sustainability and dispute prevention in the oil industry

7/30/2019 Sustainability and Dispute Prevention in the Oil Industry

1/27

Balancing the Oil Equation with Proactive Dispute Prevention in Petroleum Industries1

and Broader Sustainable Development Initiatives2

Adam R. Tanielian3

20124

[email protected]

Abstract: Civil engineers are involved in most stages of major facilities planning,6

construction, operations, maintenance, improvement, and demolition. Those engineers have7

direct influence on company systems, which in turn shape broader society. Sustainability,8

environmental and social responsibility are generalized, explicitly-stated goals of9

corporations, communities, and professional organizations like the American Society of Civil10

Engineers. The oil industry plays a key role in reaching or failing to achieve those goals.11

Safety and health violations at petroleum companies have frequently led to accidents causing12

environmental damage and death. Improperly analyzed and managed risks at oil companies13

have often been partial causes of incidents which gave rise to disputes. Dollar values of14settlements in petroleum industry disputes are high and growing, threatening jobs, companies15

and economies. Engineers have opportunities both at and beyond companies to create and16

support modern, expansive, and enhanced safety and dispute avoidance systems. This article17

examines current and future oil markets, risk analysis, safety and health issues, oil industry18

legal disputes, and theories of sustainability. Increased awareness and communication on19

accident and dispute avoidance, and sustainability programs are proposed. Engineers are20

encouraged to develop teamwork and communication skills that are second to none.21

Keywords: Oil, Sustainability, Environmental Law, Occupational Health and Safety,22

Engineering Risk Analysis23

Introduction24

Engineers design and build roads and what travels on them, but they do not directly25

control what kind of vehicles consumers prefer. Civil engineers assist in city planning, public26

works projects, and essential infrastructure but they do not fund the development.27

Engineering professionals do what they are paid to do, which in many cases abrogates most28

control and certain responsibilities. However, being some of the most highly educated and29

technically adept professionals, engineers have influence that extends beyond their daily30

duties on the job. Their attitudes and visions shape parts of our cultures and societies.31

Recently we have heard and read a lot about global warming, climate change and32

sustainability. Sustainability can be somewhat of a vague buzzword used to market green33

products and appeal to the public mind, but it is also a serious development goal with a34

specific definition. ASCE (2012) defined sustainability as:35

A set of environmental, economic, and social conditions in which all of society has36

the capacity and opportunity to maintain and improve its quality of life indefinitely without37

degrading the quantity, quality or availability of natural, economic, and social resources.38


2/27

Creating a sustainable society is an epic and monumental undertaking that requires the39

coincidental cooperation of billions of people. Some people think sustainability is impossible,40

although more accurately what skeptics acknowledge is the low probability of achieving41

sustainability within certain financial, economic, political and organizational parameters. In42

spite of the doubt and pessimism about the sustainability challenge, leaders around the world43

have embraced the charge of providing security for the future.44

Research on sustainability has taken many forms and comes in many styles.45

Engineers, businesspeople, environmentalists, politicians and interest groups have posited46

numerous op-ed and peer-reviewed articles. Corporations frequently issue sustainability47

reports alongside financial statements. However, as economies and consumption grow there48

are an increasing number of obstacles to achieving sustainability. In order to understand the49

intricacies problems that stall and prevent sustainability from taking hold, a narrower scope is50

needed to examine topics in detail.51

This article will examine only one fraction of the energy sector: oil. Consumption of52

non-renewable resources leads to unavoidable depletion and degradation of quantity and53

availability, but other parts of larger-order sustainability are affected by the petroleum54

industry and there are things oil professionals can do to improve odds of achieving other55

sustainability goals. The oil market is analyzed in several parts. Forecasts of future market56

activity, peak oil and other theories are reviewed. Global consumer dependence on oil is57

proposed to be a contributory cause in excessive risk taking at oil companies, which has58

resulted in tragic loss of life and severe environmental damage, giving rise to disputes.59

Various instances of fatality and environmental damage show that risk analysis and60

management at oil companies has been insufficient and ineffective. Failure to manage risk is61

associated with poor dispute avoidance.62

A three-tiered system of sustainability is outlined as a potential path toward63

achieving global goals. High-volume consumers need to reduce; medium-level and growing64

consumers need to tailor their consumption to support sustainability, and lower-volume65

consumers not likely grow their consumption need to sustain their basic needs. Voluntary66

action and ideal practices at modern companies are praised. Conclusions suggest that 21 st67

century engineers have a greater potential and responsibility to shape the future at their68

companies and in their communities than those in previous generations. Engineers are thus69

expected to communicate in higher quantity and quality, taking on more leadership roles.70

The Oil Market71

Measurements and estimates of annual historical world oil supply and demand vary72

slightly between sources. For example, world oil demand for the year 2010 was estimated by73

OPEC (2011) at 86.8 million barrels per day (mb/d), by IEA (2012) at 88.1 mb/d, and by74

USEIA (2012) at 87.0 mb/d. Supply for the same year was quoted at 86.4 mb/d by OPEC75

(2011), 87.3 mb/d by IEA (2012), and 86.75 mb/d by USEIA (2012). Small margins of error76

may be of little consequence presently but they do show variations in mathematical and77


3/27

reporting methodologies. Diversity of scientific reasoning and methodology is found78

throughout the oil market.79

Future Supply and Demand80

Similar to historical measures, forecasts of oil supplies and demand through 2050 and81beyond vary depending on underlying methodological and theoretical paradigm. The82

prevailing theory leads to projections of peak oil and eventually to resource exhaustion83

(Roberts et al 2010). while contending theories are oft-used in attempts to discredit peak and84

exhaustion models.85

OPEC (2012) estimated a 1.6 billion person rise in population by 2035 to nearly 8.686

billion, of which only 110 million were expected in OECD nations. Depending on a range of87

factors such as economic growth, marginal costs of production, public policies, transportation88

infrastructure and demographics, OPEC forecasted demand to grow to between 102 mb/d and89

119 mb/d by the year 2035, at which time non-OECD demand is expected to reach 90% of90

OECD demand. Whereas demand will likely fall by a few mb/d in OECD nations, developing91

countries are expected to be responsible for demand growth (OPEC 2011; Finley 2012;92

Mitchell, Marcel & Mitchell 2012); 80% of that in developing Asia, 90% of Asian growth in93

the transportation sector.94

BP manager Mark Finley (2012) forecasted a rise in demand to over 102 mb/d by the95

year 2030. This growth projection was based upon an estimated world population rise of 1.496

billion and a 100% rise in income over 20 years. Finley estimated world reserves at the 201097

level to have been 1.38 trillion barrels (bbl), which was sufficient for 46 years at the 3098

billion bbl per year (bb/y) level of consumption. Rhodes (2008) found an estimated 1.299

trillion bbl of recoverable oil could last 2048, but that it will not be possible to produce 30100

bb/y up to the bitter end, thus prolonging the life of oil supplies after shortage. World101

demand surpassed 30bb/y not later than 2010 (OPEC 2011; IEA 2012; EIA 2012) and still102

grows, thus the lifespan of supplies is shortening, however the straight line model is unlikely103

and we may see 31bb/y again on the fall after a peak.104

Peak Oil105

IEA (2012) found peak oil can mean different things to different people. Some106

people believe peak oil is a leveling-off of demand while others think it is the maximum107

possible annual rate of extraction of conventional crude oil. In the mid-1950s, a Shell108

geophysicist, Hubbert, developed the basic model for peak oil theory (Rhodes 2008; Jaffe,109

Medlock & Soligo 2011). Hubbert predicted the early-1970s peak of US oil production by110

extrapolating a bell curve, which is still used as a model for world oil production. Common111

economic sense tells us that harvesting of a finite natural resource cannot continue infinitely.112

As production grows, the resource is depleted at an increasing rate, and after some113

critical point in time there will be insufficient fixed resources to support constant or114

increasing labor. As sites are exhausted, competition for existing and new sites increases, but115

beyond some threshold, if supplies are not renewed, then the number of production facilities116


4/27

must be reduced, leading to reduction in total output. Most statisticians are comfortable with117

the idea that the bell curve is probably not perfect, but rather it is skewed one way or the118

other with the maximum not at median. Instead, due to technological and economic factors,119

in the case of peak-and-decline well probably see a steeper or milder descent than what was120

seen in the ascent. Nobody knows exactly how it will go, which is why the standard bell121

curve, although overly simplistic, is not rejected. Also not unlikely is a scenario wherein we122

experience multiple peaks or local maxima, with new rises in production following123

technological breakthroughs.124

Total (2009) alluded to the law of diminishing returns, saying the specter of peak oil125

