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TEAM CODE:

SURANA & SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION

26TH – 28TH SEPTEMBER 2014

_______________________________________________________________________

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE COURT OF SESSIONS

BAMBI THANE

(S.C. No.123 of 2014)

_______________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENCE

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF:

State of Bambi.………...................……….PROSECUTION v.

Panna……......….............................…ACCUSED 1 Saba............................................... ACCUSED 2 Jaimil...................................................... ACCUSED 3

_______________________________________________________________________

MOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

COUNSELS APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

SURANA & SURANA TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION

2 | P a g e MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF DEFENCE

TABLE OF CONTENTS Sl. No.___________________________________________________________Page No.

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

a) Cases Referred-----------------------------------------------------------------------6 b) Books Referred----------------------------------------------------------------------8 c) Websites Referred------------------------------------------------------------------11 d) Statutes Referred--------------------------------------------------------------------11

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12

4. DATES AND EVENTS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------13

5. LIST OF WITNESSES ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------14

6. LIST OF MATERIAL OBJECTS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------15

7. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------16

8. WRITTEN PLEADINGS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------17-----34

1. Whether MR. PANNA BOY (first accused A1) is liable for the offence of violation of remission punishable under section 227 of BARATA PENAL CODE 1860----

1.1 Parole is not suspension----------------------------------------------------

1.1.2 Parole is not a suspension ------------------------------------------------

2. WHETHER MR SABA (second accused A2) and MR JAIMIL (third accused )ARE LIABLE FOR THE OFFENCE OF EXTORTION PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 385 OF BARATA PENAL CODE-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2.1 The necessary ingredient for section 383 of BPC,1860 ,are not satisfied------

2.1.1 Whether there exists any intention to put the victim in fear of injury-----------

2.1.2 Whether there exists any dishonest inducement by A2 and A3 against the

complainant PW4--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2.1.3 Whether is there any delivery of property or valuable security--------



2.2 THE FIRST,SECOND AND THE THIRD ACCUSED ARE NOT GUILTY u/s 385

of BPC 1860-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 .WHETHER MR. PANNA BOY(first accused A1), MR. SABA (second accused

A2)and MR JAIMIL (third accused A3 ) ARE LIABLE FOR THE OFFENCE OF

DEFAMATION IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMON INTENTION PUNISHABLE UNDER

S 501,502 READ WITH SEC.34 OF BARATA PENAL CODE 1860--------------------

3.1 A1,A2 and A3 possessed no common intention to defame Miss Naika

(prosecution witness3) as mandated under sec.34 BPC--------------------------------

3.2 The necessary ingredient for the offence of defamation u/s 499 of BPC ,1860

not complied with --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3.2.1 Whether the alleged publication has imputed the victim----------------

3.2.2 Whether the alleged imputation has been expressed in any form ------

3.2.3 Whether there is any intention to harm the reputation of the victim ---

3.3 The necessary ingredient for the offence of defamation u/s 501 and 502 BPC,1860

have not been complied with ------------------------------------------------------

3.4 conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------

4.WHETHER MR.PANNA BOY (first accused A1) ,MR SABA(second accused A2),MR

JAIMIL (third accused A3) ARE LIABLE FOR THE OFFENCE OF CRIMINAL

CONSPIRACY,PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 120B OF BARATA PENAL CODE

1860------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4.1 Section 120A –Definition of criminal Conspiracy--------------------------

4.1.1 That there was no agreement between A1,A2 and A3-------------------

4.1.2. That there is no common intention among A1,A2 and A3--------------

5.The evidence produced by the prosecution is defective and deficient------------------

5.1 The prosecution lacks strong corroborative evidence and had manipulated the

charge sheet---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5.1.1 The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution is vague and

rooted in mere suspicion-------------------------------------------------------------------------

5.1.2 The A1,A2 and A3 are entitled to the benefit of doubt-------------------

PRAYER FOR RELIEF-------------------------------------------------------35

APPENDIX- ----------------------------------------------------------------- 36--50



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& - And

/ - Read with

@ - At/alias

A1 - Accused No.1

AC - Appeal Cases

AIR - All India Reporter

Anr. - Another

Art./Arts - Article/Articles

Asst. - Assistant

CJ - Chief Justice

Co. - Company

Cr.P.C. - Criminal Procedure Code

DB - Division Bench

DLT - Delhi Law Times

DOA - Date of Admission

Doc. - Document

DW - Defence Witness

Edn. - Edition

Etc. - Etcetera

Ext. - Exhibit

FIR - First Information Report

HC - High Court

BPC - Barata Penal Code

i.e. - That is

IE Act - Indian Evidence Act

IO - Investigating Officer

LRI - Law Reports of India

Ltd. - Limited

LW - Law Weekly

m - Metre

No. - Number

Not. - Notification

UP - Uttar Pradesh



AP - Andhra Pradesh

WB - West Bengal



INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

a)Cases Referred

1

Dadu@ Tulsidas vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 2000 SC 3203, 2000(2)ALD (Cri)804

2 Dhananjay @ Dhananjay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar

; (2007) 14 SCC 768; (2007) CrLJ 1440 (SC)

3 Venkatappa v. Jallaya AIR 1919 Mad. 954, 19 CrLJ 445, 42 Mad. 615

4 Thanummal v. Emperor AIR 1944 Sind. 203 5 Bhagtu v. Emperor AIR 1928 Lah 925 6 Nag Aung Khin v. Emperor AIR 1937 Rang 407 7 Arshed Ali v. Emperor AIR 92 IC 890 8 Shyamdeo Singh v. State of Bihar 1988 Cr LJ 508 9 Nanu Singh v. State of Bihar 1985 BLJ 316 10 Labshanker AIR 1955 Sau. 42 11 Anil Kumar Bose v. State of Bihar AIR 1974 SC 1560 12 Kishan Chand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1994 SC 32 13 Idrish Bhai Daudhbhai v. State of Gujarat (2005) 3 SCC 277;

(2005) CrLJ 1422 (SC). 14 Sunilakhya v. HM Jadwet AIR 1968 Cal. 266,

(1968) CrLJ 736 (Cal); 15 Narottmadas v. Maghanbhai (1984) CrLJ 1790 (Guj) 16 Jefferey J Diermeier& Anr. V. State of West

Bengal (2010) 6 SCC 243, 2005 (5) SC ALE 95.

17 Sanatan Daw v. Dasorthi Tah AIR 1959 Cal. 677 18 Gambhirsinh R Dekare v. Falgunbhai

Chimanbhai Patel 2013) 3 SCC 697; 2013 CRI.L.J 1757; AIR 2013 SC 1590

19 Janardhan Damodhar Dikshit (1894) 19 Bom 703 20 P.M. Abubacker v. P.J.Alexander 2000 CrLJ 1168 (Ker 21 Jacob Mathew v. Manikantan 2013 CrLJ (NOC) 62;

2012 (3) KLD 824 22 Valmiki Faleiro v. Mrs. Lauriana Fernandes &

Ors. . (2005) CrLJ 2498 (Bom.)

23 Queen-Empress v. Taki Husain 1885) ILR 7 All. 205. 24 State of H.P. v. Kishanlal 1987 Cr L J 709 (SC); 25 K.R. Purushottam Vs. State of Kerela

2005 Cr.L.J 4648 (S.C.)

26 State v. Navjot Sandhu 2005 Cr L J 3950 (SC). 27 Nalini v. State of T. N. 1999 Cr L J 3124 (SC); 28 Barindra Kr. Ghosh Vs. Emperor 14 C.W.N 1114 29 Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1955 SC 216.; 30 Subramani Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1982) 3 SCC 218 31 Khacheru Singh v. State of U.P. 1964 CrLJ 564 32 Baleshwar rai v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 1263; 33 Abrahim Sheikh v. State of west Bengal AIR 1951 Mys 1,3



34 Re Basappa 1965 SCR (1) 287. 35 Shankarlal Kachrabhai & Ors v. State Of Gujarat 1973 CrLR (SC) 93. 36 Hardev singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1988 SC 1883 37 Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration AIR 2012 SC 1921 38 Dr. Mrs Nupur Talwar v. CBI Mar 2012,TP Crl No.

