sustainability lessons learned and policy implication for

The Fukushima Accident: Lessons Learned and Policy Implication for Nuclear

Sustainability

Satoru TanakaThe University of Tokyo,

Former President, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan

August 27, 2012The IAEA INPRO Dialogue Forum in Korea 1

1. Current Status

2. Key Lessons Learned

3. Policy Implication for Nuclear Sustainability

4. Summary

Contents

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AESJ’s Report NISA’s 30 Directives to Each NPP and Stress TestsFour Investigation Committees Final Reports

Reform of Nuclear Regulatory SystemNuclear Energy Policy DiscussionContribution to Global Nuclear Energy Sustainability

2

Completion of cover construction for Unit 1 (Oct. 28, 2011)

As of Apr. 17 Step 1 (around 3 months)

Step 2 (through the end of this year)Issues

Cooling by minimum injection rate

Consideration/start offull-fledged decontamination

Installation of full-fledged water processing facilitiesStorage / management of sludge waste etc.

Mid-term issues

Accumula

ted water

reduction

3http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/111216_nps_03.pdf

Dec. 16, 2011 Step 2 of the Fukushima roadmap was attained.Reactors Condition equivalent to cold shutdown is maintained.Spent fuel pool Stable cooling is maintained.Accumulated water Radioactive wastewater is being processed in a continuous and stable manner in water treatment plants. Waste sludge is being stored and managed.Reactor building cover The cover for Unit 1 has been completed , and the cover for Units 3 and 4 is currently being constructed. Monitoring Environmental monitoring and decontamination are being performed.

Consideration of function /installation

CoolingM

itigation

Monitor-ing

Reactor

SFPAccum

ulated W

ater

Atmosphere

/ Soil

Circulating water cooling (cont.)

Circulat-

ingwater cooling

Fresh water

Injection Installation of Circulation cooling system

More stablecooling

Transferring & Storing water

Securestorage place

Installation of the facilities

Consideration offull-fledged processing facilities

Dispersion of inhibitor Dispersion of inhibitor(cont.)

Removal / management of debris Removal / management of debris (cont..)

Mitigate

scattering

Mitigate

scatteringDecontam

ination

Expansion, enhancement and disclosure of radiation dose monitoring in and out of the power station

December 16, 2011 It is made an extract and processed from the NISA public presentation data at the time of a road map completion report.

Dec. 16, 2011

Maintain and Continue coldshutdown condition

Start of removal work of fuels

Dispersion of inhibitor

Removal / management of debris

Continuous environmentalmonitoring

Continuous decontamination

Current status

Stable cooling

Equivalent tocold shutdow

n

Current Status of Fukushima Daiichi NPS

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TEPCO removed 2 unused fuel assemblies

from No.4 spent fuel poolwithout any major trouble

18 and 19, July

No.4 pool contains1535 fuel assemblies,including 204 unused ones.

Medium -to Long-term Roadmap toward Decommissioning

4

Road to recovery, Government of Japan, March 2012http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/incident/pdf/road_to_recovery_1.pdf

1. Current Status



4. Summary

Contents

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Reform of Nuclear Regulatory SystemNuclear Energy Policy DiscussionInternational collaboration

5

u The AESJ submitted a report entitled “Lessons Learned from the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant” on May 9, 2011.

The Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ)’s Report

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The lessons in the following 12 topics and their countermeasures categorized into short-term (immediate) and mid-term (in two or three years) measures are proposed.

12 topics:1) The seismic design2) The tsunami3) Station Blackout4) Loss of ultimate heat sink5) Accident management6) Hydrogen explosions 7) Spent fuel storage pools8) Safety research9) Safety regulations and safety design10) Organization/crisis management11) Information disclosure12) Safety management during an emergency

Important Lessons and Strongly Recommended Actions are summarized (see next pages) 6

http://www.aesj.or.jp/en/release/gbcom_kyokun_EN_20110530.pdfhttp://www.aesj.or.jp/en/release/gbcom_kyokun_gaiyo_EN_20110530R.pdf

The underlines in the following pages are Key Lessons to be universally recognized.


