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2011 37: 351 originally published online 31 January 2011Crit SociolPoe Yu-ze Wan

Systems Theory: Irredeemably Holistic and Antithetical to Planning?

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Systems Theory:

Irredeemably Holistic andAntithetical to Planning?

Poe Yu-ze WanNational Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan

Abstract

In this article, Niklas Luhmanns pessimistic view of steering [Steuerung] and planning in modernsociety is contrasted with Mario Bunges advocacy of technoholodemocracy (or integraldemocracy) and some core ideas of the critical social systems theory as developed by ChristianFuchs and others. Before that, the holistic leanings of Luhmanns autopoietic approach, asexemplified by such notions as structural coupling and total exclusion [Totalausschluss], are briefly

examined. I argue for a systems approach that is ontologically sound (that is to say, transcendingboth holism and individualism), with due consideration given to the role of human actors indesigning, maintaining, improving, repairing or dismantling social systems. As the writings of Bunge

and critical social systems theorists bear witness, a systems approach does not have to sacrificehuman agency to blindly self-unfolding social systems.

Keywords

critical social systems theory, emergence, holism, Mario Bunge, Niklas Luhmann, planning, self-

organization

Introduction

In his 1998 letter to Mario Bunge, the late Charles Tilly wrote:

Since you recognize systems wherever you see multiple elements and that influence each other, I haveno difficulty accepting your baptism of my thinking as systemic. In my end of the business, however(I studied with Parsons and Sorokin, among others) the word system so regularly takes on thingnessindependent of the elements and their relations that I boycott the word to avoid misunderstanding. (Citedin Bunge, 2009: 22)

In another context, Tilly (2002: 569) laments that [s]ystem explanations have lost ground insociology since the days of Pitirim Sorokin and Talcott Parsons, but they still figure prominentlyin some sorts of organizational analysis and demography. Tillys distrust of the concept of

Corresponding author:Poe Yu-ze Wan, Graduate Institute of Sociology, National Sun Yat-sen University, No. 70, Lienhai Rd., Kaohsiung 80424,

Taiwan

Email: [email protected]

Article

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352 Critical Sociology 37(3)

system is shared by numerous social theorists.1 Indeed, after the decline of Parsonss sociologicaltheory of structural functionalism, Luhmanns Systemtheorie came to be seen as the major repre-sentative of systems thinking. The holistic leanings of Luhmanns theory and its pessimistic attitudetowards any form of human intervention into social systems have therefore inclined radical social

theorists to distance themselves from systems thinking tout court.This identification of Luhmanns approach with systems theory itself, however, is problematic,since the latter has always been characterized by its diversity. This article will mainly draw on twoless well known versions of systems theory the Argentinian-Canadian philosopher Mario Bungessystemism, and the critical social systems theory as developed by Wolfgang Hofkirchner, ChristianFuchs and others to argue againstLuhmann as regards the relation between systems theory andholism, and the possibilities of deliberate intervention and planning (or steering in Luhmannsterms). In so doing, I suggest that the concept of system, with appropriate treatment and conceivedin less holistic terms, remains a legitimate and indispensible concept, and it is possible for criticalsociology to make use of an alternative systems approach that attaches sufficient importance to

human agency by bringing into focus the notion of a democratic, participatory, self-organized societybased on a form of flexible and decentralized planning.

Niklas Luhmann as a Holist

It has been argued that Luhmanns systems theory is imbued with holistic (or collectivist) features.This criticism, however, need not be based exclusively on claims such as Luhmanns theorydevotes its greatest attention to social systems at the expense of people.2 It is in response to suchclaims, or what King and Thornhill (2003: 277) call the unreflected concept of human agency,that Luhmann writes:

If one views human beings as part of the environment of society (instead of as part of society itself), thischanges the premises of all the traditional questions, including those of classical humanism. It does notmean that the human being is estimated as less important than traditionally. Anyone who thinks so (andsuch an understanding either explicitly or implicitly underlies all polemics against this proposal) has notunderstood the paradigm change in systems theory. (Luhmann, 1995: 212)

Luhmann (1992b: 1422, in King and Thornhill, 2003: 279) even asserts that the theory ofautopoietic systems could bear the title Taking Individuals Seriously, certainly more seriouslythan our humanistic tradition. Taken as an individual, no human being can be part of any othersystems. If this is the case, on what grounds can Luhmanns approach be construed as holistic? A

more nuanced concept of holism (or collectivism), of course, holds the key to this question.The defining feature of holism is the view that the whole precedes and dominates the part, as a

consequence of which the former is more valuable than the latter (Bunge, 2003a: 101; see alsoBunge, 2000a: 399). Therefore a holist typically tackles every system as a whole, and refuses toanalyze it into its composition, environment, structure, and mechanism (Bunge, 2001: 43),3 and isreluctant to explain emergent properties of a system (at least in part) as the interaction of itscomponent parts. Manifest in Luhmanns construal of emergence is accordingly a strictly holisticapproach. As the German sociologist Bettina Heintz (2004: 22) keenly observes,

the concept of emergence in the theory design of Luhmann remains a kind of foreign body [Fremdkrper]

This is particularly true as regards the concept of communication and the distinction, which is fundamen-tal to the systems theory, between psychological and social systems. For Luhmann, communications areemergent units, which cannot come into being without consciousness processes [Bewusstseinsprozesse]

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but neither contain them nor are ascribable to them. From the perspective of systems theory, psychologicaland social systems are closed systems, which presuppose [voraussetzen] each other, but stand to eachother in an exclusive relation: an element belongs either to one or the other system; there are no doubleaffiliations [Doppelzugehrigkeiten].4

Heintz notes that for Luhmann, this is also the case with the mind-body problem: the body and themind are two operationally autonomous systems, which presuppose but do not include each other.In Luhmanns own words:

Whenever there is an emergent order, we find that the elements of a presupposed materiality- or energy-continuum [Materialitts- oder Energiekontinuums] are excluded. Total exclusion [Totalausschluss] is thecondition of emergence. (1992a: 141, cited in Heintz, 2004: 22)

But on what grounds does Luhmann assert that total exclusion is the condition of emergence?It seems that there exists only one possibility: Luhmann comprehends and defines emergence

entirely in terms of epistemological considerations.5 On such an interpretation, since the emergentorder cannot be deduced from or explained by lower-level entities and their properties, Luhmannsupposes that the emergent order (for example, the social system) totally excludes the context(for example, the psychological system) out of which that order arises, asserting that they do notinclude each other. Two exponents of Luhmann also explicate emergence from such a perspective:Emergence refers to the appearance of a qualitatively new order-level [Ordnungsebene], theproperties of which cannot be explained [erklrt] by the properties of the material and energy base[Unterbau] (Kneer and Nassehi, 1993: 64).6

In stark contrast, Mario Bunges systemism

combines the virtues of individualism and holism: It holds that all things are either systems or systemcomponents whether actual or potential. Thus, contrary to holism, systemism admits the possibility ofdecomposing wholes, either in thought (through conceptual analysis) or in practice. Hence, contrary toindividualism, systemism suggests focusing on systems and their interacting components rather than onthe latter. And, contrary to holism, systemism maintains that bulk properties, such as social cohesion, voterturnout, and public opinion, emerge from individual attitudes, actions, and interactions all of whichproceed, though, within given social contexts. (Bunge, 2009: 22, emphasis added)

On account of his exclusive emphasis on the distinction between system and environment, andhis utter inattention to such ontological questions as mereology, level and mechanism, systemsfor Luhmann are ultimately black boxes impervious to rational and systematic analysis. Systems arealways prioritized over their component parts. Such holistic leanings are all the more manifestas Luhmann chooses to ground his social systems theory in the conception of autopoiesis:Everything that is used as a unit by the system is produced as a unit by the system itself(Luhmann, 1990: 3). And it should be kept in mind that this holistic claim applies to all systemsrather than to social systems alone. What Luhmanns holism leaves aside are the component partsofany system.7

As a consequence, at the level of social ontology, a consistent Luhmannian will encounterdifficulties in spelling out the mechanisms through which a change in a part may cause a quali-tative change in the whole and conversely, as when an individual initiates a social movement,and when the latter drags along an individual (Bunge, 2003a: 101). The reason is that theLuhmannian approach, mainly for its lack of a rigorous ontological foundation, provides fewconceptual tools for comprehending such underlying mechanisms.8 In comparison, Bunges



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composition, environment, structure, and mechanism (CESM) model, along with his insistenceon the principles of rational emergentism,9 is better suited to the study of emergent phenomenaand systemic transformations.