45 OF 2012 39 Rajesh Talwar v. CBI & Ors 1991 SCR(3) 692 40 State of UP v. Kapil Deo & Anr AIR 1954 SC 695; 41 Gajanand & Ors v. State Of UP, 1 February 2012,

Criminal Appeal No. 1108 OF 2002 (SC)

42 Roy Fernandes v. State Of Goa & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 1017 43 through CBI v. Mahender Singh Dahiya 1987Cri.L.J 44 Paramahamsa Yadav 2007)7 SCC 502 45 Sukhram v. Maharashtra 2010) AIR SCW 886 46 P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala (2007) 13 SCC 90; 47 Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab 2011(107) AIC 203

(SC) 48 Amitava Banerjee @ Amit @ Bappa Banerjee v.

State of West Bengal 1941 ALJR 416

49 Queen Empress v. Hoshhak 2009 Cr.L.J 2248; 50 Narayan v. Rajasthan (2007 )6 SCC 32 51 Sujoy Sen v. West Bengal 2003)3SCC 641 at Page

354 52 Ram Narayan Populiv.CBI AIR 2012 SC 2470 53 Munna Kumar Upadhyaya @ Munna Upadhyaya

v. State of A.P AIR 1992 SC 840

54 State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava 1976 SCR(1) 757 55 Partap v. State Of U.P AIR 1970 All 51(FB); 56 Rishi Kesh Singh Ors. v. State, , 1962 SCR Supl.(1)

567 57 K. M. Nanavati v. State Of Maharashtra, ,[1953] SCR 809 58 ;Mustak Hussein v. State of Bombay ,[1960]3 SCR 1 59 Smt. Nagindra Bala Mitra v. Sunil Chandra Roy (1935)AC 462 60 Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions,

LR AIR 1936 PC 169

61 Attygalle v. Emperor, [1958] SCR 580 622 State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer [1960]1 SCR 461

63 C. S. D. Swamy v. State AIR 1981 SC 1578; 64 Mohar Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab 1985 Cri. LJ 966; 65 Satya Narain v. State AIR 1975 SC 1194

15 66 Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 400

b) BOOKS REFERRED



I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE:

1. IYENAGAR'S COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1973, DELHI LAW HOUSE, DELHI,2011, SECOND EDITION.

2. PRINCEP'S COMMENTARY ON CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1973, DELHI LAW HOUSE, DELHI, 2011, 10TH EDITION, VOLUME I AND II.

3. KENNY'S OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL LAW, UNIVERSAL LAW PUBLISHING CO. , NEW DELHI, 2010, 19TH EDITION.

4. TONY STOREY & ALAN LIDBURY'S CRIMINAL LAW, WILLIAN PUBLISHING, LONDON, 2002, SECOND EDITION.

5. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL'S LAW OF CRIMES, BHARAT PUBLICATIONS, INDIA, 2002, 25TH EDITION, VOLUME I & II.

6. SOHONI'S CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1973, LEXIS NEXIS BUTTERWORTHS, WADHWA, INDIA, 2010, 20TH EDITION, VOLUME I, VOLUME II AND VOLUME III.

7. CMV CLARKSON & HM KEATING'S CRIMINAL LAW TEXT AND MATERIALS, SWEET & MAXWELL, LONDON, 1998, 4TH EDITION.

8. R.V KELKAR'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , EASTERN BOOK COMPANY, INDIA, 2008, 5TH EDITION.

9. RATANLAL& DHIRAJLAL'S CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1973, ENLARGED EDITION, WADHWA NAGPUR, INDIA, 2004, 16TH EDITION.

10. WOODROFFE'S COMMENTARIES ON CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, LAW PUBLISHERS INDIA, INDIA, 2004, SECOND EDITION, VOLUME I AND VOLUME II.

11. KRISHNAMURTHI'S HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW, C.S CHETTY AND CO. INDIA, 1986, 14TH EDITION.

12. PSA PILLAI'S CRIMINAL LAW, LEXIS NEXIS BUTTERWORTHS WADHWA NAGPUR, INDIA, 2009, 10TH EDITION.

13. KD GAUR'S CRIMINAL LAW CASE AND MATERIALS, LEXIS NEXIS BUTTERWORTHS WADHWA NAGPUR INDIA, 2009, 6TH EDITION.

14. BATUK LAL'S COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ORIENT PUBLICATIONS, INDIA, 2005, THIRD EDITION, VOLUME I AND VOLUME II.

15. B.B MITRA'S CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 1973, KAMAL LAW HOUSE KOLKATA, INDIA, 2003, 20TH EDITION II.

INDIAN PENAL CODE:



1. KD GAUR TEXTBOOK ON THE INDIA PENAL CODE, UNIVERSAL LAW PUBLISHING CO., INDIA, 2006, 4TH EDITION.

2. B.M. GANDHI'S INDIAN PENAL CODE, EASTERN BOOK COMPANY, INDIA, 2008, THIRD EDITION

3. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL'S THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, WADHWA COMPANY NAGPUR, INIDA, 1998, 28TH EDITION.

4. DR. SIR HARI SINGH GOUR'S PENAL LAW OF INDIA, LAW PUBLICATIONS INDIA, INDIA, 2004, 11TH EDITION, VOLUME I, VOLUME II, VOLUME III AND VOLUME IV.

5. TANDON'S INDIAN PENAL CODE, ALLAHABAD LAW AGENCY, INDIA, 2007, 23RD EDITION.

6. R.P KATHURIA'S SUPERME COURT ON CRIMINAL LAW 1950-2002, PROFESSIONALS PUBLISHERS, INDIA, 2002, VOLUME I, VOLUME II, VOLUME III, VOLUME IV, VOLUME V AND VOLUME VI

7. LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN'S CRIME AND ULPABILITY A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW, CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY AND LAW, USA.

IV. LAW OF EVIDENCE:

1. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL'S THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, WADHWA & COMPANY NAGPUR, 2004, ENLARGED EDITION.

2. DR. REGA SURYA RAO'S LECTURES ON LAW OF EVIDENCE, ASIA LAW HOUSE, INDIA, 2008, THIRD EDITION

3. VEPA P. SARATHI'S LAW OF EVIDENCE, EASTERN BOOK COMPANY, INDIA, 2006, 6TH EDITION.

4. C.D FIELD'S COMMENTARIES ON LAW OF EVIDENCE, DELHI LAW HOUSE, 2012, 13TH EDITION, VOLUME I, VOLUME II, VOLUME III, VOLUME IV AND VOLUME V.

5. SARKAR'S LAW OF EVIDENCE, WADHWA NAGPUR, INDIA, 2008, 16TH EDITION, VOLUME I AND VOLUME II.

6. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL'S THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, LEXIS NEXIS BUTTERWORTHS, INDIA, 2009, 22ND EDITION.

7. SIR JOHN WOODROFFE & SYED AMIR ALI'S LAW OF EVIDENCE, BUTTERWORTHS, 2011, 17TH EDITION , VOLUME I AND VOLUME II.



VI. MISCELLANEOUS:

1. C.D FIELD'S LAW ON ADMISSION & CONFESSIONS, DELHI LAW HOUSE, 2011, INDIA, SECOND EDTION.

2. D.P. VARSHNI'S HOW TO FRAME A CHARGE, EASTERN BOOK COMPANY, INDIA, 2000, SECOND EDITION

3. CHARLES R SWANSON, JR. NEIL C. CHAMELIN'S CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, MCGRAWHILL INC, NEW YORK, 1967, FOURTH EDITION.

4. BLACKSTONE'S CRIMINAL PRACTICE, BLACKSTONE PRESS LIMITED, 1994, LONDON, EIGHTEENTH EDITION

5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, THOMPSON AND WEST , USA,2007, 10TH EDITION

C). LIST OF WEBSITES REFERRED:



1. WWW.LEXISNEXISACADEMIC.COM

2. WWW.VAKILNO1.COM

3. WWW.INDIAKANOON.ORG

4. WWW.MANUPATRA.COM

5. WWW.LAW.CAM.AC.UK

6. WWW.WIKIPEDIA.ORG

7. WWW.EN.WIKISOURCE.ORG

8. WWW.THESOUTHASIAN.ORG

9. WWW.LEGALSERVICEINDIA.COM

10. WWW.THEHINDU.COM

11. WWW.LAW.CORNELL.EDU

12. WWW.THEBLUEBOOK.COM

13. WWW.JOURNALS.CAMBRIDGE.ORG

14. WWW.LEGALSUTRA.ORG

D. LIST OF STATUTES REFERRED:

1. THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860

2. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973

3. THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1860.

4. PRISONS ACT 1894

5. PRESS AND BOOK REGULATION ACT



STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Defence Counsels on behalf of Accused I (Mr.Panna Boy), Accused II (Mr.Saba) and Accused III (Mr Jaimil) humbly submits the memorandum of response under Sec.314 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 before the Hon’ble Court of Sessions, Bambi Thane, against the charges levied on the first and second accused under BPC,1860

The memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments in the present case.