Summary of Important Lessons:

7

a. Estimated tsunami was too small.b. Safety System and Components were damaged because of seawater flooding,

resulting in severe accidents.c. Long-term station blackout caused the accidents progression.d. Reactor parameter monitoring was difficult without electricity.e. Seawater cooling system was vulnerable to tsunami.f. Accident Management (AM) for long-term station blackout may have been

insufficient. g. Hydrogen explosion at outside the containment vessel (CV) was not

considered.h. Enclosure of radioactive materials at spent fuel pool was difficult after

reactor building was damaged.i. Insufficient safety design for external event.j. Japanese safety regulation system was insufficient.k. Public feels that the information disclosure was not enough.l. AM activities prevented significant deterioration of the accidents.m. It is considered Seismic Design for the earthquake was more likely to be

effective in many cases.


Summary of Strongly Recommended Actions:

8

1. Hardware preparation to protect the safety System, Structure and Components (SSC) from tsunami.

2. Preparation for variety of power sources, such as air-cooled gas turbine system.3. Consideration and preparation for variety of cooling systems in addition to

seawater cooling system.4. Adequate consideration for severe accident management (AM), assuming severe

accidents do surely occur. Hardware preparation for the AM such as multiple wiring for power source. Training and education of AM .

5. AM for preventing hydrogen explosion. AM for spent fuel pool.6. Improvement of severe accident researches and human resources development.7. Drastic revision of the safety regulation including legal system and organizational

reconstruction.8. Establishment of quantitative risk analysis. Introduction of risk concept into the

entire safety regulation.9. Reassessment of public information disclosure and information sharing.10. Realistic disaster prevention practice based on the recognition that severe

accidents do surely occur.11. Detailed evaluation for the seismic design, coordination design, AM, plant

behaviors for the present Fukushima-Daiichi Accident. Then, improve the nuclear safety considering wide range of countermeasures.

1. NISA ( Emergency Safety Measures

2. Stress test

Nuclear and Industry Safety Agency )

NISA’s 30 Directives to Each NPP and Stress Tests

u NISA’s provisional conclusion was submitted as “Interim Report on Technical Knowledge” on March 28, 2012.30 (Lessons Learned) Directives to each NPP from NISA (see next page)Utility’s action plan in response

Ensure emergency power supply and core coolingImprove Severe Accident Management

Countermeasure against Tsunami: (Example) breakwater wall by 2013

Phase I: Plants ready for restart (assessment of safety margin)Phase II: All plants to determine continued operation or not

by comprehensive assessment (PSA)

9

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Short term

Medium-to-Long term

New organization will be established in 2012 to promote safety improvement measures continuously.Continuous improvement on equipment and aspect of practical use

Power supply; Cooling; Containment (Filtered venting, etc.) ; Instrumentation

Utilities own initiatives:

Countermeasures based on Technical Knowledge Learned (NISA 30 Lessons Learned)

<Accident Sequence> <Countermeasures>Prevention of Loss of Prevention of Loss of Safety Functions by

Common Cause FailurePrevention of severe

accidentMitigation of Mitigation of

significant release of radioactivity

1. Reliable external power supply and grid2. Earthquake-resistant substation 3. Earthquake-resistant switching station 4. Quick recovery of external power supply

5. Dispersed power facilities6. Water-tightening7. Diversified and redundant emergency

power supply8. Robust emergency DC supply9. System -dedicated backup power supply

10. Facilitation of alternative power supply from outside

11. Storage of backup electrical equipments

12. Improving response capabilities to accidents14. Robust UHS at a time of accident15. Reliable and controllable isolation valves16. Alternative water injection functions17. Reliable cooling and injection system for SFP

13. Dispersed cooling water system and water-tightening

19. Prevention of damage at the top-head flange of CV caused by overheating

22. Independent venting system 23. Decreasing release of radioactivity

when venting 24. Hydrogen explosion prevention

(control gas concentration and the adequate release )

18. Diversified CV cooling system

20. Surely switching to Low pressureinjection process

22. Reliable and controllable venting system

25. Robust emergency command post26. Reliable communication tools for

accidents27. Reliable instruments for accidents28. Robust plant parameter surveillance

functions29. Robust radioactive monitoring

functions

30. Effective structure of emergency response system and training

Earthquake

Loss of External Power Supply

Tsunami

Loss of Emergency D/G

Core Damage

Hydrogen Explosion

Shut down

Start-up Emergency D/G and Core

Cooling System

Loss of Communication,

Instrumentation and Control System

On-site Power Supply

Core Cooling / Injection

External Power Supply

Loss of DC

Loss of Core Cooling System

CV Damage and Hydrogen Explosion Prevention

Communication, Instrumentation and Control

※Underlines mainly target BWR.

