsequent agreements and statutes relied on the text description of the confiscated land

given in the Schedule to the 1867 Order-in-Council. In that Schedule, the outer boundary of the

confiscation district was obscure only in one respect: which mouth of the Waiohinganga River

it adopted. Notwithstanding the fact that most reference maps and plans of the period showed the

497 Cowie, Te Matai and Pakalltutll, pp.44-46 and generally. 498 MLC Taupo MB 2, pp.26-7, 38, 54-67, 75-6, 83. 499 H. Bristed, Map a/the Province a/Hawke's Bay, Nell' Zealand. October 1889.


main channel emptying into Te Whanganui a Orotu, McLean specified the secondary sea outlet

on his 1868 sketch plan and this was adopted in all subsequent plans.

Despite relying on the 1867 Schedule, all four formal instruments determining the title of the

confiscated land between 1868 and 1881 contained inconsistencies in their texts and attached

plans. Two principal areas of confusion arose. The first was the northeastern line between the

Waikare River and the 39th parallel, which switched twice from a straight connecting line to

following the Mohaka Crown purchase boundary and the Te Hoe River. The effect was to reduce

the Tataraakina block and leave a portion of confiscated land in the Rotokakarangu block sold

to the Crown in 1877.

The second area of confusion was more disruptive. The western provincial boundary was drawn

incorrectly first in McLean's 1868 sketch and then, with gross inaccuracy, in the 1870 agreement

plan. Pakaututu was titled in 1869 despite McLean's error. However, Te Matai was excluded

altogether from the 1870 agreement, which left it in limbo as unreturned confiscated land when

the mistake was discovered. The impact on Maori owners was severe and remained unresolved

for decades.


References

Primary sources

Alexander Turnbull Library

MS-Papers-0039-41A James Cowan Papers: Te Kooti's scout: a Hauhau warrior's story, the

last of the "Rifleman JJ escapees, TS.

qMS-0487 to 0490

MS-Papers-0942

MS-Papers-0032

-0227

-0322

-0323

-0327

-0393-4

-0481-2

-0495

-0527

-0635

-0008

-0005

MS-1286 & 1287

qMS-1203

William Colenso, Journal, 1846-51.

E.P. Ramsay Papers.

Donald McLean Papers, inward letters from:

- G.S. Cooper

- F.E. Hamlin

- James Hamlin

- 1. W. Harris

- Samuel Locke

- 1.D. Ormond

- John Parsons

- Joseph Rhodes

- G.S. Whitmore

- Maori (sorted in date order)

Native reserves not defined or surveyed, (ROD C3a).

Report of the Chief Commissioner's visit to Ahuriri etc, Dec. 1857 etc,

(ROD C3a).

Donald McLean, Journal, vol.3 & 4.

Letterbook, Superintendent of Hawke's Bay, 1863-66.

qMS-1204 Letterbook, Government Agent Hawke's Bay, 1866-69.

qMS-1212 Official Letterbook, Police and Land Purchase, 1850 (ROD A21e).

qMS-1213 Inward Letters, Government Agent Hawke's Bay, 1865-68.

qMS-1214 Letterbook, Native Land Purchase Department, 1863-66.

MS-Papers-0069-0018 Williams Family Papers.


National Archives, Wellington

AD

1 66/4752

1 66/4937

1 67/3128

1 9712115

AGG-HB

111

412

HB

412

417

4/13

6/6

8/30

IA

1 236/66/417

1 239/6611670

1 2443/66/3115

1 243/66/3116

1 243/66/3219

1 244/66/3282

1 244/66/3381

MA

MAl 5/13/132

MLC

Army Department

[Operations against Hau Hau, October 1866]


[Reports on expedition to Taupo]


Government Agent, Hawke's Bay

General inward letters, 1865-69

General outward letters

Hawke's Bay Provincial Council

Outward letterbook

Inward local letters, 1866

Letters to and from Maori

Outward letters, 1866-68

Treasurer: land purchase and lease, etc

Internal Affairs

[Stealing of Whitmore's sheep]

[Stealing of Whitmore's sheep]

[Letters taken from prisoners at Omarunui]

[Correspondence with chiefs re attack on Hau Hau at Omarunui]

[Compensation for Whitmore's stolen sheep]

[Negotiations with Te Heu Heu]

[Correspondence re Waikato invasion]

Maori Affairs

Tarawera and Tataraakina Blocks, (RDB 59-63).

