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DOI: 10.1177/000169930004300106

2000 43: 63Acta SociologicaJean Clam

Luhmannian TheorySystem's Sole Constituent, the Operation: Clarifying a Central Concept of

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Systems Sole Constituent, the Operation:

Clarifying a Central Concept of LuhmannianTheory

Jean ClamCNRS. Paris, France

ABSTRACT

The autopoietic turn in Luhmanns later theory is not thinkable without the refocusingof systems theory around a new concept of operativity. The article shows the lines ofdevelopment from the earlier theory towards the final prevailing of a purely operativistconception of the system. The movement is one of deconstructing all intuitiverepresentations of a border-defined, thing-like system. The radical version that emergesleaves the operation as the sole and unique systemic constituent. The article shows thatsuch a strain of thought contracting an extensive transitive structure into a purelyoperative core has major philosophical antecedents:Aristotles conception of theactuation of life or intellection in a composite being, Fichtes self-position of thetranscendental I. Heideggers subject and authorless Ereignis constitute very similarfigures of operativization. This sheds light on the most problematic aspect ofLuhmannian theory, namely its reliance on a protologic that does not elaborate, likesimilar philosophical endeavours before it, on the fundaments of its own evidence.

Jean Clam, 1796Av. de Grasse. F-83300 Draguignan, France Scandinavian SociologicalAssociation 2000

Niklas Luhmanns systemist sociology is, in itsown project, often misunderstood. The optionfor a description of society within a systemstheoretical framework is very often reduced to

an all-commanding assertion of the structuringfunction of systems in todays societies. Luh-mannian systemism is conceived frequently asan attempt to apply a general systems approachto social phenomena. The benefits of such an

approachwould then have to be assessed in

terms of a greater accuracy of the sociologicaldescription as well as a greater explanatorypotency. Not taking into consideration the

complete transformation of the original frame-work through Luhmanns fresh modelling of itscentral concepts, such an assessment is doomed

to misapprehension.I will show in the following how and why

Luhmann goes far beyond the current systemsmodel, and in what direction his theory heads. I

shall have to show the intricacy of theconstructions necessitated by the categorialradicalization it undertakes. I begin with an

introductory presentation of the systems prob-lematics in Luhmanns sociology in order tocome to the core concept of the whole theory:that of a non-real, purely actual system,containing nothing and made of nothing but

operations.

1. The transformation of systemism

Luhmanns interest in the systems model is

particularly ambiguous. To have a clearer ideaof the status and function of the model within

the theory, I will set Luhmanns fundamental

options and intuitions into the broader context

of his sociological work. My thesis, whichstresses a statement obvious Cor any person

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resulted in a research programme focussed on

the concept of complex, or as he termed it,systernic ratiollality. The programme was to beimplemented in two stages: (1 a critique of the

supposition of an immanent instrumental

rationalityof

organization presentingthe

orga-nizational mode of action as a unique tool,defined and unified by its goals and ends, andwhose rationality is univocally inscribed in itstransitive hierarchical architecture: and (2) a

descriptive and conceptual work on a greatnumber of phenomena constituting complexrationality in a variety of complex figures. The

programme went through a series of recon-structions of the complex intelligence sedimen-ted in

organizationsas well as in every com-

municational phenomenon.Actually, every suchphenomenon combines a series of mutuallyconditioned devices to a relatively functionaland operative whole that can take various

forms, ranging from quasi-instant social sys-tems of fugitive face-to-face interaction to theheaviest and most enduring formal institutionalventures. This combination is far from being a

product of pro-projecting design and, above all,from being grasped in its consequences. Thus,the descriptive work converges towards theproblem of order. of its origin and evolution.Within the framework of a theory of complexrationality, order appears as emergent. open tovariation and self-sensitive, requiring non-linear, intransitive and original theoretical

concepts.At its origin, the research identifies

self-destabilizing paradoxical settings. Aninstance of such settings is the double con-

tingency scheme, which Luhmann takes over

from Parsons and Shils and develops into a

generative figure of all order&dquo; in collectivemeaning systems - that is, social systems. 1

1

Systemic rationality is thus a title for thecentral intuition of the improbability. fluencyand circularity of order. Order is improbable notbecause it calls for human - or divine - design.but because it has to be accounted for as the

non-natural, non-spontaneous - although self-

organizing 1 2 _ realization of forms of being thatno design could have predicted and no self-directed process could have produced. The

system-order emerging from non-reproducibleconjunctions of factors and circumstances isfluent, nurtured through fluency 13 It is neverstructured only from within. Order is differen-tial in the sense that it is the unceasingnegotiation of a difference between non-orderand order. The maintenance of the system-orderis an explicit and continuous performance.As

such it is not self-evident. Most fallacious is thus

the spatial representation of the order-unity as aclosed entity containing in itself its order

components and internally quiescent as longas its environment does not exercise any

pressureon its boundaries. Order is rather an

actual difference, order/non-order, which isreflected in its first term (order) and whosemaintenance takes the deceptive, metaphoricalform of a (spatial) boundary. In fact, the

boundary is a complex actuol relation, aneffectuation or an actuation - I try to translatethe German word: I>I>11=iig - of an asymmetricaldifference and its retlection in one Ot~ its terms.

Very soon the problematic oi~ complex orderconcentrates on the de-realization or de-onto-

logization of the spaces, the fluxes and func-tional activities related to the system. To think

systems as pure differences becomes the de-

ontologizing programme Ot LLlllfIlaI111s systemstheory.All its lines of argument converge in thisdirection.