[is] looming as more and more existing oilfields reach maturity and accessible exploration126

targets become increasingly scarce. Numerous studies attempt to predict the maximum of127

the bell curvethe tipping point where increasing demand can no longer be met by128

increasing supply. Rhodes (2008) cited a 2010-2015 estimate made by Shells CEO. Hubbert129

and Advanced Hubbert methods put peak at between 2005 and 2013. Eight of twelve sources130cited in a study sponsored by the US Department of Energy (Hirsch, Bezdek & Wendling131

2005) predicted world oil production to peak between 2006 and 2016. British Geological132

Survey (2012) statistics suggest that crude oil production may have peaked or is in the133

plateau period of a peak. Studies also suggest that OECD demand has peaked, in part due to a134

2004 peak in US road travel (Finley 2012; OPEC 2012; Mitchell, Marcel & Mitchell 2012).135

Biotic or Abiotic Origins?136

The dominant theory is that oil has biotic origins, coming from millennia-old plant137

and animal remains, and thus supplies are not replenished. However, some people believe oil138is the product of geochemical, abiotic processes, and as such that it is constantly being139

formed within the earth. Mendeleev, the Russian chemist who developed the Period Table of140

Elements thought petroleum came from a reaction of water and metal carbides deep141

underground. Indeed, French scientist Bertholet produced hydrocarbon oil by reacting acids142

on steel. Britains Sir Robert Robinson also theorized that petroleum could not have come143

from plants and animals because its hydrogen to carbon ratio was too high. The apparent144

presence of hydrocarbons on the Saturnian moon of Titan, where life is not thought to exist145

due to the extremely low temperatures, further gives hope to the abiotic theory (Rhodes146

2008).147

Recovery Rate148

Whether or not the biotic origin theory is a flawed due to Western thinking is149

irrelevant in determining the future of oil if recovery rates cannot be increased to match and150

exceed demands. If oil reserves are renewed from earthen processes not contemplated by151

mainstream science, the scenario does not change if technologies cannot get the oil out of the152

ground.153

Total (2009) found global average recovery was 32%. Some crude wells only yield154

5% of the oil they contain while for others 20% can be expected through primary recovery155methods, which rely upon the natural pressure in the well to drive the oil to the surface156


5/27

(Rhodes 2008; Veld & Phillips 2010). Water or gas is injected into the well to increase157

pressure during secondary recovery methods, which yields another 10-20%. The US158

Department of Energy (2012) found that between 20% and 40% of the original oil in place159

can be recovered through primary and secondary phases. Tertiary or enhanced recovery160

methods could yield another 20% or more, bringing total extracted to around 60%.161

According to Rhodes (2008), almost no one is in much doubt that conventional oil162

reserves are finite, meaning the era of cheap oil is long gone. However, oil production may163

not face an untimely plateau and decline if existing supplies can be economically extracted.164

Discrediting peak oil theory and sustaining supplies through the 21 st century relies upon165

development of extraction technologies. The lingering question is whether or not our166

economic paradigm can support expansive research and development projects sufficient to167

make breakthroughs leading to sustained production.168

Conventional & Non-Conventional Supplies169

A decline in conventional crude oil production does not necessarily mean a shortage170

or reduction in supply of petroleum on the market. There are other sources of hydrocarbons171

that are most frequently not factored into peak oil theories. Due to discrepancies in172

methodology and analysis, some information about oil supplies may be misinterpreted, or173

misleading to misinformed commentators. Some Cornucopians believe hydrocarbon174

supplies are infinite (ibid) while other researchers attempt to discredit peak oil theory on the175

basis of its incomplete assessment of all petroleum sources (Mitchell, Marcel & Mitchell176

2012). The future status of oil will rely upon those other, unconventional supplies. OPEC177

(2011) forecasted that 75% of supply growth through 2035 will come from non-conventional178sources.179

British Geological Survey (2012) estimated world crude petroleum production for the180

year 2010 at just over 3.9 billion metric tons. Using a global average of 7.27 bbl of181

conventional crude oil per metric ton (USEIA 2012), total crude production in 2010 sat182

around 77.7 mb/d, or about 89% of demand. Total (2009) reported a 5% annual decline in183

global production from conventional sites. According to the IEA, crude oil production in184

2011 was around 70 mb/d, a decline of 10% from the 2010 EIA levels. Remaining supplies185

came from unconventional sources like Canadas Athabasca tar sands and other bitumen186

fields worldwide.187

High quality light oil supplies are dwindling worldwide, leaving oil companies with188

the more energy-intensive task of pumping heavy oil (ibid; Facing Up to End 2011). Saudi189

Arabia has started moving some of its operations from conventional harvesting operations to190

heavy oil wells (Facing Up 2011), although this may be due in part to high profitability in191

the volatile oil market. As we look into the future, conventional oil only accounts for 33% of192

yet-to-find resources, while unconventional sources nearly match at 29%, followed by 15%193

for Arctic, 13% for deep water and 10% for heavy oil (Mitchell, Marcel & Mitchell 2012).194

Oil companies are in the first stages of researching and investing multiple non-195conventional sources such as oil shale in the USA, which some geologists believe may196


6/27


7/27

when Germany was cut-off from oil supplies. South Africa started using the indirect method237

during decades of embargoes, and has recently been successful in supplying large parts of its238

transportation fuel with coal. However, coal liquefaction is a water-intensive process which239

produces significantly more CO2 than crude oil refining (ibid). Coal liquefaction at global240

commercial levels would not only cut into limited coal supplies, but it would also require vast241

new infrastructure, which current economic constraints would not likely permit. Using coal242

for fuel would probably also amount to an about-face on other environmental policies and243

commitments.244

Nonetheless, the oil clock is ticking.245

Risks, Safety and Accidents246

There is no real alternative ready for market entry. Lag time between infrastructure247

development and full deployment of an alternative or major supplementary system is a248

minimum 10 years. Oil companies have thus exploited their extremely powerful positions249

accidentally or intentionally. In the new millennium, oil is an all-around risky business250

leading us toward a very uncertain future, but it is absolutely necessary. Therefore, it is251

imperative that engineers effectively judge and manage risks so they can be consciously252

understood and ultimately reduced.253

Risk Assessment254

Risk management is an essential part of engineering. As societal demands for more255

sustainable developments increase, governments implement stricter occupational health and256

safety standards, environmental responsibility becomes more obligatory and a new257engineering discipline is emerging in the field of risk analysis. A decision maker carrying out258

a feasibility analysis for an engineering project weighs economic, social and environmental259

factors, carefully considering potential harms and threats to personnel involved in260

constructing and operating a facility, to the general public including users of the facility, and261

to the environment (Faber 2007).262

Hands-on human error is often considered the cause of failure or accident at263

engineering facilities, but absent in many incident analyses is the influence of error in design,264

construction, use or maintenance. Due to numerous cases of structural and managerial265

blunders, Faber & Stewart (2003) recommended more standardized methods of risk analysis266

and further development of specialized courses in university engineering programs that focus267

solely on risks. Universities train future engineers, having a first-say in what will or should be268

the status quo in the profession.269

A main obstacle to more widely-accepted models of risk is the underlying270

mathematical theory. Engineers in the Faber & Stewart study were suspicious of risk analysis271

methodology, stating that it is too mathematical or required too small a window of272

acceptable risk. Probability can sometimes be in parity with the physical sciences that273

engineers prefer, but there is also a gamble involved in the numbers. When probability and274


8/27

statistics are interwoven with political and social scientific aspects of demographics and275

societal concerns, the mix is a softer science, which is less than thrilling for many engineers.276

Risk of Death277

The notion of acceptable risk may seem to encompass an element of the arbitrary to278the strict naturalist. For example, there is clear mathematical methodology leading to the UK279

Health and Safety Executives (UKHSE 2001) determination that a tolerable risk of death280

for individuals at work is 1 in 1,000 per annum, and that 1 in 1 million is broadly281

acceptable, but there is subjectivity in the language. We could refute the claims on the basis282

of sampling method. These politicized types of applications of mathematics have not been283

universally accepted as scientific due to their requirement that users adopt base assumptions,284

some of which are flimsy under criticism.285

Using the 1 in 1,000 one-size-fits-all acceptable risk model we could hold that BP286

(2012), a company with more than 83,000 employees, could lose 83 workers per year and still287

be considered tolerable. Likewise, Shell (2012) could lose 90 of its 90,000 employees each288

year and still be tolerated. This approach may fail to consider legal intolerance, however,289

considering that every work-related death leads to lawsuit. Where governments prosecute,290

fine and sanction companies for accidents, in democratic nations this amounts to public291

intolerance.292

What exactly is an acceptable death risk may be impossible to determine with293

numbers. Tolerable risk of death likely changes over time as society changes, and in the oil294

industry it is probably correlated to other environmental, political, and economic risks.295