Given that Luhmann (1995: 140) states that the relationship of human beings to social system is

one of interpenetration, the followers of Luhmann may well insist that theycan explain why humanbeings are able to influence or change society. But it is no less true that for Luhmann, human beingsare the environment of social systems (1995: 140), while social systems consist exclusively ofcommunications. This is why Luhmanns view is characterized as a dualistic systemic approach byChristian Fuchs (2008: 39) and as individual-society dualism by Wolfgang Hofkirchner (2006,2007).10 Let us examine in more detail the concept that purports to explain the relations betweensystems: interpenetration or structural coupling.11

Structural coupling, in Luhmanns usage, is a state in which two systems shape the environmentof the other in such a way that both depend on the other for continuing their autopoiesis andincreasing their structural complexity (Moeller, 2006: 19). In my view, such a concept makes

sense only in so far as the two systems in question are not in a part-whole relationship. For instance,my family and my best friends family may, under some circumstances (that is, contingently), beconstrued as structurally coupled. But the relation between myself and my family, of which I am apart, can by no means be described in this manner, because, at the ontological level, I am not theenvironment but an integral part of my family: the ways in which the members of a family interactwith each other are responsible for the emergent properties of the family as a system,12 renderingit cohesive and united in varying degrees.

Furthermore, even when two systems are indeed interpenetrated in Luhmanns sense, themechanisms by which they depend upon each other and co-evolve remain to be elucidated. Onlyby spelling out these mechanisms can we comprehend why structural coupling can have different

degrees ranging from low (loosely coupled) to high (strong, rigid coupling) (Fuchs and Collier,2007: 44). In other words, structural coupling serves primarily as a descriptive rather thanexplanatory concept.

Despite these criticisms, it does not follow that Luhmanns theory is trivial or worthless, nordoes it imply that the Luhmannian perspective always fails to generate insights. However, I amconvinced that the flawed treatment of ontological issues inherent in Luhmanns approach does setlimits to the extent to which successful causal explanations can be made. For instance, theLuhmannian approach cant adequately explain the bottom-up emergence of societal structuresand the top-down emergence of actions and behavior (Fuchs and Schlemm, 2005: 89). Furthermore,a defective (social) ontology (for example, holism) inevitably leads to serious socio-technological

consequences. Luhmanns underestimation of the role of human intervention in effecting socialchange is a revealing example.

The Socio-Technical Consequences of Social Systems Theory

In their critique of Luhmanns theory, Bunge and Mahner (2004: 252253) write:

Communication is certainly an important element of endostructure [i.e. the set of all the relations amongthe components] of the social system, but communication is a relation, and relations do not exist withoutrelata in this case human individuals. A humanless [menschenlose] theory of social systems is com-pletely inappropriate if not reprehensible regarding possible socio-technological consequences.

It is not alarmist but realistic for Bunge and Mahner to highlight the socio-technical consequencesof social systems theory. A notable example is Luhmanns comments on the protest movement



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[Protestbewegung]. As Fuchs remarks, in Luhmanns judgment, protest movements, as responsesto the functional differentiation of society, provide no alternatives. Worse, the protest is taken as anend in itself, and is therefore hazardous (Fuchs, 2006a: 124125, 2008: 3738. See also Blhdorn,2005: 2627, 2007). As an end in itself, the protest movement, or morally tinted communications

in Luhmanns phrase,13

does not burden itself with the responsibility of getting involved on theother side in order to practically achieve something there (Luhmann, 1996: 191, cited in Blhdorn,2005: 27). Obviously Luhmanns aim is to discredit social movements. When it comes to socialmovements, Luhmanns tone is chilly, sarcastic, if not downright hateful, for the participantsof these movements [pretend] to know better than society, which is impossible and at bestridiculous (sterberg, 2000: 16). This has led Takis Fotopoulos, a leading proponent of inclusivedemocracy [ ], to conclude that systems theory is of little value in socialstudies for it provides no tool of analysis to explain social phenomena involving conflict. Morespecifically, systems theory does not reveal anything about the nature of the conflict, the dynamicsof change, or even the motives of the various social groups involved (Fotopoulos, 2000: 440).

In Fotopouloss view, the adherents to Luhmanns approach (which Fotopoulos identifies withsystems theory itself) fail to recognize the fact that

it is exactly thepermanentexclusion of many social groups (which happen to be the vast majority of thepopulation!) from effective decision-making (which happens to be carried out by small minorities: thepolitical and economic elites) that motivates them to protest against decisions that significantly affect theirlives and on which they have little, if any, say. (2000: 440)

Again, this helps explain why radical social theorists often have difficulty in incorporatingsystems theory into their theoretical vision. In Douglas Griffins words, [i]t leaves us feeling thatwe are simply victims of the system (Griffin, 2005: 21). The aim of this article is therefore todispel the myth that systems theory is essentially conservative in nature or that systems theoristshave no choice but to assert that social systems are self-evolving and thus beyond control.

Before that, let us examine Luhmanns ideas in more depth. One issue that comes to mind hereis Luhmanns discussion on ecological problems. As Luhmann adopts a (radical) constructivistposition and a dualistic concept of system and environment (Fuchs, 2008: 38), what concernshim primarily is ecological communications how society constructs and communicates aboutecological problems. Luhmann (1989: 2829) states that

the concept of exposure to ecological danger designate[s] any communication about the environmentthat seeks to bring about a change in the structures of the communicative system that is society. It should

be noted that this is a phenomenon that is exclusively internal to society Thus [society] can only exposeitself to danger.

In Ted Bentons words, sociologists who endorse such a constructivist position have not sur-prisingly been accused by environmentalists of offering comfort to those powerful political andindustrial institutions (Benton, 1996: 7273). Accordingly, although it is contestable whether [t]he function of Luhmanns theory for society is that it is completely useless (Fuchs, 2008: 3940),I submit that Luhmanns theory is of limited value if one hopes toexplain those complex ecologicalproblems by investigating their generative mechanisms, or indeed to proposesolutions to theseproblems: his theory is characterized both by a lack of explanatory power and by its pessimistic

approach to social movements and steering [Steuerung].For Luhmann, when one longs to understand how [society] ought to or has to react if it wants

to improve its relation with the environment, it implies that he or she interprets society like an



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actor who needs instruction and exhortation and pretends to know how things are to be improved(Luhmann, 1989: 133). I seriously doubt whether such an approach could contribute to our under-standing of contemporary ecological problems and the emerging environmental movements.14 Forexample, I fully agree with Paul Sweezy (2004: 91) that it is necessary to query whether there is

anything about capitalism as it has developed over recent centuries to cause us to believe that thesystem could curb its destructive drive and at the same time transform its creative drive into abenign environmental force. That is to say, a critique of ecology has to be combined with a critiqueof political economy, since todays ecological problems and the unequal distribution of environ-mental risks are inextricably bound to the dominant social relations of production. A Luhmannianapproach, in my view, can at best serve as a refuge for those indifferent to the impending ecologicalcatastrophe and the very survival of mankind.