To sum up, I could say that the new de-

ontologized concepts arch an alternative to themetaphysically grounded theoretical frame-works of action theory. This does not meanthat those frameworks are altogether invalid:they are just outclassed by a new theoretical

design called for by deep transformations in theprojections (Elll BBl/fe) H of the meaning andstructure of the objects of the relevant sciences.To use an analogy I will discuss more thor-

oughly at the end of the article, the projection ofthe unconscious as the primary psychic objectand the proper theme of the science of the

psyche is an alternative to the previous intro-

spectivist and cognitivist projection of such an

object within the psychology of consciousness.The old designs, which are thus superseded, donot lose their whole relevance. They mustnevertheless be brought up to the new level.restructured so as to fit into the new categorialprojections. Coming back to the problematicswithin sociology at the emergence of the post-actionalist systemist model. I can read it asfollows:Action theory is intrinsically ontologi-cal in its categorial design; it is co-extensive withthe triadic, extensive, transitive o~tr~for-~r~-tio-opertitlitiz structure, which objectifies itsterms as real, self-identical terms: it lives from

the equally ontological assumptions made onthe nature of the subject-actor as self-consciousbearer of intentions and will, promoter of hisaction through its more or less rationalinstrumentation. The invention (in the doublesense of founding and figuring) of a de-



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ontologizing level of intcllectionis equivalentto the breakthrough in the direction of ncw

categories framing the comprehension of thesocial. These categories enable and demand anabandonment of the assumption that there is an

actor oran

action behind social communica-tion. They allow the positing of a specific,autonomous, anonymic, non-aggregative objec-tivity. Such objectivity is no more ontologicallyprojectible. It requires the framework of atransformed systemism. centred on the inher-

ently circular, self-differentia) entity whichLuhmann continues to call a system,. The new

subject-object of sociology - the social - iscommunication as a system. Communication is

the last constituent of the social, behind which

there are neither actors nor things, but onlyoperations. These are the sole. variously specifi-able constituents of all communicative systems.

2. Figures of thought

Differential self-actuationI have followed Luhmann on his way from the

receptionof systems

organization theoryto his

elaboration of systemic rationality. I saw thatwhat was to be thought could not be conceived

along the classical ontological schemes ofobjectivation. The kinds of objects that cameto the fore were paradoxical in the sense that

they could not be thought of as identities orunities, bearing extrinsic relations to theirenvironments, but as system-environment du-alities with an asymmetrical anchoring of the

self-position of the duality in the system. Thiswas the abstract frame of systemic rationality.which had to enable us thinking organizationaldevices, active or sedimented intelligence as

ambiguous contributions to the systems stabi-

lity as well as instability. When boundaries are

de-spatialized to become the expression of theself-difference of the system (as system-envir-onment) in the system (as building a self-

identity), the system enshrines in itself its own

negation. It becomes a circular dynamic chose

potentialities flow from the internalization of itsenvironment (non-self) in itself. That is howorder is built from noise: that is why the mainresources for stability and adaptation areinherent instability and variety and why tivedoptimality is suboptimal and diverse suboptim-ality a major asset for evolution.

This access to the problematic of asymme-trical self-identity of system from Luhmannsinitial preoccupation with organization theory

is a convenient one and yet, importantly, not the

only one possible. Luhmanns early - and afortior-i later - work is not restricted to thistheme and contains already a series of more

general as well as different perspectives. Never-

theless, where law or politics, power or valuesare at stake, the systems theoretical approachtransforms the traditional problem positionsthrough discovering the underlying paradoxicalstructures. Thus. the juridical code (lawful/unlawful) can itself be neither lawful norunlawful: the medium of politics, power, livescommunication ally from its non-use: values area sort of complexity stoppers, instrumented tocover the self-reference of all orders of meaning.

Throughoutthese

examples,the fundamental

theoretical difficulty is that systems are inher-ently incotnplete and made unstable throughtheir differential structures.

I should, however, insist on the passagefrom ( 11 the classical representation of a systemas a unity with an immanent order facing anenvironment which acts on it. thus promotingor inhibiting the unfolding of its order structure:to (2) a differential representation where theorder unit is that of an

asymmetricallyretlected

difference order/non-order. The contrast bringsout the features of the end term.Actually, theinvolved relational and theoretical structure in

this term is not unprecedented. It is part of astock of very special, rarely used figures Iencounter in the philosophical tradition fromAristotle to Heidegger. Where such figuresappear, they are regularly associated with a

daring and violent effort to think at a challen-

ging level of originarity and against habits ofintuitive thought. I will discuss two such figuresin unequal detail. The first. which I call the

originary self-positing self-identity, is the oneat stake here: the second is the one I call the

Ntit--17c)llzlig structure, meaning a structurewhose terms are contracted in a sole self-

contained act or effectuation (this figure engulfsthe first one and will be explained in moredetail l.

My main purpose in this article is to show

how Luhmanns most central theses can be read

instructively by means of such a structural

commentary of the engaged tigures of thought.The objects of my attention are then those

figures of thought - I could say lociisrnoi - thatmake possible a radical transformation of the

problem vision. My logismological approachfocuses on the constitution and performance ofsuch figures and in this sense, it has certainat1inities with I~1111t11~ttltl~s theory-building as a



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emerging with the most elementary position of

something. These laws must be situated at alevel preceding the level of expression graspedby classical logic. Protologic denotes, thus, inour context, the logic implied in the most

general act of appearance or position of asomething (a form). It reveals our internal

knowledge of the structure of the world ( lays ofForm 1969:xiiil. The form, as it is understood bySpencer Brown, is prior to anything logic canthematize at its own levels of generality. It is tobe thought of as lying at such a depth oforiginarity and generality as to be beyond thepoint of simplicity where language ceases to actnormally (ibid. :xx). It, then, resists expression

(il)id.), whereas logic is something discursiveabout which I can talk and which I canobjectivize. 233

To be sure, and this is a point I have alreadynoted, Brownian protologic is not the onlyapproach Luhmann draws upon in order tothink systems as differences and not as res.Luhmanns own method commanded a diversi-

fication of the contributions integrated into the

theory, in order to raise its incongruity and curb

the tendency towards massively unifyingand

potentially re-ontologizing concepts. Neverthe-less, Spencer Brown becomes gradually thedominant reference of the late theory, which

develops into an observation theory based onthe Brownian concept of difference as a bilateral

concept (~n~ei-Seiten-Forml. This evolution is not

altogether advantageous. Browns logic is still avery poorly elucidated theory waiting for agenuinely appropriating reception. Yet, Luh-mann works with it as if it were not

onlycommon knowledge, but as if one had fullygrasped the transformation of the deep ontolo-gical structure it induces. In his texts, the sameconcise, schematic hint at Spencer BrownsLaws of Form suffices to justify the most abstractconcepts and the shorthand-like exposed argu-ments. This is the reason why I think that Ishould try to build an analogical space as mucharound Spencer Browns protologic as Luh-manns use of it. For this purpose, I turn to the