Tolerance for catastrophic incidents involves emotion, which is unpredictable.296

Notwithstanding the valid philosophical argument against certain methods of risk analysis, it297

is a necessary chore at companies and until a time when more standardized methods are298

developed and broadly accepted, government and academically-endorsed theories provide299

some support.300

Faber & Stewart (2003) cited the safety targets for societal risks in the Netherlands,301

which held the acceptable rate of a single fatality in one year was 10 -5 while the acceptable302

frequency of 100 or more fatalities per year was 10-9. A straight line with a downward slope303

connected the two, suggesting that the greater the impact, the less acceptable an incident is.304

Those figures model closely to the probability of death due to non-voluntary activity aboard a305

ship, in a factory, at sea, etc., 1.4x10 -5 per year (Vrijling, van Hengel & Houben 1998).306

Commonsense analysis tells us that every legitimate worker-taxpayer expects fully that (s)he307

will not die at work, and that among x number of workers it is doubtful that so much as one308

will find a death among them at a rate of one per year tolerable. But, because zero risk is309

unavoidable, the point where no further improvements are needed is thought to be the one in310

a million gold standard used by the US Food and Drug Administration (Hunter & Fewtrell311

2001).312

Aside from the probabilities of harm, risks may also be perceived as acceptable if:313


9/27

(1)politicians say they are acceptable,314(2)the general public says they are acceptable,315(3)public health professionals say they are acceptable.316A sizeable vocal segment of the general public alongside some of the brightest health317

and science professionals in the world have effectively stigmatized what is widely considered318

excessive risk undertaken by oil companies. A few key politicians have endorsed the entirety319

of the oil industry as safe and responsible, although some commentators (e.g. Bill Maher)320

might call those the wrong politicians. Increasing public concern regarding accidents and321

frequent court involvement demonstrate strong dissent to pro-industry rhetoric. According to322

many experts, certain public officials and media outlets, although not unanimous, risks like323

those leading up to the Deepwater Horizon incident and others which caused more fatalities324

are not acceptable.325

Risks are less likely of being accepted if they are:326

(1)not voluntarily undertaken (including work),327(2)the cause of future, unavoidable harm such as disease, or perhaps catastrophic328

consequences from economic or environmental irresponsibility,329

(3)threats to future generations, pregnant women, infants or children,330(4)the cause of damage attributable to known causes or persons,331(5)the subject of contradiction among experts, and other controversy.332

Risk of Oil Spills333

Risks associated with petroleum engineering and related civil engineering334developments frequently have characteristics mentioned by Hunter & Fewtrell. Contradictory335

information and mixed political messages put the oil industry in the middle of a genuine feud336

between interests. Oil companies are some of the usual suspects in major health and safety337

violations. Spills and contamination threaten livelihoods of future generations, like global338

warming which is thought largely attributable to the common gasoline engine. Deepwater339

Horizon alone cost nearby Gulf residents nearly $23 billion in lost tourism revenues (Pew340

2010). Failures and negligence involved in many disastrous incidents are wide-reaching,341

stemming from entrenched risky and careless business ideology.342

The number of barrels in an oil spill of acceptable size is another crap shoot for343

statisticians. Depending on the time-sensitive mood swings of a local population, a tolerance344

range may be zero plus anywhere from 50 to 100 or more bbl. Those public opinions are not345

static and as time goes on, with the variety and type of media exposure pollution cases are346

receiving, tolerance is not growing but the outspoken public does not always have immediate347

direct power to change circumstances either, so there is balance and equity for good business.348

Unfortunately, the oil business can too easily seem crude in more than one way with349

just the right kind of attention. Consider Anadarko for example. If viewed with a suspicious350

eye, Anadarkos involvement in both the Guatemalan Oil Debacle (2000) and Deepwater351

Horizon (BP 2011) appears the result of intolerable risk-taking. Some communities reject any352


10/27

notion of oil development based upon the mere possibility of accidents (Wills 2000; A Test353

of Russian Environmental Laws 2003). Risk of accident and environmental damage are354

primary reasons why there has been a virtual moratorium on building new refineries in the355

US since the 1970s.356

Deepwater Horizon changed the way we think about oil spill incident totals. BSEE357

(2012) reported only 2 crude oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico in the year 2010, plus 2358

synthetic fluids spills and 1 chemical spill for a total of 5 spills, the lowest number of spills in359

the region since 2007 and before that since 1999, but one of those 2010 spills was the largest360

in US history. Due to new exotic threats, many stakeholders in the oil industry have zero361

tolerance for error and failure is simply not a luxury even the wealthiest executives can362

afford. The consensus view seems to be that more concern for self, coworkers, company,363

society and environment is necessary, which can easily start with better engineers.364

Trends in Fatal Accidents365

International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP 2010) reported on major366

accidents spanning nearly 4 decades in the industries. Major accidents included those367

leading to multiple fatalities, severe property damage, and spills of 1,000 bbl or more.368

Between 1970 and 2007, there were 553 major offshore accidents in which 2171369

people died. 71.6% of accidents and 79% of fatalities occurred prior to 1991. 78 incidents370

resulting in 208 deaths took place between 2000 and 2007. Dramatic falls in incidents and371

fatalities following the 1980s indicates improved safety measures, enhanced compliance and372

inspection regimes, and overall improvements in on-the-job competence.373

Jackets were the most common units involved, constituting the largest number of fatal374

offshore incidents (202) and the second largest number of fatalities (509). Helicopter375

accidents resulted in the second largest number of fatal incidents (113) and the largest376

number of fatalities (646). 344 incidents, or 62.2% of the total, were in US Gulf of Mexico377

(GoM). Europes North Sea followed with 574 fatalities from 88 accidents, and then Asia +378

Australia with 443 fatalities from 41 accidents. GoM accidents yielded less loss of life per379

incident than other regions but still had the highest total number of fatalities (611).380

According to Burgherr and Hirschberg (2008), between 1969 and 2000 in OECD381

countries there were 3,713 fatalities in 165 oil industry accidents, each of which resulted in 5382

or more fatalities. During the same period in non-OECD nations, 232 such accidents occurred383

resulting in 16,494 deaths. Between 1970 and 2008, OECD fatalities were 3,383 and non-384

OECD 19,376. Based upon the physical data, they concluded that accident risks are higher in385

non-OECD than in OECD nations, which concerns companies that have major operations386

outside of OECD. We can also deduce that significant improvements were made between387

2000 and 2008, and that as a general trend, oil work has become safer while at the same time388

production rose, increasing exponentially safety per unit produced.389

Trends in Spills & Pollution390


11/27

Big tanker spills may be a thing of the past. Although it was not in the top-20 largest391

tanker spills between 1970s and 2007 reported by OGP (2010),Exxon Valdez firmly392

imprinted in minds images of oil-soaked wildlife and calamitous environmental impact.393

Exxon Valdez represented a major turning-point in public reaction to oil spills. If people were394

not outraged at the 11 million gallons (262,000 bbl) spilled into Prince William Sound, they395

probably were about Captain Hazlewoods drunkenness at the time of the shipwreck. The396

jury in the case heard testimony that Exxon knew Hazlewood was an alcoholic, and that he397

drank with Exxon officials and was known to drink anywhere he could smuggle a flask,398

including aboard Exxon tankers. Exxon management knew Hazlewood was in relapse and399

should have known he was a safety risk, but instead of shoring Hazlewood, Exxon allowed400

him to pilot the ship after consuming so much alcohol that a non-alcoholic would have401

passed out an estimated blood alcohol content of .241 at the time of the accident (Exxon v.402

Baker2008).Exxon Valdez was a milestone in safety management which helps explain why403

at-sea tanker spills in the mid-1990s to present have been less frequent than in-port spills, and404

why all spill rates have declined over time (Anderson, Mayes & LaBelle 2012).405

Offshore facilities need more attention nowadays. OGP found that between 1970 and406