As Fuchs writes:

For Luhmann human beings are outside observers of social systems, not active participants. It is no won-

der that based on such a dualist concept of society he is blind for social problems and human interests.(Fuchs, 2006a: 125)

Conceiving social self-organization as detached from human actors results in functionalistic relativismand dualism that doesnt acknowledge the capacity of human actors to intervene into and consciouslyshape complex social systems although there is a great deal of uncertainty and unpredictability of socialactions A functionalistic theory that bans agency and conscious participatory system design from itsvocabulary leaves us with the dissatisfying assessment that there are problems, but no solutions. (Fuchs,2003: 114, emphasis added)

The discussion provided by Hans-Georg Moeller, a follower of Luhmann, on the global justice

movement (or altermondialisation movement, which he misleadingly calls anti-globalizationmovement) is so telltale that it is worth quoting it at length:

Luhmann is right in pointing out that his theory is much more radical and much more discomforting inits effects than those protests that eventually conserve and perpetuate an outdated semantics. Socialprotests that focus on demands for more democracy, liberation, and human rights do not truly challengethe leadingself-descriptions employed by powerful institutions and organizations they rather legitimatethe semantics employed by those institutions and organizations and thus assist them in their claim forcredibility. Social systems theory is more radical than, for instance, the anti-globalization movement, forit doubts that terms such as democracy or liberty can claim any kind of accuracy when it comes todescribing post-industrial societies. Yes, powerful institutions and organizations might be corrupt andhypocritical, but not because they are not democratic or liberal enough rather because they still marketthemselves on the basis of such euphemistic semantics. Society cannot be more democratic or free because under the conditions of functional differentiation, self-descriptions such as democracy (in thesense of rule of the people) or liberty(the right to realize an individual lifestyle) are meaningless. Thepeople cannot rule when society is primarily structured along the divisions of function systems. (Moeller,2006: 117, emphasis added)

Such a condescending tone indicates a complete lack of understanding of social movements ingeneral and todays global justice movement in particular. More importantly, in accounts like this, itseems that social struggles hinge exclusively onsemantics and descriptions. This is a position that

amounts to textualism, which confuses linguistic expressions with their referents, thereby invitingscientists, technologists, and even laymen to turn from thing and work to word (Bunge, 1996: 130).



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In sum, Luhmanns individual-society dualism, based on his holistic systems approach, failsto attach sufficient importance to the knowledgeable, creative, active human beings in society(Fuchs, 2004), thus converting social system into a black box above and beyond human beings.Such a theoretical position, which Fuchs (2004, 2005, 2006b, 2008: 39) reasonably dubs sys-

temic fatalism, leads its followers almost inexorably towards the conclusion that we cannotchange society society changes itself through the autopoiesis of its function systems (Moeller,2006: 115).

From Systemic Fatalism to Participative Planning

It seems that, although all of the higher vertebrates can imagine short term plans, only man designslong term plans, and occasionally even lifelong ones. Consequently, while animals can only experiencethe future, men can also fashion it in part to their own advantage (or perdition). Therefore planning,far from being the road to serfdom (as the neoliberal economists keep telling us), can bring greaterfreedom. However, planning is not sufficient to conquer freedom: it is also possible to draw up enslave-

ment plans. Not planning itself, but its goals and means can bring either freedom or serfdom. (Bunge,1985: 229)

On the one hand, for Luhmann, steering or the various attempts at social planning in a system(Calhoun et al., 2002: 136) in modern society is of severely limited prospects (e.g. Luhmann,1991a: 104116, 1997a). For Luhmann, as King (2004: 10) correctly observes, [t]he steering ofany system is not the result of conscious social interaction but rather the automatic, self-transforming responses of the system to the communication it receives. On the other, Luhmannis much more concerned with how the semantics of steering solves the problem of complexityby producing specific problems (Lu, 2001: 240) than with distinguishing between and evaluating

different forms of steering characterized by diverse means, ends and dynamics. It follows that onecan hardly find useful theoretical resources in Luhmanns writings for obtaining a clear picture ofvarious types of planning or steering that do take place at various levels in contemporary societies.It is also difficult for a follower of Luhmanns approach to develop a normative framework forassessing these heterogeneous forms of planning.15 For example, is a participatory plan-makingprocess involving democratic deliberation more desirable or viable than authoritative, top-downones?16 My view on this matter is shared by the German policy researcher Volker Schneider, whoclaims that Luhmanns pessimism regarding steering implicitly speaks the word of laissezfaire. Such a theory is naturally to a great extent irrelevant for a policy analysis, which wishes toproduce knowledge about steering. (Schneider, 2008: 63).17

Bunge is well aware of the complexity inherent in the social world, and therefore he states that[t]he difference between a social plan and an engineering blueprint is that people, unlike genera-tors and cables and things, have perceptions, interests and expectations, and act upon them inways that are not always foreseeable. But in sharp contrast to Luhmanns systemic fatalism, heemphasizes that this does not render social planning impossible: it only requires flexible andparticipative planning (Bunge, 1999: 535).

Bunge (1985: 230, 1998: 349350) accordingly draws a distinction between two kinds ofplan: rigid (or non-adaptive) and flexible (or adaptive). A rigid plan is drawn up once and for all,and thus requires exact forecasts for it to succeed. However, since exact forecasts are rarely pos-sible in the social world, a more reasonable plan would be flexible and sketchy, rather than rigid

and detailed. A flexible plan, according to Bunge (1985: 230), allows for the correction of mis-takes and permits alterations in the face of unforeseen circumstances, including a whole range



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of unpredictable events. A flexible and realistic plan can thus be regarded as an instance ofself-fulfilling prophecy, revealing the fact that although we cannot know the future, we makeit happen, if seldom to exact specification (Bunge, 1998: 350). In other words, human beings domake their history, but not at their sweet will as Karl Marx pointed out and Friedrich Engels

agreed long ago.18

Bunge further points out that for a plan to be flexible and corrigible, the stakeholders [have to]become involved in the deliberations as well as in the actions, and this accounts for the advan-tages of the democratic spider-web social organization over the pyramidal or hierarchical one(Bunge, 1998: 350). Along this line of reasoning, he stresses that a political choice has to bemade between authoritarian andparticipative planning, that is, between planning from above andplanning with the maximum degree of popular participation (Bunge, 1985: 293).

This view exemplifies Bunges general systemic approach to democracy, according to whichpolitical democracy is only one component of democracy lato sensu, or integral democracy(Bunge, 1985: 172). Integral democracy, also referred to as technoholodemocracy [holotecnode-

mocracia in Spanish] by Bunge,19

can be summarized as the principle of freedom to enjoy all ofthe resources of society, as well as to participate in any of its social (i.e. economic, political andcultural) activities subject only to the limitations imposed by the rights of others (Bunge,1985: 172). On the one hand, it is shaped by six primary values, the realization of each of whichdepends on that of the others: security, equality, fraternity, justice, competence, and liberty(Bunge, 2009: 136137). On the other, Bunge believes that integral democracy is the propermechanism to actualize these biosocial and political values. Considered from this perspective,integral democracy is supposed to consist of environmental, biological, economic, cultural,political, legal and global democracy.

It is particularly worth noting here that, contrary to the widespread belief that liberty and

equality are contradictory to each other, in practice equality and freedom go hand in hand, forequality ensures the free exercise of rights, and in turn freedom renders the work or fight forequality possible (Bunge, 1985: 173). This view resonates with the powerful theory ofgalibert(the contraction of equal liberty, which comes from the Roman formulaaequa libertas) developedby Etienne Balibar.20 In Alex Callinicos words,

the conditions of the fullest possible realization of liberty are co-extensive with those of the fullest pos-sible realization of equality, which implies an ethical imperative to eliminate all forms of domination andexploitation. (Callinicos, 2006: 81)21

Bunge (1985: 284) emphasizes that non-hierarchical, popular participation does not entail anar-chy or inefficiency. On the contrary, it has the advantages of centralization (unity and quicknessof information flow) without its disadvantages, that is, alienation and failure to detect and correctin time management mistakes. In a nutshell, the systemic approach to planning seeks to includeall the interested parties in the process of planning, which designs social systems that are likely toenhance individual well-being, and is well prepared to revise the plans as required by the changingconditions (Bunge, 2000b: 153).