(“Interim Report on Technical Knowledge”, NISA, 28 Mar 2012)

10

Safety Improvements of Commercial Reactors

From the presentation material of FEPC’s chairman used at Apr. 19, 2012 Nuclear Industry Convention 11http://www.jaif.or.jp/ja/annual/45th/45-s2_makoto-yagi_e.pdf

12 12http://www.jaif.or.jp/ja/annual/45th/45-s2_makoto-yagi_e.pdf

Safety Improvements of Commercial Reactors

From the presentation material of FEPC’s chairman used at Apr. 19, 2012 Nuclear Industry Convention

：

：

：

：

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：

In operation Outage for the periodic inspection and others

Shutdown due to tsunami and the government request

46.16 GWe in total : Abolished

In operation Outage for the periodic inspection and others

Shutdown due to tsunami and the government request

46.16 GWe in total : Abolished

Status of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in JAPAN(Ohi-3, Ohi-4, 2 units, 2.36GWe)

(35 units, 30.61GWe)

(13 units, 13.18 GWe)

(4 units, 2.79 GWe)

(Ohi-3, Ohi-4, 2 units, 2.36GWe)

(35 units, 30.61GWe)

(13 units, 13.18 GWe)

(4 units, 2.79 GWe)

13

As of August 27, 2012

Plant name Submitted by utilities Reviewed by NISA Confirmed by NSC Restarted

Ohi-3, Kansai

Ohi-4, Kansai

Stress test and restart status of NPPs in Japan

Before the Emergency Safety Measures

After the Emergency Safety Measures

Oct. 28, 2011 Feb. 13, 2012 Mar. 23, 2012 July 9, 2012 full power

Ikata-3, Shikoku Nov. 14, 2011 Mar. 26, 2012 Being reviewed

Nov. 17, 2011 Feb. 13, 2012 Mar. 23, 2012 July 25, 2012 full power

Tomari -1, Hokkaido Dec. 7, 2011 Being reviewed

Genkai-2, Kyushu Dec. 14, 2011 Being reviewed

Sendai-1, Kyushu Dec. 14, 2011 Being reviewed

Sendai-2, Kyushu Dec. 14, 2011 Being reviewed

Mihama-3, Kansai Dec. 21, 2011 Being reviewed

Tsuruga-2, JAPC Dec. 27, 2011 Being reviewed

Tomari -2, Hokkaido Dec. 27, 2011 Being reviewed

Higashidori-1, Tohoku Dec. 27, 2011 Being reviewed

Takahama-1, Kansai Jan. 13, 2012 Being reviewed

Kashiwazaki-1, Tokyo Jan. 16, 2012 Being reviewed

Kashiwazaki-7, Tokyo Jan. 16, 2012 Being reviewed

Ohi-1, Kansai Jan. 27, 2012 Being reviewed

Shika-2, Hokuriku Feb. 1, 2012 Being reviewed

Shika-1, Hokuriku Mar. 26, 2012 Being reviewed

Takahama-4, Kansai Apr. 6, 2012 Being reviewed

Takahama-3, Kansai Apr. 27, 2012 Being reviewed

Genkai-4, Kyushu May 10, 2012 Being reviewed

Ikata-1, Shikoku May 25, 2012 Being reviewed

Genkai-3, Kyushu May 25, 2012 Being reviewed

Earthquake 1.75 times(equivalent to 1,225 gal)

1.8 times(equivalent to1,260 gal)

Tsunami Approx. 1.6 times(4.65m)

Approx. 4.0 times(11.4m)

