t5 b38 team 5 presentations fdr- draft monograph on terrorist travel (appendix not scanned) 052

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Janice Kephart-RobertsFrom: Janice Kephart-RobertsSent: Monday, June 21, 2004 2:51 PMTo : Front Office; Team 5Subject: team 5 monograph

Dear Philip, Chris, Dan, Steve and Stephanie:In accord with the deadline Chris gave our team on June 10 of Monday, June 21 for our team 5 monograph, wehereby forward it to y ou.It reflects our work on fulfilling the Commission's mandate to write the definitive story of the travel operation of theSeptember 11 hijackers; how that operation was able to be successful in light of the counterterrorism activities ofthe intelligence community, the State Department and INS; and the response in the border security community toSeptember 11.It is about 190 pages, not including graphics.Below is a summary for reference of how we are transferring the document to you.

1. A complete binder of all materials will be sent to you tomorrow by classified courier. IN ADDITION:2. Attached to this email are the unclassified sections of our text as follows:

a. Table of Contentsb. I: Prefacec. Ill: Chronologyd. IV(b)(i): Terrorist Entry and Embedding Tactics 1993-2001: WTC One- Text box on Yousef and Ajaje. IV(b)(v): Terrorist Entry and Embedding Tactics 1993-2001: Millenium Crisis- Text box Travel Fraudf. IV(b)(v): Terrorist Entry and Embedding Tactics 1993-2001: Millenium Crisis- Text box on Ressam

entryg. V: Immigration and Border Security Evolve 1993-2001: State Departmenth. V: Immigration and Border Security Evolve 1993-2001: INSi. VI: Planning and Executing Entry for the 9/11 Plot: State Departmentj. VI: Planning and Executing Entry for the 9/11 Plot: INSk. VI: Planning and Executing Entry for the 9/11 Plot: Finding a Fair Verdict1 . VII: Crisis Management and Response Post-September 11 : Response at the Borders 9/11-9/20/01

and DHS

3. Arriving by classified courier tomorrow, June 22, will be the following classified sections of our text ondisc:

a. II: Introductionb. IV: Terrorist Entry and Embedding Tactics 1993-2001c. V: Immigration and Border Security Evolve 1993-2001: Intelligence Communityd. VII: Crisis Management and Response Post-September 11 : Intelligence Community, State

Department, DOJ

4. Arriving by classified courier tomorrow, June 22 , will be a CD of 71 graphics for insertion into the text.W e look forward to working with you on making team 5's work a published reality.

6/22/2004


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Page 2 of 2

Thanks in advance,Team 5

6/22/2004


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3 jjll'tf "1


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"For these groups, passports are as important as weapons."

Judge Jean Louis Brugiere, French terrorist experton al Qaeda and associated groupsOctober 2001


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The September 11 Attacks and the U.S.BordersTeam 5 Monograph, 21 June 2003

Table of ContentsI. PrefaceII. Introduction: A Factual Overview of the September 11 border storyIII. The September 11 Travel Operation: A Chronology of Hijacker ActivityIV. Terrorist Entry and Embedding Tactics, 1993-2001

a. The Redbookb. Terrorist Travel Tactics by Plot

i. The World Trade Center Bombing, February 1993ii. The Landmarks Plot, June 1993

iii. Atlantic Avenue Subway Plot, July 1997iv. The East Africa Bombings, August 1998v. The Millenium Plot, December 1999

c. Al Qaeda Organizational Structure for Travel and Travel Tacticsd. Lack of Travel Documents Disrupts Operationse. Organization and Trainingf. Travel Facilitatorsg. Travel Documentsh. Favoring Saudi Passportsi. Types of Passport Alteration

V. Immigration and Border Security Evolver1993 to 2001a. The Intelligence Communityi. The Evolution of the Terrorist Watchlist

ii. Defining a Terroristiii. The FBIiv. Visa Viper

b. The State Departmenti. What is a Visa and Who Needs One?

ii. Visa BasicsHow do You Get A Visa?iii. The Bureau of Consular Affairsiv. The 1990s Budget Situation at Statev. The Visa Waiver Program

vi. Consular AffairsTechnology and Watchlistsvii. The Effect of WTC1 on the State Departmentviii. Visa Policy Generally in the 1990sc. The Immigrationand Naturalization Service

i. The INS Structureii. Many Facets of the INS Mission

iii. Inspections at Ports of Entry


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vi. The INS Lookout Unitvii. Forensic Document Labviii. Office of International Affairsix. A System to Monitor Foreign Student Compliancex. A n Entry-Exit Systemxi. The INS Intelligence Unitxii. Enforcem ent of Imm igration Law W ithin the United Statesxiii. The Special A gents in the Fieldxiv. The Creation of the National Security Unitxv . IN S Detailees to the Joint Terrorism Task Forcesxvi. New Legal Tools Against Terrorismxvii. Immigration Benefitsxviii. The Border Patrol and Illegal Entry into the U nited Statesxix. State an d Local Law EnforcementVI. Planning and Executing Entry for the 9/11 Plota. The State Departmenti. Overviewii. Visa Policy in Berliniii. Visa Policy in the United A rab Em iratesiv. Visa Policy in Saudi Arabiab. The Imm igration and Naturalization Servicei. Overviewii. Commission Interviewsiii. Hijacker Im migrationiv. Immigration Inspections Facilitate Travelv. Inspector Trainingvi. The Preferential Treatment of Saudis

vii. Imm igration Violations Comm itted by the H ijackersviii. W ere the Hijac kers' Legal Violations Detectable?c. Finding a Fair Verdicti. The State Depa rtmentii. The Im migration and Naturaliza tion ServiceVII. Crisis M anagemen t and Response Post-September 11a. The Intelligence C omm unityb. The Department of Statec. The Department of Justicei. The Interview Project

ii. The Twenty-Day Holdiii. The Absconder Apprehension Initiativeiv. Th e Visa Condor Programv. The National Security Exit and Entry Registration Systemd. Response at the Borders, 9/11 -9/20, 2001e. The Department of Homeland SecurityVIII. Graphics- Re


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PrefaceThe September 11 Attacks and the U.S.BordersTeamS

June 21,2004

It is perhaps obvious to state that terrorists cannot plan and carry out attacks in theUnited States without an ability to enter the country. Yet, prior to September 11, noagency of the United States government thought of border security as a tool in thecounterterrorism arsenal. Even after 19 hijackers demonstrated the relative ease ofobtaining a U.S. visa and gaining admission into the United States, border security still isnot considered a cornerstone of national security policy. For reasons we discuss in thefollowing pages, in our view, it must be made so.

Congress gave us the mandate to study, evaluate and report on "immigration,nonimmigrant visas and border security" as these areas relate to the events of 9/11. Thismonograph represents 14months of such research. We are grateful to all who assistedand supported us along the way.

This story begins with a Factual Overview of th e September 11 Border Story. Itsummarizes many of the key facts of the hijackers' entry into the United States, hi sodoing, we endeavor to dispel the myth that they entered the United States "clean andlegal." They did not. Two hijackers carried passports with indicators of Islamicextremism linked to al Qaeda; two others carried passports manipulated in a fraudulentmanner. It is likely that several more hijackers carried passports with similar indicators.Tw o hijackers lied on then- visa applications. Once in the United States, two hijackersviolated the terms of their visas. One overstayed his visa. And all but one obtained someform of state identification, we believe hi order to board the planes on September 11.

The chronology that follows, The September 11 Travel Operation, is a detailedaccount of how each hijacker acquired a visa and entered the United States. In all, theyhad 25 contacts with consular officers, who issue visas, and 34 contacts with immigrationand customs authorities. They began acquiring their visas in April 1999 and beganentering the country in December 2000. They were successful entering the United States33 times over 21 months, through nine airports of entry, most of which were on the EastCoast. Neither the consular officers who adjudicated their visas, nor the immigrationinspectors who admitted them into the country had any knowledge of about fraudulent alQaeda documents.

This topic is explored hi the next chapter, Terrorist Entry and Embedding Tactics,1993-2001. Terrorists have long used fraudulent documents to support their internationaltravel. Indeed, the CIA studied these documents and published their commonalities as farback as the 1980s. They even made a training video for border inspectors to help themdetect this fraud. This effort was abandoned in the early 1990s, just as the United Statesexperienced the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. We reviewed informationavailable on terrorist travel practices in the 1990s and identified numerous entry and


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embedding tactics associated with these earlier attacks in the United States, which wereunknown at the time owing to the lack of analysis. No government agency would analyzeterrorist travel patterns until after 9/11, thus missing critical opportunities to disrupt theirplans.

Immigration and Border Security Evolve, 1993 to 2001, provides an overview ofcounterterrorism activities as they relate to border security in the IntelligenceCommunity, the State Department and the Immigration andNaturalization Service. Herewe explore the evolution of the terrorist watchlist and explain the process of applying fora visa and for entry into the United States. The reader is introduced to the Bureau ofConsular Affairs in the State Department and visa policy in general. The various INSunits working on counterterrorism are discussed, along with enforcement of immigrationlaw and the immigration benefits system.