philosophical tradition as a reservoir of mostinstructive figures of thought. The advantage ofthe philosophical references is that they bringwith them the necessary diachronic and histor-

ical depth severely needed for the clarification of

categorial revisions.Fichtes deduction of the asymmetrical self-

difference structure and of its reflexive entan-

glements is instructive because it reminds usthat the main difficulties of theorizing on an

originary-structural level are twofold: (1) tothink from a theoretical site lying beforeexperience in a transcendental world withouttime and without objective firmness; and (2) tothink in a world of pure actuality without time

and without objective products of activity.Despite the fact that Luhmanns theory doesnot develop on any transcendental ground, itsfigures of thought still have many essentialfeatures in common with the apriorical tradi-tion. The theoretical constructs shaped in thistradition as groundwork of all subsequentempirical acting and experiencing have a sortof homological counterpart in an enlargedsystems theory. This is even more the case as

systems theory integrates protological compo-nents and is shaped in such a manner as tobecome a sort of universal theory of objects .24 Itis actually inescapable that at a certain level oforiginarity - which we could call protological,and where we would situate most aprioricaltheories - heterogeneous schemes share in aseries of figures. The instance of Fichtesdeduction shows how a thought taking placeat the emerging point of things, at an observa-tion site

revealing their most universal features.is forced into unintuitive, highly reflexive.contracted paths. One should see that Luh-nmnns theory is not just a sociological theory ofa particularly high generality. It should be seenthat such a theory incorporates a very central

protological dimension. Taken seriously, this fact

changes the basis of the theory reception. It isthus hopeless to try to make sense of the theoryof self-referential social systems, above all when

theyare conceived of as

nothingbut

operations.while occulting the protological problematic.

Circular actuality (Nur-Vollzug)Let us now examine more accurately some

important moments of the figure of thoughtelaborating on the self-difference structure. Inthe course of my commentary on Fichtes

deduction, I said that the main pressure bendingthought into counter-intuitive, highly com-

pactedpatterns originates from the twofold

necessity of abstracting time and the necessityto reabsorb all intuitively - i.e. extensivelyposited - terms into one or a few (verbal)1actual aspects of a circular process. I now show

that this figure of contraction of extensive termsin actual effectuation < 14>11=ii g ) is not specific tothe transcendental tradition, but is also requiredin other philosophical approaches confrontedwith problems of the composite constitution of

specific beings. Concerning Luhmann, the pre-



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sent stage of my discussion will offer aninstructive specification of his general concep-tion of system as a differential non-entity. It willtake the form of a commentary on its most

fundamental, most pregnant statement: nur

Kommunikation kann kommunizieren (onlycommunication can communicatesI begin with a presentation of the figure as

it is elaborated byAristotle, in crucial develop-ments of his psychological theory. 21 It is thecentral figure of the act theory of the soul,which solves the major problems of the preced-ing doctrines. The theory reacts to the quasi-mythological treatment of psychology by Plato.forwhom the soul is a composite being extendedover several

heterogeneous domainsand

whoseunity seemed ever since problematic. It istopologically dispersed and its heterogeneousparts are thought of as co-existing and often

interacting with each other in a global space.The question for Plato was that of the unitingdomination (11egemondn) of one part over theother or all others within this plurality.Z

7

Aristotle simplifies the stratificatory scheme ofthe soul into three main parts: a vegetative

(growthand

decaywithout

motion),an animal

(autonomous motion and sense) and an intel-lectual (knowledge) part. He then resolves the

problem of the unity of the strata in superiorliving beings like animals or men in anaudacious and straightforward manner. He

rejects the idea of cumulative stratificatoryendowments and brings to the fore an actual-effectual or verbal concept of form, whichtransforms the problem: the soul (psyche) is theform (eidos) of the

living bodyin the sense that it

is the act (the realized dynamis, the energeia) ofliving, which is its perfection (entelecl1eia). In thesoul of a human being there are not threepartial souls or three psychic floors interrelatedthrough the material being they animate. Thereis only one act, through which the living humanbeing lives and realizes his being ( tois z6isi to zneinai, esse viventibus vivere, De anima 415b:14).Each time this act is specified as vegetative(when man sleeps), animal (when he perceives)or intellectual (when he thinks). The life of sucha being is effectuated (actually realized) in onesole act of being, which is here life in itsvegetative, animal or intellectual form. There isno need to multiply the involved beings.

The act theory dispels all forms of beingwhich are not actual-effectual (Vollzug), i.e. allforms of already given res-like beings. Thetheory transforms the comprehension of beingas presence of objects (frozen products of once

enacted being) in their multiplicity, factualdiversity and dispersion into that of an originaryactus esseridi. There is a transformation of the

thick-setting of an extensive, transitive multi-moment structure into a circular intransitive,

internally effective, unique-moment structure.The logico-grammatical triadic structure ofoperator-operatio-operatwn must be counter-

intuitively compacted into a monadic structurewith one last irreducible component, the

operatio.A step must be made to cut behindthe current logical and linguistic settings oftriadic ontic evidence and to attain to the

protological founding dimension of the sole-operation structure. The act theory invokes the

originary ontological ground, out of whicha

reality emerges, whose obscured perceptionbreaks its primal collection (Sanztnlting) andscatters its vivid core into cooled disjectedmembers.

The problem created by such an analogybetween Aristotles act theory in its moderninterpretation and Luhmanns operation the-

ory is that of the limits beyond which boththeories are no more comparable. Massive

misinterpretationslurk, should the

analogybe

loaded with more than it bears.Aristotles form

actuality is metaphysical in the sense that it isnot a historically or a self-organizationallyemerging operation, but is the actuating of a

primarily actual essence. It is not an arbitrarydistinction, a contingent split on the worldssurface. TheAristotelian actuality is essential.It is also strictly unitary and self-sufficient. Itscircularity is not differential or paradoxical; it is

sphericaland

global.No form-act refers to

another form-act or to an environing non-act,the difference to whom is reflected in the form-

act itself. However, if these are the restrictionsto be made on my analogy, the analogy itselfremains pertinent as an elucidation of theactual-effectual figure which is decisive inLuhmanns categorial revision of sociology.While the Fichtean deduction could help us tounderstand the asymmetrical three-step pro-cess (position of system as concomitant withthe position of difference to an unmarkedenvironment and reflection of the difference

as core operation of the system) as a proto-logical untemporal unique circularity: the

Aristotelian figure gives us a key for under-standing more than the actual-effectual aspectsof the resorption of extensive terms into one

operative structure, already partially enlight-ened by the comparison with Fichte. It ismainly interesting for the invaluable contribu-



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tion it offers to the understanding of thecouplings between different operation types,that is, different systems.