As is widely known, the opponents of planning, particularly planning in the economic realm,tend to base their arguments on Friedrich Hayeks epistemologicalcriticisms of socialist central-ized planning and his defense of the market as a reservoir of implicit and latent practical economicknowledge that is vital for the maximally efficient exploitation of economic resources (Smith,2002: 8). And as John ONeill (2007: 187) points out, Hayeks epistemological project has beendeployed against all forms of deliberative models of decision making. This approach is manifest in



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Geoffrey Hodgsons recent critique of Pat Devine and his collaborators advocacy of participatoryplanning as a deliberative democratic process,22 which has its origins in Devines model of negoti-ated coordination.23 As ONeill (2007: 187) explains, the central tenet of what Hayek calls thedivision of knowledge in society

is not simply the dispersal of knowledge throughout different individuals and groups in society, but thenature of that knowledge. It includes practical or tacit knowledge often embedded in practices and skills,and knowledge of particulars localized to a specific time and place.

Or, in Hayeks own words,

knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integratedform but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all theseparate individuals possess. (Hayek, 1949: 77, cited in Fuchs, 2008: 25)

Consequently, centralized planning is bound to fail because of the very nature of knowledge:there simply cannot be a central actor overseeing and controlling all knowledge. However, con-trary to the received view that socialism presupposes or implies an omnipotent government or acentralized form of governance, the tradition of classical Marxism, or more generally, of what HalDraper famously calls socialism from below, ascribes supreme importance to the self-managementand self-emancipation of the working class (Draper, 1992; see especially Le Blanc, 2006). It isfrequently forgotten that Marx and Engels (2002: 202) emphasize over and over again that theemancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself. For them, the taskof the socialist movement is to generate a decentralized form of governance based upon participa-tory economic planning and workers self-management in industry (Prychitko, 2002: 19). It is this

tradition that Leon Trotsky had in mind when he wrote that the history of a revolution is for usfirst of all a history ofthe forcible entrance of the masses into the realm of rulership over their owndestiny in his tour de force on the history of the Russian revolution (Trotsky, 2008: xv, emphasisadded; see also Callinicos, 2008).

Indeed, as Trotsky warns in The Soviet Economy in Danger (1932, cited in Samary, 1997: 181),there is no universal mind able to draw up a faultless and exhaustive economic plan, beginningwith the number of acres of wheat down to the last button for a vest. Bunge (2009: 325) stronglyshares this view by arguing that in any event instructions do not replace initiative. Competent work-ers add their own know-how to the instruction manual and the overseers orders.

Therefore Hayek (as well as Michael Polanyi) is perfectly right to stress the role of dispersed,

practical and tacit knowledge in society. Bunge makes this point well: [T]he details of any [overall]plan should come from the bottom because only the people on the spot have the requisite know-how, and it is they who must tackle the unforeseeable (2009: 325).24 Hayeks works are thereforeinstrumental in dispelling the extreme rationalist (or high-modernist in James Scotts phrase)illusion of the possibility of planning based on complete knowledge. Likewise, for Luhmann,systems theory attempts to enlighten society not about the slumbering potentials of rationality but about the limits of rationality in a society of function systems (Moeller, 2006: 115). However,two points can be made here. First, the undeniably significant role of tacit knowledge does notimply that (varying degrees of) rational application of knowledge is impossible or undesirable. AsBunge (1998: 300) argues, [t]he advantage of design over spontaneity is that it makes explicit

and intensive use of knowledge, and consequently may spare us the waste and sluggishness ofnatural selection.



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Second, contra Hayek, market relations serve more often than not to foster forms of abstractcodifiable knowledge at the expense of knowledge that is local and practical (ONeill, 2007: 192).Pat Devines distinction between market forces and market exchange is useful here. Whilevarious forms of market exchange exist throughout human history, only in the capitalist relations

of production do market forces dominate, leading not to the blessings of economic equilibrium,but to alienation, oppression, chronic unemployment, recurrent economic crises, warfare, andecological calamities. By market forces Devine (1988: 23, emphasis added) means the anarchy ofproduction, that is,

a process whereby change occurs in the pattern of investment, in the structure of productive capacity, inthe relative size of different industries, in the geographical distribution of economic activity, in the size andeven the existence of individual production units, as a result of atomized decisions, independently taken,motivated solely by the individual decision-makers perceptions of their individual self-interest, notconsciously coordinated by them in advance.

Market forces have come to predominate to the point that contemporary global capitalism is by nomeans as horizontal, decentralized or even efficient as assumed by its apologists like Hayek. AsCallinicos (2003: 124) succinctly points out, actually existing capitalism is not characterized byhorizontal transactions among economic actors on equal footings. On the contrary,

[o]nly a handful of privileged economic actors in particular, those participating in the real networks thatcontrol the major multinational corporations and investment banks are involved in anything remotelyresembling authentically horizontal relationships. Most people are caught in vertical relations of domina-tion and subordination.25

This is why thepower structure of the market has become one of the most researched topics inpolitical economy and economic sociology,26 inclining Neil Fligstein (2001: 69) to state that [t]hesocial structures of markets are fundamentally systems of power whereby incumbent (dominant)firms use tactics and strategies to stabilize themselves and reproduce their position over challenger(dominated) firms.27 It seems that the fatal conceit is practiced nowadays by free market apostleswho prefer to distance themselves from the reality of capitalism. In view of the discussions above,the recognition of what Hayek calls the division of knowledge challenges rather than underpinsmarket fundamentalism (or a market economy where market forces reign supreme).

Along this line of consideration, Alan Aldridge draws on the impressive work of Tim Strangleman(2004), which demonstrates how the workplace culture of the railway industry in the UK, including

the store of cultural knowledge, values and dispositions that had been transmitted from generationto generation (Aldridge, 2005: 5455), was systematically destroyed by the management whosought to weaken the trade unions and enforce privatization. From this Aldridge (2005: 55) reachesa similar conclusion:

For Hayek, only the free market system can exploit the potential of tacit knowledge; but surely markets,particularly in an era of globalization, tend to obliterate the knowledge possessed by weak and marginalizedactors indigenous peoples, peasants, de-skilled workers. It may be that command economies cannot takeadvantage of tacit knowledge; but that does not prove that markets necessarily do either, and is therefore nota valid argument for market fundamentalism.

It is obvious that an idealized view of the market, increasingly detached from the intricateworkings of global capitalism in its present form, serves only to justify the status quo in whichresources and power are asymmetrically distributed both within nation states and globally. A viable



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third way between centralized, authoritarian, rigid planning and the mythical free market, I believe,lies in the participative, deliberative and flexible mode of coordination, and with it what ONeill(2007: 194) promotes as institutional pluralism that acknowledges the existence of a variety ofnon-market forms of social and economic relations. To conclude, the real choice before us is not

between planning and laissez-faire, but between different modes of planning and coordination.