Following this broad overview, the next section, Planning and Executing Entryfor the 9/11 Plot, discusses visa issuance and admission into the United States as itapplied to the hijackers. Thus, visa policy hi Berlin, the United Arab Emirates and SaudiArabia, where the hijackers received their visas, is explored in depth. Similarly, wereview aspects of the admission of the hijackers in detail, including the immigrationviolations they committed. On both topics, visas and entry, we include excerpts ofinterviews with consular, immigration and customs officials involved in the admission ofthe hijackers. We conclude with an assessment of how well the State Department and theINS performed in the period prior to 9/11.

Finally, Crisis Management and Response Post-September 11 reports on actionstaken by the Intelligence Community, the Departments of State and Justice, and the INSfollowing the attacks and up to the establishment of the Department of HomelandSecurity. Particular attention is paid to programs implemented by the Justice Department,in some cases as part of the interagency process, including the Interview Project, VisaCondor, the Absconder Apprehension Initiative andNSEERS, the National Security Exitand Entry Registration System.


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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memo rial Comm issionsSERIES: 9/11 Comm ission Team 5, Archives Box2&&

NND PROJECT NUM BER: 51095 FOIA CASE NUM BER: 30383WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/31/2008

BOX: 00013 FOLDER: 0007 TAB: 3 DOC ID: 31211715COPIES: 1 PAGES: 5

ACCESS RESTRICTEDThe item identified below has been w ithdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Team 5 presentations/monograph 2 of 2DOCUMENT DATE: DOC UM ENT TYPE: ReportFROM:TO:SUB JECT: Tab 2: II: Introduction: Factual overview of the September 11 border story

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE


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Text BoxThe 9/11 HIJACKERS AND CONSPIRATORSAmerican Airlines Flight 11 - North Tower of the World Trade CenterMohamed Atta Hijacker (Pilot)Abdul Aziz al Omari HijackerWaleed al Shehri HijackerSatam al Suqami HijackerWail al Shehri HijackerAmerican Airlines Flight 77 - PentagonHani Hanjour Hijacker (Pilot)Khalid al Mihdhar HijackerMajed Moqed HijackerNawaf al Hazmi HijackerSalem al Hazmi HijackerUnited Airlines Flight 93 - PennsylvaniaZiad Samir Jarrah Hijacker (Pilot)Saeed al Ghamdi HijackerAhmed al Nami HijackerAhmad al Haznawi HijackerUnited Airlines Flight 175 - South Tower of the World Trade CenterMarwan al Shehhi Hijacker (Pilot)Mohand al Shehri HijackerHamza al Ghamdi HijackerFayez Bamhammad HijackerAhmed al Ghamdi HijackerOther Conspirators involved with the Visa ProcessKhalid Sheikh Mohamed MastermindKhallad Bin Attash Potential PilotRamzi Binalshibh Potential PilotZakariya Essabar Potential Pilot/HijackerSaeed "Jihad" al Gamdi Potential HijackerMoshabab al Hamlan Potential HijackerAli Abdul Aziz Ali Financial Facilitator and Potential HijackerOther Conspirator involved with the Visa and Port of Entry ProcessMohamed al Kahtani Potential HijackerEnd Text Box


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The four pilots passed through INS and customs inspections a total of 17 times from May29, 2000 to August 5, 2001. Jarrah was the most frequent border crosser, entering theUnited States seven times. Atta and Shehhi came in three times each, entering for the lasttime on May 2, and July 19, 2001 respectively. Hanjour was the only hijacker to enter onan academic visa, entering on December 8, 2000. Hanjour had already attended bothEnglish and flight training schools in the United States in three stints in the1990s. Hanjour is also be the only pilot to already have a commercial pilot's license priorto entry, having acquired it in 1999 in Arizona.While the first muscle hijackers, Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi, come to theUntied Sates in January 2000, the remaining muscle will enter between April 23, 2001and June 29,2001. They came in six pairs and one trio. Four pairs will be processed bythe same immigration inspector. Only three of the muscle will be referred a secondaryinspection: Saeed al Ghamdi to immigration secondary on June 27,2001 at OrlandoInternational Airport; Waleed al Shehri to customs secondary at a U.S. "preclearance"station in Freeport, Bahamas after being refused entry into the Bahamas on May 16,2001; and Mohamed al Kahtani to immigration secondary on August 4, 2001, also atOrlando. Only Kahtani will be refused entry.Entering the United States as a tourist will be important to the hijackers, since touristswere guaranteed six months of stay under immigration law. From Atta's perspective, thiswill mean that the 14muscle hijackers who entered the United States in the spring andearly summer of 2001 were able to stay legally in the country through September 11. Thesix month tourist stays will also assure the hijackers of sufficient time to prepare for theiroperation, including obtaining the identifications they most likely will use to board theplanes on September 11. Fourteen of 15 operatives and all the pilots will obtain one ormultiple forms of U.S. identification. Only Satam al Suqami will not, possibly because heis the only hijacker who will know he is out of immigration status, having his length ofstay end date of May 20,2000 clearly inserted in his passport.Begin Text BoxHani Hanjour's Early Visits to the United StatesHani Hanjour is the first 9/11 hijacker to acquire a U.S. visa and come to the UnitedStates. Born August 30,1972, in Taif, Saudi Arabia, he is the only hijacker to have alengthy familiarity with the United States prior to the operational build-up for the plot.He enters four times prior to September 11, seeking a U.S. education three of those fourtimes. There is no indication, however, that Hanjour was a conspirator in the plot untilsometime before his last entry into the United States in December 2000.Hanjour's first two visas and entries in 1991 and 1996Immigration records for Hanjour indicate that he acquired a B2, or tourist, visa in SaudiArabia for his first two entries into the United States in September 1991 and March


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1996.1 Hanjour entered the United States on these visas within a month of acquiring themon October 3, 1991 and April 2, 1996. There is no record as to when Ildiijouf left thecountry after his firsTentry in October 1 991 , although he was permitted a six month stay.Hanj our's March 1996 tourist visa was issued with a notation on the application stating"prospective student, school not yet selected." Records indicate that when Hanjourreturned on April 2, 1996, he received another six month length of stay as a tourist. OnJune 7, 1996, Hanjour filed an INS 1-539 application to change his immigration statusfrom tourist to an academic student to attend the ELS Language Center in Oakland,California. The application was quickly approved twenty days later, on June 27, 1996.Well before his length of stay expired, Hanjour departed the United States in November1996. OHanjour 's 1997 visa and entryHanjour' s second two visas and entries from Saudi Arabia are on one year academicvisas. He entered in Atlanta on November 16, 1997 (and as a 9/11hijacker in Cincinnation December 8, 2000).On his November 1997 visa application, Hanjour spells his last name "Hanjoor." It wasnot uncommon to see Arabic names spelled in various ways. Hanjour answered "no" tothe question, "Have yo u ever applied for a U.S. visa before, whether immigrant ornonimmigrant?" He also answered "no" to the question, "Have you ever been in theU.S.A.?"It is difficult to establish the intent behind these false statements. The application doesbear a signature that appears identical to the signature on Hanjour's two 2000 visaapplications. However, the application form also indicated that it was prepared by"Siddiqi/Samara Travel." Thus, the false statements may have been inadvertent,attributable to a travel agent who filled out the form on Hanjour's behalf.In addition to the false statements, Hanjour also left some portions of the applicationblank. For example, although Hanjour listed his occupation as a "student," he did not fillin the field asking for the "name and street address of present employer or school." Notsurprisingly, Hanjour also left blank the question "Are you a member or representative ofa terrorist organization?"The consular officer who adjudicated Hanjour's 1997 visa application interviewed himon November 2, 1997. This officer said that a decision to interview a Saudi citizen inJeddah was made on a "case-by-case" basis, but that they would interview 50-60 percent

1 Records of the Consular Officer Tier visa applications were destroyed at the Jeddah post. Memorandumfrom Richard Baltimore, Consul General, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, November 28 , 2001, describing a searchthat recovered "all applications and documents available on file relating to issuance of their [the 9-11hijackers'] visas," an d stating that the Consular Officer 7iest application was Hanjour's 1997 visaapplication. See also Consular Officer 5 MFR at 3, describing how, generally, Jeddah post kept visaapplications for two years.


