t5 b59 dos docs- niv 2 of 5 fdr- undated doj ig review of visa process 181

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  • 8/14/2019 T5 B59 DOS Docs- NIV 2 of 5 Fdr- Undated DOJ IG Review of Visa Process 181

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    DRAFTOIG Review of the Visa Process/Waivers of Personal Appearance

    Preliminary FindingsIn response to a request from Congress, ISP/CE undertook a review of visaissuance policies atposts abroad. Specifically, we looked at travel agent referralpolicies

    (TARPs) and the waiver of personal appearances (PAWs). The review was expanded to \jJOinclude executive oversight, officer training and orientation, the Visas Viper program and ,,inter-agency cooperation in the visa function. To conduct this study questionnaires weresent to all visa issuing posts. Based on the responses andother statistical information a O offunumber ofposts were selected to be visited by inspection teams. Todate, inspection \ Jteams have visited eleven posts and anticipate visiting an additional seventeen. The f~ r,

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    Executive oversight: Executive oversight of the visa function by ambassadorsand DCMs is often weak, sometimes almost nonexistent. This is frequently due to a lackof consular training and recent experience on the part of mission leadership. Somemission leadership still fails to grasp the importance of the visa function and of theconsular function in general. In too many cases inexperienced junior consular officersare left alone to determine visa policy and manage the visa function at very small orremote embassies. The consular function is too often a part time responsibility and giventoo little weight. Junior officers often have no experienced senior consular officer toturnto for advice and guidance.

    Personal appearance waivers: Personal appearance waivers (PAWs) are generallywell thought out and in manycases very restrictive. PAWs are generally established tofacilitate post operations and maximize the use of resources to scrutinize those cases mostlikely topresent problems including security risks. Some posts, however, view thesepolicies backwards, specifying which cases to interview and not which to exempt. Postswith significant visa fraud and security issues and corresponding high refusal rates havethe most restrictive policies, often interviewing virtually all applicants.

    Travel agent referralpolicies: Travel agent referral policies (TARPs) are not visawaiver programs. Applications through TARPs are adjudicated exactly like all otherapplications. TARPs allowposts to manage the workflow,decrease the number ofapplicants who actually appear at the embassy or consulate (a significant concern for thesecurity of the mission) and in some cases, when remote data entry is used, reduces thetime spent by employees in basic data entry functions. If the travel agents do their part,common problems with applications, passports lacking the required validity, missingdocumentation and others can be addressed prior to submitting the applications andsignificantly reduce the time necessary to process an application. TARPs must becarefully established and monitored. Under no circumstances should a post considersubmission through a TARP to be to any degree a substitute for adjudication by anofficer. We found that true TARPs are very rare, especially in high fraud posts, but thereare exceptions.Visa interviews: The visa interview is not an interrogation. The scope of the interview isgenerally limited to the parameters established by the written application and expressedpurpose for travel, as well as by time limitations caused by the volume of applications.There is little likelihood that applicants determined to commit terrorist acts will beexposed by the interviewprocess. The CLASS lookout system is the one place whereinformation on possible terrorists, as well as other undesirable applicants such as felonsand drug traffickers can be made available to the adjudicatingofficer. CLASS mustcontain the information developed by all agencies of the USG and it must be included ina timely fashion.Visas Viper: The Visa Viper program can be very useful in developing informationwhich should be available in the CLASS system. Its application is very uneven. Not allposts have a well-managed, aggressive program. In manymissions not all agencies arewell briefed on Visas Viper and do not participate fully, if at all. Towork successfully

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    The Department should make the importance of consular operations absolutely clear tochiefs of mission and direct that executive oversight be a primary responsibility.Posts must have flexibility in structuring the visa process but the Bureau of ConsularAffairs should carefully monitor the decisions and clear on any changes.The Visas Viper program must be a truly inter-agency program and Washington agenciesmust issue better guidance to the field to insure that all participants understand itsimportance and have clear instructions on how to participate. Washington must alsoprovide better feedback to the field on submissions made.There is a lack of consistency in the transliteration of names from several foreignlanguages into English. Our CLASS and INR/Tipoff databases shouldbe designed toutilize some coding system for names in these languages and any system should beadopted by all agencies.

    Interviewing every applicant for a visa is not a panacea to improvingthe security of thevisa process. Many applicants simply do not require an interview to establish their bonafides. Interviewing these applicants distracts from the focus on those applicantswho domerit more rigorous screening. The decisions made previously not to interview certaincategories of applicants remain valid. Better intelligence, more experienced interviewingofficers andgreater inter-agency cooperation will improve the visa process and contributeto greater security for the United States and its citizens.The sharing, at posts, of relevant information about possible terrorists is, at some posts,particularly in the Middle East, excellent. In these cases intelligence and lawenforcement personnel work closely and collegially with consuls, and with each other.This not uniformly the case, however.