2007, there were 498 offshore blowouts, 273 of which were in the US GoM. Of those407

blowouts worldwide, 128 resulted in pollution, 63 of which were in the US GoM. Blowouts408

resulting in pollution as a percent of total blowouts in the GoM were slightly lower than409

ratios worldwide, but GoM had more small and medium sized spills per blowout than410

worldwide averages. In Europe, 132 blowouts caused 6 spills2 large, 2 small and 2 of411

unknown size.412

Average offshore spill size in GoM was nearly 11,000 bbl among 16 major incidents413

between 1970 and 2007. Only 1 major event yielding 2,240 bbl was reported between 2000414

and 2007, whereas 8 were reported between 1970 and 1976, which accounted for over 75%415

of the total barrels spilt. Aside from hurricane-related spills, prior to Deepwater Horizon, it416

seemed the GoM offshore oil facilities discontinued the reckless ways of the 1970s and 80s,417

but questions arose again after April 20, 2010 and the following 87 days when nearly 5418

million bbl were spewed into the Gulf (Pew 2010).419

Ramseur (2012) found that annual volume and number of oil spills impacting US420

waters declined by 90% or more between 1973 and 2009. According to Ramseur, with the421

exception of 2005, when roughly 10 million gallons (238,000 bbl) were spilled, since the422

1990s the total volume spilled annually was not much greater than 2.5 million gallons423

(60,000 bbl) in any year. However, Etkin (2004) from the EPA calculated totals differently,424

stating in 2004 that average annual spilling was 8 million gallons (190,500 bbl) in waters425

under EPA jurisdiction. These higher totals include internal waters and spills such as that426

involving 800,000 gallons (19,000 bbl) in the Kalamazoo River in Michigan.427

Ramseur (2012) found annual number of spill incidents has been below 500 since the428

mid-90s, down from 1,000-1,500 in the mid-80s and more than 2,000 incidents occurred in429

1974. Reduction in spills from tankers and barges are the number one reason volume430

decreased following the 80s, followed by reduction in pipeline incidents and spills from431


12/27

facilities. Ramseur found a major contributing factor to the enormous reduction was the 1990432

Oil Pollution Act which expanded liability under the Clean Water Act and added new433

responsibilities for companies to prevent and respond to spills.434

In contrast to the US statistics, between 1997 and 2007, OGP (2012) reported a total435

of 16,049 bbl spilled in the UK in 161 offshore incidents. In Norway, 104 incidents occurred436

between 1997 and 2007, spilling 41,507 bbl. Before the Deepwater Horizon incident, spill437

rates in the US had decreased more than ten-fold, and per unit production by 2007 stood at438

less than the rates in Norway and the UK (ibid; Eschenbach et al 2010; British Geological439

Survey 2012). Anderson, Mayes & LaBelle (2012) found Deepwater Horizon represented440

90% of oil spilled in major incidents between 1964 and 2010. Modern technologies were441

insufficient to mitigate modern risks of deepwater drilling. In order to continue improvement442

and avoid such disasters, better work ethic is needed among executives and engineers.443

Notable Cases against Oil Companies444

Personal, social and environmental harms such as those at the center of cases briefed445

in this section place burdens upon all professionals, whose ethical obligations compel them to446

take steps to eliminate such accidents, negligence, tragedy and horror. ASCE Code of Ethics447

Fundamental Canon One refers to this concern for the greater good:448

Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public and449

shall strive to comply with the principles of sustainable development in the performance of450

their duties.451

Uhlmann (2011) reported that while deliberate violations or misleading conduct are452frequently found in environmental cases, most environmental crimes do not involve453

demonstrable harm to the environment or economic impact. Deepwater Horizon was clearly454

not the average case. Environmental claims were brought under the Clean Water Act, Oil455

Pollution Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act. BP was fined a record $4.5bn by the456

government. Claims were settled with victims of the spill for $7.8bn and BP created a $20bn457

Gulf of Mexico compensation fund (BP gets record fine 2012; BPs Guilty Plea458

Agreement 2012).459

Well site leaders Robert Kaluza and Donald Vidrine were indicted on 23 counts,460

eleven under 18 U.S.C. 1112involuntary manslaughterand eleven under 1115461

Seamans Manslaughter. The final count was for violations of the Clean Water Act 33462

U.S.C. 1319 and 1321 (US v. Kaluza & Vidrine 2012). Vice President of BP Exploration463

GoM, David Rainey, was indicted on violations of 18 U.S.C. 1001 false statementsand464

1505obstruction of Congress (US v. Rainey 2012).465

In the week before the blast, University System of Georgia Chancellor Erroll Davis Jr.466

quit BPs board of directors (Fain 2010). In that same week, an engineer called Macondo a467

nightmare well. Others called it the well from hell. Records at Deepwater Horizon468

showed the blowout preventer and other equipment had not been fully inspected since 2000.469

A BP maintenance audit in September 2009 found that the rig needed 3,500 hours of470


13/27

maintenance work. A survey of rig workers found that problems went unreported due to fear471

of retaliation (Uhlmann 2011). Clearly, there were breakdowns in management, engineering472

and maintenance that continued for years.473

Deepwater Horizon exploded less than 13 months after the Court in Texas approved474

of a plea deal for BP to settle with the Occupational Health and Safety Administration475

(OSHA) over felony violation of the Clean Air Act after an explosion at the Texas City476

refinery killed 15 people. BP accepted a record-high $50 million dollar fine and 3 years477

probation. Over 4,000 civil cases were settled with victims for $1.6bn. Circumstances leading478

up to the Texas City explosion were similar to those at Deepwater in that supervisors and479

operators failed to make proper inspections to ensure compliance with safety protocols. In480

Texas City, the federal investigations board report concluded that factors contributing to481

failure included: corporate hierarchy and culture, budget cuts, aging facilities and equipment,482

improper process safety management, reduction in maintenance spending over a decade,483

insufficient and undertrained staff (US v. BP 2009).484

A former contractor supervisor at BPs Atlantis facility sought to enjoin BP from485

drilling for and producing oil and gas until the company complied with relevant486

environmental and safety regulations.Abbott v. BP (2011) was hailed as a whistleblower case487

wherein Abbott claimed BP obtained permits only by lying to government agencies (BP488

Whistle-Blower 2012). Considering the conditions of the Texas City and Deepwater489

Horizon sites, it is not improbable that BP was noncompliant with safety and environmental490

regulations at Atlantis. Unscrupulous managers and engineers somehow operated without491

opposition at BP prior to disasters, leaving questions as to how many may still be employed.492

Death and Contamination493

Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling (2002) involved an explosion aboard a drilling barge494

located in GoM that killed 4 crew members and injured 2 others. Mallard argued that the rig495

was not a workplace under the 1970 Occupational Health and Safety Act and sought to496

challenge OSHAs jurisdiction. US Supreme Court found the rig was a workplace under497

the Act. The case represented an insult to injury for workers, four of whom died while on the498

job only to have their former employer contend that they were not in the workplace.499

US v. Apex Oil (2009) showed a similar arrogance among corporate advocates.500

Apexs corporate predecessor contaminated groundwater in Hartford, Illinois with millions of501

gallons of oil. A hydrocarbon plume emitted fumes to the surface and into homes in the502

nearby community. The corporate predecessor was ordered to clean up the site and shortly503

thereafter filed for bankruptcy. Apex argued that US bankruptcy law precluded Apexs504

responsibilities, but the court found the challenge ha[d] no possible merit.505

Five million dollars in punitive damages were awarded by a California trial court in a506

case involving subterranean oil contamination. Questions of law were considered by the507

Court of Appeals (CoA) inHoldgrafer v. Unocal (2008), wherein punitive damages were508

vacated. CoA held that mention of prior oil spills in trial were improper as part of evaluation509of Unocals reprehensibility because inclusion of the dissimilar conduct induced the jury to510


14/27

punish Unocal for unrelated incidents. This judgment follows general principles that a party511

should not be held liable for the same offense twice, and that indirect liability is not proper512

application of justice in environmental cases.513

Depending on the jurisdiction, companies may be held accountable for injury long514

after they argue statutes of limitations expire if a gestation period precedes demonstrable515

harm or injury. In Griffin v. Unocal (2008), wrongful death claims for exposure to516

carcinogenic chemicals were not found to be barred by statute of limitations based upon the517

date of last exposure, but rather that harm or death must be suffered before a statute of518

limitations starts. David Griffin was employed at a Unocal facility in Tuscaloosa, AL519

between 1973 and 1993, during which time he was exposed to benzene and other chemicals.520

David died on February 17, 2004 from myelogenous leukemia. On February 16, 2006,521

Davids wife Brenda filed a wrongful-death action based upon the theory that his illness and522

death were caused by exposure at the factory. Unocal argued that the statute of limitations523

expired before Davids death, considering that the date of last exposure was in 1993. Relying524upon dissent from Cline v. Ashland(2007), wherein Alabama Justice Harwood stated a525

cause of action accrues only when there has occurred a manifest, present injury, the526