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of Saudis who applied in Jeddah during this time period.2 The officer said they wereadvised of this interview policy after they arrived in Jeddah by their colleagues.3 Theinterviews often were cursory, a comparison between the person applying and the photosubmitted, plus a few questions about why the applicant wanted to go to the UnitedStates.4 Because the officer who interviewed Hanjour cannot read or speak Arabic, herelied on local embassy s ta ffer an American colleague to help him conduct interviews.5Similarly, the officer relied on experienced local staff to spot any anomalies in anapplication.6 The officer told us that they interviewed Hanjour during "the low season,"possibly indicating that they had more time to conduct interviews.7It is not uncommon to ask a visa applicant to provide additional documentation before acertain type of visa could be granted. For example, a student applicant was required topresent an INS form 1-20 and proof of funds sufficient to pay for schooling.8 If theapplicant wanted to go to the United States to attend flight school - something commonin Jeddah because Saudi Airlines was headquartered there - consular officers wouldrequest to see a letter from a bank showing the amount in the applicant's bank account inorder to establish whether they could, in fact, afford to pay.9Hanjour wrote on his application that the purpose of his visa request was to attendEnglish language school in Florida. The consular officer who interviewed him about hisapplication did not recall many details of the interview, but was able to reconstruct someaspects of it contemporaneously from notes on the visa application.10 During the courseof the interview, the officer wrote down on the face of the application "has cash," "travalone," and "wants to go to flight school." The officer told us that he believed he musthave looked at a bank statement from Hanjour in order to conclude he "has cash." Theofficer also believed based on his review of the application that, during his interview ofHanjour, he established that he was traveling alone, and that his spoken English abilitymatched the requirements of his student visa. nThe officer said he would not have known about Hanjour's prior travel to the U.S. unlessit was reflected in his passport. The officer also said he could not understand whyHanjour would have sought to cover up prior travel to the U.S. "It's perplexing that theywould hide that because it works in their favor," th e officer said.12 Th e officer did say,though, that a Saudi who had been to the United States twice before, as Hanjourapparently had been, and who then applied to go to the U.S. for English studies would

2 State OIG Memorandum of Conversation with Consular Officer 5, February 5, 2003. Consular Officer 5also said they interviewed"most" TCNs. Consular Officer 5 MFR at 2.3 Consular Officer 5 MFR at 2.4 Consular Officer 5 MFR at 2.5 State O IG Memorandum of Conversation with Consular Officer 5, February 5, 2003.6 State O IG Memorandum of Conversation with Consular Officer 5, February 5, 2003.7 ConsularOfficer 5 MFR at 5.8 State OIG Memorandum of Conversation with Consular Officer 5, February5, 2003, p. 2.9 Consular Officer 5 MFR at 2.10 State O IG Memorandum of Conversation with ConsularOfficer 5, February5, 2003.1 1 State O IG Me m oran du m of Conversation with Consular Officer 5, February 5, 2003.12 Consular Officer 5 MFR at 4.


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have "raise[d] an eyebrow"13 because a student visa applicant must demonstrate theyhave made reasonable progress in their studies.14 Th e officer said they did deny visas tounderperforming Saudi students on some occasions.15Th e officer also said that it was not uncommon fo r Saudis to have third parties preparetheir visa applications, and not uncommon for those third parties to make mistakes.16 Itwas also not unusual for Saudis to submit incomplete applications, including onesmissing a signature, so that Hanjour's failure to answer the question about being amember of a terrorist organization was not unusual in his experience.17 In general, theofficer told us, they felt they could make visa adjudications with only the basicbiographical information Saudis typically provided.18 However, the officer made a pointof telling us that "it bothered me; it disturbed me" to accept so many incompleteapplications from Saudis.19 When they raised it at post, they were told by the local staff,"Well, we have always done it this way."20 There is no evidence they sought to raise itwith their superiors.Finally, the officer checked the CLASS database for any derogatory information onHanjour. There were no "hits." 21 Thus, based on a review of Hanjour's documents, hisinterview with him and his check of the CLASS name check database, the consularofficer issued Hanjour a one-year F-l (student) visa.Hanjour traveled to the United States on November 16, 1997 on that visa and was granteda two-year length of stay by an immigration inspector. The visa allowed Hanjour toattend the ELS Language Centers in Florida. Seven months later, on June 16, 1998,however, Hanjour decided to attend flight school. He filed an 1-539, seeking a change ofstatus from anFl academic student to a Ml vocational student to attend the CockpitResource Management Airline Training Center in Scottsdale, Arizona from July 30,1998to July 29,1999. Eight months later, the INS requested Hanjour to supply supportingevidence for his request. By April 1999, having already attended the flight school andreceived a commercial pilot's license from the FAA without ever acquiring INS approvalto change his status, Hanjour left the country in December 1999. His 1-539 was notapproved until January 16, 2001. By this point, Hanjour has already acquired a newacademic visa and re-entered the United States for his last time.End Text Box

13 Consular Officer 5 M FR at 4.1 4 Consular Officer 5 MFR at 4.15 Consular Officer 5 MFR at 4.16 Consular Officer 5 MFR at 5.17 Consular Officer 5 MFR at 5.18 Consular Officer 5 MFR at 5.19 Consular Officer 5 MFR at 9.20 Consular Officer 5 MFR at 10.21 State O IG Memorandum of Conversation of Consular Officer 5, February 5, 2003, p. 1.


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Note: Per an agreement with the Department of State we have protected the identities ofindividual consular officers involved with the adjudication of visas to the hijackers.Throughout the chronology we refer to them all in the singular as "he," regardless of theperson's actual gender. No such agreementwas sought by the Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS). However, for privacy reasons, we have chosen to not place names ofinspectors in this monograph.The Entry of the Hijackers: Acquiring VisasAugust 1998. A threat advisory is sent by the headquarters of the Immigration andNaturalization Service (INS) to all immigration inspectors at ports of entry warning ofpossible infiltration into the United States by radical Islamic fundamentalists sympatheticto Usama Bin Ladin. The advisory called for "hard" inspections of certain visitors fromMiddle Eastern countries only if they were referred to a secondary immigrationinspection. This instruction applied to the nationalities of all of the hijackers.April 1999[Illustrations - State's Electronic Visa Records for Hazmi andMihdharPhoto la and Ib on Team 5 Monograph Graphics CD }On April 3,1999, Nawaf al Hazmi applied for a B-l/B-2 (tourist/business) visa inJeddah, Saudi Arabia, submitting a written visa application, his passport and aphotograph. Al Hazmi was a Saudi citizen born August 9,1976.On April 7,1999, Khalid al Mihdhar applied for a B-l/B-2 (tourist/business) visa inJeddah, Saudi Arabia, submitting a written application, his new passport and aphotograph. Al Mihdhar was a Saudi citizen born May 16,1975.

Both Hazmi and Mihdhar applied for visas using new Saudi passports. Hazmi's wasissued on March 21,1999 and Midhar's on April 6,1999. A copy of the passportMihdhar used to obtain a second visa in June 2001 supports a conclusion that the passporthe used in connection with his April 1999 visa application contained an indicator ofextremism that has been associated with al Qaeda.23 Although Hazmi's passport did notsurvive the 9/11 attack, based on similarities in his travel patterns and activities, as wellas evidence he provided in connection with an application to extend his visa once he wasin the United States, there is reason to believe that Hazmi's passport contained the sameindicator of extremism.24 But because this indicator of extremism was unknown at thetime to U.S. intelligence officials, the consular officer had no way to know about it.Both Hazmi and Mihdhar's visa applications were destroyed before September11, according to routine State Department document destruction practices in place inJeddah, so we could not review them. The electronic records of their applications, their

22 This was the same day that Khallad Bin Attash applied for a visa in Sanaa, Yemen and was turned down.23 The copy of al Mihdhar 's passport- C551754 - indicates it was issued in "Makkah" and includes thewords "Holy Capital."24 On his INS Form 1-539, Hazmi listed his passport as being issued in "Makkah."


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photographs, and information about the visas issued to them still exists, though, and aremaintained in the State Department's Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), and wehave reviewed those records.It is not possible to state with certainty whether either Hazmi or Mihdhar wereinterviewed by a consular officer in connection with their visa applications.25 Theconsular officer who approved Hazmi's visa stated, "I do not remember these specificapplications."26 State Department computer records do not provide any help in thisregard because they do not record whether the applicant has been interviewed.27If either of these two were interviewed, they must have convinced the officer they didhave a good reason to be going to the United States, because both were issued visas afterCLASS record checks showed no derogatory information about them. Hazmi's visa wasissued on April 3,1999. Mihdhar's visa was issued on April 7,1999. Both were one-year, multiple-entry visas.[Illustration - Khallad Visa Application Photo 2a and 2b on Team 5 MonographGraphics C D ]On April 3,1999, the same day that Nawaf al Ha/mi was applying for his visa in Jeddah,another of the 9-11 conspirators, Khallad BinAttash, attempted to get a visa in Sanaa,Yemen using the alias Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf. He submitted a writtenapplication, a photograph, and a Yemeni passport, issued March 18, 1999, shortly beforehe applied for this visa. On his application, he listed his date of birth as January 1,1974,and his nationality as "Yemeni."Bin Attash listed his address in the United States as "Bothell W.A.," and the purpose ofhis visit as "Medical Treatment." Bin Attash had lost his right leg fighting in Afghanistanand used an artificial one. He indicated that he intended to arrive in the U.S. in April1999, for a period of "aprox two months."Bin Attash was interviewed, apparently by a consular officer, who took notes of theirconversation on the visa application. As best as we can tell from the copy of the visaapplication we have obtained, the officer wrote "Family in Shobanah and Br(unintelligible) - 1kid- has shops w/family ~ artificial leg - needs all med info."Apparently because he was concerned that Khallad needed to present more information

25 A consular officer serving in Jeddah at this time told Co mmission staff that Saudi citizens wereconsidered security risks by Jeddah consular officers, that they interviewed "the majority" of Saudi malesbetween the ages of 16 and 40, and that they were not shy about turn ing down Co nsular Officer 9 Saudimale visa applicants on security grounds - including applicants who the officers felt had no good reason tobe going to the United States. This officer told us he would be "shocked" to learn that they had notinterviewed Saudi males like al Hazmi and al Mihdhar, who were between 16 and 40 years of age andtraveling alone. However, this officer did not handle the visa applications of Hazmi or M ihdhar.26 State OIG Memorandum of Conversation with Consular Officer 6, February 3, 2003.27 Althou gh today consular officers typically take notes electro nically while interviewing an applicant -notes made part of the permanent CC D record - that was not the case in Ap ril 1999.