DATE AND EVENTS



Serial

no

DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION

1 1993 A1 arrested under[TADA] for illegal Possession of

arms

2 Not given Released on bail

3 2005-2009 Four movies of A1 were big hits

4 March 2013 Supreme Court of Barata held Accused 1 guilty and 5

yrs R. I under Arms Act 1959

5 14 August 2013 A 2 and A 3 met the complainant at her residence

6 December 2013 A 1 was allowed on parole for one month

7 February 3 2014 Parole was granted for another month to A 1

8 February 6 2014 A 3 Complained of chest pain and was admitted in star

hospital

9 February 8 2014 A1 seen In mall with daughter

10 February 14 2014 Ads of ‘’Hit factory’’ released

11 February 16 2014 The victim filed a suit in High Court for permanent

injunction of the movie threatening phone calls were

made from unknown people.

12 February 17 2014 First information report(FIR) registered by the

complainant on A1, A2, A3 under sec 385,501,502 of

BAMBI PENAL CODE

13 March 30 2014 Charge sheet filed based on the report of police officer

on completion of investigation(sec-173 of CrPc)

LIST OF WITNESSES



PROSECUTION

NAME OF WITNESS

WITNESS NUMBER

Mr.Williams,Superintendent,star Hospital PW1

Inspector Mr.Sundar,Investigating Officer

PW2

Ms.Kushboo,Secretary,Panna Boy Fan Club

PW3

Ms.Naika,Actress

PW4

Mr.Ganesh,Camera Man

PW5

DEFENCE

NAME OF WITNESS

WITNESS NUMBER

Mr.Panna Boy

DW1

Mr.Jaimil

DW2

Mr.Saba DW3

Ms.Poonam.

DW4

Smt.Mashaal,actress

DW5

LIST OF MATERIAL OBJECTS



Material object no List of Exhibits

1 Security CD,Star hospital

2 Security CD,Central Mail

3 Audio recording of call received on Ms.Naika s ,mobile

4 Transcript of call details from cello mobile company

record(corroborated with recording)

5 Advertisement of the movie Hit Factory

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS



1. WHETHER MR. PANNA BOY (first accused A1) IS LIABLE FOR THE OFFENCE

OF VIOLATION OF CONDITIONS OF REMISSION PUNISHABLE UNDER

SECTION 227 OF BARATA PENAL CODE, 1860.

The defence would like to contend that in this case, Accused person A1 was a convict in

another case and is subjected to imprisonment and there was no remission or suspension

in the term of his imprisonment

2. WHETHER MR.SABA (second accused A2) and MR.JAIMIL (third accused A3)

ARE LIABLE FOR THE OFFENCE OF EXTORTION PUNISHABLE UNDER

SECTION 385 OF BARATA PENAL CODE, 1860

The defence here would like to state that there exists no intention on the part of the accused

A2 and A3 to put the complainant in fear of injury.

3. WHETHER MR. PANNA BOY (first accused A1), MR.SABA (second accused A2)

and MR.JAIMIL (third accused A3) ARE LIABLE FOR THE OFFENCE OF

DEFAMATION IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMON INTENTION PUNISHABLE

UNDER SEC.501, 502 READ WITH SEC.34 OF BARATA PENAL CODE, 1860

The defence humbly submits before the Hon’ble Court of Sessions, Bambi Thane that A1, A2

and A3 are not liable for defamation in prosecution of common intent under Sec.501, 502

read with Sec.34 of BPC, 1860.



CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 120B OF

BARATA PENAL CODE, 1860

There is no evidence to prove that the accused persons A1, A2 and A3 had any kind of

intention or ill will towards the complainant PW5. Since neither A1nor A2 nor A3

had the motive or the intention under Section 34 (IPC ) to commit an illegal act or a

legal act through illegal means, it cannot be inferred that a common intention was

formed. Hence, A1, A2 and A3 are not liable under Section 120B of BPC, 1860

WRITTEN PLEADINGS



1.WHETHER MR. PANNA BOY (first accused A1) IS LIABLE FOR THE OFFENCE

OF VIOLATION OF CONDITIONS OF REMISSION PUNISHABLE UNDER

SECTION 227 OF BARATA PENAL CODE, 1860.

An offence under Section 227 has the following essential ingredients:

1) That the accused was sentence to undergo imprisonment but it was remitted.

2) That the accused accepted any conditional remission of punishment.

3) That the accused violated any of the conditions or which remission was granted.

4) That the accused did so knowingly.

The defence would like to contend that in this case, Accused person A1 was a

convict in another case and is subjected to imprisonment and there was no remission or

suspension in the term of his imprisonment. The Accused person was out of the jail on

parole citing his wife’s serious health ailment.

1.1.1. Parole is not a suspension.

In Dadu @ Tulsidas vs. State of Maharashtra1, the Supreme Court has given a ruling

that “Parole is not a suspension of the sentence. The convict continues to be serving the

sentence despite granting of parole under the statute, rules, jail manual or the Government

orders.”

1.1.2. Parole is not a remission

As per Rule 20 of Prisons (Bombay Furlough and Parole) Rules, 1959, the period

spent on parole shall not be counted as remission. Thus the defense would like to contend

that when a parole is neither suspension nor remission of a sentence, Section 227 of BPC,

1860 would not be attracted. The charges thus pressed by the prosecution against accused

person A1 are unreasonable and arbitrary.

1 AIR 2000 SC 3203, 2000(2)ALD (Cri)804



2. WHETHER MR.SABA (second accused A2) and MR.JAIMIL (third accused A3)

ARE LIABLE FOR THE OFFENCE OF EXTORTION PUNISHABLE UNDER

SECTION 385 OF BARATA PENAL CODE, 1860

2.1. The necessary ingredient for Section 383 of BPC, 1860 are not satisfied.

According to Section 383 of BPC, 1860 which provides for explanation to the term

“Extortion”, the below mentioned are the three essential ingredients for its commission:

1) Intentionally putting a person in fear of injury.

2) The purpose of which is to dishonestly induce the person put in fear.

3) To deliver property or valuable security.2

2.1.1. Whether there exists any intention to put the victim in fear of injury

The defence here would like to state that there exists no intention on the part of

the accused A2 and A3 to put the complainant in fear of injury. It is the duty of the

prosecution to prove that there exists an intention. The accused A2 and A3 only threatened

to take action what was bound by law and this action does not fall under the purview of

Section 44.3 The word injury is defined in Section 44 as denoting ‘Any harm whatever

illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation, or property’ Thus the injury

contemplated must be the one which the accused himself can inflict or cause to be inflicted.4

Here the accused persons are persons who are established men in the film industry. Though

a lot of money has been invested in this project, shelving it is not going to cause significant

losses to the accused A2 and A3 in terms of both money or goodwill. Also, it is not safe to 2 Dhananjay @ Dhananjay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar; (2007) 14 SCC 768; (2007) CrLJ 1440 (SC)

3 Venkatappa v. Jallaya, AIR 1919 Mad. 954, 19 CrLJ 445, 42 Mad. 615

4 Thanummal v. Emperor,AIR 1944 Sind. 203



rely only upon the identification of a person by his voice alone5. The identification by voice

cannot be said to be sound and acceptable.

From the above arguments, the defence would like to contend that the accused A2 and

A3 have no intention to put any sort of fear in the mind of the victim. Random phone calls

threatening the victim, cannot be arbitrarily linked to A2 or A3 and it is the prosecution

which needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt before pressing such charges against the

accused persons.

2.1.2. Whether there exists any dishonest inducement by A2 and A3 against the

complainant PW4.

The word dishonestly in the collocation of words “dishonestly induces the person

so put in fear to deliver to any person any property” is important and needs to be noted.

As per Section 24 of BPC, 1860, one doing a thing with the intention of causing wrongful

gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing

"dishonestly". The defence counsel here states that there is no such intention to cause any

loss to the complainant. When the basic requirement of the identity of the callers

themselves has not been established before this honourable court beyond reasonable

doubt, the question of dishonest inducement never rises.