Supreme Court of Alabama changed the law and awarded Griffin damages. This could mean527

a tolling of statutes of limitations for cases of exposure by contamination.528

Recent OSHA claims resulted in multimillion dollar fines, but penalties were not529

always so severe.McLaughlin v. Union Oil (1989) arose out of a 1984 refinery explosion in530

Illinois that killed 17. OSHA fines were levied by the district court at their maximum amount:531

$31,000. The defendant appealed and fines were actually reduced, to roughly two-thirds of532

the maximum fine. Cases like this give a glimpse into the poorly-regulated history of533

petroleum in the USAtimes that led up to the present. Although significant changes made534

penalties potentially higher, as seen in the Deepwater Horizon case, overall the government535

has shown that it will not solve problems alone. Health, safety and corporate social536

responsibility need to come from within organizations, and that will require better leadership537

from within the ranks of technical experts like site engineers.538

Climate Change539

Progress has been made toward handling greenhouse gases (GHG) issues and air540

pollution from motor vehicles. US Supreme Court heardMassachusetts v. EPA (2007), which541both showed the system of checks and balances in action and confirmed the potential harms542

of global warming. In a 5:4 decision, GHGs were found to be covered by the Clean Air Acts543

definition of pollution and that the EPA is required to determine whether or not emissions544

from new motor vehicles may endanger the public health or welfare (EPA 2012).545

Following the ruling, EPA found GHGs may reasonably be anticipated to endanger546

public health or welfare. EPA issued new emissions standards for cars and light trucks, and547

new permit requirements for stationary sources of GHGs. However, due to the magnitude of548

the task in the short-term, EPA issued Timing and Tailoring Rules which required only the549

largest stationary sources obtain permits. Twelve states, several cities and industry groups550


15/27

challenged the Timing and Tailoring Rules. The Supreme Court heard the case in Coalition551

for Responsible Regulation v. EPA (2012) in which the Court held petitioners had no standing552

to challenge the rules. In any event, the Court reported, State Petitioners fail to cite any553

record evidence to suggest that they are adversely affected by global climate change. Hence,554

there is still disagreement about climate change.555

American courts shall not make decisions on the use of various forms of energy based556

upon their value or potential damage to the environment or society. The doctrine of political557

question requires one or both of the other two branches of government to regulate GHGs and558

energies. InNative Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil et al (2009), an Eskimo village charged559

24 oil, energy and utility companies with nuisance and claimed damages for defendants560

collective CO2 and GHG emissions which were blamed for global warming. The Court561

dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, citing the political question doctrine.562

Politics and environmental science are often strange bedfellows. Activists and563

environmentalists would often prefer the least political branch of government to pass564

judgment on policy issues, but the law mandates the judiciary not usurp powers of the565

legislative and executive. By being good scientists, progressive engineers and planners can566

help motivate local and state governments on the daily level to adopt more innovative means567

of curbing emissions and behaving in a more environmentally-responsible fashion.568

Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)569

Doe v. Unocal (2002) involved a pipeline project in Myanmar. Myanmar Oil,570

Thailands state Petroleum Authority, and Total SA partnered to build the transnational571

pipeline. Unocal and its wholly-owned subsidiary Union Oil acquired 28% from Total.572

Unocal was found to have had knowledge that the Myanmar military was providing security573

and other services for the project. During construction, the military forced civilians into labor574

under threat of torture and death. Villagers were murdered, raped and tortured by the military.575

Unocal was charged by Burmese plaintiffs who experienced severe human rights abuses576

perpetrated by the military during construction of the pipeline. The case was brought under577

the ATCA28 U.S.C. 1350which confers upon the American federal district courts578

original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation o f579

the law of nations.580

The District Court dismissed the case, but the Ninth Circuit conducted a de novo581

review, first questioning the nature of the law of nations. Torture, murder and slavery were582

recognized as jus cogens violations and offenses against the law of nations. Forced labor was583

considered a modern variant of slavery. Murder, rape and torture were alleged and thus584

state action was not required to give rise to individual liability under ATCA. The remaining585

question was whether or not a corporation could be held liable for a breach of the law of586

nations. After careful review, the CoA reversed in part the Districts decision and held587

Unocal liable under ATCA for aiding and abetting the military in claims regarding forced588

labor, murder and rape, but CoA affirmed the Districts judgment on claims of torture.589


16/27

Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman (2005) affirmed use of ATCA against590

corporations in a case involving the Canadian Talisman Energys complicity to genocide in591

Sudan. The Second Circuit, however, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell (2010) disagreed and,592

citing the Nurnberg Trial (US v. Goering 1946), held that the principle of individual593

liability for violations of international law has been limited to natural persons not juridical594

persons such as corporations. US Second Circuit continued, customary international law595

has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate liability for international crimes, echoing596

judge Sprizzos opinion inKhulumani, et al. v. Barclays (2007) wherein he found neither597

Nurnberg nor the Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia were binding sources of international598

law, and refused application of ATCA for aiding and abetting.599

Questions remain regarding the unanimity with which American courts agree that600

ATCA can apply to corporations, and worldwide whether corporations can be held601

accountable to individuals under international law. Chambers (2005) expects more corporate602

liability under international law, asDoe v. Unocal and Presbyterian Church v. Talisman603indicate is already starting to take hold. TheMox Plant(Ireland v. UK2001) and Southern604

Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan 1999) cases previously showed605

public interest in environmental cases involving nations under treaty.606

We have seen a growing trend among nations toward accepting environmental pacts,607

treaties and moreover, non-binding accords. Human rights laws are moving toward608

considering environmental integrity as part of rights to life and safety as outlined in the609

Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and recognized in 1966 Covenant on Civil and610

Political Rights. The time is probably not too far into the future when we see environmental611

security as part of international customary law. Bearing that in mind, international612

accountability for environmental and social damage could be very costly for corporations.613

Engineers should recognize such risks and take sufficient steps to mitigate associated harms.614

Sustainability615

Although fines and penalties may accompany violations of environmental, health and616

safety laws, the law alone is an ineffective means of protecting the environment and ensuring617

sustainability for the future. For decades, authors have not infrequently scolded the US618

government for its purportedly pollution-friendly legislation and conservative-led relaxation619

of environmental regulations (Dunkiel & Kripke 1998; Energy Policy Meltdown 2005;620Bardi 2008). Complexities inherent to litigating claims against multinational corporations,621

such as in theExxon Valdez case, have been the source of criticism of both governments and622

courts (Jenkins & Kastner 2000).623

Public protest and outrage at environmental damage done by oil companies has been624

consistent. Local residents often view exploitation of natural resources and related logistics625

projects as intrusive and offensive to traditional culture (e.g. Guatemalan Oil Debacle626

2000; A Test of Russian Environmental Laws 2003). Impacts to the once-pristine627

landscape of South and Central America, for example, have at worst been dubbed ecocide628

(Rochlin 2011). Lawyers, politicians, activists and villagers alike have denounced the evils629


17/27

of multinational oil companies and collectively as David vow to defeat their crude-soaked630

Goliath. Goliath more than once scoffed at its foe and appeared the sore-loser, the cheapskate631

and the bully (e.g. Pollution Fight 2011), yet still not down for the count.632

Some oil industry pundits blame economics for failures to support, enact and enforce633

stricter environmental laws (Bardi 2008). However, there has long been evidence suggesting634

that vast potential and opportunity exist in eco-friendly industries, and only a fraction of a635

percent of layoffs in the US are due exclusively to tighter environmental regulations (Knight636

2000). According to consumer analysts, up to a third of American consumers may prefer637

green products (They Care About the World 2003). These Lifestyles of Health and638

Sustainability (LOHAS) consumers could represent enormous economic opportunity for639

green companies. On the other hand, LOHAS could just be a buzzword like green that640

people say is appealing, while their behavior suggests quite the opposite.641

Stafford (2003) cited a then-recent J.D. Power and Associates survey which found642

30% of potential new car buyers in the US would definitely consider buying a gasoline-643

electric hybrid. Another 30% reported they would strongly consider buying a hybrid.644

Obviously, the actual number of hybrids sold after 2003 shows that attitude and behavior are645

often remarkably different. Leonard-Barton (1981) likewise cited American opinion polls646

from the 1970s, in which the majority were for a simpler existence and against increased647

consumption. In businesses too, quantitative and behavioral data are often remarkably648

different from mission and vision statements on the environment and sustainability.649