Maori Land Court Minute Books (microfilm)

i I '


NM

8/51/580

AAFV997

H4

H6

H12

H20

New Munster

Letter McLean to Colonial Secretary (ROD A21d)

Statutory and Miscellaneous Plans (DOSLI)

Andersen, [Map of Hawke's Bay], 1858.

Plan of the Mohaka ferry reserve,1873.

A. Koch, Map 0/ the Province of Hawke's Bay, 1864

A. Koch, Map of the Province o/Hawke's Bay, 1874

Land Information New Zealand, Head Office

HWB37

HWB71

HWB80

Crown purchase deed: Ahuriri

Crown purchase deed: Ahuriri (Ngati Hineuru interest)

Crown purchase deed: Kaweka & Rangatawhao

Hawke's Bay Museum Library

McLean Papers TS

Samuel Locke, Letterbook, (1869-72)

Copies o/letters and memoranda (private and official) received by Sir

Donald McLean ... , 1863-1870, typescript. Also in ATL.

John Parsons Papers.

G.S. Whitmore Papers

Official Printed Records

AJHR

1862 C-l

1864 E-2

1864 E-3

1864 E-I0

1865 C-2

1865 E-4

Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives

Commissioners' reports relative to land purchases.

Papers relative to Native affairs.

Further papers relative to the Native insurrection.

Return of persons occupying Native Lands.

Return of land purchases in New Zealand.

Further papers relative to the spread of the Hau Hau superstition among

the Maories


1867 A-IA

18881-3C

HBPC

TUlion

Publications

Newspapers

Hawke's Bay Herald

Despatches from the Governor of New Zealand.

Native Affairs Committee, report on the petition of Toha Rahurahu.

Provincial Council of Hawke's Bay, Estimates of Expenditure.

H.H. TUlion, Maori deeds of land purchases in the North Island, vol.2,

(Wellington: Government Printer, 1877).

H.H. Turton, Plans of land purchases in the North Island, vol.2,

(Wellington: Government Printer, 1878).

Te Waka Maori (translations summarised in Parsons, Hauhau movement).

Maps

H. Bristed, Map of the Province of Hawke's Bay, New Zealand, October 1889.

Books & Reports

David Alexander, Block history of Rotokakarangu and Wahreraurakau blocks, (1996. ROD J25).

Angela Ballara & Gary Scott, Crown purchases of Maori land in early provincial Hawke's Bay:

Ahuriri; Mohaka-Waikare; Maungaharuru, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1994.

ROD II).

James Belich, The New Zealand wars and the Victorian interpretation of racial conflict,

(Auckland: Penguin, 1988).


Judith Binney, Redemption songs: a life ofTe Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki, (Auckland: Auckland

University Press, 1995).

Richard Boast, Petane and Te Pahou blocks, (Wellington: CFRT, 1998. ROD T15).

Richard Boast, Mohaka-Waikare consolidated report, vol.1, (Wellington: CFRT, 1995. ROD

J28).

Paul Clark, 'Hauhau ': the Pai Marire search for Maori identity, (Auc1dand: Auckland & Oxford

University Presses, 1975).

Te Taite Cooper & Lee Smith, Ki a Te Makarini: correspondence between Donald McLean and

Maori leaders prior to and following the Ahuriri purchase 1851, (Wellington: Waitangi

Tribunal, 1996. ROD M2). Transcriptions and translations.

Dean Cowie, Hawke's Bay, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1996).

Dean Cowie, Te Matai and Pakaututu, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1998. ROD S3).

Bronwyn Elsmore, Manafrom heaven, (TaurangaiWellington: Moana Press, 1989).

Neil Finlay, Sacred soil: images and stories of the New Zealand Wars, (Auckland: Random

House, 1998).

H. Guthrie-Smith, Tutira, (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1926).

Joy Hippolite, Raupatu in Hawke's Bay, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1993. ROD 117).

Thomas Lambert, The story of old Wairoa, (Auckland: Reed Publishing, 1925).

Richard Moorsom, Raupatu, restoration and ancestral rights: the title to Tarawera, Tataraakina

and Te Haroto - main report, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1998. ROD R3).


Richard Moorsom, Mohaka ki Ahuriri inquiry: maps of claim boundaries, (Wellington: Waitangi

Tribunal, 1999).

Vincent O'Malley, The Ahuriri purchase, (Wellington: CFRT, 1995. ROD 110).