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about his medical condition before he could secure a visa, the officer denied theapplication under INA section 221(g), the section used to cover denials for incompleteapplications or other unspecified reasons. In general, Yemenis had greater difficultyconvincing consular officers they were no t economic immigrants.This is the only visa application we have located for Bin Attash, who claims to havepreviously applied for a U.S. visa.29January 2000Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar arrived together at Los Angeles InternationalAirport from Bangkok, Thailand on January 15,2000. Both Saudis were admitted astourists for six month stays by the same primary immigration inspector, who wasunaware of the indicators of extremism likely present in their passports.Neither Hazmi nor Mihdhar were on the watchlists available to border inspectors.However, Mihdhar was a known al Qaeda operative at the time, and a copy of hispassport was available to the intelligence community.

[Illustration - Al Shehhi Electronic Visa Record Photo 3 on Team 5 MonographGraphics CD ]January 18. Marwan al Shehhi, an Emirati, was issued a ten-year B1/B2 (tourist/business) visa in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Shehhi submitted a new passport with hisvisa application. Although his application was destroyed prior to September 11,2001,pursuant to routine document destruction policies, an electronic record is maintained byState.30 The consular officer who issued the visa said al Shehhi probably was notinterviewed since UAE nationals were not interviewed in connection with their visaapplications unless there was a watchlist "hit," which there was not hi this case.31 UAEnationals were considered good visa risks both on economic and on security grounds.April 2000April 2. Nawaf al Hazmi's visa expired. However, this has no bearing on his legal statusin the United States. As long as the visa is valid when a visitor enters the country, he mayremain as long as the length of stay granted by an immigration inspector upon arrivalremains valid.

28 Yemenis has a 66 percent refusal rate for "B"visas in fiscal year 1999. RDOS04020290.29 Bin Attash claims he applied for a visa before the 1999 application. The State Department has searchedfor this application using Bin Attash's real name and known aliases, but has been unable to locate anyrecords supporting this claim. However, the records could have been destroyed and no electronic recordretained.30 State Office of Inspector General, Memorandum of Conversation with Consular O fficer C onsular Officer7,2-11-03.31 State Office of Inspector General, Memorandum of Conversation with Consular Offic er C onsular Officer7,2-11-03.


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10

April 5. Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi acquired California driver's licenses.May 2000[Illustrations - Atta's Visa andPassport, State's electronic records Photo 4a and 4b on

Team 5 Monograph Graphics C D }On May 17, Mohammed Atta, an Egyptian, applied for and on May 18, he received afive-year B1/B2 (tourist/business) visa from the U.S. embassy in Berlin, Germany.32 Theconsular officer who adjudicated this visa said Atta "definitely" was not interviewed.According to the officer, because he was a third country national with a long period ofresidence in Germany (approximately five years), the visa interview requirement waswaived, and Atta was "basically treated like" a German citizen. German citizens are partof a 'Visa waiver" program, and so do not have to apply for visas. Another factor in hisfavor was Atta's strong academic attachment to Germany. Atta's visa application wasdestroyed prior to 9/11 pursuant to routine State Department policy then in effect, so wewere able to review only the electronic record of his application.[Illustration - Binalshibh's Visa Application Photo 5 on Team 5 Monograph GraphicsC D ]Also on May 17, Ramzi Binalshibh, another Yemeni, applied for a B1/B2 (tourist/visa)visa in Berlin. Binalshibh listed Agus Budiman in Washington, D.C. as the'perispn hewould be visiting in the United States. Although his application was denjecff TS&pMiibhdid not give up on trying to get a visa to the United States, as we will soon see.[Illustration - Jarrah's visa, burned visa, and State's electronic records of his visa Photo6a, 6b and 6c on Team 5 Monograph Graphics CD]May 25. Ziad Jarrah, a native of Lebanon, applied for and received a five-year B1/B2(tourist/business) visa in Berlin.33 The consular officer who issued the visa could notrecall whether he interviewed Jarrah. However, our review of Berlin visa policy for thirdcountry nationals suggests that Jarrah was a strong visa candidate based on his longresidence in Germany (approximately four years), academic involvement in Germany (attwo universities) and his Lebanese nationality. Third country nationals with more thantwo years of residency in Germany met a threshold for visa approval. The officer whoadjudicated his visa has stated that wealthy Lebanese families often sent their children toschool in Germany as a way to keep them out of the Middle East turmoil, and that Jarrahlooked like one of those wealthy expatriates.34May 29. Shehhi arrived in the United States for the first time from Brussels, Belgium,landing at Newark International Airport in New Jersey. He was admitted by immigration

32 The hijackers received visas of different lengths depen den t on reciprocal agreements in place betweenthe United States and their countries of origin.33 Jarrah's original visa application was destroyed, but an electronic record, including his photograph,remains in the State Department 's electronic records.34 State DIG MOC with Consular Officer 8.


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authorities as a tourist for six months. However, he was pulled aside by a "roving"Customs inspector who conducted a secondary inspection. The examination lasted twominutes. His bags were x-rayed but he was not personally searched and was admitted.The customs inspector was trained to look for drug couriers, not terrorists.June 2000June 3. Atta arrived from Prague, Czech Republic, at Newark airport as a tourist. He wasgiven a customary six-month stay, until December 2, 2000.June 5. Binalshibh's May application is denied under INA section 221(g).35 This kind ofdenial was routinely employed by Embassy Berlin to deny a visa application that wasincomplete or not strong without having to interview the applicant.3 The Embassy wouldsend a letter to the applicant telling them they had been denied under 221(g) and invitingthe applicant to submit further documentation in support of their application.37 Under thelaw, additional information submitted by an applicant can become part of the originalapplication.38 The applicant then had six months to overcome the original denial.39June 10. Mihdhar leaves the United States despite being told by the operationalorganizer of the plot, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, to stay put. He traveled to Saudi Arabia,Yemen and Afghanistan.June 15. Binalshibh submitted a second application for a B1/B2 (tourist/business) visain Berlin. Although this was a physically separate application, State consular officialsconsidered italong with the May 17 applicationto be one application.June 27. Jarrah entered the United States for the first time on a tourist visa. Heimmediately violated his immigration status by going from the airport straight to full timeflight school. He studied at the Florida Flight Training Center hi Venice, Florida untilJanuary 31,2001. Jarrah never filed an application to change his status from tourist tostudent. This failure to maintain a legal immigration status provided a solid legal basis todeny him entry on each of the six subsequent occasions in which he re-entered the United

35 Binalshibh's NIV Applicant D enial p roduced to the Commission by the State Department lists theadjudication dates of his Berlin visas as : June 5 , June 27, July 18, and November 1, 2000. FBI's PentbomSummary concurs with the November 1 adjudication date, but states that Bina lshibh's first visa w as deniedon May 31, 2001. For reasons discussed herein, we disagree.36 That provision of law states: "No visa . . . shall be issued to an alien if (1) it appears to the consularofficer, from statements in the applicatio n, or in the pap ers subm itted therewith, that such alien is ineligib leto receive a visa . . . under section 212, or any other provision of law, (2) the application fails to complywith the provisions of this Act, or the regulations issued thereunder, or (3 ) the consular officer knows orha s reason to believe that such alien is ineligible to receive a visa . . . under section 212, or any otherprovision of law."37 22 CFR Section 41.105(a)(l)(Authority to require documents). "The consular officer is authorized torequire documents considered necessary to establish the alien's eligibility to receive a nonimmigrant visa.All documents a nd other evidence presented by the alien, including briefs subm itted by attorneys or otherrepresentatives, shall be considered by the consula r off icer."38 22 CFR Section 41.103(b)(2)(Additional information as part of application).39 MFR of consular officer Consular Officer 9 interviewed February 20, 2004; 22 CFR Section 41.121(Refusal of individual visas) provides, "If the ground(s) of ineligibility may be overcome by thepresentation of additional evidence, and the applicant has indicated the intention to submit such evidence, areview of the refusal may be deferred for not mo re then 120 days."