Saving the Theory of Self-Organization from Luhmann

In striking contrast to Luhmann, for whom the theory of self-organization (or more specifically,Maturana and Varelas version of autopoietic theory) serves as a justification for his neglect ofthe mechanisms specific to human society, the critical social systems theorys approach to self-organization is oriented on human practice and puts humans and human interests into the verycenter of theory and society (Fuchs, 2008: 8). It is no coincidence that this approach has beendeveloped through a critique of Luhmann and the elaboration of a human-centered notion of

social self-organization (Fuchs, 2008: 8, emphasis added). Such a human-centered construal ofself-organization as the dialectical dynamics in social systems is typical of the upholders of criticalsocial systems theory (mainly Wolfgang Hofkirchner, Christian Fuchs and their collaborators atthe University of Salzburg, and therefore this line of systems thinking is also known as theSalzburg approach) and is shared by system theorists such as Espejo (2000), Collen (2003), andGriffin (2002, 2005).28

The theory of self-organization (or more generally,complexity theories that bring into focus theprocesses of self-organization) is sometimes invoked by attempts to oppose conscious humanintervention (or planning) to what Hayek famously calls spontaneous order, or more specifically,catallaxy [ in Greek] that is, the order brought about by the mutual adjustment ofmany individual economies in a market (Hayek, 1976: 108109).29 These proponents of the notionof spontaneous order have come to find in self-organization theories a benevolent force creating amore efficient system than humans could devise by planning (Kilpatrick, 2001: 19). Indeed, whilethe economist LE Blume (1997: 457) emphasizes that the spontaneous order of the Austrians could equally well be Shakespeares bloody and invisible hand of night as Adam Smiths hand ofPangloss, he nevertheless acknowledges that [u]nfortunately it is hard to separate the notion ofspontaneous order from that of a beneficent invisible hand.30

This has led some radical social theorists to conclude that

[the] self-reflective choice for democracy and autonomy does not need a scientific self-organization the-ory to justify it [A]lthough systems theory and complexity may be useful tools in the natural sciences,

in which they may offer many useful insights, they are much less useful in social sciences and indeed areutterly incompatible, both from the epistemological point of view and from that of their content, with aradical analysis aiming at systemic change towards an inclusive democracy. (Fotopoulos, 2000: 446)

However, complexity theorists themselves have stressed that the benevolent force that Hayekbelieves in may at times be malevolent and that the collective actions of humans may be necessaryto return to optimum efficiency (Kilpatrick, 2001: 19). Institutional sociologists have also estab-lished the case that intentional attempts by individuals to improve their lot underpin the processesthrough which institutions emerge (Greif, 2005: xii). Therefore, the notion of self-organizationdoes not have to be monopolized by market fetishists, and in fact it is not.

As discussed elsewhere, it is of utmost importance to recognize that the mechanisms of socialemergence and self-organization critically involve the actions and interactions of those reflexiveevaluative beings capable of what Charles Taylor terms strong evaluation.31 Therefore, Fuchs



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and Collier (2007: 29, emphasis added) emphasize with clarity that the self-organization of societyis not something that happens only blindly and unconsciously, but depends on conscious, knowl-edgeable agents and creative social relationships that result in actions that have both plannedand unintended consequences. In a series of studies on complexity and organization, Griffin

(2002: 14) also proposes his concept of participative self-organization to refer to the process ofconstructing the as yet unknown future by human individuals in daily interaction.Despite the Hayekian or Luhmannian interpretation of self-organization that attaches strong

emphasis to the non-steerability of complex social systems, the point is that the prickly problemsof design, control, and planning do not disappear by saying that one should stress autonomyinstead of control (Fuchs and Collier, 2007: 31). Bunge (2009: 323) puts this point well:

Hayek proclaimed ex cathedra that allplans are totalitarian endeavors and produce the opposite of whatthey intend, as if only unplanned action were free from unintended consequences. What is true is thatplanners should make room for unintended consequences.

Bunge (2009: 323) further stresses that, considered from a historical perspective,

organizations do not emerge spontaneously running any social system requires plans, in particularbudgets whoever takes initiatives, particularly if these require the cooperation of other people, mustplan before acting if they wish to succeed. Those who do not plan their activities are irresponsible andplace themselves at the mercy of planners.32

Indeed, the impossibility oftotalcontrol of what Luhmann conceives of as the functionallydifferentiated, operationally closed and self-referential subsystems of society does not imply thathuman beings cannot act in certain ways in order to increase the possibility that certain develop-ments will be realized and others wont (Fuchs, 2008: 29).

In contrast to Hayek and Luhmann, by applying the theory of self-organization to society, criticalsocial systems theorists lay great stress on cooperation, participation, grassroots democracy, soli-darity, and responsibility. For them, it is the grassroots social movements, rather than the allegedimpossibility or undesirability of intervention, that embody the authentic form of self-organizationthat could serve as a model for the participatory design of society (Fuchs, 2008: 32). To put itbriefly, the theory of self-organization, reformulated as the theory of creative and transformativehuman capacity (Fuchs, 2008: 31), serves the purpose of capturing the practical force, [the] humancreative social action that produces structures in grassroots bottom-up processes in social systems(Fuchs, 2008: 336).

Take the political and economic systems as cases in point. The Hayekian and Luhmannianapproaches assume that the subsystems of modern society can realize their self-organizationindependently and autonomously from the human being and other subsystems (Fuchs andCollier, 2007: 39). But this assumption not only is false but reproduces the neoliberal hegemony,for it justifies neoliberal policies by asserting that human beings are unable at all to interveneinto the capitalist economy in order to solve social problems and that hence market-based regu-lation will do best (Fuchs and Schlemm, 2005: 9798). Let us move from the abstract to theconcrete.

First, every social system is re-creative in the sense that its maintenance or transformationdepends on the fundamental human properties of creativity and innovation (Fuchs and Collier,2007: 36). A sober and realistic approach to social systems will always have to take into accountthe fact that human beings are able to consciously behave towards the world, to select from



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different alternative actions and to actively change the conditions of their existence which enableand constrain their choices and actions (Fuchs and Schlemm, 2005: 82, note).

Secondly, the economic and political systems are not structurally coupled (as Luhmannsuggests) but overlap in the sense that some people (for example, most of the citizens), groups

(for example, some NGOs) and institutions (for example, the state) are component parts ofbothsystems. The role of the state is particularly important in linking the two systems, since a host ofpolitical economists and economic sociologists have long demonstrated that

1) the state organizes a number of necessary conditions for capital accumulation (for example,the enforcement of property rights, regulation of competition, provision of infrastructureand welfare, etc.) so that the crisis-prone and antagonistic character of capitalism can bestabilized, however temporarily; and

2) the re-production of the state is in need of taxation, i.e. on money stemming from the eco-nomic production process (Block, 1977; Fuchs and Collier, 2007: 43). These two aspects

are interrelated: the reproduction of the state requires taxation, which means that it has totranscend the individual interest of any particular capital, to assume the role of the idealcollective capitalist (in Engelss terms), in order to ensure the normal functioning of thecapitalist economy as a whole.

Thirdly, and even more importantly, as Fuchs and Collier point out,political regulation, under-stood as decision-oriented human action (Fuchs and Collier, 2007: 41), is fundamental to modernsociety both descriptively and normatively. Descriptively speaking, political practices are inherentin all societies, because they are necessary conditions for the functioning, differentiation, andcohesion of all social systems, including economic subsystems. As regards the normative dimen-

sion, it is clear that all social systems will not work properly if responsible, decision-orientedpolitical action is absent (Fuchs and Collier, 2007: 40). In other words, what we need is Bungesvision of integral democracy, which extends the principles of democratic decision-making andparticipation into various spheres of social life, especially the economic sphere. It is preciselyalong this line of thought that critical social systems theorists envisage an all-embracing democ-ratization of society, that is, a more democratic and participatory society where polity and economyare harmoniously coordinated in decentralized processes (Fuchs and Collier, 2007: 47, 48).

More specifically, Fuchs (2008: 232) proposes that a self-organized (participatory) democracy33could be realized through decentralization at three levels:

1) Cognition: a plurality of information sources is guaranteed, and every recipient can also bea sender of information received and valued by others;

2) Communication: all citizens are guaranteed equal access to the resources and capacitiesrequired for active and informed participation;

3) Cooperation: all institutions of decision-making and governance are democraticallycontrolled by all citizens.