2.1.3. Whether is there any delivery of property or valuable security.

5 Bhagtu v. Emperor AIR 1928 Lah 925; Nag Aung Khin v. Emperor AIR 1937 Rang 407, Arshed Ali v. Emperor

AIR 92 IC 890, Shyamdeo Singh v. State of Bihar 1988 Cr LJ 508, Nanu Singh v. State of Bihar 1985 BLJ 316 (

identification by voice cannot be said to be sound and acceptable).



The prosecution has not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there is

any such delivery of property or valuable security to the accused A2 and A3. Delivery by

the person put in fear is essential in order to constitute the offence of extortion. Thus the

offence of extortion is not complete before actual delivery of the possession of the

property by the person put in fear.6

In this case, no such delivery of property has taken place and thus, this ingredient is not

attracted.

2.2. THE FIRST, SECOND AND THE THIRD ACCUSED ARE NOT GUILTY u/s

385 of BPC, 1860.

As per as S 385 of BPC 1860, the essentials to be satisfied to charge a person under

attempt to commit extortion are:

(1) That the accused put any person in fear, or

(2) The accused attempted to put any person in fear, of any injury and

(3) The accused did so in order to the committing of extortion.

The first ingredient and second ingredient are not satisfied as the accused A2 and A3 do

not even possess the knowledge as to happening of the incident. They know this fact only

when the investigating officer investigates them and thereupon charges them. When the

said accused does not even possess knowledge about such a happening, it is the duty of

the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt and establish that the accused had prior

knowledge.

As regards to the third ingredient, the defence would like to contend that the defence has

already proved that there exists no extortion under section 383 of BPC, 1860

2.3. Conclusion

6 Labshanker AIR 1955 Sau. 42



On the basis of arguments advanced, the defence would like to contend that the said Accused

persons A2 and A3 have not committed any offence under Section 385 of BPC, 1860.



DEFAMATION IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMON INTENTION PUNISHABLE

UNDER SEC.501, 502 READ WITH SEC.34 OF BARATA PENAL CODE, 1860

The edifice of the judicial system of Barata rests on the principle, ‘it is better and

more satisfactory to acquit a thousand guilty than to condemn a single innocent.’ This

sacred principle is unimpeachably embedded in the Criminal laws of Bambi so that rule

of law in its sublime semantics doesn’t become a rope of sand loosing it righteous

meaning and moral quintessence, causing a miscarriage of justice. The defence humbly

submits before the Hon’ble Court of Sessions, Bambi Thane that A1, A2 and A3 are not

liable for defamation in prosecution of common intent under Sec.501, 502 read with

Sec.34 of BPC, 1860.

3.1. A1, A2 and A3 possessed no common intention to defame Miss Naika

(prosecution witness 3) as mandated under Sec.34, BPC

Scrutinizing the outlines of Sec.34,7 the Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Bose v. State

of Bihar8 laid that, to draw an inference of common intent, the evidence adduced must

establish beyond reasonable doubt, a mens rea on the part of the accused and it was 7 Sec.34: Act done by several persons in furtherance of common intention (Refer Appendix I, pg.17)

8 AIR 1974 SC 1560



shared by all accused.9 The essence of joint liability under Sec.34 is the intentional joint

criminal act by several persons in furtherance of common intention. The essence, thus, is

the simultaneous consensus of minds of persons participating in criminal action to bring

out a particular result.In the instant case, there is nothing material on the part of the

prosecution to make out common intent on the part of A1, A2 and A3. The mere presence

of A1, A2 and A3 at the premises as visible in the Security Tape has been arbitrarily

magnified by the prosecution as the key circumstance that opens the door of criminal

intent of A1, A2 and A3 to frame charges for the offence of defamation. This was a

coincidence rather than an act with common intention. As the prosecution has failed to

bring any direct material on records to show that there had been any pre-concert or pre-

arranged plan so as to commit the alleged offence, the accused deserves the benefit of

doubt and the consequential acquittal. 10

3.2 The necessary ingredient for the offence of defamation u/s 499 BPC,1860 not

complied with-

Sec. 499 of BPC, 1860 deals with the meaning of Defamation and the essential

ingredients of the offence are as follows:

1) The making or publishing of an imputation concerning any person

2) The means of such an imputation is expressed either in words, writings, signs, or

visible representations

3) Such an imputation must have been made with an intention of harming the

reputation of the person about whom the imputation is published.11

9 Kishan Chand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1994 SC 32

10 Idrish Bhai Daudhbhai v. State of Gujarat, (2005) 3 SCC 277; (2005) CrLJ 1422 (SC).

11 Sunilakhya v. HM Jadwet AIR 1968 Cal. 266, (1968) CrLJ 736 (Cal); Narottmadas v. Maghanbhai (1984)

CrLJ 1790 (Guj.); Jefferey J Diermeier& Anr. V. State of West Bengal (2010) 6 SCC 243, 2005 (5) SC ALE 95.



3.2.1 Whether the alleged publication has imputed the victim.

Publication of a defamatory matter is the most important ingredient in defamation,

as it is because of this publication that others get to hear or come to know about the

alleged defamatory imputation. The defence here contends that the victim, after initially

consenting to pose for the alleged defamatory material, later went back on her promise

and seeks refuge in filing a criminal suit. Though she had previously dissented in acting

in intimate motion picture scenes, she did not dissent to pose for the posters of the movie.

The posters have come out with her consent and no substitute can match her unique

appearance.

The counsels for the accused humbly declare that these posters represent nothing but the

factual truth and are not edited or plagiarised in any manner whatsoever. They are truthful

representations of the victim PW4 and fall under the exception to the offence.12 (TELL

GIKU)

Also, it is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that

the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making

it or of any other person, or for the public good.13 Here, the producer and the director have

invested immense time and money on the project and would have published the same to

recoup investments besides promoting the film and its cast.

Arguendo, even assuming but not conceding that the accused persons released those

posters, “truth” and “imputation made in good faith to protect one’s interest” is always a

12 First Exception.- “Imputation of truth which public good requires be making or publishing”Ratanlal

Dhirajlal 26th Edn. Law of Crimes, Pg 2752

13 Ninth Exception.- “Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or others interest” Ratanlal

& Dhirajlal, 26th Edn,. Law of Crimes, Pg 2755



defence for the offence of defamation. However, a court, while deciding veracity of such

a defamatory matter and protection of public good, is not expected to weigh it in a fine

scale. It has to give some allowance to the accused.14

The defence here also contends that there are innumerable flaws in the action of

the prosecution. The prosecution’s sole aim is to charge only A1, A2, and A3 in this case

and they have failed to establish that Accused persons were involved in the publication of

alleged defamatory matter. The alleged defamatory matters were published through the

public medium, of newspapers and magazines. Strictly in the eyes of law, the editor,

printer, publisher and even the distributor of such medium is liable for printing or

publishing of any defamatory matter. Though they could be made co-accused persons, the

prosecution has failed to frame charges against them, which clearly shows the intention of

the prosecution to nail only our clients due to some form of bias. As per the provisions of

the Press and Registration of Books Act, it is evident that the editors have to take

responsibility of everything they publish and maintain the integrity of published record.15

The person who publishes the imputation need not necessarily be the author of the

imputation.16 The source of information regarding published defamatory substance is not

a consideration for prosecution for defamation.17 Thus it is the duty of the prosecution to

establish beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged defamatory matter is published by the

accused.

14 Sanatan Daw v. Dasorthi Tah, AIR 1959 Cal. 677

15 Gambhirsinh R Dekare v. Falgunbhai Chimanbhai Patel; (2013) 3 SCC 697; 2013 CRI.L.J 1757; AIR 2013

SC 1590

16 Janardhan Damodhar Dikshit, (1894) 19 Bom 703

17 P.M. Abubacker v. P.J.Alexander, 2000 CrLJ 1168 (Ker)



3.2.2. Whether the alleged imputation has been expressed in any form

The defence here contends that although there has been an expression of the

defamatory matter, the very source of this matter is disputed here. Only the person who is

responsible for the publication will be responsible for its expression in any public

medium. It cannot be understood that the publication of the photographs in the newspaper

was with the intention or with knowledge or having reason to believe that it will harm the

reputation of the complainant.18 Thus it is the duty of the prosecution to include all

involved in this expression of defamatory matter as the co-accused and prove beyond

reasonable doubt that they were indeed responsible for such publication.