Patrick Parsons, The Mohaka-Waikare confiscated lands: ancestral overview, (1993. ROD 118).

Patrick Parsons, Ngati Hineuru customary usage report, (1995. ROD 114).

Patrick Parsons, The Hauhau movement in Hawke's Bay, (1994. ROD 119).

Patrick Parsons, In the shadow ofTe Waka, (Te Pohue History Committee, 1997).

Stephen Robertson, The alienation of the Petane block, 1866-1912, (Wellington: CFRT, 1998.

RODR4b).

Bevan Taylor, Mohaka-Waikare confiscated lands: customary usage report, (1993. ROD J5).

Alan Ward, A show of justice, (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1973).

W.T. Williams, Life of the Venerable Archdeacon Samuel Williams, (1929).

J.G. Wilson, The history of Hawke's Bay, (Wellington: A.H. & A.W. Reed, 1939).

Matthew Wright, Hawke's Bay: the history of a province, (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press,

1994).


Appendix 1. Extracts from the Wai 299 and 638 Statements of Claim

Wai 299: Third Amended Statement of Claim (20 December 1996)

2. THE CLAIM

2.1 The Claim relates to the areas of land, lakes and rivers and other resources in the area

now described as the Mohaka Waikare block.

2.2 The Claimants say that they are or are likely to be prejudicially affected by or

ordinances, Acts, regulations, proclamations, notices and other statutory instruments,

and the policies, practices, the acts or omissions of the Crown and further as set out in

this Statement of Claim.

2.3 The Claimants further claim that all ofthe Acts, regulations, orders, policies, practices

and actions taken, omitted or adopted by or on behalf of the Crown referred to are and

remain inconsistent with the terms and principles of the Treaty ofWaitangi.

3 CONFISCATION

3.1 The New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 (together with its amendments) was in breach

of the Treaty ofWaitangi.

3.2 The Crown's actions in confiscating the Mohaka Waikare Block were ultra vires the

1863 Act, andlor in breach of the Treaty.

Particulars

(a) No "state of rebellion" in fact existed to support a confiscation under the New Zealand

Settlements Act 1863. A state of rebellion would require a deliberate challenge to the

authority of the Crown of which there is no evidence.


(b) There is no evidence, as required by the Act that any "tribe, section or any considerable

number" of a tribe were in a state of rebellion.

(c) The Act authorised the Crown to make a proclamation only in respect of land which was

"the property or in possession of' rebellious tribes and in respect of no other lands. By

including all of the land within the Mohaka.Waikare Block the Crown in effect

confiscated lands of Maori and hapu who were not involved in any act of rebellion.

(d) The Crown made no proper inquiry into:

(i) the background and circumstances to the Omaranui encounter;

(ii) the background to the proclamation under the 1863 Act;

(iii) those Maori involved in the encounter, their tribal affiliation, and whether they

were representative of any hapulwhanau;

(iv) what lands were in the possession of those involved at Omaranui; and

(v) who were the customary owners of the land within the Mohaka Waikare Block.

(e) The Crown made no endeavour to consult or to hear from the persons to be affected by

the proposed confiscation.

(f) The Crown failed to consider whether there were proper grounds to make the

proclamation under the 1863 Act.

(g) The proclamation was unlawful.

(h) By failing to clearly determine who was in a "state of rebellion" and confiscating the

entire Mohaka Waikare block the Crown's actions inevitably led to future costs, delays

and uncertainties to the prejudice of the claimants.


(i) The Proclamation took land of "loyal" Maori. It put Maori not accused of being in

rebellion at the mercy of Crown officials who delayed and obstructed the return of their

lands (contrary to that promised in the agreement of 1870).

3.3 The Crown failed to inquire into the propriety of the confiscation and took steps to

prevent the Mohaka-Waikare confiscation being investigated by the Sim Commission

in 1925.

3.4 The Crown acted illegally to punish the individuals involved in the Omaranui encounter

without due process of law and in breach of the Treaty.

4 1870 AGREEMEENT AND REVESTING

4.1 The Crown failed to act in accordance with spirit and intent of the Proclamation of 12

January 1867 and in breach of the Treaty ofWaitangi.

Particulars

(a) the Proclamation stated that the land ofloyal inhabitants would be returned. This was

not undertaken in a proper and consistent fashion. There was no proper inquiry or

consultation.

(b) the Proclamation stated that the "loyal inhabitants" would have their lands returned to

them. This was not undertaken in a proper and consistent fashion.