A few more words on the role of cooperation. Bunge and critical social systems theorists all high-light the importance and potential of cooperation in their systems thinking (see also Ratner, 2009for a Marxian model of cooperativism). For Bunge (1983: 110), it is egregiously mistaken andideologically distorted to stress breakneck competition alone. He points out that all normallyfunctioning social systems are propelled by cooperation as well as competition. It should beborne in mind by any social investigator that



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a social system cannot emerge, let alone persist, without a modicum of (spontaneous or coordinated)cooperation in some regard. And, once in place, competition in some respect is bound to arise in its midstprecisely because of a common interest in some scarce resource, such as attention, affection, time, space,food, money, jobs. (Bunge, 2003a: 119)

Consequently, while Hayek loathes cooperation and praises competition as the essential drivingforce of human civilization as well as the only method to make use of the wealth of dispersed knowl-edge,34 Bunge (1998: 403404) insists that the best ways for sharing knowledge are publication,discussion, and cooperation for example, in workshops, research teams, professional meetings,and strategic alliances35 a view shared by ONeill (2007: 191), who points out that the scientificcommunity exemplifies an international non-market order within existing economies.36

Likewise, Fuchs emphasizes that social emergence critically involves active social relation-ships. Since anonymous market structures and competition dont put forward synergeticaladvantages (Fuchs, 2008: 31), it is crucial to recognize the fact that

[i]ndividually acquired knowledge can be put to use efficiently by entering a social co-ordination and co-operation process. Synergetical advantages that could not be achieved on an individual basis can be gainedby such a co-ordination of knowledge. Emergent knowledge and qualities show up and are due to thesynergies produced by the cooperating efforts of knowledgeable actors. (Fuchs, 2008: 115)

Fuchs laments that traditional sociology has paid scant attention to the topic of cooperation, andhis and his collaborators theory of social self-organization is therefore centered around coopera-tion, understood as a cohesive force based on the active, knowledgeable, transformationalsocietal capacities of human beings (Fuchs, 2008: 32). Cooperation is the essence of social systems,indeed the highest principle of morality (Fuchs, 2008: 33).37 Participants involved in cooperation

depend on and learn from one another, make constructive and creative use of existing structures,and achieve their goals more efficiently. It is precisely through cooperation that individuals andgroups take active part in the process of decision-making, transform themselves, and thus co-designtheir social systems and co-determine their future(s).

Concluding Remarks

Luhmann (2005: 172, cited in Benhabib, 1996: 85) once stated that a conception of politics basedon the recognition of social complexity [gesellschaftliche Komplexitt] will force one certainlypainfully to give up any expectations of rationality and any hopes of a revitalization of a civic

republican life.

38

In this article I have attempted to refute this claim, closely related to the holistic leanings ofLuhmanns approach, by drawing on Bunges arguments for integral democracy and participativeplanning, and critical social systems theorists reformulation of the theory of self-organization. Theidea that systems or complex thinking entails or underpins laissez-faire policies, the myth of self-regulating markets, and a view of human beings as passive pawns of social forces, is not merelyungrounded but detrimental both to human welfare and to the credibility of systems thinking.Further, in social theorizing, attempts should be and have been made to liberate systems thinkingfrom the functionalist ideology that excludes the potentials for social change by human agency(Fuchs, 2008: 23). I am convinced that social theory will benefit significantly from appreciating

the contributions of these less well known variants of systems theories.I do have reservations about some of the arguments made by critical social systems theorists.For example, Fuchs and Collier (2007: 42) write that [c]ulture and polity that form the super-structure influence the economy in processes of downward causation. I am aware that this is



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intended as an anti-deterministic interpretation of the principles of historical materialism (or thebase-superstructure model), but the term downward causation used here may raise more problemsthan it solves. In the philosophical literature, this term serves to depict how the higher hierarchicallevel affects the properties of the lowercomponents (Luisi, 2006: 119, emphasis added). In other

words, this term does not apply except in a part-whole relationship. Since it is obvious that culture,polity and economy, as three relatively autonomous social subsystems, stand in partiallyoverlapping relations, they can hardly be understood as existing in a part-whole relationship, andtherefore it may be confusing to use this term even in a non-deterministic base-superstructuremodel. I admit that this term may still have a heuristic value in the above case, but readers witha background in philosophy (especially philosophy of mind) may have difficulties appreciatingit. For another example, few Luhmannians, who often regard the recognition of the double con-tingency problem that leads to the building of social systems as one of Luhmanns major insights,and generally praise Luhmann for his attention to the uncertainty and contingency associatedwith the future (Calhoun et al., 2002: 417), would accept the accusation that Luhmanns concept

of a system see[s] a whole as something complete and finished (Fuchs and Schlemm, 2005: 90).This said, however, generally I regard their reformulation of social self-organization as a healthyantidote to the pessimistic/fatalistic understanding of complex social systems that prevails in thefield of social theory. What is urgently needed is a systems approach that is ontologically sound(that is to say, transcending both holism and individualism), with due consideration given to therole of human actors in designing, maintaining, improving, repairing or dismantling social systems.As the writings of Bunge and critical social systems theorists bear witness, a systems approachdoes not have to sacrifice human agency to blindly self-unfolding social systems.

Acknowledgements

The author is deeply grateful to two reviewers for valuable comments and suggestions.

Notes

1 For example, Kahler (1997: 43, cited in James, 2002: 21) mentions the decline of system-level theory,

claiming that systems-oriented theories fail to develop a convincing research program.

2 For example, Hamilton (1996: 169) writes: It might be argued that Luhmanns systems theory represents

the most radical attempt yet seen to exclude the human actor from any account of structure and system.

Likewise, King (2004: 10) states that in Luhmanns works, the individual is subordinated to the objective

system.

3 According to Bunges composition, environment, structure, and mechanism (CESM) model, in describing

and analysing a system, one has to take into consideration (a) what it consists of (its composition); (b) theenvironment in which it is located (its environment); (c) how its components and environmental items are

related to one another (its endostructure and exostructure); and (d) how it works, or what makes it what it

is (its mechanism[s]). See, among others, Bunge (1998: 6164, 105107, 2001: 42, 71, 112113, 2003a:

3537, 2003b: 39, 2004a: 188ff., 2004b: 1617, 2006a: 124129, 2006b: 1011, 2008: 52ff.).

4 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from non-English languages are mine.

5 It is beyond the scope of this article to deal with emergence comprehensively. Put at its simplest, an

epistemological approach to emergence, as Bunge (1996: 20) correctly observes, seems to confront one

with the dilemma that if emergence is acknowledged and conceived of as mysterious (that is, unpredictable

or even unexplainable), the principle of rationality has to be abandoned; but the denial of emergence also

seems detrimental for it brings us nowhere near appreciating the complexity of the world. Therefore, itis ultimately problematic to construe emergence as an epistemological category. To do so involves the

epistemic fallacy inasmuch as it confuses our knowledge of being (the explanation or prediction of

novel qualities) with being itself (the novel qualities in question). What is needed is instead what Kistler



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(2007) calls the ontologicalconcept of emergence, which both Bunge and Kistler believe is compatible

with reduction but not with radical forms of reductionism. See Kistler (2007: 92) and Wan (forthcoming).

Among other things, to place emergence on the ontological level is of assistance in demystifying the very

concept hallowed by obscurantists and dismissed by self-proclaimed (radical) reductionists.

6 A more detailed discussion on contrasting approaches to emergence can be found in Wan (forthcoming).7 I believe this explains why Luhmanns systems theory has limited potential to contribute to contemporary

research on complex systems. Having said this, it does not follow that one cannot reinterpret some of the

insights scattered throughout Luhmanns writings in light of complexity science. For example, Luhmanns

theory is employed, modeled, and assessed by socionics [Sozionik] researchers in Kron (2002).