The UKs Defra (as quoted by Pepper 2007) said,650

The goal of sustainable development is to enable all people throughout the world to651

satisfy their basic needs and enjoy a better quality of life, without compromising the quality652

of life of future generations.653

As part of a globalized outlook, the UKs Institution of Civil Engineers strategic aims654

include integration of sustainable development into everyday work, building capacity for655

sustainable development in the civil engineering profession, creating and influencing policy656

demanding more socially and environmentally responsible behavior. Worldwide, the three-657

tiered structure of our economy suggests diversified methods for achieving sustainability will658

work best. Higher-volume consumers need to reduce consumption. Middle-level consumers659

in emerging markets will need to consume wisely. The poorest segments will need to sustain660

their basic needs.661

Voluntary Reduction of Consumption in Developed Countries662

Reduction of energy consumption is something of a cinch in some OECD countries,663

and easier said than done in others. In small countries and those with high population664

densities like Belgium, the Netherlands and Japan, living and working in the same city is a665

reality. But in the United States, Australia and Canada, the daily commute is virtually666

impossible to avoid. Public transportation across town in places like Detroit and Los Angeles667

is phenomenally unpopular, and thus not economically feasible. Culture is the biggest668


18/27

obstacle to reduction of gasoline and diesel consumption there. Infrastructure limits the extent669

to which ethanol, hydrogen and electric vehicles can compete with conventional automobiles,670

but market forces ultimately limit the success of reduction goals.671

Governments can implement new emissions standards, but in free societies,672

governments cannot fully control the buying habits of consumers. Rates of technological673

advancement have yet to provide real, long-term solutions to transportation problems. In674

order to realize the expected decrease in consumption among OECD nations by 2035,675

voluntary reductions are needed in addition to tighter regulations and incentives for auto676

manufacturers to improve fuel economy. Oil companies should diversify investments and put677

more into alternative fuels where they can make-up for downsizing of OECD oil markets.678

Full sustainability requires new infrastructure, more localized production and679

essentially a redevelopment of national economies, which is beyond the powers of any680

government branch or agency, multinational corporation, concerned community and it is681

certainly greater than any individual. Real improvement requires the independent and682

integrated efforts of civilizations from the ground-up. From simple acts like recycling and683

riding a bicycle, to installing solar power units on houses and apartment buildings or farming684

on urban rooftops (Urban Farming 2012), to the furthest extents of self-sufficiency 685

generating fuel from solid waste, making clothes and furniture, owning an autonomous house686

(Chen et al 2009), etc.sustainability can be created incrementally, but it requires voluntary687

independent effort.688

Leonard-Barton (1981) found values at the core of voluntary simplicity included689

material simplicity, self-determination, ecological awareness, human-scaled thinking, and690personal growth. Those values are still very much at the heart of sustainability movements.691

Institutions and social networks enhance and strengthen the reductionist movement with692

increased volume and quality of communication, education and access to information. But at693

the end of the day after the theories are laid out and disseminated, individuals and694

organizations need to invest time and financial resources to take action directly.695

Hybrid fleets are realistic options for companies like UPS (2012), which estimated696

35% fuel economy savings with 380 hybrid electric delivery trucks. Port Metro Vancouver697

saved nearly 1,500 liters of fuel in 2011 by using hybrid vehicles in its corporate fleet698

(Canadas Green 30 2012). Smaller-scale opportunities to improve macro-energy699consumption are also abundant in no-brainers like replacing incandescent light bulbs with700

screw-in fluorescents, reducing use of heating and cooling units, re-insulating homes and701

offices, replacing old windows, stocking the office break room with durable silverware and702

dishes instead of disposable ones, two-sided printing, using electronic documents and tablet703

readers instead of paper, emailing instead of snail-mailing, video-conferencing instead of704

flying or driving to meet with clients or business associates, etc.705

Governments cannot mandate use of technologies to cut resource consumptionthese706

things need to be done voluntarilyand some businesses are taking the opportunity to lead707

the community toward sustainability. In Canada, BC Biomedical Laboratories cut down on708


19/27

fuel consumption by encouraging the telecommute, and in 2012, more than 15% of their709

administrative staff worked from home. Cisco Corporation Toronto reduced business travel710

by 40% between 2010 and 2012. TD Bank Toronto piloted a video-conferencing program in711

2011 that saved over 800,000km of travel (ibid).712

Sustainable New Development & Re-Development713

Corporate initiatives are part of growing trends toward embracing new technologies in714

new property development and renovation of older facilities. In Asia and non-OECD nations715

where growth is expected to be greatest in the 21st century, architects, engineers and716

construction companies have an opportunity to create sustainable communities. In the717

developed world, similar opportunities are abundant in rebuilding broken down cities like718

Baltimore, and in the average renovation job.719

In Freiburg, Germany (2012), All the major urban development decisions are subject720

to the overriding principle that traffic must be prevented.Although the Freiburg Green721

City model might be slightly more ambitious than some communities can support in the722

short-term, the zero-carbon city vision is what every city planner should aspire to create.723

Freiburg is a center for innovation and economic growth in alternative energies. A niche724

market was born and expanded there in one of the worlds model cities, where an attractive725

variety of public transport provides citizens options to gasoline dependence. In Freiburg726

(2011), community action is integrated with sustainable living and civic duty. In 2003, the727

Garden & Civil Engineering Office launched Freiburg Participates, a program where728

citizens work on city ecology projects. Participation increases a sense of ownership and729

stakeholder value in local works. Whether developing for the first time or redeveloping730outdated, inefficient structures, the engineers true colors are all shades of green.731

Britain (2008) said it is time to design and build for the environment and732

sustainability with zero carbon homes, low-carbon communities, improved urban drainage733

systems, life-cycle assessments, site waste management plans, rainwater harvesting and more.734

In new construction, voluntary initiative is supplemented by national policy in the UK735

(2007), where all new homes and schools from 2016 forward and commercial buildings from736

2019 shall be zero carbon. New buildings must have renewable energy on site. All new737

buildings and extensions are required to contain a minimum of 10% recycled material by738

value. Minimum water efficiency, energy consumption and emissions standards are legally739binding and set to help Britain achieve international goals.740

Feats of engineering such as the self-sufficient sky scraper (Burj Al-Taqa 2008;741

Chen et al 2009) highlight the potential of the modern age, when materials and design can742

enable enormous structures to provide natural lighting and ventilation, waste management743

and water treatment. The rationale for ASCE Policy Statement 360 on the Impacts of Climate744

Change should sufficiently motivate civil engineers to promote sustainable and745

environmentally-responsible building.746

Civil engineers are responsible for design and maintenance of infrastructure747projects that facilitate economic development and protect human health, welfare and the748


20/27

environment. Climate change may result in significant impacts to this infrastructure. Civil749

engineers and government policy makers must work together to anticipate and plan for these750

impacts. ASCE, its members, leaders, and resources are ready to develop and implement751

prudent policies as part of their mission to serve the public good.752

Sufficiency Economies in the Third and Developing World753

King Bhumibol of Thailand is the reigning champion of the sufficiency economy754

cause in the developing and third world. Since 1973, the King has talked about moral and755

cultural aspects of moderation, especially in the farming sector. Self-sufficiency at a national756

level is a complicated objective that some would argue is impossible, but at the micro-level,757

the Thai King advises farmers to feed themselves and their families first, later selling758

surpluses which result from good harvests and improved cultivation. Farmers are encouraged759

to plant a variety of crops and develop small fish ponds so they can reduce dependency on760

barter and trade.761

The New Theory is a spinoff of old farmers commonsense worldwide. Storage of762

rainwater and community cooperation are essential. Under the new theory about 5 acres763

of land is divided into four parts of ratio 30:30:30:10. 30% supports ponds holding rainwater764

for the dry season and fish stocks for protein. The Thai military has assisted pond digging in765

impoverished villages. 30% of the land is used to grow rice, the quintessential staple of the766

East Asian diet. Cash crops are growth on another 30%, and the remaining 10% is used for a767

home, paths, livestock pens, etc. (Thai PRD 2012).768

Although land-use and tax policies in Thailand do not resemble those in some nations,769

the poorest areas of the world likely support the communal farm structure of basic770

civilization. For segments of the world population like the nearly 2.5 billion people living on771