The relatedness and dependency of thebrain autopoiesis8 to the autopoiesis of con-

sciousness, as well as the relatedness of thelatter to the autopoiesis of communication, canbe explained in terms very much analogous toAristotles act theory. Only communication cancommunicate, meaning that consciousness - aswell as the brain - cannot: this refers to an

actual contraction necessary to think the form

as act. There is no place for whatever multi-

plicity in theAristotelian scheme because theentities at stake are not objective (res-like), but

actual-effectual ( Uollzug). Multiplicity is theco-

existence of many different items at a time, in a

space. Prime actuality - or protological pro-cesses - are non-spatial and are untemporal inthe sense that they are not in time as in a pre-existing space. They are, on the contrary.themselves time-generative. There is thus no

place, on the originary ground, for a multiplicityof acts. The actiis essencdi of a living being is lifeand that of a thinking living being is thinking

(noein).There is no

stratification, orderingthe

acts of being, life, vegetation, perception andintellection as a multiplicity in space or time,

arranging their cumulation at the higher levels.In the action theoretical framework, the most

specific act is always and alone the actual one.All others, underlying ones, are there, in it.

They are superseded by its actual specificity sothat their actuation is its own.

Coupling of operativelevels

Aristotle proposed a detailed theory of the

couplings involved in the actual absorption oflower act dimensions within higher ones, in

particular the famous abstraction theory coup-ling perception and intellection through the

processing of sense data into intellectual

forms.29 It is not possible to expose it here, butwhat is sure is that the analogical setting of boththeories, Aristotles and Luhmanns, persistsaround their central logismic figures. Thus,Luhmann approaches the problematics of coup-ling as one of a contribution of the autopoiesis ofthe lower systems to the autopoiesis of the

higher ones. This contribution takes the form ofan entry of lower difference reflections in higherones without breaking the unity of the specificactual effectuation. When conscious material

(thoughts - Gedanken)30

enters communication,

it does so in the form of that material which

structurally stimulates the asymmetrical differ-

ence reflection that constitutes the communica-

tion acts. The conscious actuality entering thecommunicative actuality does not operate like amaterial component entering a material synth-esis. Consciousness is already fully and genu-

inely present in communication. Whencommunication is actuated, consciousness andcerebral life are as well. Aristotle had alreadystressed this presupposition relationship of thelower actuality by the higher one.31 In Luh-mannian terms: whereas only communicationcommunicates, there is no communication

without consciousness and no consciousness

without cerebral life.

The difference between the two visions lies

in Luhmanns conception of the absorption ofthe subordinate actuality in the effectuation ofthe more specific one in terms of contributionand stimulation. Since the lower actuality doesnot imply the realization of the higher one, sincee.g. consciousness is not already communica-tion, the coming to pass of communication mustbe specifically conditioned. Communication

being autopoietic, the continuous connectionof its operations from one instant to the next,

buildingmore or less coherent

sequences,is

purely communicative in nature. That meansthat each level of actuality is completelyautonomous in its sequence-building and

time-consuming operation. The system endureson the basis of self-motion and self-continuation

through the structural connectibility of its parts- each operation demanding the connection of anew one of the same actuality. The lower

actuality systems do not condition the operative

continuityof the

higherones - these would

otherwise not be autopoietic; rather they supplythem with the type of actuality they need,which is in turn transformed by them, througha specific reticulation into the higher typeactuality. The material out of which commu-nication is made is conscious Erlebnisse, sense

syntheses of the specific kind that I callconsciousness. These syntheses build the basicmaterial of communication by entering intothe higher syntheses specific to this higher typeof sense system.

Not all conscious syntheses enter, however,into the higher communicative ones, as thetransformation of conscious experience

(thought, in Luhmanns terminology) into

intersubjective communication is not itselfautomatic. Moreover, not all conscious synth-eses are equally appropriate to enter intocommunication - some being structurallyexcluded, like incommunicable, ineffable con-



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seems to be very close to Luhmanns view of the

operation as a prime constituent of the systemwith no guarantee of ontological identity andstability.

Through the flow of time, the concretions

of life, consciousness and communication arecooled forms of current continuous operations.These maintain transtemporally identifiable,functionally in fine advantageous operata. Thestability of the operata (a cell, a thought, aspecific communication such as a friendlyinteraction, a work conflict, a legal procedure)is nothing but the permanence, from instant toinstant, of the actual effectuation of the

corresponding operation. The operata have no

subsistence and no substance outside theoperation. But what then probabilizes coherent.enduring, system-building operations ratherthan anarchic, non-self-confirming, non-con-densing, instantly vanishing ones? WithinAristotles act theory, such a question isirrelevant. The act form is an ontologicallyfirm eidos, ever since, and self-identical under allconditions. Within de-ontologized frameworkslike systems theory, the tendency to condensa-

tion must be especially accounted for. Luh-manns proposal elaborates on the ground ofthe self-organization theory in a protologicaldifferentialist formulation. Thus, each differencethat scratches the surface of the world tends,from its prime event on, to iterate in a way thatbuilds a nucleus for redundancy as well as forvariation. Redundancy is the basic, variation-enabling process, while variation is the mar-ginal one. Both are the substance, the content of

the operative life pulsing in the constituted formthrough the time-matter flow. Each operation,from moment to moment, either confirms andcondenses further the form, or inflects its

wrapping movement and prepares the possible(not necessary)emergence of new forms. Thedouble trajectory of confirmation and variationis an unpredictable one. Predictions of evolutionhave some pertinence after bifurcation hasoccurred, in phases of necessary condensation

through strong redundancy,the

post-bifurcativephase being similar to theoretically initial ones.The nearer to the inaugural distinction, themore redundant operating is likely to prevail.The more virginal the ground where thedistinction is drawn, or the more originary thelevel of emergence, the more hasty and intenseare the processes of iteration. This is clear from

protological, form-theoretical premises: thereflection of the difference system-environmentwithin the

systemis

stronger,and enhances the

building of self-identity, when the environmentis not already so differentiated as to imposeinternal complexification of the system throughthe differentiation of diverse roles and functionswithin the latter. These processes are namelyfactors of variation that inflect the actuatedform in a number of directions. The systemicstructure is maintained as long as variationdoes not provoke a switch to a changed form,whose confirmation would require anew a highmeasure of shape- or structure-building redun-dancy.A major feature of Luhmanns systemsoperativity theory is finally its inversion of thestatus of structure (in all functionalist and

systemic theories) from one of a superordinated

commanding magnitude, whose stabilityenhancing is the finality of the functionalprocesses, to one of a flowing process with noreal anchoring in things. Structure reflects justthe temporary redundancy tendencies of opera-tions, with enslaving effects upon certainoperative sequences. 34