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12States. Because there is no student tracking system in place, however, there is no way forimmigration inspectors to know this information, as neither Jarrah nor the school hascomplied with the law.June 27. Binalshibh's second visa is again denied under 221 (g), apparently without hisbeing interviewed by a consular officer.

i the United States, which is due toexpire on July 14,2000.[Illustrations - Binalshibh's May and June visa applications ] Photo 7 on Team 5Monograph Graphics CDJuly 18.A consular officer interviewed Binalshibh in connection with his two visaapplications submitted on May 17 and June 15, 2000, which the State Departmentconsidered as "one case." This time, a consular officer denied his application under INASection 214(b) based on the officer's conclusion that Binalshibh had failed to prove thathe was not an intending immigrant to the United States.40 The consular officer noted onhis application that Binalshibh had a poor academic record at German universities,attending only sporadically. The officer also noted that Binalshibh had no apparentsource of income, no apparent job, and was traveling back and forth to the Middle East.Based on all these factors, the officer considered Binalshibh a bad visa risk. There is noevidence that the officer denied Binalshibh based on concerns about terrorism.September 2000

[Illustration - al Ghamdi's visa application ] Photo 8 on Team 5Monograph GraphicsCDSeptember 3. Ahmed al Ghamdi, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B1/B2(tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He presented a new Saudi passport only13 days old. There is no evidence that he was interviewed.[Illustration - Hanjour's September 10 visa application] Photo 9a and 9b on Team 5Monograph Graphics CD40 According to Derwood Staeben, an official in the State Department's Visa Office within the Bureau ofConsular Affairs, State records support a conclusion that Binalshibh's first two visa applications amountedto "one case" that was denied on July 18, 2000 under 214(b). Copies of State records support thisconclusion. Copies of Binalshibh's visa application show no writing on his June 15, 2000application. Rather, notes taken on the May 17, 2000 application describe the reasons why bothapplications then pending were denied, and includeth e dates of June 5 and July 18both dates th e Statecomputer system indicate were dates of refusals. It appears that Binalshibh's tw o applications were firstdenied under 22 1(g) (on June 5 and June 2 7) without a face-to-face meeting with a consular officeracommon practice in Berlin during this time period, an d that Binalshibh was denied under 214(b)the moreserious denial-only after a formal interview with a consular officer on July 18, 2000. That this occurred issupported by a note on Binalshibh's last application denied November 1, 2000. On the application, aconsular official wrote "two prior refusals," i.e. one in Berlin, and one in Sanaa, Yemen.


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September 10. Hani Hanjour again applied for a B1/B2 (tourist/business) visa inJeddah, Saudi Arabia. Hanjour submitted a new passport issued on July 24, 2000 with theapplication. H e said on his application that he would like to stay for three years in theUnited States, an answer that triggered concern in the minds of consular staff that he wasat risk of becoming an immigrant to the United States. A consular employee whoscreened Hanjour's application forwarded him to a consular officer for an interview.Hanjour told the consular officer that he was going to attend flight training school in theUnited States and wanted to change his status to "student" from "tourist" once he arrivedin the United States.41 "Look, you have spent enough time in the States" to know whatyou want to do there, the officer told Hanjour. Based on Hanjour's prior travel to theUnited States, the officer said to him, he did not qualify for a tourist visa in order to go tothe U.S. and find a school "because he had been in the States long enough to decide whathe wanted."42 For these reasons, the officer denied Hanjour's application under INAsection 221(g), a general denial that allowed the applicant to return with additionalinformation in support of his application.September 15. Shehhi's 1-539 application to change his status from tourist (B1/B2) tovocational student (Ml) is received by the INS. The application requested that his statusbe maintained until September 1,2001. The contents of the application are substantiallythe same as Atta's application dated four days later, including the same financialstatement of support, bank and lease statements.

Marwan al Shehhi's 1-539 application of September 15, 2001 to change status fromtourist (B1/B2) to vocational student (M-l) -with a request to extend status untilSeptember 1, 2001. Note th e approval date of August 9, 2001.Photo lO a and lO b on Team 5 Monograph Graphics CD

September 19. Atta's 1-539 application to change his status from tourist (B1/B2) tovocational student (Ml) is received by the INS. It makes the same request for aSeptember 1,2001 end date and has the same supporting documentation as Shehhi'sapplication.

41 In testimony before Congress, the consular officer was under the misimpression that Hanjour applied fo rthis visa under the Visa Express program, which was not, in fact, the case. Testimony of Consular OfficerNumber 3 before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform, August 1,2002,p. 38. This led the officer to state, incorrectly we believe, that he had denied Hanjour under section 221(g)in order to call him in for an interview. Id. at 38 -39. "I remember that I had refused him for interview,because he had applied for a tourist visa and he said that his reason for going to the United States was tostudy," the officer recalled.); Id. at 39 (221(g) denial was "for administrative reasons." It meant "No.Come in. I want to talk to you." In fact, the date Hanjour appliedas shown on his written application--and the date he was deniedas shown both on the application and on State's electronic records-are thesame: September 10 , 2000.42 Id. at 40.


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14MohamedAtta's 1-539 application received September 19 , 2001 to change status fromtourist (B1/B2) to vocational student (M-l) with a request to extend status untilSeptember 1 , 2001. Note the approval date of July 17, 2001.

Photo llaand libon Team 5Monograph Graphics CD

September 16.Binalshibh's third visa application was denied in Sanaa, Y emen underIN A section 214(b), the intending immigrant provision. It is not clear precisely whenBinalshibh submitted this third application, and the application was destroyed before itsrelevance was known.43 There is no evidence that concerns about terrorism played a rolein this denial. It is likely that Binalshibh's prior refusals in Berlin signaled to the officerthat he was poor visa prospect, and Binalshibh's sporadic residency in Y emen confirmedthat fact in the officer's mind.[Illustration- Hanjour's September 25 Visa application] Photo 1 2a on Team 5Monograph Graphics CD[Illustration- Hanj our's electronic State Visa Records] Photo 12b on Team 5 MonographGraphics CDSeptember 25 . Hanjour returned to the Jeddah consulate and, apparently having listenedto what the consular officer had told him, submitted another application for a studentvisa. This time, Hanjour wanted to attend the ELS Language Center in Oakland,California. A consular officialprobably the intake screenerwrote a note on hisapplication indicating that Hanjour had been denied a visa under section 221(g) onSeptember 10. The same consular officer who interviewed Hanjour in connection withhis September 10 application also processed this one. He recalled to us that Hanjour orsomeone acting on his behalf submitted an INS form 1-20required to qualify for astudent visato the consulate at the end of the day on September 25,2000.44 "It came tome, you know, at the end of the day to look at it. I saw he had an 1-20, and it [his visa]was issued."45 State Department electronic records indicate that this approval allowedHanjour to "overcome" his September 10 visa denial, another indication that multipleapplications can be considered "one case." State Department records also erroneouslyrecorded the visa issued to H anjou r as a "B1/B2" (business/tourist) visa when, in fact, itwas an F (student) visa that was printed and put in Hanj our's passport. In addition,Hanjour had already received an approved change of status to attend this same Englishlanguage school in 1996. But this approval was granted by the INS in the United States;the State Department had no record of this.

43 Binalshibh's Sanaa visa application apparently was destroyed by the State Department before itssignificance was known. On his October 25, 2000 visa application, Binalshibh lists the date of his Sanaavisa application as August 12, 2000. However, according to the FBI Penttbom summary (p. 14) Binalshibhapplied for this visa on September 15, 2000. State's electronic records of this application do not settle thequestion. They list the date of "data entry" and of "adjudication" as September 16, 2000. Binalshibh maywell have applied before that date.44 Id at 40.45 Id.


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October 2000

[Illustration Hamza al Ghamdi's visa application]October 17. Hamza al Ghamdi, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B1/B2(tourist/business) visa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. His application was incomplete. There isalso evidence that al Ghamdi may have presented a passport manipulated in a fraudulentmanner when he applied for this visa.46 The consular officer who adjudicated his casewas not familiar with this kind of manipulation and, because of the workload in Jeddah,he rarely had time to thumb through the passport in any event. Al Ghamdi was notinterviewed because nothing in his application raised concerns in the mind of theconsular officer who adjudicated it, and there was no "hit" in the CLASS system.47 Hisvisa application was granted.[Illustration - Mohand al Shehri's Visa Application] Photo 14a and14b on Team 5Monograph Graphics CDOctober 23. Mohand al Shehri, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B1/B2(tourist/business) visa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. His application was incomplete. Heclaimed he was a 21-year-old student who would be supporting himself in the UnitedStates. He was not interviewed because, according to the officer who issued this visa,"We only interviewed Saudis if there was a previous denial of a visa application or ifthere was something wrong with the application."48 Al Shehri apparently raised no suchconcerns. The officer noted that the lack of handwritten notes on the application was afurther indication that he did not interview him.49October 25. Binalshibh applied for a visa again in Berlin, Germany, this time for astudent (F) visa to attend aviation school in Florida. He accurately indicated on hisapplication form that he had been denied visas previously in Berlin and Sanaa.[Illustration -Visa application of Ahmed al Nami Photo 15 a and 15b on Team 5Monograph Graphics CDOctober 28. Ahmed al Nami, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B1/B2(tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Nami's applicationwas incomplete.There is also evidence that al Nami may have presented a passport manipulated in afraudulent manner that has been associated with al Qaeda. Nami's passport also mayhave contained the same indicator of Islamic extremism likely present in Hazmi and46 FBI Pentbom Summary February 24 ,2004 , at p. 10 (discussing timing of travel).47 Dep artment of State Office of Inspector General, Memorandum of Conversation with Consular Officer,January 22 , 2003.48 State D epartment, Office of the Inspector General, Memorandum of Conversation with a C onsularOfficer, January 24,2003 .49 State Department, Office of the Inspector General, Memorandum of Conversation with a C onsularOfficer, January 24 ,2003 .50 FB I Pentbom Summary February 24 ,2004 , at p. 10 (discussing timing of travel relative to acquisition ofpassport and visa).