(c) the Proclamation stated that a "sufficient quantity of land ... for their maintenance

would be conveyed to the "rebel inhabitants". The Crown made no attempt to undertake

this.


Wai 638: Amended Statement of Claim (23 April 1998)

3.0 Confiscation

3.1 The claimants claim that the Crown's actions in confiscating Tataraakina Block was

wrong in Law, based on error or mistake in that no "state of rebellion" in fact existed

to support a confiscation, and was in breach of the Treaty ofWaitangi.

3.2 The Crown made no proper enquiry into the background and circumstances of the

presumed "state of rebellion", the tribal affiliation and representation of any hapu or

whanau of those represented in the incident, the lands in possession of those involved

and particularly who were customary owners of the Tataraakina C Block and made no

consultation with those affected or likely to be affected by the proposed confiscation.

3.3 The Crown's actions in confiscation led to inevitable resulting costs, delays,

uncertainties and disputes all to the prejudice of the claimants.

3.4 The Crown acted illegally to punish the individuals involved in the Omaranui encounter

by interalia confiscating their land without due process of Law and in breach of the

Treaty.

4.0 1870 Agreement and Statute, Revesting of Lands and Reinvestigations of Titles

4.1 The claimants claimed that the Crown failed to act in accordance with the principals and

spirit and in breach of the Treaty ofWaitangi.

4.2 The claimants say the Agreement and later Statutory and Crown action failed to ensure

that the correct land was returned to the original owners, the Agreement failed to

provide for the interest of "rebel Maori", the Agreement did not make clear the basis

upon which the land was returned to the listed persons and ultimately failed to complete

Titles pursuant to the 1870 Agreement.

/" /

\

Appendix 2. Research Commission

WAITANGI TRIBUNAL

CONCERNING

AND CONCERNING

Wai299

the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975

the Mohaka ki Ahuriri Inquiry

Claims

DIRECTION COMMISSIONING RESEARCH

1. Pursuant to clause 5A of the second schedule of the Treaty ofWaitangi Act 1975, the Tribunal commissions Richard Moorsom, a member of staff, to complete a supplementary research report covering the following matters:

Taking account of any relevant source material additional to previous research and evidence presented to this inquiry:

a) Review the extent ofNgati Hineuru's interest before 12 January 1867 in land adjacent to the Tarawera and Tataraakina blocks and within the inquiry district.

b) Assess the intentions of the Ngati Hineuru and government protagonists leading up to the battles at Omarunui and Petane in October 1866.

c) Review the role of Samuel Locke in arranging the 1870 Mohaka-Waikare Agreement.

d) Analyse the content and status of the geographic information specifying the confiscation district in the legal instruments determining the title of the land between 1867 and 1870.

2. The commission commences on 1 September 1998 and ends on 16 October 1998, at which time one copy of the report will be filed in unbound form together with indexed copies of any supporting archival documents.

3. The report may be received as evidence and the author may be cross-examined on it.

( I

Page 2

4. The registrar is to send copies of this direction to:

Richard Moorsom Claimants for Wai 119,216,299,318,436,598,599,600,601,602,608,627,638, 640,731,732 Counsel in the Mohaka ki Ahuriri claims inquiry Solicitor General, Crown Law Office Director, Office of Treaty Settlements Secretary, Crown Forestry Rental Trust Director, Te Puni Kokiri

Dated at Gisbome this (~I-- day of September1998.

Judge W W Isaac Presiding Officer WAITANGI TRIBUNAL

,Q oO/fO c1t'}/,,) , t::'


Appendix 3. Maori drafts of two letters from McLean to Panapa [500]

Note: These texts have been transcribed from the handwritten originals and have not been

checked or corrected. They may therefore carry over both mistakes in the drafts and misreadings

of the writing.

1. Maori draft ofletter 'to Panapa and party!! 5 October 1866.

Ehoama

Tenei ka rongo a hau kia te Moananui raua ko te Hapuku, ki ta koutou kupu e me nei na taku

pukapuka koutou i tono mai ki Petane.

Me he mea ko te Rangihiroa tetahi 0 koutou me he mea he haere mai ta koutou ki te wakarere

i ta koutou ahua wakatupu i te kiuo[?] katahi ka mohiotia he haere pai mai ta koutou i runga i

taku pukapuka.