To sum up: a system would be a sort of

transtemporally stable whirlpool, a form main-tained in actuality through a constant bend of

its individual operative components into aglobal structure. The complex mechanismsthat link together or mutually indent thesuccessive operations are not deterministic.

They are inherently unstable because they aregrounded on paradoxes. These paradoxes arethe main source of systemic dis-equilibrium aswell as the main resources for complexity-building and actuality-furthering variation.

Pure eventThe last instantiation of the logismic figure of

Nur-Vollzug I would like to present before

closing this commentary on Luhmanns sys-temic operation could help us understand itsevential aspect. Operation happens as the

asymmetrical reflection of a difference in aform act. The products of this happening are

living beings, conscious contents and social

interchanges. Luhmanns theory tends todeconstruct these cooled

objectivitiesinto

their constituting operations. But as soon aswe leave the real-objective level for the

operative one, we face the problem of the

representability of protological complexes. Oneof the problematic aspects of thinkability of

originary operativity is the happening of pureoperations. What does it mean that an opera-tion happens or comes to pass? Once more theevocation of a philosophical figure is mostinstructive. It is

Heideggersdoctrine of



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Ereignis (event ).35

The idea of Ereignisrepresents the climax of the fundamental effortof Heidegger to think be (Sein) in its differenceto the being (Seiendes). This effort leads to a

complete verbalization of thought structures

with a concentration on building ways ofaccess to the non-objective, purely actualuniverse of prime reality. The main statementshave the form: Welt weltet, Nichts nichtet,

Ereignis ereignet, ist istet ...36 reminiscent ofthat fundamental structure of pure actualitywhere operator operatum and operatio arecontracted in a sole intransitive, internallyactual. circular act. Heideggers novelty isthat pure actuality is thought as ab-solute

finite, with no anchoring in any transcendentnor transcendental nor worldly reality. Being isthe pure event of itself, the gift of time and

being, winding in itself like an out-less finite

ring. The pure event is a circular event, a

coming into its own being (Er-eignen). Onceagain, the circular structure is a complex onewith a dual movement of giving time and beingto the reciprocal duality of themselves.

Luhmanns protological conception of a

self-sustaining operativity is certainly nearer tothe asymmetrical three-moment movement ofthe Fichtean deduction than to Heideggersdual, quasi-mystical movement of a self-givingbeing. The interest of the Heideggerian figure is,however, its insistence on the event character of

circular actuality. Its shaping of the eventmotive is one whose central stakes are the

saying of the gratuity of the givenness of the

given. Ereignis is irrelative and causeless. Thereis no transcendent nor

any otheractor

whodoes. makes or motivates the event. There is no

internal necessity eliciting it and unfolding itsmovement. Sole-actuality is eventual for Hei-

degger in the sense that its effectuation ( Uollzug)has no motive outside of itself. When it comes to

pass and endures through time and being, it isstill inaugurally motiveless, with no relation to

anything outside its pure event. This radicalityof the Heideggerian figure has no correspondentin Luhmanns

theory.Thus, my last analogical presentationdesigned to enrich my commentary on Luh-manns operational conception has to be muchmore contrastive than the preceding ones.Operations, the sole systemic constituents,happen, occur, in an already existing streamof specifically identical operations. Metabolic

processes, thoughts and communications cometo pass through insertion in such a stream,

connectingthemselves to

respectively adequate

and specific operations which are at thatmoment effective. This idea is developed byLuhmann along with a well-known theoreticaltopic, that of the connection or connectability(Anschluss,Anschlussf11igkeit. Anschliessbarkeit)

of current operations in systems. Thus, the pureoperativity of systems, though circular, is not

prime-eventual. Its protological description canshow it in status llascendi as emerging and

inaugural, and elucidate its structure, momentsand movement. It does not make any assump-tion on its prime event. Operative systems - inLuhmanns sense - appear then as structurallyor immanently unstable: they can never stopoperating, being, as I would say, tilted ahead

and ever searching adequate connection tooperate. They are literally pro-clivious, bentforward in a relentless concatenation with

similar entities. This ever-current connectingis nothing else than the effectuation of the

asymmetrical reflection of the differencebetween the system and its environment withinthe system. This difference can never attain the

status of an in itself quiescent unity. As anactual difference, it is continuously, unceasingly

in effectuation (in Vollzug). Thus, systemsconsisting in actual operations presupposethemselves. Their operations can never beginout of nothing, but always lack connection toother operations of the same autopoiesis inorder to happen. Each singular operation isstructurally referential of other operationsimmediately connected to it through a puzzle-like key mesh. The operations sequence isconcatenated through a sort of structural

intrusion of the end ofone

operationinto

thebeginning of the next.To be sure, the expression of this state of

things in terms of a beginning and end ofoperations is not very appropriate, though itreflects the fact that the circular process of the

singular operation refers constantly backwardsfrom its (protological) end moment to itsbeginning one. In a way each operation has a

part of itself pre-posited in an undeterminednext

operation, specified throughthe

keyfit

characteristic of the relevant autopoiesis.An

operation of social communication cannot beconnected with an operation of life or ofconsciousness, as none of the moments of the

autopoiesis of life nor of consciousness are ableto fit between the circularly organized momentsof the communication operation, i.e. informa-tion, impartation and comprehension. Eachoperation of a specific autopoiesis hosts in itselfthe reference to a

homopoietical operation



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under the form of an entangling intrusion oftheir different moments in the circular processof their effectuation. 37

3. The world problem

Although contrasting with such an embedded-ness of the advent of the like in the stream of

ever-actuated like, the Heideggerian event con-cept still has illuminating aspects. It actuallyshows the thought of Nur-Vollzug in a state offull completion. Unfolding its immanent motivesand making explicit its internal horizons, pureoperativity would tend to these extremes of pure

eventuality.Acutely elaborating on the proto-logical structures, Luhmanns approach is, forits part, not blind to the problem of pureeventuality. In its terms, the problem of theevent of circular actuality would be a world

problem, outreaching the scope of a theory ofsociety - however radical the theory may be inits categorial casting of pure, internal-intransi-tive, circular operativity. The achieving piece ofNur-Vollzug thought is the reflection of an aspect

of reality which hints towards a horizon thatout-ranges, and in a way engulfs the horizon ofall- and self-engulfing communication.