3.2.3 Whether is there any intention to harm the reputation of the victim.

Intention to cause harm to the reputation of a person is the sine qua non of the

offence of defamation.19 The commission of offence of defamation or publishing any

imputations concerning any person must be “intending to harm or knowing or having

reason to believe” that such imputation will cause harm.20

As a man’s opinion of himself cannot be called as his reputation, 21 the defence

humbly submits that the complainant, perceiving herself to be defamed by a regular film

poster may be mistaken in her belief that she has been defamed. The defence here

contends that the complainant has entered into the contract with the accused A1, A2 and

A3 for acting in a motion film and this definitely includes posing for its promotional

campaigns, such as shows and posers. This practice is a common feature of the film

industry and is not a malicious attempt by my clients to defame the complainant. The

allegedly defamatory posters have been approved of by the complainant and she has

18 Jacob Mathew v. Manikantan 2013 CrLJ (NOC) 62; 2012 (3) KLD 824,

19 Sunilakhya v. H.M. Jadwet AIR 1968 Cal. 266; CrLJ 736 Cal.

20 Valmiki Faleiro v. Mrs. Lauriana Fernandes & Ors. (2005) CrLJ 2498 (Bom.)

21 Queen-Empress v. Taki Husain (1885) ILR 7 All. 205.



consented to be photographed in such a manner. Also as per the terms of contract, there

exists an implied consent to publication of poster or contrary otherwise if expressly

stated. The prosecution has miserably failed to establish an intention in relation to that of

A1, A2 and A3 and prove beyond reasonable doubt. Without proving the intention of my

clients, this charge would fail completely.

3.3 The necessary ingredient for the offence of defamation u/s 501 and 502

BPC,1860 have not been complied with-

The necessary ingredients for the offence of defamation u/s 501 and 502 are as follows:

1) Printing or engraving any matter u/s 501

2) Sale or offering of such matter u/s 502

3) Knowledge or reasoning to believe that such substance contains defamatory

matter u/s 501&502

The defence would like to contend that A1, A2 and A3 are not liable under the

above offence as the provisions state that “Whoever prints or engraves any matter…..”

and thereby, only the editor and (or) the printers must be held liable for this offence if it

all it has been constituted.

The defence would also like to contend that there was no such sale or offering of

the allegedly defamatory matter by A1, A2 and A3 and the prosecution has failed to

establish the same. Arguendo, if such alleged sale or offering of defamatory matter did

happen, it could have been done by anyone other than A1, A2 or A3. Irrespective of it

being a sale or offering, it would come to light only when the prosecution frames charges

against the editor and all those involved in this process.

As far as the third ingredient is concerned, the Defence would like to humbly state

that the A1, A2 and A3, not only they have no knowledge or reasoning to believe that

such substance contains defamatory matter but have no knowledge as to who actually



published the said poster. It is now the duty of the prosecution to accuse and convict the

real wrongdoer.

3.4. Conclusion

On the basis of arguments advanced, the defence would like to contend that the said

accused persons A1, A2 and A3 have not committed any offence under section 501 and

502 in furtherance of common intention u/s 34 of BPC, 1860.



CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 120B OF

BARATA PENAL CODE, 1860.

4.1. Section 120A - Definition of Criminal Conspiracy-

When two or more persons agree to do,

1. An illegal act or

2. An act which is not illegal, by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a

criminal conspiracy.

The accused can be held guilty u/s 120 B if the prosecution proves that an

agreement to commit a criminal act existed.22 However no evidence of such an

agreement exists and the prosecution has not proved the same. There is no evidence to

prove that the accused persons A1, A2 and A3 had any kind of intention or ill will

towards the complainant PW5. Since neither A1nor A2 nor A3 had the motive or

the intention under Section 34 (IPC ) to commit an illegal act or a legal act through

22 Nalini Vs State; K.R. Purushottam Vs. State of Kerela 2005 Cr.L.J 4648 (S.C.)



illegal means, it cannot be inferred that a common intention was formed. Hence, A1,

A2 and A3 are not liable under Section 120B of BPC, 1860

4.1.1. That there was no agreement between A1, A2 and A3.

To establish the offense of conspiracy there must be cogent evidence of

agreement in the matter of commission of offence.23 Actus Contra Actum is

necessary to form a common intention. Hence mere knowledge24 association or

suspicion does not make an accused liable for conspiracy.25 The mere knowledge of

the circumstances that A1, A2 and A3 had difference of opinion with the complainant

PW4 does not make them liable for the offence of criminal conspiracy. Clear evidence of

an agreement between the said persons must be proved and the prosecution has failed to

prove the existence of such an agreement.

4.1.2. That there is no common intention among A1, A2 and A3

Common intention implies a prior criminal pre arranged plan26, that is, a

prior meeting of minds and participation of all members of the group in execution

of that plan27. For A1 and A2 to be liable u/s. 34, it must be shown that a

23 State of H.P. v. Kishanlal, 1987 Cr L J 709 (SC); State v. Navjot Sandhu, 2005 Cr L J 3950 (SC).

24 Nalini v. State of T. N. , 1999 Cr L J 3124 (SC);

25 Barindra Kr. Ghosh Vs. Emperor , 14 C.W.N 1114

26 Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1955 SC 216.; Subramani Vs. State of Tamil Nadu 2002 Cri.

L.J.4102 (S.C.)

27 Khacheru Singh v. State of U.P. (1982) 3 SCC 218; Baleshwar rai v. State of Bihar, 1964 CrLJ 564; Abrahim

Sheikh v. State of west Bengal AIR 1965 SC 1263;



criminal act was done by several persons, secondly that all of them intended that

the criminal act should be committed and lastly that the criminal act was done in

furtherance of a common intention.28

To constitute common intention it is necessary that the intention of each

person be known to all the others and be shared by them29. There is no conclusive

evidence that prove that the accused persons had any common intention to commit any

offence. Hence, it is submitted that the requisite common intention was not there among

the accused persons A1, A2 and A3.

5. The evidence produced by the prosecution is defective and deficient.

‘It is better to err in acquitting than convicting’ was the stand taken by the Supreme

Court while setting free Balbir Singh, asserting lack of incriminating evidence in the Indira

Gandhi assassination case of Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration).30 Thus the

presence of strong and cogent evidence against an accused is a necessity in the criminal court

rather than a luxury, as reiterated in a couple of precedents covering recent 2012 decision of

Dr. Mrs Nupur Talwar v. CBI, Delhi And Anr.31 There is likelihood of miscarriage of justice

28 Re Basappa AIR 1951 Mys 1,3; Shankarlal Kachrabhai & Ors v. State Of Gujarat, 1965 SCR (1) 287.

29 Hardev singh v. State of Punjab 1973 CrLR (SC) 93.

30 AIR 1988 SC 1883

31 AIR 2012 SC 1921



due to the lackadaisical attitude of the prosecution32 in levying criminal charges against the

two accused on weak and vague evidence.33

a. The prosecution lacks strong corroborative evidence and

has manipulated the charge sheet.

• With respect to Defamation u/s 501 and 502 of the BPC, 1860:

1. The prosecution has failed to establish whether the accused persons

committed the offence, in furtherance of their common intention u/s 34

as well as u/s 501 and 502 of BPC.

2. The prosecution has failed to establish the identity or the source of the

allegedly defamatory material

3. The editor, printer and publisher of the medium through which the

allegedly defamatory matter was published, have not been added as

accused in the case.

• With respect to Extortion u/s 385 of the BPC, 1860:

1. The prosecution has failed to establish the identity of the callers who

allegedly threatened the complainant.

2. The prosecution has failed to establish the link between the accused

persons and the callers.

32 Rajesh Talwar v. CBI & Ors,2 Mar 2012,TP Crl No. 45 OF 2012 SC;State of UP v. Kapil Deo & Anr,1991

SCR(3) 692

33 Gajanand & Ors v. State Of UP,AIR 1954 SC 695;Roy Fernandes v. State Of Goa & Ors., 1 February 2012,

Criminal Appeal No. 1108 OF 2002 (SC)



3. The prosecution has failed to establish whether the accused persons

had any intention to commit the offence of extortion.

4. The prosecution has failed to establish the whether there exists any

“delivery of property”, which is an essential ingredient of the section.

• With respect to Criminal Conspiracy u/s 120 (B) of the BPC, 1860

1. The prosecution has failed to establish that the offenses u/s 385, 501

and 502 have been committed by the accused persons, in furtherance of

their common intention u/s 34 of the BPC, 1860.

2. The prosecution has failed to prove the above mentioned charges and

in such a circumstance, the charge u/s 120 (B), fails due to lack of

evidence.

3. The prosecution has not established a reasonable chain of events that

conclusively and beyond doubt prove the guilt of the accused persons.