Kei te rapu ahau ki tenei tu haere a koutou he lduo ranei he pai ranei o. Ko tenei me hold koutou

ki tou koutou kainga ko te haere mai ki Heretaunga me haere tika mai i rung a i te karanga, i te

ahua 0 te Rangimarie kia mohio ai matou ko nga rangatira 0 Heretaunga ki te ritenga 0 ta koutou

haere.

Kaore hold e marama ta koutou haere mai ki te Pa Whalcairo, no te mea he kotahi tonu ta matou

wakaaro ta nga rangatira maori 0 Heretaunga me taku hold

Naku na te koutou hoa

500 MS-Papers-0032-0690F, ATL.


2. Maori draft of letter 'to Panapa and friends', 8 October 1866.

Ehoama

Kua tou mai ta koutou reta a ki nei i haere mai koutou ki te wakarere i ta koutou Atua porangi.

Kua tae a te Hapuku a hia a Paora Kaiwhata kia koutou ki ai me he pono ta koutou tikanga kia

haere mai e Panapa, ki te Pa Whakairo ka rite nga korero ki reira ka tae mai ai ki konei.

Ko tenei ki hai i rite taua a kupu a koutou ka ki mai koutou he Panapa katoa te tangata.

Kei te rapu ahau ki tena tu 0 te ki ki ta koutou ahua e mahi na koutou, ko te kupu atu kia hold

mariri ka ta koutou kainga ture tonu koutou he kupu pai na matou katoa. Ko tenei me he kino ta

koutou korerotia mai me he wakaaro ki te pai korerotia maio Kia wawe te marama.


Maps & Figures

-=- -=:I -=:I .::I -=:I KEY TO BLOCKS: ____

1 Ahuriri 2 Arapaoanui 3 Awa 0 Totara 4 Heru a Tureia 5 Kaiwaka 6 Maungaharuru r SH.t 7 Maungataniwha 6 Moeangiangi 9 Mohaka

10 Mohaka Crown block 11 Owhio 12 Pakaututu 13 Pakarutahi 14 Petane 15 Pihanui No.1 16 Pihanui No.2 17 Puketitiri Reserve 16 Purahotangahia 19 Putere 20 Rotokakarangu 21 Tangoio 22 Tangoio South 23 Tarawera 24 Tarawera Crown block 25 Tataraakina 26 Tatara 0 Te Rauhina 27 Te Haroto 26 Te Haroto rural sections 29 Te Kuta 30 Te Matai 31 Te Pahou 32 Tutira 33 Waihua 34 Waihua Crown block 35 Waiohiki & Waitanoa 36 Waipapa 37 Waitara 38 Wharerangi Reserve 39 Whareraurakau 40 Wharetoto

c:=:J Mohaka-Waikare confiscation districf 166i •.

I,------!I Pre-1666 Crown purchase

r J Confiscated laridfetained by the Cro~~.;

[m:J State forests

SH.50 State highways =

,=:I

o 10 20 ·3K .' ·40~~ I, !, t! tIl I ! I

6 "" 1 0 20~iles

.::1 ::J .::1 ',=:t . .::1 -:=I~::J .:J .~ '::1 -. ., . (

rill i a

-, ---t

_ :W.S- -

~ ~

"0

~

> "0 "0 ""I Q ~ s· ~ -~ 00 C = -. =~ 3-

Map 3. The Mohaka Valley in the Ahuriri Deed Plan, 1851

I ,

\

I

\

J I

I ,

, \.

I t'

Map 4. Runholders in the Ahuriri Block, 1858

..

/ <-, " t ; • . ~. .....

- ,/

. > 4

.. ..

Andersen map of 1858. AAFV 997, H4 courtesy of National Archives Head Office, Wellington.

Map 5. Te Rangatawhao and Kaweka Purchase Deed P1a!l' 1863

, I')

,:;r;iil"""'""~"."'''''''''''''''''' ""

, !

. 1\' , \ \

Map 6. Runilolders in tile Almriri Block, 1864

II'

/I I:! /II

/(1 /1' /(1 /1

1:1 J,'j

/I /I /Ii /(;

1/; /S

1.1 1,\'

17

IiU~IUS'US Koch map of 1864. _ .... _-

/.

,,'

"j',:

.,

(I q'i r

,

\ I

...,~ I

Approx. boundaty of Lieut.-Col. Whitmore's nm

Map 7. Nesfield's Sketch of Localities Upstream of Church Crossing, January 1866

Map 8. H. Guthrie Smith's Map of Hapu in the Mohaka-Waikare Area

.~

·s

~ ..