$2 per day or less (World Bank 2012), who are unconcerned about economic growth and772

lavish lifestyles, Thailands sufficiency-economy approach may be preferable. Military and773

government engineers have incredible opportunities to develop sustainable rural communities774

worldwide.775

Conclusion776

Poor engineering and management increases risks, threatening health, safety, social777

harmony, profits and ultimately the life of a business. Such tragic accidents and devastating778

harms as those mentioned in this article are simply unacceptable under six-sigma or ISO779

regimes. Anderson (2004) found causes of accidents included inadequately trained personnel,780

reduced supervision, cost-cutting, transfer of engineers offsite, poor maintenance priorities,781

failures to replace equipment, poor control over contractors, insufficient and misguided risk782

analysis. Technical guidance in management is urgently needed, and engineers have high783

potential to make positive impacts. Broader corporate social responsibility programs focusing784

on sustainability and community inclusion can help improve company image, performance785

and leadership.786


21/27

Intra-organizational solutions lie in applying a more uniform and competent work787

ethic. A redesigned approach is necessary. Refurbished and new cultures of safety and788

concern need to permeate various divisions and units of organizations. Active engagement789

across and between facilities is needed, directed at assuring and maintaining absolute quality790

and safety, beyond merely passing government inspections or earning a certification. A791

whole-company approach stressing equality, inclusion and diversity will support broader792

improvements. After some time and success under new regimes, business strengths should be793

translated into social messaging campaigns wherein oil energy companies can honestly depict794

themselves as leaders in the cause of future sustainability.795

The bottom line is not that safety and sustainable methods cost more money, but796

rather they require more personal time and concern, and a longer-term orientation. Engineers797

have both hands-on and theoretical knowledge of industrial systems which many times798

exceeds the knowledge capacity of executive management. Accounting and finance799

departments at corporations should easily understand risks associated with failure and800disaster, in the present or future tense, can be far more costly than a few man hours from801

maintenance or some new machines. Surely, recent failures and incidents showed the lower802

quality of historical technologies, many of which have already improved and others that will803

improve with time, thus reducing incidents. But other factors in myriad failures included804

communication and teamwork skills engineers famously lack (Roman 2001; Missingham805

2006; Thilmany 2009; Hoschette 2010).806

Training and supervision for maintenance personnel and operators on site is essential807

for compliance and improvement, but so is communication training and practice for808

engineering corps. Outdated theories of infinite growth also need to be replaced with more809

realistic thinking. Lifelong learning will not fail to support continuous improvement.810

Engineers are competent in math and sciences, which increases their analytical power, but811

they need to communicate abstract concepts internally and externally in a way that is easy for812

laypeople to understand. Engineers who are top performers in technical disciplines can do813

great things for companies, but those same engineers, if also highly skilled in literary and814

linguistic arts, can do greater things for the world.815

List of Statutes816

18 U.S.C. 1001 - Statements or Entries Generally.817

18 U.S.C. 1112Manslaughter.818

18 U.S.C. 1505 - Obstruction of Proceedings Before Departments, Agencies, and819

Committees.820

1789 Alien Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. 1350.821

1970 Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.822

1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act. 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.823


22/27

1972 Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.824

1990 Oil Pollution Act. 33 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.825

List of Cases826

Abbott v. BP Exploration and Production. 2011. United States District Court, S.D. Texas,827

Houston Division. 781 F.Supp.2d 453. Civil Action No. H-09-1193.828

Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling. 2002. United States Supreme Court. 534 US 235. No. 00-927.829

Cline v. Ashand. 2007. Supreme Court of Alabama.970 So.2d 755. No. 1041076.830

Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc., et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency. 2012.831

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. No. 09-1322.832

Doe v. Unocal Corporation. 2002. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. 395 F.3d833

932. Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628, 00-57195.834

Exxon Shipping v. Grant Baker. 2008. Supreme Court of United States. 128 S.Ct. 2605. No.835

07-219.836

Griffin v. Unocal Corporation. 2008. Supreme Court of Alabama. 990 So.2d 291. No.837

1061214.838

Holdgrafer v. Unocal Corporation. 2008. Court of Appeal of California, Second District,839

Division Six. 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 216 (2008), 160 Cal.App.4th 907. No. B175953.840

Ireland v. United Kingdom (MOX Plant Case). 2001. International Tribunal for the Law of841

the Sea Case No. 10.842

Khulumani et al. v. Barclay National Bank. 2007. United States Court of Appeals, Second843

Circuit. 504 F.3d 254, 260. Docket Nos. 05-2141-cv, 05-2326-cv.844

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell. 2010. United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. 621 F.3d845

111. Docket Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv.846

Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency. 2007. Supreme Court of United States.847

127 S.Ct. 1438. No. 05-1120.848

McLaughlin v. Union Oil. 1989. United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. 869 F.2d849

1039. Nos. 88-1374, 88-1832.850

Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation. 2009. United States District Court,851

N.D. California, Oakland Division. 663 F.Supp.2d 863. Case No. C 08-1138 SBA.852

New Zealand v. Japan & Australia v. Japan (Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases). 1999.853

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Case Nos. 3 & 4.854


23/27

Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy. 2005. United States District Court, S.D.855

New York. 374 F.Supp.2d 331. No. 01 Civ.9882(DLC).856

United States of America v. Apex Oil Company. 2009. United States Court of Appeals,857

Seventh Circuit. 579 F.3d 734. No. 08-3433.858

United States of America v. BP Products North America. 2009. United States District Court,859

S.D. Texas, Houston Division. 610 F.Supp.2d 655. Criminal No. H-07-434.860

United States of America v. David Rainey. 2012. United States District Court, Eastern District861

of Louisiana. Accessible at http://www.justice.gov862

United States of America v. Goering. 1946. 6 F. R. D. 69. International Military Tribunal.863

United States of America v. Robert Kaluza and Donald Vidrine. 2012. United States District864

Court, Eastern District of Louisiana. Criminal No. 12-265. Accessible at865

http://www.justice.gov866

References867

ASCE. 2012. Policy Statement 360 Impact of Climate Change. Accessible at868

http://www.asce.org869

ASCE. 1914-2009. Code of Ethics. Accessible at http://www.asce.org870

Anadarko Petroleum Corporation. 2001. Anadarko Divests Guatemala Operations.871

Accessible at http://www.anadarko.com872

Anderson, C., Mayes, M., and LaBelle, R. 2012. Update of Occurrence Rates for Offshore873

Oil Spills. US Department of Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management & Bureau of874

Safety and Environmental Enforcement, Herndon, VA, USA. Accessible at875

http://www.boem.gov876

Anderson, M. 2004. Behavioural Safety and Major Accident Hazards: Magic Bullet or Shot877

in the Dark? UK HSE. Accessible at http://www.hse.gov.uk878

Balouga, J. 2012. Unconventional Oils: The 21stCentury Rescuer? International879

Association for Energy Economics 4th Quarter Review: 27-31.880

Bardi, J. 2008. The Issue at Hand. The Humanist September October 2008: 3.881

BBC. 2012. BP Gets Record US Criminal Fine Over Deepwater Disaster. Accessible at882

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news883

BP. 2011. BP Announces Settlement with Anadarko Petroleum Company of Claims Related884

to Deepwater Horizon Incident. Accessible at http://www.bp.com885

BP. 2012. BP at a Glance. Accessible at http://www.bp.com886


24/27

British Geological Survey. 2012. World Mineral Production 2006-2010. Keyworth,887

Nottingham.888

BSEE. 2012. Incident Statistics and Summaries 1996-2012 ytd. Accessible at889

http://www.bsee.gov890

Burgherr, P., and Hirschberg, S. 2008. Severe Accidents in the Oil Chain with Emphasis on891

Oil Spills. Strategic Insights 7. Accessible at http://hdl.handle.net/10945/11128892

Calkins, L., and Fisk, M. 2012. BP Whistle-Blower Says Gulf Atlantis Facility Remains893

Unsafe. Bloomberg. Accessible at http://www.bloomberg.com894

Casselman, B. 2011. Facing Up to End of Easy Oil. Wall Street Journal. Accessible at895

http://www.online.wsj.com896

Chambers, R. 2005. The Unocal Settlement: Implications for the Developing Law on897

Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses. Human Rights Brief 13. Available at898

http://www.wcl.american.edu899

Chen, S., Chu, C., Cheng, M., and Lin, C. 2009. The Autonomous House: A Bio-Hydrogen900

Based Energy Self-Sufficient Approach. International Journal of Environmental Research901

and Public Health 6. Accessible at doi:10.3390/ijerph6041515902

Cortese, A. 2003. They Care About the World (and They Shop, Too). The New York903

Times July 20. Accessible at http://www.nytimes.com904

Dunkiel, B., and Kripke, G. 1998. Taxing the Environment: Corporate Tax Breaks to905Promote Environmental Destruction. Multinational Monitor 19: 9.906

EIA. 2012. World Petroleum Facts. Excel tables accessible at http://www.eia.doe.gov907

EPA. 2012. U.S. Court of Appeals - D.C. Circuit Upholds EPA's Actions to Reduce908