The defence counsels humbly submit that the prosecution has, despite such inconsistencies

and lack of evidence, charged the accused persons with the above mentioned offences only

due to a preconceived notion or a strong bias. The charge sheet has been manipulated to

include the accused persons, when there is absolutely no nexus between them and the chain

of events. The prosecution has thereby exposed its charge sheet as one that is frivolous and

lacking any conclusive evidence.

b. The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution is vague and

rooted in mere suspicion



The Apex Court has well established in its 2011 verdict of State through CBI v.

Mahender Singh Dahiya34 that in a criminal trial, ‘suspicion’, no matter however strong,

cannot and should not be permitted to take the place of proof. It was laid in Paramahamsa

Yadav35 that if prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence a clear link has to be

established and the chain has to be completed otherwise it would indeed be hazardous to

accept a part of the link as a complete one. By invoking Sukhram v. Maharashtra36 all the

established chain should be complete and there should be no gap in the chain of evidence.37

The circumstances should be conclusive and tend only to prove that the accused is guilty. 38

In the case at hand as proved earlier no solid evidence of circumstances exists to

prove the guilt of accused.39 Accused can be discharged when the prosecution case gives

rise only to mere suspicion & not to grave suspicion by invoking P. Vijayan v. State of

Kerala.40 With reference to Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab41 & above mentioned

authorities pertaining to delineation of cases that hinge on circumstantial evidence, it is

apposite that the weighed circumstances on diligent evaluation and appreciation makes it

evincible that, the circumstances on which the quintessence of the prosecution case lies on

is incapability of establishing the guilt of A1 and A2 and A3.

34AIR 2011 SC 1017

351987Cri.L.J

36(2007)7 SCC 502

37Amitava Banerjee @ Amit @ Bappa Banerjee v. State of West Bengal, 2011(107) AIC 203 (SC)

38Queen Empress v. Hoshhak 1941 ALJR 416; Narayan v. Rajasthan 2009 Cr.L.J 2248; Sukhram v.

Maharashtra (2007)7SCC 502; Purushothaman v. State of Kerala (2005)2 SCC 631; Sujoy Sen v. West

Bengal(2007 )6 SCC 32

39Ram Narayan Populiv.CBI (2003)3SCC 641 at Page 354

40(2010) AIR SCW 886

41 (2007) 13 SCC 90;Vide Munna Kumar Upadhyaya @ Munna Upadhyaya v. State of A.P., AIR 2012 SC 2470



c.The A1, A2 and A3 are entitled to the benefit of doubt

In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava42, emphasis has been laid if the evidence

adduced by the prosecution is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the

accused must be accepted. That apart, the circumstances relied upon must be established and

the cumulative effect of the established facts must lead to a singular hypothesis that the

accused is guilty.43 In the present scenario, the prosecution’s evidence including

circumstantial evidence relied upon is not free from the vice of inconsistencies. Wherefore,

the three accused are entitled to benefit of doubt.44 Wherefore it is submitted that A1, A2and 42 AIR 1992 SC 840

43 Partap v. State Of U.P.,1976 SCR(1) 757;Rishi Kesh Singh Ors. v. State, AIR 1970 All 51(FB);K. M. Nanavati

v. State Of Maharashtra, 1962 SCR Supl.(1) 567;Mustak Hussein v. State of Bombay,[1953] SCR 809;Smt.

Nagindra Bala Mitra v. Sunil Chandra Roy,[1960]3 SCR 1;Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, LR

(1935)AC 462;Attygalle v. Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 169;State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer, [1958] SCR

580;C. S. D. Swamy v. State, [1960]1 SCR 461

44 Mohar Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1981 SC 1578; Satya Narain v. State, 1985 Cri. LJ 966; Swaran

Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 1194



A3 are not liable under Sec. 385, 501, 502 read with section 32 and 120(B) for the

Defamation and Extortion of the complainant in furtherance of their common intention

through a criminal conspiracy, in the absence of requisite actus reus and men rea and due to

lack of clinching and cogent evidence



PRAYER FOR RELIEF

In the light of the facts stated, charges framed, evidence adduced,

arguments advanced and authorities cited, the first accused (Mr.Panna Boy) and the

second accused (Mr.Saba),third accused (Mr.Jaimil) the Defence herein, most

humbly prays before this Hon’ble Court of Sessions, Bambi thane to be graciously

pleased to declare:

1. That A1, A2 and A3 are not liable under sec 120B and read

with Sec.34 of the Bambi Penal Code,1860 for the Alleged

criminal conspiracy with a common intention on the

complainant Ms.Naika

2. That A1,A2 and A3 are not liable for defamation under sec

501,502 of BPC 1860

3. That A1,A2 and A3 are not liable for extortion under sec 385

of BPC 1860

And acquit the first, second and the third accused herein and pass any other

order in favour of the Defence that it may deem fit in the ends of equity, justice and

good conscience.

For this act of kindness, the Defence shall duty bound forever pray.

All of which is humbly submitted,

S/d……………………

(Counsels for Defence)



APPENDIX THE BARATA PENAL CODE, 1860

1. Sec 34 : Acts done by several persons in futherance of common intention.—

When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common

intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were

done by him alone.

2. Sec. 43. " Illegal"." Legally bound to do".—

The word" illegal" is applicable to everything which is an offence or which is prohibited by

law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action; and a person is said to be" legally bound to

do" whatever it is illegal in him to omit.

3. Sec. 120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.—

When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,-

(1) an illegal act, or

(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal

conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall

amountto a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or

more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Explanation.- It is immaterial whether

the illegal act is theultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.

Sec. 120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.----

(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death,

2[imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall,

where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be

punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.

(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an

offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for

a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.]

4. Sec 227. Violation of condition of remission of punishment.—

Whoever, having accepted any conditional remission of punishment, knowingly

violates any condition on which such remission was granted shall be punished with the

punishment to which he was originally sentenced, if he has already suffered no part of that



punishment, and if he has suffered any part of that punishment, then with so much of that

punishment as he has not already suffered.

5. Sec 383. Extortion.—

Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any

other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any

property, or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a

valuable security, commits" extortion". Illustrations

(a) A threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning Z unless Z gives him money. He thus

induces Z to give him money. A has committed extortion.

(b) A threatens Z that he will keep Z' s child in worngful confinement, unless Z will sign and

deliver to A a promissory note binding Z to pay certain monies to A to Z sings and delivers

the note. A has committed extortion.

(c) A threatens to send club- men to plough up Z' s field unless Z will sign and deliver to B a

bond binding Z under a penalty to deliver certain produce to B, and thereby induces Z to sign

and deliver the bond. A has committed extortion.

(d) A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly induces Z to sign or affix his seal to a

blank paper and deliver it to A. Z sings and delivers the paper to A. Here, as the paper so

signed may be converted into a valuable security A has committed extortion.

6. Sec 385. Putting person in fear of injury in order to commit extortion.—

Whoever, in order to the committing of extortion, puts any person in fear, or attempts to put

any person in fear, of any injury, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description

for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

7. Sec 499. Defamation.—

Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible

representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm,

or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such

person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.

Explanation 1.- It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if the

imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be hurtful to

the fellings of his family or other near relatives.



Explanation 2.- It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company

or an association or collection of persons as such.

Explanation 3.- An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed ironically, may

amount to defamation.

Explanation 4.- No imputation is said to harm a person' s reputation, unless that imputation

directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of

that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or

lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a

lothsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful.

Illustrations

(a) A says-" Z is an honest man; he never stole B' s watch", intending to cause it to be

believed

that Z did steal B' s watch. This is defamation, unless it fall within one of the exceptions.

(b) A is asked who stole B' s watch. A points to Z, intending to cause it to be believed that Z

stole B's watch. This is defamation, unless it fall within one of the exceptions.

(c) A draws a picture of Z running away with B' s watch, intending it to be believed that Z

stole B' s watch. This is defamation, unless it fall within one of the exceptions.

First Exception.- Imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published.- It

is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for the

public good that the imputation should be made or published. Whether or not it is for the

public good is a question of fact.

Second Exception.- Public conduct of public servants.- It is not defamation to express in

good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of

his public functions, or respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that

conduct, and no further.

Third Exception.- Conduct of any person touching any public question.- It is not defamation

to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of any person touching

any public question, and respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that


Illustration It is not defamation in A to express in good faith any opinion whatever resepting

Z' s conduct in petitioning Government on a public question, in signing a requisition for a

meeting on a public question, in presiding or attending at such meeting, in forming or joining

any society which invites the public support, in voting or canvassing for a particular



candidate for any situation in the efficient discharge of the duties of which the public is

interested.