The world problem of world event is,however, like everything having sense, a poten-tial object of social communication. It can beindicated, discussed, referred to.Any emergenceof it is socially constructed. In contrast to allother constructions of communication, it is.

however, something that directly hits upon the

paradoxical, self-eluding, circular limitations ofsocial communication itself. It unites all the

paradoxity of the latter in one enigma and givesit the name of the sole horizon of all its horizons,that is, the world. Social communication beingthe ultimate envelope of itself cannot cross

beyond itself. However, it does not reflect thisself-limitation as a problem of communicationitself, i.e. as a social problem. Communicationreflects its paradoxical character as a whole in

the form ofa

(non-social) world problem.It

shows, then, in its most paradox forms like art3s

or religion, that there still is a problem that isnot its own.A problem that is neither a part of itnor coextensive with it, but definitely largerthan it. It is the problem of a sphere thattranscends communication and should not be

confused with any sphere of the incommunic-able within communication. We have seen that

conscious experience, especially when very inti-mate and intense, is not

easilycommunicable.

Other spheres of meaning do not motivatecommunication adequately. Besides, there is awhole shadow domain of communication which

is structurally incommunicable: a communica-tion can never impart, in its own act, the

impartation quality of this same act.39Awholestream of non communication is thus co-current to that of communication, buildingthe non attainability of the whole of commu-nication to itself.40 These are the paradoxes ofpure operativity as structurally pro-clivious andunending. Besides these specific paradoxes,communication hosts, very centrally, another

type of communication that does not reflect

problems of its self-reference, but the fact that

although all-engulfing and self-contextual,communication is not the largest horizon ofbeing. Communication, thus, contains the most

paradoxical hint towards a world, larger thanit is. The extreme of paradox is thus reached in acommunication - which could be, like silence, a

renunciation of communication - that shows

beyond itself. World problems are problems ofthe pure eventuality of ever-streaming pureoperativity. They are not those of self-reference

of communication, but those of the self-refer-ence of the givenness of a world for it.41

1

4. Social communication: a concept for

refounding sociology

Our exploration of Luhmanns version of

systems theory showed it as a radical transfor-mation of the initial model through a new

shaping of its central categories. The main lineof thought commanding this categorial revisioncould be characterized as a programme of

universal de-ontologization viewed as historial

necessity. My endeavour was to shed some lighton the ways and motives that led to the final

centring of the whole theory upon the conceptof operation. I have proceeded by establishingsome conjunctions of Luhmanns approachwith philosophical theories, all of which docu-mented efforts to conceive the

emergenceof

fundamental structures of meaning at proto-logical levels. The convergence of these theoriestowards a de-realization (Ent-dinglicirung - or de-substantivization) of current ontological cate-

gories was in itself instructive. Thus, mostefforts went in the direction of a counter-

intuitive thinking of internal-intransitive, cir-cular, effectual actuality. I brought them underthe logismic title of Nllr- Vollwg. WhereasLuhmanns

theorystands somewhat alone in



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contemporary sociology and seems thereforeerratic and incomprehensible, my procedureallowed me to situate it in a line of philosophicalthought. The trajectory of the reviewed figuresof sole-operation could lead us, in an altogether

ordered way, from the first shapings of thesystem-operation motive within the complexityproblematics to the last of its reflections in theworld problem.

Let us venture a last remark on the

sociological interest of such a theory of socialcommunication. Its primary level reveals itself.once more, as very remote from the traditional

settings of social theory - and not only itsempirical ones. It would thus further the

scepticism of those who feel that its entryrights are prohibitively high. Moreover, while

showing the strong stimulation such a generaltheory receives and exerts on the specifically a

priori theorizing of neighbouring philosophy, myinterpretation could have enhanced the opinionof its marginal sociological fertility. My thesiswould here be that a sound approach toLuhrnanns design cannot do mithout a miniifium

of philosophicnl analysis of its theoretical pre-

mises. Suchan

analysis should deliver acharacterization of the nature and level of theinvolved concepts. We should avoid self-delusion

and recognize the basic evidence that the groundon which Llljlnl(inrlS theory stands - and falls - isprotological. Protologicity. as practised by Luh-mann, is a very new and peculiar setting for

forging primary categories, conceptual archi-tectures and descriptive frameworks. Whereasclassical sociology could lean on philosophical

groundwork (Simmel and Weberon neo-

Kantianism, Scheler and Schutz on phenomenol-ogy, etc.), Luhmann inaugurates a new type ofrelation between a theory of society and thefoundational or categorial work of philosophy.He rejects any reliance on a global philosophicalposition. Instead, he combines a multiplicity oftheoretical pieces to a conception of highabstraction and logical priority. The protologicalstatus of the whole synthesis is not always clear.Yet,

myconviction is that the central

piecesof

the theory are protological, and hence require a

philosophical elucidation.Actually, protologic isa sort of unidentified transcendental logic whichis poorly established and whose contours arestill very ambiguous. I can see no way to

dispense with a philosophical elucidation of itsstatements.

Admittedly, all this being done, the ques-tion remains as to the concrete returns of a

theoryso

costlyin terms of

conceptualelabora-

tion and so remote from the fields of its

acknowledged objects. My thesis is that themain and most potent acquisition of Luhmanns

theory is the concept of social communication.To make clear what I suggest, I would compare,

in strictly epistemological terms, Freuds inven-tion of the Unconscious with Luhmanns

construction of social communication. 42 Thebasic epistemological feature they share is thatboth concepts embody a sort of coming tothemselves of their respective disciplines.