Map 9. Sketch Plan Attached to the 8 May 1868 Agreement

!. I

/i

HflWf(£S Bf/Y PROVINCE

MOHRKH _ WfllKARE BLOCK

8> M~ 186B

r ,

I

" )' . ~, I .

", I,. ~

, . ~ :, :' :':i ;. :,' ~ :"-,' : I. . -,

" .'

KEY TO BLOCKS: __ 1 Ahuriri 2 Arapaoanui 3 Awa 0 Totara 4 Heru a Tureia 5 Kaiwaka 6 Maungaharuru 7 Maungataniwha 8 Moeangiangi 9 Mohaka

10 Mohaka Crown block 11 Owhio 12 Pakaututu 13 Pakarutahi 14 Petane 15 Pihanui No.1 16 Pihanui No.2 17 Puketitiri Reserve 18 Purahotangahia 19 Putere 20 Rotokakarangu 21 Tangoio 22 Tangoio South 23 Tarawera 24 Tarawera Crown block 25 Talaraakina 26 Talara 0 Te Rauhina 27 Te Haroto 28 Te Haroto rural sections 29 Te Kuta 30 Te Malai 31 Te Pahou 32 Tutira 33 Waihua 34 Waihua Crown block 35 Waiohiki & Waitanoa 36 Waipapa 37 Waitara 38 Wharerangi Reserve 39 Whareraurakau 40 Wharetoto

~ Mohaka-Waikare confiscation district 1867

I,_-_-_-JI Pre-1866 Crown purchase

~ Confiscated land retained by the Crown

o 10 20 30 40km t! !!! 1 !" [ 1 1 I

b """ 10 20~iles

,

- - .. - 1868 agreement boundary

Inquiry District Sheet 2 of 9

::I:

'" .... ;:,. en

'--'" :'1 ~ :g ~ """C

'""" P 0 .... ~ ~ ::: /") ~ ~

c:r ~

i ~ ~ ::: ..... =-~ '""" OC C'I OC

~ ~ ::: ~ ::: Q. ..... =-~ ~ Q ::: ::i ~ /")

~ ..... .... Q :::

= Q

= ::: Q. ~

~

i,

t: I: ;

il I' ·ii

f "

.\

Map 11. Sketch Plan Attached to the 13 June 1870 Agreement

[;.'~

.• /I

"0

"

t

"

\,

\:", .' ",

•

..

~

.-'-'

:I :I :J' :a :a ::J ;J ;a :::a :a :a ':I :I '::I':J :J ,:J :J :J :1'-I I ,,1

~ KEY TO BLOCKS: _____

1 Ahuriri 2 Arapaoanui 3 Awa 0 Totara 4 Heru a Tureia 5 Kaiwaka 6 Maungaharuru 7 Maungataniwha 8 Moeangiangi 9 Mohaka

10 Mohaka Crown block 11 Owhio 12 Pakaututu 13 Pakarutahi 14 Petane 15 Pihanui No.1 16 Pihanui No.2 17 Puketitiri Reserve 18 Purahotangahia 19 Putere 20 Rotokakarangu 21 Tangoio 22 Tangoio South 23 Tarawera 24 Tarawera Crown block 25 Tataraakina 26 Tatara 0 Te Rauhina 27 Te Haroto 28 Te Haroto rural sections 29 Te Kuta 30 Te Matai 31 Te Pahou 32 Tutira 33 Waihua 34 Waihua Crown block 35 Waiohiki & Waitanoa 36 Waipapa 37 Waitara 38 Wharerangi Reserve 39 Whareraurakau 40 Wharetoto

c::::a Mohaka-Waikare confiscation district 1867

1,_-_-_-"1 Pre-1866 Crown purchase


o 10 20 30 40km ,. "'!"! I ! ! I

6 I I I I I 10 20~iles

- - ___ 1870 agreement boundary


:J:: Q)

~ c...

!I ~ :g ~ """0

...... ~ ~ .... ~ "'! ~ :: ~ ~ t;9.l

C"

~ ~ ~ :: -=-~ ...... Qe -....l Q

'"d -~ :: ~ ... ... Q. -=-~ ~ ~ :: == t;9.l ~ ~ -S· :: ~ ~

= :: Q. ~

~

Map 13. Survey PI an Refen-ed t . , 0 III the 1881 Act

,'; J'.' ~ .