Fourth Exception.- Publication of reports of proceedings of courts- It is not defamation to

publish a substantially true report of the proceedings of a Court of Justice, or of the result of

any such proceedings.

Explanation.- A Justice of the Peace or other officer holding an enquiry in open Court

preliminary to a trial in a Court of Justice, is a Court within the meaning of the above section.

Fifth Exception.- Merits of case decided in Court or conduct of witnesses and others

concerned. It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the

merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has been decided by a Court of Justice, or

respecting the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case, or

respecting the character of such person, as far as his character appears in that conduct, and no

further.

Illustrations (a) A says-" I think Z' s evidence on that trial is so contradictory that he must be

stupid or dishonest." A is within this exception if he says this in good faith, inasmuch as the

opinion which he expresses respects Z' s character as it appears in Z' s conduct as a witness,

and no farther.

(b) But if A says-" I do not believe what Z asserted at that trial because I know him to be a

man without veracity"; A is not within this exception, inasmuch as the opinion which

expresses of Z' s

character, is an opinion not founded on Z' s conduct as a witness.

Sixth Exception.- Merits of public performance.- It is not defamation to express in good faith

any opinion respecting the merits of any performance which its author has submitted to the

judgment of the public, or respecting the character of the author so far as his character

appears in such performance, and no farther.

Explanation.- A performance may be submitted to the judgment of the public expressly or by

acts on the part of the author which imply such submission to the judgment of the public.

Illustrations

(a) A person who publishes a book, submits that book to the judgment of the public.

(b) A person who makes a speech in public, submits that speech to the judgment of the

public.

(c) An actor or singer who appears on a public stage, submits his acting or singing to the

judgment of the public.



(d) A says of a book published by Z-" Z' s book is foolish; Z must be a weak man. Z' s book

is

indecent; Z must be a man of impure mind." A is within the exception, if he says this in good

faith, inasmuch as the opinion which he expresses of Z respects Z' s character only so far as it

appears in Z' s book, and no further.

(e) But if A says-" I am not surprised that Z' s book is foolish and indecent, for he is a weak

man

and a libertine." A is not within this exception, inasmuch as the opinion which he expresses

of Z' s character is an opinion not founded on Z' s book.

Seventh Exception.- Censure passed in good faith by person having lawful authority over

another.- It is not defamation in a person having over another any authority, either conferred

by law or arising out of a lawful contract made with that other, to pass in good faith any

censure on the conduct of that other in matters to which such lawful authority relates.

Illustration A Judge censuring in good faith the conduct of a witness, or of an officer of the

Court; a head of a department censuring in good faith those who are under his orders; a

parent censuring in good faith a child in the presence of other children; a schoolmaster,

whose authority is derived from a parent, censuring in good faith a pupil in the presence of

other pupils; a master censuring a servant in good faith for remissness in service; a banker

censuring in good faith the cashier of his bank for the conduct of such cashier as such

cashier- are within this exception.

Eighth Exception.- Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person.- It is not

defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have

lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject- matter of accusation.

Illustration: If A in good faith accuses Z before a Magistrate; if A in good faith complains of

the conduct of Z, a servant, to Z' s master; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a

child, to Z' s father- A is within this exception.

Ninth Exception.- Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other' s

interests.- It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided

that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person

making it, or of any other person, or for the public good.

8. Sec 501. Printing or engraving matter known to be defamatory.—



Whoever prints or engraves any matter, knowing or having good reason to believe that such

matter is defamatory of any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term

which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

9. Sec 502. Sale of printed or engraved substance containing defamatory matter.—

Whoever sells or offers for sale any printed or engraved substance containing defamatory

matter, knowing that it contains such matter, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for

a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

10. Sec 503. Criminal intimidation.—

Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the

person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm

to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to

omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the

execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.- A threat to injure the

reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this

section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from prosecuting a civil suit,

threatens to burn B' s house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.

11. Sec 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.—

Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment

of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If

threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc. If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.-

- and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any

property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or [imprisonment for life], of

with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a

woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may

extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.

THE EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

1. Sec 6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction.—



Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part

of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at

different times and places. tc "6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction.—Facts

which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same

transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different

times and places." Illustrations

(a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by A or B or

the by-standers at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction,

is a relevant fact.

(b) A is accused of waging war against the 1[Government of India] by taking part in an

armed insurrection in which property is destroyed, troops are attacked, and goals are broken

open. The occurrence of these facts is relevant, as forming part of the general transaction,

though A may not have been present at all of them.

(c) A sues B for a libel contained in a letter forming part of a correspondence. Letters

between the parties relating to the subject out of which the libel arose, and forming part of the

correspondence in which it is contained, are relevant facts, though they do not contain the

libel itself.

(d) The question is, whether certain goods ordered from B were delivered to A. The goods

were delivered to several intermediate persons successively. Each delivery is a relevant fact.

2. Sec.9: Facts necessary to explain or introduce relevant facts. —

Facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which support or

rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which establish the identity

of anything or person whose identity is relevant, or fix the time or place at which any fact in

issue or relevant fact happened, or which show the relation of parties by whom any such fact

was transacted, are relevant in so far as they are necessary for that purpose. Illustrations

(a) The question is, whether a given document is the Will of A. The state of A's property and of his family at the date of the alleged Will may be relevant facts.

(b) A sues B for a libel imputing disgraceful conduct to A; B affirms that the matter alleged to be libellous is true. The position and relations of the parties at the time when the libel was published may be relevant facts as introductory to the facts in issue. The particulars of a dispute between A and B about a matter unconnected with the alleged libel are irrelevant,



though the fact that there was a dispute may be relevant if it affected the relations between A and B.

(c) A is accused of a crime. The fact that, soon after the commission of the crime, A absconded from his house, is relevant, under section 8, as conduct subsequent to and affected by facts in issue. The fact that, at the time when he left home, he had sudden and urgent business at the place to which he went, is relevant, as tending to explain the fact that he left home suddenly. The details of the business on which he left are not relevant, except in so far as they are necessary to show that the business was sudden and urgent.

(d) A sues B for inducing C to break a contract of service made by him with A.C ., on leaving A's service, says to A— "I am leaving you because B has made me a better offer”. This statement is a relevant fact as explanatory of C's conduct, which is relevant as a fact in issue.

(e) A, accused of theft, is seen to give the stolen property to B, who is seen to give it to A's wife. B says, as he delivers it—" A says you are to hide this”. B's statement is relevant as explanatory of a fact which is part of the transaction.

(f) A is tried for a riot and is proved to have marched at the head of a mob. The cries of the mob are relevant as explanatory of the nature of the transaction.

APPENDIX

THE BARATA PENAL CODE, 1860

12. Sec 34 : Acts done by several persons in futherance of common intention.—

When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common

intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were

done by him alone.

13. Sec. 43. " Illegal"." Legally bound to do".—

The word" illegal" is applicable to everything which is an offence or which is prohibited by

law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action; and a person is said to be" legally bound to

do" whatever it is illegal in him to omit.

14. Sec. 120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.—

When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,-

(1) an illegal act, or

(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal



conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall

amountto a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or

more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Explanation.- It is immaterial whether

the illegal act is theultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.

Sec. 120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.----

(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death,

2[imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall,

where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be

punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.

(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an

offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for

a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.]

15. Sec 227. Violation of condition of remission of punishment.—

Whoever, having accepted any conditional remission of punishment, knowingly

violates any condition on which such remission was granted shall be punished with the

punishment to which he was originally sentenced, if he has already suffered no part of that

punishment, and if he has suffered any part of that punishment, then with so much of that

punishment as he has not already suffered.

16. Sec 383. Extortion.—

Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any

other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any

property, or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a

valuable security, commits" extortion". Illustrations

(a) A threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning Z unless Z gives him money. He thus

induces Z to give him money. A has committed extortion.

(b) A threatens Z that he will keep Z' s child in worngful confinement, unless Z will sign and

deliver to A a promissory note binding Z to pay certain monies to A to Z sings and delivers

the note. A has committed extortion.

(c) A threatens to send club- men to plough up Z' s field unless Z will sign and deliver to B a

bond binding Z under a penalty to deliver certain produce to B, and thereby induces Z to sign

and deliver the bond. A has committed extortion.



(d) A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly induces Z to sign or affix his seal to a

blank paper and deliver it to A. Z sings and delivers the paper to A. Here, as the paper so

signed may be converted into a valuable security A has committed extortion.