8 Heintz (2004: 2122) is opposed to subsuming Luhmann under the label of collectivism. She believes

that what Luhmann develops is a comprehensive [umfassend] systems theory, the scope of which is not

restricted to the macro level. Therefore it would be misleading to construe Luhmann as a representative

of macro-sociology or collectivism. But a holist or collectivist, as I understand it here, does not have

to restrict attention to macro-social phenomena such as those of the world society [Weltgesellschaft].

Typical of a holist or collectivist is their exclusive emphasis on the whole (system) at the expense of (therelations among) its parts.

9 Bunges systemism is characterized by the principles of rational emergentism, which he expounds

as [t]he philosophy that combines an acknowledgment of emergence with the thesis that emergence

is explainable and predictable within bounds This philosophy supersedes both atomism (though

not its allegiance to science) and holism (though not its insistence on emergence), and it incorporates

a critical realist theory of knowledge (Bunge, 1979: 251). Bunge maintains that the aim of science is

not only to acknowledge the ontological status of emergence, but also to integrate it into theories in

such a way that makes it comprehensible and occasionally predictable. See Bunge (1979: 191). But it

should always be remembered that the explanation of emergence by no means explains emergence away,

because explained novelty is no less novel than unexplained novelty, and predicted novelty is no lessnovel than unpredicted (or perhaps even unpredictable) novelty: the concept of emergence is ontological,

not epistemological (Bunge and Mahner, 1997: 29).

10 In this regard, Luhmanns approach can be compared with Margaret Archers analytical dualism,

according to which structures and agents are analytically separable (Archer, 1995). But it should be

remembered that while Archers account is methodologically driven, Luhmanns dualism is unequivocally

ontological, and hence vulnerable to my criticisms presented here. Cf. King (2004: 810).

11 Moeller (2006: 225226) points out that interpenetration and structural coupling can be considered to

be synonymous in Luhmanns theory.

12 But probably only partly so, since the family may in turn be embedded in some other system such as a

neighborhood, and may thus possess what Bunge calls relational(orstructural, orcontextual) emergentproperties (Bunge, 2003a: 17). The two eminent dialectical scientists Richard Levins and Richard

Lewontin (1985: 3) also demonstrate how parts acquire properties by virtue of their being parts of a

particular whole, properties they do not have in isolation or as parts of another whole.

13 In consistence with his general approach, Luhmann regards protest movements as particular autopoietic

systems consisting ofcommunicative events. See Luhmann (1993: 126). This collides with our view of

systems, but I will not dwell on this issue due to space limitations.

14 Another important aspect of Luhmanns systems theory that the readers of this journal may be more

familiar with is his notion of functional differentiation, which is briefly mentioned in a preceding

paragraph. I certainly cannot do full justice to the various issues surrounding this notion here, but three

interrelated points can be made here. First, this notion is closely related to Luhmanns attempts to replacethe difference between the whole and its parts with a theory of system differentiation (i.e. the duplication

of system/environment differences within systems). As I argue elsewhere, such a constructivist-oriented



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approach fails to take seriously such important questions as the part-whole relation, level, and emergence

(Wan, forthcoming). Second, as Fuchs (2008: 28) points out, when this notion is employed uncritically, it

may lend support to neoliberal ideology, since this notion implies that no subsystem, each with its own

societal function and binary code, that organizes a specific mode of communications is responsible and/

or competent for the ecological problems confronting us, for example. Third, while this notion serves adescriptive function in some cases, it is problematic to elevate it as the primary basis for a social ontology,

as Luhmann and his followers sometimes do. In brief, functional differentiation is an empirical, not an

a priori, question. In his critical discussion of LuhmannsDie Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft(1997b) and

other works, Dag sterberg indicates quite a few of Luhmanns claims that are empirically contestable,

such as [f]unctional society operates without a top and a center, [n]ot even the very rich have

political power or better artistic understanding or better chances to be loved, [s]tratification and a

fortiori social class is less important than the distinction between those who are included in society

and those who are excluded, and so on. He consequently characterizes Luhmann as a sociologist

of unlimited imagination, whose writings often take on an imaginary character (sterberg, 2000: 16,

2223, 24). I submit that Luhmannsfactual propositions concerning the nature of the social world (e.g.those propositions concerning functional differentiation) should be subjected to empirical scrutiny. But

here arises another interesting question: how does Luhmann employ his rhetorical eloquence to neutralize

the criticisms hurled at his social ontology? The following passage more or less testifies to Luhmanns

apriorism: [Only communication can communicate.] If one calls this conceptual disposition into

question, as I want to do, one usually hears the following: In the end, it is always people, individuals,

subjects who act or communicate. I would like to assertin the face of this that only communications

can communicate and that what we understand as action can be generated only in such a network of

communication (Luhmann, 2002: 156, emphasis added). Whether or not this is an aprioristic assertion,

I will let the reader judge.

15 One reviewer suggests that the term planning has been discredited and should no longer be used insocial theory for describing the concept of a democratic form of organizing society. S/he then proposes

that design may be a better term than planning. Although I agree with the reviewer that the term

planning is sometimes confusing, I opt to use it for the simple reason that such terms as democratic

planning [demokratische Planung; planification dmocratique] and participative (participatory)

planning continue to be employed by important authors like Pat Devine, Thomas Coutrot, Paul

Cockshott, Michael Albert and Bunge himself.

16 In proposing his project ofphronetic planning research, the Danish urban geographer and planner Bent

Flyvbjerg (2004: 289290) suggests that a planning researcher ask four questions: (1) Where are we

going? (2) Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power? (3) Is this development

desirable? (4) What, if anything, should we do about it? His suggestion is well in line with the chain thatBunge (1999: 535) thinks obtains in social engineering (or planning in a broad sense): knowledge and

values plan action evaluation correction. Elsewhere Bunge (1998: 447) also argues that four

questions have to be asked before any global, nationwide, or regional plan is laid down: (1) What kind of

society do we want to plan for? (2) Is the plan feasible? (3) Which social changes are its implementation

expected to bring about? (4) Are these changes likely to improve the quality of life of the vast majority

of people without endangering the welfare of future generations? Flyvbjergs and Bunges views suggest

that [t]he question is not whether to plan but how and for what Goals matter at least as much as

strategy, since means and goals determine one another. (Bunge, 1998: 446)

17 However, to some degree I agree with Calhoun et al. (2002: 136) that Luhmanns works do provide

keen insights into why attempts at manipulating such levers have so often met with unexpectedresults.

18 See, among others, Callinicos (2004).



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19 This term stems from the fact that [s]ociotechnology without democracy can only help tyranny; and

democracy without sociotechnology is blind, hence inefficient, ergo fragile (Bunge, 1985: 290).

20 See, for example, Balibar (2002: 165).

21 Political philosophy finds no place in Luhmanns theoretical system, because political philosophy by

definition is concerned with analyzing, evaluating and sketching political projects aimed at maintaining,reforming, or replacing a social order (Bunge, 2001: 201).

22 See, among others, Devine (1988, 2002), Adaman and Devine (2001, 2006), Adaman et al. (2003),

Noonan (2006, 2008), Callinicos (2003) and Hodgson (1998, 2005).

23 Devines ideas of negotiated coordination deserve an entire book on their own, and can be fruitfully

compared with, or complemented by, similar lines of thought, including, for example: (1) Thomas

Coutrots model of participative economic democracy, as well as some French theorists conception of

solidarity economy [conomie solidaire]; (2) the various projects of (democratic) economic planning

and workers control/self-management [autogestion] developed by as diverse figures as Ernest Mandel,

Catherine Samary, Tony Andrani, Al Campbell, David Laibman, Paul Cockshott, Allin Cottrell,

John ONeill and others; (3) Michael Albert and Robin Hahnels provocative vision of participatoryeconomics (parecon) associated with the anarchist tradition; (4) David Schweickarts conception of

economic democracy as a form of market socialism incidentally, Bunge (2009: 397) regards his

own vision of economic democracy as a type of market socialism, in which all the firms are owned,

operated and managed by workers themselves, and the state resembles an advanced liberal state minus

military aggression; (5) theories of participatory democracy as developed by C. B. Macpherson, Carole

Pateman, etc. Theoretical discussions on democratic planning cannot be purely philosophical, for they

will inevitably touch on crucial aspects of political economy, such as the nature of the capitalist state.