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16Mihdhar's passports. Al Nami indicated that "My friend Moshabab" would be travelingwith him.[Illustration - AlHamlan's visa application] Photo 16 on Team 5 Monograph GraphicsCDOn the same day, Moshabab al Hamlan, a Saudi and a friend of 9/11 hijacker Ahmed alNami, acquired a two-year B1/B2 (tourist/business) visa hi Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. AlHamlan was selected to participate hi the plot, but backed out after obtaining his visaperhaps at the urging of his family.October 29. Jarrah arrives back in the United States, entering in Tampa, Florida fromFrankfurt, Germanyon a tourist visa. He is given a six-month length of stay in the UnitedStates. He is still hi flight school.November 2000[Illustration - Bhialshibh's Berlin Application] Photo 17 onTeam 5 MonographGraphics CDNovember 1. Binalshibh was denied in Berlin yet again under 221(g) for lack ofadequate documentation and failure to show sufficient ties to Germany. His applicationwas incomplete, and his prior denials in Berlin and Sanaa provided powerful grounds forthis denial. Consular officials wrote on this application, "Incomplete [application],refused hi Sanaa and here, bad case." Once again, there was no evidence that officialswere at all concerned about terrorism. A citizen of apoor, developing country, withtenuous ties to Germany, Binalshibh was considered an economic immigrant and a badvisa risk.

[Illustration - alHaznawi's Visa Application] Photo 18 on Team 5 Monograph GraphicsCDOn November 12, Ahmad al Haznawi, a 20-year-old Saudi national, applied for andreceived a two-year B1/B2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. There isevidence that al Haznawi mayhave presented a passport manipulated in a fraudulentmanner that has been associated with al Qaeda.5 There also is evidence that Haznawimay have submitted a passport with an indicator of Islamic extremism. Haznawi listed hisoccupation as "student" but left blank the question seeking the street address of hispresent school. He stated that he would provide financial support for his visit. He wasnot interviewed.[Illustrations - Visa application and State Department electronic record of Saeed alGamdi indicating it was submitted in person] Photo 19a and 19b on Team 5 MonographGraphics CD51 FB I Pentbom Summary February24 , 2004, at p. 10 (discussing timing of travel relative to acquisition ofpassport and visa).


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17

Also on November 12, Saeed al Gamdi, a Saudi national, also known as "Jihad" alGamdi~a different person from 9/11 hijacker Saeed al Ghamdi-applied for a B1/B2(tourist/business) visa in Jeddah. Al Gamdi's application was denied after an interviewwith a consular officer who believed he was intending to immigrate to the United States.Al Gamdi wrote on his application that he intended to stay in the United States for "12months," a red flag because this was longer than the usual six-month period of admissiongranted by INS inspectors at ports of entry to tourists. Contemporaneous notes byconsular staff, probably taken during his interview, state: "To stay one year. . . no job ... graduated from H.S. last year . . . he has SR [Saudi Rials] 10000 only and staying oneyear! ... Not working." Al Gamdi was denied under IN A section 214(b), the intendingimmigrant provision. There is no evidence that terrorism concerns played a role in thisdenial.[Illustration - Moqed's visa application] Photo 20a and20bon Team 5 MonographGraphics CDNovember 20. Majed Moqed, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B1/B2(tourist/business) visa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. His application was incomplete. Heclaimed to be a "student" but left blank the question asking the street address of hispresent school. The officer who adjudicated his visa said they did not interview Moqed:"I would have written some notes on the application form[] if I had."52 He was notinterviewed because, according to the officer who issued this visa, "We only interviewedSaudis if there was a previous denial of a visa application or if there was somethingwrong with the application."53 Incompleteness did not qualify.[Illustration - al Suqami's visa application] Photo 21 a and 21b on Team 5 MonographGraphics CDNovember 21 . Satam al Suqami, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B1/B2(tourist/business) visa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. There is very strong evidence that thepassport Suqami submitted with this application was manipulated in a fraudulent mannerin a way that has been associated with al Qaeda. Suqami left blank the question askingthe name an d street address of his present employer. Th e consular officer who issued thevisa said he interviewed Suqami because he put the word "dealer" down on hisapplication for his present occupation. The officer testified that "dealer" was what Saudisoften put on their applications when they meant "businessman." The officer testified thathe asked Suqami a number of questions including, he believes, who was paying for thetrip.54 Although the officer stated that they always took notes during interviews,55 thereare no written notes on Suqami's application, raising the possibility that the officer was52 State Department, Office of the Inspector General, Memorandum of Conversation with a ConsularOfficer, January 24 , 2003.53 State Department, Office of the Inspector General, Memorandum of Conversation with a ConsularOfficer, January 24, 2003.54 Testimony of C onsular Officer Number 2 before the U.S.House of Representatives, Committee onGovernment Reform, August 1 , 2002, p. 13.55 Id.


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18mistaken in believing he interviewed him. Regardless, Suqami evidently raised nosuspicions and his application was approved.November 25. Jarrah rented a private plane for a one day jaunt from Miami to Nassau,Bahamas with a couple of companions. There is no immigration departure record becausethe United States does not have such a system, but there is a record of his re-entry intothe country. At the general aviation terminal where Jarrah arrived, he was subjected toboth an immigration and customs check, including an inspection of the plane by customsfor the presence of drugs, contraband and currency. Nothing unusual was found andJarrah is once again admitted as a tourist for six months. Again, he is still in school usingaBl/B2visa.December 2000December 8. Hanjour entered the United States for the final time at theCincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport, six months after the entry of theother pilots. He never attended the ELS Language Center in Oakland, California, thestated destination on his second visa application of September 25, 2000. His records donot indicate the length of stay the primary immigration inspector gave him.December 12. Zakariya Essabar, a Moroccan who may have intended to be a pilot,submitted the first of two visa applications in Berlin. He indicated that he intended toarrive in the United States on February 15. 2001 .2001 prftA. rfi plotJanuary 2001January 4. Atta departed the United States for the first time, having overstayed histourist visa by one month.January 5. Jarrah returns from Dusseldorf, Germany, landing at Newark, New Jerseyand flying onward to Tampa, Florida. He is admitted as a tourist for six months. Hisflight school education continued.[Illustrations -Essabar s two applications] Photo 22 on Team 5 Monograph GraphicsCDJanuary 10. Essabar was interviewed and was denied a visa under INA section 221(g),on grounds that he had no evidence of a job or other ties to Germany. Essabar applied fora visa again on January 28, 2001 but there is no record indicating that the StateDepartment ever acted upon this second application.56On the same day, Atta returned from Madrid to Miami. The primary immigrationinspector who screened him told the Commission that he had been working as a primaryinspector for less than a year when Atta presented himself. He said he knew that if he

56 The FBI states in its Penttbom Summary that he was denied a visa twice, an d that he cancelledreservations at a Hostel in Florida "after the second visa denial." W e have found no evidence that thissecond application was denied. It is not indicated on the application form itself, and does not appear assuch in State's electronic records.


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19took more time than 45 seconds to determine a visitor's admissibility or if he made toomany referrals to secondary inspection, he could receive a poor performance appraisal.The primary inspector recalled some of his encounter with Atta during an interview withthe Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG), in November2001. In that interview, he said that Atta presented an Egyptian passport with atourist/business visa and an INS student/school form indicating that he was attendingschool. The inspector determined that Atta needed either an Fl visa to attend an academicschool or an Ml visa to attend a vocational school. Atta had neither. His "inspectionresults report" stated that Atta told him he had "turned in" a student/school form to theINS in an attempt to change his status, but that he "has not had a response [from the INS],meanwhile he's attending flight training school, already in school for 5/6 months."57The inspector, however, had already begun to process Atta for admission into the UnitedStates before he noticed the visa problem. The 1-94 arrival record, which was stampedand stapled into his passport, indicated that the primary inspector initially gave Atta a onemonth stay as a Bl business visitor.The second red ink admission stamp (located on the top of Atta's passport below), showsthe Bl visitor stamp, but the length of stay is left blank. We know this is the work of theprimary inspector, as the stamp bears the inspector's assigned number. The inspector toldus that the blank length of stay on the admission stamp indicated that while he was almostfinished processing Atta, he stopped, realizing that Atta needed more scrutiny.58 He senthim to a secondary immigration inspection for closer examination.