Total loss of AC power

Approx. 5 hoursafter the event

Approx. 16 daysafter the event

Loss of ultimate heat sink

Approx.6 daysafter the event

Approx.16 daysafter the event

3% improvement

145% improvement

76-fold improvement

2.6-fold improvement

Primary evaluation results summary, Ohi-3 and 4 of KEPCO

14

Investigation Committees final reports

Date Investigation Committee

Key focus Report management

Private Sector

TEPCO (Internal report)

Diet

Government

15

Feb. 27,2012 Koichi KITAZAWA

(Advisor of Japan Science and Technology Agency)

The report hopes to be helpful to extract lessons to the future of children in Japan and World identifying the truth of the unfortunate situation of the accident as a complex severe accident.

Lessons learned are extracted to achieve safer Japan identifying the back ground of the accident.

June 20,2012 Masao YAMAZAKI

(Vice President of TEPCO)

To clarify causes of the accident by investigating and verifying facts by ourselves as the central player of the accident, and to incorporate the lessons learned into future business operations.

Lessons learned and regrets are reflected to future management of the TEPCO and are helpful for improving the safety of the all NPPs .

July 5,2012 Kiyoshi KUROKAWA

(Former Chairman of Science Council of Japan)

The committee was created under the diet, which has the one of three powers, to recover the trust of Japan and its government from national and world by investigating independently from TEPCO and government administrative body as the party concerned.

For the contents of the report, the investigation committee watches the implementing situation by government.

July 23,2012 Yotaro HATAMURA

(Professor Emeritus at the Univ. Tokyo)

The committee was established with the aim of making policy recommendations on measures to prevent further spread of the damage caused by the accident and a recurrence of similar accidents in the future. This was being done by conducting a multifaceted investigation in an open and neutral manner, accountable to the Japanese public, to determine the causes of the accident.

Government will propose recurrence prevention measures.

NAIIC

ICANPS

Report published, July 5, 2012

“Manmade” disasterThis was a disaster “Made in Japan.”

Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture (our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our insularityHighlighted

1) Organizational issues: Regulatory capture (lack of oversight of safety by regulatory body due to industry lobbying), organizational issue of TEPCO (lack of concern over public health etc.), organizational issue of NISA, and

2) Deficiency in crisis management system16

NAIIC: The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Committee

[source] http://naiic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/NAIIC_report_lo_res5.pdf]

Conclusions:

Key issues raised byDiet Investigation Committee [NAIIC]

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A

)

Recommendations

Key issues raised byDiet Investigation Committee [NAIIC]

1) Monitoring of the nuclear regulatory body by the National Diet2) Reform the crisis management system3) Government responsibility for public health and welfare4) Monitoring the operators including corporate reform of TEPCO

(governance and risk management and information disclosure—with safety as the sole priority)

5) Criteria for the new regulatory body (Independent (from organizations promoted by the government, operator, politics), Transparent, Professional, Consolidated (especially emergency communications, decision-making and control), Proactive)

6) Reforming laws related to nuclear energy7) Develop a system of independent investigation commissions

17

[source] http://naiic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/NAIIC_report_lo_res5.pdf

Key issues raised byGovernment Investigation Committee [ICANPS]

Report published on July 23, 2012

TEPCO & Government trapped by “safety myth” by thinking“severe accident will not happen here”Preparedness to complex disaster by natural hazard andconsequential nuclear accidentParadigm shift (expressed as “changing attitude”) in riskmanagement to avoid nuclear disaster

[Comprehensive] mitigation, regardless of its probability of occurrenceNot setting aside residual risk

18

ICANPS: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations

[source] http://icanps.go.jp/eng/ExecutiveSummaryOfTheFinalReport.pdf

Major Issues:Ø

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ü

[source] http://icanps.go.jp/eng/SaishyuRecommendation.pdf

Recommendations:


1) A basic stance for safety measures and disaster preparednessPreparedness in light of complex disasters in mindChanging an attitude to see risks (Different approach for risk reduction, regardless of its probability of occurrence; Institutional framework to ensure in-depth examination of residual risk)Need to identify all risk potentials from “disaster victims’ standpoint” Incorporating the latest knowledge in the disaster prevention planCentral Disaster Management Council to consider nuclear disaster

