t5 b64 gao visa docs 1 of 6 fdr- 3-12-03 doj-kalisch letter to grassley re condor 500

8/14/2019 T5 B64 GAO Visa Docs 1 of 6 Fdr- 3-12-03 DOJ-Kalisch Letter to Grassley Re Condor 500

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U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of Justice

03 H A R 2 I PH 5: 3l Federal Bureau of InvestigationWashington, |J. C. 20535-OQoMarch 12, 2 0 0 3

Senator Charles E. GrassleyUnited States SenateWashington, D.C.Dear Senator Grassley:

I am writing in response to your inquiry relating to the recent General AccountingOffice (GAO) report entitled "Border Security."Starting in January 2002, the Directorate for Visa Services Coordination Divisionofl l ie U.S. Department of State (DOS) established the Visa Condor clearance program forcertain visa applicants from certain countries. It required that information on these visaapplicants be placed in cables, (denominated by DOS as "Condor cables") and sent by DOS visaissuing points around the world directly to the FBI for a Security Advisory Opinion (SAO), andsimultaneously to the DOS visa office in Washington, D.C.Within 30 days, the FBI was expected to search each visa applicant's name an dbiographical information in the central index system in order to determine if the visa applicant's

name was referenced in FBI investigative files. If there was no possible match, then th e SAOwould indicate that the FBI had "no objection" to issuance of the visa. In all other cases, theCondor cable information and the possible file references were reviewed to determine whetherthe applicant was identical to the file material. This review process could includeareview of thecontext and basis for the reference within the FBI's investigativedivision withcase managementresponsibili ty for the type of investigative file(s) involved.If after 30 days, DOS had not received a response from the FBI to aparticularcondor request, the original procedure allowedDOS to assume that th e FBI had no objection to*issuance of the visa. Initially, the FBI began to receive these cables at Ih e rale of 2,000 a week. 'i

A s the clearing process progressed, it became extremely time andmanpowerintensive, resulting in a backlog at the FBI. By April 2002, there was an apparent backlog ofapproximately 14,000. vis a applicant cables to which the FBI had not yerresponded to DOS,a l th o u g h th e FBI's nat ional name check unit had run all pendingvisa applicant names throughthe central index system. A s it turned out, th e backlogw as only about 10,000 since m a n y ofthese Condor cables were duplicates that had not clearly been identified as re-subm itted requests .


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Senator C h a r l e s E . Grass leyA l t h o u g h th e FBI's national name check unit h ad searched all these pending names through it sindices, t he FBI h ad no t completed administ rat ively proces s ing the names fo r whi ch no poss ib l ematch w as found or those wh ich requ i red more detailed, ana lys i s before t he SAO cou ld b ecomple ted .

Unfortunate ly, due to expiration of the 30 day period fo r action established b y t h eor iginal C o n d o r procedure, some visas were issued by DOS points to applicants w hos e cab leswere s t i l l pending at the FBI . W e bel iev e tha t th i s is the reason thai visas were issued to 105applicants whose data reflected poss ib le m atches in FBI inves t iga t ive f i le s .From Apri l through June 2002, prior to it being consolidated in lo th e FBI'sCounterterrorism Div is ion, the Department of Justice F oreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force(FTTTF) undertook to temporarily ass is t the FBI in reducing the backlog of responses due toDOS. FTTTF personnel sorted the cables and keyed pertinent inform ation into a formal t ha tcould be run against th e FBI ' s index system in order to run w ha t am ounted to a second nam e

check. W here no possible match occurred in FBI indices system which was true in the vastmajority of cases - - DO S w as informe d that "n o objection" existed to issuance of the visa. Thiscleared th e vast majori ty of the backlog.In th e remaining cases, applicants that appeared to have possible matching datawere searched b y FTTTF s taf f through FB I automated investigative systems to see if there w asinformat ion that either refuted th e possible match, conf i rmed th e match or resolved outstandingsubstant ive questions. About ha l f of the remaining cases w ere resolved by t he FTTTF in thisfashion an d DO S was so not i f ied. W ith respect to the final category of remaining cases t ha tcould not b e electronically resolved, DO S w as notif ied to ho ld in abeyance the f ina l process ingQf t ho se requests and they were referred byThe^FTTTF back to the FB I soJnat FB I ai ia lys tsc&ujdretrieve and review th e appropriate case f i l e s BvJ u ne , ' t he I T ac id og w as cleared, and the p r imar ysponsibi l i ty lo r th e Vi sa C ondor SAO process was re tu rned to the F BI in a revised procedure.Throughout this difficult period, the FBI, FTTTF and DO S were meeting toestabl ish mo re efficie nt procedures to streamline this process . I am pleased to adv i se thai by theend of June 2002, a more effect ive process was in place. Th e F BI began electronica l lyprocessing these cables and providing reports to DO S with in 72 hours on the s tatus of theapplicants where there was no possible ma tch. In a l l other cases, an applicat ion co uld be h eld upfo r as l o n g as needed to com plete the SAO .With t h i s automated process and in l i gh t of concern over th e process ing of C o n d o rcables , t he DOS recently agreed w i t h th e FTTTF to r e t r an s mi t (o the FBI for u pd a t edreprocessing that portion of the "remaining names" t ha t th e FTTTF had s ou g h t to resolve on i tsown and not referred back to the F BI for an S A O .In June 2002, the FTTTF conducted an audit of th e Condor applicat ions backlog,tha t g roup, th e EEIE determined tha t 105 persons were i ssued v i sa s b y D O S v i s ai s s u i n g points befo re a response w as s e n t to DOS. A s y o u r N o v e m b e r 2 6 th l e tt e r acknow ledges ,th e ini t ia l GA O est imate of rough ly 200 prematurely issued visas was also reduced to 105 afterdu p l i c a t e referrals were taken in io accoun t . Th e FTTTF review conc luded t ha t at leasl 76 of t hose 105 persons had no information on record t ha t wou ld cause ih e FBI to r e c o m m e n d to DO S D < ft h a t th e v i s a applicat ion be den ied. The clearance of those 76 applicat ions means that there are ^L / '7


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Senator Charles E. Grassley/less than 30 visa recipients, who have not at this point been the subject of an SAO. If the SAO in( any of the reprocessed referrals ultimately concludes that a visa should not be issued, the FBI willv no t i f y the DOS in accordance w i th th e agreed-upon procedures now in place.

Thank you fo r your interest in this very important matter and for your patience aswe sought to address these issues. The FBI is committed to assisting GAO in completing itsthorough review of this process.Sincerely yours,

Eloni P. KaJischActing Assistant DirectorOffice of Congressional Affairs

t5 b64 gao visa docs 1 of 6 fdr- 3-12-03 doj-kalisch letter to grassley re condor 500

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