Greenhouse Gases under the Clean Air Act. Accessible at http://www.epa.gov909

Eschenbach, T., Harper, W., Anderson, C., and Prentki, R. 2010. Estimating Oil Spill910

Occurrence Rates: A Case Study for Outer Continental Shelf Areas of Gulf of Mexico.911

Journal of Environmental Statistics 1: 1-19. Accessible at http://www.jenvstat.org912

Faber, M., and Stewart, M. 2003. Risk Assessment for Civil Engineering Facilities: Critical913

Overview and Discussion. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 80: 173-184.914

Accessible at doi:10.1016/S0951-8320(03)00027-9915

Faber, M. 2007. Risk and Safety in Civil Engineering. Swiss Federal Institute of916

Technology, Zurich, Switzerland. Accessible at http://www.ibk.ethz.ch917

Fain, P. 2010. Chancellor of U. System of Georgia Quit BPs Board Just Before Spill. The918

Chronicle of Higher Education 56.919


25/27

Finley, M. 2012. The Oil Market to 2030 Implications for Investment and Policy.920

Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy 1: 25-36. Accessible at921

http://dx.doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.1.1.4922

Freiburg. 2011. Environmental Policy. Accessible at http://www.freiburg.de923

Freiburg. 2012. Green City: Approaches to Sustainability. Accessible at924

http://www.freiburg.de/greencity925

Global Response. 2003. A Test of Russian Environmental Laws. Environment March 2003:926

6.927

Hirsch, R., Bezdek, R., and Wendling, R. 2005. Peaking of World Oil Production: Impacts,928

Mitigation, & Risk Management.929

Hoschette, J. 2010. Career Guide Book for Engineers. Wiley.930

Hunter, P., and Fewtrell, L. 2001. Acceptable Risk. World Health Organization, London,931

UK.932

IEA. 2012. FAQs: Oil. Accessible at http://www.iea.org/aboutus/faqs/oil933

IEA. 2012. Oil Market Report. Accessible at http://www.oilmarketreport.org934

International Association of Oil & Gas Producers. 2010. Major Accidents. OGP Risk935

Assessment Data Directory, Report No. 434-17. Accessible at http://www.ogp.org.uk936

Jaffe, A., Medlock, K., and Soligo, R. 2011. The Status of World Oil Reserves:937

Conventional and Unconventional Resources in the Future Supply Mix. Baker Institute for938

Public Policy, Rice University.939

Jenkins, R., and Kastner, J.. 2000. Running Aground in a Sea of Complex Litigation: A Case940

Comment on the Exxon Valdez Litigation. Journal of Environmental Law 18: 151-215.941

Knight, D. 2000. Environment-Economy: Jobs for the Environment Pay Off. Environment942

Bulletin September 2000.943

Leonard-Barton, D. 1981. Voluntary Simplicity Lifestyles and Energy Conservation. The944

Journal of Consumer Research 8: 243-252.945

MacLeans Canada. 2012. Canadas Green 30 Companies for 2012. Rogers946

Communications. Accessible at http://www.macleans.ca947

McKeegan, N. 2008. Burj Al-Taqa: Self-Sufficient Skyscraper Design. Gizmag. Accessible948

at http://www.gizmag.com949

Missingham, D. 2006. The Integration of Professional Communication Skills into950

Engineering Education. Proceedings of the EDU-COM 2006 International Conference.951

Engagement and Empowerment: New Opportunities for Growth in Higher Education, Edith952


26/27

Cowan University, Perth Western Australia, November 22-24.953

http://ro.ecu.edu.au/ceducom/91954

Mitchell, J., Marcel, V., and Mitchell, B. 2012. What Next for the Oil and Gas Industry?955

Chatham House, London, England. Accessible at http://www.chathamhouse.org956

Mollman, M. 2000. Guatemalan Oil Debacle. Multinational Monitor December 2000: 7-8.957

Multinational Monitor. 2005. Energy Policy Meltdown. Behind the Lines section958

July/August 2005: 4.959

Murphy, D., and Hall, C. 2010. Year in Review EROI or Energy Return on (energy)960

Invested. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Ecological Economics Reviews961

1185: 102-118.962

Murphy, D., Hall, C., and Powers, B. 2011. New Perspectives on the Energy Return on963

(energy) Investment (EROI) of Corn Ethanol. Environ Dev Sustain 13: 179-202. Accessible964

at DOI 10.1007/s10668-010-9255-7965

Nature. 2011. Pollution Fight. Seven Days section, vol. 470: 310-311.966

OPEC. 2011. World Oil Outlook. OPEC Secretariat, Vienna, Austria. Accessible at967

http://www.opec.org968

Pepper, C. 2007. Sustainable Development Strategy and Action Plan for Civil Engineering.969

Institution of Civil Engineers. London, UK. Accessible at http://www.ice.org.uk970

Pew Environment Group. 2010. Oil Spill Index. Accessible at971

http://www.pewenvironment.org972

PTTC. 2011. Enhanced Recovery is Growing. Technology Connections 17.973

Ramirez, A. 2012. BPs Guilty Plea Agreement: Record $4.5 Billion Fine, Manslaughter974

Charges. Accessible at http://www.findlaw.com975

Ramseur, J. 2012. Oil Spills in US Coastal Waters: Background and Governance.976

Congressional Research Service 7-5700 RL33705. Accessible at http://www.crs.gov977

Rhodes, C. 2008. The Oil Question: Nature and Prognosis. Science Progress 91: 317-375.978

Accessible at doi: 10.3184/003685008X395201979

Roberts, S., and Industry Taskforce on Peak Oil & Energy Security. 2010. The Oil Crunch:980

A wake-up call for the UK economy. Ove Arup & Partners, London, UK. Accessible at981

http://www.peakoiltaskforce.net982

Rochlin, J. 2011. Development, the Environment and Ecuadors Oil Patch: The Context and983

Nuances of the Case Against Texaco. Journal of Third World Studies 28: 11-39.984

Roman, H. 2001. The 8 Skills You Need to Succeed. IEEE-USA Today's Engineer Online.985

Accessible at http://www.todaysengineer.com986


27/27

Schmidt, E. 2004. Twenty-Year Trend Analysis of Oil Spills in EPA Jurisdiction.987

Environmental Research Consulting Freshwater Spills Symposium. Accessible at988

http://www.epa.gov989

Shell. 2012. Shell at a Glance. Accessible at http://www.shell.com990

Stafford, E. 2003. Energy Efficiency and the New Green Marketing. Environment April991

2003: 8-10.992

Thailand Government Public Relations Department. 2012. The New Theory and the993

Sufficiency Economy. Foreign Office, Bangkok, Thailand. Accessible at994

http://www.prd.go.th995

Thilmany, J. 2009. Time for Teamwork: Want to Teach Young Engineers to Work996

Together? Change the Stereotypes. Mechanical Engineering-CIME 131: 35.997

Total. 2009. Maximizing Recovery Factors. Accessible at http://www.total.com998

Uhlmann, D. 2011. After the Spill is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental Crime, and999

the Criminal Law. Michigan Law Review 109: 1413-1462.1000

UK. 2007. Sustainable Construction Policy. Accessible at http://www.stockton.gov.uk1001

UK. 2008. Strategy for Sustainable Construction. Department for Business, Enterprise &1002

Regulatory Reform. Accessible at http://www.berr.gov.uk1003

UK Health and Safety Executive. 2001. Reducing Risks, Protecting People: HSEs1004

Decision-Making Process. Her Majestys Stationary Office, Norwich, UK. Accessible at1005

http://www.hse.gov.uk1006

United States Department of Energy. 2012. Enhanced Oil Recovery/CO2 Injection.1007

Accessible at http://fossil.energy.gov1008

UPS. 2012. UPS Hybrid Electric Vehicle Fleet. Accessible at1009

http://www.pressroom.ups.com1010

Urban Farming. 2012. More than a Gardening Organization. Accessible at1011

http://www.urbanfarming.org1012

Veld, K., and Phillips, O. 2010. The Economics of Enhanced Oil Recovery: Estimating1013

Incremental Oil Supply and CO2 Demand in the Powder River Basin. The Energy Jounal1014

13: 31-56.1015

Vrijling, J., van Hengel, W., and Houben, R. 1998. Acceptable Risk as a Basis for Design.1016

Reliability Engineering and System Safety 59: 141-150.1017

Wills, J. 2000. Counting Russias Black Gold. The Ecologist 30: 66-67.1018

World Bank. 2012. Poverty. Poverty Reduction & Equity at The World Bank Group.1019

Accessible at http://go.worldbank.org/VL7N3V6F201020

sustainability and dispute prevention in the oil industry

Documents