2) Safety measures regarding nuclear power generationComprehensive risk analysis Building disaster prevention measures and severe accident management

3) Nuclear disaster response systemsReforming the crisis management system for a nuclear disasterRole of Nuclear emergency response headquarters, Off-site centers, Prefecture

19

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[source] http://icanps.go.jp/eng/SaishyuRecommendation.pdf

Recommendations:


4) Damage prevention and mitigationProvision of information and risk communication to build mutual trust between the public and the governmentUse of the SPEEDI systemEvacuation procedures of residentsDeepen public understanding for radiation effects, Information sharing with, and receiving support from, overseas, etc.

5) Harmonization with international practices such as the IAEA safety standards6) Relevant organizations

Functional separation for safety-first decision by regulationRebuilding safety culture, etc.

7) Continued investigation of accident causes and damage

20

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Nuclear Regulation SystemIndependent, Transparent, Professional, Consolidated, Proactive also in Severe Accident (SA) conditionsHarmonization with international good practices such as the IAEA safety standards

Preparedness against Low -Probability High-Consequence (LPHC) risks:Complex hazards of extreme external events such as earthquake and Tsunami and consequent Loss of ultimate heat sink and SBO.Comprehensive mitigation for LPHC events considering Level 4 and Level 5 in Defense-in -Depth. (Level 4:Prevention and mitigation of Severe Accidents, Level 5: Emergency Plan and Crisis Management)

Robust Design:Reduced system interactions; Enhanced reliability by ‘passive’, ‘diversity’ and ‘Redundancy’ in safety system; Elimination of common mode failure

Robustness of Nuclear emergency response headquarters, Off-site centersStrengthen of SA measures in multiple units installationInterface with society:

Provision of information and Risk communicationInformation sharing with, and receiving support from, overseas, etc.

Universal Key Lessons Learned (personal view)Ø

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1. Current Status



4. Summary

Contents

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Reform of Nuclear Regulatory SystemNuclear Energy Policy DiscussionInternational collaboration

22

New Act (June 27, 2012) Independence

Integration

Amendment to the Nuclear Regulation Act

Reform of nuclear regulatory systemwithin 3 months

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: Separate nuclear regulation function and nuclear promotion function and establish the “Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRA),” as an independent commission body affiliated to the Ministry of Environment (MOE). A Chair and 4 Commissioners are appointed by the Prime Minister after the approval of the National Diet.

: Integrate nuclear regulation functions, namely, nuclear safety, security, safeguards, radiation monitoring and radioisotopes regulation, into the NRA

Legally requested Severe Accident Measures to the licensees Regulation system based on the latest scientific/technical knowledge (Introduction of back-fit rule )Operational limit of 40 years in principle

Establish “Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Commission (NEPC)” in a CabinetAmendment to the Nuclear Emergency Act

23

Crisis Management:

Reform of Nuclear Safety Regulation System

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Current Organizations

Nuclear Regulatory

Agency

Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Chair +4 commissioners

Regulation

New Organizations

CabinetOffice

Atomic Energy

Commission(AEC)

Nuclear Safety

Commission(NSC)

Nuclear Security

METI

Agency for Natural

Resources and Energy

(ANRE)

Nuclear and Industrial

Safety Agency (NISA)

Regulations concerning

commercial power reactors etc.

Double -Check

MEXT

research reactors etc.

Ministry of the

Environment(MOE)

※

24

○

○

【】

・

・

・

・

・

＋

＋＋

＋＋

【

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【】

・

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In light of the two oil crises, Japan has been steadily promoting efforts to ensure a stable supply of imported resources while reducing the rate of dependency on external resources (through diversification of the generation mix and energy conservation)The energy policy of Japan, a country with limited natural resources, is based on the best mix of the 3 Es: “energy security,” “economic efficiency” and “environmental preservation.”