17. Sec 385. Putting person in fear of injury in order to commit extortion.—

Whoever, in order to the committing of extortion, puts any person in fear, or attempts to put

any person in fear, of any injury, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description

for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

18. Sec 499. Defamation.—

Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible

representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm,

or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such

person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.

Explanation 1.- It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if the

imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be hurtful to

the fellings of his family or other near relatives.

Explanation 2.- It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company

or an association or collection of persons as such.

Explanation 3.- An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed ironically, may

amount to defamation.

Explanation 4.- No imputation is said to harm a person' s reputation, unless that imputation

directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of

that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or

lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a

lothsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful.

Illustrations

(a) A says-" Z is an honest man; he never stole B' s watch", intending to cause it to be

believed

that Z did steal B' s watch. This is defamation, unless it fall within one of the exceptions.

(b) A is asked who stole B' s watch. A points to Z, intending to cause it to be believed that Z

stole B's watch. This is defamation, unless it fall within one of the exceptions.

(c) A draws a picture of Z running away with B' s watch, intending it to be believed that Z

stole B' s watch. This is defamation, unless it fall within one of the exceptions.



First Exception.- Imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published.- It

is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for the

public good that the imputation should be made or published. Whether or not it is for the

public good is a question of fact.

Second Exception.- Public conduct of public servants.- It is not defamation to express in

good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of

his public functions, or respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that


Third Exception.- Conduct of any person touching any public question.- It is not defamation

to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of any person touching

any public question, and respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that


Illustration It is not defamation in A to express in good faith any opinion whatever resepting

Z' s conduct in petitioning Government on a public question, in signing a requisition for a

meeting on a public question, in presiding or attending at such meeting, in forming or joining

any society which invites the public support, in voting or canvassing for a particular

candidate for any situation in the efficient discharge of the duties of which the public is

interested.

Fourth Exception.- Publication of reports of proceedings of courts- It is not defamation to

publish a substantially true report of the proceedings of a Court of Justice, or of the result of

any such proceedings.

Explanation.- A Justice of the Peace or other officer holding an enquiry in open Court

preliminary to a trial in a Court of Justice, is a Court within the meaning of the above section.

Fifth Exception.- Merits of case decided in Court or conduct of witnesses and others

concerned. It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the

merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has been decided by a Court of Justice, or

respecting the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case, or

respecting the character of such person, as far as his character appears in that conduct, and no

further.

Illustrations (a) A says-" I think Z' s evidence on that trial is so contradictory that he must be

stupid or dishonest." A is within this exception if he says this in good faith, inasmuch as the

opinion which he expresses respects Z' s character as it appears in Z' s conduct as a witness,

and no farther.



(b) But if A says-" I do not believe what Z asserted at that trial because I know him to be a

man without veracity"; A is not within this exception, inasmuch as the opinion which

expresses of Z' s

character, is an opinion not founded on Z' s conduct as a witness.

Sixth Exception.- Merits of public performance.- It is not defamation to express in good faith

any opinion respecting the merits of any performance which its author has submitted to the

judgment of the public, or respecting the character of the author so far as his character

appears in such performance, and no farther.

Explanation.- A performance may be submitted to the judgment of the public expressly or by

acts on the part of the author which imply such submission to the judgment of the public.

Illustrations

(a) A person who publishes a book, submits that book to the judgment of the public.

(b) A person who makes a speech in public, submits that speech to the judgment of the

public.

(c) An actor or singer who appears on a public stage, submits his acting or singing to the

judgment of the public.

(d) A says of a book published by Z-" Z' s book is foolish; Z must be a weak man. Z' s book

is

indecent; Z must be a man of impure mind." A is within the exception, if he says this in good

faith, inasmuch as the opinion which he expresses of Z respects Z' s character only so far as it

appears in Z' s book, and no further.

(e) But if A says-" I am not surprised that Z' s book is foolish and indecent, for he is a weak

man

and a libertine." A is not within this exception, inasmuch as the opinion which he expresses

of Z' s character is an opinion not founded on Z' s book.

Seventh Exception.- Censure passed in good faith by person having lawful authority over

another.- It is not defamation in a person having over another any authority, either conferred

by law or arising out of a lawful contract made with that other, to pass in good faith any

censure on the conduct of that other in matters to which such lawful authority relates.

Illustration A Judge censuring in good faith the conduct of a witness, or of an officer of the

Court; a head of a department censuring in good faith those who are under his orders; a

parent censuring in good faith a child in the presence of other children; a schoolmaster,

whose authority is derived from a parent, censuring in good faith a pupil in the presence of

other pupils; a master censuring a servant in good faith for remissness in service; a banker



censuring in good faith the cashier of his bank for the conduct of such cashier as such

cashier- are within this exception.

Eighth Exception.- Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person.- It is not

defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have

lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject- matter of accusation.

Illustration: If A in good faith accuses Z before a Magistrate; if A in good faith complains of

the conduct of Z, a servant, to Z' s master; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a

child, to Z' s father- A is within this exception.

Ninth Exception.- Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other' s

interests.- It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided

that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person

making it, or of any other person, or for the public good.

19. Sec 501. Printing or engraving matter known to be defamatory.—

Whoever prints or engraves any matter, knowing or having good reason to believe that such

matter is defamatory of any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term

which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

20. Sec 502. Sale of printed or engraved substance containing defamatory matter.—

Whoever sells or offers for sale any printed or engraved substance containing defamatory

matter, knowing that it contains such matter, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for

a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

21. Sec 503. Criminal intimidation.—

Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the

person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm

to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to

omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the

execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.- A threat to injure the

reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this

section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from prosecuting a civil suit,

threatens to burn B' s house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.



22. Sec 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.—

Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment

of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If

threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc. If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.-

- and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any

property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or [imprisonment for life], of

with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a

woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may

extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.

THE EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

2. Sec 6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction.—

Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part

of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at

different times and places. tc "6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction.—Facts

which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same

transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different

times and places." Illustrations

(a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by A or B or

the by-standers at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction,

is a relevant fact.

(b) A is accused of waging war against the 1[Government of India] by taking part in an

armed insurrection in which property is destroyed, troops are attacked, and goals are broken

open. The occurrence of these facts is relevant, as forming part of the general transaction,

though A may not have been present at all of them.

(c) A sues B for a libel contained in a letter forming part of a correspondence. Letters

between the parties relating to the subject out of which the libel arose, and forming part of the

correspondence in which it is contained, are relevant facts, though they do not contain the

libel itself.

(d) The question is, whether certain goods ordered from B were delivered to A. The goods

were delivered to several intermediate persons successively. Each delivery is a relevant fact.



2. Sec.9: Facts necessary to explain or introduce relevant facts. —

Facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which support or

rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which establish the identity

of anything or person whose identity is relevant, or fix the time or place at which any fact in

issue or relevant fact happened, or which show the relation of parties by whom any such fact

was transacted, are relevant in so far as they are necessary for that purpose. Illustrations

(a) The question is, whether a given document is the Will of A. The state of A's property and of his family at the date of the alleged Will may be relevant facts.

(b) A sues B for a libel imputing disgraceful conduct to A; B affirms that the matter alleged to be libellous is true. The position and relations of the parties at the time when the libel was published may be relevant facts as introductory to the facts in issue. The particulars of a dispute between A and B about a matter unconnected with the alleged libel are irrelevant, though the fact that there was a dispute may be relevant if it affected the relations between A and B.

(c) A is accused of a crime. The fact that, soon after the commission of the crime, A absconded from his house, is relevant, under section 8, as conduct subsequent to and affected by facts in issue. The fact that, at the time when he left home, he had sudden and urgent business at the place to which he went, is relevant, as tending to explain the fact that he left home suddenly. The details of the business on which he left are not relevant, except in so far as they are necessary to show that the business was sudden and urgent.

(d) A sues B for inducing C to break a contract of service made by him with A.C ., on leaving A's service, says to A— "I am leaving you because B has made me a better offer”. This statement is a relevant fact as explanatory of C's conduct, which is relevant as a fact in issue.

(e) A, accused of theft, is seen to give the stolen property to B, who is seen to give it to A's wife. B says, as he delivers it—" A says you are to hide this”. B's statement is relevant as explanatory of a fact which is part of the transaction.

(f) A is tried for a riot and is proved to have marched at the head of a mob. The cries of the mob are relevant as explanatory of the nature of the transaction.

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