Atta's passport containing a U.S.B1/B2 visa along with June 3, 2000 and January 10,2001 U.S. admission stamps with th e primary inspector's assigned number on the topstamp, and the secondary inspector's assigned number on the bottom stamp.Photo 23A and 23b on Team 5 Monograph Graphics CD 59The immigration inspectors the Commission interviewed understood that INS policypermitted a commercial pilot coming to the United States for on-going training to beadmitted as a business visitor for the length of stay necessary to complete his training.However, an alien seeking an education to be a pilot needed a vocational student visa.60The primary inspector therefore initially thought Atta was already a pilot seekingcontinuing education, and then decided that Atta was a student studying to become a pilotwho had the wrong visa.

57 January 10 , 2011 INS Inspection Results Report for Moh amm ad Atta.58 The "VOID"handwritten over top of this stamp is not the handwriting of the primary inspector,according to him.It is likely the handwriting of the secondary inspector, who told the Com mission he couldnot recognize his own handwriting stating: "I've hurt my writing finger too many times and myhandwriting keeps changing; couldn't recognize it."59 This color image was recovered by the FB I from a location where Atta had used his passport asidentification.60 This policy was in contradiction to the stricter lang uage of the INS F ield G uide lines , whic h hadspecifically delineated business categories for admission. Continued trainin g as a pilot was not within thelanguage of those guidelines.


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21eight months, until September 8, 2001, without supervisory approval. Atta, then, receivedan imprope r adm ission as a tourist and improper eight mon th stay.63

Atta's 1-94 arrival record of January 10, 2001.In addition, Atta had overstayed his previous visa by one m onth when he departed theUnited States on January 4, 2001.64 Considering there would have been an entry stampinto a foreign country from a week prior, and an original US adm ission stamp datedseven months earlier, the overstay should have been obvious to a secondary inspectortasked with giving a thorough look at Atta. His previous overstay was a consideration forinadmissibility, but did not mak e Atta autom atically inadmissible. In Atta's case,however, this is no indication that the secondary inspector considered the overstay inadjudicating Atta's admission, hi contrast, other inspectors have told us that this is atypical travel pattern of an intending immigrant, and is normally a red flag for re-entry.The secondary inspector also could have adm itted Atta into the United States for 30 daysfor a fee of $170. This would hav e required A tta to present paperwork from his schoolproving his current student status within 30 days. However, the inspector told us heconsidered a deferred inspection a viable option. A deferred inspection would haveplaced Atta in a difficult position since he was already finished with school and thereforewould have been unable to legally present paperwork indicating he w as in school. But itturned out to be Atta 's lucky day.January 18,2001. Shehhi arrived at JFK airport in New York onRoyal M oroccan Airfrom Casablanca. He was screened by a ten-year veteran of immigration inspection atJFK and Miam i International Airports and the New York City seaport inspecting shipcrews.65 When Shehhi cam e up to the primary inspection counter, the "room was full,with num erous flights coming in at the same time." The inspector told the C omm issionthat she was suspicious Shehhi might be an intending imm igrant, noting from the stampsin his passport that he had just left the United States a w eek earlier after a six-month stay.She typed the following entry into the computer record: "Sub left one week ago afterentry in May. Has extension and now returning for a few more months." She referredShehhi to a secondary im migration inspection for closer examination.66 The secondary63 The eight month time period is clConsular Officer 7y recalled by another inspector who reviewed Atta's1-94 arrival record in May 2001, as this inspector changed Atta's length of stay from eight months back tosix months. The electronic admission record also noted an eight month stay. The admission stamp,(although hard to read), bares this secondary inspector'snumber. It appears that the secondary inspectorwrote "VOID" on the primary inspector's one month Bl admission stamp in Atta's passport, and insteadadmitted Atta as a tourist for eight months, apparently to accommodate Atta's schooling. The samehandwriting appears on Atta's 1-94 arrival record as well, crossing out the primary inspector's one monthstay and replacing it with a sloppy handwritten date which looks to be September 8, 2001, with the samelength of stay that listed on the original immigration arrival record.64 If an alien files an application for a change of status while they are legally in the United States, they maystay in the country until the application is adjudicated. In addition, Atta could have qualified for a deferredinspection if the inspector was convinced that "the case could possibly be resolved in the alien's favor."(INS Field Inspectors' Manual at 17.1).65 Healy MFR.

"I referred him to secondary and he didn't want to leave the booth. 'What is your problem?' I said. Hesimply said, 'No.' I had to get out of the booth and take him into secondary because I thought he wouldbolt, and I sat him down. I told someone in secondary to watch him. He made me remember him; if he hadbeen smart he wouldn't have done that." Healy MFR.


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22inspector told the Com mission that Shehhi w ore conventional western clothing, hadglasses and facial hair, and "did not look like he had just com e from boot camp." Unlikehis behavior in primary inspection, where he initially said "no" when the inspector toldhim to go to the secondary inspection room, requiring an escort, Shehhi waited u ntil hewas called and was not aggressive. Th ere were abou t a dozen other visitors being calledinto secondary in the 10 minutes prior to Shehhi being referred to secondary.67The secondary imm igration inspector said that Shehhi had completed the required arrivaland customs forms. He said Shehhi spoke English well during the course of the 10-12minute interview. "I had the impression Shehhi had money," the inspector said. "Iremember looking at his passport, and it showed he had been in and out of the UnitedStates and there were other travel stamps. I remem ber asking how much money he hadhe had a substantial am ount, three credit cards and more than $2,000."68Shehhi also m entioned applying for an extension of stay in the United States to remainuntil September 8,2001, but that he had waited months for an answer, did not get one,and finally left. To the inspector, "that seemed reasonable." The inspector told theCommission he was not aware that leaving the country while an imm igration benefitapplication was pending amounted to abandoning that application.The inspector asked Shehhi the purpose of his trip to the United States, trying todetermine if he intended to stay in the coun try permanently as the primary inspectorsuspected. Shehhi told the inspector that he was com ing back to the U nited States forcontinued flight training; that he had previously attended Huffman Aviation School; andthat he was finished with flight school but wanted to log more hours in the sky. Theinspector thought Shehhi was seeking private flying lessons, but did not ask Shehhi forsupporting docu mentation.The inspector did not recall whether Shehhi show ed him any papers to verify his previousflight school attendance at Huffman Aviation, nor whether he asked him for suchpaperwork. "I didn't have any doubt he did go to school, and I didn't think he was tryingto use his change of status application to rema in here in the U nited States for illegitimatereasons. My belief was that he was coming b ack to log flight hours with a privateinstructor." Un der this inspector's understanding of INS guidelines, a pilot here for aform of continuing education, such as private flight lessons, may be admitted as abusiness visitor. Although the baseline tim e for business visitor at JFK International w asthree mo nths, Shehhi asked for four and got it.The inspection results tell a somew hat different story. The record of this secondaryinspection indicated that the inspector actually may have considered Shehhi a student "tobecome a pilot," not already a pilot. The INS inspection results read: "Was in U.S.gaining flight hours to become a pilot. Admitted fo r four months."Whether or not this inspector had inform ation indicating that Shehhi was a studentseeking to become a pilot, or already was a pilot, was not an insignificant nuance.According to immigration law applied at ports of entry, if Shehhi was already a pilot, the

67 INS secondary inspection roster for JFK on January 18, 2001, during the time frame Shehhi was referredto secondary.68 Spigel MFR.


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23Bl business entry he was granted was arguably legitimate. However, if Shehhi was a fulltime student, then his admission as a business visitor was erroneous. And because Shehhi,like Atta, had left the country while his application for a change of immigration statuswas still pending, this application would have been considered "abandoned." In otherwords, Shehhi would have needed to obtain the proper student visa overseas in order tore-enter the United States. The facts of this adjudication are simply not clear enough toreach a conclusion about the properness of this entry.January 26. Jarrah departed the United States for the fourth time.February 2001February 25. Jarrah enters for the fifth time at Newark as a business visitor, but stillreceives a six month stay. This was unusual, as most inspectors told us that standardoperating procedures were to give business visitors a stay of one or three months,depending on the port, and only six months based on supporting documentation for thepurpose of the stay.March 2001March 30 . Jarrah departed for the fifth time.April 2001Illustration - Al Shehhi's Florida Driver LicensePhoto 25a on Team 5 Monograph Graphics CDApril 12. Shehhi obtained a Florida driver's license.Photo 25b and 25c on Team 5 Monograph Graphics CD[Illustration - Al Nami's visa application]April 21 . Ahmed al Nam i acquired a new Saudi passport, #0505363, replacing#C115007, the one he had used to acquire a visa on October 28, 2000 in Jeddah. AlNami never used this earlier visa. There is evidence that he acquired this new passport inorder to cover up evidence of travel to Afghanistan in his previous passport.Tw o days later, on April 23, al Nami applied for and received a B1/B2 (tourist/business)visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia with his new passport. There is evidence from a handwrittennote on his application that al Nami was interviewed briefly in connection with hisapplication, either by a consular officer or a consular staff member, to clarify an entry onhis application. The words "My friend Mosh" are crossed out under the question askingthe "names and relationships of people traveling with you." This is probably a referenceto Moshabab al Hamlan, another potential 9/11 hijacker who applied for a visa with alNami on October 28,2000. Al Nami also crossed out a box checked "No" under thequestion asking if he had ever applied for a U.S. visa previously, and changed his answerto "yes." It is not clear what prompted this change, possibly his brief interaction with aconsular official, but it is accurate. However, he failed to complete the question an d statewhere and when he had previously applied for a U.S. visa. Had he done so, it would have