Energy demand and energy supply mix of Japan

10%

3%

3%

19%

23%

42%

Stable supply

Stable supply Economic efficiency

Stable supply EnvironmentEconomic efficiency

Stable supply EnvironmentEconomic efficiency

Ensuring stable supply by reducing the dependency on oil and introducing alternative energy to oil

Further promotion of the introduction of alternative energy to oil and energy conservation

Ensuring economic efficiency through electricity/gas service reform

Expanded introduction of non-fossil energy (renewables, nuclear)Strengthening of resource diplomacy

1970’s

1990’s

2000’s

1980’s

Promotion of energy conservation

Reinforcement of the efforts to ensure

resources

Energy demand increased with economic growth (1.4-times increase from 1973 to 2008)

Improved efficiency through energy conservation

(By 40% from 1973 to 2008)

Renewable energy, etc.

Water power

Coal

Oil

The 1st oil shock

Nuclear

Natural gas

CoalEnforcement of the Kyoto Protocol (‘05),increased competition for resources

Oil crisis (‘73 and ‘79)

Demand for economic structural reform

Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol (’97)

25Current Basic Energy Plan (June 2010)

Dependence on oil

History of the Energy Policy Based on the 3 Es (Before 3.11)

○

年度実績年推計年度実績年推計

（）

％

【】

：

【】

The current Basic Energy Plan anticipates the increase of the energy self-sufficiency rate (18% 40%) and the zero-emission power source ratio (renewable energy: about 10% 20%, nuclear power: about 30% 50%) by 2030

Total: 10,305Total: 10,200

Oil39% Oil

27%

LPG3%

LPG3%

Natural gas:19%

Natural gas:16%

Coal23%

Coal17%

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

2007 2030

Mill

ion

kL c

rude

oil

equi

vale

nt

Current energy self-sufficiency ratio: 18

Energy self-sufficiency ratio in 2030: about 40%

Total: 592

Total: 517

(100 million kW h)

Generated output

Zero-emission power source: 34%

Zero-emission power source: about 70%

Nuclear 10%

Nuclear: 24%

Primary energy supply

Renewables, etc.6%

Renewables, etc:13%

Renewables, etc: 9%

Renewables, etc:21%

àà

à

Oil13%

Oil2%

LNG28%

LNG 13%

Coal25%

Coal11%

Nuclear26%

Nuclear53%

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

2007 20302007 record 2030 estimate 2007 record 2030 estimate26

Supply Forecast in the Basic Energy Plan (Before 3.11.2011) Cabinet Decision in June 2010)（

Ø

Ø

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Statements

Medium- and long-term onsite activities (decommissioning) in Fukushima Daiichi NPS

Revision of “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy”

Evaluation and report to “Energy and Environment Committee” (Cabinet)

JAEC activities after 3.11.2011

Dec. 11, 2011

Start in November 2010 and suspended after March 11, 2011Resumed (August 2011) and suspended again (June 2012)

on June 21, 2012Accident costFuel cycle options- Three options (Complete recycle, Direct disposal, Hybrid)- Evaluation from 7 viewpoints (Economics, SF and waste, International

aspect….) - Report emphasized, besides evaluation, four points (SF storage,

comprehensive assessment of the nuclear fuel cycle business, FBR R&D, International aspect)

27

(See next page)

Seven Evaluation Viewpoints in Evaluating Scenarios(JAEC; ) http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2012/siryo22/siryo1-1.pdf

Important issues in the short term

Important issues in the medium - and long-term

June 5, 2012

Management and storage of spent fuelsVolume of spent fuel to be stored and the storage capacity

International perspectives over the nuclear fuel cycleUse of Pu (in stock) and International contributionImplications for non-proliferation and for nuclear security riskImpacts on Japan-United States Atomic Agreement

Challenges involved in the policy change or for realization of the policy (incl. difficulty in siting)

Implications for spent fuels storage, trust relationships with local governments, employments, technical capabilities (human resources, technical basis and infrastructure), waste to be returned from abroad and the burden of costs associated with the policy change

EconomicsTotal cost of the nuclear fuel cycle based on the scenarios

Energy security and security of uranium supply Resource conservation and resistance to fuel crisis

Amount of radioactive waste generatedSecuring options (flexibility)

Flexibility of development and flexibility to the policy change 28

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Preparations for future uncertainty are vital, regardless of the chosen option.The government should be responsible for policy changes, and take appropriate measures to maintain reliable relationships with municipalities nationwide, especially those which have cooperated in the national nuclear fuel cycle policies for a long period and accepted the related facilities.Various arrangements and related costs are required to change the present policies and promote other policies.The following issues should be discussed :

1. Expansion of the storage capacity of spent fuel on-site and off-site of nuclear power plants, including dry storage, finding final disposal site for high-level radioactive waste, the discussing the development of technology enabling direct disposal and the required measures and regulations.