,,:«,),,' " ,'" '

. "

, ~, .,.. "\1,,' ,"

~ ,~'~ -',' "!!.JI'~,r ,Ii'-:' :~~ :,1:\'1/ '- !{'1;', '

:', ~~ -~ '~Ij~ ,i"r ~~i" ,-~~,-,-, <,.,"" I ~ ~ ~ ," ". ' ! I ~ ~ '1 - ' , I ~ ~ ~ '" f: -,

~ :s I ~ fJ ~" I ~'~I'- ,:~ :". ): fl' ,r> " ~ , ,"

.:.I .... ~.:;J·,'.

.,- __ J-.r81 .,-~-,- i�r".-.

KEY TO BLOCKS: ___

1 Ahuriri 2 Arapaoanui 3 Awa 0 Totara 4 Heru a Tureia 5 Kaiwaka 6 Maungaharuru 7 Maungataniwha 8 Moeangiangi 9 Mohaka

10 Mohaka Crown block 11 Owhio 12 Pakaututu 13 Pakarutahi 14 Petane 15 Pihanui No.1 16 Pihanui No.2 17 Puketitiri Reserve Ik 18 Purahotangahia 19 Putere 20 Rotokakarangu 21 Tangoio 22 Tangoio South 23 Tarawera 24 Tarawera Crown block 25 Tataraakina 26 Tatara 0 Te Rauhina 27 Te Haroto 28 Te Haroto rural sections 29 Te Kuta 30 Te Matai

J! 6J 31 Te Pahou 32 Tutira 33 Waihua 34 Waihua Crown block 35 Waiohiki & Waitanoa 36 Waipapa 37 Waitara 38 Wharerangi Reserve 39 Whareraurakau 40 Wharetolo

~ Mohaka-Waikare confiscation district 1867

Ii-_-_-_-JI Pre-1866 Crown purchase


10 20 30 40km !, t, !, t!! t ! r

6 i \ iii 1 b 20~i1es

R 25

"'!'" - - - 1881 district boundary


:c: :x: ., :::: ~

~, ~ - ~ :g "C <0

'""" ~ C .... ;S ~ ("I>

:: ~ ("I> I;fl

C" ("I>

i ("I> ("I>

:: """ == ("I>

'""" Qe Qe

'""" ~ -~ :: ~ :: Q..

""" == ("I>

('j e :: ::'l I;fl ~ ~

""" ,... e :: = e = :: Q.. ~

~

\

\

\

Map 15. Waitara Purchase Deed Plan, 1863

, \ .

tf'> . i2\.PorOpOl0 0

",,:\. -:1"- .:'? \ > Tut"I',anuku ....

\,-_:.::,:, Ahuriri Lagoon

Ie Whsnlsnuioroto

..... , -. Mat.wltet. .c, 'J'

Ket.k.t.reu Ori.lill.l _",t/~t

,0,

, ..'

canoe locations

100 years ago-,Plan showing Ahurirl Lag~on/Sc'lnde Id. •• sunoundings-upto Ut t865 -, Scate: 20 chiJ to anl.1ch.

:-,

~.;.~. [ (

; ,- ,

I:

~:I

Figure 1. Watercolour View of Omarunui, 1866

Figure 2. Photograph of a Painting of Omarmmi, 1866

I',

~;; tl ~i,

F: I::,

"

{i! r~n

~il .,1 iJ tl;~ 1,1, t~ 1

I I

:1 1 1 I

t"l

~: :.1 i';1

Iz ~I' ~~ . . ' t; I~ '<'

W: f: I:t

l ;.'-

~ i:

• "";

I ~

~" (,:

~; ~~ :,

;~ "

r: ,"i I" t;

~. r

f',1 ',I

Figure 3. Photograph of Omarmmi, 1866

,--~---------~---------,--,-~----

•

Figure 4. Sketch of the Omarunui Battlefield, 1866

Omarunui battlefield (Statioll 67)

I I i

Figure 5. Plan of the Military Dispositions at Omarunui, 1866

/ -.\ \

/'. " .. ~ , ~ ~

~ ,"

I

::::::---~ ~ ~ :-----...:

-~ ""-~

..--.--.;:::: .---:-...---: -~ ---~ ..----------,----------~----

~-'---;:::.-. --~.:~.

'lI

" ~

, --_.,

,I'~

.T.-:.-0

------------------~--~~----- ,

, , , ,

~ ~ ~

~

---I-I