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24revealed that he was applying for a new visa long before the two-year visa he acquiredthe previous October would have expired. This fact could have raised questions whencoupled with the fact that al Nami was applying with a new passport. But it would not benoticed by the consular officer who issued the visa because Saudis were not required tofill in their applications fully, Saudis were rarely interviewed, an d State's name checksystem did not automatically call up prior visa issuances; it only called up prior refusals.April 12. Shehhi received a Florida driver's license.April 13. Jarrah entered at Atlanta from Amsterdam and is granted three and one halfmonths on business.April 23. Waleed al Shehri and Satam al Suqami, both Saudis, entered together atOrlando from Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Suqami was the only Saudi "muscle"hijacker admitted on business, and only for one month. Shehri was admitted as a touristfor a six month stay. Both were admitted by the same primary immigration inspector.Suqami's passport survived the attack. A passerby picked up his passport from the WorldTrade Center and handed to a New York Police Department detective shortly before thetowers collapsed. An analysis of his passport showed that it also contained what is nowknown to be fraudulent manipulations associated with al Qaeda. Upon reviewing colorcopies of the document, the inspector who admitted Suqami told the Commission he didnot note any such fraud. Indeed, he could not have been expected to identify the fraud atthe time of his admissionit was not discovered by the intelligence community untilafter the attacks.April 25. Nawaf al Hazmi obtained a Florida driver's license.May 2001M ay 2. Majed Moqed and Ahmed al Ghamdi arrived together at Dulles InternationalAirport in Washington, D.C. Both Saudis were admitted as tourists for six months bydifferent immigration inspectors. Ahmed al Ghamdi's Customs declaration indicated thathe had more than $10,000 with him upon entry, but the Customs inspector who processedhim did not fill out the required additional forms fo r amounts of money brought into theUnited States over $10,000.Also on this day, Shehhi arrived in Miami and was granted a six-month tourist stay.Meanwhile, Atta and we believe Jarrah, were attempting to extend Jarrah's length of stayto September 2001.Begin Text BoxAtta's walk-in inspection at the Miami Immigration District O f f i c eOn May 2,2001, Atta and two companions stood in a long line at the Miami DistrictImmigration Office. INS district offices adjudicate all types of immigration benefitsinspections, including: naturalization interviews, applications fo r permanent residencybased on marriage to a U.S. citizen, and deferred inspections for students lacking theproper paperwork upon entry. But Atta had something else in mind. He wanted his


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25companion, who was likely Jarrah, to obtain the same eight month length of stay that hehad (wrongfully) received in January.69By late morning, Atta finally made it to the inspection desk. An inspector from MiamiInternational Airport, who had never worked deferred inspections before at this office,was getting ready to take a break for lunch at about 11:30 am when three m en approachedher at the counter. This inspector had worked primary and secondary inspections, as wellas ship crews, since 1988 in Ft. Lauderdale and Miami. However, because she had neverworked at this district office before he recalls the encounter with Atta vividly.Atta did not speak first. One of his companions did. This companion spoke proficientEnglish. He told the inspector, "My friends have a question about their 1-94 arrivalrecords." The inspector asked, "Do you need to see immigration?" The companion saidno. The inspector then told him to go sit down and that she would help him with hisfriends. He did, and the inspector did not talk to this person again. She told them that theperson needing help should write his name on the sign-in sheet. In big capital letters, hewrote, "ATTA."

Miami District IN S O f f i c e deferred inspection sign-in sheet for May 2, 2001.Atta told the inspector that he wanted his friend to receive an eight-month length of stayas he had. The inspector recalled taking both passports to see if they had genuine visas.She also looked at the 1-94 arrival records in the passports. Atta's companion hadreceived six months as a tourist, with an end date of September 8, 2001. She also noticedthat Atta had been admitted as a tourist for eight months. During this time, Atta wasquiet. She told Atta "someone gave you the wrong admission and I'm not giving yourfriend eight months."The inspector then went to her supervisor, told him that Atta had been granted anincorrect length of stay and asked permission to roll it back to six months. The supervisoragreed. The inspector then tore the 1-94 record out of Atta's passport, and created a new1-94 for six months. The new 1-94 allowed Atta to remain in the United States until July

Identification of Atta's companions. The inspector identified two of Atta's three companions. She saidal l three had olive skin tone an d dark features. Sh e told the Gommission she will never forgot Atta, whomshe told a colleague was "an ugly man, he looked like a bulldog." Th e companion who first spoke to theinspector, she recalled "was a great looking kid," which she also mentioned to a colleague. When the FBI'sMost Wanted photo of Adnan G. El Shukrijumah appeared on the inspectors' bulletin board afterSeptember 11, and after the FBI interviewed her, the inspector says she told her supervisor at the port thatshe was "75 percent sure" that she could identify the man who was with Atta as Shukrijumah. In checkingShukri jumah's immigration status, she learned that he was a legal resident and had worked in southFlorida. Information about the September 11 plot has not to date associated Shukrijumah with the plot.However, Shukrijumah is considered a well-connected al Qaeda operative, otherwise known as "Jafar thePilot." Shukrijumah's father is a well known imam in South Florida, having testified on behalf of SheikRahman during his trial for the conspiracy to destroy New York landmarks. Th e inspector cannot recallwhat the third companion looked like, and did not recognize any of the photos of other hijackers shown toher. The Commission, however, believes that Jarrah m ay have been the third companion. He was the onlyhijacker who matched the facts as told by the inspector, that Atta's "friend" had come back in January andreceived a six month stay. It is also known that Jarrah was with Atta later that day, driving north to get aFlorida driver 's license.


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269, 2001. On the record she wrote: "1-94 issued in error at MIA (Miami InternationalAirport). New 1-94 issued." The inspector then took a red-inked admission stamp, rolledthe date back to January 10, and stamped Atta as a B2 tourist. She hand wrote a length ofstay until July 9,2001, and handed Atta back his passport and new 1-94 record. Atta tookthe documents, said thank you, and left with his companions.End Text Box

Atta's 1-94 arrival record created on May 2,2001 at the Miami District INS Office thatwas returned to Atta.Photo 26a on Team 5 Monograph Graphics CDMay 2. Atta and Jarrah acquired Florida driver licenses.May 4. Waleed al Shehri obtained a Florida driver's license.May 5. Waleed al Shehri acquired a duplicate Florida driver's license, this time with adifferent address.May 16. Waleed al Shehri and Suqami again traveled together, this time out of thecountry to a resort in the Bahamas, where they reserved three nights at the BahamasPrincess Resort. They turned in their arrival record, which is now acting as an exit record,boarded the plane and arrived in Freeport, Bahamas. Bahamian immigration, however,refused the two entry because neither had a Bahamian visa. That meant they had to goback from where they came, in this case Miami. Because they never entered theBahamas, under U.S. immigration they never left the United States. In being refusedentry by the Bahamian INS at Freeport, they were sent through U.S. "pre-clearance"before boarding the plane back to Miami. The purpose of pre-clearance was to help easethe burden of admission at busy U.S. airports by conducting immigration inspections ofU.S. bound travelers prior to their U.S. arrival. These stations also had the benefit ofrefusing to let travelers board a U.S. bound plane if they were deemed inadmissible.70 Indoing so, immigration waived them through but customs stopped Shehri. The inspectionlasted one minute, and Shehri was neither personally searched nor was his luggage x-rayed. They boarded a plane and returned to Miami.71May 20. Suqami joined the millions of "overstays" in the United States after failing tofile for an extension of stay with the INS after he returned from the Bahamas. Had hebeen allowed into the Bahamas, upon his return to the United States he would have likely70 These preclearance stations existed prior to September 11 in Canada, Ireland, the Bahamas and theCaribbean.71 The attempted three-day jaunt by Shehri and Suqami to the Bahamas would cause difficulty for the INSin assisting the FBI's investigation into 9/11 since the INS records indicated the two had left the UnitedStates and not returned. W hen the two left Miam i for the Bahamas, they handed in their 1-94 departurerecords as required, indic ating they had departed the United States. W hen they were turned around in theBahamas for a lack of visas, under U.S. immigration law they were considered never to have left the UnitedStates. How ever, they were not given new arrival records w hen they p hysically returned to the UnitedStates. T herefore, when the attacks occurred, investigators thought that Suq m ai and Shehri had departed theU.S.as the INS records indicated.


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27been granted an add itional length of stay in the country as a tourist, thus remaininglegally in the United States. Since this did not happen, he remained in illegal status untilSeptember 11.M ay 24 . Jarrah obtained a duplicate Florida driver's license.May 28. Hamza al Ghamdi, Mohand al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami arrived togetherat Miami from Dubai, United Arab Emirates. 72 The three Saudis were admitted astourists for six months by different primary inspectors. Like Nawaf al Hazmi, Ahmed alNami's travel documents were not recovered, ye t evidence exists that his passport alsomay have contain