2. A comprehensive assessment of nuclear fuel cycle business operations focused on the performance of plant operation at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, progress of plutonium utilization and international perspective (in several years).

(1/2)

29

http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/kettei/kettei120718_e.pdf

Key issues for promoting Nuclear fuel cycle policy options(JAEC; June 21, 2012)

3. Construction of an effective check-and-review system for R&D of FBRs, an R&D system to produce innovative and competitive advanced reactors, and effective and efficient R&D utilizing international cooperation without insisting on finalizing the domestic R&D. Despite opting for a direct disposal policy, continuation of basic R&D into advanced reprocessing and FR technology, etc. is important.

4. Establishment of nuclear fuel cycle policy which takes sufficient account of the increased safety of nuclear power generation worldwide, reducing nuclear nonproliferation and the nuclear security risk.

5. The government is responsible for deciding nuclear policies, with the more explicit assignment of responsibilities to government and private utilities, and enhanced trust via sincere communications with people, and ensuring transparency.

(2/2)

30

://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/kettei/kettei120718_e.pdf

Key issues for promoting Nuclear fuel cycle policy options(JAEC; June 21, 2012)http

n

n

n

n

Three options for power generation capability in 2030

Based on discussions by;(considering green growth)

’s discussion on “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy”on countermeasures against Global

Warming

Mindful* of;Risk management of nuclear powerReduce dependence on nuclear powerShift to low carbon economy fully utilizing energy saving, renewableEconomics, energy security, green growth

To be decided by the end of August

31

* Interim Compilation of Discussion Points for the Formulation of “Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment,” July 29, 2011, The Energy and Environment Council

üüüü

üüüü

Energy & Environment Committee Advisory Committee on Energy and Natural ResourcesAECCentral Environment Council

Options raised for public consultation

http://www.npu.go.jp/policy/policy09/pdf/20110908/20110908_02_en.pdf

Three options were presented for nationwide discussions on the basis of reducing the dependence upon nuclear power generation;

Viewpoint: Stick with the principle of zero nuclear power with no new construction or expansion.

Viewpoint: Lower the dependency on nuclear power generation. Make the most strenuous efforts to promote green innovation and nuclear safety improvements.

Viewpoint: Within the direction of lowering the dependency on nuclear power generation, utilize nuclear power to a certain degree including new construction.

32

Option 1: Reduce the nuclear power generation ratio to 0% as soon as possible (0% at 2030)

Option 2: Gradually reduce the nuclear power generation ratio to 15% by 2030

Option 3: Lower the rate of nuclear power generation to below that before the Earthquake but maintain a certain portion. Make the rate 20 -25% at 2030

Three Options for Energy Mix

Fuel Cycle Options Depending on Nuclear Power Generation capacity in 2030

Commercialization of fast breeder reactors (FBR) or fast reactors (FR) is prerequisite.

FBRs/FRs is an option to prepare for future uncertainty.

FBRs/FRs is not an option.

Option 1 Full reprocessing of all nuclear spent fuelsFull reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, which entails reprocessing all spent

fuel and reusing the recovered uranium and plutonium .

Option 2 Dual policy of reprocessing and direct disposalBoth reprocessing and direct disposal of nuclear spent fuel are kept as

options.

Option 3 Full direct disposal of all nuclear spent fuelsFull direct disposal of all spent nuclear fuel, which entails direct disposal of

spent nuclear fuel after a period of storage.