Actually, both social communication and theunconscious are primary object concepts, cir-

cumscribing the proper theme of a specificscience. As the phenomenological thorough

theorizing of these matters has shown, suchprojections of specific objectivities are nothingless than inductive. They represent fundamentalEtitik,tit-fe (castings) of primary objects, impul-sing a decisive differentiation of the scientific

discipline at stake and establishing it on a newbasis. They open unsuspected horizons fortheory-building, allowing a much farther-reaching inspection of their objective domains,as well as a much more rigorous formulation of

their accounts. They are prior to any set ofobservations or cognitions, and have somethingof a founding performance.

Our suggestion is to consider the Luhman-nian concept of social communication as an

inaugurative performance endowing sociologywith its proper object: the social. In the samemanner, Freuds Unconscious represented anew foundation of psychology on the basis of a

recasting of the psychic. The analogy holds in a

very pertinentmanner.

The problem of psychol-ogy at the beginning of the 20th century was,from a psychoanalytical point of view, thedominance of I-centred, introspective and cog-nitive thematizations of the psychic. The psychicas an objectivity was featured in a massivelyontological manner, supposing a firm, self-identical and individual mental entity. The

concept of the Unconscious anonymized the

psychic entity, transforming it in a bundle of

processes governed bya

complexaffectual

economy. We can observe in Luhmanns theorya similar aversion from individualistic ontologyand a striking analogy with the anonymizingeffects of the position of an anthropologically de-centred - or de-anthropologized - third person,non-mechanical processual object. The limits ofthese similarities between both castings of de-individualized, centre- and nameless primaryobjects, is that the Freudian Unconscious hasbeen often

thoughtof as an

objective entity



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existing somewhere - a sort ofAtlantis dis-covered by a good-hearted man who, after along search, came across it. From a Luhman-nian point of view, Freuds casting of the psychicwas not thoroughly de-ontologizing. For this

purpose, the Unconscious should have beenthought as a difference and not as an identity.43

3

However, on the whole, we can maintain the

analogy and insist on the autonomizing and

fertilizing effects of the switch, in both psychol-ogy and sociology, to anonymous and auton-omous primary objects who allow theobservation of a level of reality in its own

right. Psychic life is no more an aggregate ofconscious or cognitive mental states than social

interchange is an aggregate of individualactions. The contribution of Niklas Luhmannto a refoundation of sociology on the basis of a

proper primary objectivity not only delivers theconcept of such a specific object, but also a

highly reflexive, epistemological and protologi-cal theory thematizing all central processes ofany de-ontologization project. My purpose herewas to show how the idea of a circular,

internally actual operation constitutes the coreof such a

theory.First version received July 1999

Final version accepted September 1999

Notes

1Luhmanns first articles bear testimony to this conscious-ness, where the Uberholtsein der uberlieferten metaphysischen

Bestimmung der Wahrheit von ontologischen Pramissen her(Luhmann 1962-1, 63) is stated as the basis for a profoundtransformation in the dogmatic structure of social beliefs.2A political project, a juridical dogmatics, the perception of

or the acting in a market, a scientific theory, a game. a conflict... all are conceived as self-descriptions of social communica-tion, constituting modes of representing the world withincommunication as well as modes of experiencing or actingrelated to it.

3The text (Derrida), consciousness (Husserl), language or

logic (Saussure. Spencer Brown) are other figures of the same

protological paradigm.4A formulation Luhmann uses in

biographical interviews:weil... man als Soziologe alles machen kann, ohne auf einenbestimmten Themenbereich festgelegt zu sein (1987-141)

5Parsons systemism was in many respects too narrow. too

essentialist for that purpose, lacking the main characteristics ofthe required theory, namely high reflexivity. For a reconstruc-tion and critique of Parsons essentialism, see Clam (1999:142-

150).6

The relevant literature is immense. The theoretical

sophistication has been ever-increasing. Organization theoryand its literature remained a constant source of inspiration for

the later Luhmann - until recently, where the evolutionaryproblematic in the chapter Evolution of Die Gesellschaft der

Gesellschaft (Luhmann 1997) was developed partially on thebasis of such literature

7The major reference in Luhmanns work is definitely

Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalitt (1973). Yet Legitimation durch

Verfahren (1969). where the rationality of subordinate, micro-final devices like procedures is theorized, is also interesting.

8See

Clam (1997), thefirst

partof which is dedicated to

Luhmanns early work.A stimulating discussion of Luhmannsadministration and organization theory is Dammann et al.(1994).

9That is, reacting to its own variation.10As checked disorder11It should be noted that the double contingency scheme is

the paradigm of whatI would call the indefinite generativity of

paradox It is the genus, so to speak, of all other reflexive

paradoxes like, for instance, that of the circular making of law

through legal procedures. See on this latter circularity the

enlightening work of G. Teubner (1989).12Imake a terminological distinction between sponta-

neous and self-organizing order.I understand spontaneousprocesses as reproducible, whereas self-organizing order is

emergent, coming but once to pass and self-encaging.13We could call it the principle of das Feste wird . auf

das Flieende gegrundet (found the solid upon the flowing.Luhmann 1962 190).

14

Using the terms of the phenomenological eptstemologyof Husserl and Heidegger.

15One should always insist on the fact that Luhmanns

invention does not proceed like an abstract, apriorical deduc-tion. It is nurtured through the evidence coming from

constructivistically reconceived sciences (like attribution theoryin psycho-sociology) and is developed along the lines of atheoretical sociology - and not those of an aprioric philosophy.

16Like those of the sequencing(Sequenzierung) of notions

and arguments in circular or reticular topics, or those of the

sense and scope of abstraction in general theory (cf. Luhmann1979:170-177).