Therefore, as ONeill (2007: 186) aptly remarks, the major weakness in recent works on deliberative

democracy is their avoidance of issues in political economy, since they tend to concentrate on a purely

symbolic or cultural politics which fails to address the ways in which the structural imperatives ofmarkets place constraints on the actual decisions of actors.

24 See also Bunge (1983: 249250, 1998: 416, 446). This is richly evocative of James Scotts critique of

high modernism: The destruction ofmetis [i.e. local knowledge] and its replacement by standardized

formulas legible only from the center is virtually inscribed in the activities of both the state and large-

scale bureaucratic capitalism. (Scott, 1998: 335)

25 Furthermore, the view shared by market optimists is marked by its lack of interest in the fact that

the division of labor within the firm remains under the control of a single authority the capitalist

(Prychitko, 2002: 19). In view of this fact David Schweickart (2002: 46) writes that [c]ontemporary

capitalism celebrates democracy, yet denies us our democratic rights at precisely the point where they

might be utilized most immediately and concretely: at the place where we spend most of the active andalert hours of our adult lives.

26 For a handful of examples, see Schutz (2001), Bourdieu (2005), Crouch (2005) and Mizruchi (2007).

Of equal relevance here are Gary Gereffi and his collaborators well-known studies of the global

commodity/value chain (e.g. Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Gereffi et al., 2005; see also Bair, 2009).

See especially Selwyn (2007) for a critical assessment of the global commodity chain approach from the

perspective of Marxian political economy.

27 Mark S. Mizruchi (2007) believes that power structure research could provide a means of linking

political economy, economic sociology, and network analysis. But he also points out with regret that

since the early 1990s, the application of network analysis to the study of corporate power structures and

other topics relevant to political economy has been in decline.28 To stress again, systems thinking has always been characterized by its diversity. Notwithstanding

Luhmanns announcement of the end of critical sociology in the early 1990s (Luhmann, 1991b), the

critical tradition in sociology remains alive and kicking. Critical social systems theorists, for example,



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have benefited in some way from Jrgen Habermass critique of Luhmann at the beginning of the 1970s,

in which a marked difference between critical thinking and functional thinking was brought to the

fore (Fuchs, 2008: 40), even though Habermass conception of systems is too narrow, deriving from

Durkheim, Parsons, and Luhmann almost exclusively (Bausch, 1997: 323). Due to space limitations, I

will not discuss Habermas and his many faceted critique of Luhmann in this article. (But see especiallyBausch, 1997) Incidentally, according to Luhmann (1991b), it was the major breakthroughs in scientific

theory and research that spelled the demise of critical sociology. However, some researchers critique

of Luhmann stems precisely from the fact that Luhmanns theory fails to provide a general philosophy

anchored in modern science (Pickel, 2006: 1; see also Wan, 2010).

29 D Wade Hands (2001: 386) states that the Hayekian approach seems to be consistent with recent

developments in the theory of complex adaptive systems. To what extent this is the case remains debatable.

30 Callinicos (2002; see also 2007: 236) aptly captures the tensions within Hayeks works: Hayek,

undoubtedly the most sophisticated defender of capitalism, equivocates between an esoteric conception

of the market as a spontaneous order that, because he rejects the standard assumptions of perfect

competition, can make no guarantee of this orders stability and a more exoteric view, to be found inhis propagandist writings, in which he relies on all the vulgar liberal claims about the market tending

towards a full employment equilibrium that Keynes had demolished.

31 Margaret Archer (2000: 318319; and see particularly Sayer, 2005) notes that we are quintessentially

evaluative beings. There is nothing in the world which dictates how we list our priorities, although there

are plenty of forces inducing us this way and that, not least of which are the discursive powers of the

social order. All these resonate with Charles Taylors well-known discussion of strong evaluation, that

is, human beings ability to evaluate their own beliefs and preferences, and thus to form second-order

desires. See, for example, Callinicos (2004: 132133). Following these lines of thought, proponents of

deliberative democracy have been at pains to demonstrate that democratic deliberation is not a process

of merely expressing and registering, but should be seen as transformingthe preferences, interests,beliefs, and judgments of participants (Young, 2002: 26). See also Bohman (1996), Benhabib (1996),

and ONeill (2007).

32 In Bunges systems theory, a social system can be (a) spontaneous if it emerges by way of free association

or reproduction (for instance, families, circle of friends, informal social networks); (b) artificial if it is

formed in compliance with explicit rules or plans (for example, schools, armies, business firms, political

parties, NGOs). Artificial systems (and their corresponding mechanisms) are often called organizations.

33 Participatory systems are self-organized and self-managed systems (Fuchs, 2008: 227). Critical social

systems theorists and Bunge arguably work within the tradition of participatory democracy in a broad

sense, which has been the leading counter-model on the left to the legal democracy of the right since

the early 1970s (Held, 2006: 209). For Fuchs (2008: 228), participatory democracy denotes a dynamicprocess in which civil society communication and public administration act mutually upon each other and

guarantee the overall reproduction of the political system. Generally speaking, authors with a Marxist

affiliation put more (though not exclusive) emphasis on the democratization of the economy by means

of democratic control of productive resources. Recently a number of eco-socialists have attempted to

combine ecological concerns with visions of democratic (economic) planning. For example, Michael

Lwy (2006: 81) proposes three necessary conditions for a democratic and sustainable socialism:

(1) collective ownership of the means of production; (2) democratic control of investment and production;

(3) a new, ecologically sustainable technological structure of the productive forces. In his words, this will

be a revolutionary social and economic transformation.

34 As Fuchs (2008: 30) states, for Hayek, cooperation and solidarity are an expression of a primitiveorder; complex social relationships would always be based on markets and competition. In the words

of Duncan K Foley (2006: 206), in Hayeks theory, the antagonistic relations of the market are the

existential core of human existence, the ground from which everything else emerges.



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35 As any member of a scientific community knows, the advancement of knowledge is rendered possible

by a combination of cooperation in the search for truth with competition in the allocation of credits and

resources (Bunge, 2006a: 131).

36 Despite the general weakness of Negri and Hardts approach, it is sensible for them, in my view, to

highlight the fact that cooperation is completely immanent to the laboring activity itself (Hardt andNegri, 2000: 294, emphasis removed), and to characterize what they call operaio sociale (socialized

worker) as the subject characterized by a hybrid of material and immaterial laboring activities linked

together in social and productive networks by highly developed laboring cooperation (Hardt and Negri,

1994: 274, emphasis added).

37 Fuchss argument for this ethical position goes like this: One can imagine a society that functions

without competition; a society without competition is still a society. One cant imagine a society that

functions without a certain degree of cooperation and social activity. (2008: 33, 349) Fuchs seems to

ignore the fact, as Bunge emphasizes, that a social system can hardly be maintained or improved without

a minimum amount of competition. But it is also true, as one reviewer points out to me, that competition,

when marked by a friendly and cooperative character, is not necessarily bound up with domination.38 Benhabib (1996: 85) regards Luhmanns conceptual framework as curiously science-fiction language,

and argues that Luhmanns account of the modern political system as a self-immunized closed circuit is

empirically false. But a rock-ribbed Luhmannian may insist that empirical adequacy is not fundamental

to social theorizing. See Wan (2010) for extended discussion.

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