：

：

：

33

From the presentation material of in the JAEC’ Regular meeting (June 12, 2012) http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2012/siryo23/siryo1.pdf (Japanese)

http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/turuga/internationalworkshop/presentationPDF/201206121030_Hiroshi%20Ikukawa_Japan.pdf

MEXT

Options raised for public consultation

Year 2010 2030

**)

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Option Current Option 1 Option 2 Option 3

Shares(%)

Nuclear 26 %* 0 % 15 % 20-25 %

Renewable(including Hydro)

10 % 35 % 30 % 25-30 %

Fossil 63 % 65 % 55 % 50 %

Electricity output saving Base(1.1 Trillion kWh)

-10 % -10 % -10 %

Electricity cost (JPY/kWh) 8.6 15.1 14.1 14.1

Final energy consumption saving Base (3.9 Billion kl) -22 % -18 % -18 %

GHG emission (compared to 1990) -0.4 % -23 % -23 % -25 %

GDP change in Trillion JPY (compared to business as usual

Base(511)

-8 - 45 -2 -30 -2 -28

Nuclear fuel cycle Reprocessing Direct disposal

Reprocessing/Direct disposal

Reprocessing/Direct disposal

* 26% shows the electricity output (kWh) fraction of nuclear power generation in total power generation in 2010** economic growth rate: 1.1% in 2010s; 0.8% in 2020s (609-636 Trillion JPY in 2030)

[SOURCE] Cabinet’s Energy & Environment Committee (29 June 2012)http://www.npu.go.jp/policy/policy09/pdf/20120629/20120629_1.pdf

～～～

Government opinion poll on Japan’s future energy policy

Opinions of the three major economic organizations

Japan Business Federation).

Japan Chambers of Commerce and Industry)

Japan Committee for Economic Development)

Deliberative polling, Public hearing and Public comments

0%scenario

15% scenario

20-25% scenario

Other

Deliberative poll

47 15 13 25 285 randomlyselected people

Public hearing 68 11 16 5 1,400 participants

Publiccomments

90* 1* 3* 6* *preliminary resultsin 7,000 out of 89,124

comments

Ø

Ø

Ø

All three options have numerous problems in terms of feasibility and impact on the economy (All of the three options are unfeasible and the scenarios are lack of consistency with the government’s growth strategy* (

.

The nuclear power ratio should be considered flexible in accordance with technological innovations after establishing new safety standards ( .

(between Jul. 2 and Aug. 12, 2012)

* Based on the economic growth rare 2% in 2010s

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Contribution to Global Nuclear Energy Sustainability (1/2)

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Japan, as its responsibility, should share severe experience and lessons learned by tackling the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima NPS with all other countries and contribute to enhancing nuclear safety worldwide.

Develop safety design criteria and specification standards which clearly define severe accident measures on the basis of the IAEA’s Safety Standards taking in the lessons from the accident and contribute to harmonizing international standards.

Develop nuclear plants and components with higher levels of safety and make a contribution to the worldwide introduction and expansion of nuclear energy.

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Contribution to Global Nuclear Energy Sustainability (2/2)

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Share knowledge/lessons accumulated in the world regarding spent fuel management (storage technology, etc.), radioactive waste management, disposal technology, site selection, social acceptability and so on.

Contribute to fostering of human resources in the fields of nuclear safety/security/safeguards, nuclear engineering, emergency preparedness and response, radiation medicine, and so on.

In order to respond to the interest of countries seeking to use nuclear power generation for energy security and for responses to global warming, Japan should provide with its nuclear technologies of the world-class safety.

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Summary (1/2)

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Nuclear energy is essential as an energy source with sustainability on a global scale.

We, however, never let an accident like the one at Fukushima Daiichi NPS which affects people and the environment happen again.

It is necessary to 1) thoroughly investigate the cause of the accident2)continue to examine and understand the accident progression3)develop and review the measures for preventing the

recurrence of accident of a severe accident4)build effective AM measures.

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Summary (2/2)

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Given the investigation reports submitted by various accident investigation committees, it is important to share internationally the results and reflect the results in improving the safety of nuclear energy in future.

Cooperating with the IAEA, Japan will promptly develop and update the safety design criteria, specifications standards and nuclear emergency preparedness and response which clearly define severe accident measures, based on the knowledge and lessons learned.

Japanese industry strongly supports nuclear power although the current public opinion on nuclear energy is negative.

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Thank you for your attention!

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sustainability lessons learned and policy implication for

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