17Succeeding Platos distinction of different levels of

philosophizing, the top of which is the Platonic dialectic.Aristotles prt philosiphia is a research on how being revealsitself as being; a research upon the most fundamental. i.e.

categorial. ground of our world comprehension.18The Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre of 1794 is

the most detailed exposition of the system However, theGrundriss des Eigenthumlichen der Wissenschaftslehre of 1795contains, at its beginning, a very brief and clear presentation ofthe figure I am discussing. We quote from the first edition of the

Werke (1834-35. 1845-16).19The I is understood by Fichte as a pure activity (reine

Thtigkeit) (Grundlage 1, 6), where the actor(das Handelnde)and its product (die That) sind eins und dasselbe (are one andthe same thing: 1. 6). The same passage implicitly identifiesdas Handelnde (the actor) and die Handlung (the action). This is a

very clear token of the underlyingNur-Vollzug structure that Idiscuss later.

20No need to say that our presentation of Fichtean

deduction is a most cursory one. The exegesis of the extremelydense principles(Grundstze) of the deduction fills an extendedliterature. I concentrate, in our interpretation, on the central

and consensually acknowledged figure of thought(logismos).Afew hints at the literature may suffice: P Rohs (1991).brings an

interesting image to illustrate the activity-based conception oftheI like a photon which is nothing when stripped of itsmovement, the I is nothing besides its actual activity (p. 53,

Thathandlung being the identity of Tat (activity) and Handlung(product of the activity): Hans-Jurgen Muller (1980:120ff.)stresses the problems of the sequenciation of circular activityunder the title of symbolic narrative (the Thalhandlung being



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78

explained in the deduction symbolisch erzhlend) as well as thefact that the Thathandlung of the I is the paradigm of everyposition(setzen); Dieter Henrich (1982) brings into discussionthe later (1801) Fichtean formula an activity whom an eye has

been implanted (p. 75ff.) which would fit very well into our

interpretation -however, he proposes a divergent assessment ofit; Reinhard Lauth (1984:19ff.) analyses very accurately the

doubling of self-reflection/determination and hetero-determina-tion in one unique act(Vollzug or Selbstvollzug).

21The transcendental philosophy of consciousness is no

longer modelled on the perfect and divine intellectus originarius,of whom the human intellect represents a derivative form

(intellectus derivativus). Thus far, the statement that worldliness

begins with a finite subjectivity does not prejudge the givennessor not givenness of a pre-worldly consciousness.

22First edition: London (1969); second edition: New York

(1972) containing some significant complements.23A recent discussion of Spencer Browns logic with a clear

link to Luhmanns revival of its central stakes is to be found in

the two volumes edited by Dirk Baecker (1993a, b).24

The allgemeine Gegenstandstheorie in the manner ofthe pure Logistik of the beginning does not reach such deeporiginary levels as Spencer Browns protologic It doesnt reallypropose a theory of purely actual, paradoxical and circular

objects25

The context of the statement is the following: AberMenschen konnen nicht kommunizieren, nicht einmal ihre

Gehirne konnen kommunizieren, nicht einmal das Bewusstsein

kann kommunizieren. Nur die Kommunikation kann kommu-

nizieren (in the chapter entitled Wie ist Bewusstsein anKommunikation beteiligt? Luhmann 1995b:37).

26

The main text is De anima (especially Book II:412a-b,414a). Our interpretation draws on Inciarte (1970), Frede &

Patzig (1988) and Liske (1985).27

Plato, Republic 436a, 544e, 580d-e, 588c-e: Timaeus

69c-e.28Autopoiesis means, in our context, self-producing

circular actuality and activity.29

Cf Hamelin (1953).I suppose thatAnstotle, with his

theory of the totalizing unity of the most specific form act,resolved the problem of the coupling between the principle ofintellectual knowledge and that of animation of the body. For adetailed study of the long groping search for that solution, see

Nuyens (1948)30 I would like to add, in the wide sense of all conscious

experience(Erlebnisse). However, Luhmanns texts on con-

sciousness occult the affective domain of conscious expenence.31

With the exception that pure intellects are not onlyconceivable, but really exist with no anchoring in animal or

vegetative life.32

To avoid confusion I translate the second moment of the

communication(Kommunikation) operation, namely Mitteilung,as impartation - rendered otherwise most naturally into

English communication. Impartation has the advantage of

replicating with relative fidelity the etymological composition ofthe German word - an advantage the word utterance (the

adopted rendering in English translations of Luhmann) does nothave.

33Furth (1978, quoted in Liske 1985:256).34

These effects have drawn the attention of the self-

organization theorists. On this point, cf. Schweitzer (1997).Most impressive examples of redundancy in initial phases of self-

organizing processes are paths (or tracks: Wege).35

The basic text is Zur Sache des Denkens (1969).As for

Fichte andAristotle, a thorough penetration of the philosophicalnotion requires a much greater textual basis, extending to theentire corpus.

36One can easily figure how embarrassing the translation

of such nominal-verbal doublets is. World worlds, nothingnothings, event events, is ises ... reflect quite accurately the

challenging violence done to language in the German of the

original text37

Empirically, all systems are described as being always ina state of operative ongoing.

38I mean the figure of art which Luhmann calls world artin distinction from all other art configurations. World art is theform of art characteristic of our differentiated societies, where

art has no reference outside itself. concentrating its self-creatingmission and paradoxity on the closure of the work of art itself onitself. See Luhmann (1990, 1995a).

39It cannot convey or communicate its own intention-

ality (communication quality), because the intentionality of the

intentionality communicating act would, while this latter is ineffectuation. itself be still veiled - awaiting a higher act of

explicitation, whose intentionality again would have to beunveiled...

40Erreichbarkeit (attainability) of social communication

forms a consistent topic in Luhmanns theory (1997, ch. 5).Ithas been explicitly thematized by Fuchs (1992)

41Luhmann does not make a clear distinction between

communicational paradoxes and world problem. World, as the

all-engulfing unity of difference(Einheit der Differenz), is what isconcomited(mitgefuhrt) in the paradoxes of communication. I

opted for a formal distinction as a means of giving a higherprofile to a world problem that is not just silently concomitantwith current communication, but takes form as such and for

itself A basic Luhmannian text dealing with the world

problematic is Reden und Schweigen (1989).42

What is at stake is not on any account an assessment of

the scientificor

cultural repercussions of both. That would beobviously mistaken, the weight of the Luhmannian theorybeing, in this respect, rather modest when compared to that ofFreudian psychoanalysis.

43Moreover, the energetic economy of psychic life by Freudis still too mechanistic, that is, not complex enough to enable the

emergence of a difference theoretical theorizing.

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